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Re-Schematizing Pre-Reflective Consciousness

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Abstract of Thesis

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This thesis aims at constructing an ontology of pre-reflective and reflective modes of consciousness in an attempt to understand how pre-reflective responses to certain stimuli become schematized through reflection. After mapping movements made in phenomenology that allow for the body to be our departure point for analysis, this paper focuses especially on the role that affectivity plays in motivating a reflective act, and how that reflective act may habituate new behaviors over time. To do so, I look to Jeffrey Schwartz's theory and research on his patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder, and through phenomenological methodology show why his Four-Step Method for overcoming the disorder has ontological grounding.

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Preface

The distinction between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness has become a staple fixture in the fields of phenomenology and philosophy mind. While pre-reflective consciousness is often used to describe the “auto-pilot” type of experience that occurs while performing behaviors through habit, and reflective consciousness indicates an explicit awareness of oneself in a situation, these existential modes of consciousness are the two poles placed at the ends of the hodological map of bodily and reflective intentionality that our current project aims to construct. This aim focuses on how pre-reflective responses to stimuli become re-schematized through reflective acts, or in other words, how do rote behaviors change, and how does that change become habitual itself?

There are certain responses that different individuals develop as habits, such the order in which one puts his or her seatbelt on and checks the mirrors in the car before driving, the morning ritual one performs before going to work, and in pathological cases, how many times one changes the light switch to the on and off positions before moving on to the next action. The focus of this paper is to understand how these rote behaviors develop, ask if they are subject to change, then, how that change may come about through willful effort.¹

¹ The notion of “willful effort” will be further elaborated in our discussion of Jeffrey Schwartz’s theory and research on patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder.

A strong answer comes from a tradition in phenomenology that emphasizes the role of the body when examining consciousness from the first-person perspective. In the first chapter of this thesis, we will introduce the body as a necessary to cognition and allow it to be our departure point for analysis. This chapter begins with Husserl's understanding of intentionality and construction of phenomenological methodology. Heidegger's treatment of the individual as always being-in-the-world will then build bridge to thinking of consciousness as *bodily* in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty and Thompson. The chapter ends with a preliminary introduction to Sartre's phenomenological ontology that will be worked out in greater detail in chapter three.

Chapter two is dedicated to the development of a phenomenological understanding of the body for which chapter one built a foundation. After highlighting the body's necessity in our analysis, we again look to Heidegger, Thompson, and Merleau-Ponty, in a more focused effort to place the body in the world and to account for the emergence of interiority at the vital level.

In chapter three the theoretical understanding developed in earlier chapters is applied to a particular case, and linked with important issues in another discipline, to an understanding of Jeffrey Schwartz's theory and research on his patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. This example will guide then guide rest of the paper. Although this paper aims to understand the re-schematization of rote behaviors in general, extreme cases such as the ones portrayed by Schwartz's

theory and research allow us, with the help of Husserl's theory of inner time-consciousness and Sartre's phenomenological notion of reflection, to develop an ontological grounding for answering our initial questions. By doing so we hope to tie it all together in chapter four, applying a cognitive behavioral method to a structural account of pre-reflective responses, concluding with an outline of just how a re-schematization of pre-reflective responses work. To finish our introduction, however, let us further develop what we mean by the terms pre-reflective and reflective.

What is meant by pre-reflective consciousness is the non-positional "auto-pilot" stream of consciousness that occurs in thought and behavior that does not concern an explicit awareness of oneself having those thoughts or performing those behaviors. If I am driving my car, for example, chances are that I am not explicitly focused on the actions that are required in order for me to adequately drive the vehicle, nor am I aware of the physical mechanisms that are functioning in my body when performing those behaviors. In fact, the only thing that I may be explicitly aware of is my destination, what I will be doing once I reach my destination, or where I want to go to dinner later that evening. The pre-reflective mode being dealt with here, then, is not only the conceptual auto-pilot view of consciousness, but the understanding that consciousness is fundamentally bodily, skillful, and normatively adapts and comports itself toward the world in which it is rooted. In other traditions such as psychology, this non-positional mode of

awareness is often labeled as unconscious, but as we shall see later, for our purposes it is more appropriate to think of it as pre-reflective, since linguistically it anticipates being reflected upon.

When using the term pre-reflective, we are not solely talking about the non-positional experience that occurs prior to making it an object for reflection. In the pre-reflective mode of consciousness, behaviors become schematized as motor habits, which, in turn affect the way the experience is given. As Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Cole (1995) explain in their essay on body image and body schema, contra to the perceptual experience of one's own body and understanding of the body in general, "[t]he body schema is not a perception, a belief, or an attitude. Rather, it is a system of motor and postural functions that operate below the level of self-referential intentionality, although such functions can enter into and support the intentional structure" (132). Importantly, these schematized motor and postural functions are normative, which means that they adapt within their limits to certain stimuli in certain ways.

Reflection, on the other hand, makes explicit the pre-reflective mode of consciousness and the individual's relation to the object of the experience in question. To reiterate, the focus of this essay is not the ontological relation between the pre-reflective and the reflective per se; instead, our primary aim is how one is able to modify the schematized pre-reflective response to a given object or situation through the transformative act of reflection. Experts in certain

fields such as playing a musical instrument or sport, for example, have schematized the conceptual rules and physical responses required to perform at the expert level. By contrast, novices need to conceptualize each step taken until they are able to complete the tasks determined by the intentional goal they set for themselves. A concert pianist does not start off as a concert pianist, but takes years of schematizing the conceptual rules and physical habits of playing the keys in certain combinations before he or she makes playing a difficult piece seem effortless. Additionally, a topic of special interest in this paper is not only those experts that have been able to acquire a level of ability that seems effortless to novices, but also pathologies and the ability to manage and sometimes even overcome them through a transformative, affective reflection, as we shall see in Jeffrey Schwartz's patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder in chapter three. It is easy to see, then, that we are concerned with phenomenological methodology in this investigation due to it giving us the tools to reveal not only the existential structure of affective entrainment, but, as the motivating question guiding this thesis, how reflection is able to schematize new responses to a given object or situation.

Although this question would traditionally be treated as an ontological problem of how the mind relates to the body, as theories of mind, consciousness, and cognition develop it seems that the ontological relation between the individual and the world has presented itself in the form of, as Evan Thompson

puts it, a “body-body” problem; the difficulty now lies in the relation of the body as subjectively lived through and the body that one is, as an organism in the world. Regarding this as a dynamic, dialectical relation between the individual and his or her environment, however, puts the subject-object poles of an intentional consciousness and its physical object out of play, viewing consciousness as bodily in relation to its physical milieu. Therefore, not all intentional activity is conceptual, and yet there is still a tacit self-awareness and disclosure of the world occurring through a normative adaptation by the individual in response to the environment. Thus, in order to account for this we must take into consideration the pre-reflective and reflective modes of existence for consciousness and its intentional structure, as well as the ability to reflect on the pre-reflective experience and transform it according to additional possibilities disclosed. First, let us map the movements in phenomenology that make this analysis possible.

Chapter 1

Movements in Phenomenology: Mapping the Pre-Reflective and Reflective Response

Edmund Husserl initiated phenomenology during the early 1900s as a methodological movement in opposition to what he called *psychologism*, a term coined to signify the identification of non-psychological processes as psychological ones. Husserl claims that the natural sciences had built their foundation on presuppositions, and in his estimation, contra psychologism, it was first necessary to understand the apparatus through which sciences observe empirical data in order to give their methodologies a necessary degree of rigor. Due to the view that all observations are made from a first-person perspective and only after this are matched with other first-person perspectives to be considered objective, the apparatus in question is consciousness, and by implementing the phenomenological method Husserl intended to uncover essential structures of consciousness and the essences of given objects in order to attain the needed support for the natural sciences. Additionally, Husserl explains that science requires methodological interventions that must be critical of themselves, which leads to a notion of “grounding” the multiple fields of science with logic. This is a phenomenological project because once you make the move from the “thought” to “thinking” you are dealing with a universal condition for the sciences since, to

make a description (in the form of a logical proposition) is to make a judicative statement that has the structure of intentional thinking as its condition.

The phenomenological method, as Husserl puts forth, begins with the *epoché*², a concept originally used by the ancient Greek skeptics to explain their teleological suspension of judgment regarding knowledge. Husserl, however, uses the term to signify the first step of his method: “bracketing” an experience in order to move to a *phenomenological reduction*, during which one suspends judgment about the object regarding its mode of existence. From this, one is then able to carry out an *eidetic variation*, calling for the individual to imaginatively manipulate and change certain properties of the object without theoretically removing any attributes that would cause an essential change to the object in question. Take a cell phone, for example: if I am looking at my first-generation Droid and remove all of the unessential properties that make it a cell phone, I could switch out the casing, processor, interface, operating system, touch screen, and everything that I can use my previous experiences of cell phones to think of as well as come up with future variations, until I reach the core set of properties that are required to remain in order for it to still be a cell phone – the cell phone’s essence. In this case, a button to transmit sound, a speaker to receive it, and the minimum necessary technology for those functions to occur would be all that was left.

² Gk. ἐποχή, “suspension.”

Through this, the idea of intentionality - the concept that all consciousness is consciousness *of* something or directed toward an object, rather than the view of consciousness as a passive Cartesian theater - gains additional support. Far from being simply axiomatic, the intentional structure of consciousness is based on phenomenological findings, one being the revelation that all experiences occur from a certain perspective in the world, with each profile synthesized together and contextualized with sociocultural meaning, significations, and an element of givenness. For example, I do not perceive my house the same way that I perceive a rock; the house appears to me *as a house that is mine, in the midst of the world*. Furthermore, if I were to walk to the other side of my house and find nothing there, I would be astonished and wonder what the explanation could be. Thus, we have a nexus of what Husserl calls the *acts of consciousness* and the *object of consciousness* (or *noesis* and *noema*, respectively)³. The object of consciousness is the *attentional core* of an experience, correlative with the concomitant *acts of consciousness* such as judging, sensing, and other qualitative properties within an experience.

Although there are many differences in the thought of Husserl and his successors, a main target for criticism is his idea of a *transcendental ego*. By now, one may have gathered that the phenomenological method is a reflective act⁴; rather than living through the experience, that experience is now bracketed and

³ Cf. Husserl (1982), pp. 211-235

⁴ Cf. Husserl (1982), p. 174

posited as an object in order to strip away the noetic properties and get to the essence or “core” of an object. According to Husserl, this perception of essence is accomplished by making the *cogito* his Archimedean point and postulating a pure transcendental ego that grasps the initial consciousness-of as its object, without the ability of being posited as an object itself.⁵ Future phenomenology, such as in the writings of Sartre, will attack this idea and claim that there is no transcendental point of reference for a subject to grasp itself from,⁶ but the main point to take away from this is the idea of positing an experience as an object so to imaginatively modify it through eidetic variation. We will later see how all reflective consciousness is transformative in regard to its object, and taking it a step further, how that transformation becomes schematized.

Following Husserl, Martin Heidegger sought what he considered the more primordial structures of *Dasein*⁷, his term for the human individual, or individual human existence. His move to first and foremost root the individual in the world is based on the idea that there is no primordial experience of an ego, and that the individual is thrown into the world, always “there” in his or her existence and relatedness to the world. *Dasein* is viewed as always *being-in-the-world*, and as Evan Thompson (2007) points out, “[t]he hyphens indicate that ‘being,’ ‘in,’ and ‘world’ are not ontologically separable, but form one irreducible and unified

⁵ Cf. Husserl (1982), p. 190

⁶ Sartre (1960).

⁷ More precisely translated as *being-there*. Cf. Heidegger (1962), p. 27; Thompson (2007), p. 21.

structure” (21). It is also important to note that “world” does not connote an entity or plurality of entities; rather it is to be understood as the “horizon” or “ground” for any human activity (Thompson 2007, p. 35).

Another concept of Heidegger’s that provides much of the foundation for this paper is *Befindlichkeit*, which has been translated in a number of different ways, but all are used to signify a type of affective attunement. Although we will discuss this at greater length in chapter two, for now it is important to consider that to Heidegger, an individual’s mood reveals not only one’s situatedness in the world (their *being-there*), but, at the very least, an intuitive and primordial awareness of oneself and his or her comportment towards objects and situations in the world, prior to the act of reflection. According to Heidegger, Dasein is always in a mood, or “moody,”⁸ and all moods coincide with an implicit understanding of oneself as one lives in the world. We will return to this when examining affectivity and the pre-reflective response in an attempt to better understand the individual’s relation to the world and a way to modify the mood disclosed in a pre-reflective state.

Continuing, Maurice Merleau-Ponty made the lived body the focal point of his work when dealing with subjective experience of the world and its transcendental character of making possible the disclosure of the world as meaningful. In the case of the human individual, rather than locating

⁸ Cf. Heidegger (1962), pp. 172-9

consciousness as an internal structure somewhere within the skull, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the coupled bond between the individual's action and the environment in which that action takes place. This coupling then translates into a dialectical relation between the individual and his or her "environment of meaningful symbols and the intentional actions of others" (Thompson 2007, p.80), and as Evan Thompson (2007) explains, to belong to the world in this way is primarily sensory and reflexive (247), which means that primarily, a form of nonconscious intentionality is to be accounted for. This concept of nonconscious intentionality is found in both Merleau-Ponty's and Thompson's work on *motor-intentionality*: a fundamental unreflective bodily intentionality operating when the individual is directed towards an object that it is grasped by, resulting in skillful action. Thus, Merleau-Ponty's claim that consciousness is *embodied*, or *bodily*, setting the foundation for Thompson's dynamic sensorimotor approach to perceptual consciousness, essentially claiming that one can even find this relation between a bacterium and its milieu, indicative of some level of consciousness at the microbiological stratum.

Finally, Jean-Paul Sartre's cynosure of consciousness as the necessary condition for the revelation of being brings us to a one-level theory of consciousness and a more focused account of transformative reflection. As Sartre claims, all consciousness is not only consciousness-of something, but more accurately, consciousness (of) being. Because all consciousness is supported by

that which is not itself, the parenthetical (of) is used to clear the line in the subject-object distinction and portray the synthetic unity of consciousness and the phenomena in the process of being revealed. In this sense, consciousness is nothing – not simply what it is – but a transphenomenal dimension that conditions the appearance of phenomena; a nothingness that “lies coiled at the heart of being – like a worm” (Sartre, 1956, 21). The importance of this statement (the details of which will be worked out in chapter three) is due to the ability of reflexive consciousness to posit the original synthetic unity of consciousness (of) being as an object, making an immediate transformation of the experience in question while simultaneously revealing the individual and his or her relation to the object. Thus, in one stroke there is an act of objectification, revelation, and transformation, all of which are necessary conditions to reflectively schematize new pre-reflective responses. As will be worked out, the objectification of the experience acts as a form of “othering,” and although phenomenologists such as Dan Zahavi ask the question of whether reflection can occur without altering the reflected,⁹ just the opposite is what is of concern here; the transformation and consummation of the experience is precisely what we’re after. To put our aim in greater perspective, rather than attempting to explain how the marginalizing pre-reflective becomes reflective, we’re after how to transform the pre-reflective by

⁹ Cf. Zahavi 2005, pp. 91-2

reflecting upon it, then re-inserting it back into the pre-reflectively lived-through experience, prior to reflection.

Now that we have introduced some of the fundamental ideas in phenomenology that have occurred throughout the past century, we are able to make this our point of departure and begin our ontology of schematizing new pre-reflective responses. Let us now investigate the affective structure of intentional consciousness by turning our attention to the body and how consciousness is better understood as the aforementioned dialectical relation between an organism and its environment.

Chapter 2

Dialectical Significance: The Dynamic Emergence of Interiority and the Affective Structure of Experience

Though phenomenology began with Edmund Husserl as a method to study the essential structures of conscious experience, the concept of embodiment has shifted the focus from pure consciousness to an embodied mind as the condition of possibility for the disclosure of a given object. From a self-organizing being-in-the-world to a perceptual apparatus with its own motor intentionality, the body's role in phenomenology plays a part not only as an essential structure of experience, but as an object with multiple structures itself that require phenomenological investigation to disclose.

Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi's argument against the idea of a 'brain in a vat'¹⁰ in *The Phenomenological Mind* is a perfect portrayal of the necessity of including the body when talking about consciousness. The brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, simply put, is the reductionist postulation that the minimal requirements for having a conscious experience are a brain sitting in a vat and being hooked into apparatuses that transmit perceptual stimuli. Contra this view, however, Gallagher and Zahavi point out that this thought experiment presupposes mechanisms attached to the brain that function *as the body functions*.

¹⁰ See Dennett (1991); Cf. Gallagher & Zahavi (2008)

If a brain in a vat were to be able to perceive visual stimuli, for example, it would require an apparatus that was composed and functioned as an eye would. To take this line of thought further, in order to stay alive the brain would also need blood pumped by a heart, delivered through the arteries, and oxygenated by the lungs, among the other various and complex organs and systems required for a brain to competently function. In addition, an even closer look at the anatomical structure of the human body will increase the polarization of the minimal conditions that are assumed to be sufficient for the brain in the vat to experience without the body, and the actual way that the body shapes how we perceive and think about the world.¹¹ Aside from the fact that the human skeletal structure enables certain affordances¹² from the world while making others impossible, the human perceptual devices have their own specific affordances; the ability to see far ahead of where one is located in space and time facilitates advanced planning; the mouth enables verbal communication; the ears allow the determination of where a sound originates. In addition:

Bodily movements are not fully determined at brain level; rather, they are re-engineered by the design and flexibility of muscles and tendons, their geometric relations to other muscles and joints, and the prior history of their activation. Thus, ‘the nervous system cannot process information that is not transduced by the periphery, nor can it command movements that are physically impossible for that periphery.’

(Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, p. 133)

¹¹ Cf. Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 133

¹² Cf. Gibson (1986), 138.

Although the body's anatomical composition and being rooted in the world accounts for its necessity for conscious experience and part in structuring certain affordances, it also acts as a point of perspective in the acts of perception and action. With an analysis of intentionality comes the notion of the embodied mind always perceiving something from a given perspective, and that given perspective, which is located in space and time, is the zero-point set by the perceiving body. This is what is known as *egocentric space*, and it is precisely the structure of egocentric space that enables Evan Thompson to develop his theory of identity and selfhood manifesting at a microbiological level in his book, *Mind in Life*. The selfhood that Thompson discusses at first, however, is not the phenomenal selfhood that may be expected to be dealt with in a phenomenological analysis; instead the focus is on autopoiesis¹³ (and autopoietic selfhood), the term he uses to describe the self-organization of an organism, which is significant to portray individuality and a circular network of causality between an organism and its environment – a dialectical relation that he ultimately considers to be “mind” that we will look to shortly. Of course, he is not claiming that there is subjectivity at this level (though he is also not denying the possibility), but it is the foundation of individuality. Thompson writes:

In establishing a pole of internal identity in relation to the environment, the autopoietic process brings forth, in the same stroke, what counts as other, the organism's world. To exist as an individual means not simply to

¹³ Greek. *αὐτο*, *Auto*, self; *ποίησις*, *poiesis*, production

be numerically distinct from other things but to be a self-pole in a dynamic relationship with alterity, with what is other, with the world. This kind of relationship is not possible for nonautonomous entities.

(Thompson 2007, p. 153)

Not only does this dynamic relationship between autopoietic organism and environment reveal the primordial structures of identity and selfhood, but sets the foundation for the disclosing structure of motor intentionality. The organism's openness to the world (which Thompson claims is a second feature of intentionality, rather than strictly limiting it to a subject-object pole) can be inferred by taking into account what Thompson calls the organism's "sense-making," or its normative adaptation to a dynamic environment. To better understand this type of relation, let us turn to Merleau-Ponty's understanding of *form*, which sets the foundation for Thompson's work and allows for our transition to the affective structure of experience.

Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Structure of Behavior* puts forth a thesis of *form* when discussing the lived perspective. Influenced by his background in Gestalt psychology, Merleau-Ponty's use of *form* is the concept of a whole irreducible to its parts, and it is from his understanding of consciousness in terms of this formal structure that he analyzes perception and behavior¹⁴. Contrary to what he calls "mechanical thinking" – the view that

¹⁴ As Evan Thompson explains, the word behavior is not to be understood by the behaviorist conception of movement; rather, Merleau-Ponty uses the French word *comportement*, which more aptly conveys the type of structure he is investigating. Cf. Thompson (2007), p. 67

actions and events can be decomposed in a one-to-one causal correspondence – Merleau-Ponty claims that life and mental events belong to a non-linear, dialectical relation between an organism and its milieu. He explains that an environmental stimulus is not necessarily a causal determination of effect in the organism, but a condition that triggers a response contingent on the organism's vital significance. In the case of an assumedly nonconceptual organism the vital significance considered here is the biological norm of the organism in connection with its environment, which highlights the primary ontological status of the stimulus to the organism as inherently relational. Evan Thompson (2007) writes:

To say that stimuli play the role of occasions rather than cause is to say that they act as triggering conditions but not as efficient causes. To say that the organism's reaction depends on the vital significance of the stimulus is to say that the informational stimulus is not equivalent to the physical stimulus. The latter is definable independently of the organism; the former is not. The informational stimulus is the stimulus as informed by (the form or structure of) the organism. It cannot be described as "input" definable independently of the organism because it is already relational, definable only in relation to the organism, or specifiable only against the background of the organism's structural coupling with its environment. (69-70)

From this, Thompson points out that in Merleau-Ponty's attempt to close the explanatory gap between consciousness and nature, it is revealed that an autopoietic individual and the internal and normative relation between this individual and its environment are the necessary conditions for the possibility of a

dynamic emergence of interiority at the vital level.¹⁵ The necessity of this relation for interiority at the vital level, then, allows for the move to view consciousness as primarily a perceptual and skillful motor attunement to the world in which we live.¹⁶ To reiterate the above quote, what this means is as an organism is affected by a certain stimulus, it is triggered to react in accordance with that environmental structure. The stimulus, however, does not act as a causal condition for a certain mode of action; instead, it presents the organism with an exigency and the organism reacts based on its normative, vital significance, such as needing sustenance, shelter, or defense.

To be clear, the normative adaptation to one's milieu is, in a sense, conditioned by the affective structure in this relation through both basic affects and what Donn Welton calls *affective entrainment*¹⁷. In the organism's normative, intentional act¹⁸ of sense-making, it is grasped by objects within its environment through the affective structure and becomes directed toward them, resulting in skillful action. As Welton points out, however, there is also a transformation of the organism's internal processes and norms by an "affective entrainment" of the environment. The transformative affectivity of the environment in conjunction with the openness to the world and adaptation of the organism thus further

¹⁵ Cf. Thompson (2007), 79.

¹⁶ Thompson (2007) points out that in the human case, this world is fundamentally one of meaningful symbols and intentional actions of others (80).

¹⁷ Cf. Welton 2012b.

¹⁸ It is important to note that a secondary feature of intentionality is the organism's "openness" to the world, rather than strictly limiting the relation to a subject-object pole.

illuminates the dialectical relation that Merleau-Ponty considers primordial and Thompson considers mind, but needs additional elaboration before we can make the move to a conceptual and transformative reflective consciousness.

To make relative the aforementioned descriptions, the human individual in a pre-reflective mode of consciousness acts according to affordances provided by the environment in conjunction with his or her normative intentional goal, all-the-while being without a thematic, objectified view of oneself in relation to the situation at hand. As actions are performed, the phenomenal field is altered and creates a new environment with new affordances *by* the environment and new intentional goals *of* the individual. Whereas the example of a hungry bacterium swimming up a sucrose gradient in search for a source of energy that Thompson uses is an apt example of a microbiological organism being “drawn” by the sucrose as a food source while projecting itself up the gradient due to self-generated norms, Welton offers us a conceptual circumstance still operating at the pre-reflective level. In his essay, *Bodily Intentionality, Affectivity, and Basic Affects*, he makes the distinction between *intention-of-action*, where the “action is guided or directed by *prior* intentional acts” (he also calls this type of action *scripted*), and *intention-in-action*, which “does not require a prior intention, for the intention is formed in and by the action itself” (Welton 2012b). With the latter, what Welton labels as *unscripted* action, the action constitutes the intention itself. In the midst of an intense baseball game, for example, the act of picking up

the ball and throwing it itself constitutes the intention to do so.¹⁹ To further elaborate this type of engagement with the world and co-dependency between the way in which the object manifests itself to us and the way we act in relation to it, Welton (2012) writes:

Caught in the rain while hiking the Long Trail...we first see what is before us as a place of shelter into which we can scurry and only subsequently as a hole in the side of a cliff. After leaving the bat, the ball is seen as catchable or not by the fielder and only later as a solid, round object...with intention-in-action the content of the embedded perceptual act is not defined by a core of “physical” features to which the action adds “practical” properties. Rather, having a tacit familiarity with the possible bodily schemata of action is a setting condition for perceptual acts to apprehend the sort of basic features that they do. With the onset of rain the action is drawn to or, better, *inclined toward* the cave, which is manifest as what “affords” shelter and invites us to scurry inside. Here, perceptual content, action, and world are interlocked and frame the intention in play.
(5)

The main concern of this paper, however, is how one modifies, or better, *transforms*, through reflection, the way in which one responds pre-reflectively to his or her being solicited by a given object or situation. It is easy to see, then, how we may make the transition through the disclosure of situatedness found in Heidegger’s use of *Befindlichkeit*. Heidegger’s theory of *care* characterizes one’s comportment toward the world and discloses the concern one has for oneself and objects in-the-world. Through a description of this structure of experience that acts in response to an object soliciting my engagement with it, it is revealed that

¹⁹ Welton does mention that this type of action does require a preconscious familiarity with our ability to move and the rules at hand. The point, however, is that in unscripted action the intentional content only becomes regarded as a conceptually formed belief upon reflecting on it after the fact.

in Dasein's everyday existence there is never a time that one is not in a situation with certain modes of action being solicited, substantiating the affective structure that is ubiquitous to all experiences. Therefore, care is a fundamental structure of Dasein and, ontologically speaking, acts as a revelation of *mood*; a dynamic mode of being that attests to our always being "affectively attuned" to the world in which we live. To put it in a Heideggerian way, the mood of Dasein (which attests to *Befindlichkeit*) manifests as "how one is faring," discloses its structure of its "there," and its attunement to its "there" subsequently reveals the structure of Dasein's facticity, or the "that-it-is." As Heidegger himself puts it, "[w]hat we indicate *ontologically* by the term *Befindlichkeit* is *ontically* the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned" (Heidegger 1962, p. 172).

Heidegger's notion that Dasein, or again, the human individual, is always in a mood and attests to the individual always being affectively attuned to the world in which he or she lives is not, however, the only piece of the puzzle that this revelation gives us. What is possibly even more important, or at the very least as segue into the next chapter, is Heidegger's claim that Dasein ought to become the master of its pre-cognitive²⁰ moods through a cognitive and volitional act of effecting a counter-mood. Heidegger (1962) writes:

Factically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing this may

²⁰ Macquarrie and Robinson translate the German "Erkenntnis" as "cognition," but it seems that Heidegger is using the word in context of what he thinks is the level of conceptuality secondary to primordial engagements.

signify a priority of volition and cognition. Only we must not be misled by this into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods. (175)

Additionally, “[t]he mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something” (Heidegger 1962, 176). So the primordially of *Befindlichkeit* becomes primary as a revelatory structure, and by being submissive to the world that Dasein is in fact in, Dasein’s mood allows for disclosure through encountering something that matters to it. Through this disclosure, Dasein is then able to effect a new mood by volitionally directing itself toward something else in the world, which essentially precludes Jeffrey Schwartz’s Four-Step Process that will be discussed in the next chapter of this paper.

It seems, though, that we have yet to bridge Heidegger’s exegesis on mood to the role that the body plays in the previous section; but a solution can be found in the notion of *self-affection*, which Dan Zahavi explores in his book, *Self-Awareness and Alterity*. Zahavi sets out to show that the term - *self-affection* is “appropriate as a description of prereflective self-awareness since it not only captures a whole range of its defining features, but ultimately allows for new insights as well” (Zahavi 1999, 110). Although our aim is not to better understand pre-reflective self-awareness, Zahavi’s conclusion, as we will see,

works to bridge the notion of the body to Heidegger's exegesis on mood, and will serve to continue the path toward our current project's goal.

Starting with Michel Henry's take on self-affection, Zahavi explains that it is important not to conflate the concepts of hetero-affection and self-affection, since the former concerns the givenness of a foreign object and the latter does not. Instead, self-affection is the notion that I am both affecting and being affected by myself in the same moment, with no object outside of my experience to mediate. To support this description Zahavi points out that the "what is it like" of experience, or the "what it *feels* like" to have that experience is without distance; it's an awareness that puts the experience in direct relation with itself. What's most important here is Henry's idea that self-affection, in this way, is a radical passivity – a given state that an individual neither initiates nor controls. As Zahavi puts it, "to be self-aware is to find oneself in a state that one cannot escape or surpass. It is to be *situated*" (Zahavi 1999, 112). Thus, the self, to Henry, is fundamentally in relation to itself, which ontologically provides the necessary condition for self-manifestation. The problem, however, is that Henry's analyses do not satisfy questions concerning the interplay between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation,²¹ still leaving the question of what role the body plays unfulfilled, and leaves Zahavi to turn to Husserl for answers.

²¹ Cf. Zahavi (1999), 115

As we have already seen in earlier sections such as the example of the brain-in-a-vat, there is a reciprocal co-dependency between the constitution of spatial objects and the constitution of the body. Zahavi confirms:

The body is not first given for us and subsequently used to investigate the world. The world is given to us as bodily investigated, and the body is revealed to us in its exploration of the world. It is when we perceive that we are aware of ourselves, and it is when we are affected that we appear to ourselves, i.e., it is exactly as exposed and self-transgressing subjects that we are given to ourselves. To phrase it differently, we are aware of perceptual objects by being aware of our own body and how the two interact; that is, we cannot perceive physical objects without having an accompanying bodily self-awareness, be it thematic or unthematic. But the reverse ultimately holds true as well: The body only appears to itself when it relates to something else – or to itself as Other.

(Zahavi 1999, 122-3)

Following the same line of thought, Zahavi then explains that this all attests to our situatedness that Heidegger claims to disclose through an analysis of mood, being both present to oneself and the world simultaneously; only now we see that this ontological structure or constitution cannot be thought without the body being in play.

Now that we have seen that self-affection is not only on the same level as pre-reflective self-awareness but acts a condition for self-manifestation and subsequently the constitution of the body, let us look at Jeffrey Schwartz's theory and research on his patients with OCD.

Chapter 3

Reflecting OCD: The Possibility of Choosing Otherwise

It seems that the way we will be able to understand the type of behavioral modification that we are after is through example. The example in question, however, must be carefully chosen in order to remain parallel to the idea of a transformative reflection operating at the level of self-affection and making one Other to oneself. So far the introduction of Evan Thompson's embodied dynamicism in this paper has given us only one side of the coin, which is the idea that the individual is always in a dialectical relation with his or her environment. Following the same path, it is through this enactive approach to cognition that we are able to make the move to affective reflection. In this case, Jeffrey Schwartz's theory and research on patients who suffer from obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) seems to be a right fit.

Jeffrey Schwartz is an American psychiatrist and associate research professor at the UCLA School of Medicine specializing in the research and treatment of people with obsessive-compulsive disorder, which is characterized by intrusive and distressing thoughts, mental images, and compulsive behaviors that people perform in an attempt to satisfy or alleviate the fears and anxieties

caused by their obsessions.²² Although classified as a disorder, OCD has additionally been considered a disease due to its origination as a chemical imbalance in the brain.

To briefly convey its biological status, through the use of positron emission tomography (PET) researchers have been able to measure the metabolic activity of both people with and without OCD, and have concluded that the orbital cortex in people with OCD is hypermetabolic, or becomes ‘overheated’ as compared to the people without. The orbital cortex, Schwartz tells us, is not only where thought and emotion combine, but is also the brain’s ‘error detection circuit’; otherwise put, it informs the individual whether something is to be approached or avoided. Additionally, the caudate nucleus, or part of the striatum that is the filtering station and ‘automatic transmission’ for the orbital cortex gets ‘stuck’ and accounts for the obsessive-compulsive ‘false messages’ that the brain is sending out. By ‘consciously changing behaviors,’ though, Schwartz claims that people using the Four-Step Process he created starts to actually ‘fix’ their broken transmission by changing the metabolism of the striatum, eventually leading this function to work automatically.

Schwartz’s Four-Step Process begins with *Relabel*. During this first step, while the individual is overcome with the obsessive-compulsive urges and questions what they are, he or she recognizes them as obsessions and compulsions

²² It is important to note that performing these compulsive acts usually only perpetuate and worsen the disorder.

and calls them just that. Relabel is helped by showing the patient PET scans comparing an image of a brain with OCD to one without and explaining all of the aforementioned neurological functions. This leads to the second step of the process, which is *Reattribute*, and answers the question of why the thoughts, urges, and behaviors will not go away. After being made aware of the neurological malfunctioning of the brain in a person with OCD, an understanding that the obsessions and compulsions are originating as false messages in the brain develops, allowing the individual to label those thoughts and compulsions correctly instead of being burdened with the perpetual anxiety of not knowing what is causing them to feel and act the way they are. After performing the first two processes, the individual then *Refocuses* their attention to something useful and enjoyable. The key to this step is to perform a behavior other than the compulsive act. By doing so, the individual is ‘retraining’ their brain to work more smoothly and ‘fix’ the ‘broken transmission’ of the caudate nucleus.

The final step is *Revalue*, where revaluing is a natural outcome of actively performing the first three steps. During Revalue, the individual learns to recognize the obsessive thoughts and behaviors as “worthless distractions to be ignored” (Schwartz 1996, 98). Scientific evidence based on the research of before-and-after PET scans on individuals with OCD that followed through with Schwartz’s Four-Step Process shows that the individuals were able to change the physical composition and function of their brains’ neural pathways, falling under

the category of self-directed neuroplasticity. Due to this, Schwartz argues that consciousness functions as a physically efficacious mental force with the ability to alter the neural networks of the brain, resulting in enduring changes in cerebral metabolic activity (Schwartz 2002). The Four-Step Process leading to the change in the brain's metabolic activity does not, however, happen overnight, but rather is a gradual process that takes a significant amount of mental effort. To further portray this, Schwartz uses the example of Johnny Ray.

Johnny Ray had a stroke in 1997 that left him 'locked-in,' which means that although his powers of reason, cognition, and emotion all remained intact, he was completely paralyzed due to his brain no longer being able to communicate with his body. During a twelve-hour operation in the March following his stroke, Johnny had electrodes that were encased in glass cones and contained growth-promoting substances that caused some of his functioning brain cells to grow implanted into a region of his motor cortex that controlled the movement of his left hand. Over the course of a few months, Johnny became more and more able at moving a cursor on a computer monitor attached to the electrodes in order to spell words by choosing letters from the screen, one at a time, all by *imagining* moving his left hand. According to Schwartz, this provides evidence of real, volitional effort, which is the same kind of effort needed for his patients with OCD to veto the urge to perform a compulsive act. He states that "[v]olitional effort and attentional Refocusing generate a mental force that changes brain

circuitry, thus resulting in a lessening of OCD symptoms – and, over time, produces a willfully induced change in the very circuitry of the brain” (Ibid. 317).

At this point it is important to note that Schwartz makes a distinction between the *form* and *content* of OCD. The *form* of OCD is what makes it a neuropsychiatric problem; the individual is overcome with an intrusion of obsessive-compulsive thoughts originating from the biological malfunctioning of the brain. The *content*, or why the individual has one symptom over another (i.e., the continual urge to wash one’s hands as opposed to checking if the appliances are all turned off) has no biological explanation. Schwartz here is concerned with the form of OCD, which is biologically explained, and with his Four-Step Process he claims that one is able to manage and even overcome the obsessive-compulsive urges despite the content. In fact, Schwartz claims that understanding the psychological and emotional content will rarely make the obsessive-compulsive urges go away (Schwartz 1996, xxxi). On the other side of the discussion, however, phenomenology would take up the content as an essential structure of the experience in the form of meaning, which, in the contextual perspective of the individual, may provide road blocks when re-schematizing behavior since meaning is the catalyst for concern given to the thoughts and urges leading to anxiety.

The problem is that Schwartz’s theory behind his method to manage OCD is an attempt at somewhere between a philosophical and a scientific account of

how his method works, but falls short in explaining how consciousness is structured or functions.²³ From a phenomenological standpoint, however, it reveals the high level of reflection needed to afford a transformative schematization of an emotional attitude or pre-reflective response to a given object or situation. In this case, relabeling acts as an objectification of the symptom and allows for the individual to *change the symptom's content in order to make it less meaningful* through reattributing it to the malfunctioning brain, thus revealing the significance of the content at hand – otherwise, reattribution would not be so important. From there, the willful change in behavior presents a new response to the situation as an act of reflective adaptation, and after a period of time the response becomes immediate, pre-reflectively. In the case of Johnny Ray, the ability to efficaciously imagine moving a cursor on a computer screen that was attached to the electrodes implanted in his brain took a strong amount of effort over an extended period of time, becoming easier as the reflective act gradually schematized the pre-reflective response.

To elaborate the process that is in operation we must make a digression and briefly sketch Sartre's understanding of reflection in concordance with Husserl's analysis of inner time-consciousness. As we mentioned in chapter one, Sartre holds the Brentanian axiom that all consciousness is consciousness-of something, but stresses the unity of consciousness and being. Therefore, rather

²³ Cf. Schwartz (2002)

than the subject-object structure of “consciousness-of,” Sartre claims that the relation of consciousness to an object would be better understood if it were linguistically stated as “consciousness (of) being.” Without going too far into the phenomenological view of inexhaustible, multifaceted objects with inner and outer horizons, it is an accepted understanding by Husserl, Sartre, and many contemporary phenomenologists that due to an object appearing to consciousness through profiles and from given perspectives, the full positivity of the object is never experienced.

Sartre, specifically, explains that to speak about consciousness is not to speak of cognitive functions or Cartesian theaters, but as lack – a privation of being. Thus, as spontaneous activity that is born through the perception of a multifaceted object, consciousness itself, to Sartre, is to be understood as a nothingness – a transphenomenal dimension that conditions the appearance of being. Based on this, the phenomena of being depends on consciousness in its absence, as appearances appear *to* consciousness, which can only grasp *an* appearance. With these considerations, being is then raised to the level of possibility, for if the object can never be perceived in its fullness it seems that the revealed being in question is contingent on the possibility of being other than what it is (as perceived).

Although it seems that we have gone onto a separate and convoluted path (which is much in the tradition of Sartre), the key concepts at play are reflection

and possibilities, and without an ontological foundation for understanding these concepts we would be without the necessary tools to draw together the connection between the previous chapters and the examples of Jeffrey Schwartz's theory and research. The reason for this is found in his statement that:

At the moment an OCD patient actively changes how he responds to the obsessive thoughts and compulsions that besiege him, the volitional effort and refocusing of attention away from the passively experienced symptoms of OCD and toward alternative thoughts and behaviors generate mental force. Mental force acts on the physical brain by amplifying the newly emerging brain circuitry responsible for healthy behavior and quieting the OCD circuit. (Schwartz 2002, 295)

Without yet focusing on the number of implications brought out by this claim, what ought to be emphasized is the *actively* changing how one responds to the *passively experienced* symptoms leading to newly emerging brain circuitry. As stated earlier, this entails reflection, which takes the unified pre-reflective consciousness (of) being as an object and reveals a horizon of possibilities with the potential to be actualized by the individual. Sartre explains:

Reflection is the for-itself²⁴ conscious of itself. As the for-itself is already a non-thetic self-consciousness, we are accustomed to represent reflection as a new consciousness abruptly appearing, directed on the consciousness reflected-on, and living in symbiosis with it. One recalls here the old *idea ideae* of Spinoza. (Sartre 1956, 126).

²⁴ For-itself (*pour soi*) is the term that Sartre uses for consciousness, since it is conceived as a lack of being, unified with the object in-itself (*en soi*) that it is not. Therefore, consciousness is in a position to stand out from being and judge it, a concept that is fundamental to this paper.

What we have here is a problem that is found in contemporary a higher-order theories of mind (HOT),²⁵ which not only seems to lead to an infinite regress, but is a different yet similar version of Husserl's transcendental turn that Sartre argues against in *Transcendence of the Ego*.²⁶ In order to avoid what Sartre sees as a separation of being, he puts forth the thesis that "the reflective simultaneously be and not be the reflected-on" (Sartre 1956, 127), and begins to solve this by claiming, as stated in the quote above, that there is always a non-thetic self-awareness in all pre-reflective modes of consciousness. To speak apodictically (as Sartre likes to say), in order for there to be reflection there must initially be something to reflect upon (thus the linguistic structure of *pre-reflective* and *reflective*). For example, if I have been reading a book for the past hour and completely "lost" myself in the narrative, I would not be able to answer the interruptive question "what have you been doing for the past hour" with "I have been reading" unless there was an awareness of myself operating at the pre-reflective level.

With the emphasis on there not being a separation of being, it is evident that this reflective-reflected-on act is not to be taken as a dyad of reflection-reflecting; rather, "it is not the appearance of a new consciousness directed on the

²⁵ Higher-order theories of mind claim that in order for a mental state to become conscious it must be grasped as an object by a higher-order mental state, and so on so forth. The problem, however, is this leads to an infinite regress with higher-order mental states grasping each other *ad infinitum*, with no strong understanding of self-awareness being made.

²⁶ They are similar in that there is what seems to be a separation of being.

for-itself but an infrastructural modification which the for-itself realizes in itself...” (Sartre 1956, 129). In this sense, what one reflects on is identical with what is being reflected; that is, what conditions the “mineness” of an experience. It is a unity, rather than a synthesis of parts, and when trying to reflect on the initial consciousness (of) being it collapses back on to what was originally reflected, since the thing reflected and the thing reflecting are the same. Thus, when trying to capture it, it disappears, but brings the initial relation of the individual to the object to an explicit mode of awareness.²⁷

Something of the utmost importance that we must hold in consideration before we turn to Husserl’s theory of inner time-consciousness²⁸ is the notion that although we are adhering to a one-level account of reflection, reflection still operates as a modifier of the reflected. Indeed, it is not some non-temporal agent that is doing the reflecting, but myself, as a temporal and enduring being-in-the-world. “Reflection,” Sartre tells us, “is a recognition...” and to re-cognize something is to imply a past. “But if the reflective *is* the reflected-on,” he adds, “if

²⁷ Referring to the “as-structure” of intentionality may be helpful here. As Donn Welton explains (see Welton 2012a), the three-fold intentional structure of consciousness can be diagrammed as follows: I/p-of-f/x-as-y. With this, we see that an individual (I) perceives from a given perspective (p) a facet (f) of an object (x), which is always seen *as* something (we see the chair *as a chair*, for example). With Sartre’s ontology of consciousness, consciousness is reflecting on itself *as* consciousness (of) being; therefore, if one attempts to reflect on it, he or she would solely be making explicit the consciousness (of) itself *as* consciousness (of) being that was originally only given tacitly.

²⁸ Although Sartre’s theory of reflection is found in his chapter on temporality in *Being and Nothingness*, by continuing down that path we would be led astray from our initial agenda of understanding how the process of schematizing new pre-reflective responses through reflection occurs. Thus, we must turn to Husserl’s notion of passive and active synthesis.

this unity of being founds and limits the laws of reflection, it should be added that the reflected-on, itself, *is* its past and its future” (Sartre 1956, 132).

This process can be further elaborated in Husserl’s notion of internal time-consciousness and the structures of retention and protention. Husserl claims that as we experience, not only are those experiences retained in the unity of consciousness but they also serve to structure protentional anticipations of future experiences. The objects are unfamiliar to us at first, but as we experience them perspectively and in different modalities we become more familiar and acquainted with them, giving the protentional structure a greater retentional base. This also accounts for the focused conceptual content of novices and what seems to be an expert’s more bodily and skillful ability to perform the same function at ease. Husserl states:

In general, in addition to the object that is primarily noticed, with which I am occupied in a privileged way while viewing it, there are still other single objects that are co-noticed, be they given in a second or third order co-grasping. This will take place in such a way that in passing over from the observation of one object to the observation of another, I am indeed no longer looking at the first one, I am not longer primarily occupied with it, properly speaking; but I still have a hold on it, I do not let it slip from my attentive and conceptual hold, and along with that, everything I had previously grasped: It continues to belong to me in a modified way, and in this way I still have a hold on it. (Husserl 2001, 18)

With this, the experiences that one has are enduring as retained in the unity of consciousness, serving as background lived-experiences. To elaborate, if one were to experience a ball, he or she would perceive it perspectively, and as

the ball was turned the person perceiving it would notice its different sides as the manifold of appearances became more and more familiar (remember the change in phenomenal field mentioned in chapter one). As the ball turns and as each visible side becomes non-visible by virtue of it escaping my immediate sense perception, the sides experienced immediately prior do not simply disappear; instead, they are retained in the background, tying together the different perspectives into an understanding that this is one and the same object, though different experiences of that object. In other words, the structure of retention is what gives the object a determinate prefiguring that was lacking prior to my experience, affording a thematic and meaningful re-cognition of it in an articulated manner.

On the other side, in addition to what has been retained and what is being immediately perceived there is also the structure of protention at play. When perceiving the ball, one anticipates more and intends the other sides of the ball in an empty but prefigured framework. Understood in this way, the non-visible sides of the ball are also co-present. If I were looking outside and saw a profile of my car, the anticipation of the car as having other sides to it would be present to that experience. If, however, I walked around to the other side of the car and saw that there was nothing there, it would put that experience into question based on a conflict with an experience that had been retained, along with the unfulfillment of my protention.

This forward-pointing act of consciousness that is functioning in each experience is what allows for the awareness and effectuation of possibilities. In the case of what Husserl calls “open possibilities,” although there is an element of certainty regarding a general, intentional prefiguring, the particulars of the possibilities are uncertain and therefore open. To shed light on this, Husserl discusses the protentional ability to eidetically vary the non-visible aspect of a perception (the backside of an object that is being experienced from its frontside, for example), and intuiting a determinate feature conditioned by a horizon of indeterminacy. As opposed to the car that I am familiar with, if I were to experience a multicolored object that I have never seen before from the front, I may anticipate that the backside of the object also contains colors. The particular colors that it may be, however, are unknown to me, and therefore the possibilities remain open in the general framework of the anticipation that there is in fact some color or another on the momentarily non-visible side of the object. In this scenario, consciousness is pointing toward an object being presentified in a mode of certainty without the act of fulfillment, progression of perception, or gradation of knowledge. Instead, there is only a general framework that sets the range of possible determinations that can continue to be altered through an eidetic variation.

On the other hand, instead of prefiguring a determinate within a horizon of possibilities, there are times when consciousness enters a static state of suspension

in the form of doubt regarding its object. In this type of experience, a doubting vacillation ensues with a number of opposing possibilities affecting the ego in a way that entices it to believe in each simultaneously, and this is what Husserl calls “enticing possibilities.” (Something important to note here, however, is that the affection issues from the side of the object, modalizing egoic acts of perception into acts of enticements to believe, which is indicative of a dynamic play between the ego and its object.) As opposed to the question of “what color is it?” being framed in the determinate, open specification that there is a color to be seen despite the indeterminacy of what particular color it is, with enticing possibilities there arises a conflict of “is it this, or is it that?” For example, in questioning whether the object to my right is a human being or wax figure, without my investigating the matter further I am inclined to believe both until one proves to be more valid.

In this type of experience, each possibility “pulls” the individual with a certain “weight.” Despite this pull, however, the possibilities do not determine the belief that “it is so.” Instead, the individual may feel stronger degrees of pull toward each of the possibilities and choose to believe the one carrying the most weight, suspend belief in any of them until further evidence is found to support one over the others, or form a decision making one possibility more valid than the others *despite* their weight. To begin to tie all of this together, the significance of this analysis in relation to our current project is that in the third type of situation –

what Husserl calls *subjective certainty* – the existence of other possibilities only lose their validity through a subjective denial and not necessarily based on objective evidence, which takes, as Husserl states, a volitional conviction on the part of the individual making the decision.

It seems, then, that Husserl's analysis of an individual's ability to actively choose one propensity to believe over another despite their affective pulls begins to line up with Schwartz's claim that the individual has the ability to actively change how they respond to passively experienced symptoms of OCD. Once the individual with OCD has been informed of how and why the OCD originates, he or she has their retained familiarity with the symptoms *painted over* (to use Husserl's terminology), allowing for a modification of how the retentional base informs the protentional anticipations and framework for the horizon of possibilities that are open to them. By continuing Schwartz's four steps, the familiarity becomes greater, the acquisition of knowledge (by acquaintance) becomes fuller, and the ability to respond pre-reflectively becomes schematized.

Chapter 4

Conclusion: Tying it all Together

After mapping some of the movements that have been made in phenomenology over the past century and briefly sketching the pre-reflective and reflective distinction in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we chose the body as our point of departure and set ourselves on the path to understanding how pre-reflective responses become schematized through an affective reflection. The body we chose was not just any body; instead, we took Evan Thompson's lead and started from the bottom up, using microbiological organisms to illustrate the rooted and situatedness of being-in-the-world. Through this we saw that the individual is always in a dialectical relation with his or her environment, with the environment triggering certain conditions that allow for responses by the individual based on the individual's vital significance, setting the stage for the possibility of interiority at the vital level.

Bringing our analysis to the conceptual level, we then looked at how each action involves a change in the phenomenal field, perpetuating the dialectical relation by creating a new environment that is shaped by both the affordances of that environment as well as the individual's intentional goals. To follow up with this and re-emphasize the individual's situatedness, we shed light on the idea of *Befindlichkeit* as always being affectively attuned to the world and that

attunement being revealed through different moods that an individual is always in, providing a catalyst for understanding affectivity, basic affects, and their relation to the individual on the pre-reflective level.

After examining affectivity, we bridged the gap between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness by reviewing the example of Jeffrey Schwartz's theory and research on his patients who suffer from obsessive-compulsive disorder. By looking into the disorder's originating as malfunctions of the brain and how directed mental effort not only changes the affective symptoms but the neural networks of the brain's pathways, we began to see just where a phenomenological investigation can merge or intersect with a situation being dealt with in the cognitive sciences. Although the disorder is rooted in the microstructure of experience that phenomenology does not normally deal with, the idea of *self-directed neuroplasticity* brings it to the subjective level, requiring phenomenological analysis and descriptions to further enrich an understanding of how this type of process occurs, as well as what implications may follow.

In order to better understand this process, we first turned to Jean-Paul Sartre's phenomenological ontology of the for-itself, and found in his one-level theory of consciousness that the reflection and what is being reflected are always the same, but presented in either implicit or explicit modalities. Once the reflected-on is made the object of an explicit self-consciousness, the horizon of possibilities opens for the individual and allows for a transformative effect in

addition to the transformative objectification that is already at play. Once mentioning possibilities, a brief sketch of Husserl's theory of inner time-consciousness became necessary, giving us one more piece of the puzzle we are trying to construct. With the structures of retention and protention we were able to understand how a process such as Schwartz's has the physical effect that it does, and how through reflection, long-lasting rote behaviors become solidified.

To tie it all together, let us once more view Schwartz's Four-Step Process through a phenomenological lens. When the individual begins the process and relabels the affect, he or she is immediately *objectifying* it, creating a sense of alterity and giving the affect environmental status. Through this act of othering, the affect's horizon of possibilities broadens, affording the individual a reattribution of meaning in the form of conceptual sense-making and leading to a new and volitional normative adaptation in the form of a refocused response. Reflection, in this case, acts as a higher-order coupling at the macro-level of experience to reconfigure the micro-level sensorimotor coupling of the individual and his or her environment. As the individual continues the process, over time he or she builds a stronger retentional base for this newly informed protention that is operating at the moment the affect manifests, diminishing the need for reflection to initiate the different response.

To conclude, people such as Johnny Ray or the patients of Jeffrey Schwartz who suffer from obsessive-compulsive disorder are only extreme

examples of learning how to schematize new responses to environmental stimuli, but through phenomenological investigation we have elucidated the structures and conditions necessary for any act of re-schematization through reflection, whether it be an attempt at conditioning new adaptations due to a disorder or unfortunate circumstances, or simply wanting to make a change in behavior. Furthermore, by understanding how this process occurs we have also shown that there is, other than the reflective act, evidence of strong volitional effort that is additionally required in order to effectuate the desired outcome, which, although outside the limits of this paper, is indicative of human freedom.

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