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Ethics of World Citizens : Kantian Cosmopolitanism

A Dissertation Presented

by

Eunah Lee

to

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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The goal of this dissertation is to defend the Kantian cosmopolitan ideal in the context of contemporary debate about global ethics. Kant's cosmopolitanism has been criticized for its sharp dualism between morality and legality, which deprives it of the very potential for a practical project toward perpetual peace that it promises. This line of objection, famously raised by Hegel, enables a competing conception of cosmopolitanism. Although Hegel's situated or rooted conception of self and state provides us with relevant resources, Kant's ideal cannot or should not be replaced by Hegelian principles. An adequate appropriation of Kant's espousal of cosmopolitan rights that has been modified to accommodate Hegelian insights ought to endorse global efforts to economically and politically empower vulnerable global citizens in our time. At the end of the 20th century, John Rawls drew a sharp distinction between domestic and global justice under the banner of "realistic utopianism." However, a form of cosmopolitan vision seems inevitable even to correct forms of profound domestic injustice. Drawing on Amartya Sen's work, this dissertation instead examines a conception of development that may eschew charges of metaphysical as well as political imperialism. A defense of Kantian cosmopolitan principles requires, in turn, a closer examination of a so-called chasm between moral universalism and political inegalitarianism implied in Kant's work. Revisiting recent debates on Kant's racism invites us to think that a cosmopolitan responsibility suggests not only the need to ensure formal rights of global others, but also the urgency to nurture our emotions toward these others. In short, the moderate cosmopolitanism that this dissertation endorses as the most suitable principle of global ethics has a Kantian face with a Humean heart across and inside borders.

For my mother ...

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PREFACE

It is not uncommon for us to treat people differently according to whether they are our compatriots or foreigners. But a famous scene in the Bible draws special interest. As the Gospel of Mark has it, the conversation starts when Jesus went to the vicinity of a city called Tyre. He entered a house hoping that he could escape notice. But there was a woman whose little daughter was possessed by an evil spirit. As soon as she heard about the miracles, she came to Jesus and fell at his feet. The woman, born in Syrian Phoenicia was a Greek, not a Jew, but she begged Jesus to drive the demon out of her daughter. At her request, Jesus replied that “First let the children eat all they want” for “it is not right to take the children’s bread and toss it to their dogs.” At this harsh reply that likened her to a dog, the desperate woman answered “Yes, Lord, but even the dogs under the table eat the children’s crumbs.” And the story has it that the woman’s humble response eventually cured her daughter.

The overly harsh response of Jesus toward a Gentile woman in this scene has been interpreted time and again. The woman was a foreigner, a gentile, thus humiliated by Jews, a dog. She does not deserve the miracle based on her group membership. Perhaps the remark represents a very conventional view of the day. Perhaps it is a device to test her faith. From a religious point of view, this story illustrates the evangelical message that goes beyond racial and national difference. However there is another aspect to this story, one that came to my attention while completing this dissertation, namely the importance of coming to understand the moral urgency of individual needs. I think it is the moment in the New Testament where the important teaching of Christian ethics, i.e., to love your neighbors, obtains its universal character. And it became possible by focusing on the dire situation of a woman and the desperate needs of her soul.

Often we are drawn to think that it is not right to give resources and chances to others at distance because there are “our” fellow nationals in close proximity who may claim entitlements to them. Yet, as the above conversation shows, there is a moral urgency to satisfy the needs to satisfy one’s hunger, the needs to have shelter, the need to take care of one’s children, and the concern for the normal life of children. Regardless of

group membership or religion, there are urgent needs that nearly all of us desire to be satisfied in order to have a good life in this world. The urgency of such issues invites us to think that the existent linkage between membership and entitlement may be unreasonably tight. The issue is not whether “foreigners” deserve or are entitled to the social good; but rather how often and how easily geographical borders define the boundaries of our moral imagination.

This dissertation is an analysis and a defense of a type of approach to global ethics. The particular approach I chose is Kantian cosmopolitanism. This term needs clarification since “cosmopolitanism” is an indeed a hodge-podge concept. I shall use this term to refer to legal, political and moral justifications to ensure basic rights of human beings and to inculcate corresponding responsibilities across state borders and related parochial distinctions within. By “Kantian,” I mean a particular line of moral reasoning whose main commitments are attributed to Kant. Throughout the dissertation, I use this term “Kantian” as opposed to “Hegelian” as a way to represent two distinctive ways of looking at inter-state or inter-national relations which we often associate with Kant and Hegel. Thus “Kantian” or “Hegelian” cosmopolitanism does not mean that all the aspects of these models are shaped or influenced by Kant and Hegel themselves; yet, they are the prominent thinkers who provided groundings for the distinctive ideals. What their proponents claim under the name of the same aegis, therefore, may greatly differ from one another.

In very broad strokes, Kantian cosmopolitans share Kant’s moral universalism at its heart. Many contemporary Kantians cherish the idea that all humans are worthy of respect just because of their being humans. As human beings, we are rational agents capable of guiding our lives following principles. The ability to set an end for ourselves underpins our status as autonomous beings, and thus as commanding respect from one another. In other words, the ability, more specifically, the potential for reasoning that is supposed to be universally shared by human beings is what ensures dignity. It is due to this universal moral commitment that contemporary cosmopolitan enterprises look to Kant in order to find their impetus in grounding a conception of cosmopolitan right.

However, Kant’s formulations of cosmopolitan rights display important limitations to contemporary readers. Despite Kant’s moral commitments, his own

arguments for a cosmopolitan right as a right of a visitor in light of a loose political federalism in a league of nations falls short of the expectation of many who are drawn to the discourse of cosmopolitanism in our world. Even the most ardent Kantians put their fingers on certain principles to be redressed such as the lack of a critique of capitalism, the consequence of dualistic understanding of the self in the world of noumena and phenomena, and the severing of reason from emotion.

On the contrary, Hegelians place a central value in the idea that our identities are forged by recognition of others, and we can flourish as long as we are recognized in a net of interconnection. Even the most fundamental moral virtues lose their worth aside from the social and political whole which sustains their very meanings. Although Hegel's conception of self and society has advantages *vis-à-vis* Kant's, it leads him to deny the vision of a cosmopolitan whole. Hegel's objections leveled against Kant's moral and political philosophy have pointed out the significance of the material basis of a moral agent. On the other hand, for there are struggles around recognition generating winners and losers, some follow Hegel in a different direction leading to a system of global recognition. Hegelian cosmopolitans find the mechanism that leads to the world government from Hegel's struggle for recognition, yet they sacrifice the moral ideal for the sake of a political vision. So, I intend to accept some of Hegel's criticisms of Kant, but retain a critical distance from contemporary Hegelians.

Contemporary Kantian cosmopolitanisms grows out of the familiar Kantian principle enjoining us to respect the universal dignity of human beings; yet, the old principle is altered by and applied to the understanding that the human beings are conditioned by their socioeconomic status. Even within a nation state which grants equal status to its citizens, redressing material deprivation is a necessary condition in order to guarantee formally defined equal rights. Without this awareness, all kinds of redistributive policies and welfare programs to a specific group or class of population would seem to be unjustifiable special treatments. The principle of universal dignity, modified by the Hegelian insight, demands that we fight against social discriminations that arise from the inherited poverty or distorted identities occasioned by marginal social status. In a way, this project may as well be a response from a Kantian camp to Hegel's objection that since the Kantian moral agent is required to abstract him or herself in order

to reach a universally valid maxim of their actions, he or she would fail to apply his or her maxim in a concrete situation.

This dissertation is comprised of five chapters. The first two chapters in Part I, respectively on Kant and Hegel, present and analyze historical debates on the cosmopolitan conception of right. Through this work, we can identify the basic foundation of these ideas and the formulations of such concepts. Later, the three chapters in Part II examine three major challenges to the position that I defend. Chapter Three examines claims of various contemporary Kantian cosmopolitans who commonly take economic as well as political empowerment seriously in order to realize Kant's normative commitment to the moral worth of individuals. Chapter Four deals with the question of development. It is to ask whether we still need this much-criticized concept in order to realize the necessary degree of global material redistribution, and if so, what type of measurement it needs to take. Chapter Five is a response to suspicious voices toward the implied inegalitarianism of Kantian principles. I revisit the problem of race in Kant and examine various contemporary interpretations to reconcile Kant's racism and moral universalism in his work. By doing so, I argue that there is no internal conflict between Kant's ethics and racism, at least, in his system; rather, the real issue resides in Kant's dismissal of the power of emotion in moral reasoning.

Part One: The Foundation of Kant's Cosmopolitanism

Chapter One: Kant's Proposal for the Federation of Peoples

1. Introduction

In the *Social Contract*, Jean-Jacque Rousseau once ridiculed cosmopolitans who “boast that they love everyone to have the right to love no one.” In *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, Rousseau expressed his ridicule again as we read:

Civil right having thus become the common rule among the members of each community, the law of nature maintained its place only between different communities [...] which lost, when applied to societies, almost all the influence it had over individuals, and survived no longer except in some great cosmopolitan spirits, who, breaking down the imaginary barriers that separate different peoples, follow the example of our sovereign Creator, and include the whole human race in their benevolence.¹

Rousseau's scoffing at the naivety of pacifism represents a general attitude towards cosmopolitanism, which is still widely accepted. Cosmopolitanism, despite its noble aim, is considered as not a real possibility but naive and impractical wish because the law of nature actually regulated interaction between societies, even if some exceptional individuals wished it otherwise. Nevertheless, this great thinker was also well aware that it is only “imaginary” barriers that separate those communities. Due to the barriers, nation-states have been considered for more than three centuries as autonomous entities endowed with the inviolable sovereignty and the right of self-determination. It is precisely this point from which recent cosmopolitan theorists start to argue that we need a

¹ Jean-Jacque Rousseau. *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (Classic Books America, 2009), p. 55.

different conception of political authority to address much higher level of interaction between states than before. For the boundaries between states are not any longer impervious as they used to be, a strong case has been developed for cosmopolitanism in terms of a political framework conception as well as an economic global redistribution.

When contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers want to secure their theoretic foundations they often appeal to Immanuel Kant. Kant, less than half a century after Rousseau, argued in favor of a cosmopolitan constitution. Kant saw that justice of civil states is hampered by incessant wars among one another, and even worse, by the preparation for future wars. Thus he suggests a league of nations or a federation of peoples as a way to escape the *status quo*, and further claimed that attainment of peaceful international relations and establishment of a just civil constitution are interdependent. Against this basic framework, Kant attempts to defend, though in a very minimal form, the concept of a cosmopolitan right. However, interestingly, the status of the cosmopolitan right remains somewhat ambiguous. At one place, Kant argues that a concept of cosmopolitan right is a part of a public right, and is not an ethical concept based on philanthropy, i.e., an altruistic desire for the humanity.² At another place, he seems to identify the term “cosmopolitan” with “philanthropic.”³ This does not only reflect confusion in his use of the word; rather, it indicates the fundamental ambiguity of the status of his cosmopolitan ideal. Indeed, in Kant’s writings on a cosmopolitan constitution, there seems to be two strands of thoughts, moral and political, always deeply interwoven, and yet, with irresolvable tension.

As a political doctrine, cosmopolitanism can be dated back to the ancient times as we see in the anecdote where Cynic Diogenes claimed that “I am a citizen of the world (*kosmopolitês*)”.⁴ By identifying himself as a citizen of the world, not as a citizen of Sinope, Diogenes refused to agree that he owed special duties to his own state or his own people. Thus, the claim of world citizenship of this Cynic philosopher remains a negative concept in that it demands no special duties to my own. Modern cosmopolitans seek, in a

² See Kant “Toward Perpetual Peace” or “The Doctrine of Right” in *Metaphysics of Morals*.

³ See Kant “On the Common Saying: ‘This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’” (Hereafter, “Theory and Practice”).

⁴ Diogenes Laertius VI 63, see Eric Brown, “Hellenistic Cosmopolitanism,” *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, eds. by Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 549-558.

contrast, a rather positive content to the concept of world-citizenship. It is positive in that it attempts to stipulate a certain sets of duties to all. The question is to what extent a cosmopolitan right, if any, could be conceived as a positive right. A corresponding problem also occurs as to whether a political institution should come into being in order to ensure the observation of, or to punish the infringement of this right. Often proponents of this idea would argue for an establishment of world government. Nevertheless, Kant defends the concept of a positive cosmopolitan right in a particular way; and yet he resists the temptation toward a world government. He instead argues that a form of federation or a league is rather the adequate condition for enduring peace.

Cosmopolitanism, as a normative concept, takes the individual to be the ultimate object of moral concern and to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of nationality and citizenship.⁵ Although philosophical parlance seems to be stricter in its use than political usage of the term, there has been no consensus about the precise content of cosmopolitan positions since there are different strands. Roughly, cosmopolitanism is used to describe a posture that is naturally contrasted to more parochial or provincial views. Against this backdrop, Kant's moral universalism has been considered a powerful argument toward cosmopolitanism, because of its commitment to respect each individual's dignity as an end in itself. An individual demands respect as an equal member of the moral community, or otherwise called, "the Kingdom of Ends." Nevertheless, a close reading of his text reveals that Kant's own normative criterion bears not a direct, but only an indirect implication for his cosmopolitan thought.

Perhaps, for this reason, Kant's own conception of cosmopolitan right is quite remote from what has been dealt with under the same rubric in our days. In effect, Kant's

⁵ Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism* (Cambridge University Press, 2004). In the recent body of literature, there are two notable distinctions: *legal cosmopolitanism* and *moral cosmopolitanism*.⁵ Legal cosmopolitanism is concerned with an ideal of a global order in which all persons are guaranteed equivalent rights and duties as members of a universal world state. Moral cosmopolitanism is committed to a pursuit of an ideal in which all persons are required to respect one another's dignity as moral ends. See Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," *Ethics* 103 (1992); Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge University Press, 2000). Also, some authors have pointed out the relationship between *cultural cosmopolitanism* and *economic cosmopolitanism*. See Samuel Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought* (Oxford University Press, 2001); Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative," *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* 25 (1992); Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

own account of a cosmopolitan right must be distinguished from contemporary liberal Kantian cosmopolitanism. Further, many contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers claim to be Kantian, and yet, their reason for being Kantian seems to be different even among themselves: Some argue the concept of right is central in the Kantian outlook while others claim the concept of obligation is critical.⁶ Accordingly, one of the aims of my dissertation is to clarify the foundation of Kantian cosmopolitanism and call attention to its contemporary interpretations and appropriations. Some of Kant's arguments may turn out obsolete; nevertheless, there seems to be good reason to take Kant seriously. Among others, I shall argue that the actuality of Kant's cosmopolitanism resides in mainly two fundamental claims: first, Kant's commitment to each and every individual as the subject of ultimate moral concern as an end; second, Kant's view that any convincing account of justice should be cosmopolitan. Indeed, although there are points where Kant's moral commitment does not seamlessly dovetail with his political project within his philosophy as a whole; Kant's cosmopolitan outlook seems to stand at the intersection of his moral and political philosophy. Although not on a surface level, but on a deeper level, I should argue that Kant's cosmopolitan political project is guided by his moral concern to respect individuals as ends in themselves. In the following, how these two claims can be jointly considered shall be the first task in laying out the foundation of Kantian cosmopolitanism in an attempt to articulate its essential commitment.

2. A Political Conception: "Toward Perpetual Peace"

Kant's article, "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch"⁷ published first in 1795 and again in 1796 with a small addition has famously argued for a federation

⁶ In many cases, rights involve correlative duties. However, in the Kantian literature, this distinction is important to make. See Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁷ Hereafter, English translations of Kant texts will be based mainly on three books depending on the translation: *Kant: Political Writings*, trans. by Nisbet, edited by H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, trans. by David L. Colclasure and edited by Pauline Kleingeld (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). Following the convention, I also reveal the pagination based on in *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, Preußischen Akademie Wissenschaften, Berlin: G. Reiner, and later Walter de

of peoples as the ultimate political goal of humanity. Although this article has been the apparent source of intuition whenever cosmopolitanism is at issue, a close reading of this article reveals its intriguingly complicated character: Of four sections, this article is again divided into six preliminary articles, three definitive articles, two supplements and two appendixes. The complexity of this short sketch is perhaps due to the fact that it is more or less a propaganda version of his entire outlook. More devoted readers can easily find the arguments of each part of this article somewhere else in Kant's writings in more detail.

The structure of this piece can be summarized as the following: In the first part, the preliminary articles discuss issues of what can now be considered as a just war theory. They describe the vice of wars and suggest how the burden of wars could be reduced. While aiming at banning of all wars, they also suggest practical ways in which wars should be carried out to protect "the germ" of future peace. Now in the second part, three definitive articles put forth three distinctive realms of public right, namely, civil right, international right, and cosmopolitan right. All in all, they envision the legal conditions of perpetual peace as a rather loose confederation of states with a democratic constitution in which individuals are granted certain rights even in foreign lands. Subsequently, in the third part, two supplements argue in a bizarre way that perpetual peace is guaranteed by a "hidden plan of nature" and urge politicians to accept this "secret" principle of peace. The last two appendixes in turn examine the relationship between morality and politics and stress the importance of a cosmopolitan political framework for moral progress of humanity.

The idea of cosmopolitan right, according to Kant, is not an ethical principle of philanthropy, but a principle of *right*.⁸ Because no one originally has any greater right than anyone else on the earth, the human race shares "the original right to the earth's surface." Oceans and deserts separate nations but ships and camels connect them *via*

Gruyter, 1902). For example, "Contest of Faculties" (AK 7: 21) means that the quote is found on the page 21 of the band VII of Akademie edition.

⁸ Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace" in *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 105; also, in *Metaphysics of Morals* in the same book, p. 172. *The Metaphysics of Morals* consists of two parts, "The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Right" (Hereafter, "Doctrine of Right") and "The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Virtue" (Hereafter, "Doctrine of Virtue"), which were published separately in the same year.

international commerce. Drawn close to one another, Kant argues that a violence done in one part of the world is now felt everywhere. In *Metaphysics of Morals*, first appeared in 1797, Kant states this idea almost verbatim.

Yet these visits to foreign shores, and even more so, attempts to settle on them with a view to linking them with the motherland, can also occasion evil and violence in one part of the globe with ensuing repercussions which are felt everywhere else. But although such abuses are possible, they do not deprive the world's citizens of the right to *attempt* to enter into a community with everyone else and to *visit* all regions of the earth with this intention.⁹

What Kant means by the right of the world's citizens, namely, the cosmopolitan right turns out to be, in fact, a very minimal concept. It is a right of a foreigner or a right of resort, which prohibits an inhospitable behavior towards foreigners who happen to be in a foreign land due to some misfortune. Strangers who "drifted to our shores" or "are lost in desert" deserve a charitable treatment as long as they behave in a peaceful manner. He further says that this does not include a right to settle down in this region, nor does it amount to a right of a guest, for they both need a special agreement. Obviously, whether this content of a cosmopolitan right is positive enough for the demand of contemporary discourse must be revisited. All in all, Kant holds that any violent treatment of foreigner would be a seed of hostility in the future, which hinders peaceful relationships.

Kant calls this right 'cosmopolitan' in so far as it affords a *prospect* for a cosmopolitan constitution where all nations enter into peaceful mutual relations under certain public laws that regulate their intercourse with one another. Kant suggests this constitution as the following:

[P]eace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general agreement between the nations; thus a particular kind of league, which all might call a *pacific federation (foedus pacificum)* is required. It would

⁹ *Ibidem*.

differ from a *peace treaty* (*pactum pacis*) in that the latter terminates *one* war, whereas the former would seek to end *all* wars for good. This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, [...] although this does not mean that they need to submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of nature. It can be shown that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality.¹⁰

Kant's notion of a general agreement between the nations apparently follows the model of an agreement among the individuals in the traditional social contract theory. In order to terminate the state of nature amongst nations, all must give up their absolute freedom and thereby enter into a lawful relation, or as Kant puts, into the "freedom of reason". However, the analogy between domestic and international contract is not thorough since the nation states are already a civil union based on the general will of the people. Because of the inviolable rights of states, Kant argues that they are not subject to a coercive power or a higher authority as the individuals do within a state. Kant rather warns against danger of "the world republic" or "the international state" as the following:

[I]f such a state of universal peace is in turn even more dangerous to freedom, for it may lead to the most fearful despotism (as has indeed occurred more than once with states which have grown too large), distress must force men to form a state which is not a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single ruler, but a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right.¹¹

Separate states are not to be fused into a single state because the sovereign will inevitably turn into a universal despot. A state of universal freedom, according to Kant, is a shortcut to a state of universal tyranny. Trying to steer away between a despotic Imperialism and a

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 104, original emphases.

¹¹ Kant, "Theory and Practice," *ibid.*, p. 90

lawless Anarchy, Kant chooses a form of federalism to secure lasting peace. In tandem with this political framework centered on states, Kant conceives the cosmopolitan right of the individual to be no more than can be accepted within a republican constitution. Then what will be the sources of sanctions against those who violate the agreement? Notably, Kant did not leave sufficient amount writings on this topic. Kant foresees that attempts for a League Nation may be frustrated on its road many times, as the first real embodiment of his ideal collapsed at the outbreak of World War I, but he seems to believe that states, as rational agent, will choose to be a part of a cosmopolitan world order.

Behind this optimistic attitude, there are two points in the description of Kant's own cosmopolitan framework that require our critical attention. One is Kant's confidence in economic liberalism and the other is Kant's commitment to legal positivism. Both of them reflect a different worldview of Kant which marks a conspicuous distance from ours. By this abstract pronoun "ours", I mean the people who argue for, or at least partially sympathize with, cosmopolitanism in the political philosophy of the early 21st century.

(1) Economic Liberalism

In Kant's argument for perpetual peace, Kant overestimates "the spirit of commerce" well too often. He notes that "the spirit of commerce would sooner or later take hold of every people, which cannot exist side by side with war." Further, He claims that "[among] all the powers at the disposal of the power of the state, financial power can probably be relied on the most." Kant believes that states would want to have peace in the fear of the massive expenses for warfare and in the hope to protect their mutual interest in international commerce. Accordingly, Kant maintains that states enter into this permanent league not from a moral reason, but from a prudential reason. This liberalist line of argument harbors a thought that seems too risky. Karl Marx, for one, would argue to the contrary that the universal misery that capitalism generates is the basis of the need for the Communist International, which has been considered the more influential alternative in order to overcome the ills of nation-states in the nineteenth century of the world history.

With two hundred years' hindsight, we have learned that indeed the spread of capitalism does connect different parts of the world as Kant anticipated. Yet we have also learned that it does not always promote peace. Empirical researches show that wars among liberal countries have decreased; however, wars between liberal and illiberal countries have rather increased.¹² Moreover, the rivalry between different economic frameworks has fueled political tension between them. Critiques of cosmopolitanism thus argue that an aspiration for liberal internationalism will become a new form of political mobilization that is willing to wage wars against illiberal states.¹³ Of course, it does not disprove Kant's argument for perpetual peace because his claim was that war would disappear, once all states become "republican" or liberal democracies in the contemporary usage.

The real problem of the "spirit of commerce" is that it often brings severe misery and drastic inequality even within the parts that are connected. The globalization of capitalism has been the main cause of poverty in some corners of the earth along with the massive wealth that it produces elsewhere. Due to vast unequal distribution of social wealth, free-market capitalism has been proven to be exploitive and oppressive.¹⁴ In other words, it has created the very condition that contemporary cosmopolitan theories need to come to grips with. We cannot believe anymore that the spread of wealth will eventually bring all peoples into a peaceful and just relation; rather, any adequate account of cosmopolitanism has to take the material conditions of the globalization seriously. Ending of all wars is no longer the sole aim of contemporary cosmopolitan project. The pursuit of global economic justice has appeared as an equally urgent problem. In this regard, the conception of a cosmopolitan right has now to take on a more positive content than the version which Kant defends.

¹² Michael Doyle, "Kant and Liberal Internationalism" in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings in Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. by Pauline Kleingeld, pp. 201-242.

¹³ Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Politics* (Verso Press, 2006); also, see *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, ed. by Chantal Mouffe (Verso Press, 1999). Theorists of radical democracy who see a pacific vision of world order is deeply flawed often draw their insights from Carl Schmitt. See Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. by George Schwab (University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1976]).

¹⁴ Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W.W. North, 2002); Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

(2) Legal Positivism

Another idiosyncrasy of Kant, which sounds quite obsolete and even oblivious to the problems of his own day, is his commitment to what Jeremy Waldron calls legal positivism.¹⁵ In a civic union, the individuals establish a sovereign power over themselves. Once the civic union is established, the citizens have to submit themselves to the rule of law; and there is no room for disobedience. Kant emphatically says “[a] law [...] is so holy that it is already a crime even to call it in doubt in a practical way, and so to suspend its effect for a moment.” He goes on to say that “the principle that the presently existing legislative authority ought to be obeyed, whatever its origin.”¹⁶ Therefore anyone who engages in an act of disobedience, not to mention revolution, must be thrown away back to the state of nature stripped of *all* rights. According to Kant, disobeying one law is tantamount to questioning the foundation of an entire legal system. This absolute obedience of legal authority, in turn, poses a moral burden on the sovereign to legislate only just laws; yet, he is reluctant to acknowledge any right to citizens to disobey or resist any putatively unjust laws. Therefore, finding a just master becomes the most difficult problem for Kant in founding a civic constitution. Indeed, legal positivism had been a powerful view in the eighteenth century, but in the era of the United Nations, it has become increasingly unattractive. Instead of the unconditional demands of obedience, most civic constitutions acknowledge a leeway of civil disobedience to the extent that it does not shake the foundation of its legal authority. Rather, the reflectivity of a legal system, the possibility of mediation between the citizens as thinkers and citizens as actors, has become a sign of civic maturity of a society.

(3) Dualism between Morality and Legality

Now I want to turn to another problem in Kant’s cosmopolitan project. Unlike two problems that have been discussed, the third one poses a harder problem. Kant contrasts morality and legality, and even argued that they are sharply severed because

¹⁵ Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism,” *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 109, No.7 (May 1996), pp. 1535-1566.

¹⁶ Kant, “The Doctrine of Right” in *Practical Philosophy*, p. 462 (AK 6: 319).

they are respectively based on the world of *noumena* and the world of *phenomena*. Accordingly, Kant argues that the promotion of perpetual peace does not require a moral betterment of the individual, but enlightened self-interest will make humanity pursue peace. Against skeptics who argue that such a global constitution is so sublime a goal that would only be possible in “a state of angels”, Kant famously retorts that setting up a state will be solved even in “a nation of devils”.¹⁷ Because no one wants self-destruction in a lawless state of nature, man’s self-inclinations *dictate* him to enter into a lawful condition. Thus, we are *forced* to become good citizens even if we are not morally good people. This motivation from sophisticated self-interest may be enough to make perpetual peace *prudentially* inevitable, but it does not say anything about why it is *morally* required. To the contrary, in other places, Kant holds that perpetual peace is an ideal “incapable of realization” but an end we must continuously approximate.¹⁸ He goes so far as to say “even if the fulfillment of this pacific intention were forever to remain a pious hope, we should still not be deceiving ourselves if we made it our maxim to work unceasingly towards it, for it is our duty to do so.” To give up this moral law within us would be equivalent to regarding ourselves as subject solely to the mechanism of nature, which Kant vehemently abhors. How can we plausibly accommodate these two contradicting claims? Why not argue from the beginning that we have to act morally in order to promote world peace?

Kant’s metaphysical foundation of morals tells us the true moral worth of our actions comes from our inner motivation, not our consideration of consequences. Locating the foundation of ethics on the *noumenal* plane, not on the *phenomenal*, opens up an unfathomable depth to moral investigation. However, it follows that there is no guarantee that our morally good intentions will bring forth a good outcome. I do not need to be a morally good person in order to become a good law-abiding citizen. Although a state can coerce me to conform my action to its conception of right, it cannot force me to act on a particular maxim or an internal motivation. External sanctions cannot force me to acquire an internal incentive to “respect” a moral law. Due to this sharp severance

¹⁷ Kant, “Perpetual Peace” in *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 112.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

between morality and legality, in turn, there is no point in appealing to moral incentives in order to bring about a desirable outcome such as constituting a political institution.

In parallel, Kant makes ambiguous remarks on the status of cosmopolitan ideal throughout his works. At one point, he argues that it is a political goal that is attainable solely with our natural inclinations; at other point, he claims that it is a moral ideal that is beyond our reach but only an object of approximation. There seem to be then two conceptions of cosmopolitanism at work in Kant. It is against this backdrop that I shall contend that Kant's cosmopolitan project is a morally motivated political ideal. Given Kant's sharp severance between the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right, or morality and legality, Kant's political project as a whole has been criticized as impotent.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Kant makes it clear that this ultimate political end receives its true meaning so far as it serves to the final goal, namely, the moral progress of humanity. In order to stress the moral commitment underlying Kant's cosmopolitan project, of course, it is necessary to get beyond the narrow conception of morality that Kant presents in his famous *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*. To the contrary, I shall examine Kant's philosophy of history in which the teleological argument forms a necessary hinge between his prudential argument based on self-interest and moral argument based on duty.

3. A Historical Conception: Teleology in "The Idea of Universal History"

In the first supplement of *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Kant maintains that perpetual peace is *guaranteed* by the great artist *Nature* herself. This framing of perpetual peace in Nature suggests a teleological argument in Kant. In fact, Kant's argument for a cosmopolitan constitution is teeming with teleological arguments. Kant notes that whether we are willing or not, Nature does it herself: *fata volentem ducunt, nolentem*

¹⁹ Among others, Yirmiyahu Yovel takes up this position in the most systematic way. Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Recently, there has been attempt to shed light on an interpretation in a different direction. Otfried Höffe, *Königliche Völker: Zu Kants Kosmopolitischer Rechts- und Friedenstheorie* (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001). Axel Honneth, "Die Unhintergebarkeit des Fortschritts: Kants Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Moral und Geschichte" in *Recht-Geschichte-Religion: Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart*, eds. by Herta Nag-Docekal and Rudolf Langthaler (Akademie Verlag, 2004).

trahunt.²⁰ Kant suggests that there is a higher intelligence that works behind the back of the individual, even when it is against their willing. However, we also know that Nature or Providence, according to *Critique of Pure Reason*, is the concept that goes beyond theoretic reason, which cannot be objects of knowledge. For casual readers, therefore, Kant's appeal to Nature or Providence may be striking. However, the teleological argument is not a mere oddity in his philosophy of history; rather it is a pervasive and entrenched thought in his entire writings. Even the preface of his First Critique contains his conception of teleology; the second half of the Third Critique is also dedicated to this idea. How can the teleological principle of history be plausibly conceived by Kant in the framework of his philosophy? To put this question in a more straightforward way, what does Kant gain by accommodating teleology in his philosophy that is necessary for this project and that would not be achieved otherwise? In a nutshell, Kant's teleology represents his attempt to bridge the gap between theoretic reason and practical reason in his systematic whole. He points to the possibilities that the ultimate end of nature that is found by our theoretic reason matches up with the final end which is set by morality.

(1) The Idea of Universal History from A Cosmopolitan Point of View

Kant's teleological approach is particularly prominent in "The Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" published in a periodical, *Berlin Monthly*, in November 1784. Here a cosmopolitan point of view means, undoubtedly, a teleological point of view. In this essay, Kant argues that the attainment of "a federation of peoples" is "inevitable" by the hidden plan of Nature. This article, published nine years prior to *Perpetual Peace* and at the same year with his *Critique of Pure Reason*, is important because it shows that his teleological idea is not of a marginal significance in his later years; to the contrary, it has been a guiding theme of his philosophical work from the outset. Some have even argued that it is what motivated and oriented his entire project. In what follows, I shall examine nine propositions that constitute this article in order to follow Kant's teleological argument in detail.

²⁰ The fates lead the willing but drag the unwilling. "Toward Perpetual Peace," p.112 (AK 8: 365); also in "Theory and Practice," p. 92 (AK 8: 313). Kant borrows this quote from Seneca, *Epistles*, 107.11. *Quem fata non ducunt, trahunt*.

The first proposition of this article states, “all of a creature’s natural predispositions are destined eventually to develop fully and in accordance with their purpose.” When we look back at history, according to Kant, there are seemingly inconsistent events; yet, they seem to demonstrate a consistency over a long period of time. The regularity is so apparent that we are invited to think that these incoherent and lawless happenings are planned by the “Nature” or “Providence”. We encounter phrases like “Nature has willed...” or “Nature wills...” time and again in this article.²¹ Given that Nature does nothing in vain, seemingly meaningless events can be interpreted as serving to the steady progress of human history despite cases of regression and stagnation.

The second proposition suggests that this plan of nature shall be achieved, not on the individual level, but only on the species’ level. We can see that certain potentials do not get full development within a lifetime of an individual. Particularly, when it comes to the natural predispositions aimed at the use of reason, Kant holds that we can only expect the full development only in the humanity as a whole, not in single individuals. In the third proposition, Kant claims that this goal, or the hidden *telos*, toward which the history of human races marks progress must be the moralization of humanity. Nature works to make men virtuous, not happy. Were happiness the prime goal of history, all the arduous works that Nature imposes on humans would be wasteful. Through toils and pains, humans become more concerned with their self-esteem, thus worthy of their happiness. In a nutshell, through an apparent separation between happiness and virtue, Nature trains humanity toward its goal.²²

The fourth proposition states that Nature employs a certain device to ensure human history to fulfill this purpose. This is what Kant calls “the unsociable sociability”. This phrase, however, seems to be a rather common anthropological assumption among the authors in the eighteenth century; namely, man has a fundamental propensity both to isolate himself and to achieve social distinction.²³ Especially, Kant identifies the motor of

²¹ Kant, “Idea of Universal History,” *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 41 (AK 8: 18).

²² Although Kant argues that happiness should not be the supreme goal of humanity, the reconciliation of virtue and happiness constitutes the keystone in the architectonic in Kant’s system. Paul Guyer, *Kant, Freedom, Law and Happiness*. Particularly, see chapters 10, 11 and 12.

²³ Allen Wood “Kant’s Philosophy of History” in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, pp. 243-262. An allusion is made here to Montaigne, “Il n’est rien si

social progress in the social antagonism, the desire to compete with others, to have others at my will or to achieve higher rank on social ladder. Kant observes, with a sense of wonder, how the evil side of humanity such as greed, ambition and vanity force men to leave their barbaric state and enter a civil state. Evil inclinations, which often lead men astray from their moral principle, awaken humans from their dormant state and develop their hidden potentials. In the subsequent three propositions, Kant describes how this happens.

It is, Kant claims, mainly commerce and war that propel humanity into a civic union. From the state of nature, a state of savagery, the need for commerce comes forth; Hermes, the God of merchants and commerce, brings wealth to humanity and connects different parts of the world. However, insatiable desire for possession in turn results in war against one another. Kant argues that the humanity comes to realize the necessity of a civic union after experiencing the misery of war. Only in a law governed society, he goes onto says, selfish inclinations produce the best effect, just as trees grow up straight and beautiful in a forest.²⁴ Interestingly, the sixth proposition addresses what Kant calls “both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race”: The problem is how to find a supreme authority to whom the power of a civic union should be delegated. For Kant, it is the weightiest problem because the sovereign must be the ground of normativity, or what he calls “in itself,” and yet the sovereign himself is “also a man.” Kant laments, “[n]othing straight can be constructed from such warped wood which man is made of.”²⁵ Since men need a master to guarantee their lawful acts, there seems to an incessant regress to find a master for a master. Again, based on Kant’s conception of person made of “the crooked timber,” finding a master does not guarantee the justice of laws.

dissociable et sociable que l’homme: l’un par son vice l’autre par sa nature”, “De la Solitude,” *Essais*, Vol. I, ed. by André Tournon (Paris: Imprimerie nationale Editions, 1998), p. 388.

²⁴ This constitutes the problem of radical evil in Kant. For an interesting comparison on this problem: see Pierre Laberge, “Von der Garantie des ewigen Friedens” In *Zum ewigen Frieden*, edited by Otfried Höffe, 2nd edition (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), pp. 161-162 and Pauline Kleingeld, *Fortschritt und Vernunft* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1995), pp. 26-27.

²⁵ *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 46

Finally, the seventh proposition suggests that constitution of civic union shall lead to humanity's attempt for a lawful relationship among states, that is, a federation of peoples. I shall quote at length:

That is to say, through wars, through the excessive and ceaseless preparations for war, through the resulting distress that every state, even in times of peace, must ultimately feel internally, nature drives humankind to make initially imperfect attempt, but finally, after the ravages of war, after the downfalls, and after even the complete internal exhaustion of its powers, [nature] impels humankind to take the step that reason could have told it to take without all these lamentable experiences: to abandon the lawless state of savagery and enter into a federation of peoples.²⁶

Again, it is the miseries of war among states that draws humanity to the conception of a cosmopolitan constitution. He observes that a perfect civil constitution is only possible when there is a lawful external relation among states. By contrast, in *Perpetual Peace*, Kant argues that establishment of a just civil constitution is a prerequisite for the federation of peoples; while in *Universal History*, Kant claims that the establishment of a law-governed international relation is a necessary condition for the establishing an internal constitution. This obvious difference is interesting, but for the present purpose it is worth mentioning only briefly.²⁷ In either direction, what is important in these arguments seems to be Kant's emphasis on the interdependence between individual civic unions and global background framework.

The conclusion is, as Kant states in the eight proposition, that the history of the human race may be considered as "*the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

²⁷ For a possible reason of this change, many scholars have discussed the impact of the French Revolution that took place between the publications of these two articles. See Reinhard Brandt, "Historisch-Kritische Beobachtungen zu Kants Friedensschrift", *Zum ewigen Frieden: Grundlagen, Aktualität, und Aussichten einer Idee von Immanuel Kant* (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996); also, Brandt, "Quem Fata Non Ducunt, Trahunt" in *Der Vernunftfrieden: Kants Entwurf im Widerstreit*, ed. by Klaus-M. Kodalle (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1996).

as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely.” A lawful external framework is important because it is the medium, or the womb as Kant puts it elsewhere, in which humanity’s moral predispositions can be developed. A just global as well as domestic order is a means to achieve a higher goal, that is, the moral development of humanity. It is at this point that Kant’s imaginary reconstruction of human history differs from that of Rousseau. Indeed, Kant’s *Idea of Universal History* echoes Rousseau’s *Origin of Inequality* in many regards. Just as Rousseau thinks of civilization as a process of dehumanization or degradation from the state of nature, Kant often describes a civilized state as “glittering misery (*schmmerndes Elend*).” Instead of Rousseau’s steadfast lamentations on the civilization, however, Kant endorses, or even praises, this excellent apparatus of “a wise creator.” Rousseau’s nostalgic glorification of the state of savagery, Kant argues, is due to his failure to see the last stage of this development, that is, not only a civilized, but also a *moralized* state of the humanity. The accomplishment of a civic constitution is a necessary condition for moralization of humanity, and no less so is the law-governed international framework.²⁸

Now, the last proposition states that this assumption of a *telos* gives us a reason to act in a way to promote world peace. Kant maintains that assuming the teleological purpose in his universal history is actually conducive to promoting the perfect civic union. It is noteworthy that in this last proposition that Kant addresses the reader directly: “if *we* assume a plan of nature, *we* have grounds of greater hopes.”²⁹ This sudden appeal to “we”

²⁸ Kant’s own reading of Rousseau is obviously more favorable to him than my reading of him. Kant notes that “[i]t is possible to reconcile with each other and with reason the often misunderstood and apparently contradictory pronouncements of the celebrated J. J. Rousseau. In his essay *On the Influence of the Sciences* and *On the Inequality of Man*, he [Rousseau] shows quite correctly that there is an inevitable conflict between culture and the nature of the human race as a *physical* species each of whose individual members is meant to fulfill his destiny completely. But in his *Émile*, *Social Contract*, and other writings, he attempts in turn to solve the more difficult problem of what course culture should take in order to ensure the proper development, in keeping with their destiny, of man’s capacities as a moral species, so that this [moral] destiny will no longer conflict with his character as a natural species.” Kant, “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,” in *Political Writings*, p. 227 (AK 8:116).

²⁹ Kant, “Idea for a Universal History” in *Political Writings*, p. 52 (AK 8:30).

as a collective agent has received a good deal of scholarly attention.³⁰ The puzzle can be thus summarized: If the natural teleology will force the individual toward the right conclusion in the long run regardless of their moral intention; why must we, as moral agents, pursue this kind of moral progress?

Clearly, this question adds a moral or political dimension to Kant's account of universal history on top of its claimed theoretic dimension. This does not mean that natural teleology may impose a moral duty on us. Nor is an end of morality to be necessarily regarded as an end of nature. Kant is quite clear that Nature will drag even the unwilling individuals; yet it is rational for us to cooperate with it. In other words, if nature leads toward perpetual peace, or an ideal civic union; we as moral agents who respect human beings as ends in themselves also have reasons to recognize their rights and support an institutional framework that protect those rights. If a theoretically conceived history contains rational ground for a perfection of civic union, then it gives us reason to practically strive toward perpetual peace. We have a duty to promote moral progress of humanity; and to this end, we should also seek a cosmopolitan constitution that will ensure the most favorable condition to this aim. In other words, historical research provides us with empirical data as a ground on which it is rational for us to set up a moral aim to seek a cosmopolitan constitution.

Nevertheless, no matter what these contingent empirical facts may provide us as a heuristic reason, in no way can they "guarantee" the success of our moral striving as Kant puts in "Toward Perpetual Peace." In Kant's deontological moral framework, the "success" of our moral striving *per se* is out of point. The teleological argument makes perpetual peace inevitable, and morality only demands that we promote what is going to happen anyway. Clearly, Kant's philosophy of history holding such a bold claim seems to be irreconcilable with his non-consequentialist moral standing.

³⁰ Allen Wood, "Kant's philosophy of History"; Terry Pinkard, "Norms, Facts, and the Philosophy of History," *Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide*, eds. by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (Cambridge University Press. 2009).

(2) Critical Assessments

Robert Flint, in his article published in 1874, makes a canonical claim against Kant's teleological explication. He argues that Kant's teleology implies "a monstrous paradox" by inviting us to study history, not from the empirical data to final causes, but from final causes to empirical facts. He further points out, rightly, that a speculative inference can be disastrous to the study of empirical history. Indeed, Kant does seem to be guilty of just this when he, already reminding us of Plato, calls the attempt to reform reason by experience "the scandal of philosophy."³¹ He denounces the assumption that we "can see farther and more clearly with its dim moles' eyes fixed on experience than with the eyes belonging to a being that was made to stand erect and look at the heavens."³² Kant claims without hesitation that his historical sketches are *a priori*. In the twentieth century, after a good deal of historical folly, Karl Popper famously warns against the danger of unscientific predictions of a course of human history. Is Kant committing the error of historicism in his philosophy of history?

This criticism indicates further an internal conflict within the system of Kant's philosophy. Kant states that there is no *a priori* use of reason except for the idea of causality.³³ Given this, how can Kant's teleology be plausibly accommodated within his critical philosophy as a whole? Flint posits Kant's dilemma in a disjunctive sentence: If there is no *a priori* use of reason *then* Kant has trespassed the boundaries in his teleology, *or* if there is a *a priori* use of reason *then* Kant merely refuses to admit its use. Either way, we are left with unhappy options. If we choose the former part, Kant's writings on history are full of inconsistencies, thus they do not deserve our attention. If the latter, Kant, unbeknownst to himself, provides the pretext for the speculative philosophy of history and further paves the way for reintroducing metaphysics that he has hitherto attacked. Famously, among his immediate successors, Fichte followed the latter path and claimed that the entire human history can be written apart from all experience. Hegel claimed, in a more audacious manner, that the history of the world is the process of development and

³¹ Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This may be true in Theory, but it does not apply in practice'," in *Political Writings*, p. 62 (AK 8:277).

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, eds. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

the realization of Spirit with all the changing scenes. However, Kant has no interest to describe *the* philosophy of history as Fichte or Hegel does; rather, he says that he is trying to find a clue to *a* philosophical account of history. Accordingly, Kant saves us the embarrassments that we are likely to have while reading Hegel's lectures on history where he tries to apply the general concepts to the particular events. Clearly, as it is typical of Kant's modest and cautious style, he stresses that his teleological principle should not be read literally, but only as a heuristic idea.

Now I believe that we are in a better position to evaluate the status of Kant's philosophical history. Does it claim to be an imaginary fiction, an accurate representation or a non-empirical verisimilitude? Definitely, Kant's reconstruction of history cannot be compared to a noble lie or a myth that Plato tells in the *Republic* in order to make good citizens. In this case, the truth-value of this "as if" reconstruction does not matter as long as it serves the political aim of the philosopher king. On the contrary, it is also not quite the same as a verisimilitude or a mere abstraction of reality in which case it can be claimed as either true or false. As Kant claims, it can be best viewed as a heuristic tool of which truth-value can be bracketed. However, the status of a reconstruction of history from a teleological point of view remains somewhat oscillating between the second and the third possibilities because Kant still tries to show that empirical data present the tendency toward perpetual peace. If the attainability of perpetual peace is not dependent on a posteriori data, but they are only to be used as materials to remind people of the hidden purpose which is going to fulfill itself anyway, then what the empirical data is to world citizens promoting perpetual peace is no more than what the ark of the Testimony is to the Jewish people heading for the Promised land in the *Exodus*.

In the following, I shall focus on a practical claim in Kant's history of philosophy. However, it is not to say that the entire philosophy of history has been motivated by his moral hopes. This way of reading will render Kant's natural teleology as one of practical postulates along with God, freedom and immortality. Such a reading may overlook his serious intention to carry out a theoretic research in history. The crucial task seems to be rather how to frame the relation between his theoretic claim and his moral claim in his philosophy history.

4. A Moral Conception

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant states that concepts that go beyond theoretic reason cannot be objects of knowledge. The ideas of reason such as God, freedom and immortality of soul are beyond the limit of knowledge, thus cannot be proven by empirical data. Nevertheless he claims that these transcendental ideas are natural to human thought; in fact, these concepts, though indeterminate, are commanded by reason in order to illuminate human actions. In other words, they serve as heuristic principles; and in this sense, they are called “regulative”, not “constitutive.” A regulative idea can be used as a guiding thread in scientific research such that the belief in beauty and harmony encouraged Johannes Kepler to continue his investigation through a series of disappointing results. Kant’s natural teleology as a heuristic principle thus occupies a special status: It is neither a necessary truth nor an empirical proposition. It is not to be *objectively known* as a matter of fact, but to be *subjectively assured of*. However, natural teleology seems to differ from Kant’s well know practical postulates in that it claims to occupy a role for a theoretic understanding of history.

In the second half of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant expounds on the status of teleology as a regulative principle, more specifically, as an object of reflective judgment.³⁴ The faculty of reflective judgment is helpful to understand a realm of experience which exhibits a high level of purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*). Organisms are good examples that invite us to assume a higher purpose when we ponder their existence or structure.³⁵ The shape of fish and birds or the division of sexes invokes a

³⁴ The power of judgment is in general defined as the faculty of thinking the particular as related to the universal. In the first and second introductions to *Critique of Judgment*, Kant stipulates the distinction between determinant and reflective forms of judgment in the following: “If the universal is already given, then the judgment that subsumes the particular to this universal is **determining**; on the contrary, if the particular is given and the universal has to be found, then the judgment is **reflecting**.” I. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. by Paul Guyer and trans. by Eric Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2001). For an older translation, I also consulted Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. by J. H. Bernard (NY: Prometheus Books, 1959).

³⁵ Whether organisms truly have the special status in the nature to force a teleological point of view is also questionable although we are not going to discuss this topic further for the present purpose. To this question, see Paul Guyer, “Organisms and the Unity of Science” in *Kant and the Sciences*, edited by Eric Watkins (Oxford University Press, 2001).

teleological thinking. Human history is, according to Kant, another example where we experience purposiveness. Thus, Kant argues that just like biologists may use a teleological principle for their findings, historians may derive a fruitful outcome using this buttress for their research.

However, Kant's analogy between biology and history entails some problematic assumptions. W. H. Walsh, for one, claims that this analogy is flawed in his *Philosophy of History*. Walsh argues that Kant's principle of teleology is claiming to be no more than a methodological assumption or working postulate; yet, in effect, it leads us to anticipate a particular pattern of findings in nature. He goes so far as to say that when Kant holds that the human race is in progress toward a specific goal, namely, the establishment of a universal civil society, Kant actually uses the teleological principle not only as a formal principle, but also as a material, i.e., constitutive principle.³⁶ Despite Kant's hope that philosophers can provide a general principle for the working historians, Kant's history of philosophy may still be viewed as making an arbitrary claim for historians to coordinate their research in order to satisfy his wishful thinking. Indeed, the disanalogy between biology and history seems apparent. To offer a teleological principle for biologist as a crutch for discovery seems a harmless gesture, whereas to suggest it for historians would not be as innocent. It could be interpreted as, in Walter Benjamin's term, asking to adopt "a view of the winner" and tell a story accordingly.

Yet such a reading of Kant's teleology seems to be a result of confusing his theoretic and practical thesis. As Kant stresses himself, we should not forget that the assumed *telos* of humanity is an object of an idea of reason. Kant warns time and again of the danger of treating those concepts such as "God" or "Nature" as an objective entity. Although Kant holds that humans are the creatures who consciously pursue those ideas, he did not make the argument that there exists real "God" or "Nature" and imposes a specific purpose upon humans. This is again all too literal reading of Kant's teleological passages. Kant makes it clear that we can always give a scientific explanation to a phenomenon, be it the structure of a bird and the hollowness of its bones, or the founding of a political organization. Nevertheless, there are certain questions that are not entirely answered on the level of efficient causality, a paradigmatic example of which is the moral

³⁶ W. H. Walsh, *Philosophy of History* (Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 125-128.

questions. A teleological explanation provides an alternative way of answering the meaning of certain things, or what he calls “what is it for?” question (*Wozu-Frage*) which cannot be simply explained away by a mechanical explanation. At this point, Kant would have to concede that the teleological principle has no predictive potency. Rather, it is from a teleological point of view that the cosmopolitan global whole can be viewed as the formal condition for the final aim, “the development of the natural [moral] predispositions.”³⁷ It provides us in turn with a rational ground to hold up a moral duty to promote the perfect civic constitution.

In short, the moral duty to promote peace is derived from the theoretic certainty of certain future rights; and reversely, the achievement of perpetual peace will render particular historic events meaningful in the humanity’ backward gaze. In this sense, the notion of regulative idea in history is not only aimed at working historians for the use of theoretic reason; but also, perhaps mainly, at politicians for their practical guidance. It must be why the second supplement that urges to accept this teleological principle is “secretly” dedicated to, not historians, but politicians. Moral skepticism of the politicians, according to Kant, posits the real hindrance to a forward step. He claims thus:

It was very well for the Jewish prophets to foretell that the state to which they belonged would sooner or later suffer not only decline, but also complete dissolution; for they were themselves the architects of their fate. [...] Our politicians behave in exactly the same way, and they are just as successful in their prophecies.³⁸

In order to bring about a lawful relation among states, there has to be a guarantee, a certain kind of reassurance for the politicians to show that their attempt has at least a possibility of success. It is beneficial to assume the existence of divine providence aiming at the historical progress toward a cosmopolitan world order in order to hold out against the entrenched thought to think that history will be the repetition of the same. Kant holds that a firm belief in human progress is “useful” as an antidote to this deep-rooted

³⁷ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §83, p. 432

³⁸ Kant, “The Contest of Faculties,” in particular, Part 2 “the Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: ‘Is the Human Race continually improving?’” in *Political Writings*, pp. 177-178.

skepticism; thereby conducive to bringing about the ideal political state, like a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is “the principle of hope” as Ernst Bloch once pointed out in his book.³⁹ Again, at this point, it is not a matter of right or wrong; rather it is a matter of useful or useless in the realization of a practical aim that Kant thinks of teleology.

Why, then, does Kant make his address to politicians, not to lay citizens? The problem of reassuring politicians’ moral acts would not have appeared, if Kant could conceive of an enlightened public as the subject of politics. However, Kant’s prospect of the enlightened public was even darker than that of the moralized politicians. Kant states “*only a few*, by cultivating their minds, have succeeded in freeing themselves from immaturity and in continuing boldly on their way.”⁴⁰ Again, insinuating the infamous allegory of Plato, Kant claims that, “there will always be a few who think for themselves. [...] Such guardians, once they have themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will disseminate the spirit of rational respect for personal value and for the duty of all men to think for themselves”.⁴¹ However, Kant laments, the public refuses to use their reason out of dogmas and even grows fond of immaturity. Therefore, the “unthinking mass”, Kant claims, needs a benevolent despot, such as Frederik II of the Prussia, to guide their external relations, rather than too much civil freedom. It is probably for this reason that in both *Toward Perpetual Peace* and *The Idea of Universal History* Kant speaks to state politicians of the attainability of a cosmopolitan whole with such a conviction. There is an interesting contrast, however, when we look at Kant’s two other articles, “What is Enlightenment?” published in 1784 and “Contest of Faculties” published in 1798. Kant likewise argues for the progress of humanity, however, notably, without resorting to the teleological principle.⁴² Compared to his optimistic conviction for ultimate moral progress in “*Toward Perpetual Peace*” and “*The Idea for Universal History*”, Kant’s tone in these articles is impressively skeptical. He speaks of little hope about the possible

³⁹ Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, in 3 volumes, Neville Plaice, trans. by Stephan Plaice and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995).

⁴⁰ Kant, “The Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” in *Political Writings*, p. 55, my emphasis.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² Axel Honneth, “Die Unhintergebarkeit des Fortschritts: Kants Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Moral und Geschichte” in *Recht-Geschichte-Religion: Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart*, eds. by Herta Nag-Docekal and Rudolf Langthaler (Akademie Verlag, 2004).

enlightenment of the public, not to mention, the enlightenment of humanity as a whole. In fact, Kant considers the globally lawful constitution to be an almost unattainable goal.

I think Kant could have reasonably chosen between these two options: Obviously, his enthusiastic talk of “guarantee” cannot be reconciled with his other commitments; at the same time, his pessimism about the enlightened public seems to be somewhat groundless. In the era of liberal democracy, we have to act on the belief that citizens are not only motivated by their self-interest, but also by moral consideration. I shall call this the necessity of hope. This is also perhaps what it means to become “*königliche Völker*.”⁴³

But here is a more interesting question: if Kant does not depend on the teleological principle in order to make the practical thesis that we should promote perpetual peace, how should his arguments look? In other words, how can his proposal for the perfect political constitution be reconstructed, if it is to be addressed directly to “the educated public”? In fact, there is a little textual evidence, though not full-fledged, which points toward an alternative way of proposing progress. Kant seems also to be well aware that it is only through more practice of reason that individuals learn how to become autonomous, not through the guidance of a benign despotism. In the same vein, Kant holds that although the public can only achieve enlightenment slowly, the government will eventually profit if they treat man “in a manner appropriate to his dignity.”⁴⁴ The enlightened citizens would strive for a cosmopolitan civic union even when they are fully cognizant of the slim chance of its attainability. These citizens are not only motivated by the self-interest, but also by the moral necessity. Reluctantly, however, Kant saw this possibility of the enlightened mass who would voluntarily work for the ideal of perpetual peace out of moral commitment only as a remote chance, a bud that had barely burgeoned, such that he could not help but fall back on the teleological principle for the “not yet” enlightened public toward “the ultimate goal” of history as though it has been imposed from without.

⁴³ Otfried Höffe, *Königliche Völker* (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001).

⁴⁴ Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in *Political Writings*, p. 60.

5. Chapter Conclusion

Kant's proposal for perpetual peace is based on the attainment of a global political constitution in a form of federation of states. On a normative level, Kant's moral universalism to endow the individual with equal respect as ends in themselves seems to support this political ideal. However, devoted readers find that there is a chasm between Kant political and moral claim. In continuity, at different parts of Kant's writings, the readers face sometimes seemingly contradictory claims regarding the cosmopolitan ideal. On the one hand, he argues that perpetual peace is to be attained by a higher intelligence merely using men's selfish egoism, regardless of individuals' moral intention. On the other hand, Kant argues that we as moral agents have a moral duty to promote world peace even though it is possibly an unachievable goal. It is only through Kant's philosophy of history that we can understand how far our political pursuit can be morally required. Whether or not our strivings turn out to be successful, Kant argues that we have a moral duty to pursue the perfect political constitution because it constitutes the adequate external condition within which humanity's moral capacities can be developed. In this sense, Kant's ideal of cosmopolitanism can be interpreted as morally motivated political order. However, even though this political goal is hardly to be achieved without the enlightenment of peoples within his framework, Kant does not hold out high hope regarding its possibility. It becomes clear therefore we not only need "moral politicians", but also "moral peoples" for the feasibility of this purpose. Now, the next chapter shall examine Kant's concept of person, and see what drives Kant to remain with such views. In order to critically engage with Kant, I shall use Hegel's, in particular, Habermas' adaptation of Hegel's criticism of Kant.

Chapter Two: Hegel's Objection to Kant and Hegelian Cosmopolitanism

1. Introduction

Kant's notion of perpetual peace in the eighteenth century was not smoothly succeeded by nineteenth century thinkers, in particular, by Hegel. Instead of Kant's vision that humanity will eventually achieve perpetual peace, Hegel considers that it is unlikely that plural states can enjoy peaceful or fair relationships amongst them. Passages in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* clearly show that any emergence of political organization beyond *Staat* is unthinkable and even undesirable. Hegel's virulent critique of Kant positions himself as a communitarian or statist thinker diametrically opposed to Kant's cosmopolitan ideal. On this view, "Hegelian cosmopolitanism" seems to be itself an oxymoron.

On the contrary, some of the most ardent champions of cosmopolitanism have claimed that they are 'Hegelians.'⁴⁵ Readers of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* claim that his unique concept of freedom as a process of mutual recognition suggests a radical cosmopolitanism.⁴⁶ On this view, *Kampf um Anerkennung* must transcend the state boundaries and continue until the underrepresented and the disrespected get globally recognized by others. Some argue that not only the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but also the *Philosophy of Right* entails a line of logic out of which an alternative version of the cosmopolitan ideal can be distilled.⁴⁷ They even claim that Hegel was the first thinker to give cosmopolitanism a definite and real form of right. In the recent literature, therefore it

⁴⁵ Traditionally, Alexander Kojève and Francis Fukuyama represent this view. Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures of the Phenomenology of Spirit*, edited by Allan Bloom, trans. by James H. Nichols Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992).

⁴⁶ Robert Fine, "Kant's Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel's Critique," *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Issue 29, No.3 (2003); Shannon Brincat, "Hegel's Gesture towards Radical Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies*, Issue 1 (2009).

⁴⁷ Andrew Buchwalter, "Hegel's Conception of an International "We"," in *Identity and Difference*, edited by Philip Grier (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007).

is still an object of dispute whether Hegel can be considered ‘cosmopolitan’ at all.⁴⁸ Despite Hegel’s overt rejection of *Kosmopolitismus*, I do think that these lines of interpretations or appropriations may find textual support. The question is however whether a Hegelian cosmopolitanism construed this way provides us with a better hope into the future than the Kantian one. I doubt it is so.

In this chapter, I will begin by elaborating Hegel’s condemnation of Kant’s espousal of cosmopolitan right. Section 1 of this chapter is devoted to this purpose. It aims to show that Hegel’s disagreement with Kant derives from his unique conception of the metaphysical underpinnings of self and freedom, and his understanding of the state and war. In Section 2, I shall then turn to the claims of Hegelian cosmopolitans. The position based on Hegel’s concept of freedom as mutual recognition has been much discussed in the literature. The focal point of discussion is Hegel’s argument for the universal mind or universal consciousness as the consequence of historical development. It has been argued that the potential for the justification of a global legal or political order is immanent even here. Others argue, on the contrary, that Hegel’s opposition to a global political organization must be taken seriously; yet, there is instead a strong case for cultural cosmopolitanism. After examining the justifications and limitations of these claims, Section 3 turns to the problem of poverty as viewed through a Hegelian lens. Hegel’s analysis of the origin of poverty and its impact on the citizen’s moral degradation leads him to argue for political intervention to remedy this evil of civil society. Hegel’s distinction between civil and ethical community in this sense may provide a realistic framework to understand the global poverty that is widespread in our day. Although Hegel was mostly oblivious to or unreflective of the possibility, my thesis is that, thinking “with Hegel contra Hegel” indicates that the boundedness of the state shatters. Given the global economic interconnectedness, his description of the function of the state as distinct from civil society sheds light on the contemporary appeals to global economic justice beyond state boundaries.

⁴⁸ Allegra de Laurentiis argues that as long as we remain loyal to Hegel’s understanding of ethicality, “[e]thical life going global is a breakdown of ethicality.” “Mortal Gods: A reply to Andrew Buchwalter’s “Hegel’s Conception of Situated Cosmopolitanism” presented at the Pacific APA in March 2005. I would like to thank her for letting me use this manuscript.

2. Hegel's Critique of Kant's Cosmopolitan Right

In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel notes that international relations are necessary outcomes of the fact that there is more than one state; yet, he claims that states are not to be parts of a higher political order or an “ethical community.” In a direct reference to Kant, Hegel claims that a league or an alliance of nations is meant to fail because it is only “relative and limited” in its nature. He writes,

There is no praetor to adjudicate between states, but at most arbitrators and mediators, and even the presence of these will be contingent, i.e., determined by particular wills. Kant's idea (*Vorstellung*) of a *perpetual peace* guaranteed by a federation of states which would settle all disputes and which, as a power recognized by each individual state, would resolve all disagreements so as to make it impossible for these to be settled by war presupposes an agreement between states. But this agreement, whether based on moral, religious, or other grounds and considerations, would always be dependent on particular sovereign wills, and would therefore continue to be tainted with contingency.⁴⁹

Whether or not Hegel was conscious of this, Hegel's objection in the passage above displays somewhat caricaturistic, or even erroneous readings of Kant. First, as we examined in the previous chapter, it is hard to believe that Kant claims that a federation of states would resolve *all* disputes and disagreements among states. Nor is it the goal of Kant's project. Kant's goal is, in fact, much more modest than that: he is concerned with

⁴⁹ G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §333, p.368, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Allen Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1991); henceforth, called *Philosophy of Right*. This translation is based on the first edition of the *Rechtsphilosophie* originally published in 1820, which was reproduced in Hegel's *Werke* and published by the Suhrkamp Verlag. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Vol. 7, eds. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970). Hegel delivered in his lifetime total seven lectures of *Philosophy of Right*, the last of which he was not able to finish because of his sudden illness. Over the course Hegel left many illuminating comments which are described as ‘Remarks (*Anmerkungen*)’ and to which students’ lecture notes are incorporated as ‘Additions’ (*Zusätze*). In this dissertation, Hegel's quote will be following his paragraph numbers and page numbers with the mark of ‘R’ indicating ‘Remarks’; ‘A’ meaning ‘Additions’.

the ways in which various disagreements and disputes can be reconciled without waging violent wars. Second, Kant does not hold that a global political institution such as a league of nations would *guarantee* perpetual peace. Although Kant does claim that perpetual peace is guaranteed by the divine providence, it is only in the teleological sense that he engages such confidence. Rather, we have seen that there are three different levels - political, moral and teleological - in Kant's argument for perpetual peace. Hegel in this passage however conflates them into one simple bold claim.

Hegel's objection to Kant's idea of perpetual peace is in fact a reflection of their differences at a deeper level, rooted in their overall philosophy. There are fundamental disagreements between Kant and Hegel that need to be understood at this point. Now, I shall delineate Hegel's objection to *Kosmopolitismus* in terms of three aspects, namely on the communitarian notion of self (1), the positivistic notion of law (2), and the realistic account of war (3).

(1) Hegel on the Concept of Self

Hegel's metaphysical foundation of political right characterizes him as 'communitarian' thinker in that he views a right as an embodiment of mutual recognition of individuals or groups. Against the natural law tradition that grants each individual a universal right merely because he is a human being, Hegel's phenomenology contends that the concept of right is based upon particular needs that are to be recognized by others. The master and slave dialectic in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* dramatically shows that a right is to be conceived as a trophy earned only after laborious struggles, a fruit harvested at the end of sizzling summer days.⁵⁰ Granted that mutual recognition plays a pivotal role in the formation of human right, a right receives its actuality and validity only within the boundaries of reciprocal interaction. Conversely, a right has no independent reality apart from this whole of social interconnection.

This intersubjective notion of right is undergirded by Hegel's unique conception of freedom. Hegel claims that one is free when one is with oneself in this other (*in diesem*

⁵⁰ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press, 1977).

Anderen bei sich selbst sei).⁵¹ The concrete freedom is neither the expressions of immediate will nor the absolute freedom of Kantian moral subject. The “deontological self”, as Michael Sandel calls it, presupposes the conception of *I* that is clearly detached from one’s desires and perceptions. *I* am free as long as *I* can repress, eliminate or overcome the intrusions of nature - nature both inside and outside me - by obeying moral laws that can be approved by reason alone.⁵² On this view, the notion of transcendental subject prior to any experience is required for any self-awareness or freedom.

Hegel’s is rather a notion of embedded or situated self: Hegel argues that my perceptions, desires and even thoughts are deeply imbued with cultures in which one finds oneself. The boundary between oneself and the other is always transient and porous, so that claims of self-knowledge and freedom presuppose understanding of one’s community. Given Hegel’s conception of right that is deeply rooted in one’s ethical community, now we are in a better position to understand his assertion that thinking of a right is “inadequate only if it adopts a fixed position - for example, as *cosmopolitan* - in opposition to the concrete life of the state.”⁵³

Hegel’s account of *Sittlichkeit* – ethicality, or translated as ethical life by T. M. Knox - represents a harmony between individuals and their society. In his scattered description, the account of *Sittlichkeit* appears almost always in contrast to Kantian notion of *Moralität*. Hegel contends that Kantian morality concerns merely individual conscience derived by one’s reason, and neglects the ethical norms embodied in the customs of a community. For Hegel, it reflects the malaise of bourgeois modernity in which individuals are immersed with private interest only without thinking about the common good of one’s society.⁵⁴ Instead, *Sittlichkeit* represents concrete norms that are bound in a particular time and place. Therefore, it is socially mediated and historically constituted as opposed to Kantian morality that purports to be universally binding.

⁵¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §7A, p.49, translation is altered by me. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, eds. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 55.

⁵² Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁵³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §209R, p. 240.

⁵⁴ Although his scattered account of ethicality is always preceded by an account of Kantian morality, Hegel’s Ethicality is not simply contrasted with Kantian morality. Although he acknowledges the emergence of ethicality precedes the emergence of individual morality in history, he argues that morality forms one constitutive moment in the formation of ethicality. Michael Inwood, *Hegel Dictionary* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 92.

This notion of right has to do with his unique understanding of freedom. Hegel criticizes the notion of freedom in modern society as purely subjective and negative. It is negative in that the notion of freedom of modernity pursues elimination of external impediments through my will; it is subjective in that it has forgotten the self-constituting aspect of ethical life. One cannot be free when one is alone. One needs to be in an “ethical” community to rescue one’s freedom from the fragmented and atomized “civil” society of modernity. In contrast, Hegel suggests the ancient Greek era as a good instantiation of positive freedom. In the Greek *polis*, the individual citizens enjoyed the immediate identity with their political community; thereby the citizens realize their freedom through working for the common good. Under the Roman Empire, however, that the public sphere becomes saturated by the concerns of private sphere. Since the citizens cannot identify themselves with the Empire, the political persons lost their loyalty and became private persons. The citizens only take care of their own property and are no longer willing to risk their life for the common good. Likewise, in large republics of the modern time, the individuals lose this immediate identity with their political community and feel alienated in their political life.

It is important to remember that these are conceptual moments in Hegel’s dialectical argument and should not be conflated with particular historical societies. Yet, Hegel’s distinction between ethical community and civil society seems to be a resonance of the Greek distinction between a life dedicated to a public world and a life that is immersed in private interest. It thus comes as no surprise that Hegel sees ethical community represents a higher or nobler aspect of human life. Nonetheless, Hegel does not want to retrieve the past, for he is also aware that the ancient Greek republic neglects the subjective aspect of freedom, or what he calls, *Innerlichkeit*, which is so central to the modern way of life. Hegel’s agenda thus becomes the sublation of the freedom of modernity and the freedom of the ancient that are both one-sided.

In sum, Hegel’s conception of freedom pursues the identity of the other with oneself, as the famous phrase ‘being with oneself in the other’ poetically formulates. One is free when one is self-determining and dependent from external necessities. However, the boundary between oneself and the other is transient in Hegel’s multi-faceted Hegel’s theory of freedom. The other is neither the natural nor social environment that surrounds

and controls me; it is not the bodily desires or inclinations as in Kant that are to be suppressed by my rational thoughts. Hegel does not see that freedom can be achieved by simply ignoring or even eliminating external impediments or compulsions; rather he sees a moment of freedom in internalizing the other into oneself through mediation. In a social and political sense, slavery is a clear sign of dependency and thus lack of freedom. In Hegel's theory of mutual recognition, however, abolishing enslavement presents the dynamic process of mediation between oneself and this other. Freedom as mutual recognition presupposes this conception of freedom as the identity between oneself with the other, yet this metaphysical conception cannot be externalized without mediation.

Now based on Hegel's understanding of persons and freedom, the speech of cosmopolitan right may ring hollow. What is unique and yet problematic about this insight is that Hegel considers the highest possible form of ethical community as the state. It is the ultimate boundary in which the concreteness of a right can be sustained. All the other forms of community such as families, clans or associations are a constitutive element, or what Hegel calls a *Moment*, of the state.

(2) Hegel on Modern State

Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is a paean to the rationality of the modern state. He celebrates the rule of law, not of one person, as an indication that the civilization has reached a level of maturity to recognize freedom of the individual. In a much-celebrated passage, Hegel claims that the consciousness that a human being is recognized as such just because he is a human being is "the aim of thought" and it is "of infinite importance." At this stage, Hegel writes "[a] human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc."⁵⁵ That is to say, an individual deserves equal treatment due to the concept of abstract right, not because he belongs to a particular religion, nation, or race. This passage is often interpreted as an indicator of Hegel's gesture toward cosmopolitan universalism, acknowledging universal value of human being *qua human being*. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that for Hegel it is only in a state that an individual receives such an abstract right, and thereby is

⁵⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §209, p. 240.

recognized as “a universal person.” He therefore argues that the highest duty of individuals is to be “members of the state”.⁵⁶

Hegel’s ideal state, however, does not share the liberal aspiration to remain as a minimal and neutral state. On Hegel’s view, traditional liberal theory treats individuals as mere cogs of a machine, failing to recognize the organic qualities of the state. The mechanistic and individualistic concept of state common to the mainstream social contract theories is fundamentally flawed, for it assigns the state merely instrumental values to protect individuals’ life and property. The state is not a necessary evil needed to be “transcended”; rather it is a self-maintaining entity whose function as a whole is not reducible to the particular ends of the individuals within in. Hegel speaks of “inner organism” of the states, and contends that citizens are “not parts but members.”⁵⁷ Hegel claims therefore the state does entail a higher mode of allegiance.

In the state, individuals voluntarily identify themselves with the whole for that whole is partly constitutive of their self-understanding, and therefore they are ready to work for the good of the whole. When citizens go to war for the sake of the state, they are willing to sacrifice their limbs and even their own life. They put the good of the whole before their self-interest. The liberal understanding of the state represents a state based on needs, or what he calls *Notsstaat*, not a state based on reason, or a *Verstandesstaat*. “Civil society” is a name that Hegel reserves for this kind of organization based on mutual needs, *vis-à-vis* the state proper.

The organic model of Hegelian state has called forth various kinds of stigmas onto itself. Some of them need clarification because they are reified as hackneyed prejudices. Among others, since Hegel builds his political philosophy around the individual state, he has been interpreted as a statist thinker. Moreover, due to his seeming relation to Prussian state, he is often labeled as an advocate of an authoritarian or a totalitarian state. Even worse, Hegel has been charged even as a harbinger of the fascist German nationalism that came along in the history of the twentieth century. For all of

⁵⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §258. Peperzak rightly points out a discrepancy in Hegel’s explication of right and duty. The duty of individuals stops at the defense of one’s nation and there is no corresponding duty to the “absolute right” of world history. Adriaan Peperzak, “Hegel contra Hegel in His Philosophy of Right: The Contradictions of International Politics,” *Journal of History of Philosophy*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1994), p. 245.

⁵⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §286, p. 328.

these labels such as statism, totalitarianism, or nationalism, it might be said that Hegel is always required “to pay the debts that others have incurred.”⁵⁸ Various labels turn out to be indeed “myths and legends” when a specific quote is countered by another. Especially because Hegel is a thinker whose writing ought to be understood in context only, extracting one small portion of his work to criticize him is all too easy, but not helpful for a genuine understanding of his thoughts.

Totalitarianism: The charge that Hegel is totalitarian thinker comes from his statement that the particular must serve the universal. This is often interpreted as his justification of using individuals as mere means for the interest of state. Against this interpretation, Knox has pointed out liberal aspects of Hegel. Hegel was indeed a defender of freedom of conscience and the individual civil right. For example, mentioning the Quakers, Hegel maintains that their individual conscience must be tolerated in a rational liberal state although they refuse to fulfill their duty to defend their state.⁵⁹ Also regarding the Jewish problem of his time, Hegel’s position is also clear: He notes that the exclusion of the Jews is “claimed to be based on the highest right” but “it proved to be the height of folly.”⁶⁰ This is particularly telling, given that Hegel’s political philosophy is sometimes assimilated with that of Carl Schmitt in the twentieth century.

Nationalism: With regard to the heated debate on German nationalism of his time, Hegel was rather thoroughly critical of nationalistic tendency in the political realm. He points toward the different interests of different *Länder*: “on a small scale, interests can be the same; on the large scale, as in Germany, the interests of the Bavarians, the Austrians, the Pomeranians and the Mecklenburgers are highly distinct.”⁶¹ Apparently, Hegel was not enthusiastic about building one state out of German nation. Moreover, quite interestingly, he was excited about Napoleon’s invasion of Prussia as a world historical event. In each and every turn of his writing, Hegel speaks as a fervent defender

⁵⁸ Otto Henning, “Hegel and Political Trends: A Criticism of the Political Hegel Legends” in *Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Northwestern University Press, 1996), p. 55.

⁵⁹ T. M. Know, “Hegel and Prussianism” in *Hegel Myths and Legends*, p. 81.

⁶⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §270. See Hegel’s second footnote, p. 295-296.

⁶¹ Hegel, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte: Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann* (Winter 1830/1831), p.128. I am indebted to Terry Pinkard on this point. Pinkard notes that this particular reference to the German divisions is missing in Karl Hegel’s edition of the *Lectures of Philosophy of Right*. Terry Pinkard, Lecture at Stony Brook University, May 2010.

of enlightenment and rationalism.⁶² Nation is one element of many that needs to be subsumed in order for the rationality of the state, even if the ideal state does not exist in reality.

Statism: Hegel's relationship to the state is somewhat more dubious. Hegel's famous sentence, "*Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, dass der Staat ist*"⁶³ is often caught in a crossfire. This phrase is often translated, "The state is the march of God through the world" and accordingly interpreted as a justification of any behavior of a state as "the march" or "the course" of God. Hegel is often accused to deify the state. Against this claim, Shlomo Avineri seems to convey the most adequate meaning of this phrase based on Kaufmann's translation, which reads: 'It is the way of God in the world, that there should be the state.' Avineri claims that Hegel means to say no more than that "the very existence of the state is part of a divine strategy, not a merely human arbitrary artifact."⁶⁴ That is to say, Hegel's notion of modern state is far from an attempt to lay the ground for an authoritarian state; rather he is merely stressing the necessity that there ought to be the state in human history. It is a vindication of the modernity and rationality of the state, and nothing more. We can make an equally hospitable reading of Hegel's famous dictum, "what is rational is real, and what is real is rational": everything that is rational has the potential to realize itself; in turn, everything that exists must have reasons for their existence.⁶⁵

Hegel characterizes the modern state in its rationality. That is, through the state, individuals are freed from traditional shackles and their particular interests are recognized. What makes the modern state differ from the past despotic form of state is that the modern state deserves veneration from individuals because of its rational institutions. Thus Hegel construes patriotism as a natural consequence of trusting this rationality. Patriotism is a feeling that develops in response to the rationality of the state. He claims that patriotism is in general "a consequence of the institutions within the state, a

⁶² There are critiques of aspects of enlightenment in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in particular, in the sections on "Absolute Freedom and Terror." However, it seems to me that Hegel's critiques aim at the violence of enlightenment, which was evident in the French Revolution, rather than the spirit of enlightenment itself. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 355.

⁶³ Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁶⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, trans. by J. Sibree (NY: Dover Publications, 1956).

consequence in which rationality is actually present, just as rationality receives its practical application through action in conformity with the state's institutions."⁶⁶

Nevertheless, even this hospitable reading of Hegel does not allay all the suspicions. Although patriotism may well be naturally derived from appreciating rational institutions, it is often demanded as an imperative from individuals' point of view. This is more seriously so when the state tries to behave in an irrational way. A closer examination of the text reveals that the rationality is anything but the trust that my interest or even my whole existence will be preserved in the state. He notes,

This disposition is in general one of trust (...) that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of an other [the state] (...) As a result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my consciousness of this, I am free.⁶⁷

He continues with a sense of wonder,

They trust the state will continue to exist and that particular interests can be fulfilled within it alone; but habit blinds us to the basis of our entire existence. It does not occur to someone who walks the streets in safety at night that this might be otherwise, for this habit of [living in] safety at night has become second nature, and we scarcely stop to think that it is solely the effect of particular institutions.⁶⁸

What is problematic here is that Hegel attributes the 'rational' feature to the bare existence of the state, not to the behaviors of the state once it is established. The rationality of the state does not guarantee any pattern of either internal or external behaviors of the state. The allegiance we have toward our state is often habitual and conventional. Rather than being an appreciation of the rational character of state, it is often a form of irrational passions or parochial favoritism. The conviction that the

⁶⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §268, p. 288-289.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

rational state benefits all the members inside it seems to be self-defeating when used as a basis for the claim that the individual must serve the universal to the point that they must risk their life. Of course the agreement to risk one's life for the state is only something that occurs in times of crisis whereas the benefit of the state supposedly is felt by us in our everyday life. However, in a totalitarian state there is no better excuse than assumed "crisis" to stifle dissents among its citizens.

Indeed, there are many reasons for us to be skeptical about Hegel's optimism about the rationality of the state. On one hand, Hegel sees nation as one component of many particular differences along with sex, race, or class that are constitutive of and are to be subsumed by a modern state. On the other hand, he claims nations or peoples to be the agent of history, not individuals. He assigns a pivotal role to nations in the historical progress, as he notes "each particular national genius is to be treated as only one individual in the process of universal history."⁶⁹ Apparently, as a social analyst, Hegel fails to anticipate the relation between state and nation, for nationality has been the one of main obstacles to the rational workings of the state in the following century. Nations have been not only the dominant driving force of state building, but also the reasons for irrational acts of a state, far from being sublated by the rationality.

At the same time, Hegel rightly foresaw the configurations and the impact of national identities in the twentieth century. In reality, modern states have been charged the greater evil than wars since the number of people murdered by their own state is virtually greater than the numbers killed in war, including two world wars.⁷⁰ It is to say that the internal workings of states, or as some might argue, the constitution of states, have created greater evils than warring states. Contrary to the hackneyed criticism aiming against Hegel as nationalist, Hegel's failure to see the heavy influence of nationalism down the road may be then, as Avineri points out, the grave error that Hegel committed. Hegel clearly did not see how the rationality of the state could be marred by the claims of national identities as he located the nations at the center on the historical stage.

⁶⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, trans. by J. Sibree, p. 53.

⁷⁰ The numbers killed by their own government was hundreds of millions during the last century. Rudolph Rummel, *Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder in the Twentieth Century* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994).

Moreover, Hegel largely neglects the emergence of a global society that transcends interstate relations. If the ethical component of the state is to bring the individual out of their selfish desires and to make them realize the nobility of sacrifice to the universal, this role does not have to be played exclusively by the state. Patriotism is not necessarily a virtue when it serves the extended form of self-interest. In our days, various international organizations may provide us with better opportunities to overcome these immediate dispositions and go beyond one's concern for selfish interest. At the same time, Hegel's strict dichotomy between private egoism in the civil society and political participation in the ethical community blinds him to the possibility of intermediate associations. As Charles Larmore argues, it is indeed "a common argumentative strategy" of anti-liberals for praising the political as the highest form of activity, and to make politics the exclusive domain for deliberating about the good life.⁷¹ In other words, Hegel's solution of the state to cure the fragmentation through the wholeness of society turns out to be somewhat hasty and leaves out many other possibilities.

(3) Hegel on War and Peace

Hegel notes that "[I]f no agreement can be reached between particular wills, conflicts between states can be settled only by war."⁷² Due to Hegel's understanding of the state as the highest and the best possible form of human organization, Hegel's notion of war and peace is conspicuously opposed to that of Kant. For Hegel, war is not an absolute evil; rather, war is not only inevitable but also useful. Instead of the immediate imperative to stop all wars, Hegel embarks on analyzing the function of war. According to Hegel, war defines on one hand the relationship of individuals toward their state, and on the other hand the relationship among states.

Indeed, war is a rare situation where individuals give up their selfish desires to protect their private interest, and determine to sacrifice themselves for the public good. The sacrifice that war demands in turn is a proof that the ultimate end of a state is more

⁷¹ Charles Larmore, *Patterns of Moral Complexity* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 105.

⁷² Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §334, p. 369.

than securing life and property of individuals. The idea of war forces humanity to face its existential condition and thereby it becomes “a healthy antidote against the dispersion” from a privatization in a bourgeois society.⁷³ Thus, war, regardless of its cause, is a case in which the “sanity” of a state can be tested. In his “German Constitution” - one of his early publications - he notes, “[t]he health of a state generally reveals itself not so much in the tranquility of peace as in the turmoil of war.”⁷⁴ In *Philosophy of Right*, he reaffirms this thought:

The higher significance of war is that, through its agency, the ethical health of nations is preserved in their indifference towards the permanence of finite determinacies, just as the movement of the winds preserves the sea from that stagnation which a lasting calm would produce - a stagnation which a lasting, not to say perpetual, peace would also produce among nations.⁷⁵

This line of thought that underscores the solemnity of war has been not uncommon. Even Kant acknowledges this idea, too. He notes,

[w]ar itself, if it is carried on with order and with a sacred respect for the rights of citizens, has something sublime in it. (...) On the other hand, a long peace generally brings about a predominant commercial spirit and, along with it, low selfishness, cowardice and effeminacy [*sic!*], and debases the disposition of the people.⁷⁶

Despite this awareness, Kant argues that the loss of waging and preparing for wars still outweighs the benefit. Hegel, however, goes a step further claiming that war is necessary for the upkeep of “the health” of peoples. War is a condition in which “the vanity of

⁷³ Adriaan Peperzak, “Hegel contra Hegel in His Philosophy of Right: The Contradictions of International Politics” *Journal of History of Philosophy*, Vol. 32, No. 2, (1994).

⁷⁴ Hegel, “German Constitution (1798-1802),” in *Hegel: Political Writings*, eds. by Laurence Dickey and H.B. Nisbet (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁷⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §324, p. 360.

⁷⁶ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. by J. H. Bernard (NY: Prometheus Books, 1959), §28, p. 127.

temporal things and temporal good (...) takes on a serious significance.” Instead of Kant’s effort to transform the political moralists into moral politicians, Hegel acknowledges waging war as a basic and inevitable undertaking of politicians. Hegel goes so far as to suggest that a government might utilize this option to rekindle patriotic feelings necessary for social cohesion.⁷⁷

On another level, war explains the way in which one state relates to one another. War is a conflict between two wills, a clash between two rights. Hegel notes, therefore, there is no right or evil side in war. On this view, therefore, an attempt to punish a ‘rogue’ state for its ‘immoral behavior’ is nothing but a sign of hypocrisy. Engaging any moral language in describing wars occurs, in other words, as a consequence of confusing politics with morality. It is at this point, Habermas notes that Carl Schmitt “comes closer” to Hegel in his criticism of Kant.⁷⁸

It is disputable whether Hegel truly “glorifies” war. At the one end of spectrum, Hegel is often classed with agonistic thinkers; at the other end he is said to be compatible with the mainstream liberal thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.⁷⁹ One may argue that analyzing Hegel’s writing from a normative perspective is highly dangerous because Hegel is concerned with describing a state of affairs rather than prescribing how things ought to be.⁸⁰ Yet, it seems to me that Hegel is not only describing states of affairs. He is also generating certain normative claims in that he espouses another ideal, that is, a vision centered around an ideal state, not an ideal world as a whole. It seems that the concept of the state is already a normative concept as it is connected to the idea of rationality. Donald Verene, rightly in my view, attempts to eschew this dichotomy by claiming that Hegel puts forth a theory of war while Kant puts forth a theory of peace.

As we have examined so far, Hegel’s communitarian theory of self, the positivistic notion of legality, and the realistic account of war place him on the opposite

⁷⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §324, pp. 360-362, especially see the remark and addition.

⁷⁸ Jürgen Habermas, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Year’s Hindsight,” *Perpetual Peace*, ed. James Bohmann and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), p.145.

⁷⁹ Donald Phillip Verene, “Hegel’s Account of War” in *Hegel Myths and Legends*, edited by Jon Stewart (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996). Originally printed in *Hegel’s political philosophy: Problems and Perspectives*, edited by Zbigniew Andrzej Pelczynski (Cambridge University Press, 1971).

⁸⁰ Allegra de Laurentiis, “Mortal Gods: A Reply to Andrew Buchwalter’s “Hegel’s Conception of Situated Cosmopolitanism.”

side of Kant. But in putting forth a theory of war instead of a theory of peace, Hegel has done what cannot be done through a Kantian lens, namely describing *what* it is and *why* it is. In other words, Hegel gives an adequate account of the reality and its rationality. The question then becomes whether Hegel could accommodate a theory of peace, too; and if so, what it looks like.

3. Hegelian Cosmopolitanism

Despite Hegel's own overt objection, it has been argued that there is a strong case for a "Hegelian Cosmopolitanism." In the literature, mainly two patterns of arguments can be discerned. One is a "political" adaptation of Hegel's notion of universal consciousness which claims that the universal consciousness points to a formation of world state or world government. The other is a "cultural" interpretation which argues that intermingling of different cultures points for unity, a culturally perceived global identity without positing global political institutions. In this section, I shall delineate the justifications as well as the limitations of these two versions of Hegelian cosmopolitanism.

The common venue of the start-up for both versions of Hegelian cosmopolitanism is Hegel's theory of freedom as mutual recognition. The politics of recognition, as the master and slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* displays, pursues humanity's liberation from social chains and traditional shackles. The master appears initially self-sufficient in that he gets satisfaction without laboring. He does not need to be recognized by the other. On the contrary, the slave labors without getting enjoyment and he is dependent on the master. However, the initial relationship gets subverted as master's dignity becomes in effect dependent on the slave's activity because now it is the slave who can control external things. Moreover, the master's dignity is also dependent upon the slave's free recognition. Therefore it can be argued that the dialectic needs to presuppose the freedom of slave to begin with. Representing two different modes of consciousness and their mutual relations, Hegel clearly endows slave consciousness with the agency of social change in history, rather than master consciousness.

In this portrait, freedom cannot be given from above; but slaves must risk their life to “win” freedom. Only the individual who has staked his life may be recognized as a person. Slave consciousness goes through stages in this transformative process: First, slave consciousness fights against master’s dominion, which is external oppression. In order to do this, the slave also has to overcome his internal desire to succumb to the master’s demand in fear of losing his life. Lastly, the freed consciousness would grant others the same freedom that it has fought for, rather than subjugating the previous master. This is the proof of genuine liberation of consciousness. In this vein, Hegel claims that “there [should] be no slavery is the ethical requirement.”⁸¹

Based on this ultimate goal of the dialectic, some Hegelians argue that a logical offshoot of the struggle for recognition points toward ‘cosmopolitanism.’ The struggle must transcend the state boundary just like any other distinctions such as family, religion and even nations, and continue until it embraces the globally underrepresented and disrespected. Due to this liberating aspect, they claim that Hegelian cosmopolitanism is in fact “rooted”, “situated” and even “radical” vis-à-vis Kant’s ideal. On this interpretation, the politics of recognition may provide a framework within which the dichotomy between ‘insider and outsider’ or ‘citizen and alien’ can be resolved. Now, I shall examine the political application of the universal consciousness.

(1) Political Cosmopolitanism

Alexandre Kojève illustrates an immediate application of this universal consciousness in a political sense. In his *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, Kojève argues Hegel’s theory of recognition combined with his historicism would logically lead to a homogenous and universal world-government. Hegel’s understanding of world history is famously depicted as the voluntary unfolding of the struggles of the two moments of mastery and slavery. On Kojève’s reading, this antagonism is to be followed by the synthesis of the two in which human existence overcomes its one-sidedness and actively realizes its own possibilities to the fullest extent. One might argue that Kojève’s interpretation has done too much violence to Hegel himself and has had a negative effect

⁸¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §190, p. 228, my addition.

on the reception of Hegel among the French intellectuals. No matter how idiosyncratic it may seem, Kojève's interpretation represents one of the most common readings of Hegel's philosophy of history.

According to Kojève, this moment of synthesis marks the consummation of history, where all past labors and struggles are preserved and taken up. Because this state contains all the differences, the future will be nothing but a repetition of the past. The bizarre expression, "the end of history" hereby receives its meaning. Kojève claims that after "the end of history," we will be left with a universal homogeneous state:

Individuality can be fully realized, the desire for Recognition can be completely satisfied only in and by the universal and homogeneous State. For, in the homogeneous State, the "specific-differences" (*Besonderheiten*) of class, race, and so on are "overcome," and therefore this State is directly related to the particular man as such, who is recognized as citizen in his very particularity. And this recognition is truly universal, for, by definition, the State embraces the whole of the human race.⁸²

In this universal state, the citizens are satisfied because they are recognized by all men who are their peers. He stresses that it is due to the homogeneity of this universal state that the citizens are recognized for really who they are, and not because their family, social class, or nation.⁸³ On this view, in this universal state, wars and revolutions are impossible. Since the state will remain eternally identical to itself, and the individual formed by the state in which he lives and acts will not change anymore.

Nonetheless, the static consummation of history that preserves all the dynamic changes and differences is nothing but an illusion, which may be as captivating as the presupposition of the unmoved mover in traditional metaphysics. It is indeed true that Hegel's discussions on world historical events and world historical figures seem to

⁸² Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures of the Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p.235; the Translation is based on *Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel* (Gallimard, 1980), p. 145. Kojève's reading of Hegel is, in my point of view, the epitome of the Hegelian cosmopolitanism. Other Hegelians along this line such as Fukuyama seem to share, more or less, the main flaws that Kojève shows.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

support this reading. It is well known that when Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Jena where Hegel was writing a draft of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it appeared to Hegel as “the world spirit on horseback.” As Napoleon himself confidently claims that France needs recognition no more than the sun, this symbol of French Enlightenment is expected to finalize all the wars and revolutions in world history. Hegel is no doubt mistaken in believing that the Napoleonic Empire would be the realization of the universal state. It was perhaps even worse for Kojève who hinted that Stalinist Socialism might be the one that embodies the culminating moment of world history. It is perhaps by the same logic that Francis Fukuyama considered after the fall of the Soviet that the United States would carry this historical role. All these predictions turned out to be mistaken; and it could be so by accident. However, it is surprising to see how often the same pattern of arguments appears again and again. This is why we need to render Kojève’s reading central here, and yet view it critically.

In fact, Kojève’s optimistic interpretation of the world state that foregoes wars and revolutions is made possible only by jettisoning Hegel’s pessimistic prospect on interstate relationship that is always permeated with the immanence of war. Hegel was aware that a war would ensue after this culminating moment. The victory of one side does not guarantee that the winner is right; it just gives a way to one right over the other. Therefore it is possible that history not only progresses but also regresses: Hegel’s illustration of this is that the superior Greek spirit gave way to - at least on his assessment - the inferior Roman culture.⁸⁴ This explains the deepest pessimism on his understanding of world history.

However, Hegel was tempted to say that a homogenous spirit will emerge after all from these struggles amongst multiple spirits. He writes, “their deeds and destinies in their mutual relations are the manifest dialectic of the finitude of these spirits. It is through this dialectic that the *universal* spirit, *the spirit of the world*, produces itself in its freedom from all limits, and it is this spirit which exercises its right - which is the highest right of all - over finite spirits in world history as the world’s court of judgment.⁸⁵ Hence

⁸⁴ Robert R. Williams, *Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997), p. 363.

⁸⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §340, p. 371.

his famous dictum, *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*. This thought becomes more explicit in his *Lecture on Philosophy of History*. Hegel notes,

States in the modern world seek independence of one another, and this is their honour. This obstinate tendency toward an absolute position to autonomy they have in common with the Greek city-states (...). But despite all the differences between the individual states (...) there also obtains a unity among them, and therefore we should view even political independence as a merely formal principle. Today there is not the same absolute chasm between the states of Europe which prevailed between Greece and Persia. (...) The trend of the states is, therefore, towards uniformity. There prevails among them one aim, one tendency, which is the cause of wars, friendships, and the needs of dynasties. But there also prevails among them another uniformity, which parallels the idea of hegemony in Greece, except that now it is the hegemony of spirit.⁸⁶

This supposition of the universal state seems to be tempting for Hegelians to consider the ultra-power of the day as the universal state. It is analogous to the hegemonic cosmopolitanism of the Roman Empire. Yet, any attempt to identify one single power as the unifying world-state is doomed to fail, for there will always be a new configuration of powers around the hegemonic state. When Hegelians fall into this hackneyed temptation and lose the insight into the vicissitudes of history that is immanent in Hegel's political theory, it can simply turn into a justification of the pre-existing hegemony of the day.

(2) Cultural Cosmopolitanism

This is where the cultural interpretation appears to be a more adequate reading of universal consciousness. It stresses the fact that Hegel considers nations or peoples, rather than states, as the main agent of historical development. Noting Hegel's distinction

⁸⁶ Hegel, *Lectures of the Philosophy of World History*, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, with an introduction by Duncan Forbes (Cambridge University Press, 1975); the translation is based on Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, edited by G. Lasson (Leipzig, 1920), p. 761.

between law of states (*Staatenrecht*) and law of peoples (*Völkerrecht*), Buchwalter argues the latter represents Hegel's notion of international law (*Ausserstaatrecht*) proper.⁸⁷ The benefit of placing nations instead of states at the center of the argument is that nations or peoples are cultural entities whereas states are rigid self-contained political entities. Openness and fluidity mark the idea of nations or peoples. Peoples as cultural entities are always in the recognition process which presupposes mutuality and reciprocity. Buchwalter claims that even though Hegel argues for authenticity of a culture, "this claim of authenticity eschews appeals to the irreducible uniqueness of cultural experience and accentuate instead that which is alien and other to itself."⁸⁸

This culturalist account of Hegel's "universal mind" takes Hegel's rejection of any legal-political entity beyond state boundary seriously, be it a world government or a league of nations. Instead, it endorses Hegel's espousal of uniformity as "global identity." Regarding the content of global identity, Buchwalter draws attention to the following sentence. "*Die Völker wollen das Recht an und für sich; nicht bloß die besonderen Traktate gelten, sondern zugleich Grundsätze machen den Inhalt der Diplomatie aus*": Peoples will the right in and for itself; regard is not had exclusively to particular conventions between nations, but principles enter into the consideration with which diplomacy is occupied.⁸⁹ It is to say that the law of peoples is demarcated for moral principles that are independently valid and at the same time universally binding, which cannot be replaced by particular customs of communities.

This interpretation of law of peoples is, however, not without problems. First, despite Buchwalter's account of law of peoples, Hegel ultimately relegates its destiny to a verdict of world spirit. Hegel argues over and over again that politics is not to be confused with morals. Then what is the content of the universal norms out of which particular political conventions are to be formed? He claims that global identity results from "the process and practice of the world's peoples and nations asserting, individually

⁸⁷ Andrew Buchwalter, "Hegel's Conception of an International "We"," in *Identity and Difference*, edited by Philip Grier (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007). Buchwalter makes similar remarks in "Bounded Communities, International Law, and Hegel's Conception of Situated Cosmopolitanism," Presented at the Pacific APA (2005).

⁸⁸ Andrew Buchwalter, "Hegel's Conception of an International "We"" in *Identity and Difference*, p. 160.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 163; for the original text, see Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. by J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 346,

and from their perspectives, their own self-identity.”⁹⁰ On this view, Hegel’s concept of right would generate normative principles that are embedded in particular culture, and yet, shared by different culture groups. However, on what ground can we be certain that various cultures would arrive at universal normative principles, or what John Rawls would call “an overlapping consensus”?

Another problem has to do with the ultimate subject of international law. Again the benefit of talking of a law of peoples instead of a law of states is that peoples are cultural entities and are thus much more flexible and open to changes. Buchwalter seems to have no qualms about assuming nations or cultures to be the ultimate subject of cosmopolitanism in Hegel. The true agent of history for Hegel is peoples, not individuals.⁹¹ Hegel notes,

The concrete Ideas of national spirits (*Völkergeister*) have their truth and destiny (*Bestimmung*) in the concrete Idea as absolute universality, i.e., in the world spirit, around whose throne they stand as the agents of its actualization and as witnesses and ornaments of its splendour.

This thought becomes more explicit in his *Philosophy of History*. Hegel notes “each particular national genius is to be treated as only one individual in the process of universal history.”⁹² In my view, this is what is fundamentally different from the Kantian commitment in Hegel’s cosmopolitan ideal. Hegel leaves no room for Kantian *Weltbürgerrecht*, the cosmopolitan right; instead he only acknowledges *Völkerrecht*, the law of peoples. As feminists often point out, however, the notion of authenticity of culture often keeps the socially vulnerable, such as women or children, under the yoke of

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁹¹ The German word, *das Volk*, is translated as variously as nation, people or even race; thus it causes much confusion. I will use ‘people’ as the most adequate translation of this word given that ‘nation’ and ‘race’ has an equivalent German word, respectively, *Nation* and *Geschlecht*. Although these terms are related to a certain degree, I hope this choice prevents unnecessary confusions as well as prejudices against Hegel.

⁹² Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. by J. Sibree (NY: Dover Publications, 1956), p. 53, modifications added.

tradition and further hinders their liberation from it.⁹³ Collective identities may leave the disadvantaged fighting an uphill battle rather than empowering them. This is precisely why Hegel himself regards nation as merely one constitutive aspect of the rational state along with other racial and religious differences. Focusing on peoples might veer away from an accusation of statism based on Hegel's rigid notion of self-contained state. Nevertheless, the shift seems to cause more problems than it solves. Fluidity and hybridity of culture can always open up new horizons; however, encounter with otherness is not enough of a safeguard from the pervasive injustice that is taken for granted within a culture. In sum, the culturalist account of homogeneous spirit as global commonality actually falls back to the danger of pre-modern society which Hegel seeks to overcome through the rationality of the state.

(3) The Politics of Recognition

Now I shall focus on the last problem that the political and the cultural interpretations share. They share this problem because they commonly draw on the politics of recognition as the engine of the dynamic process.

In Kojève's passage quoted above, Kojève considers the world state as the unity of all humanity. This rendering of the universal state is deeply flawed in another way because he neglects the fact that no historical empire has ever encompassed all of humanity. However, it seems easy for him to account for other parts of globe that did not join the modern enlightenment – those people who do not participate in this process do not count! He says, though in parenthesis, “the state unites all of humanity *at least which counts* historically.” Although this reading may not be the most charitable reading of him, there is something deeply troubling in this passage. Contrary to his hope that the unifying state that subsumes all differences will put an end to all violent conflicts, this assumption may make war even more atrocious because the enemy is now a barbarian who does not count, and does not belong to the legitimate “humanity.”

⁹³ See Uma Narayan, *Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third-World Feminism* (Routledge, 1997); Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development* (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Hegel is not innocent of his disciple's Eurocentrism. Regarding international recognition, Hegel faces this difficulty, too. He presupposes that there are various stages of development among nations: While some nations have reached internal development to constitute a modern state, others seem to remain pre-modern. Hegel observes, "the degree of cultural development is different, so that perhaps one degree of ethical life is not recognized by the others." If achieving the sovereignty were for a state the prerequisite of gaining international recognition, lacking an objective constitution could be a justifying ground for paternalistic intervention, if worse, imperialistic dominion. As Robert Williams argues rightly, "recognition between states presupposes comparable levels of cultural development and convergence of values, especially freedom."⁹⁴ Therefore, it turns out that a certain level of homogeneity is not a consequence of struggle for recognition, but it is a precondition for this fight to death even to start up.

In light of this, Hegel's rendering of slavery deserves closer examination. From his master and slave dialectic, slavery is considered as the sign of servility and the opposite of freedom.⁹⁵ Given that the goal of history is to gain freedom, it follows that slavery must be abolished. For this reason, it comes as surprise that Hegel supported the slavery of the black Africans in his days. Hegel's argument is this: Africa remains in the pre-ethical condition in world history. Slavery, polygamy, and even cannibalism are even widely accepted in this continent. Therefore, he argues, it is still better for the Africans to be in colonies as slaves than to remain in Africa. The prevalence of despotic rule in Africa is a sign that they are not suitable for "such thing as a constitution." He argues in one of his *Lectures on Philosophy of History*,

The negroes are enslaved by the Europeans and sold to America. Nevertheless, their lot in their own country, where slavery is equally absolute, is almost worse than this; for the basic principle of all slavery is that man is not yet conscious of his freedom, and consequently sinks to the

⁹⁴ Robert R. Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997), p. 354.

⁹⁵ Regarding Hegel's position on slavery, see Susan Buck-Morss, "Hegel and Haiti," *Critical Inquiry* 26 (University of Chicago, 2000).

level of a mere object of worthless article. In all the African kingdoms known to the Europeans, this slavery is endemic and accepted as natural.⁹⁶

The underlying logic is that slavery is unjust because the essence of man is freedom; but he must first become mature in order to be free. In other words, the Africans must be free someday but they do not yet deserve freedom because they are still immature. Hegel suggests thus “it is more fitting and correct that slavery should be eliminated gradually than that it should be done away with all at once.”⁹⁷ Discussing seemingly “barbarous” practices, Hegel engages in Eurocentric paternalism on and on. On this point Hegel seems to have forgotten the insight that humans are made servile when they remain under serfdom, not that they are created as such. The lesson that we can learn here is that simply replacing the subject of cosmopolitanism from states with cultures does not increase sensitivity to difference and otherness. It is the stubbornness of one’s attitude that is always reluctant to extend one’s recognition to others. If the genuine sign of liberation would be that I would want this other to be free just as I am, the liberating potential of Hegel’s recognition process is thwarted by Hegel himself at this point. Even when the Hegelian argument is not so much that I *want* the other to be free but that I *need* the other to be free as a condition of the confirmation of my own freedom, the reluctance to recognize others becomes the very failing ground of my own freedom.

Moreover, Hegel mentions that in reality there are Negroes who rather kill themselves for their honor than living in serfdom. Instead of praising their courage to fight to death, Hegel claims that “their contempt for life does not mean that they are weary of it, or that some fortuitous irritation has overtaken them; on the contrary, life in general has no value for them.”⁹⁸ Comparing this dismissive statement towards slaves’ actual struggle in *Philosophy of History* with his earlier praise of slave consciousness in *Philosophy of Phenomenology* reveals an undeniable double standard that is underlying Hegel’s thought. Indicating Hegel’s frequent mention of the abolitionist movement in Haiti of his time, Susan Buck-Morss bitterly notes: “What is clear is that in an effort to

⁹⁶ Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 183.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

become more erudite in African studies during the 1820s, Hegel was in fact becoming dumber.”⁹⁹ Clearly, in Berlin years, Hegel’s rendering of slavery becomes more conservative and less enlightened.

The question then becomes whether Hegel’s clearly egregious views on race are internally connected to, or implicit in, his philosophical position. I am inclined to answer that Hegel’s philosophical position does not necessitate his view on race; still it entails lines of logic that justify this frightful conclusion. For this reason, I agree with Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth that Hegel loses the emancipatory potential of the politics of recognition in his later works. Drawing a distinction between “the early Hegel” and “the mature Hegel,” Habermas claims that the possibility of reconciliation of the former is lost in the latter.¹⁰⁰ Honneth argues in a similar vein that recognition, the central engine of Hegel’s account of the ethical life, becomes “a form of monologically self-developing Spirit and no longer constitutes a particularly demanding form of intersubjectivity.”¹⁰¹ In contrast, in his valuable work on the ethical aspect of the recognition theory, Robert Williams argues that there is unbroken continuity even in the later Hegel that is not fully appreciated. However, Williams’ attempt to rescue Hegel comes at a price: in particular, with regard to his treatment of international law, he has to blame someone else for Hegel’s obvious bigotry claiming that “certain important respects of his thoughts remain Fichtean.”¹⁰² Even if the later Hegel preserves the liberating promise, at least Hegel seems to have failed to make it convincing to his readers.

In conclusion, Hegel’s universal consciousness seems to be no guarantee for the genuine cosmopolitan promise - the promise that the politics of recognition would bring forth universal freedom - as its defenders argue. It is always possible for a socially privileged race or advantaged class whose insiders recognize each other reciprocally to

⁹⁹ Susan Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti” *Critical Inquiry* 26 (University of Chicago, 2000). She goes onto juxtapose Hegel’s support of slavery to others’ actions in favor of its abolition. The “moments of clarity in action” that she praises are, for example, the French soldiers wondering whether they are on the right side upon hearing their former slaves singing “Marseille” and the Polish regiment’s denial to massacre six hundred African captives against command.

¹⁰⁰ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. by F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1987), p. 295.

¹⁰¹ Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar for Social Conflicts*, trans. by Joel Anderson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 61.

¹⁰² Robert R. Williams, *Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997), p. 26.

refuse to recognize outsiders, or even to consider them as morally insignificant nonpersons. If the concept of humanity depends on social recognition, certain individuals or even a whole group can be denied such a status. This has been the cause of suffering for many people for many centuries. The politics of recognition may provide us a better framework in which serious antagonism of our world can be addressed; however it seems to be inadequate to become the sole ground constitutive of moral claims. If we were to remain loyal to Hegel's earlier ethical requirement that there should be no slavery, we would be forced to jettison his later historical-anthropological assumptions. In fact, when the demand of universal recognition is met, that is to say, the human being is recognized as a human being, the ultimate picture thus depicted does not look very different from Kant's cosmopolitan ideal in which human being is respected qua human being.

4. Hegel on Capitalism, Poverty and Colonialism

So far we have examined the justifications and limitations of Hegelian cosmopolitanism. Now I shall turn to Hegel's account of poverty and colonialization in the modern industrial state. They are comparatively less discussed subjects in the Hegelian cosmopolitan discourse; yet, these topics demand special attention for the present purpose. In fact, the contemporary discourse of cosmopolitanism has gained its momentum from the cognizance of extreme global inequality and the need to redress this situation. Against this backdrop, Hegel's explication of poverty speaks to the importance of the material condition of freedom. Contrary to Kant's concept of the deontological self that leaves little space for the material basis needed to become a free agent, Hegel's embedded notion of freedom opens up the possibility of taking the individual's economic condition and its moral implication seriously. Moreover, Hegel's analysis of poverty as a necessary consequence, and at the same time, as an irresolvable social problem of civil society, I shall argue, points to the limits of the rationality of the state. This conclusion, which Hegel himself might not be prepared to make at all, finds support in his negligence of the injustice done to colonies while he is willing to include them as a possible way of curing the evil of the domestic affairs of modern industrial society.

The realization of the power of civil society is a central theme in the *Philosophy of Right*. Civil society is operative based on the system of needs. Labor, the medium through which the needs are satisfied is also the means of liberation of humanity from nature. Unlike Rousseau's portrait of the state of nature as the golden age, Hegel regards men as becoming free only through their own labor. Thus, the principle of civil society is that each earn their own livelihood through his or her own work, and thereby the feeling of self-sufficiency and honor. It is the sphere of "universal egoism," yet at the same time, a "universal family" in that it attempts to satisfy its members' interests to the fullest degree.

However, the needs that civil society undertakes to satisfy are neither definite nor determinable. Human needs are, unlike animal's, multiplied through mediation. There are socially fabricated as well as naturally given needs. Hegel rightly observes that the desire for "comfort" knows no limit. The pursuit of consumption and production is therefore endless. Civil Society is now caught in a vicious circle, and finally driven to restless expansion. He notes, "[t]he activity of civil society is unrestricted, it is occupied internally with *expanding its population and industry*."¹⁰³

Hegel's account of poverty is posited as the opposite of unlimited wealth of the modern society. Hegel observes that poverty is not an accident, but a natural consequence of market economy in the modern society. Amidst the accumulation of wealth, he observes "a large mass of people sinks below the level of a certain standard of living."¹⁰⁴ Hegel observes that it is not only objective lack of resources, but also subjective need to achieve the minimum of a particular society. Of course, there is no standard of living that can be determined ahead of time. Without the fixed minimum, the poor has the felt needs. He claims "The lowest subsistence level, that of a rabble of paupers, is fixed automatically, but the minimum varies considerably in different countries. In England, even the very poorest believe that they have rights."¹⁰⁵

Amongst the pauper, he notes, the feeling of right, integrity, and honour, which comes from supporting oneself by one's own labor, is lost. The poor lose all the advantage of society such as "the opportunity of acquiring skill or education of any kind,

¹⁰³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §243, p. 266, emphasis is original.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, §244, p. 266

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, §244A, p. 266.

as well as the administration of justice, the public health services, and often even of the consolations of religion.”¹⁰⁶ This is when “the rabble” (*Pöbbel*), the totally alienated and atomized mass of people is created. However, Hegel notes that the rabble comes into existence not because of poverty itself, but dispositions attached to it. Namely, they become habituated in their laziness as a result of lack of hope, and at the same time, they feel indignation and rebellion toward the rich and the powerful. As a consequence, a rabble feels no allegiance to their society and no longer wishes to be part of it. A contradiction arises in that they, nevertheless, claim their right to be recognized while they subsist solely on others’ work. Soon, this leads to social alienation and polarization.

What Hegel is concerned about is the influence of poverty on the people who are subject to it. The paupers do not take up an active role in fostering social change in Hegel as in Marx. Their existence troubles Hegel because it is an affront to the decency of civil society. Interestingly, Hegel’s analysis does not stop at the moral wound of the rabble. The culture of poverty breeds moral degradation not only to the poor, but also to the rich. He observes the phenomenon of “rich rabble.” The humility of the poor is putting them to the hands of the rich; this, in turn, makes the rich to think that they can buy everything with enough wealth, even a human being’s dignity. He writes, “[t]he wealth can lead to the same mockery and shamelessness that we find among the rabble. The disposition of the master over the slave is the same as that of the slave.”¹⁰⁷ Ultimately, poverty injures the principle of civil society in general.

What is to be done to solve this problem? First, Hegel suggests charitable donations as forms of subjective help based on emotion and love. In a society where poverty is endemic, there are a lot to do for charitable workers. Hegel calls this is the realm where private morality flourishes. However, Hegel regards benevolent charity as not a sufficient solution to this evil. It is too contingent in its nature and effect to be counted upon. It is not only limited, but also counter-effective in that it hurts the dignity of the recipient. It goes against the healthy principle of civil society which demands that

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, §241, p. 265.

¹⁰⁷ Hegel, *Lectures on Philosophy of Right*, (VPR 19: 196), also quoted in Allen W. Wood, *Hegel’s Ethical Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 253.

all find their livelihood through their work. He instead concludes that, “public condition should be regarded as all the more perfect the less is left for the individual.”¹⁰⁸

Hegel maintains that the conflicts of self-interest are not remedied by the invisible hand as in the outlook of Adam Smith or by divine purpose as in Kant. Kant holds onto a harmonistic vision that this brute clash of self-interest will be somehow refined and enlightened. Even on the international level, Kant argues that the spirit of free commerce will bring more countries into a closer relationship and motivate them to pursue peace with one another. He even claims that out of their own self-interest states will join the league of nations. Hegel is definitely not a libertarian when it comes to the matter of equality. It is from this emergence of a rabble that Hegel sees the need for the mediation of the state. He argues that a conscious state intervention and supervision is required to minimize this inability of integration of civil society. The problem of poverty now takes up a qualitative dimension and plays the key role in his explication of civil society as one necessary moment toward the state, the realization of human freedom within Hegel’s system.

Now given that poverty is the social expression of the systematic tension between the enriched productive force and the inability to enjoy this wealth, or the created needs and inability to satisfy these needs, the public authority, or what he calls the police, stands out to fix the evil of civil society. Hegel considers the option of producing more work for the poor. This might make their livelihood secured by their own work; but, soon he realizes it does not touch the root of the evil. Since over-production is an internal problem of capitalism, creating more jobs causes, rather than solves, the problem. Hegel stresses again and again that poverty is a structural problem based on the connectedness of civil society.

In spite of the different talents and attitudes, Hegel clearly perceives that, the underclass is not produced solely because of their idleness or extravagance. Therefore, Hegel claims that this way of dealing with poverty is, in short, “to leave the poor to their fate and direct them to beg from the public.”¹⁰⁹ Later, in the final section on civil society, Hegel discusses somewhat eccentrically the corporations under which members of a trade

¹⁰⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §242R, p. 266.

¹⁰⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §245R, p. 267.

or profession seek to assist their members in distress. However, none of these remedies seem to be sufficient to cope with the endemic poverty.

Thirdly, he turns to colonialization to which civil society is somewhat forcefully driven. It is to say that civil society may export its surplus goods and commodities and transplant its over-populated paupers to colonies.¹¹⁰ It may be that Hegel considers colonialization as an effect of poverty rather than an active cure for it.¹¹¹ However, since expansion is regarded as necessary from the inner dialectic of the operation of civil society, Hegel clearly discusses colonialization as a systematic act of the state to secure a means of its subsistence. At this point, he praises the dynamism of commerce and navigation as the pursuit of gain as opposed to the agriculture, which is the precondition of family life. The danger and audacity in the ocean is contrasted with the stability and the domesticity on the soil. He goes so far as to say that conquering nations flourish through fluidity and creativity, whereas the conquered nations such as India and Egypt who have shunned navigation sink into superstitious stagnation and appalling misery.

Nevertheless there is another aspect of colonialization, that is, the destructive potential of having colonies, that Hegel is insinuating without fully explicating at this point: as colonies are not granted equal rights, they become the cause of wars and rebellions. Instead, he optimistically claims that the colonialization helps those nations subsist who lack the means of supporting themselves or the creativity to break through their situation. Hegel maintains his usual calmness as political analyst even when he speaks of the hardship and bondage of the colonies as well as their independence. Hegel claims that “the liberation of colonies itself proves to be of the greatest advantage of the mother state, just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage to the master.” It is not unusual that he describes state of affairs without making either normative judgment or practical advices. What is striking, however, is that Hegel barely mentions the harm done to colonies and slaves. He selectively speaks of the benefit that exported goods and services will satisfy the needs in the underdeveloped and uncivilized parts of the world, without considering the violence and injury inflicted to the colonized. Given

¹¹⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §246 through §248.

¹¹¹ Commentators seem to disagree on this point. Dudley Knowles represents colonialism as Hegel’s one proposal to remedy the problem of poverty whereas Allen Wood argues that Hegel merely describes the effect of it rather than suggesting it as a solution. Dudley Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 291.

Hegel's insightful diagnosis of "rich rabble" within civil society, who thinks there is no such thing as human dignity beyond price, the shamelessness and mockery of the wealthy individuals must equally apply to the wealthy peoples. Compared to his usual rigor, the failure to mention of the harmful effect of colonialization in regard to men's freedom and the rationality of the state is indeed perplexing.

What is forgotten is that colonialization not only contributes to the welfare of the colonized, but to their continued poverty and misery. It is noteworthy that Hegel regards colonialization as a necessary consequence of civil society's operation. It has a necessary tendency to expand beyond itself in order to transfer surplus goods and services. It may be too hasty to say that lands connected through the operation of civil society must be regarded to be part of civil society, and so be granted equal right. It may as well be stretching Hegel's point too far to talk about the emergence of global civil society or a global welfare state from this observation. However, at least, it is enough reason to support the indictment of the so-called self-sufficiency of the modern state. As Allen Wood cautiously suggests, if every ethical order must ultimately destroy itself through the reflective awareness of its own principles and their limits, "Hegel's reflection of the modern state may also begin to reveal the limits of its principle."¹¹² As the state grows old as a form of life, the time of its ethical decadence and self-destruction grows near. Hegel's theory of the modern state does not give, not even hint at, any positive content to the idea of the possible next form of life. However, Hegel's theory of pauperization, social polarization and colonialization suggests, despite himself, the limits of the modern state as an ideal form of life.

5. Chapter Conclusion

Hegel clearly argues that any emergence of political organization beyond the state is unthinkable and even undesirable. Three aspects of Hegel's critique of Kant's ideal of perpetual peace have been examined; namely, the communitarian notion of self, the theory of rational modern state, and the realistic account of war. Despite the difference

¹¹² Allen W. Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 255.

between these two great thinkers, however, some argue that Hegel can accommodate a theory of peace, not only a theory of war. In this light, Hegelian cosmopolitans argue that a logical offshoot of the struggle for recognition points toward ‘radical cosmopolitanism’ aiming at transcending state boundaries and embracing the globally underrepresented and disadvantaged. Nevertheless, I doubt that a Hegelian cosmopolitanism construed this way provides us with a better outlook. Neither a political nor a cultural interpretation of Hegel’s “homogenous state” or “universal spirit” provides a safeguard against pervasive global injustice. Instead, Hegel’s account of poverty and colonialization supports the view that the modern state bears an internal limit as the embodiment of reason and freedom. It is here that I suggest, contra Hegel, that an argument for global redistribution and a modest form of global political organization can be constructed.

Part Two. Transformation of Kantian Cosmopolitanism

Chapter Three: Global Distributive Justice

1. Introduction

Often when writers conceive of the framework of justice globally, they attribute their work to Immanuel Kant. Their moral justifications and political suggestions vary depending on which part of Kant's insight they consider more fundamental; quite a number of contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers claim to be Kantian.¹¹³ Mostly, the metaphysical ground of his moral philosophy and the teleological justification in his political philosophy are assessed to be untenable or unnecessary. Despite many revisions and omissions, however, three commitments remain central among Kantian cosmopolitans. First, the legacy of moral universalism as the normative basis for cosmopolitanism, that is, all persons are required to respect one another's dignity as moral ends. Second, the espousal of political federalism designed to protect the forms of human diversity in language, culture and religion. Third, the formulation of a cosmopolitan right, that is to ensure individuals' basic rights and duties as members of a universal community beyond national boundaries. There is a wide variety in the interpretations and appropriations of these three principles; yet, they all attempt to have a balanced view on all three principles for they are related to each other.

¹¹³ Henry Shue, *Basic Rights*, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996 [1980]); Thomas Pogge, *Realizing Rawls* (Cornell University Press, 1989); Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens* (Oxford University Press, 2004). Among Kant's proponents, for example, Henry Shue develops a right-centered theory while Onora O'Neill develops a duty-center account of cosmopolitanism. Pogge and Benhabib focus on the concept of cosmopolitan right; Pogge interprets its significance through distributive justice while Benhabib emphasizes the right to be a citizen in a legal community via a theory of citizenship.

It is the common goal for contemporary Kantian cosmopolitans to give a new meaning to the familiar Kantian principle from which they grow to respect the universal dignity of human beings. To see what it means to be committed to these principles clearly, each deserves closer attention. Among others the questions we can ask include: What does it mean that all persons ought to respect one another's dignity? What does it mean that persons have *dignity*; more importantly, what does it mean to *respect* the dignity that persons have? This statement presupposes a question regarding the *recipients* of moral concerns who make claims upon us on one hand, and a question regarding the *agents* who should carry out the urgent demands on the other hand. It behooves us to act on behalf of the persons whose dignity has been violated.

It is noteworthy that the talk of cosmopolitanism in the last two decades gained its momentum from concerns about justice evolving from John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*. Many scholars have been occupied with the question as posed by Rawls as to what it means to have a just society and what it takes to promote that ideal. The fundamental idea pronounced in this discussion is the need to remedy economic inequality, which has been promoted by the dominant Utilitarian school. Even within a nation state that grants equal status to its citizens, redressing material plight is a necessary condition in order to guarantee substance to the formally defined equality. Without this awareness, any kind of redistributive policies and welfare programs to a specific group or class of population would seem to be unjustifiable special treatments. Now in this framework, the principle of universal dignity encourages a fight against discriminations that arise from the inherited poverty or distorted identity molded by the marginal social status of members of disadvantaged groups.¹¹⁴

The idea of political federalism secures the place of local government and peoples' self-determination. Political institutions provide a framework in which individuals pursue their own conception of good. Kantian cosmopolitans seek the moral and political groundwork through which they can meet the needs of individuals regardless of where they belong. This aspiration does not necessarily mean aiming at abolishing or replacing local states. If local authorities serve its members well, so be it. However, one big change

¹¹⁴ See Charles Taylor "The Politics of Recognition" in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

is made from Kant's picture: In the contemporary discussion of cosmopolitanism, the economic concern has come to the foreground. The shift implies the understanding that human beings are profoundly conditioned by their socioeconomic condition. As Kant anticipated, the global flow of capital, of resources as well as of labor often blurs the notion of boundaries. Nevertheless it causes inhumane consequences for many rather than bringing peace across boundaries. Indeed such an interconnection across boundaries may increase both peace and misery. The need to respond to this interconnection provides a motivation for, and at the same time, puts a limitation on the Kantian idea of federation.

In fact, it has been a long time since the mechanism of cooperative production has replaced the self-sufficient domestic model. Multinational products bear extensive importance in our life: The food that comes to our dinner table is produced in South America; the t-shirts and sweatpants that we put on are fabricated in South Asia; the coffee we drink every day is grown in Africa. At the same time, we learn that there are people participating in the production process of what we consume who work and live in unfavorable conditions. As we come to learn the reality, we also come to realize the responsibility. In fact, the more we know, the more we care; the more we care, the more we learn in turn.

Along with the undeniable traces of foreigners in the production of consumer goods, the physical presence of 'foreigners' is everywhere. In all three places -America, Europe and Asia-that I migrated while writing this dissertation, I noticed that most manual jobs are undertaken by 'aliens': Latinos in U.S., Turks and Arabs in Germany and South Asians in South Korea. The global reality is filled with immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Therefore there is a strong case to be made that we need to respond to the moral claims of the migrating people.¹¹⁵ Their presence allows, more adequately, demands a revision of Kant's conception of "cosmopolitan right."

For Kant, a cosmopolitan right is only a minimal concept of hospitality that prohibits inhospitable behavior towards foreigners who happen to be in a foreign land due to some misfortune. Kant makes it explicit that a cosmopolitan right is 'a right of visitor,' not 'a right of guest.' However, continents are not as "distant" from each other as

¹¹⁵ On this argument, see Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

in the late 18th century: We do not encounter foreigners merely as strangers who “drifted to our shores” or who “are lost in desert.”¹¹⁶ As I have suggested in the previous chapter on Hegel, having political rights ought to mean being in a position to be able to enjoy the formally granted rights with substantive material resources. Recognition of moral worth, I argue, requires us to commit ourselves to remove the economic direness that is deeply connected to thwarted exercises of political rights and wounded self-esteem of persons. Should Kant’s normative commitment to moral worth of individuals be the central element in his cosmopolitan outlook, as I have suggested, its pursuit must be toward economic as well as political empowerment of individuals.

Our ordinary life is permeated with the interaction with others at distance and at home. Therefore, we must start from the fact of an economically and culturally connected social model which is markedly different from the state-centered Westphalian model of the previous century. The first thing I will read in the NY Times will be the revolutions in the Middle East, the natural disaster in Japan or the ongoing poverty in Africa. Some of the disasters, as we learn, are directly or indirectly caused by actions that are done for the national interest, again, without a clear intention to harm. Yet, dumping crops in the third world countries may ruin their local agriculture, or selling weapons may result in killing innumerable people in warfare. Global inter-connectedness breeds globalization of consequences.

If ethics¹¹⁷ is about the responsibility that arises from the fact of living with other human beings that can be affected by my action, then today any adequate account of ethics ought to be cosmopolitan. Of course it would be difficult to hold particular individuals who consume those goods for all the responsibilities. However, as long as our way of life is based on a structure that involves these foreigners or strangers, be what you name them, the moral responsibility is applied to all who live in this society.¹¹⁸ Theories of cosmopolitan economic justice and cosmopolitan citizenship theory are different ways of responding to this moral urgency.

¹¹⁶ See chapter 1 of this dissertation.

¹¹⁷ I hold no longer the strict contrast between ethics and morality in the history of philosophy at this point.

¹¹⁸ For a conception of responsibility based on social connection model, see Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model” in *Justice and Global Politics*, eds. by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

By saying this, I support the view that the traditional dichotomy between ‘harming’ and ‘letting be harmed’ does not hold anymore. The common idea that it would be kind to help others; but not that it is morally wrong not to leaves room for supererogation. It would be heroic and saintly if someone performs such a sacrifice for others, yet a normal person is not to be blamed for failing to do so.¹¹⁹ Absence of direct harm has been good enough reason for moral exoneration. However, globally minded ethicists tell us that not harming someone directly is not all that is required of us, particularly if we derive a benefit from the situation that causes harm to those others.¹²⁰ Not acting means supporting or taking for granted the status quo, which may indirectly harm others.

Thus, acknowledging the fuzzy boundary behooves us not only to refrain from harming, but also to help those whose dignity is violated. However, to what extent? After all, the Kantian legacy stipulates that we have a moral duty to support just social institutions.¹²¹ Does challenging unjust ones concur with the ideal? Or does the ideal support the principle of non-intervention and non-interference? This question is significant on its own right. Yet, it goes well beyond the purview of this chapter and needs independent research in the future. I hope, however, that my evaluation of existing views on global economic justice will suggest a rough idea about the direction of my answer to the question.

In this Chapter, I shall start with briefly reviewing Rawls’ main argument for the construction of the original position in *A Theory of Justice*, and then in *The Law of Peoples*. I will show some genuine affinities and differences between Rawls’ law of people and Kant’s league of nations. I will then examine arguments of cosmopolitan distributive justice. I hope to explore arguments by Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge to point out the important limitation of Rawls’ position. Although I deeply sympathize with the commitment of cosmopolitan distributive justice, I will explain why I find their

¹¹⁹ J. O. Urmson, “Saints and Heroes,” in *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, ed. by Abraham I. Melden (London, 1958).

¹²⁰ On this point, most cosmopolitans agree. Henry Shue, *Basic Rights*, especially, ch. 2 on this point. Onora O’Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge University Press, 2000). Some Utilitarians also explicitly support this idea; see Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol.1, (1972): 229-243, p.236.

¹²¹ See ch.1 of this dissertation.

proposals unsatisfactory. In order to show this, I will examine claims of anti-cosmopolitans on the ground of cultural diversity. That is, the concept of equality fails to give due consideration to the pluralism of the global population. Then I will discuss Amartya Sen's capabilities approach to the effect that it is possible for a certain concept of equality to avoid such an objection. I will conclude that the attempt to remedy economic inequality must come under scrutiny according to the basic principles on which it is founded.

2. John Rawls: The Law of Peoples

(1) The Original Position

Cosmopolitan conceptions of distributive justice have been brought up as a response to John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*. The core of Rawls' conception of justice is to redress the extent of inequality amongst members of a society. The "original position" invites us to think of a situation where representative members agree on a contract about the basic principles of their society behind the "veil of ignorance" which keeps them from knowing their natural talents and particular social standings such as their income and status.¹²² Rawls suggests that, through this hypothetical conceptual apparatus, the parties would agree on two principles. The first principle is that basic social goods such as liberty and equal opportunity must be equally distributed. And the second principle specifies that inequality is permissible to the extent that unequal distribution is to everyone's advantage including societies' worst-off members.¹²³ The implication of the second principle, otherwise called the difference principle, reveals its egalitarian commitment in that it suggests the goodness of a society should be judged by the utility level of the worse-off person in it.

¹²² In a later design of the original position in *Justice as Fairness*, Rawls conceded that race and gender must also be behind the veil of ignorance. John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, 2nd edition, edited by Erin Kelly (Harvard University Press, 2001).

¹²³ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, (Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 62.

Rawls develops a conception of 'justice as fairness' as opposed to the utilitarian conception of justice that has been dominant in modern moral philosophy.¹²⁴ Rawls gives distinct arguments against two variations of utilitarianism, namely, 'classical utilitarianism' and 'the principle of average utility.' Classical utilitarianism holds that a society is well ordered when its basic institutions are so arranged that the amount of satisfaction of all the members belonging to it becomes the greatest. It is mainly concerned with the overall biggest sum, no matter how unequal the distribution is. For classical utilitarianism, the distribution of satisfaction within society is not an issue. The principle of total average utility, on the other hand, seeks to maximize the average, not the total, of the net satisfaction of its members. Rawls observes that the average utility is markedly distinct from classical utilitarianism in its implication, and it may be more attractive than the classical version for the reason. Yet, Rawls rejects both variations for, he claims, they often have very similar practical consequence.

Rawls' criticism of utilitarianism is based on his commitment to the inviolable and inalienable worth of individuals. As long as classical utilitarianism gives no intrinsic worth to distribution, it may support a social decision that contributes to the bigger net total at the sacrifice of some individual persons. In utility calculations, the losses of some members can be outweighed by the greater gain of another's. Rawls argues, in this regard, that utilitarianism fails to give due weight to separateness of persons. Rawls claims that the utilitarian principle of aggregation is a reflection of the view that "the principle of rational choice for one man" is applied to society as a whole. Thus, Rawls goes on to claim that if consenting parties in the original position do not know where they belong in the society, they would not want the principle of average utility that seeks the maximum aggregation even at the expense of their own sacrifice. Not knowing where they fall in society and still with the prospect of hardship, Rawls argues that the parties will choose the "maximin principle" which guarantees that their worst situation is better than any other alternatives.

There has been a long dispute whether the construction of the original position will guarantee the choice of the difference principle over the principle of average utility,

¹²⁴ On the ambivalent character of the relationship between Rawls and Utilitarianism, see Samuel Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch.9.

as Rawls argues. There is little reliable evidence that consenting parties would choose an option where their worst outcome is better than any other options, rather than one where their best outcome is greater than any other prospects. Rawls claims “any further advantages that might be won by the principle of utility (...) are highly problematical, whereas the hardship if things turn out badly are intolerable.”¹²⁵ The assumption that consenting parties are risk-averse seems to be based on a particular moral psychology. Nevertheless, Rawls maintains that his two principles would assure the tolerable minimum to all the members of a society.

It is reasonable to believe that Rawls’ argument with the original position actually depends on certain psychological tendencies. Rawls’ commitment to a secure social framework, which ensures a satisfactory minimum for all members, appeals to considerations of dignity, stability or an idea of reciprocity. Now given this consideration which finds fuller discussion in later chapters of his book, I agree that Rawls’ overall project is more attractive than the principle of total utility. Although the justificatory force of the construction of the original position may still be incomplete and questionable in itself, the commitment to equal distribution poses an important and forceful challenge. In other words, even if it cannot be justified in the way Rawls attempts, I shall place Rawls’ moral insight at the center of my project. After all, despite its quasi-consequentialist approach of utility calculation, Rawls’ theory of justice attempts to guarantee ‘the social primary goods’ as the material basis of each and every person in a society, goods that should not be taken away on behalf of greater total amount of utility.

In spite of the theoretic strength that Rawls has against utilitarianism, some critics have raised objections to Rawls’ understanding of selfhood. Famously, Robert Nozick argues that Rawls’ conception of justice committed to economic distribution implies clear violation of individual property rights. Goods are not produced out of nothing, and thus waiting for distribution; but they emerge from certain preexisting entitlements in the world. In a clear reference to Rawls, Nozick states that “If things fell from heaven like manna, and no one had any special entitlement to any portion of it, and no manna would fall unless all agreed to a particular distribution, and somehow the quantity varied depending on the distribution, then it is plausible to claim that persons placed so that they

¹²⁵ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p.175.

couldn't make threats or hold out for specially large shares, would agree to the difference principle rule of distribution."¹²⁶ In other words, things are produced as already attached to someone as *entitlements*, not as common assets.

Nozick justifies his objection as giving due consideration to "the separateness of persons" whereas Rawls does not. Nozick argues that taxing the rich to give to the poor as if things were overall social goods covers up the "historicity" of entitlements. Nozick goes on to say:

To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. *He* does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him - least of all a state of government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be *neutral* between its citizens.¹²⁷

The libertarian constraint on redistribution is perched on the absoluteness of individual rights, in particular, the right to property. It is not to be violated by other individuals, groups or states. From this point of view, in his support for conceiving of outcomes of individual differences as common assets in society, Rawls suffers from the same error that Rawls himself charges utilitarianism with

On the other hand, Rawls' commitment to respect the separateness of persons is challenged by communitarians. Michael Sandal offers such a critique in his *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. Sandel claims that Rawls' conception of justice as a primary virtue of social institutions presupposes a radically different conception of the self than he explicitly announces. The idea of persons who can detach themselves from the concrete contexts of their lives is misleading in that it is the particular attachments and interests – natural gifts, social status, race and gender – that make them who they are. In reality, our identities are formed by various associations and obligations that grow out of these relations. *I* that is detached from empirically identifiable attributes will only be a

¹²⁶ Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, (Basic Books, 1974), p.198.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.33.

null lacking substance, which is a basis of moral deliberation. One may entertain the idea of bracketing one's attributes as a thought experiment; nevertheless, disengaging all particularities from a subject would be equivalent to seeking an Archimedean point. Thus, the self in the original position is nothing but a radically disembodied subject. Sandel argues that the self is always situated.

Given this situatedness of the self, the ideal of 'the freely choosing self' implicit in the construction of the original position is not only fictitious, but also counter-productive. The account of self, devoid of any moral experience, is incapable of meaningful moral deliberation and rational choice. The conception of a self stripped of all particularities as constructed in the original position saps such selves of motivations. Seen this way, the principles derived from this abstracted situation are nothing more than arbitrary decisions. He goes on to say, the principle from the original position is not voluntarily chosen; rather they are "guaranteed to" choose only certain principles by the design.¹²⁸ Since there is little to differentiate amongst the consenting parties, there is virtually nothing to agree on. The undifferentiated subjects under the veil of ignorance are not separate persons; but there is actually only one person. Sandel claims that the agreement is at best "a metaphorical agreement that I make with myself."¹²⁹

Although Sandel's criticism is revealing, it is by all means reasonable to assume the ability to reflect upon our own 'givenness' even with an acknowledgement of our factual embeddedness. Also, some relations may be more constitutive than others. Special relations and concrete situations may *structure* the self, but not entirely *constitute* its identity. Although I am a product of my surrounding to a certain degree, I do not have to believe that am totally determined by it. In order to detach certain desires, wants and needs, I do not have to deny all the influences that are, partially, constitutive of my identity. With this regard, conceiving of identity as 'clusters' is significantly illuminating for the possibility of critical reflection on one's identity.¹³⁰ Granting that we can question and reflect on an identifiable part of clusters of concepts that constitute my identity

¹²⁸ Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 2nd edition (Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1982]), p.127.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.129.

¹³⁰ Lorenzo C. Simpson, *The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), For such an idea of cluster conception of identity, see especially, ch 4. "Situated Cosmopolitanism."

allows for a space for reflexive examination of a problematic part of our identity without being threatened by losing it all together. Detachment from my particular situation, to a certain extent, is not only possible but also necessary in our moral reasoning.

Nevertheless, Sandel is right in pointing out that Rawls' suggestion to consider natural talents as common assets and further to distribute its benefits entails a more holistic conception of society than he recognizes. Rawls argues that those attributes are a matter of moral luck, thus arbitrarily given. To consider natural talents as detachable from my identity is not the same as considering them common assets, not to mention, assets to a community or a state. Yet, to consider them as common assets presupposes a community as the subject of the possession.¹³¹ In short, Rawls invokes a presupposition of a communitarian self that is not consistent with his theory. This point is of particular importance to us because this assumption becomes more conspicuous and obtrusive as Rawls turns his gaze to demands of justice in the global context.

(2) Rawls: The Law of Peoples

It is remarkable that Rawls' account of justice is largely based on the presupposition of a self-contained society. It is precisely at this juncture that his conception of justice, despite the egalitarian potential, strikes many as too parochial and obsolete.¹³² In *The Law of Peoples*, published twenty years after *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls advances his objection to cosmopolitan economic redistribution, which is already implicit in his earlier work. The main line of argument is that his theory of justice does not hold for global inequalities amongst rich and poor societies due to the disanalogy between domestic and international circumstances. The law of peoples is concerned about helping each society to establish and maintain reasonable justice and stability; it is not concerned about bringing out equality amongst them.

Rawls observes that the economic prospects of a society depend on its overall political and cultural tradition, and not merely on its possession of material and technological resources. Drawing on the example of the Indian state, Kerala, he further

¹³¹ Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, p. 80.

¹³² I found a similar concern in Allen Buchanan, "Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World," *Ethics* 110 (July 2000): 697-721.

argues that even with modest resources, justice can be achieved with good public policy while injustice is supported by deep-seated interests. That is to say economic distribution is decisively shaped by the internal political will of a country and a sufficiently effective organization to carry it out. Thus he concludes that “dispensing funds will not suffice to rectify basic political and social injustices.”¹³³ However, why not think that such transfer is maybe necessary, although it will not be sufficient? Against Beitz and Pogge’s appeal to apply the original position globally, Rawls rather develops two distinct arguments. I shall call the first the objection from self-determination and the second, the practical objection.

The objection from self-determination: Rawls suggests that we consider two different societies at the same level of wealth at some point. If country *A* works diligently to industrialize itself, while country *B* chooses to remain in an idyllic life style, it is likely that country *A* will become much wealthier than country *B* some time later. In this case, both societies make their own decision; so country *A* does not bear any moral obligation to sacrifice to enhance the material condition of country *B*. In other words, as long as the two countries are just and stable, the principle of the law of peoples is indifferent to the disparity between the two. Thus, he argues, there is no further need for global distribution. But who in society *B* decides that it should remain idyllic? Granted that it is a decent society, Rawls seems to assume that the decision is made through a democratic process. And as long as the ways in which their decisions and executions remain democratic, the decision of country *B* renders no basis for global redistribution.

In this understanding of economic disparity, one feels genuine affinity to Locke’s justification of the right of private property. Provided that individuals are all on a par in the state of nature. Once they make things their own through their labor, they rightly have an entitlement to the property. Thus, the owner is justly entitled to the property accumulated over time through honest and voluntary exchanges. And no one, even the government, has right to take it away; doing so would mean no less than stealing their private property, and thus violating the inalienable right of a person. This is plainly a *historical* account of ownership. This way of connecting a society’s economic well-being solely to its self-determination is highly problematic. One of the central commitments in

¹³³ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Harvard University Press, 1999), p.108

A Theory of Justice is to correct extreme poverty from the point of the social structure, not from the point of view of historical account. It attempts to secure the minimum for a life worth living, regardless of the historical background of how anyone has come to be so poor. Individual laziness or recklessness is a vice, and persons must take responsibility for their own decision; Rawls claims that these individual vices should not be the ground for stripping one of one's dignity so that social cohesion as a whole is not dismantled. However, in this discussion, Rawls' commitment to *structural* reform of social inequality, that was once so powerful, seems totally lost.

It may be understandable in contrast to Beitz and Pogge's emphasis on causal relations between rich and poor nations. From their assumption that there already exists a close cooperative global society, they claimed that rich societies have a duty of compensation for inequality caused by the operation of the global market. Furthermore, they often stress the wealth accumulated through past colonialism in European countries are unjust because it is based upon usurpation of the natural resources of poor countries in Africa, Asia and America. Of course, the traces of past transfer are hard to identify. Even with memories of colonialism, there are cases of successful integration in the global market.¹³⁴ An adequate explanation of persistent poverty needs a combination of various factors. Nevertheless, Beitz and Pogge's objection is sufficient to reveal the *ahistoricity* of the historical justification of global inequality.

The practical objection: Rawls admits that rich countries do bear the duty of assistance toward countries in unfavorable situations up to the point that each people has its own liberal or decent government. He goes on to argue that economic disparity must be remedied if it "unjustly wounds" the self-respect of those not so recognized; yet, those inferior feelings that the citizens of poor countries have towards the citizens of rich countries are "unjustified" once this cut-off point is met.¹³⁵ Up to that point, he suggests, poor societies can increase savings or borrow from other rich societies. At the same time, he maintains that the cosmopolitan egalitarian principle is "without target" and therefore

¹³⁴¹³⁴ Some argue that it is rather lack of trade and unwillingness to integrate in global markets that cause persistent poverty. Mathias Risse, "How does the Global Order Harm the Poor?" *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2005): 349-376; Debra Satz, "What Do We Owe to the Global Poor?" *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol.19, No.1, (2005): 47-54.

¹³⁵ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, p.114.

knows no “cutoff point.”¹³⁶ Rawls admits that cosmopolitan egalitarian principle, with targets and cutoff points, might work similarly to the law of peoples; however, he still prefers the law of peoples because it does away with practical matters of taxation and administration.

Not having a target does not seem to be an intrinsic problem in the cosmopolitan egalitarian principle.¹³⁷ If Rawls admits that it is a *duty* for rich countries to assist members of poor countries, it requires more than appealing for voluntary donations. If it is right to help them to become free and equal individuals, why not say it is a *duty* to ensure the minimum of the worst-off individuals? Rawls’ argument here is markedly similar to the one Nozick raises toward Rawls himself. Nozick maintains, “No end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous interference with people’s lives.” In other words, a society with a redistributive tax policy that Rawls envisions to be just promotes continuous interference of free exchange of goods and service, which is close to “confiscation.”¹³⁸

My point is that Rawls’ objection to the global egalitarian principle is not innocent of the very same fault that he points out in response to Nozick. Rawls claims that “taxes and restrictions are all in principle foreseeable, and holdings are acquired on the known condition that certain corrections will be made.” Thus, *if* the cosmopolitan egalitarian principle is morally required, then the administrative difficulty should not weaken its moral force any more than it does in a domestic case. Of course, it is a big “if” for Rawls. In Rawls’ framework, the social minimum is indexed, that is, contextualized in a way that it reflects a function of the resources available in a particular society. And states are a dominant form of society that already have a system of taxation.

I am sympathetic to the argument that states are valuable not because they have inalienable rights in themselves like organic entities, but because they are efficient agents serving and protecting their members’ well-being. This does not mean that states have only instrumental value; nevertheless, there is no place for the claim that they are of absolute value regardless of their relations to their members. Rawls starts from the liberal

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.117-119.

¹³⁷ For Pogge’s response that his version does have a target and a cutoff point, see Thomas Pogge, “Human Flourishing and Universal Justice,” *Social Philosophy*, Vol.16, No.1 (1999).

¹³⁸ Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, p.163.

commitment that states are neutral agents that provide a just background institution for freely acting citizens; yet, he chooses the law of peoples whose ultimate concern is the justice of societies over a cosmopolitan duty for global equality whose ultimate concern is the well-being of individuals.

Rawls' obstinate adherence to a concept of a society as a self-contained basic unit of justice is outdated because of its inability to respond to ever-increasing global interconnectedness. It fails to acknowledge the urgent problems that have been created from the political as well as economic interdependence of societies. Ultimately Rawls' two-tiered moral commitment which prioritizes societies over individuals seems to betray the more fundamental Kantian moral principle that individuals must be the ultimate moral concern.¹³⁹

More importantly, this theory, despite its attempt to be 'realistic', remains more 'unrealistic' because of the conflict between the principle of non-intervention and his espousal of the principle of just war. Rawls is forced to acknowledge just wars to the extent that there are 'outlaw' states that are aggressive to other states and are failing to protect basic human rights of their citizens. In this framing, the principle of law of peoples prohibits this society from becoming a member of the society of peoples because it violates the citizen's human rights. Now, liberal societies are to choose to act in accordance to the principle of non-intervention to wage a just war toward this illiberal society. To me, multinational conflicts on human rights issues remain in vacuum in this picture without a possibility of joint projects or political negotiations.

What do we - let us say, the citizens of decent liberal societies - owe to the distant others in 'outlaw' states? Foreign aid or economic assistance to developing countries

¹³⁹ The difficulty comes from the ambiguous role of the individualistic principle in Rawls' conception of Justice. On one hand, Rawls has been criticized for his too individualist conviction in matters of social justice. He argues "We want to account for the social values, for the intrinsic good of institutional, community, and associate activities, by a conception of justice that in its theoretical basis is individualistic. For reasons of clarity among others, we do not want to rely on an undefined concept of community, or to suppose that society is an organic whole with a life of its own distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations with one another. (...) From this conception, however, individualistic it may seem, we must eventually explain the value of community." John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, pp. 264-265. On the criticism that Rawls' account of justice being too individualistic, see Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, ch.1. However, this moral commitment to individuals shatters at the boundaries of the states, which is a clear sign of the status quo of the modern international relations.

often has been misdirected and empowers the corrupt or authoritarian dictatorship of the countries, not their peoples. Therefore, one may wait and help a society to first become liberal, because once liberalized, the society will take care of its citizens. Rawls' argument follows this line of reasoning. However, the order of this argument is disputable. Might it not be that an empowered citizenry is likely to bring forth the change in its government sooner than a government change empowering its citizenry? Attention must be paid to empirical evidence that shows the two-way relationship between public policies and democratic participation.¹⁴⁰ Individual freedom can be enhanced by government policies; and at the same time, the direction of public policies can be shaped by the use of participatory power of the peoples. In other words, there are clear reasons to improve individual freedom, both in political and economic senses, in order to foster liberal frameworks in foreign countries.

Now I shall examine some of the most prominent disparities between Kant's conception of the league of nations and Rawls' conception of the law of peoples. Comparisons between Kant and Rawls on the question of peaceful or just international relationships are illuminating to the effect that they help us grasp their forms of argumentation more clearly.

(3) Kant's League of Nations and Rawls's Law of Peoples

Rawls' *The Law of Peoples* is an important contemporary representation of the main concern of Kant's *Toward Perpetual Peace*. Both works aim to offer a liberal ideal of peaceful coexistence of plural societies. Furthermore, in his espousal of a loosely connected society of peoples instead of the pursuit of global equality Rawls is particularly reminiscent of Kant: Rawls claims, "In the absence of a world-state, there *must* be boundaries of some kind, which when viewed in isolation will seem arbitrary, and depend to some degree on historical circumstances."¹⁴¹ The manifest affinities, however, should not prevent us from noticing significant differences in the structure of

¹⁴⁰ This point will be discussed more in detail in the next Chapter on the idea of development. The emphasis on two-way relationship between political policies in public domains and economic empowerment of individual persons is made by Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), p.18.

¹⁴¹ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, p.39.

their frameworks. In the following, I will examine salient disparities in Rawls' proposal of the law of peoples and Kant's league of nations. Rawls modifies some presumptions in Kant's picture in order to make it a "realistic utopia"; and yet, I hope to show that this attempt underscores the difficulty of the issue and engenders its own weakness.

Rawls suggests that "the society of peoples" comprises "well-ordered societies" that agree on the principles that will govern the relations among them and also condition their internal institutions to a certain extent. A well-ordered society refers to "liberal democracy" which Rawls regards to be "superior to other forms of societies"; yet, he also includes "decent society" which may be hierarchical, but peaceful.¹⁴² In order to meet the criterion of decency, a society must respect the law of the society of peoples in a sense that it is not aggressive towards other societies and protective towards the basic human rights of its citizens. The ultimate goal of the Law of Peoples is to include all the societies into the society of peoples governed by the minimal liberal principles.

In this picture, Rawls drops the requirement of democratic constitutions - one of three definitive articles in Kant's proposal. Rawls claims that the pluralism of cultures and traditions makes it unworkable and unrealistic to demand the democratization of all societies.¹⁴³ It may well be understandable if we remind ourselves of the fact that Rawls' proposal for domestic justice in *A Theory of Justice* holds that the fact of reasonable pluralism as not being incompatible with the possibility a common conception of justice; rather he puts forward that it is a starting ground for any practical design of social institutions. With respect to the vast disparities and deep disagreements among different societies across the globe, Rawls' giving up the democratic requirement seems illuminating. Given the diversity of world societies, demanding all societies to accept liberal democracy may be too high a standard. It would be more cogent to lay a "thin" conception of the good at the bottom of our dialogue for peaceful coexistence.

To begin with, the underlying assumption in Kant's democratic requirement that liberal states are peaceful is disputable. Kant's conjecture seems right in that there is empirical evidence that liberal states tend not to wage war against each other, and to this degree, are more peaceful. The greater the distribution of liberal states, the more peace

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p.62.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 59-62.

we may expect. However, there is a counterargument showing that democracy is not sufficient to ensure peace because liberal states often wage wars against non-liberal states.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the wars that liberal states go to are not solely self-defensive, but often times aggressive.¹⁴⁵ Against this background, some argue that liberal/illiberal distinction is just one of many antagonisms that can fuel the conflict which is innate to politics.¹⁴⁶

These arguments may suggest that democracy itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for ensuring peace. However, I do not endorse such a view that the liberal/illiberal distinction is nominal without corresponding differences to the peoples' lives within the corresponding regimes. Indeed the antagonism can fuel the tension between liberal and non-liberal societies, and thereby trigger popular sentiments to go to war. I admit that there is a latent danger that the liberal and illiberal distinction itself may be manipulated for political mobilization. Nevertheless, this possibility does not mean that the distinction has no merit, that liberal and illiberal societies can be regarded on a par. Thus, Kant's assumption that liberal nations won't go to war may prove wrong, but there are many reasons for us to support liberal constitutions.

Furthermore, Rawls diverges from Kant's optimistic assumption that all societies will eventually join the League of Nations out of prudential reasons. The democratic requirement implies Kant's expectation that once citizens have a say in decision making, they will avoid wars given the prospect of the burden - the cost of waging wars, the preparation and the payment of the debts. He goes so far as to claim that "the spirit of commerce" is most reliable in its effect of bringing different parts of the world into a lasting peaceful coexistence. Rawls, on the other hand, emphasizes that the actors are not "nations" but "peoples." As Rawls understands it, peoples are, unlike states, "not moved solely by their prudent or rational pursuit of interests"¹⁴⁷; rather, peoples are willing to act

¹⁴⁴ Michael w. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* Vol.12, No.3: 205-235 and No.4: 323-345 (1983); "Kant and Liberal Internationalism" in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History*, edited by Pauline Kleingeld (New Haven: Yale University Press: 2006): 201-242.

¹⁴⁵ In the U.S. foreign policy, there have been various wars against Latin America. Recent wars in the Middle East have often been analyzed as struggles over natural resources such as oil and minerals.

¹⁴⁶ For such a view, see Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* [1932], trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996).

¹⁴⁷ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, p.27.

out of moral motivation “to grant the very same respect and recognition to other peoples as equals.”¹⁴⁸ In other words, just peoples in a global society are prepared to accept and abide by principles and standards to limit their conduct pursuing their self-interest as long as others will act likewise.

The development of capitalism over the past two hundred years entrenches extreme inequality. Commercial cooperative networks do not simply prevent wars and foster rapport worldwide. Extreme poverty and affluence exist side by side. A great number of people have fallen to a level in which it is impossible for them to satisfy their most basic needs. They are denied even the most basic set of rights - namely, a right to food, a right to be clothed or a right to be sheltered. Thus, Kant’s assumption that all nations will join the peaceful league out of prudential self-interest needs to be reexamined. Joining a peaceful league may not guarantee the satisfaction of prudential self-interest of individual citizens.¹⁴⁹ Of course, it does not imply that joining the league will not promote such self-interest. However, from a moral point of view, it is required for liberal states to join the league even if it is not sufficient for promoting self-interest.

The two deviations constitute a very interesting contrast. At first glance, Rawls seems to propose a more workable picture in that the law of peoples is open to non-democratic societies and is corrective of Kant’s largely optimistic assumption that the expansion of capitalism will end all wars. It may well be interpreted as a compromise of basic liberal standards in order to address the larger societies. I think Rawls should make these departures; but his framing of such departures comes at a high price. Critics such as Rivera-Castro argue that Rawls’ attempt to make Kant’s *ideal* more *realistic* becomes even more *unrealistic* precisely because his revision neglects the most pressing problems of world politics.¹⁵⁰ First, in his construction of the ideal theory, Rawls excludes two categories of societies that cannot meet the standards of the society of peoples. They are namely “outlaw states” which are politically aggressive and economically “burdened

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.35.

¹⁴⁹ It may be possible to promote the interest of a nation without promoting the interest of individual citizens. The relationship between the interest of a nation and the interest of citizens seems more intricate than Kant seems to identify in his peace writings. A fuller discussion on this point however needs another opportunity after this dissertation.

¹⁵⁰ Faviola Rivera-Castro, “What Makes a Utopia Realistic” presented at Ethics Workshop at Stanford University (2008).

societies “societies that are unable to maintain reasonable and just social framework because of their unfavorable conditions.”¹⁵¹

Rawls saves the “non-ideal” part of his book for these societies that comes after he delineates the nuts and bolts of the “ideal” picture of the international order. In other words, while Kant starts from the reality of his day that is plagued with conflicts and wars, Rawls’ division between ideal/non-ideal stages in his theory supposes the peaceful character of well-ordered societies at the outset. Excluding these societies at the outset is not so striking provided that Rawls conceives the law of peoples as a guiding policy of a liberal state, not as a genuine attempt to pursue peace among all nations.

Moreover, the presumed moral character of agents in the society of peoples may allow Rawls to bypass the problem of assurance among peoples to abide by the principles. This then leads to the lack of material prerequisites to provide an equal ground amongst peoples in Rawls’ framework. It stands in a sharp contrast to Kant’s prerequisites intending to promote “rough equality” among the states in his six preliminary articles that suggest the abolition of standing armies, banning of national debt due to the external affairs, prohibiting of political intervention as well as annexing of independent states.

Against this backdrop, the relative lack of theoretic concern regarding global economic inequality on Rawls’ part invites considerable puzzlement. The problem of dealing with extremely poor societies does not occur until the “non-ideal” part of the book. The underlying assumption is that once these societies become sufficiently rich so that they can ensure basic rights of their citizens, they will be qualified to enter the society of peoples. Meanwhile, the well-ordered society has a duty to assist them to overcome poverty to the point of being able to have a decent liberal government. At any rate, however, Rawls explicitly states that there are only “obligations of assistance,” but no “obligations of justice” toward economically burdened societies. If Rawls assumes that peoples, the actors in his ideal society of peoples, are moral agents, then what is incumbent on them toward the burdened societies, moreover, toward the individuals

¹⁵¹ “(...) their political traditions and institutions of law, property, and class structure, with their sustaining religious and moral beliefs and underlying culture. It is these things that shape a society’s political will; and they are the elements that must change before a society can support a reasonable Law of Peoples.” John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, p. 106.

living in those societies? Instead, I would like to argue that given these assumptions a rather different conclusion has to be derived.

In conclusion, Rawls' own proposal does have its own advantages over Kant's picture; yet the revisions Rawls makes seem to pose an obstacle to his own ideal. Kant's presumption of the democratic requirement and the prudential motivation of the agents are both disputable. Rawls' departure thus suggests more realistic considerations with regard to the profoundly pluralistic global society of peoples. Furthermore, it points out the unrealistically optimistic assumption in Kant that prudential self-interest is a good enough motivation to drive societies to pursue peace. Yet, Rawls' construction of the law of peoples fails to abide by the potential it purports to promise. The two-tiered theory of the law of peoples neglects the conflict-filled reality, which for Kant was the starting point; and at the same time, it unreasonably clings to the old fashioned state boundary when it comes to economic redistribution. If global agents are moral agents as Rawls assumes, or if they ought to be, then the conclusion should be something more than supportive assistance towards the vulnerable peoples. Now as to the alternative ways to address the needs of the vulnerable, I shall examine the principles of the conceptions of cosmopolitan distributive justice.

3. Cosmopolitan Distributive Justice: Beitz & Pogge

Conceptions of cosmopolitan distributive justice have grown in an ambivalent relationship to Rawls. The influence of Rawls' egalitarian commitment is obvious; yet, cosmopolitans argue that the principle must include the global population if some of the false assumptions in Rawls' theorizing are to be corrected. Thus, although their specific arguments are different, the proponents of cosmopolitan distributive justice attempt to apply the principle of distributive justice to the global population by adopting a system of transfer of wealth between countries. Now, I would like to examine the basic arguments of Beitz and Pogge in defense of global distributive justice. Although I agree with the basic direction they pursue, I hope to point out the limitations of their proposals.

(1) Charles Beitz: Global Original Contract

In an immediate response to Rawls' theory of justice, Charles Beitz proposes to use Rawls' conception of the original position globally. Indeed, being born in a rich country is a morally arbitrary fact no less than having rich family. Yet the simple fact shapes one's life prospects in a significant way. The commitment to minimize the play of luck in Rawls' conception of justice fails to recognize this profound arbitrariness that one's nationality plays. Accordingly, Beitz takes seriously Rawls' suggestions to take natural talents of individuals as common assets. He thus suggests a parallel between natural assets of states and natural endowment of individuals, and natural resources are privileges that are morally arbitrary and yet leading to inequality among states.

In the global original position, the criterion for a right action will be whether it promotes the well-being of the globally worst-off.¹⁵² Therefore, he argues for "the Global Resource Redistribution." The Global Resource Redistribution demands applying the difference principle globally in a way that it requires the transfer of natural resources from the rich countries to the poor. Yet, his proposal for global distributive justice is weakened mainly by two defects in his argument.

Sometimes his proposal appears to be a compromise between his moral commitment and a matter of practical considerations. He admits that perhaps some other mechanism such as direct payment to poor countries could be more efficient. He is nonetheless reluctant to adopt this line, because "such mechanisms may well be politically impossible at present."¹⁵³ Beitz holds that such transfer of resources is possible without international institutions. One may wonder how if direct payment is deemed unfavorable from practical concern, how natural resource transfer can work. At this point, however, Beitz seems to be too concerned with the prospect of the world government to go all the way as his moral conjecture implies.¹⁵⁴

Moreover, the analogy between natural assets in individual persons and natural resources in individual states, despite its seeming plausibility, turns out to be ungrounded. This assumption is, to the contrary, quite mistaken given the reality. Empirically, it has

¹⁵² Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1979).

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

been reported that many resource poor countries are well off whereas resources rich countries are poor. For example, Nigeria suffers from an economic nightmare despite its bountiful natural assets, while Japan has maintained rapid economic growth with relatively moderate natural resources.

A theory known as ‘the resources curse’ explains that natural endowments are rather an obstacle to a country’s development than an asset.¹⁵⁵ Most resource rich countries, in particular, those that are rich in oil and minerals, are internally corrupt and politically unstable. Dependence on resources generates economic volatility due to price changes. Moreover, relying on resources also tends to suppress the development of other internationally competitive industries, probably because ease of access to resources gives low incentive to make investments in manufacturing industries. Resources themselves do not lead to the employment of many people, leading to high unemployment rates. In other words, resource wealth has little positive correlation with the well-being of its people.

After all, the thesis of global resource redistribution fails to take various external factors into account which in many cases weigh more than natural assets. It is perhaps for this reason that in a later version of his suggestion, Beitz admits this objection and suggests a revised proposal.¹⁵⁶ Without sufficient changes to redress phenomena such as the resource curse, transfers of natural resources do not seem to cure the ills; in fact, it may exacerbate the problems. Thus, the final version of Beitz’s diagnosis seems more plausible than his earlier one.

(2) Thomas Pogge: Proposal for a General Resources Dividend

In a similar vein, Thomas Pogge asks why the commitment to restrict economic inequality must stop at the national or sub-national level. He claims that the maximin principle chosen in the original position ought to transcend state boundaries, so that the

¹⁵⁵ Richard M. Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis*, (London: Routledge, 1993); Idil Boran, “Do Cosmopolitans Have Reasons to Object to Global Distributive Justice?” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2008): 1-17.

¹⁵⁶ Beitz concedes that the question of the importance of natural resource endowments for national wealth is “unsettled”. He acknowledged that today’s industrialized societies are less well endowed with natural resources and at the same time resource rich countries are comparatively slow in economic growth. Charles R. Beitz, “Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism” *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (1999): 515-529. Regarding this revision of his position, see pp. 524-525.

globally least advantaged becomes the standard of global distributive justice, regardless of their legal citizenship. He suggests a reorganization of the world economy through institutional reforms so that each society has a sufficient basis for equal liberties that are effective. As opposed to Beitz' focus on natural resources, Pogge endorses "the General Resources Dividend," a rather direct monetary transfer to an international organization which will administer the common fund. He envisions a mechanism in which each society is to pay its share proportionate to its wealth into an international fund to be administered to help the poor all over the world. One of the central insights is the acknowledgement of the close connections between material conditions and the exercise of rights and liberties in societies.

According to this proposal, the most poor across the world will be compensated from this pool to ensure their basic rights and liberties. As the word "compensation" suggests, Pogge emphasizes the past wrongdoings of Western civilization with respect to the so-called third world. Europeans imported through colonialism enormous amount of natural resources, art objects, and what is worse, slaves. In most cases, all this usurpation has been regarded as just transfer without any equivalent payment. At the same time, the imperialists wreaked havoc in the local economy, administration and cultures. Therefore Pogge argues that a duty for global distributive justice is not merely a duty to assist, but rather a duty to compensate.

In the proposal of the global resource dividend, Pogge goes one step further to argue for the need of global institutions in order to assure that each government abides by the principles. He argues that the parties in the global original position would favor "an organization of the world economy that makes it sensitive to distributional concerns, so that all societies have at least a sufficient material base to satisfy the first principle domestically."¹⁵⁷ In this framework, international disputes are to be settled by legal procedures recognized by global society, and unjust societies shall be exhorted to move in this direction with economic as well as diplomatic sanctions.

Pogge rightly thinks that a global institutional scheme is required to engender sufficient compliance and moral allegiance to the ground rules among national governments and their populations. In turn, the possibility of whether these institutions

¹⁵⁷ Thomas Pogge, *Realizing Rawls* (Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 245.

can ensure such compliance and allegiance depends on the internal organization of the individual nation states that it regulates. It is probably why Rawls starts with looking at the internal characters of each society in order to become “decent” members of an ideal society. Pogge’s argument is that it must be the other way around.

Apparently, there is a circularity between the global framework and internal organization of individual states. The global framework will only work with states that are suitable to being regulated by it. Nevertheless, this circularity needs not be considered a vicious one. This is rather a clear sign of international interdependency which Kant already acknowledged in his proposal. Indeed, Kant stresses the institutional interdependence in the pursuit of lasting peace as he notes: “the problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution is dependent upon the problem of a lawful external relation among states, and cannot be solved without a solution to the latter problem.”¹⁵⁸ One may argue that we would break out of the circle only if global justice is seen by the individual states to be necessary for lasting peace. But, surely, theorizing global justice is a way to persuade individual states as well as their citizens to see why it is a necessary step for this change.

With this regard, although the commitment to cosmopolitan distributive justice is not to be identified with a world institution, Pogge does not hesitate to make a bold move to suggest such an institution in order to overcome the assurance problem. On this point, Pogge takes up a more radical suggestion than most other Kantian cosmopolitan thinkers including Beitz. Opponents of cosmopolitan global equality hold that there is no place for global distributive justice precisely because there is no international society, not to mention a world government, to enact such principles and to sanction the violators. It is to say distributive justice is only possible when there is a clearly defined agent who practices and punishes as we have at the domestic level.

Nevertheless, we have no reason to believe that what exists now works best for the ideal derived from theoretic deliberation. It is essential to the cosmopolitan commitment that the ultimate subject of moral concern is the individual, and not states. Accordingly, as long as it serves the pivotal concern, as Beitz argues, cosmopolitanism

¹⁵⁸ Kant, *Political Writing*, p.47.

remains “agnostic” regarding the adequate form of institution to carry it out. I concur with Beitz’s more recent justification of a global distributive institution:

We do not begin with an actually existing structure and ask whether it is reasonable to cooperate in it. Rather, we begin with the idea that *some* type of structure is both required and inevitable, given the facts about the extent and character of the division of labor, and work towards principles the structure should satisfy if it is to be acceptable to individuals conceived, in Rawls’s phrase, as free and equal moral persons.¹⁵⁹

Conceiving of global institutions that will administer distributive justice globally does not have to fall into the bleak picture of the world state. It would rather require the cosmopolitan constitution that individual states will adopt. We already have international organizations, such as United Nations, World Bank, or International Criminal Court. There are possibilities for coexistence of multiple global organizations, with due checks and balances. Of course, in order to endow such an organization with the full strength to ensure allegiances from states and carry out distribution to the needy, the problem of political legitimacy might emerge.¹⁶⁰ The commitment to ensure universal human rights might imply that some of the principles of democracy must be compromised. The foreseeable difficulty, however, points to the need for feedbacks between the domestic and transnational level, which have not yet taken place in existent global institutions. The cure for legitimacy crisis is more responsiveness and transparency of global organization toward local regimes, not giving up on the ideal.

¹⁵⁹ Charles Beitz, “Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism,” p.523, original emphasis.

¹⁶⁰ Jürgen Habermas offers great insights on this issue from his research on the European Union in his recent article. Habermas, “The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution for World Society,” *Constellations*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2008): 444-455. Habermas argues that a world society must be “more juridical than political.” p. 451.

4. Limitations of Cosmopolitan Distributive Justice

Now I would like to consider two limitations of the conception of cosmopolitan distributive justice discussed so far. The idea of a global system of distributive justice has been the central concern of the cosmopolitans. The focus on the economic framework is not surprising because this conception of cosmopolitan justice evolved from Rawls' theory of justice which takes justice as a virtue of social institutions. Recently, however, some critics point out the limitations of framing cosmopolitanism primarily through the language of distributive justice. Their goal is not to undermine the significance of distributive justice; rather, it is not to limit global justice to global economic redistribution. Too much focus on distributive justice obstructs a more balanced approach to realizing the commitment of Kantian principles. That is to say, a more adequate account of cosmopolitanism must address other concerns, such as reframing the terms of the global market or of citizenship. There are two salient critics: one from the point of view of economic rights and the other from the point of view of political rights.

(1) Some writers argue that there is good reason to *depart* from the framework of distributive justice and to find ways for a direct solution to the problems of economic justice that arise on a global scale.¹⁶¹ Idil Boran argues that attempts to remedy inequality by income redistribution while leaving the current operation of the global market intact is counterproductive. She thus suggests that cosmopolitans must exert their effort to find direct regulations of markets or to draft good policies, rather than to design forms of redistribution. At the ground level, she also agrees with Beitz and Pogge on the interdependence of global markets; yet she proposes that direct regulation is a better way to reach the cosmopolitan goal than income distribution. In a sense, her proposal is more radical in that it urges us to fix the root of the problem, rather than the result.

(2) Another criticism of global distributive justice is raised from the angle of citizenship. Seyla Benhabib points out that a conception of distributive justice pays too

¹⁶¹ Idil Boran, "Do Cosmopolitans Have Reasons to Object to Global Distributive Justice?" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2008): 1-17.

much attention to transfer of wealth from rich countries to poor countries, without rendering the boundaries among states porous.¹⁶² She claims, “Contemporary Kantian cosmopolitans treat border-crossings, whether they be those of refugees, asylees, or immigrants, within the framework of global distributive justice.”¹⁶³ In leaving those boundaries intact, even cosmopolitans such as Pogge and Beitz “go much further than Rawls in pleading for justice across borders.”¹⁶⁴ In reality, she points out that there are hundreds and thousands of people who left their familiar terrains to search for either material means of living or political peace. Borrowing Hannah Arendt’s terms, Benhabib claims that the bigger injustice arises from the vulnerable being “stateless,” thus having lost their “right to have rights.”

Concentrating on income distribution tends to overlook the significance of the moral claims that the migrating population makes to enter a new terrain. Somalis who walk miles and miles to find peace and food are unable to enter UN refugee camps because they are barred at the border of Kenya. North Korean Refugees are forced to go back to their poverty-stricken country right before they escape China because their presence causes diplomatic uneasiness between the Chinese and North Korean governments. Recognizing their moral claims would require a reformulation of the obstinate modern citizenship theory.

Redressing the rigid citizenship policy of the modern nation state might be an even harder task than sending funds away. Instead of sending resources and money away, why not accept those people to share the benefit within the boundaries? Accepting those vulnerable on the other side of the border would imply not only substantial sacrifice of material resources within a country; but also it is likely to create internal political problems. Expectedly, the presence of immigrants will cause political issues such as cultural integration. However, when distributive justice comes under scrutiny of the cosmopolitan principles, porous boundaries and inclusion of others would work better than defending tight boundaries and arguing for fund transfer to distant lands.

¹⁶² Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others* (Oxford University Press, 2004). Pogge also acknowledges this problem in a footnote, although his central concern is distributive justice. He states: “The most fundamental right of person is the right to live in a state that has the kind of state rights accorded by international law.” Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*, pp. 248-249 ff.

¹⁶³ Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others*, p.72.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibidem*.

So far I have argued for two alternative mechanisms for realizing cosmopolitan justice. These two objections are not necessarily incompatible with distributive cosmopolitanism. The central commitment of cosmopolitan justice is that persons, not the states, are the ultimate subjects of moral concern. It follows that it is morally required to ensure a material basis to ensure that their life is worth living, regardless of where they happen to belong with respect to state boundaries. Thus, the shift of focus to redress the basic terms of global markets as well as the current principles of citizenship seems to be legitimate.

5. Alternatives to Kantian Views:

Utilitarianism, Multiculturalism and Capabilities Approach

(1) Utilitarian Approach: Peter Singer

Now I would like to explore another liberal tradition that seeks global equality. Consequentialists, in particular, Utilitarians seek global equality, yet from a distinctively different line of reasoning from Kantian cosmopolitans. Utilitarian thought on global economic justice is geared to evaluate policies or actions in terms of their consequences for the maximization of happiness, or well-being. Due to their concern for consequences and their systematicity in calculation, Utilitarian policies often result in great efficiency. Despite the clear advantages of Utilitarian approaches, Kantian cosmopolitans find some of their central assumptions unacceptable.¹⁶⁵ In the following, I shall assess the charges made against Utilitarianism and at the same time argue that they mirror the weaknesses of proposals by Kantian cosmopolitans that are to be overcome.

Utilitarian reasoning about global distribution has been developed mainly in two camps. Traditionally, marginalist Utilitarians have pursued equality of marginal utility of everyone. In other words, marginalist Utilitarians have argued that any unit of resources will be more valuable to the poor than to the rich, so that a perfect equal distribution should be the goal of resource transfer. This requires that the rich countries give to the

¹⁶⁵ Earlier I have discussed mainly Rawls' criticism to Utilitarianism.

poor to the extent that the rich come almost to a level that is similar to that of the poor. This approach has been criticized as too demanding. As opposed to marginalist Utilitarians, welfarist Utilitarians focus on the sum-total of utilities of a state. Evaluating the aggregate well-being of a nation, this approach often uses an index to make interpersonal comparisons. They often use a preference function that is relatively common to persons. Thus, the welfarist approach, its proponents argue, can avoid the charges of hedonism in that it is not concerned about subjective states of consciousness; rather it appeals to a more objective order of shared relative desirability of material resources and personal qualities.

As a consequence of applying Utilitarian reasoning, Peter Singer makes a famous argument in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” that it is morally required for the rich to transfer their resources to the poor until the gap between the aggregate sums begins to diminish.¹⁶⁶ His argument, also known as the *Argument of Shallow Pond*, claims that rich people’s not giving money to international aid agencies helping the poor is immoral in the same way that a failure to save a drowning child would be immoral.¹⁶⁷ He says,

[I]f I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.

Engaging this thought experiment would, his argument goes, force us to accept the conclusions of consequentialism.

In this framing, the moral intuition to help the dying child takes no account of distance or proximity. If we resist a psychological difference in one’s guilty feeling between the drowning child in front of my eyes and the dying child in famine stricken

¹⁶⁶ Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 1, (1972): 229-243, p. 236.

¹⁶⁷ Garrett Cullity presents and defends a reformulated version of Singer’s argument against both Kantian deontologists and Aristotelian virtue ethicists. His revised formulation of Singer’s argument reads: “When one is aware of threats to other people’s lives, the failure to take steps to avert those threats is unkind and unjust, unless there are countervailing considerations.” Garrett Cullity, “International Aid and the Scope of Kindness” *Ethics*, Vol. 105, No. 1, (Oct. 1994): 99-127, p. 117.

East Bengal, the same moral principle would dictate that we should provide food, shelter and basic medical care in order to save the lives that would be lost without help. The amount of donation needed to prevent fatal diseases, given the empirical data, is no more significant a sacrifice than ruining one's clothes. Singer thus accepts both the "strong" conclusion of the marginalist Utilitarians and the "moderate" conclusion that rich people must give to the poor or to the famine relief organizations to that effect.

Seen this way, Utilitarian reasoning has a great deal in common with the proposals suggested by Kantian cosmopolitans. Both camps share the goal that it is moral obligation to reach global equality. They argue in a similar fashion that the traditional distinction between duty and charity does not hold anymore in the face of the moral claims that the global poor make upon us. As Hare argues, the Utilitarian principle can harmonize with the Kantian principle of universalizability for it is "giving equal weight to the equal interests" of a person. In some respect, Utilitarians seem to be able to embrace a more radical change than Kantian cosmopolitans.

Surprisingly, however, the Utilitarian approach may lead to a totally different conclusion through the same line of logic. Some Utilitarians argue that the rich countries should not transfer any of their wealth to the poor countries. In particular, neo-Malthusians argue that humanitarian projects, roughly put, assure that the poor subsists below the neutral level of well-being, thus prolonging their sufferings. The logical consequence goes so far as to imply what Derek Parfit calls the "repugnant conclusion" which claims that if there were a large enough population living below the neutral level of well-being, then it would be better that it not exist.¹⁶⁸

Such a repugnant conclusion is often put forward by Neo-Malthusians in particular, and there have been considerable efforts to avoid this implication even within the Utilitarian camp. Onora O'Neill argues, however, that it is not a coincidence that there are sharp conflicts among various Utilitarian conclusions when it comes to global equality. She goes so far as to claim that the contention arises due to an innate defect of the methodology of Utilitarianism. I do not think that the criticism against the argument by Neo-Malthusians can be equally applied to a type of Utilitarianism such as Singer's. Nevertheless, it may well be reasonable to wonder why such a split is possible.

¹⁶⁸ Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford University Press, 1984), p.436.

One of the problems with the Utilitarian approach is that it confuses the maximum of the utility calculation with the criterion for justice. It is to say that their criterion for a just state of affairs is inadequate to address the concerns at hand. As discussed earlier, because Utilitarianism focuses on the aggregate sum of welfare, it theoretically permits one person's life to be sacrificed for the other person's life when doing so contributes the overall greater well-being of a society. Understandably, one may argue that the maximization of well-being would not occur in this way. However, there seems to be no internal constraint to prohibit this possibility. This difficulty raises legitimate concerns about whether Utilitarianism captures the moral importance of equality. As long as it is unable to cope with this objection, it remains inadequate and incomplete as a normative ground of a guiding cosmopolitan principle. Interestingly, with regard to redistribution, Singer's proposal expands the limit of society to the global populations while Rawls does not. However, the same question Rawls poses to Utilitarianism in a domestic context remains, in principle, unsolved.

Another problem has to do with the Utilitarian criterion of the subjective pleasure and pain as the measure of the moral good. As a hedonistic principle, Utilitarianism does not provide independent criteria of the right; rather the accumulation of the good gets translated in the standard of the right. Even in recent variations of Utilitarianism that takes "preference" instead of "utilities" as the standard, the fundamental problem remains. It is still hard to offer a satisfactory answer to the problem of "adapted" or "deformed" preference. Exposure to extreme poverty often blunts one's mind rather than sharpening it. What if a person has internalized oppression so that he or she does not realize, or feel the pain? In this case, preferences often fail to reflect certain moral urgency when the subject does not even realize the direness of his or her needs. It opens the question whether there is an independent measure of right or bad apart from one's desire and aspirations. Now the question of adapted preference goes well beyond the purview of this dissertation and needs separate work to meet the complexity.

Moreover, Utilitarianism overlooks the difficulty of interpersonal comparison. In principle, Utility-functions assume rough equality or similarity among persons. As a consequence, a person with special needs compared to the 'normal' range is not taken into consideration. It could be that the marginal utility of a ramp to a disabled person is

greater than it is to an able-bodied person. However, when the size of a population comes into play, the satisfaction of a larger population can simply outweigh that of a relatively smaller disabled population. The persons who have special needs - for example, persons with severe physical or mental disabilities fall out of normal utility-functions. However, the persons who are left out of the purview of the normal range can constitute the most severe cases of social inequality, the most vulnerable. I shall come back to the limitation of interpersonal comparison later in dealing with Sen's criticism of Utilitarianism.

(2) Demands of Multiculturalism: The Cultural Diversity Thesis

Multiculturalist critics of cosmopolitan distributive justice ask whether it is possible to accommodate liberal universalism without imposing liberal imperialism. From the early years of the debate on global justice, the skeptics challenged cosmopolitanism by pointing to the lack of a common sense of justice as well as the absence of shared institutions at the international level.¹⁶⁹ The criticism is that, in bold strokes, the pluralistic world society does not have a common conception of justice; thus, global justice is not a worthy goal to pursue because it is a mere cover up for the hypocritical generosity of the Western civilization. At best, they argue, global justice may be a noble ideal in theory, but in practice the attempt to realize this goal will do more harm than good.

This line of objection focuses on *the fact of cultural diversity*.¹⁷⁰ Kukathas argues that it is hard to believe that there is a shared sense of justice across different cultures. This objection is understandable when we simply think of the failures of cross-cultural conversations. Kwame Appiah elegantly describes the difficulty as the following:¹⁷¹ The leaders of the Parliament of the World's Religions agree on the "Golden Rule" as the fundamental principle on which global ethics is based. In fact, most world's religions find the principle "Do to others what you wish done to yourself, and never do to other what you do not wish done to yourself" in their teachings; yet, it turns out that it is virtually

¹⁶⁹ Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983); David Miller, *Principles of Social Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

¹⁷⁰ Chandra Kukathas, "The Mirage of Global Justice" in *Justice and Global Politics*, eds. by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge University Press, 2006): 1-28.

¹⁷¹ Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).

impossible to identify a single thing that all will universally agree to wish done or not done to them. The abstract principle that appears universally valid turns out that to have radically different substance when interpreted in the particular context. Different cultures have different values, different vocabularies even for the common values, and further different priorities among those values.

Cosmopolitans often suppose that there can be an ‘overlap’ amongst different cultures. At a minimal level, there can be a sufficient overlap that they can be mutually assured they are talking about the same thing. Disagreements about values are pandemic even at home; yet liberals often assume there are certain values that are universal. Despite fundamental disagreement in their justification, they may hold certain practices or values in common. This idea is also central to Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus; that is, there is a possibility to reach an agreement in a deeply pluralistic society, at least in the political realm. Anti-cosmopolitans argue that the prospect of reaching an overlapping consensus at a domestic level is pretty dim, but it will be even more hopeless at a global level.¹⁷²

If the paucity of commonality indicates the impossibility of agreement, the seemingly “agreed upon” outcome is an illusion. Provided that the conception of universal justice is a bogus one, if it is imposed then it will be nothing but an imposition of one value over many others. Most likely, it will be the stronger party’s being able to enforce his view of justice. Indeed, the possibility exists that global institutions may be manipulated by individual states, local communities, or lobbyists in a way that they influence decisions in favor of their particular interests. The politicians of well-off and hegemonic countries may indeed try to manipulate the global fund on behalf of their national or even personal interests.

The charge of neocolonialism is thus often related to the assumption that the current global order benefits the rich countries, and harms the poor countries. Therefore, the critics go so far as to claim that global accounts of justice may end up cultivating the medium in which more powerful agents are better able to exploit resources from

¹⁷² Kok-Chor Tan also expresses the concern that the parallel may not hold between the domestic and international levels in this regard. Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

vulnerable ones.¹⁷³ The suspicion is that the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund regulates the economies of the worse-off countries and instead plants liberal systems that supplant the local ones so that liberal corporations may easily get a grip on the economies of poor countries.

However, this line of objection seems to be based on a misrepresentation of cosmopolitan principles. Of course, it is clearly not the intention of such thinkers. Moreover, the sense of cosmopolitan moral obligation toward distant others is brought up as a result of social processes that have already connected different cultures. A conception of a cosmopolitan obligation is, in other words, a *response* to this newly framed structure, not that it is a *basis* for such a change.

Such acknowledgement answers another objection related to the practicability of a cosmopolitan conception of distributive justice, a view which assumes that distributive cosmopolitanism entails a global sovereign. Given its purview, they claim, such an institution will be a world government, or a global leviathan. As we saw earlier, even among cosmopolitans, opinions vary about the need of such an institution. When it is assumed necessary, however, the prospect of the all mighty global agent often stifles any positive outlook it has. The underlying logic is that remaining with many small leviathans in nation states is better than creating one huge one. They argue that once an agent is created in order to carry out the global economic redistribution, there is no competing power that can keep this global agent under checks and balances in case of its wayward behaviors. Whoever would be the subject of agent of such a power, they assume that it will inevitably become wayward. As Lord Action has it, absolute power corrupts absolutely.

I do not think such a centered global institution is necessary, but at this point I will limit myself to pointing out that there are questionable assumptions in this argument. On one hand, it assumes that the world state will be as powerful as states; on the other hand, the world state would lack any balancing power which most well-functioning modern states are equipped with. In other words, in order to argue from the supposition

¹⁷³ Mathias Risse suggests, contrary to this point, that there is empirical evidence that integration into open markets and global institutions improves the well-being of developing countries. See, Mathias Risse “How Does Global Order Harm the Poor?” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2005): 349-376.

of global leviathan, one needs to depend on both similarity and dissimilarity between domestic and international levels. If a modern state is not acting on its absolute will, but rather it is comprised of many sub-institutions and will-formation processes, there is no reason to assume that this will not be possible in the global institution. The fear of the imaginary leviathan should not stifle our hope of constituting a political union.

What is more, the current nation-states themselves, in so many cases, enforce the view of justice of the stronger within their boundaries and fail to protect the vulnerable. If the ideal of global justice is a mirage, no less is the ideal of the general will of the people in a nation state. A cosmopolitan framework is neither necessarily aiming at strengthening the current global hegemony, nor is it aiming at dissolving all boundaries. Economic redistribution shall require corresponding institutions in order to resolve the assurance problem; yet, we do not have to conceive a single-centered institution, as many skeptics claim it would have to be.

What I think is required of us is to meet the charges of cultural diversity. The following is a response to the “fact of cultural diversity.” It requires efforts to provide enabling conditions for cross-cultural conversations. For example, Lorenzo Simpson’s attempt to define the conditions necessary for understanding of other cultures is a valuable research in this direction.¹⁷⁴ Inspired by Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Habermas’ discourse ethics, his development of “counterfactual narrative critique” suggests that certain approaches to social justice can do justice to cultural difference and avoid the charge that their legitimacy is dependent on normative standards imposed by the West. Granted that these necessary conditions are met, interlocutors in cross-cultural conversations may come to a position to discuss certain problematic issues without imposing one’s own view regarding other cultures.

(3) Basic Capability Approach: Amartya Sen

So far we have seen various proposals for global economic justice. I broadly agree with the approach of Beitz and Pogge, but they seem still insensitive to the assessment of

¹⁷⁴ Lorenzo C Simpson, “Critical Interventions: Towards a Hermeneutical Rejoinder” in *Critical Intercultural Hermeneutics: Challenges and Possibilities*, edited by Ming Xie (Toronto, University of Toronto Press), forthcoming.

the urgency of individual needs. Despite their normative commitment to the individuals' moral worth beyond state boundaries, their proposal does not provide a satisfactory way to address diverse conceptions of the good across different cultures. In particular, Pogge's theory is committed to the guarantee of a basic set of universal human rights; yet as the cultural diversity thesis has it, it may be rooted in the Western view of the good. Although the basis of our suspicion must also come under scrutiny,¹⁷⁵ the defense of universal values without essentialist implication thus seems to be pivotal to the project of a cosmopolitan framework of justice. Can we ever accommodate a set of universal values without the charge of imposing ethnocentric Imperialism? What I suggest here is a careful reexamination of proposals for global equality with an eye on the critique of the cultural diversity thesis.

Against this backdrop, I hope that a conception of equality that is more sensitive to cultural difference is able to cope with the cultural diversity thesis. Amartya Sen's basic capability approach seems to offer a balanced and adequate standard of assessment of equality. There are three salient reasons why I think Sen's basic capability approach entails the most suitable form of measure for global justice. First, it addresses the urgency of individual need rather than prioritizing other political collective forms. Second, it is sensitive to fundamental cultural diversity. Third, it still pursues universal values at a minimal level while it leaves space for culture-dependent differences.

Sen starts by incorporating Rawls' proposal for social primary goods that must be provided aside from distribution by the maximin principle. In Rawls' terminology, social primary goods are "things that every rational man is presumed to want" such as "rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect." Sen maintains that Rawls' proposal for the primary social goods is adequate in that it espouses the moral importance of the material basis of the exercise of individual freedom. Liberty is not just a matter of having abstract rights; but it requires being in a position to exercise those rights, and this requires having material and institutional resources.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, Sen argues that Rawls' list has an element of "fetishism," that is, Rawls still focuses on "things" too much rather than what "things do to persons."

¹⁷⁵ I hope to examine this problem elsewhere in the near future.

¹⁷⁶ Recall the connection between economic condition and political/civil rights discussed earlier in this chapter.

In a nutshell, Sen claims that the predominant way of measuring individuals' well-being, both in Utilitarian and Rawlsian conceptions of justice, fails to capture the moral significance of equality. The basic capability approach is geared to address the main problems of both Rawls' social justice theory and Utilitarian theory. Sen argues:

It [primary goods] still is concerned with good things rather than with what these good things *do* to human beings. Utility, on the other hand, *is* concerned with what these things do to human beings, but uses a metric that focuses not on the person's capabilities but on his mental reaction.¹⁷⁷

While both camps are mainly concerned about income as an indication of the citizen's economic level, he further argues, individuals' well-being cannot be simply measured by how much they make or how much they possess. Income and wealth have considerable correlation to the exercise of individual freedom, but there is a lot more to take into account. Rather, it requires gaining access to things including clean water, adequate food, clothes and a shelter. In a cross-cultural comparison, this inadequacy of measurement leads to even larger misconceptions, because what *X* amount of income can do differs greatly from person to person, from society to society. Instead, he proposes to look at the basic capabilities of the individual persons. This approach suggests that we must take into account whether a person has abilities to do certain things, such as "the ability to move about," "the ability to be clothed" or "the ability to meet one's nutritional requirements."¹⁷⁸

Martha Nussbaum tried to provide the basic capability approach with the philosophical underpinnings from the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle. As a plant would flourish given adequate circumstances, she argues, a human being would also develop her potentials to the fullest degree given an adequate material basis. A circumstance where a being's naturally given potential can flourish without impediment is *better* than situations in which they are stunted.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibidem.*

¹⁷⁸ Amartya Sen, "Equality of What?" *The Tanner Lecture on Human Value* (1979), p. 218.

It is noteworthy that the basic capability approach focuses on the *capabilities*, not *functioning*. In other words, what matters is whether an individual does have the basic capabilities, not whether he or she actualizes these capabilities. Wanting to actualize certain capabilities depends on her conception of the good and her surrounding communities. A devout Muslim would refuse to eat food from sunrise to sunset during Ramadan even though he or she has access to food; a devoted Catholic might refrain from enjoying sexual pleasure before marriage even though there is no external sanction to forbid doing so. If their wanting not to actualize these capabilities is supported by their deeper convictions, they can be understood to have freely suppressed their first order desires.

We can see the advantage of the basic capability approach over both Utilitarian and social justice theories. With regard to the evaluation of equality among individuals across different cultures, Sen aptly presents a way to navigate between the Scylla of Rawlsian resource fetishism and the Charybdis of Utilitarian subjectivism. However, as Sen acknowledges, the basic capability approach is only a “partial” guide to realize the moral goodness of the idea of equality. It sheds light on a direction for an adequate measurement of equality; yet it does not touch upon institutional issues such as how we should meet the criteria of the basic capabilities approach. Thus, when it comes to the question about the agent of distribution, the basic capability approach remains silent. Now, this partial character of the capability approach suggests the need to fit it in a broader picture.

(4) A Proposal for a Hybrid Model

At bottom, I have argued that the Kantian principle of cosmopolitan justice entails a moral concern to respect individuals beyond state boundaries. Further, the attempts to respect individual persons’ dignity must entail the obligation to support a life worth living, that is, a life endowed with the economic and political basics. Now let me turn to the “the hybrid model” that I would like to propose as an alternative way of realizing cosmopolitan justice. The gist of my argument is for balancing the care for the recipients and the duty of agents. This hybrid version has another advantage in that it sets a clear

target of redistribution for the cosmopolitan project, the lack of which was a basis of Rawls's concern.

Conceptions of Kantian cosmopolitan justice do relatively well in defining obligations from the perspective of the agents; yet their approaches seem to be limited in the way they address the needs of the recipients. It does not tell us clearly what we have an obligation to provide. I hope the above discussion makes it clear why Kantian cosmopolitan justice needs to incorporate the critique of the basic capabilities approach. Following Amartya Sen, I concur that the concern for equality must focus on what material resources do to human life, not on the numerical data of income and wealth; at the same time, the concern for equality must not be based primarily on subjective feeling of pleasure or happiness. In other words, cosmopolitan distributive justice is required to commit itself to enhance the agency of the vulnerable, rather than conceiving them primarily as receivers, and to provide the legitimate baseline for global populations to have the basic capabilities that are the touchstone for their substantial freedom.

With regard to the agents of cosmopolitan justice, the onus of carrying it out must be distributed to various levels. I think the discourse of Kantian deontology is particularly illuminating on this point. As Onora O'Neill argues, one of central feature of Kantian ethics is its emphasis on agency. It primarily asks "what ought I do?" rather than "what ought I get?"¹⁷⁹ Focusing on the talk of human rights in cosmopolitanism can often be construed as describing a set of defined rights without clarifying who are the bearers of these rights. The common confusion on global justice regarding who should bear the responsibility to ensure the basic rights reflects the need to specify the agents to carry out what is morally justified. Is it individual citizens, nation states, or global organizations that bear the obligations to meet basic rights?

In short, the conception I propose is to distribute the responsibility to multiple agents at different levels. The conception of multiple levels of agents includes, as Pogge suggested, the need to withdraw dividends from the states to the collective fund, and to distribute to meet the basic capabilities of individuals around the world. Multiple levels of agents are expected to cooperate according to their share in the common project. In this framework, individual citizens, nation states and global organizations do have their

¹⁷⁹ Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of Justice*, p. 199.

own place within cosmopolitan justice. States remain as significant agents but their role must be different from the previous era. States play an intermediary role in a way that they collect funds from their citizens and then to contribute to global organizations. States can be efficient agents in allocating the cosmopolitan burdens within the states; at the same time, states shall monitor the performance of global organizations and keep it accountable to their members.

In this light, the conventional view that states are obstacles to the cosmopolitan ideal must be reexamined. In order for this ideal to work, of course, individuals are expected to develop allegiance to global institutions that are based on the cosmopolitan principles. Perhaps the curriculum of civic education of each country must be coordinated for this purpose. Yet this demand does not necessarily eradicate citizens' loyalty to local governments. We can rather envision in their coexistence partial conflicts on particular issues. This change may imply divided loyalties, but it is not the same as impotent agency. When conflicts occur, allegiance to cosmopolitan principles can regulate allegiance to local ones. In turn, individual allegiance to state governments would be justified as long as the local governments support, or at least do not impinge upon, the cosmopolitan principles.

However, a conception of cosmopolitan justice does not, and indeed ought not, demand strict universal values across diverse people's lives. A theory of cosmopolitan justice must leave a space for the rich diversity and complexity of human interactions and interconnections. Cosmopolitan justice motivated by the problem of global inequality does not need to appeal to one unique conception of the good. A theory that attempts to regulate particular interactions and define personal pursuits would be rather unappealing and disagreeable. A genuine cosmopolitan justice starts from the double commitment to acknowledge this space and at the same time to establish a just social context for individuals to pursue their own conceptions of meaningful lives.

6. Chapter Conclusion

What ought a theory of cosmopolitan justice that is rooted in Kantian moral and political principles to be? For a genuine motivation to cure the ills of global inequality, the theory of Kantian cosmopolitan justice ought to revise some of the central Kantian concepts of persons and societies; further it ought to incorporate criticisms that come from other liberal traditions. Thus far I have accordingly evaluated existing views on cosmopolitan distributive justice and questioned how well they serve its core commitments. I agree with the central tenets of Rawls' conception of justice which takes material basis seriously for citizens' exercise of political and civic rights. Rawls' two-tiered commitment, however, holds that global economic inequality is permissible as long as other countries have a decent political structure. Although this position seems to grant autonomy to different peoples, I have argued that it is no longer morally justified in the face of the claims the globally vulnerable make upon us, nor is it politically feasible to approach peaceful coexistence. Rather, as Beitz and Pogge point out, the egalitarian commitment is rightly to be extended beyond state boundaries. Just as we do not want extreme poverty to prevent our compatriots from exercising their freedom in shaping their lives, we do not want distant others to suffer from premature death and chronic malnutrition due to the lack of basic material resources. Cosmopolitan conceptions of justice hold the individual person as the ultimate subject of economic distribution. Despite its adequate orientation, I have shown that the overall discourse of cosmopolitan justice is limited on several fronts. First, it focuses on the distribution of wealth without due consideration for rectifying the present fabric of the global market. Second, cosmopolitan distributive justice has been neglected the demand of cosmopolitan citizenship in the face of refugees and asylum seekers. Among others, the claims to transfer natural resources or funds are mistaken in its analysis of the moral implication of equality. Based on the promises and limitations of the various suggestions, the present chapter has lastly put forward a hybrid model in order to balance between the strength of Kantian cosmopolitanism in assigning the moral obligations of the agents and its weakness in addressing the needs of the vulnerable whose dignity it aims to ensure.

Chapter Four: The Concept of Development

1. Introduction

John Stuart Mill's masterpiece, *On Liberty*, starts with a quote from Wilhelm von Humboldt on human development. "The grand, leading principle, (...) is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity."¹⁸⁰ As Mill notes later, Humboldt holds that "freedom" and "variety of situations" are the two necessary conditions of human development. Mill diagnosed while the first condition is satisfied by legal arrangement of his society, the second condition, i.e., the plurality condition is notably less prevalent in his time. I think Mill is right in seeing the importance of both freedom and plurality for human development throughout his book on liberty. Nevertheless, I wonder why the idea that humanity must develop seems to be set in stone both in the cases of Mill and Humboldt.

Why is the idea of development so central in their works? Where does this development ultimately lead humanity? After all, what did they mean by development? Liberty and diversity may be of intrinsically value, but they are stressed for their instrumental value for human development. Mill's emphasis of the interrelation between human development on one hand and liberty and diversity on the other hand is perhaps easy to understand; nevertheless, why human development seems to be the overarching value that liberty and plurality are designed to serve? There seems to be something profoundly questionable in Humboldt's assertion: It is the idea that freedom and plurality are important because they nourish human development. Framing the issue in this way, I argue, overlooks the priority of freedom and diversity over human development. Putting human development prior to freedom and plurality seems to me putting the cart before the horse. In short, development may be a contingent byproduct of liberty and diversity; yet it is not the condition of their importance.

¹⁸⁰ Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Sphere and Duties of Government*, cited by John Stuart Mill, *The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill*, (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), p. xxi.

This chapter envisages the proper place of the idea of development in Kantian cosmopolitan thoughts. In a nutshell, I would like to suggest that we should invert Humboldt's idea above: Human development is important so long as they contribute to the basic liberty and plurality of peoples. Liberty and plurality are, in other words, criterial properties of development.

In the history of philosophy, the idea of development, or the idea of progress, to use a more common term, is typically assigned to the enlightenment thinkers as we saw above. Under the banner of progress, the age of enlightenment sought to spread reason all over the world. Much social evil and injustice were expected to disappear once the use of reason dominates stubborn customs and age-old superstitions. The zeal for enlightenment soon went beyond Europe as colonization has begun in other parts of the world. However, this commitment was so powerful that it often justified Eurocentric imperialism as the self-imposed role of liberator to save the rest of the world from their slumbers. Scientific and philosophical research were the instruments to institutionalize the popular European perceptions of the "strange" habits of peoples from different parts of the world such as Asia, Africa and America. Under the name of social development, far too often immoral acts have been justified. "Barbarians," etymologically, "they" who do not speak "our" language, are yet-to-be-civilized objects who have failed to reach enlightenment by themselves.

Of course, some policies of European countries in their colonies indeed acted against certain cruelties and violence. The British in India put the ban of *sati*, which was the prominent example of "barbaric customs" of Asia. Some of the colonial policies are truly examples of benevolent paternalism. However we need to think about to what extent domestic violence is different from the practice of *sati*. We may well recall the claims of third world critics that female genital mutilation in the Islam is no more cruel or risky than breast augmentation for women in the West. These are examples to showcase the difficulty and complexity of the inter-cultural criticism. What I intend to show is how easy it is for us to be deceived by the naive enlightenment dualism between "barbarism" and "civilization." After all, as the Frankfurt school theorists argued after the World War II, barbarism is not something that exists out in the wilderness; it is rather cultivated and

reinforced by the European civilization itself.¹⁸¹ The desire to identify the non-identifiable, to measure the non-commensurable with one measure was the very name of its own barbarism.

I have argued in an earlier chapter that Kantian cosmopolitanism endorses a set of loosely conceived universal values, which raises claims for global economic justice. Many humanitarian aid agencies and international organizations that aim for global justice in this context commonly use the term “development.” I believe some uses of the term, however, are sufficient to undermine the idea itself. History shows us that the idea of development gets misused to suppress autonomy of some populations quite contrary to what it professes. With an eye to this apparent danger, now the question arises as to whether the idea of development must be discarded forever. Or does it have a proper place in the conceptions of Kantian cosmopolitanism? The goal of this chapter is to address these questions. My thesis is that the idea of development can still be useful as long as it functions as a way to ensure a material threshold for individual freedom and social diversity.

Now this is the structure of this chapter: First, I shall examine Kant’s justifications of the logic of development that leads to an interesting conflict with his moral universalism. Readers shall see, despite certain difference, the core conviction of Kant’s conception of historical progress is carried down to the 19th century thinkers, Mill and Marx, and indeed well into our days. Against this backdrop, “post-developmentalists” argue that due to its intrinsic limitations, the idea of development needs no more modifications; rather it must be entirely given up. They further claim that we need to thoroughly “undo” the influence of the linear understanding of development in our consciousness. Although these concerns are legitimate, I shall argue that the idea of development itself cannot be simply discarded. Without any practical alternative, what we can do is to revisit the concept time and again. I shall argue that an adequate concept of development does not compromise political values in order to reach the assumed predetermined shape as in some conceptions of development. What is crucial is to realize the core connection between political rights and economic benefits, and more importantly,

¹⁸¹ Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford University Press, 2007).

to commit not to compromise the former for the latter in the name of development. As a conclusion, I would present and defend a threshold conception of development - that is - an economic concept, not a cultural or social concept, which aims to provide the material minimum for political rights and freedom.

2. Kant on the Idea of Development

At the beginning of the *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant makes a distinction between “pure” and “impure” ethics. Kant holds that the principle of moral law is derived from a formal procedure, thus it is not involved in various contingent interests and motivations. Since the purely formal principle of moral law does not presuppose any particular conception of the good, it constitutes the basis of the concept of freedom that is prior to all empirical components. Kant claims that the purely formal foundation of freedom can be of universal worth because only in this “[no one] can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others.”¹⁸² In his distinction between pure and impure ethics, we can feel his animating zeal to have “human science (*Geisteswissenschaft*)” emulate natural science (*Naturwissenschaft*). Just as there are related but separate realms of metaphysics and physics, Kant further holds that there is also an equivalent relationship in moral inquiry, to wit, metaphysics of morals and schematizing the moral laws in practical use.

Let me set aside the cogency of this analogy, which looks already problematic and yet appears so commonly in the modern history of philosophy. The result of this application of the metaphysical principle of moral law in practical use, however, well deserves our attention. It is at the end of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, the magnum opus for which the *Groundwork* was intended to be a preliminary work, where Kant explicitly illustrates such application. Along with “duties of virtue to one’s own self,” Kant discusses “duties of virtue to others” in mainly two categories.¹⁸³ He holds that, firstly,

¹⁸² Kant, “On Common Saying: ‘This may be True in Theory, but It does not Apply in Practice’,” in *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 73-74 (AK 8:290).

¹⁸³ It would be interesting at this point to note Kant’s distinction between ‘a duty of love’ and ‘a duty of virtue’ to others. In Kant’s framework, performing the first would be meritorious and the

we have duties to others merely because they are human beings; and secondly, with regard to their conditions. Under the second category, he further examines the need for pure moral principles to be *schematized* when they are applied to different people. The principle of moral law, in other words, is to be applied differently to persons depending on their condition. The following passage nicely captures this idea:

How should one behave, for example, toward human beings who are in a state of moral purity or depravity? toward the cultivated or the crude? toward men of learning or the ignorant, and toward the learned insofar as they use their science as members of polite society or outside society, as specialists on their field (scholars)? toward those whose learning is pragmatic or those in whom it proceeds more from spirit and taste?

Kant clearly says that there is no difference in the *kinds* of our ethical obligations since they are given by the metaphysical principles, but the *ways* of applying these principles to experience become modified depending on the differences of the subjects to whom the principles are applied. In this framework, it becomes legitimate for Kant to ask: “How should people be treated in accordance with their differences in rank, age, sex, health, prosperity, or poverty and so forth?”¹⁸⁴

However, if moral laws are as Kant argues absolute, wouldn't the value of moral laws become ineluctably compromised in applying these principles to empirical data? In particular, the above mentioned criteria for proper treatment of other people includes purely socially contingent factors such as one's level of being civilized or one's state of intelligence. Even whether the person belongs to an advanced society affects the way one ought to behave toward him or her. This is clearly not violating Kant's principle because individuals that are less cultivated or ignorant are still entitled to our respect. They have a

performing the latter would be fulfilling what is owed to others. In other words, a duty of virtue, i.e., a duty of free respect toward others, is *narrow* in the sense that it prohibits degrading others by treating them merely as a means to further my end, whereas a duty of love is *wide* in the sense that it inculcates a duty of actively setting others' ends as my own. Accordingly, a duty of virtue becomes similar to a duty of right so far as it is a negative duty not to encroach upon what already belongs to others. See Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*.

¹⁸⁴ Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. and trans. by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 584 (AK 6: 469).

right not to be used merely as a means. We can make best sense out of it in that they may be used as a means as long as doing so somehow contributes to their own good. This would be using them as means to further their end, thus getting away with the proviso that we should not use them merely as a means to further my end.

In this framework, if restricting someone's freedom can contribute to their own ends, using them would be justified. Kant thus claims "immature" individuals are better off under the guidance of "a master" until they are ready to use their reason. Doing good for them is in other words the condition that we have the other's implied consent to do something against their will. This of course puts us in the position of deciding what is good for them. Parents think they know what is good for their children. This framework becomes suspicious when it works not only for immature individuals, but also mature adults at different social stations.

Here it is important to note that this differential attitude holds not only for individuals but also for societies. To Kant, there are societies of different "stages" ranging between social childhood and social maturity. Since the "backward" people are not yet ready for "self-rule," they need guidance and education until they become civilized. The hierarchical relationship among different peoples according to their assumed status on the development timeline in turn justifies their unequal treatment. Interestingly, Kant also fears that the sudden spread of freedom may cause anarchy, wreaking havoc among barbaric subjects. Hence, Kant's espousal of gradual social progress instead of radical revolution.

In the justification of the developmental hierarchy, Kant's philosophy of history plays a significant role. As we saw in Chapter I, Kant holds that history unfolds in such a way that humanity approaches moral perfection. Just political institutions are required for this moral progress of humanity. Despite particular cases of progress and regress, the divine providence would ultimately lead humanity to its utmost level. The basic tension between the faith in historical progress toward universal freedom and the doubts about the maturity of some populations is also reconciled by appealing to the divine providence. Although backward people are not yet ready for self-rule, they may eventually learn how to use reason. Meanwhile they need enlightened despots to guard them from their foolishness and to further the enlightenment process.

The conception of a linear trajectory in history, however, justifies a great deal of injustice and violence to be committed. Frequently, this teleological assumption entails a very uncomfortable implication: Namely, the evil in human history will become redeemed in the end. He writes,

This education from above is, I say, salutary, but harsh and strict, a treatment of humankind by nature that is coupled with hardship and verges on the destruction of the entire race. The aim of nature is, namely, to bring about, out of *evil*, which is always in a state of internal strife with itself, the *good*, unintended by humankind, but which, once it exists, continues to preserve itself.¹⁸⁵

The attempt to see the course of history as the unfolding of divine providence has been a common topic since the Middle Age. As St. Augustine's *City of God* shows, theodicy has been one of the main tasks of theologians. Kant's philosophy of history remains as a secular counterpart of the Christian apologetics in that he firmly states that the ultimate goal is an object of a regulative ideal, which needs to be approached in a humane political society on earth.¹⁸⁶ Although his terminology is still under the influence of Christianity, in this regard, Kant's teleological account of history is called a "naturalized version of theodicy."¹⁸⁷

Many authors after Kant have also grappled with the question of how a good consequence as a whole is brought about by seemingly individual selfish actions. From the idea of "the invisible hand" of Adam Smith in the eighteenth century to the idea of "the cunning of Nature" in G. W. Hegel in the nineteenth century, authors came up with various mechanisms to support this idea. Or they may as well be the very placeholders marking an absence of explanatory mechanisms.¹⁸⁸ "The driven providence" or "the

¹⁸⁵ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Part 2, in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History*, edited by Pauline Kleingeld (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 171 (AK 7: 328), original emphasis.

¹⁸⁶ I discussed on this point in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

¹⁸⁷ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 58.

¹⁸⁸ Thanks to Dr. Lorenzo Simpson for this comment.

hidden plan of nature” is Kant’s way of suggesting this idea. Human miseries are not totally meaningless; rather they are inevitable stages gradually leading to a higher level of morality. In order to navigate between the danger of presumptuously predicting the future and the danger of falling into the cynicism of political realists, perhaps the “assurance” of the providence is helpful. He further argues that this is not only justified but also necessary in order not to despair and work toward the betterment as our moral insight tells us.

In light of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, recent evaluations of his use of teleology are quite split. A hospitable reading has it that it is useful as long as it can be read as an inculcation of hope. Sankar Muthu calls Kant’s narrative of progress is “a narrative of hope.” It is a narrative that “appeals to the imagination, the intent of which is to energize passive individuals who would otherwise take the injustice of the modern world as an inevitable necessity.”¹⁸⁹ According to Muthu, framing history in this way has a double aim. On one hand, this crafted narrative is meant to instill the sense of agency into human souls that at least partly they can improve their social and political lives; on the other hand, it reminds us of the limit of the human agency to bring forth the political progress.

In this way nature guarantees perpetual peace through the mechanism of human inclinations itself, with an assurance that is admittedly not adequate for predicting its future (theoretically) but that is still enough for practical purposes and makes it a duty to work towards this (not merely chimerical) end.¹⁹⁰

Thus, on the theoretic level, it may encourage us to look for evidence to back up the actual progress of human history toward the cosmopolitan goal. On the practical level, at the same time, such a narrative may generate hope, despite the grim and brute political reality, in the minds of the citizens to work towards this goal. So, the goal will be realized or is more likely to be realized if we can get people to believe that it can be realized even if there is no independent theoretical certainty.

¹⁸⁹ Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 163.

¹⁹⁰ Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace in Practical Philosophy*, edited by Mary J. Gregor, p. 337 (AK 8: 368).

In any case, however, it is not very clear whether or not the narrative Kant describes offers us the optimistic reassurance required for the endeavor. Whether or not Kant's philosophy of history provides us with sufficient reason to expect the success of our moral strivings remains as a question. In spite of all the hospitable interpretations, Kant's espousal of enlightenment remains troubling precisely because of its implication for condoning the injustice and violence that are said to be conducive to historical progress. Although Kant's critique of Europeans' colonialism of his time indicates his dedication to a cosmopolitan federation for citizens of the world, there is a deeply rooted double-sidedness in Kantian moral universalism. At the center of the conflict between Kant's anthropological and historical works and his ethical and political writings lies what Thomas McCarthy calls "the universalism/development dilemma."¹⁹¹ It is to say that the pursuit of social development systematically hinders the very promise of universalism it makes. There is a deeply rooted hypocrisy in the liberal thesis of self-rule.

After all, the discussion of impure ethics, that is, the application of pure moral principles leads to a dilemma. The application of the universal moral laws in reality does not only modify it and thus limit the use of freedom of so-called immature people; but rather, it profoundly injures the development and thus the acquisition of their autonomy. In other words, Kant's moral universalism pursues the guarantee of certain rights of individuals while it denies the capability of self-rule to some people, resulting in their subjection and exploitation. Differential treatment loses its justificatory power when it gets to the point that it hinders the development of individuals' autonomy, the potential for which is the ground of the moral respect that we all owe to all merely because they are human beings.

3. Mill & Marx

The idea that human history is progressing has become even more pervasive throughout the 19th century. It is particularly interesting to note that how Kant's

¹⁹¹ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

successors justify the progressive conception of history in a changed global framework of their time. John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, despite their oppositional positions in the history of philosophy, both inherited the view of historical progress and, to certain extent, the hierarchical view among different cultures. Of course both Mill and Marx try to ground their theories in a more scientific objectivity than Kant. Instead of Kant's invocation of a biblical narrative based on the book of *Genesis*,¹⁹² his successors replaced a teleological account with explicitly secular mechanisms of historical development, be it utility maximization or class struggle. However, from this legacy of the conviction in progress, one may readily expect the disjunction between the universal ideals that they pursue and their hierarchical treatment in reality.

Now Mill and Marx appropriated the idea of development through their own justifications; the dilemma that we examined in Kant still appears as serious inconsistencies in their works. In particular, I shall focus on how Mill's principle of freedom and the proviso of preventing harm to others stand in conflict. Likewise the geographical and at the same time temporal implication of Marx's account of the Asiatic mode of production displays a similar dilemma. Focusing on them, I would like to stress how the same pattern of thoughts occurs again and again in the history of western philosophy.

(1) Mill's Principle of Liberty and Espousal of Paternalism

In the Introduction to *On Liberty*, Mill asserts the principle of freedom as the following: "The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it."¹⁹³ Mill's classical liberalism is expressed in such a way that he champions the inalienability of the rights of individuals against the pressure of any groups and even a state government. Thus he says, "Over himself, over his own body and

¹⁹² See Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History (1786)" trans. by Allen W. Wood in *Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education*, eds. by Günter Zöllner and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹⁹³ Mill, *On Liberty* in *The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill* (New York: Modern Library, 2002 [1859]) p.14.

mind, the individual is sovereign.”¹⁹⁴ This individualistic idea of self-ownership leads to a conception of free society with ample place for individual originalities so that each can lead their life according to their own idea of the good. Self-protection is, he claims, the sole reason that mankind, individually or collectively, can use as a warrant for interfering with the liberty of their actions. That is to say, the only way that the power can be exercised rightly, be it physical force, legal penalties or moral repression, is to “prevent harms to others.”

Now the proviso of preventing harms to others - which is added as the only one exception to the principle of liberty - needs to come under closer scrutiny. Mill confines the principle of liberty only to the so-called societies that have long since achieved the age of freedom. Doing so is regrettable to his readers, but I think Mill managed to exclude immature individuals or underdeveloped societies from the purview of freedom without an explicit contradiction, at least in his own mind, due to this proviso. He claims,

Those who are still in a state of require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage.

At any rate, it is remarkable to find his paternalistic attitude toward other societies side by side with his genuine espousal of human freedom on the same page. He says compulsion and pains for noncompliance are not admissible; yet, with one exception that they are inflicted for the security of those who are subject to them. Until they grow up from their immaturity, the principle of liberty is not to be applied to them. Since the initial difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are such huge obstacles that they may hardly find means to hurdle, he maintains, despotism is a type of government suitable for them: “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.”¹⁹⁵ If they are lucky, they may have good despots who would use all

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

means to expedite the civilizing mission. Still, how is the transition from benevolent paternalism to autonomy effected? Mill remains silent when it comes to the question how despotism will provide a free space for individuals to cultivate their originality and creativity that in turn nourishes the development of their society.

It is even more troubling to find such an intellectual mind as Mill's simply accepts a dualistic worldview between civilization and barbarism. For Mill, the standard against which societies are measured as "civilized" is whether the societies take their members' liberty seriously. Of course, Mill mentions countries such as India and China as half-civilized and half-barbaric. According to Mill, the Indian and the Chinese once achieved a high level of civilization; yet, they somehow lost the momentum to make further development. Thus they have fallen into a state of cultural stagnation in which the masters are authoritarian while the subjects are subservient, unworthy of the treatment as free persons. The underlying logic is that authoritarian regimes hinders the practice of autonomy of their citizens, thus eventually leads to the loss of their capacity for autonomy. It is clear for Mill by contrast that the European civilization is the only one that kept moving forward, reaching the highest level of development. He now endows the "civilized" European countries with a mission to spread this freedom to other parts of the world.

It is beyond doubt that Mill wrote these passages out of good intention. His genuine concern for the people living in "backward" societies can be felt line by line as if toward children. Despite Mill's altruistic commitment to civilize barbarian societies, however, it is easy to see how the logic of development can be used as a sheer cover for imperialism. The idea that a group of people must reach a certain point of development in order to claim their freedom is nothing but an excuse for denial of the potential to develop their agency that might bring about a new change. It is central in Mill's defense of freedom that the conception of man as a progressive being has the utmost moral value. True to this ideal, he nods to the possibility of improvement of "barbarian societies." Nevertheless, there is no explanation of how the deferral of the practice of freedom can eventually lead to its development. Furthermore, he is fully aware that societies cannot acquire freedom anterior to the time when men become capable of improving themselves by free and equal discussion.

The truth is quite contrary: colonialism has generated enormous economic, political, and social cost. Economically, many resources, and alas, innumerable slaves, were “legally” transferred to Europe or North America. Politically, many third world countries in Africa still suffer from enmity created and fostered by European colonizers among diverse groups. Socially, past memories of subjection still weigh heavily on the former colonized as an onerous burden to overcome. Colonization only oppresses the mind of colonized through internalizing the hierarchy with rewards and punishments even if they may be already used to oppression and dominance under a despotic rule. Such are a few examples of the wounds that a paternalistic colonial rule can leave in the consciousness of the colonized.¹⁹⁶

In sum, Mill holds that we should not interfere with others’ freedom unless it prevents harming those whose freedom is violated. In Mill’s framework therefore colonialism does not conflict with the principle of liberty since it is to the benefit of the “backward” peoples. However, a closer examination of what it means to “harm others” reveals the hypocrisy of the double standard.

(2) Karl Marx: Oriental Despotism vs. Asiatic Mode of Production

Now I shall turn to Marx’s idea of development in contrast to that of Mill. It was Karl Marx who aptly exposed the greed of capitalism implicit in Mill’s espousal of benign despotism and endorsement of colonial exploitation. In criticizing the heinous acts of exploitation and the vile pursuit of interests in the colonial reality, Marx claims that the idea of progress degrades rather than improves them. Rhetorically, he asks: “Has it [the bourgeoisie] ever effected a progress without dragging individuals and peoples through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?”¹⁹⁷ Marx rightly pointed out the hypocrisy of liberal imperialism that we examined above without being inclined to redeem in as in Kant.

¹⁹⁶ See Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. by Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2003[1963]).

¹⁹⁷ Karl Marx, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978); also cited by Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 178.

Nevertheless, in an interesting way, Marx shares the enlightenment legacy from Kant on the linear trajectory of historical development. All the liberal evils are not to be redeemed through an internal logic, but to be transcended by a socialist transformation. Of course, the end state of the historical progress, that is, the ideal society that he envisioned is very different from that of Mill; yet, the commitment to linear understanding of history remains unchanged. It is for this reason that despite Marx' virulent criticism of liberal universalism, his theory is not entirely innocent from the fundamental problems that he accuses the liberals of.

From the materialist point of view, Marx holds that each society has a different mode of production, namely, a whole network of producing and maintaining social needs. Marx draws a line of logical development based on an abstraction of the crucial features of these material conditions. According to Marx's analysis, historical development comes in five stages: primitive communism, slave society, feudalism, capitalism and socialism. The mechanism Marx uses to explain this historical movement is the so-called class struggle. Roughly speaking, the idea of class struggle assumes possibilities of internal conflicts in each mode of production due to the limited ownership of the valid means of production of the particular society. The internal antagonisms, according to Marx, necessarily call for the abolition of the old system and further a transformation into a new level of material condition. A renewed material relationship which is called "the basis" will then bring forth further changes in politics, cultures, religions, and all that Marx regards as being dependent on the material condition.

In this linear understanding of historical unfolding, the previous stage is viewed as a necessary condition for the next stage. Thus in his description of world development, capitalism, even though it is fraught with evil, is portrayed as a pre-socialist stage that is also necessary for this historical transformation. Capitalism's evil is only an inevitable step toward the destined future. The theodicy element becomes clear in Marx in so far as the indicated capitalistic vices are considered as necessary elements for historical progress. In Marx, the previous stages are directed to the socialist transformation. And we already know the face of the future.

The postulation of a linear path in history, however, not only justifies but also encourages uses of violence to the extent that it precipitates the process. As a midwife

accelerates the process of a life giving, a revolution thus quickens the necessary birth pang. A revolution, a bloody culmination of the torrent of history, is thus a necessary evil. The idea that evil in human history will become good in the end is once more used to justify atrocities of violence in wars and revolutions.

After all, Marx's materialist account of historical progress is anchored in the essentialist idea of humanity.¹⁹⁸ Marx holds that only in socialism can humanity realize its fullest capacities. Modern industrialization develops only a small part of human capacity due to the division of labor, obstructing the fullest development of the multi-faceted potential of human being. The malaise of modernity is, according to Marx, the denial of the capacity that humanity can create its nature, or "the species-being." Marx argues the idea of "species-being (*Gattungswesen*)" is already determined by the totality of material relations, and thus is distinct from assuming human nature as the permanent essence of humanity. However, ethical components cannot be completely separated from this idea of species-being in that there is a normative standard that is not historically relative. Marx is essentialist under this interpretation as long as he postulates something that needs to be realized and restored from all alienating productive relationships.

At this point, Marx's analysis of "the Asian mode of production" seems to be worth noting.¹⁹⁹ Marx's account of "the Asiatic mode of production" is important for our purpose because it opens up a possibility of mutual influence between different civilizations in his account of social transformation. It presents us with a rather different picture than his predecessors. Nevertheless, the presupposition of a uni-directional development toward one goal obstructs this potential in his theory.

Marx's historical prognosis shares a great deal with Hegel's scheme of historical development. Hegel also schematizes historical development as the maturing process of reason in four successive stages: the oriental, the Greek, the Roman and the Germanic world. Despite the apparent difference in their explanatory mechanism between Marx's historical materialism and Hegel's speculative philosophy of history, the influence of Hegel and even Kant on Marx is easily detectable in their common characterization of so-

¹⁹⁸ Scott Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx* (Open Court Publisher, 1985).

¹⁹⁹ For a detailed discussion on the theoretic and practical implications of the Asiatic mode of production in Marxism, see Du-Yul Song, *Aufklärung und Emanzipation: Die Bedeutung der asiatischen Welt bei Hegel, Marx und Max Weber* (Berlin: Express Edition, 1987), ch. 3.

called “oriental despotism.” Perhaps it is reasonable to say that these thinkers’ critical insight was just not strong enough to question the age-old binary worldview, i.e., freedom of the ancient Greek and the unfreedom of the Orient, one that has held sway since Herodotus of the ancient Greeks.

During his exile in London in mid 1850s, Marx published a couple of articles on the so-called “Asiatic mode of production” in *New York Daily Tribune*. His analysis of Asian forms of economy, of China and India in particular, added a unique perspective on the Marxist conception of historical progress. First of all, he defines the basis of the Eastern civilizations as the lack of private property. The lack of private property prohibits accumulation of capital and industrial capitalism. He observes instead that a significant portion of property belongs to the communities in small villages in Asia. Explaining the phenomenon, Marx appeals to climates, politics and religions; nevertheless, the distinctive feature of many Asian lands, in Marx’s view, lie in their material conditions. The pressing need to fight against harsh natural condition such as draught and flood suggests again the need for organization of mass labor. Despotism is thus considered a typical as well as suitable mode of government in Asia.

To Marx as well as Mill, Asian despotism has an ambiguous implication. It indicates the need for further development on the axis of progress and the inability to bring about this development by themselves. Marx claims, despite innumerable changes of dynasties within their continents, the Asian world has made no significant change. In their self-sufficient mode of political economy, they have lost the momentum to move along. Interestingly, Marx sees this as a failure to catch up on the predetermined path of history, or to even get on the path of history. Thus he notoriously claims: “The Indian has no history, at least no well-known history.”²⁰⁰ That is to say that India and China are deprived of history proper, as long as they fail to make a comparable development as European countries.

It is brave naivety on Marx’s part to camouflage his ignorance by blaming others. What Marx calls the lack of history of India or China is a laughable sign of

²⁰⁰ Karl Marx, “The Future Results of British Rule in India” in the *New York Daily Tribune*, August 8 (1853).

ethnocentrism.²⁰¹ And we have to remember that it is his understanding of history which drove him to write such thing. What he calls ahistoricity of Asia only betrays the provincial character of his own conception of history. I think it is by the same token that industrial capitalism has profound ambivalence in Marxist analysis. To begin with, the transition to industrial mass production is the significant achievement of Western civilization. It is a path to be trodden, only to be overcome. Here is Marx's profound ambiguity.

Marx's analysis of "the Asiatic mode of production (*asiastische Produktionsweise*)" seems to me a paradigmatic example to showcase this ambiguity in Marxist writings. The Asiatic mode of production refers to the material totality based on communal ownership that is characteristic of Asia.²⁰² At the same time, the Asiatic mode of production is related to a pre-capitalist form of society in the successive developmental stages. In a similar way, oriental despotism, which appears so commonly in the Asiatic mode of production, is more or less identified with social stagnation in Marx's historical understanding. Now the concept of the Asiatic mode of production has topological designations while it refers to a chronological link. For the concept has both geographical and chronological references at the same, what is related to a certain area is being simultaneously related to the past. But, as the wise ancient Greek has it, nothing remains in the same water.

Within this framework, thus, the question arises as to how revolution is possible for a society that has not yet reached a level of bourgeois capitalism. Given the Marxist assumption that the abolition of capitalism represents progress in the human history,

²⁰¹ Marx, of course, appreciates certain things about India and says in the same article that Indians' submission even is "counterbalanced by a certain calm nobility, who, notwithstanding their natural langor [*sic*], have astonished the British officers by their bravery [...]." However, needless to say, Marx's students in the third world find this quote repugnant. See S. Katz, "The Problems of Europocentrism and Evolutionism in Marx's Writings on Colonialism" in *Karl Marx's Social and Political Thought* Vol. IV in four volumes, eds. by Bob Jessop and Russel Wheatley (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999).

²⁰² The relationship between the Asiatic mode of production and the stage of primitive communism has been a much-discussed topic and yet has no clear-cut answer. At this point, it is noteworthy that communal ownership in the Asiatic mode of production is related to the past; yet it entails an aspect of future in Marxist historical understanding. Since socialism pursues a version of communal ownership ultimately, the concept contains features of both past and future. See Du-Yul Song, *Aufklärung und Emanzipation: Die Bedeutung der asiatischen Welt bei Hegel, Marx und Max Weber* (Berlin: Express Edition, 1987).

where is the place for pre-capitalist societies that exist side by side with capitalist society? Can they also avail themselves of a revolution or are they first subject to modernization just to rehearse the misery of capitalism, whose demise Marx himself predicts? It is not my aim to evaluate the validity of Marx' justification of socialism or his postulation of a particular path of history. My goal is rather to point out the internal dilemma that manifests itself due to the very conception of linear development.

It is a big irony of history that a Marxist revolution was realized, albeit for only several decades, in backward Asia, not in industrialized Europe as Marx predicted. Both Russia and China belonged to, in Marx's analysis, pre-capitalist rural parts of the world. The difficulty of interpreting the concept of "the Asiatic mode of production" therefore became a more pressing issue. In order to acknowledge the transformative agency in Asian lands, many Slavic and Asian Marxists tried to either falsify or modify the troubling concept of the Asiatic mode of production. The historical "Leningrad debate" in the Marxist camp, finally resolved that "the Asiatic mode of production" is not a geographically defined concept, but merely refers to a stage in universal development process. It is a chronological characterization of an initial phase of a societal development that is to be found in all civilizations including Europe, not only in Asia. In other words, the debate resolved the theoretic tension of the concept by way of depriving its content of anything Asian. If the characteristics are universal symptoms of early civilizing societies, it has no reason to be called "Asian." It could have had a completely different name without any relation to Asia.

Furthermore the linear conception of historical development is fraught with practical variations. Whenever the historical logic of development is to be applied, it is virtually impossible to find any one single community that fits into the description. Quite contrary to the monotonous description of pre-capitalist societies, Asian, African and Latin American all have a too complex reality. Although they may share common features that are theoretically important, these overarching categories are utterly unable to capture the complexity of their own traditions, different political agendas and distinct cultural values. In particular, social developments happen in the nexus of particular circumstances such as independence movements or nationalistic modernization. Often the democratic claim for political autonomy comes into conflict with paternalistic deferral of

agency in the name of development. The suggestion of universal stages of development cannot be “applied” to any of real societies precisely because of its abstraction in its caricaturing social relationships and schematizing various conditions. It is only through confronting their contemporary socio-economic condition that one can meaningfully talk about the meaning of liberation, be whatever their past shackles are.

Walter Benjamin, amid the insanity of the World War II, claimed that the belief in the progress of human history is nothing but a mirage covering piles of past oppressions. The expected achievement of the goal of history does not justify the suffering of innocent victims. He thus claims that the task of philosophy of history after *Auschwitz* is to unbury the past wreckage hidden behind the cover of enlightenment. Only through active remembering anonymous victims of the past, Benjamin argues, can we be pushed out of the rail of madness called “progress” which would otherwise drive all of us to a destructive end. It is a kind of claim that I consider to be a serious challenge to the idea of progress. Now my question is then whether the idea of development necessarily victimizes some populations for the sake of others? In the following I shall consider such claims.

4. Post-Development?

In the second half of the last century, the idea of development flourished once more as a guiding principle of social change. After World War II, much of humanitarian or nationalist projects have been designed based on the idea that industrialized countries of Europe and North America came to be seen as models for societies in Asia, Africa and South America. Modernization was seen as the necessary means to overcome cultural backwardness and to sever societies from the traditional superstitions. Most of all, economic development takes up the role of the flagship in the development discourse, pulling social, cultural and political development along with it. Indeed various economic development plans are common to people who lived in industrializing countries. In this framework, the future is divided into 5-year plans to achieve specific goals. Often it

suggests the economic growth with reference to Gross Domestic Product or Gross National Product; but it naturally infiltrates bit by bit into citizen's everyday life.

Against this backdrop, severe criticisms are leveled against the idea of development. The rejection of the idea of development has been widely shared among postcolonial and poststructuralist thinkers towards the end of the last century. Their thesis, roughly, is that a variety of development policies have never been successful; and even worse, they are harmful to the populations that they attempt to help. I will examine historical lessons that we can learn from Latin America and some parts of Asia. I appreciate the critical insights of post-development thinkers; nevertheless, I think there are two common misunderstandings in their critiques. The gravest problem, I shall argue, comes from compromising political rights for economic development. After all, my goal is to argue for a balanced account between the espousal of economic development and the complete rejection of the idea of development.

Latin America: The steep disparity in wealth between North and Latin America has invited various forms of development policies in Latin American for the past half century. Here is a sketchy portrait of developmentalism in Latin America. Initially the underdevelopment in Latin America was linked to their internal conditions - such as races, culture and tradition - in need of external help. A common response to this analysis was to introduce advanced foreign systems to replace indigenous ones. Because of the lack of accumulated capital to make investments, foreign loans were introduced. In turn, natural resources were exported to help produce commodities for the use of industrialized countries. Many countries, however, failed to make expected economic growth and pay back their debts. Soon they are caught in a vicious circle to ask for more foreign investment.

Since the 70s, Neo-Marxists put forth "dependency theory" arguing that the underdevelopment of Latin America is not due to internal reasons but external circumstances that reinforces its dependency. They argue that the poverty of the third world occurs because the first world continually extracts capital from the third world. The first world lends it back to Latin American countries in the forms of development funds and loans, only to exacerbate their dependency. In this account, the global economy

permanently creates “centers” and “peripheries.” It lives on the system that structurally generates this binary distinction where wealth flows mostly in one direction. Underdevelopment is the underside of development - they are not continuous sequences that one can move from one to the other.

Majid Rahnema, an Iranian former diplomat, argues that the ideology of development was “a deceitful mirage” or “a recurring nightmare” that had acted as a factor of division, exclusion and discrimination rather than of liberation for the suffering populations.²⁰³ In reality, the process of development benefits only a small minority profiteers and “devastates the very foundations of social life in these countries.” Arturo Escobar, a Colombian anthropologist, argues in a similar vein that the development discourse is a mechanism of control that is as effective and extensive as their colonial dominance.²⁰⁴ The development policies in the South are forms of neo-imperialism that maintain, in particular, the U.S. hegemony over the resources and populations of the South.

Seen this way, development policies are forms of expansionist capitalism in disguise. The entrenched hierarchy between the rich and the poor has a similar influence to that of imperialist colonialism in this respect. As colonization cripples the mind of the colonized in that they internalize the imposed superior values as something they must imitate, development has comparable effects to the mind of the citizens. It is like running a race they join too late, therefore can never win.

Interesting, it is argued, this process cripples the mind of the colonizers more than the colonized. The colonizers are also harmed to the extent that they fall victim to the skewed objectification of others. Once colonial consciousness had taken root in the mind of everybody affected by colonialism, the psychological effect is hard to undo even after the formal ending of colonialism. It is to argue that “the colonization of mind” - a mental process of internalizing domination and obedience - left victims only without winners.

²⁰³ Majid Rahnema, “Introduction” to *The Post-Development Reader*, eds. By Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997), p. x.

²⁰⁴ Arturo Escobar, “The Making and the Unmaking of the Third World through Development” in *The Post-Development Reader*, pp. 85-93.

The antidote to this effect is a conscious effort to “decolonize” our mind, be it the former colonizers or the colonized.²⁰⁵

Many post-developmentalists thinkers draw on Foucault’s genealogical analysis on the intertwinement of power and knowledge. That is to say, the theory of development itself reflects existent patterns of hegemony; moreover it perpetuates the hierarchical relationship. The norms generated by development discourse must come under critical eyes since their validity comes from the current power relationship, it is argued. The “assumed” universal values on which the idea of development is based are inevitably ethnocentric, thus doomed to fail to address different peoples living in different cultures. Thus, Escobar further argues that the cure cannot be found within this framework, but only from giving up this entire framework. For a new way of thinking, the concept of development must be completely dismantled.

Newly Developed Asian Countries: In the 80s, economists characterized a group of Asian countries under the name of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC), often identified with “the four tigers” indicating South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan.²⁰⁶ These Asian countries went through a remarkable economic growth rate surpassing their counterparts in the third world league. Most of them managed economic growth despite their colonial past. Their economies also had high dependency on foreign capital investment and technological transfer. The success of these Asian countries was often used to disprove the universal validity of the dependency theory put forward by Neo-Marxists. However, there are too many other circumstantial elements, geologically and politically, to draw this conclusion. Too much depends on a variety of factors to use the cases of Asian countries to defeat the dependency theory of the neo-Marxists.

Among others, the economic development of those Asian countries is often attributed by the neo-Marxists to so-called “development dictatorship.” Authoritarian leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore and Park Chung-Hee, the former president of South Korea gave priority to economic growth over political rights. The so-called “Lee thesis” or “Park syndrome” holds that the escape from poverty

²⁰⁵ Ashis Nandy, “Colonization of the Mind,” *The Post-Development Reader*, pp. 168-177.

²⁰⁶ It must be noted that the recent characterization of NICs does not include these countries anymore; instead it nowadays refers to China, India and Brazil.

takes precedence over full democratization. While denying full guarantee of political and civil rights of their citizens, they argue that satisfying economic needs serves the country in the long run. Their statements suggest a dichotomy between economic development and political rights. A slightly different variation has it that limiting political rights of citizens actually encourages economic growth of a country; or enhancement of political rights delays economic growth. It is not hard to believe that harsh labor conditions backed by the authoritarian government help maintain low labor cost, which is crucial for export-led economic growth.

Those who are sympathetic to the neo-Marxist position go on to point out that the success of authoritarian rule in these countries is often attributed to cultural particularity. Namely authoritarian politics is suitable for Asian circumstances due to the underlying Confucian culture that emphasizes order and discipline. It may be true that in such cultural contexts, there still might be greater inclination to accept authoritarianism, yet it does not mean that the citizens of Asian countries are prone to forsake their full-blown rights. Most notably, this explanation does not take into consideration the democratic movements led by many Asian populaces. The massacre of Kwangju in Korea of the 1980 or the much forgotten massacre of the Tiananmen Square in China of the 1989 were just a few examples of how pro-democracy protests violently cracked down by their own governments. What about the revolution in Arabic countries in 2011? These uprisings illustrate that the approach to connect a particular culture with docility, therefore claim that it is subject to authoritarian rule, fails to consider peoples' claims for guarantee of political and civil rights.

We have to remember that in these state-run industrialized countries, development is often an anti-colonialist slogan. Nationalism or patriotism is often opposed to something externally forced upon. When economic growth is connected to this political agenda, the deferral of freedom under the name of development remains unaltered as set by their former colonialists. In these contexts, the agency aspect of members is invariably neglected. Democratic principles are again sacrificed for the sake of economic efficiency. As foreign development organizations in underdeveloped countries define the "target" populations of their program, that is, objects of a variety of intervention, development

dictators also regard their citizens as means to further overall economic growth of the nation while denying individual members' rights.

Furthermore, successful transformation of the NICs countries into fuller democracies after reaching a certain economic level seems to support the cause of authoritarian rule. The case of South Korea which has become one of OECD countries along with its former colonizer Japan, for 36 years, fuels the much discussed debate whether the consequence can justify the means, or the debate on 'which comes first' between political rights and economic needs. However, is it unreasonable to think that this young democratic country could have achieved a similar level of economic development without several decades of dictatorship? Even if it was impossible to achieve economic development at such speed, is the price worth paying?

All these hypothetical questions are hard to answer, particularly with the presence of famine-stricken North Korea just across the border. Surely there seems to be a strong positive correlation between democratic maturity and economic prosperity. However, the correlation is not strong enough to build a causal relationship. There are at the same time quite strong counter-evidence. Kerala, a relatively poor community in India boasts higher level of the members' well-being brought up by political openness and democratic deliberation.²⁰⁷ On the other hand, even in an overall wealthy country as US, groups of blacks and Hispanics suffer from egregious deprivations and miseries. Even if we concede for the sake of argument that it is probable that economic needs can be better satisfied that way, compromising political rights in favor of economic needs would do the citizens harm which cannot be replaced. After all, political rights have intrinsic worth.

To the contrary, it is perhaps an uneasy truth that when facing extreme poverty, most people would choose escaping the misery of destitution over having full-blown political rights.²⁰⁸ We are still living in a world where people endure abominable pain. People risk foreseeable injuries, and often life itself to make a couple of dollars. Perhaps it is a luxury to talk about human rights, when poverty makes people miserable. Without material basics, there wouldn't be much to do with their fully guaranteed rights and

²⁰⁷ Amartya Sen discusses Kerala as an example in many places of the book, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), chs. 4, 5 and 6; Rawls also discusses this example. John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 110.

²⁰⁸ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 146.

liberties. Extreme poverty numbs people's mind to the extent that they sometimes fail to see the value of freedom. Such is the force of poverty. When we think of the miseries of human beings because of the lack of basic economic needs, the idea of development, it seems, cannot be jettisoned *in toto*. This is in no way to support the problematic authoritarian politics; yet, I would like to point out that it does not have to be framed as an 'either/or' question between economic development and political freedom.

The core of the development plans and policies relate to the idea that there are miseries that can be prevented with organized human efforts. Even critics of the idea of development recognize the need for systematic changes in the much-troubled third world. No matter what it is called, there are people who suffer from persistent poverty, and extensive violence. Without guiding principles, what are their means to resist oppressive or regressive social injustice? Uma Narayan powerfully describes the importance of upholding universal values in cross-cultural context even at the charge of colonial legacy:

One thing I want to say to all who would dismiss my feminist criticisms of my culture, using my "westernization" as a lash, is that my mother's pain too has rustled among the pages of all those books I have read that partly constituted my "westernization," and has crept into all the suitcases I have ever packed for my several exiles.²⁰⁹

In cases of human rights violations, those values are set as guiding principles to which individuals or societies may look to in their attempt to rise above the weight of social reality. We must ask if deprivations can be satisfied and miseries can be restrained, what can be done about them? As long as the idea of development is not used as an excuse to deny political rights, even with a promissory note, I think it is still sensible to revisit the idea of development. Overcoming these problems is ultimately the essential part of the practice of development.

²⁰⁹ Uma Narayan, *Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third-World Feminism* (Routledge, 1997), pp. 7-8.

5. Toward A Critical Development Theory

In light of cosmopolitan justice theorizing, concerns about global inequality also give good reasons to support a theory of development. The core idea is that the satisfaction of basic economic needs shall promote the guarantee of political rights of individuals. As we have seen earlier, the satisfaction of economic needs and the guarantee of political rights have a very complex connection. What is certain is that there is a considerable correlation between these two, and further, extreme deprivation of one accompanies extreme deprivation of the other. In this context I think that a viable option for us is to revisit the idea of development so that it aims for satisfying basic economic needs to the extent that it helps boost people's political right. For this purpose, I would like to suggest a 'threshold' conception of basic economic needs.

Opponents of the idea of development detest the idea that different peoples will and ought to progress in the one and the same direction. When there is one predefined goal for humanity, it will suppress the values of different paths of different cultures and deny each individual's rights in order to hasten the process to reach the goal. If the concept of development is used as such an excuse for continuation of suffering and deprivation, there is no reason to support this idea. I fully share their praise of human plurality and of coexisting differences. What I do not share, however, is the assumption that the idea of development can never be reconciled with the claims of universal values and the respect for cultural plurality.

Post-development thinkers rightly claim that the idea of societal development has harmful effects; yet, they have not come up with any alternative as to what we as global citizens ought to do facing extreme poverty and injustice in some parts of the world. What does this moral acknowledgement practically behoove us to do? Rather than giving up on the idea of development entirely, I argue that we are still obliged to refine this idea in order to focus on its untainted moral commitment. Based on what we learned from lessons of the past, it then requires us to sift out what has caused its misappropriations.

For this purpose, we must hold on to a theoretic distinction between economic and social development. The idea of development that we must discard is the one that suggests that there is one final goal, with a definite shape toward which all societies will

eventually move. The idea of development that we must retain is the one that focuses on the enhancement of the satisfaction of the individual basic needs without believing that history necessarily embodies movement from a lesser to a better stage of social development. On a practical level, the distinction will, of course, become fuzzy because economic development would bring along patterns of social behaviors that will accommodate the change. However, the distinction is important because it will give us a room to make cross-cultural comparisons without falling into ethnocentric impulses. In this way, we could still say a particular stage is “superior” by some criterion to another, thus justifying an evaluation or even a “hierarchy” against which social improvement is measure. An adequate conception of development would enable us to posit a state that is valid for everyone, but would claim that different groups are at different points or stages in a given respect with respect to that state.²¹⁰

In this regard, I concur with McCarthy that realizing the defects of past ideas of development does not force us to be completely skeptical about this idea. First, it seeks a notion of development that forgoes transcendental implications that define the unique idea of the good, a notion of development without transcendental implications even as a regulative idea à la Kant. Without a clearly defined shape of the future, we can still work with general guidelines. This is what I take McCarthy’s version of “a critical development theory” intends to do.²¹¹

In a similar vein, I would like to propose that the idea of development should be adopted only as a threshold concept, not as an overarching goal. The hackneyed disjunction between their theories and their actions of the development discourse comes from a perfectionist desire to precipitate the final result. In order to achieve the desired goal, individuals have been considered as merely a means to further this goal. As long as the idea of development justifies compromising fundamental principles of liberalism such

²¹⁰ To come up with such universally valid criteria would require another project that easily goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, in order to give a vague idea as for the possibility of such a conception of inter-cultural discourse, see Lorenzo Simpson, *The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism* (New York: Routledge, 2001). For a more recent discussion of the same author, “Critical Interventions: Towards a Hermeneutical Rejoinder” in *Critical Intercultural Hermeneutics: Challenges and Possibilities*, edited by Ming Xie (Toronto, University of Toronto Press), forthcoming.

²¹¹ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 222.

as liberty and autonomy, I think it is doing harm to some intrinsic value of humanity. It must be confined to facilitate individuals' basic capacity. Thus, the threshold conception of development implies that even when an overall greater economic benefit is expected, it must be given up if it impedes substantial freedom of certain members. In a sense, we have to learn that the proper notion for us is, to wit, "good enough development" but not "perfect development."²¹²

It is worth recalling that an adequate concept of human development has ample space for different forms of development. To these questions, the works of critical theorists are particularly illuminating. Many have observed that the process of modernity has grown with self-reflexivity to correct its problems.²¹³ Modernization has generated internal mechanisms that can problematize its internal conflicts. Democratic deliberation and collective action are cardinal components of the self-reflexivity of modernity. The concept of "multiple modernities" must not give way to the idea of the one and only form of modernity. Universality is indeed not equivalent to uniformity.

In order to sustain this plurality of development, it is important to open up the discourse to non-Western perspectives. Without listening to their own voices, how do we know what constitutes the urgency of others' needs? We need to put a microphone on the underrepresented voices. This is where democratic virtues have emphatic importance for a critical development theory. Democratic practices, that is, open discussions, activism of oppositional parties and freedom of press and media, altogether nurtures the presence of multiple voices.²¹⁴ A higher aggregated income does not really address individual needs without democratic processes. How to distribute social wealth is itself a political concern at its core which should not be compromised.

In sum, a critical theory of global development compliments cosmopolitan commitments to ensure individuals' basic capabilities as autonomous agents. We are living in a closely interconnected global society, where self-contained nation states are no longer the norm. The most vulnerable and the most deprived make adequate moral claims for collective actions of global citizens. The urgency of their claim support practices of

²¹² I am indebted to Dr. Lorenzo Simpson for introducing me to this metaphorical expression, which he took from Donald Winnicott's idea of "Good enough Mother."

²¹³ Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press, 1979 [1976]).

²¹⁴ Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Deliberative Democracy* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

development. Nevertheless, along with Benjamin's insight, we must always abide by certain rule of the mind in order to remember the irreparable sufferings and irrevocable losses in the past generated under the name of development.

6. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter examined the role of the idea of development in cosmopolitan thought. Kant's subscription to the idea of historical progress, despite his critique of colonialism, breeds a dilemma between Kant's commitment to moral universalism and his explanation of societal development. I have traced variations of the same logic in Mill's defense of liberalism and Marx's analysis of socialism in the subsequent century. Despite their distinctive variations, the idea of development time and again betrays a double-sidedness in that the thinkers deny full-blown autonomous agency to "backward" civilizations precisely because of their linear understanding of history. Despite the altruistic commitment to civilize "barbarian" societies, this idea all too often justifies violence and injustice towards the vulnerable.

I then examined the claims of "post-development" that seeks to have done with the idea of development. Postcolonial and poststructuralist thinkers argue that the idea of development is hopelessly entwined with Eurocentrism, and thus readily used as a political cover for imperialism. The idea of progress based on Western models breeds more domination and exploitation than it actually promises to cure. The antidote to its intrinsic "hypocrisy," they argue, is thoroughly cleansing our mind of the idea of uni-directional development, rather than trying to modify it by piecemeal revisions.

However, for cosmopolitanism conceived as an ethical and political project, I claimed that the logic of development cannot be simply jettisoned. The post-development arguments raise adequate concerns and critiques, yet they have not provided any practical alternative in the face of extreme global injustice. As a conclusion, I have proposed a threshold concept of development in order to avoid the danger of falling prey to the temptation to sacrifice individuals' political rights in order to advance societal or economic development. After all, paying homage to Immanuel Kant, satisfying economic

needs without political rights is blind; guaranteeing political rights without economic basics is empty.

Chapter Five: Kant and the Problem of Race Revisited

1. Introduction

As a cosmopolitan thinker, Kant is viewed as a critic on violence and injustice done in European colonies in his times. Kant criticizes the European expansionist policies and the vices done to colonies in “Toward Perpetual Peace [1795].” He writes that “inhospitable conduct of the civilized states of our continent” looks upon America, Africa and the Spice Islands etc. as a discovery and as ownerless territories “for the native inhabitants were counted as nothing.” He further observes that the greed of commercial trades in tandem with European troops lead to “oppression of the natives, incitement of the various Indian states to widespread wars, famine, insurrection, treachery and the whole litany of evils which can afflict the human race.”²¹⁵

Emmanuel Eze nevertheless includes Kant amongst ‘racist enlightenment thinkers.’²¹⁶ Eze claims that the work of Kant, along with many other enlightenment thinkers, are full of observations and interpretations that are imbued with ‘racial’ prejudices, in effect, disguised in the name of science or philosophy. In one of his earlier essay, Kant writes notoriously,

Father Labat reports that a Negro carpenter, whom he reproached for haughty treatment of his wives, replied: “You whites are real fools, for first you make concede so much to your wives, and then you complain when they drive you crazy.” And it might be something here worth considering, except for the fact that this scoundrel was completely black from head to foot, a distinct proof that what he said was stupid.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace,” *Political Writings*, p. 106 (AK 8:358).

²¹⁶ Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The introduction” to *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader*, (Blackwell Publishing, 1997).

²¹⁷ Kant “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764)” trans. by Paul Guyer, in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, eds. by Günter Zöllner and Robert B. Loudon (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 61 (AK 2:255).

In fact, it is not difficult to find racist as well as sexist remarks Kant made. Kant's racism nevertheless has been scandalous in the history of philosophy. Why is it so troubling?

He is the thinker who suggests that we act from duty according to a categorical imperative, which tells us that it is morally right only when the maxim of your actions could become a universal law. He is the thinker who argues that every man has a cosmopolitan right regardless of his state boundaries and yet cherishes human diversity in cultures, languages, and religions as a good in itself, not to be fused into one monolithic world state.

From a moral point of view, Kant is best known for his universal moral law or categorical imperatives. In various formulations of universal moral law, Kant says:

1. *“Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”* (Groundwork, 4:421)
2. *“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”* (Groundwork, 4:429)
3. *“Act only so that the will could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law through its maxim.”* (Groundwork, 4: 434)

Kant further urges us to regard a rational being as a member to the kingdom of ends in which one is both the author and the subject of universal laws. The moral agent is sovereign in that it gives law to himself, not subject to the will of any other. He famously adds, *“Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature”* (Groundwork, 4:436). The dignity we grant ourselves and also extend to others is not based on our esteem for our character or achievement; rather it is fundamental respect of our humanity. Although it is not a place to delve into the justifications of each formulation, a glimpse of them is enough to inform us of the universal character of his moral philosophy.

From a political point of view, Kant gives a formulation of a cosmopolitan union of nations that is dedicated to terminate all wars and enter into perpetual peace. His

proposal for a league of nations to achieve perpetual peace has been the source of insight for contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers. Given the global interconnectedness in our days, his insistence on the preservation of human diversity has appeared to be particularly promising. Thus, the vision of peaceful coexistence of different peoples, nations and cultures has been the hope for those who look for the possibility of peaceful international relationships.

Based on Kant's moral and political thoughts, one may expect that Kant would have said that a more "civilized" race has no right to enslave a less "civilized" race. Or more adequately, we want him to say that regardless of racial differences, they deserve equal respect as autonomous human beings, and that it is morally wrong to enslave others because it is treating them merely as a means to further their profit. One may as well anticipate a firm condemnation of cruelty and violence involved in European colonialism. Nevertheless, instead of such an unswerving criticism, Kant left a great deal of troubling and appalling records on other races. How can one resolve this seeming contradiction in Kant's thoughts?

The standard response to this dilemma has been dismissive of Kant's writings on race as insignificant part of his work, of little philosophical value. Traditionally, Kant's work on race question has received little attention, which explains the relatively meager notice of this topic in the literature. Robert Loudon says, "Kant's writings do exhibit many private prejudices and contradictory tendencies. (...) But Kant's theory is fortunately stronger than his prejudices, and it is the theory on which philosophers should focus."²¹⁸ Willibald Klinke also ignores Kant's theory on race in his political philosophy and simply writes, "Kant's eyes are fixed upon a kingdom of justice."²¹⁹ These dismissive assessment or indifferent omission of Kant's work on race has been the main target of criticism in the recent scholarship.

In light of the revival of his cosmopolitan thought, recent studies have illuminated Kant's work on racial hierarchy, white supremacy and pro-slavery. Kant's racism has been revisited and criticized frequently because of its implication to his ethical and

²¹⁸ Robert Loudon, *Kant's Impure Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 105; also quoted in Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race" *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 229 (October 2007), p. 582.

²¹⁹ Willibald Klinke, *Kant for Everyman* (New York: Collier Books, 1951).

political philosophy. Kant's philosophy has been criticized as intrinsically inegalitarian, thus his vision of peaceful coexistence of different peoples and nations is illusory and hypocritical. With regard to Kant's cosmopolitanism, in particular, Kant's racist remarks seem to be deeply self-undermining. I think Kant's remarks on race vis-à-vis his ethical universalism and political federalism invites, no, commands us to think about both sincerity of his commitment and consistency of his project.

Reading Kant's prejudicial remarks on non-white races, one might argue that Kant is not to be blamed for his racism because he did not know any better. Truly, it would be anachronistic to attribute 'racism' to him, as we understand it today.²²⁰ Hannah Arendt traces the history of race thinking in the eighteenth century Europe as one of many opinions - only a fiction not a truth - that happened to enter public realm for political mobilization.²²¹ The theory of moral luck raises an interesting question and would ask for a detailed historical evidence for Kant's culpability. At this point, however, I would like to suspend my judgment as to whether Kant is blameworthy for his morally repulsive beliefs or attitudes to non-white races. There is a strong case that Kant is not a victim of ignorance when it comes to racial differences. Kant develops his theory of race, which is a sign that it is not a regrettable personal prejudices but comes out of due reflection. The records of other theorists such as Herder - Kant's former student - who seem to have "more enlightened" opinions on other races indicates a possibility that Kant could have thought otherwise but he chose not to.²²² The traditional position simply did

²²⁰ What racism means invites a long discussion itself. The Oxford dictionary defines the word 'racism' as belief that all members of each race possess characteristics or abilities specific to that race. Beyond this descriptive level, however, it often dissolves into a belief that a certain race is inferior or superior to another race because of those characteristics attached to it. Accordingly, racism implies discrimination and antagonism directed against a different race based on such a belief, with or without the intention to promote such racial prejudices. As such, Bernard Williams calls racism as a 'thick ethical concept' in that it is both descriptive and prescriptive. It may refer to the fact someone merely assigns certain characteristics to a race; it may imply that the person is blameworthy for doing such an action or holding such an attitude. Therefore, whether to say 'x - someone, an action or an attitude - is racist' is to claim that x is blameworthy requires closer examination. If there is normative content in this claim, then we can conclude that x is morally culpable. See Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). I am indebted to Ronni Sadovsky for clear analysis on the normative contents of racism, whom I met at the Conference in the Social and Political Thoughts at York University, Toronto in 2011.

²²¹ Hannah Arendt, "Race-Thinking before Racism," *The Review of Politics* 6 (1944): 36-73.

²²² See Johann Gottfried Herder, "Organization of the Peoples of Africa." in *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader*, ed. by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (Blackwell Publishing, 1997).

not seem to realize the importance of race question in Kant as well as in political philosophy in general. Kant's thought on race does impair some of the basic tenets of his moral universalism that the project toward perpetual peace espouses.

The goal of this chapter is to meet this challenge. Kant's racial remarks should not be judged accidental coincidence or personal prejudices thus can be simply disposed of. I sympathize with the worries that in order to revive Kantian cosmopolitanism, his thought on race need to be taken seriously. Acknowledging that his formulation of cosmopolitan union does have deeply troubling and uncomfortable aspects, I nevertheless argue that it does not force us to abandon his political as well as moral vision. I am not saying that it would be committing a phony refutation to challenge Kant's ethical and political philosophy based on his racial remarks. It is important to look at enlightenment philosophy through a critical lens, especially when it comes to issues of racial and gender discrimination. However, I do not endorse this wholesale rejection of Kant's ethics on the ground of his racist attitude. It is because critiques of universalism often lead to cynical relativism or political realism.

Now the first group represented by Eze suspects Kant's universalism is not innocent for his willful racism and suggests that we should diverge from it. On the contrary, another group represented by Muthu and Kleingeld attempts to rescue the fundamental commitments of his moral and political philosophy from the crossfire by claiming that Kant revised his racist thought at some point in his career. Although I am sympathetic to their goal, I shall argue that the evidence which shows a discontinuation of Kant's racist attitude is not sufficiently strong to convince wary readers. Rather, Kant's position on race seems to have remained throughout his career. My contention is that focusing on the role of racism in his project for cosmopolitanism does not necessarily force us to give up genuinely universalistic morality, but rather betrays one of his false premises on the relationship between morally good persons and politically good citizens. In the following, I shall examine Kant's thought on race, and then two competing views on his race thinking. Ultimately, I shall show why race thinking was not a real dilemma in Kant's framework, while I will criticize it in order to promote Kant's own cosmopolitan ideal.

2. Kant's Thoughts on Race

Based on voluminous research, Kant left several independent articles on race questions. Kant's theory of race appears in mainly three published essays, "Of the Different Races of Human Beings (1775, expanded later in 1777)", "Determination of the Concept of a Human Race (1785), and "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788)" but can also be traced back to an early essay, "Observations on the Feelings and the Beautiful and Sublime (1764)."²²³ Along with the extended time of publications, Kant also regularly delivered lectures on race throughout his career under the theme of 'anthropology' and 'physical geography' which Kant called "twin sciences."²²⁴ Two books came out of these lectures: one is *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, which Kant himself edited shortly before he passed away and the other is *Physical Geography*, which his editor Rink put together after Kant's death. As he is known for spending his entire life in a little port town called Königsberg, the materials of these works came from various sources such as explorers' travelogues or other thinkers' writings.²²⁵

In a simplified version, Kant's theory of race postulates that the human species has different races. These are sub-categories, which again can be distinguished into various sub-classifications. Kant accepts Carl Linnaeus, also known as Carl von Linné's modern taxonomy that there are four types of *homo sapiens*. The four kinds of human beings - namely, Europeans, Asians, Africans and American Indians - are represented by their skin colors as white, yellow, black and red. The classification of four types is again

²²³ These essays are included in *Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education*, (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

²²⁴ Interestingly, Eze points out that Kant was the first who introduced 'geography' and 'anthropology' into the curriculum in any German university, respectively in 1756 and 1772. Both of the disciplines are known to have provided in later years with 'scientific' justifications for colonial domination. Interestingly, in the University of Königsberg where he taught for his entire career, Kant offered "as many as 72 courses in anthropology or geography" compared to only 54 in logic, 49 in metaphysics, 28 in moral philosophy, and 20 in theoretical physics." Emmanuel Eze, pp. 2-3, originally cited from J. A. May, *Kant's Concept of Geography and its relation to Recent Geographical Thought*, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 4.

²²⁵ For detailed sources of travelers, see Bernasconi, "Who Invented the Concept of Race?: Kant's Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race," in *Race* edited by Robert Bernasconi, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p.14.

linked to the four continents and the natural conditions of their territories. In a quite idiosyncratic manner, Kant attempts to connect the climate differences of four combinations of hot/cold and dry/damp to four characteristics. Compared to some of his contemporaries who argued for polygenism, that is, whites and blacks evolved from different ancestors and they belong to different species, Kant's position is somewhat enlightened. And yet, Kant's account of diverse human beings, embraced under *one humanity*, soon devolves to a hierarchical framework.

In theorizing race, Kant posits the existence of the original human species or 'a stem genus' (*Stammgattung*) in which different 'seeds' or 'germs' (*Keime*) are planted by the Nature. Depending on the interplay between external factors such as climates and the internal potential given as seeds, the species' potential may be fully developed or stunted. More precisely, since Kant believes that the full development can only be achieved in humanity, a people or individuals may embody a fuller or less developed humanity. He claims in a teleological fashion,

This foresight of Nature to equip her creation with hidden inner furnishings against all sorts of future circumstances in order that it be preserved and suited to the variety of climate or soil, is worthy of all wonder; and in the course of wanderings and transplantations of animals and plants it seems to produce new sorts which, however, are nothing more than deviations and races of one and the same genus, whose germs (*Keime*) and natural dispositions (*Anlagen*) have merely developed appropriately at long periods in various ways.²²⁶

The talks of seeds are present in various versions in the eighteenth century scholars. Compared to the then dogmatic Christian doctrine of preformation, a theory of seed has an apparent advantage in its capability of explicating diversity within a species, which seems to be natural consequence of environmental influence on its organic development.

Among others, this theory is compatible with the Enlightenment commitment to progress. Kant writes that Nature wisely designed her creature equipped with various

²²⁶ Kant, "On the different Races of Man" in *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader*, p.43.

seeds so that they can adjust themselves in different places, resulting in different races. He argues that this differentiation is geared toward the perfection of humanity, first in their political institution and later in their moral constitution. However, Kant's theory of race entails some logical ambiguities by itself.

First Puzzle: Even though Kant regards different physical traits or cultural customs as the results of adaptation process to various parts of the globe, it is not certain whether Kant views this as development or degradation. On one hand, he praises the ability of human beings to be better suited to its environment as a wonder of the nature; on the other hand, he writes as though all derivations are deviations that are worse than the original. Hence, he claims that the race that remains closest to the original to be superior and self-sufficient so that its perfection is only hindered by the interruption of the alien. In this passage reminiscent of 1930's propaganda of Nazi ennoblement of the Aryan, Kant writes,

[A]ll deviations need nevertheless a stem genus; and either we must declare it now extinct, or else we must seek among those extant the one which we can best compare to the stem-genus (*Stammgattung*)" (...) The very blond, soft-white-skinned, red-haired, pale-blue-eyes variation seems to be its nearest in the north, in the time of the Romans it inhabited the northern regions of Germany (...). So the influence of a cold and damp air, which gives the juices a tendency towards scurvy, finally produced a certain strain of humans which would have attained the self-sufficiency of a race; if only in this region of the earth frequent alien mixture had not interrupted the progress of the variation.²²⁷

If the white race would have perfected themselves without alien interruption, what is the *raison d'être* of other races in this teleological argument? Furthermore, if non-white races only obstruct the development of the humanity without contributing to the historical progress, then why would the Nature invented them to begin with? The idea is that the other climates allow only the development of stains that are inferior and these "inferior"

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

strains then dilute the “superior” strains, but the total of humanity needs to include these inferior strains, as they are the only ones that can flourish in certain climates. This makes the idea less inconsistent internally.²²⁸ However, in order to accept this interpretation, Kant should have explained why some population of humanity is designed to inhabit even the harshest climates, and further, how their presence contributes to the historical progress. Given the self-sufficiency of the whites, the invention of different races then appears nothing more than “sublime waste” in the Nature’s design.²²⁹

Second Puzzle: The role of culture also seems ambiguous in Kant’s framework on race. From his earlier work, Kant holds that there are innate differences between “peoples” or “nations.” For example, Kant endows their national differences such as the English, the French and the German to their cultural distinctiveness. He writes in Part IV of the “Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime” of 1764:

[O]f the peoples of our part of the world, in my opinion those who distinguish themselves among all other by the feeling for the beautiful are the Italians and the French, but by the feeling of sublime, the Germans, English and Spanish. Holland can be considered as that land where the finer taste becomes largely unnoticeable.²³⁰

The problem is that although the national differences to climate conditions in some places, these cultural differences are described as *innate* to the peoples, not *acquired*. Given that the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime are representative of cardinal moral feelings for Kant, this framing of cultural differences logically leads to the hierarchical assessment in moral capacity among different peoples. Unless Kant subscribes to political romanticism that admires unalterable uniqueness of each and every culture, how can we understand this role that culture gives to its members?

Among others, in the above mentioned passage, Kant refers to “our part of the world” meaning ‘civilized’ part of Europe, feelings of the beautiful and the sublime are

²²⁸ I am indebted to Professor Eva Kittay for this point.

²²⁹ Mark J. Larrimore, “Sublime Waste: Kant on the Destiny of the ‘Races’” in *Civilization and Oppression*, edited by Catherine Wilson (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1999); originally published in *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume 25 (1999): 99-137.

²³⁰ Kant, “Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime,” (AK 2: 243).

determining grounds of different national characters. Although he makes remarks about Holland here, and about Portugal elsewhere, as being somewhat inferior to other nations within Europe, his evaluations become extremely pejorative as his gaze moves out to other parts of the world. The aesthetics taste and religious feelings are tested around the world and stigmatized as inferior against the European standard. Walter Mignolo points out that his depreciation of nations around the world as well as within Europe is a reflection of the marginalization of their cultures.²³¹

Third Puzzle: Another bewilderment arises related to the first one. Given the different place of different races in the ladder of perfection, the prospect of human perfectibility seems internally impaired. Kant argues that humanity can achieve moral perfection only in species, i.e., humanity, not in individuals. Then wouldn't it be reasonable for us to look for signs that all members of the species are perfectible? Or does a part of the species being near the perfection suffice for the final goal? If some races were to remain stunted in their development, then the perfectibility of the entire species seems to be an unachievable goal.

The following passage is one of the most frequently quoted passages when it comes to Kant's racism:

In hot regions, people mature earlier in every sense, but do not reach the perfection of the temperate zones. Humanity is in its greatest perfection in the race of the whites. Yellow Indians have somewhat less talent. Negroes are far lower, and at the bottom lies a portion of the American peoples.²³²

Physical Geography is a tough source to work with. There is strong evidence that the part on race could be written in much earlier years in Kant's career, therefore, this passage cannot be used as a trustworthy indication of Kant's persistent racism in his latest

²³¹ Walter D. Mignolo, "The Darker side of the Enlightenment: A De-Colonial Reading of Kant's Geography," *Reading Kant's Geography*, Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (eds.), (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011), p. 332.

²³² Kant, *Physical Geography*, (AK 9:316). For a clarification, by "yellow Indians" he means "Asian peoples" as opposed to "American Indians" which he refers to "American peoples" in this passage.

years.²³³ What is deeply troubling, however, is that it is clear in the passage that Kant not only categorizes the four races in terms of different physical traits, but also links the characteristics to their intellectual and moral capacities as autonomous agents. Thus this hierarchical treatment of different races invites us to think about its contrast to his work on morality in which Kant refers to the entire *humanity*, which was written around the same period. It is important because Kant's remarks on the intellectual as well as moral capacity of non-white races seem to be linked to the reluctance to guarantee a full-blown right to the peoples who live in 'uncivilized' parts of the world. This reluctance is quite implicit on Kant's part, but becomes explicit for politicians who follow the political philosophy that is traced to Kant. Defenders of Kant often try to argue that his view on racial differences does not involve their capability as moral agent, but it is confined to physiological differences just like many of our time take for granted the physical characteristics as 'given facts.' Although the biological basis of racial archetypes has been questioned in recent studies, the underlying assumption is that highlighting the similarities and differences is benign as long as it is confined to appearance.²³⁴

Furthermore, Kant's hierarchical accounts of the races, particularly as it may involve their moral capacity, easily lead to pro-slavery statements. In his later article "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" [1788], though in footnote, Kant claims that black slaves will never be good laborers unless they are coerced to work. In other words, they are good laborers, but never make themselves work.²³⁵ His remarks on Native Americans are even harsher: "this race, which is too weak for hard labor, too

²³³ *Physical Geography* deals with human race briefly in its later sections, however, it has been considered important for his white supremacist statement. A recent discovery of Werner Stark argues that these later sections can be assigned to Kant's very early thoughts because there is evidence that these were written a long before his first essay on race appeared. This indicates that we have to be cautious in dealing with Kant's statement saying, "Humanity attains its greatest perfection in the White race" as in Rink's edition makes us read. For a detailed discussion of the legitimacy of sources, see Robert Bernasconi, "Kant's Third Thoughts on Race" in *Reading Kant's Geography*, Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (eds.), (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011). Bernasconi attributes the source to Werner Stark, ed. *Vorlesungen über der Physische Geographie*, forthcoming. I like to express my gratitude to Professor Eduardo Mendieta for letting me read the draft of this book before the publication.

²³⁴ For the scientific untenability and expected social danger of maintaining a conception of biologically defined racial distinctions, see Lorenzo Simpson, "Biology, Race, Ethnicity and Culture: A Response to Kitcher," presented in Rutgers University, New Brunswick: NJ (1994).

²³⁵ Kant, "On the Use of Teleological Principle of Philosophy," in *Anthropology, History and Education*, p. 209 (AK 8:174)

indifferent for industry and incapable of any culture - although there is enough of it as example and encouragement nearby - ranks still far below even the Negro, who stands the lowest of all other steps that we named as differences of the races.”²³⁶ Now he comes to say that skin color is not the product of natural influence but a predetermined moral character. “The white color of the inhabitants of Sumatra in comparison with other peoples of the same region is, on my view, a strong proof that the skin does not all depend immediately on the climate.”²³⁷ These passages simply betray Kant’s commitment to human equality and contradict some of the germ theory.

One may ask whether the requirement that we respect all equally as agents implies that all in fact are equal in moral agency. In a similar vein, Kant writes, “This homage which every state pays (in words at least) to the concept of right proves that man possesses a greater moral capacity, still dormant at present, to overcome eventually the evil principle within him (for he cannot deny that it exists) and to hope that others will do likewise.” The respect of all human beings as moral agents does not necessarily assume their present autonomy. Put differently, their *de jure* rights are not based on their *de facto* agency. Rather, Kant’s point of suggesting lawful constitutions, be it of any domestic republic or an international federation, lies in the fact that they promote a social context in which men’s moral potential finds fuller realization, unencumbered by social injustice.²³⁸ It is a hope that by virtue of these institutions men can realize their moral potential to overcome their natural selfish desires.

3. Critique of Kant’s Ethical Universalism: Eze

The traditional silence on Kant’s racism has been broken only by a series of recent publications. Emmanuel Eze lunched this move and powerfully showed that the traditional dismissive assessments of Kant’s racist writings in our time cannot be justified. Following the lead of Eze, researchers such as Charles Mills and Robert Bernasconi emphasized that Kant’s position on race contradicts the fundamentals of his universalistic

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 211 (AK: 8:176).

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 209 (AK: 8:174), see the footnote.

²³⁸ Kant dedicates the first appendix to “Toward Perpetual Peace” to this argument.

ethics. Eze argues, for Kant, skin color is not merely a physical characteristic; rather it is an unchanging and unchangeable factor in moral capacity. Kantian ethics preaches that humans are equal as moral being; however, the scope of humanity is circumscribed to the European whites because other races - blacks, yellows or the red Indians - do not possess or use this capability to the same degree as the whites. Eze goes so far as to claim that Kant's universal moral law purports to be neutral and impartial, yet, it is colored from the get-go, and thus inevitably limited.

Charles Mills, in the same vein, argues that Kant's moral universalism is logically linked to, or even, conducive to the development of racism.²³⁹ Through historical research, he traces the crystallization of the idea of the "humanoid" - that is, there are entities that resemble humans but not fully humans such as "savages" or "barbarians." This he claims is a category that has been developed in European thought since the ancient Greeks. Humans living in a different civilization or a 'less' civilized part of the world are relegated to the rank of 'sub-human,' that is, beings that look like a human, but barely a human. Based on the distinction between full and sub humans, Mills further argues, a two-tiered moral code has been developed with one set of rules for whites and another for non-whites.²⁴⁰ Once instituted, the logic of argument can be used in such a way that moral superiority justifies economic and political domination of inferiors. Mills shows how such presumed moral superiority has been appropriated as justifications for political conquest, quoting from a French imperial theorist, Jules Harmand (1845-1921): "the basic legitimation of conquest over native peoples is the conviction of our superiority, not merely our mechanical, economic, and military superiority, but our moral superiority. Our dignity rests on that quality, and it underlies our right to direct the rest of humanity."²⁴¹

Against this backdrop, Kant takes up a special position that epitomizes both egalitarian and inegalitarian philosophy. Historically, Kantian personhood with the emphasis on sanctity of individuals emerged in opposition to the hierarchically differentiated human values of medieval feudalism. This noble ideal, however, holds true

²³⁹ Frederickson also argued that there has been a parallel development in moral universalism and systematic, barely disguised as scientific, racism. See George Frederickson, *Racism: A Short History*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

²⁴⁰ Charles Mills, *The Racial Contract*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.23.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.25.

only for white persons and ontologically excludes others from the project of modernity. Now entities living in “uncivilized” parts of the world incapable of self-rule are subject to paternalistic guidance, and even worse, to extermination. It is to say that Kant’s ethics, despite its pretense, can never be universal since it is based on hidden assumptions about racial differences. In Mills’ framing of the “racial contract,” Kant underwrites the transition of the first period where white supremacy is explicit and the egalitarian social contract applies only to the privileged race to the second period where the terms of social contract has been formally extended to apply to everyone, yet, actual discrimination persists in latent forms. The tension between the guarantee of formal rights to all in the polity and the discrimination actually experienced marks the second period. Thus he writes, “in complete opposition to the image of Kant’s work that has come down to us and is standardly taught in introductory ethics course, full personhood for Kant is actually dependent upon race.”²⁴²

In this framework, even though race thinking is usually treated in a history of philosophy as a regrettable deviation from the ideal, it has been revealed that racial white supremacy was the actual norm. Accordingly, we should not say that Kant failed to live up to his moral ideal; rather he successfully adhered to the actual norm. Therefore, a dismissive assessment of Kant’s racial thinking makes a double mistake in that it not only fails to see the significant role of racial thinking in Kant’s philosophy, but also it makes race seem contingent, accidental and residual.²⁴³ It is not an exception, but the rule. Kant’s belief in racial make-up is so deeply entrenched as an unchanging substance that the suspicious think that the theory of personhood rather seems to be “a conspiracy to conceal embarrassing truths.”²⁴⁴

As in Plato, Kant’s formulation of the moral law abstracts from the concrete realities to an idealization. Thus, as Onora O’Neill writes, there is no conceptual point to start talking about how the sifted out impurities in moral abstraction, such as race and gender, actually influence or even structure one’s life in a fundamental way.²⁴⁵ The practical implication of the claims of Eze’s school seems then to be mainstreaming racial

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p.71.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.56.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.70.

²⁴⁵ Onora O’Neill, “Justice, Gender and International Boundaries,” *The Quality of Life*, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 303-323.

sensitivity in all disciplines including philosophy. Purported neutrality or impartiality is not only pernicious; yet it is even more injurious than outspoken discrimination, for disguised color-blindness may provide a cover for a functionally operative but hardly detectible injustice. In this remark, the claims of racial equality bear evident resemblance to the claims of gender equality made by radical feminists. The silence of mainstream moral and political philosophy on issues of race is culpable in that it actually entrenches white privilege just as the silence on gender entrenches male privilege. The silence is a sign of the continuing power, and the passivity is a form of complicity in its continuation. The fact that the very concepts have been considered inappropriate subjects of the discipline is a reflection of the obstinate hegemony of realities and the disturbing provincialism that are irreconcilable with the fundamentals of Kantian philosophy.

4. A Turn in Kant's Career? : Muthu and Kleingeld

In response to the critical voice and the subsequent skepticism, another group attempts to rescue Kant by arguing that Kant revised his view on race at some point of his career. Sankar Muthu argues that Kant did defend racial hierarchy in his earlier period, but argues that he dropped it before he embarks on critical philosophy. Similarly, Pauline Kleingeld claims that there is such a gap, but she claims that he changed his mind around the time he writes "Toward Perpetual Peace." Though there are differences in their diagnoses of the supposed turn, Kleingeld and Muthu agree that there is evidence that Kant's attitude toward non-white races underwent a significant change. Namely, there is a qualitative break, or a turning point in Kant's work. They acknowledge that there is a conflict in Kant's writings on morality and his thoughts on race, but the problem faded as Kant revised his racist view. Theirs is a rather subtle task because they have to show this revision without explicit renouncing or repudiating of the earlier view on Kant's part. In short, I appreciate their attempt to broaden the scope of the understanding of Kant compared to the commonplace reception; I am nonetheless skeptical of the possibility that this supposed turn can rescue Kant. In the following, I shall look at their arguments more in detail, and argue why I differ from their otherwise invaluable readings of Kant.

(1) Sankar Muthu

Muthu claims that the hierarchical and biological concept of race disappears in Kant's later published writings. In Kant's 1788 essay "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy," Muthu argues that Kant no longer makes remarks on the preeminence of whites or Europeans over other human races. He writes,

Kant never repudiated the hierarchical claims of his earlier writings on race, and indeed he continued to lecture about the concept of race late into his life. Yet, strikingly his development of the idea of a distinctively human freedom (i.e., of cultural agency) and concomitantly his sociological account of human diversity displaced both the cognitive and the hierarchical assumptions and arguments of race theory in his late moral and political works, in which he explicitly defended non-European peoples and the equality of varying collective lifestyles (including pastoralism and nomadism) and vehemently attacked European empires and conquest.²⁴⁶

As it is apparent here, Muthu instead draws our attention to usually ignored aspect of Kant, namely, the concept of 'cultural agency.' He claims that when Kant developed his theory of humanity, it is not mainly through moral agency, but rather through cultural agency. It is to say that what is constitutively human is not based upon a radical autonomy in obeying universal moral law which is severed from the concrete contexts of our lives and thus has fallen into abstract metaphysical realms; rather, it is cultural activities, our capacities to bring about a wide variety of pragmatic purposes. Muthu emphasizes that the concept of freedom is much larger than the common interpretation of Kant. Since it is a brute anthropological fact that humans have cultural powers to pursue its use, the enlarged scope of freedom is expected to encompass a much larger part of the world.

²⁴⁶ Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), p.184.

However, as he acknowledges himself, Muthu's argument for a turn relies on the absence or the disappearance of Kant's racist statements, rather than his clear repudiation of earlier thoughts. Muthu's understanding of Kant's broader notion of freedom is attractive in that it is not limited to moral agency but encompasses cultural agency. By doing so, he accentuates the affinities, not the dissimilarities, between Kant on one hand and Rousseau or Herder on the other. Instead of viewing moral agency as a qualitatively different from or superior to any other cultural capacities, that is to say, Kant also saw morality as an outgrowth of and therefore a continuation of larger cultural agency. Yet I wonder whether the enlarged concept of agency smoothly leads to sufficient egalitarianism in Kant. In Kant's view, the horizontal differences are linked to the vertical progress. Kant sets cultural, national and racial differences as anthropological facts in order to guard against the torpid inactivity of the homogenous world-state. What is significantly lacking is the mechanism for how the differences work toward the progress of humanity. In this regard I concur with Todd Hendrick in that Kant always conceives of progress as requiring the tensions brought about by differences, but "it is hard to see how hostility, hierarchy, and division are supposed to be conducive to, not to mention necessary for, moral progress."²⁴⁷

(2) Pauline Kleingeld

Acknowledging the uncomfortable implications of Kant's race theory in his own moral and political theory, Kleingeld also attempts to defend Kant against the charge that Kant's philosophy is fundamentally inegalitarian. She admits Kant's racist position in earlier work, however, argues that Kant radically changed his mind in the 1790s toward genuinely egalitarian position. According to Kleingeld, this turn took place after the publication of 'On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy' (after 1792) and before the completion of 'Toward Perpetual Peace' (1795). Kleingeld corrects Muthu's position that this turn happened in the 1780s because critics such as Bernasconi managed to offer plain racist remarks in Kant's work around the same time when Kant completed

²⁴⁷ Todd Hendrick, "Race, Difference, and Anthropology in Kant's Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2008): 245-268, p.259.

his major moral work in the 1780s. I shall claim the argument for radical turn does not hold even in this revised version, although her attempts at a defense shed light on an importantly new direction that Kant's thought on cosmopolitanism takes. Kleingeld's arguments are unfolded on mainly two fronts: Firstly, exegetical evidence suggests that Kant dropped his view of a racial hierarchy and moved toward a more cosmopolitan view; secondly, the role of race theory in Kant's later work is restricted in that race has no direct bearing on people's moral standing, that is, the use of one's freedom as a human agent.

Indeed Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right espoused in "Toward Perpetual Peace" forms an apex in his political theory introducing the cosmopolitan right into the tripartite public rights. It is a visitor's right, though not a guest's right, for hospitality in a foreign land. Accordingly, it makes a more open gesture for global migration. Though in a very minimal sense, the cosmopolitan right pioneered the conceptualization of universal human rights beyond state membership, and thus surely buttresses peaceful coexistence of different peoples. The league of nations, that Kant conceives of, allows nomadic tribes to live peacefully side by side with agricultural tribes. As such, Kant's view comes in no way close to commonplace white-supremacist view.

However, the question is whether one can find evidence to prove that Kant changed his attitude toward different races. Of course, Kant's proposal in "Toward Perpetual Peace" clearly contradicts Kant's instruction to train black slaves or to exterminate them. Yet, I am inclined to think that without more positive proof for revision of his racism, highlighting Kant's egalitarian proposal merely restates the initial problem. In a similar fashion to Muthu, Kleingeld claims, "He gives no indication of when or why he changed his views. He makes no mention of a racial hierarchy anywhere in his published writings of the 1790, however what he does say about related issues contradicts his earlier views on a racial hierarchy."²⁴⁸ I doubt that the lack of white supremacist statements could be used as an evidence to prove a revision in Kant's view. The line of argument that 'his position of related issues contradicts his position of race, and therefore he must have jettisoned the latter somewhere' seems only to recall the dilemma that troubles Eze so much, rather than to suggest a solution.

²⁴⁸ Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," p.586.

Kleingeld also maintains that Kant “ascribes the ideal of military courage equally to Native Americans and medieval European knights (PP 8:365). This stands in marked contrast with his earlier insistence on the weakness and inertia of Native Americans.” However, with closer examination, one may equally find somewhat “nicer” things that Kant had to say sporadically regarding non-white races even in his earlier writings.²⁴⁹ In short, without a positive renunciation of his former racist belief, this evidence is not powerful enough to persuade critics who are on guard. The evidence that can be put forth to defend Kant on race issues is too meager both in quantity and in quality to counterbalance the egregious things Kant said. Understandably, Robert Bernasconi claims that “[t]here is a ready audience for such efforts because it is hard not to be shocked and disappointed when one learns of Kant’s racist statements.” He further complains that “[p]hilosophers need to think less about saving the reputations of past philosophers and more about the ways with which moral theories are divorced from practice, precisely because so many of us fail in this regard.”²⁵⁰

In Kleingeld’s reading of Kant, whose influence on this dissertation may be clear, her defense of Kant against the charge of racism seems to be nevertheless untenable. She argues that for Charles Mills convincingly to defend the view that Kant understands non-whites to be sub-persons, Charles Mills needs to show that non-whites are not even human beings on Kant’s view.²⁵¹ Yet, I like to contest that this criticism is unfair because Mills is aware that Kant is perfectly clear about that all ‘races’ are humans and he denies that Kant views non-whites as non-humans. Mills’ point is rather that Kant claims that all races are human and yet he consistently denies equal rights to a certain race. Kant’s failure to apply equal level of moral dignity and to extend formal rights to all the ‘humans’ regardless their race is the perplexing predicament, not that he claims that some races are not human beings as Kant’s contemporary polygenesisists would. Demanding evidence of Kant’s positive assertions denying the status of human being to certain races simply shifts

²⁴⁹ For example, even in “Observation on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime” of 1764, Kant writes, “Among all the savages there is no people which demonstrates such a sublime character of mind as that of North America. They have a strong feeling for honor, (...) The Canadian savage is moreover truthful and honest.” *Anthropology, History, and Education*, p. 60 (AK 2:253).

²⁵⁰ Robert Bernasconi, “Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race” in *Reading Kant’s Geography*, p. 296.

²⁵¹ Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race,” p.584.

the burden of proof on Mills.²⁵² Thus, the absence of Kant's clear statement that Negroes are not human cannot be waged against Mills' criticism.

I do endorse however Muthu and Kleingeld's objective that there are reasons to believe that Kant put more weight on what is politically right in order to achieve a cosmopolitan union. Muthu develops the concept of "cultural agency" in order to show that Kant valued human diversity as an intrinsic good. I value this broadened understanding, given the one-sided reception of Kant. Likewise, Kleingeld is right to point out the significance of his discussion of cosmopolitan right and its preponderance in Kant's later work. However, my contention is that the attempts to prove that Kant revoked his racist view are neither successful, nor necessary given my concerns. The comparative shift in his interest or the infrequency in his racist remarks does not necessarily mean a positive revision on Kant's part. Further, this way of defending Kant seems too apologetic and fails strategically to further the core of his cosmopolitan commitment.

5. The Role of Race in the Cosmopolitan League

In the previous section I contended that Kant's racism, no matter how awkward it is, runs parallel to his moral and political theory. Nor are there yet sufficient reasons to believe that he revised his appalling views on racial hierarchy or white supremacy. There is, understandably, a ready attempt to look for signs that Kant dropped, or even renounced, his racism. What defenders of Kant can show is the relative lack of mentioning of race, or the possibility that the clear evidence of his racism in later work might have been written earlier; at best, they can point to his critiques of the most extreme cruelties to black slaves of his days. Yet, these hospitable interpretations seem to give him an all too easy acquittal in order to defend his moral as well as political commitments. I would like to argue that we cannot rescue Kant from the racist charges,

²⁵² I would like to stress that we need to be careful about the fact that racism and sexism often functions at sub- or even unconscious level. More often than not, a plain racist remark follows a commonplace excuse, "I am not a racist, but ..."

but that such a rescue is not necessary in order to retain and reformulate his moral and political commitment that is still viable for us.

From its conception, Kantian cosmopolitanism is not conceived of as an antidote to racism. To the contrary, Kant seems to take for granted that we all think badly of others, be it other individuals or specific groups, from our egotistic desires. In the following, I shall suggest my reason to think that Kant did not really change his mind as opposed to Muthu and Kleingeld's claim. In order to do this, I like to bring attention to the final paragraphs in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Because this was edited shortly before his death, this book was regarded as important source to showcase his later thoughts on race in 1790s.²⁵³

The final section of this book starts with the discussion on "the character of a man," which then comes to discuss more specifically "the character of the sexes," "the character of nations," "the character of races" and "the character of species." Indeed, Kant's makes merely sketchy remarks under the section on races - too short compared to his earlier enthusiasm dealing with this subject before he discusses the entire humanity in which he brings up the vision of *Cosmopolitismus*. This nonchalant take on race may well be interpreted as his revised view; however, I contend that a careful examination of the last section reveals interesting counterevidence. I shall quote the last two paragraphs of the book in length:

If we look at man's behavior not only in ancient history but also in contemporary events, we are often tempted to take the part of *Timon* the misanthropist in our judgments; but far more often, and more to the point, that of *Momus*, who considers foolishness rather than evil as the most striking trait of character in our species. But since foolishness combined with a lineament of evil (which is then called offensive folly) is an unmistakable feature in the moral physiognomy of our species, the mere fact that any prudent man finds it necessary to conceal a good part of his thoughts makes it clear enough that every member of our race is well advised to be on his guard and not to reveal himself *completely*. And this

²⁵³ Here I am thinking of Muthu's argument.

already betrays the propensity of our species to be ill disposed toward one another.

It could well be that some other planet is inhabited by rational beings who have to think aloud - who, whether awake or dreaming, in company with others or alone, can have no thoughts they do not *utter*. How would their behavior toward one another then differ from that of the human race? Unless they were all as *pure as angels*, we cannot conceive how they could live together peacefully, have any respect at all for one another, and get on well together. (...) And this would be correct, were it not that our very judgment of condemnation reveals a moral predisposition in us, an innate demand of reason to counteract this tendency. So it presents the human species, not as evil, but as a species of rational beings that strives, in the face of obstacles, to rise out of evil in constant progress toward the good. In this, our volition is generally good; but we find it hard to accomplish what we will, because we cannot expect the end to be attained by the free accord of *individuals*, but only by a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and towards the species, as a system held together by cosmopolitan bonds.²⁵⁴

What we can find here is Kant's suggestion for the conscious concealment of individuals' feelings toward other peoples. Just like he acknowledges that human nature is ingrained with selfish desires, innate inclinations toward evil, he takes for granted the tendency to think ill of others as being inscribed in our nature. Nevertheless, these selfish desires can be mitigated by another tendency to bring about the good. And this already gives what he calls "moral certainty," - a certainty that is sufficient for us to do the duty of working toward this goal. Kant's conception of a cosmopolitan right does not require that we, citizens of the world, love each other. For Kant, love is not a necessary condition to respect different nations and different races. After all, against the cynics who ridiculed that perpetual peace would only be possible within "a state of angels," Kant wrote

²⁵⁴ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. by Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 191-193, original emphases.

confidently that even the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by “a nation of devils” (*Volk vom Teufeln*).²⁵⁵

In other words, there is not a real contradiction between racial hierarchy and entering into civil polity with formal equalities within Kant’s framework. For Kant, one needs not to be a morally good person in order to become a good citizen. Due to the dualism between the moral and the political realm, Kant’s theory on race is allowed to remain in a limbo. As a consequence, Kant’s political philosophy endorses significant inequality and even discrimination within a civic union as long as it guarantees formal equality. Now one may be driven to enter a law-abiding polity out of his selfish inclinations for fearing one’s annihilation in the brutish and miserable state of nature, it seems to fall too short of a ‘good’ polity. For those who are committed to combat and eradicate the root of racism, a liberal *laissez-faire* policy appears merely as an insufficient and an incomplete remedy to the deep-seated vices. In short, a suggestion for a peaceful public relationship with their recalcitrant racist attitude withheld in privacy is no more than a tepid gesture for a *modus vivendi*.

If Kant had to choose between his ethics and racism, I believe he would have chosen the demand of morality. Nevertheless, in his framework, racial hierarchy seems to be perfectly compatible with the final end of humanity to achieve a cosmopolitan union. One may as well argue that the formal equality will be significantly impeded by substantial inequalities such as racist and sexist attitudes; yet, after all, Kant is not to be criticized as hypocritical for his stance on racism and his vision toward a cosmopolitan whole at the same time. Thus the painstaking attempt to rescue Kant from his racism may be in vain. Or we are equally entitled to apply Kant’s own criticism of the German people to himself: The German has “a certain mania” to renounce the principle of equality among fellow citizens in favor of classifying them according to hierarchy, and thus “servile from mere pedantry.”²⁵⁶

²⁵⁵ Kant, *Political Writings*, p.112.

²⁵⁶ The entire passage reads like this: “German’s negative side is his tendency to imitate others and his diffidence about his ability to be original (which is diametrically opposed to the Englishman’s defiance). Still worse, he has a certain mania for method which leads him to renounce the principle that, e.g. fellow citizens should approach equality, in favor of classifying them punctiliously according to degrees of precedence and hierarchy. This mania makes him inexhaustible in [finding positions within] this schema of rank and in inventing

What becomes salient in Kant's all too easy reconciliation between formal equality and informal hatred is a deeper understanding of alterity and inferiority. When we dislike or thinking ill of someone, is it the same as thinking less of them? Can I not dislike someone precisely because I see them as an equal or even superior competitor?²⁵⁷ Hegel's *Kampf um Anerkennung* does capture these moments for the non-equals to come to be equal in their encounter of each other. I admit that each fight entails the moment of taking the other as my enemy - as someone whom I take seriously enough to see as enemy. However, all too often alterity is connected to inferiority. Otherness gives sufficient enough reason for disrespect, ignorance and even violence.

Probably what Kant fails to see is that the "ill disposition toward others" may be powerful enough to structure social and legal institutions. Perhaps he did not see this because he did not pay enough considerations to the difference between the selfish tendency amongst individuals and amongst groups. Public decisions and resource allotments are shaped by widely pegged sentiments toward a group of people. What can be considered as a personal prejudice at individual level may lead to structural injustice in society when applied to groups.²⁵⁸ Collectively justified selfishness is, as in a form of ethnocentrism for an illustration, creates bleak social injustice, and leaves deep moral wounds. A socially stigmatized group as inferior is often obstructed to make a justice claim as full members. As we commonly see in the minority groups - the Jews in the pre-world war II Germany, the Hazaras in Afghanistan, - social persecution is almost always connected to and even justified by their moral degradation or inferiority. Quite contrary to Kant's expectation, social antipathy and repugnance do not seem to lose offensive and nocuous effect because they are curbed by law in public realm. Emotions are ready materials malleable for political mobilization.

Kant would have hoped that individuals in a sense learn to overcome their raw sentiments through the universality of their reasoning.

titles (titles such as *Edlen* and *Hochedlen*, *Wohl-* and *Hochwohl-* and *Hochgeboren*). And so he is servile from mere pedantry." Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. by Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 181.

²⁵⁷ I am indebted to Professor Lorenzo Simpson for making me clarify on this question.

²⁵⁸ I would like to thank Professor Lee Miller who brought up this point at the Provost Graduate Students Lecture Series in spring 2011 where I had a chance to present an earlier version of this chapter.

For, the pure thought of duty and in general of the moral law, mixed with no foreign addition of empirical inducements, has by way of reason alone an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives, which may be summoned from the empirical field, that reason, in the consciousness of its dignity, despises the latter and can gradually become their master; (...).²⁵⁹

In a conflict between sentiment and obligation, Kant would radically suggest that we obey the obligation. However, I would like to ask whether it is reasonable in the case of racism and other deep human feelings to expect people to break from their primary motives.²⁶⁰ Emotions severed from reasoning may appear accidental and thus unprincipled, yet in many human affairs, principles are backed by one's deepest feelings. Why would we ask to come to subdue one's feelings that became so alienated and severed from reason without making any effort to instruct them? Even though the success is not guaranteed in any sense, I shall suggest that we as citizens of the world must reflect and refine our sentiments when encountering otherness. I hope it is clear that the concept of cosmopolitan right describes the formal boundary where our provincial emotions are screened. I am suggesting that it would be unrealistic to expect the adoption of cosmopolitan responsibility without nurturing our emotions toward others.

6. Chapter Conclusion

Kant is best known for his formulations of universal moral law or categorical imperatives. Equally, his proposal for a league of nations to achieve perpetual peace has

²⁵⁹ Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, tr. and ed. by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.64 (AK 4:411).

²⁶⁰ In a wonderful manner, Henry Shue makes a similar argument regarding nationalist sentiments. He argues for 'Rousseauian expansive soul' to overcome parochial nationalism as opposed to 'Kantian deontology.' Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, second edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996 [1980]), in particular, ch. 6 "Nationality and Responsibility."

been the source of insight for contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers. However, in light of the revival of Kant's cosmopolitanism, recent studies have illuminated Kant's lesser known works which contain his remarks on racial hierarchy, white supremacy and pro-slavery. The traditional attitudes among Kant scholars toward his racism have been dismissive silence - a sign that it is not of a great philosophical value. However, as Emmanuel Eze has argued powerfully, this attitude cannot be justified anymore in our time. In this chapter, I have delineated three different groups of response, namely, an espousal of a break in Kant's work defended by Muthu and Kleingeld; a renunciation of Kant's universalistic ethics defended by Bernasconi and Mills; finally, a compatibilist view between Kant's racism and his universal ethics suggested by Hendrick. My goal has to support the last position. I have argued that there is only insufficient evidence that Kant dropped or renounced his racist prejudices in his later work; nevertheless, it does not mean that his ethical position is thoroughly embedded in racism to the extent that it enervates his moral and political project *in toto*.

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I presented, analyzed and defended a type of approach to global ethics. The particular approach that I chose is Kantian cosmopolitanism. Both parts of this term need clarification. First, by “cosmopolitanism” I refer to legal, political and moral justifications to ensure basic rights of human beings regardless of their state membership and to inculcate corresponding responsibilities across state borders and citizenship. By “Kantian” I mean a particular line of reasoning whose main commitments are attributed to the Prussian thinker, Immanuel Kant. Throughout the dissertation, I use the term “Kantian” as opposed to “Hegelian” as a way to represent two distinctive ways of looking at inter-state or inter-national relations. Thus “Kantian” or “Hegelian” cosmopolitanism does not mean that all the aspects of these models are shaped or influenced by Kant and Hegel themselves. They are the prominent thinkers who provided groundings for the distinctive ideals. What their proponents claim under the name of the same aegis, therefore, may greatly differ from one another, and even from these original thinkers. These concerns account for the historical character of the first two chapters of the dissertation.

I sought to identify the foundations of Kant’s cosmopolitanism in the first chapter. From 1760s through 1790s Kant published an array of works called *Friedensschriften* - writings on peace. In “Toward Perpetual Peace,” the most famous piece among these works, he made a proposal to end all wars and to enter into a peaceful global society. He envisions the legal conditions of perpetual peace as a rather loose confederation of states with a democratic constitution in which individuals are granted certain rights even in foreign lands. However, Kant’s formulation of the cosmopolitan right, as a right of a visitor, is a very minimal concept, and thus falls short of the expectation of many who are drawn to the discourse of cosmopolitanism in our world.

Against this background, Hegel’s critique of Kant is very important to my purposes. Hegel clearly argues in his *Philosophy of Right* that any emergence of political organization beyond the state is unthinkable and even undesirable. In Chapter Two, I examined three aspects of Hegel’s theory, namely, the communitarian notion of self, the

rationality of the modern state, and the realistic account of war. Hegel's critiques shed light to something that cannot be seen through a Kantian lens. Despite the difference between these two great thinkers, however, some contemporary Hegel scholars argue that Hegel can also accommodate a theory of peace, not only a theory of war. It is to say that a logical offshoot of the struggle for recognition described in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* points toward 'radical cosmopolitanism' aiming at transcending state boundaries and embracing the globally underrepresented and disadvantaged. Nevertheless, neither a political nor a cultural interpretation of Hegel's "homogenous state" or "universal spirit" provides a safeguard against pervasive global injustice. That is to say, Hegelian cosmopolitanism thus construed fails to answer the genuine ethical concerns in our time which motivate us to be, or to want to be, world citizens. Instead, I suggest that Hegel's account of poverty and colonialization supports the view that despite Hegel himself the modern state bears an internal limit as the embodiment of reason and freedom.

The historical discussion on Kant and Hegel thus far points to main problems that I dealt with in the final three chapters. In rough strokes, I suggest that a conception of cosmopolitan justice rooted in Kantian moral principles ought to revise some of the central Kantian concepts of persons and societies, such as the dualistic understanding of the self in the world of noumena and phenomena, and the enlightenment understanding of history, and the severing of reason from emotion. I take these three are the main challenges to contemporary Kantian global ethicists. After all, the role Hegel plays in this dissertation may be a foil to my argument because we need some way of relating an idea of human flourishing to moral duty, that is, a way of tying Kant and Aristotle together.

Now Chapter Three examines various claims of contemporary Kantian cosmopolitanism who commonly take economic and political empowerment seriously in order to realize Kant's normative commitment. At the end of 20th century, John Rawls drew a sharp distinction between domestic and global justice under the banner of "realistic utopianism." I agree with the central tenets of Rawls' conception of justice which takes material basis seriously for citizens' exercise of political and civil rights. Rawls' two-tiered commitment, however, holds that global economic inequality is permissible as long as other countries have a decent political structure. Although this position seems to grant autonomy to different peoples, I think that it is no longer morally

justifiable at the face of the claims that the globally vulnerable make upon us. Moreover, a cosmopolitan vision seems inevitable in order to correct forms of profound domestic injustice. I concur with Beitz and Pogge in that the egalitarian commitment is rightly to be extended beyond state boundaries. Despite its adequate orientation, the overall discourse of cosmopolitan justice is limited on several fronts. First, it focuses on the distribution of wealth without paying due considerations for rectifying the present fabric of global market. Second, the cosmopolitan distributive justice has been neglected the demand of cosmopolitan citizenship in the face of refugees and asylum seekers. In many cases, the claims of “material redistribution” are mistaken in its analysis of the moral implication of equality. Based on these promises and limitations, I sought for a hybrid model in order to balance between its strength in assigning the moral obligations of the agents and its weakness in addressing the needs of the vulnerable.

The Chapter Four examines the role of the idea of development in cosmopolitan thought. For cosmopolitan economic projects, theories of development have a significant place. Nevertheless, the idea of development or progress is a very troubling concept. For one, Kant’s subscription to the idea of historical progress, despite his critique of colonialism, breeds a dilemma between Kant’s commitment to moral universalism and his explanation of hierarchical societal development. We can trace variations of the same logic in Mill’s defense of liberalism and Marx’s analysis of socialism in the subsequent century. Despite their distinctive justifications, the idea of development time and again betrays a double-sidedness of the thinkers who deny full-blown autonomous agency to “backward” civilizations. Moreover, despite the altruistic commitment to civilize “barbarian” societies, the linear understanding of history all too often justifies violence and injustice towards the vulnerable others. In the 20th century, therefore, “post-development” thinkers sought to have done with the idea of development. Postcolonial and poststructuralist thinkers argue that the idea of progress based on Western models breeds more domination and exploitation than it actually promises to cure, and it is readily used as political cover for imperialism. Thus, the antidote to this is thoroughly cleansing our mind of the idea of development, rather than trying to modify it by piecemeal revisions. However, for cosmopolitanism conceived as an ethical and political project, I claimed that the logic of development cannot be simply jettisoned. The post-

development arguments raise adequate concerns and critiques, yet they have not provided any practical alternative in the face of extreme global injustice. Instead, I have proposed a threshold concept of development in order to avoid the danger of falling prey to the temptation to sacrifice individuals' political rights in order to advance "assumed" social development.

In the last Chapter, I revisited the problem of race in Kant and, doing so, suggested the need to redress the Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion. Kant is, as we discussed earlier, best known for his formulations of universal moral law and his proposal for a league of nations to achieve perpetual peace; however, recent studies have illuminated Kant's lesser known works which contain his remarks on racial hierarchy, white supremacy and pro-slavery. The traditional attitudes among Kant scholars toward his racism have been dismissive silence - a sign that it is not of a great philosophical value. Yet, it seems to me this attitude cannot be justified anymore in our time. I have delineated three different groups of response to this dichotomy, namely, an espousal of a break in Kant's work defended by Muthu and Kleingeld; a renunciation of Kant's universalistic ethics defended by Bernasconi and Mills; finally, a compatibilist view suggested by Hendrick. My goal has to support the last position. I have argued that there is only insufficient evidence that Kant dropped or renounced his racist prejudices in his later work; nevertheless, it does not mean that his ethical position is thoroughly embedded in racism to the extent that it enervates his moral and political project entirely. Rather, the real issue lies in his neglect on the power of emotions in morality. Revisiting recent debates on Kant's racism invites us to think that a cosmopolitan responsibility not only points to the need to ensure formal rights of global others, but also the urgency to nurture our emotions toward these others.

In conclusion, I suggest that an adequate appropriation of Kant's cosmopolitan rights ought to be modified to accommodate Hegelian insights in order to endorse global efforts to economically and politically empower vulnerable global citizens in our time. My current research points to the direction of my future research to develop a workable conception of a hybrid model that I suggested earlier. Also the remaining problem is how to escape the hackneyed temptation that these great thinkers also fell prey to: how can we enable intercultural comparison without falling into the linear understanding of history.

Another problem has to do with the problem of alterity, that is, how can we nurture our emotion toward the others. After all, Kant named his vision for peace as a pious hope, that is, something that we wish for, and yet that we cannot but believe. So is mine.

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