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dc.contributor.advisorSmolka, Scott A.; Stoller, Scotten_US
dc.contributor.authorDeshpande, Tushar Suhasen_US
dc.contributor.otherDepartment of Computer Scienceen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-15T18:02:55Z
dc.date.available2012-05-15T18:02:55Z
dc.date.issued1-May-10en_US
dc.date.submittedMay-10en_US
dc.identifierDeshpande_grad.sunysb_0771M_10119.pdfen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1951/55407
dc.description.abstractWe use the probabilistic model checker PRISM to formally model and analyze the highly publicized Kaminsky DNS cache-poisoning attack. DNS (Domain Name System) is an internet-wide, hierarchical naming system used to translate domain names such as google.com into physical IP addresses such as 208.77.188.166. The Kaminsky DNS attack is a recently discovered vulnerability in DNS that allows an intruder to hijack a domain; i.e. corrupt a DNS server so that it replies with the IP address of a malicious web server when asked to resolve the URL of a non-malicious domain such as google.com. A proposed fix for the attack is based on the idea of randomizing the source port a DNS server uses when issuing a query to another server in the DNS hierarchy.We use PRISM to introduce a Continuous Time Markov Chain representation of the Kaminsky attack and the proposed fix, and to perform the requisite probabilistic model checking. Our results, gleaned from more than 240 PRISM runs, formally validate the existence of the Kaminsky cache-poisoning attack even in the presence of an intruder with virtually no knowledge of the victim DNS server's actions. They also serve to quantify the effectiveness of the proposed fix, demonstrating an exponentially decreasing, long-tail trajectory for the probability of a successful attack with an increasing range of source-port ids, as well as an increasing attack probability with an increasing number of attempted attacks or increasing rate at which the intruder guesses the source-port id.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipStony Brook University Libraries. SBU Graduate School in Department of Computer Science. Lawrence Martin (Dean of Graduate School).en_US
dc.formatElectronic Resourceen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherThe Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY.en_US
dc.subject.lcshComputer Scienceen_US
dc.subject.otherdns, formal verification, kaminsky, prism, securityen_US
dc.titleModel Checking the Kaminsky DNS Cache-Poisoning Attack Using PRISMen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.advisorAdvisor(s): Scott A. Smolka. Scott D. Stoller. Committee Member(s): Erez Zadok.en_US
dc.mimetypeApplication/PDFen_US


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