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# **The Effects of Self-Interest and Prejudice on Immigration Attitudes**

A Dissertation Presented

by

**Marie Courtemanche**

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**Marie Courtemanche**

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the  
Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend  
acceptance of this dissertation.

**Leonie Huddy – Dissertation Advisor  
Professor, Political Science**

**Stanley Feldman - Chairperson of Defense  
Professor, Political Science**

**Gallya Lahav  
Associate Professor, Political Science**

**Sheri Levy  
Associate Professor, Social and Health Psychology, Stony Brook University**

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School

Lawrence Martin  
Dean of the Graduate School

Abstract of the Dissertation

**The Effects of Self-Interest and Prejudice on Immigration Attitudes**

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**Doctor of Philosophy**

in

**Political Science**

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This research investigates the role of self-interest and prejudice in determining immigration attitudes. In regards to self-interest, it is argued that policy preferences are driven both by individual circumstances as well as geographic contexts. Because recent immigrants to the United States have fewer occupational skills they pose greater job related threats to select groups of individuals. The population standing to lose the most from incoming low-skill immigrants is the working class. Consequently, this group should be the most vociferous in their support for immigration restrictions. Furthermore, it makes little sense to say that all working class individuals bear the same burden. A working class individual in a small town in Iowa is unlikely to experience the same threat as an individual in Queens, N.Y. Consequently, contextual geographic information will be examined in order to fully understand the role of job market competition.

A strong competing counter argument, however, suggests that prejudice informs immigration preferences. Consequently, I investigate how group antipathy influences immigration attitudes. More specifically, I propose that prejudice is conditioned by realistic threat. Given that populations negatively affected on the labor market by immigrants should be most threatened by immigration, prejudicial attitudes should also be influenced by realistic elements. My hypotheses are tested using data from the Census Bureau as well as the American National Election Study. In general, my research investigates the intersection between labor market competition, prejudice and geographic context in forming immigration policy preferences. The findings of my work have great potential to shape political discourse as well as elite decision making.

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## INTRODUCTION

Even though the United States is a nation of immigrants, recent growth in migration has incited both controversial and heated national debates. Since the passage of the Hart-Cellar Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 the number of immigrants entering into the United States has increased dramatically from a yearly count of 380,000 to nearly 950,000 by 1990 (Lapinski, Peltola, Shaw and Yang 1997). In relative terms, the number of foreign-born people living in the United States along with their U.S. born children account for nearly 23% of the U.S. population (Fix and Sucher 2003).

Concomitant with this growth has been an increased desire for immigration restrictions. For example, when asked if immigration should be kept at its present level, increased or decreased 46% of poll respondents in 1964 wanted to see immigration kept at its present value while 38% wanted it decreased. In 1993 these figures were 27% and 61% respectively (Lapinski et al. 1997). Even as support for immigration has obviously declined over the years, less clear is the mechanism driving this reduction. Research suggests that immigration attitudes are driven by a variety of factors including self-interest, prejudice, and cultural pressures. None of the findings however are conclusive in that they definitively substantiate one motive above and beyond the others. Consequently, this research will attempt to reconcile these differences by investigating the changing attitudinal environment as it pertains to these specific factors.

The thesis of this dissertation is that support for greater restrictions on immigration is not constant across groups of individuals. Given the nature of current immigration some people are affected more than others. For example in the past immigrants were much more likely than native-born Americans to have college educations. This is no longer the case. Since 2000, 35.5% of the incoming immigrant population has not even completed high-school, compared to less than 8% of the native workforce (Camarota 2007). Consequently, certain groups of individuals face greater competition on the labor market from immigrants than others. Because incoming

immigrants are less likely to be educated the wages and job opportunities of the working class, as well as those who are economically vulnerable, should be disproportionately affected as compared to other classes of individuals.

In addition, while immigrants as a whole come from divergent countries the vast majority (54.6%) hail from Latin America (this includes Mexico, South America, Central America and the Caribbean). This far exceeds the second largest immigrant population coming from East/Southeast Asia and making up 17.6% of the total immigrant population (Camarota 2007). Immigrants from Latin America also share similar characteristics in that they are more likely to earn less money than other groups of immigrants once in the United States as well as to live in poverty. Moreover, they are less likely than their Asian counterparts to have completed an advanced degree- 20% on average compared to nearly 50% (Pew Hispanic Center 2006-Tables 22, 28, 34). Consequently, this research will focus exclusively on Latinos as they make up the greatest percentage of incoming immigrants as well as share similar characteristics (i.e., having a greater likelihood of being uneducated as well as making less money) which could make them more threatening to the native working- class.<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that other immigrant populations are unimportant or uninteresting. In terms of practicality, however, concentrating on a single population seems to make most sense.

The goal of this dissertation is to explore the underlying factors influencing attitudes toward immigration. Because recent immigrants to the United States have both fewer skills and education levels they should be threatening to select segments of the population as it pertains to the labor market. The population standing to lose the most from incoming immigrants should be the working class and economically insecure. It is expected then that these groups will also be the most vociferous in their endorsement of immigration restrictions. As a result, the primary driving force behind immigration attitudes is believed to stem from economic concerns based upon labor-market competition.

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<sup>1</sup> Please note that the terms Latino and immigrant will be used synonymously for the remainder of the paper. This is with the acknowledgement that not all Latinos are immigrants, nor are all immigrants Latinos. For ease of terminology, however, when the phrase Latino is employed it is with the knowledge that native-born Latinos are being excluded, as are all other immigrants. Only foreign-born Latinos are implied.

Moreover, geographic context should exacerbate this tendency. As such, those experiencing economic hardship living in close proximity to immigrant populations should feel the most endangered. For example, blue-collar workers living Waverly Iowa are unlikely to experience the same threat from immigrants as those living in Queens NY. Contextual geographic information should play a significant role in heightening perceptions of competition. Surprisingly this somewhat obvious assertion has not been fully tested within the existing literature. As such, I will focus both on the main effects of the economic variables as well as their interaction with geographic context.

In addition to investigating competition as a means of explaining immigration attitudes the present model will attempt to separate interests to the self from interests to the group. As a result it will explore if threats to working class interests have the same effect as threats to self-interest. The distinction between individual-level threat and group level threat could have very real implications for policy attitudes. Research in related areas, for instance, suggests that the effects of threat to the self and to the nation result in divergent attitudes and behaviors (Huddy et al. 2002). Therefore, distinguishing the two could be of great consequence in broadening both the understanding of attitudes toward immigrants as well as conflict in general.

Because prejudice is a strong competing argument its role will be investigated more thoroughly as well. For the most part however, the literature on immigration fails to sufficiently address the issue of prejudice as a compelling counter-argument to self-interest. Much of the existing work explains immigration preferences as a consequence of either self-interest or cultural threat. Rather than reflecting either of these, attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy could instead reveal racial prejudices felt toward non-group members. Prejudice has been found to play a strong role in influencing all sorts of attitudes and behaviors (Allport 1954; Green, Strolovitch and Wong 1998; Huddy and Sears 1995). For example, feelings of animosity toward out-group members can influence preferences for programs targeted at the out-group (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Feldman and Huddy 2005; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000). Consequently, it seems likely that prejudice will affect immigration attitudes within this study as well.

Moreover, while much research suggests that prejudice has both diverse components and divergent predictive powers, this knowledge has not been applied to the

literature on immigration. Consequently, I investigate whether some measures of prejudice are inherently better at predicting policies related to immigration as compared to others. In addition, I explore the antecedents of prejudice. It seems highly plausible that realistic interests will influence feelings toward immigrants. If this is the case then environmental determinants should be of great consequence. On the other hand, prejudice has also been determined to be the result of individual level variables. As a result, factors such as authoritarianism could play a meaningful role in predicting prejudicial sentiments. Through careful examination, I attempt to decipher the function of both context and long-standing predispositions in contributing to immigrant antipathy.

The empirical analyses are based on data from the 1992, 1994 and 2004 American National Election Survey. The ANES is a series of national surveys conducted bi-annually before and after an election. Generally, the same questions are asked making them useful for academic studies and rigorous research. The analysis will be supplemented with data from the United States Census Bureau. Information gathered from the Census will be employed in the creation of geographic context measures.

Using these datasets the research stands to make a variety of contributions to the extant literature. Generally, the various tests illuminate how immigration preferences are formed. Using competition as a lens by which attitudes are understood provides the literature with a distinct theoretic model. Furthermore, examining self-interest in a novel arena could prove enlightening. Much past research suggests that self-interest plays a very limited role in the construction of attitudes and behaviors. Thus, testing for its existence under new circumstances could provide exciting contradictions. In addition, much of the literature on group relations has focused on interactions between blacks and whites. Consequently, demonstrating the usefulness of the existing theories in explaining the interactions of new and different groups such as whites and Latinos are a wonderful test of the theories' robustness. Moreover, the exploration of prejudice is important as its findings have special consequence for policy directions. If prejudice toward immigrants has roots in realistic threat, programs could be tailored to address this specific problem. The government, for example, could impose more restrictive immigration policies to alleviate tensions. Prejudice arising out of psychological components, on the other hand, would require different kinds of action.

## **SELF- AND GROUP-INTEREST AND LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Individual Level: Self-Interest**

#### **Introduction**

Self-interest has long been thought to influence both political attitudes and behaviors. According to this viewpoint individuals use personal interests as a way to guide individual preferences. Therefore, attitudes are the result of a conscientious attempt to determine individual and/or familial best possible outcomes. In terms of immigration attitudes, policy preferences would be based upon the personal costs and benefits associated with immigration. Consequently those negatively affected by immigration, either currently or in the near future, should exhibit the greatest opposition to liberal immigration policies. My research explores the extent to which this theory is substantiated within the American context. More specifically, I investigate the degree to which labor market vulnerability (e.g. being poor, unemployed, blue-collar and/or a union member) increases the probability of supporting immigration restrictions. For reasons to be discussed, it seems likely that those who are economically vulnerable on the labor market should be most opposed to liberal immigration policies if self-interest is relevant.

By confining self-interest to represent labor market competition, I have intentionally imposed upon it a narrow definition. Economic threat could encompass a multitude of other factors however. Individuals could support immigration reductions, for instance, as the result of social welfare considerations. Those living in areas with large immigrant populations could resent paying higher taxes for services from which they receive no immediate benefit. Public opinion polls do in fact reveal a common tendency to believe that immigrants use a disproportionate share of government services (Lapinski, Peltola, Shaw and Yang 1997). Additional research suggests welfare concerns are

associated with attitudes toward immigration restrictions (Dustman and Preston 2007; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; McClaren and Johnson 2007).

I opt to define self-interest narrowly however as I have no way of actually gauging either the perceived or actual economic effect of immigration on the community as it pertains to social welfare policies within my research design. The surveys I employ do not assess the extent to which respondents had been personally affected by tax increases whose main purpose was to bolster policies specific to immigrants. Neither do I have access to actual government spending on programs benefiting immigrants at the local level. Consequently, I am left without the proper means of effectively testing a broad definition of self-interest. This is not to say that self-interest, as it pertains to the cost of services, is uninteresting or unimportant. In fact, the scholarly community would benefit greatly from additional research investigating the unique effect of each. It is however outside the purview of the current study.

### **Past Research on Self-Interest**

Somewhat at odds with rational choice models, extensive research supports the idea that individuals act in their self-interest only under very limited circumstances (Feldman 1982; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Sears and Funk 1981). For example, voters are more likely to use evaluations of the national economy than their own personal economic status in determining candidate preferences (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). In the realm of affirmative action, both white and black Americans alike come to their views without calculating attendant personal harms or benefits of the policies (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Similarly, individuals in need of medical services are no more likely to favor government health insurance than are the fully insured (Sears et al. 1980). On such diverse matters as racial busing, mandatory college examinations, housing policy, bilingual education and abortion rights, self-interest turns out to be quite unimportant (Kinder 1998). Instead, values and sociotropic evaluations are oftentimes much better predictors of both candidate and public policy preferences (Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991).

This is not to say that self-interest is inconsequential in influencing public opinion. Self-interest seems to matter when the material benefits or harms of a proposed policy are substantial, imminent, and well publicized (Sears and Funk 1981). For example studies conducted during information campaigns designed to sway public opinion on tax relief demonstrate sizeable evidence of self-interest (Hawthorne and Jackson 1987) whereas self-interest had little influence on support for tax relief in the context of hypothetical scenarios (Lowery and Sigelman 1981). Research looking at policies related to smoking found that smokers were more likely to oppose smoking restrictions and cigarette taxes than non-smokers (Green and Gerken 1989). Similarly, studies investigating support for drinking regulations and gun control had analogous effects (Crowe and Bailey 1995; Wolpert and Gimpel 1995) with greatest opposition from those most directly affected by the government policy.

Consequently, it appears the question is not whether self-interest matters but when it matters. Self-interest influences public opinion when the stakes are large, clear and/or imminent. Given these circumstances its manifestation in immigration attitudes seems likely. Because some of the effects of increased immigration (i.e. greater labor market competition) for some groups of individuals are substantial it should be easy for those affected to perceive threat. A construction worker or landscaper on Long Island, for instance, who faces job competition from immigrants has a very real understanding of the issue at hand. Losing one's job, or experiencing increased economic insecurity as a result of immigration makes the issue extremely salient. Consequently, it seems likely that individuals in some way economically threatened on the job market by immigrants should have the ability to identify policies which affect their self-interest.

Because recent immigrants to the United States have fewer skills they should not be universally threatening. Instead, certain populations should bear a greater burden of the costs associated with their arrival. The population standing to lose the most from incoming immigrants should be the working class and economically insecure. Surveys have in fact shown that individuals who fear competition from immigration the most are those employed in low-skill, low-wage occupations (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). As a result, working class individuals should be more likely than white-collar workers to support greater restrictions in immigration policies. Moreover, individuals who are

economically insecure (e.g. the unemployed, the poor) should be more opposed to liberal immigration policies than those who are economically secure and better able to weather financial difficulties.

These anxieties, however, are somewhat dependent upon proximity to immigrants. The previously specified relationships are expected to be strongest where there are greater concentrations of immigrants. A construction worker in Deluth, Minnesota, for example, should feel less anticipation over immigration than an individual in San Diego, California. As a result, the success of self-interest in explaining immigration attitudes should be contingent upon the ethnic makeup of the individual's surrounding area. Consequently, those perceiving the greatest threat should be the economically insecure living in areas with large immigrant populations.

### **Self-Interest in the Immigration Literature**

Much of the research investigating the interplay of self-interest and immigration preferences is seemingly contradictory. While evidence exists to substantiate the claim of self-interest, there is also quite a bit of research to challenge it. Studies have shown, for instance, that less-skilled workers are more likely to support immigration restrictions than are workers with greater skills (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Similarly, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) found that the less educated and less affluent had a smaller probability of endorsing liberal immigration policies than the better educated and more affluent. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that Americans holding pessimistic views of the economy are more likely to support immigration restrictions than those who hold optimistic views of the economy (Burns and Gimpel 2000).

Conversely, a similar line of research suggests that self-interest plays a limited role in influencing policy preferences. Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997), for example, demonstrate the importance of negative Latino affect in predicting immigration attitudes. Within their research self-interest seemed to exert a minimal influence on immigration attitudes. As a result, the authors suggest that immigration preferences are the consequence of cultural norms and values rather than economic self-interest. Similarly, Fetzer (2001) finds support for cultural differences as explaining anti-

immigration policy preferences. Accordingly, resentment toward cultural outsiders rather than economic self-interest appears to drive support for restrictionist immigration policies.

It seems likely that the discrepant findings may be explained in part to issues of measurement. Self-interest has not been uniformly operationalized within the literature. Some scholars have emphasized occupational groupings, for instance, while others have focused on income. Similarly, objective measures of threat are sometimes employed while other times subjective measures are used. Because the same measures are not employed consistently, the results are difficult to compare. This could explain the divergent findings. Furthermore, for the most part, many scholars have gauged self-interest using only a few variables at once rather than a wide-range simultaneously. It could be that the best way to test the idea of self-interest is to employ as many feasible variables concurrently.

Perhaps more importantly, economic threat felt on the labor market as a basis for immigration attitudes may not have been thoroughly captured within the literature. It seems likely that threat related to the job market could be felt more deeply in areas with larger immigrant concentrations. Consequently, there exists an important interaction between immigrant proximity and threat to self-interest that has not been thoroughly tested. While much research has included geographic information as a control, only one study has investigated the interaction between location and labor market vulnerability (see Scheve and Slaughter 2001). As such, additional research may unearth compelling evidence for the existence of self-interest as informing immigration preferences.

### **Measuring Self- Interest**

As previously alluded, measures of self-interest have not been uniformly employed within the literature. While income manifests with great frequency, it is not included in all studies. Furthermore, some measures, such as union membership, are employed much less regularly. Hood and Morris (1997), for instance, employ income and economic perceptions of personal well-being as ways of capturing self-interest. Haubert and Fausell (2006), on the other hand, operationalize self-interest using occupational

classifications and employment status. The variance in the measures employed could explain the divergent results. While Haubert and Faussel find a positive correlation between blue collar occupations and negative beliefs about immigration, Hood and Morris find no relationship between either economic perceptions or income and immigration attitudes. In general, the various specifications of self-interest make it difficult to conclusively state that self-interest is a strong predictor of immigration preferences (or a weak predictor for that matter).

Income does however appear with the greatest frequency as a measure of self-interest (see Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Wilson 2001). Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), for example, demonstrate a positive correlation between personal income levels and immigration preferences. This is interpreted as suggesting that people care about the impact of immigration on wages, employment, and general working conditions. Indeed, additional research actually appears to conflate income with occupational skill-level (see Kessler 2001 and Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Each set of scholars transform occupational information from survey respondents into an average wage that other individuals from within the same occupation earn. While both contend the measure captures skill, it could be argued that it in fact represents income.

This is not to say that self-interest is not captured by an individual's income level. While it seems likely that income should influence immigration preferences, it is not clear why income alone should be considered an adequate measure of self-interest however. As stated previously, self-interest should be measured using a variety of operationalizations in order to ensure robust testing. Moreover, instead of using a wide-range of variables, many scholars opt to represent self-interest with a limited number of indicators. With the exception of a few studies (see Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mayda 2006; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Wilson 2001), objective measures of economic self-interest have generally been assessed using two variables simultaneously. I would argue however, that to fully test the concept of self-interest numerous measures should be utilized concurrently. Economic insecurity arising from job market competition could potentially manifest in a variety of forms. Low income levels, for instance, may not be able to fully capture economic insecurity on the labor market alone. Similarly, working as a manual laborer may not entirely portray

anxiety felt on the job market due to immigration. Consequently, numerous measures should be employed simultaneously to fully capture economic insecurity and competition. Only then would the concept of self-interest be fully tested.

Notable exceptions do exist however. Citrin et al. (1997), for example, incorporated a variety of measures assessing self-interest within their analysis. These included income, union membership, employment status as well as occupational grouping as self-interest proxies. Moreover, their measure for occupational threat was extremely nuanced. They conceptualized occupational threat as holding an occupation where “the number of immigrant workers as a proportion of all immigrant workers is greater than the equivalent figure for native workers.” Even though the measure proved to be insignificant it remains a novel way of capturing self-interest. Similarly, Mayda (2006) employed income, subjective class identification, union membership and occupational skill-level as a means to capture self-interest. None of the studies which include multiple measures, however, interact them with geographic location. Consequently, it is not apparent that self-interest as an explanation for immigration preferences is fully tested.

There are a few scholars who have conceptualized self-interest as a function of education. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), for instance, argue that education characterizes economic insecurities as the better educated generally make more money. Moreover, those who earn less money may find it more difficult to weather tough economic times. Due to these economic insecurities, those with less education should be more opposed to immigration than those with higher levels of education. Similarly, Alvarez and Butterfield (2000) argue that those with less education should be more supportive of immigration restrictions as they perceive themselves to be in competition with immigrants for jobs. In fact, much work has demonstrated the importance of education in predicting immigration attitudes (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Hoskin and Mishler 1983; Starr and Roberts 1982). Generally, those with more education tend to be more supportive of immigration than those with less education.

It is not clear, however, if education is in fact a good proxy for self-interest. A great deal of literature suggests that education is typically an indicator of tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Condran 1979; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Stouffer 1955). At best, education teaches people to be more accepting and open toward those with

differences. At worst, it teaches people to hide attitudes which have been deemed socially unacceptable by the masses (Jackman and Muha 1984). Either way, education is conflated with tolerance or an awareness of tolerant norms. Consequently, it is not possible to confidently state that it only captures self-interest thus making it an inappropriate measure of the concept.

Interestingly, there exists a contentious debate over whether subjective measures or objective measures are better gauges of self-interest. In fact, each has been used with success. For example, subjective views on the national economy are significant in predicting immigration attitudes. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) demonstrate that Americans in general were more likely to support restrictions on immigration when they believed the economy to be getting worse. Similarly, Alvarez and Butterfield (2000) showed that voters who perceived the economy as poor were more likely to support Prop 187. In sharp contrast, negative perceptions of personal economic well-being typically fail to predict immigration attitudes. Moreover, pessimistic views toward the well-being of the national economy played a much greater role in levels of support for immigration policies than individual assessments (Burns and Gimpel 2000).

There is a strong reason not to employ subjective measures, however. It is often argued that subjective measures of self-interest are mere rationalizations for prejudicial attitudes. An individual who is not actually economically disadvantaged by immigration can couch his opposition to it in terms of its inimical effects on the economy. Therefore, subjective measures may merely reflect prejudicial sentiments. Because subjective indicators carry this substantial negative qualification, it seems better to employ objective measures over subjective ones. At the very least objective measures are exogenous to the model.

### **Proximity to Immigrants**

As mentioned previously, self-interested opposition to immigration should arise in areas affected by immigration. This point is obvious but has been overlooked or ignored in much of the research on immigration attitudes. Even though Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) demonstrated the importance of income in informing immigration

preferences they failed to take into account immigrant proximity. The effect of income should be larger in areas with higher concentrations of immigrants. Similarly, individuals with modest incomes in areas without immigrants should not feel as threatened.

While many researchers have investigated the direct effects of proximity to immigrant populations on immigration policy attitudes (Fennelly and Federico 2007; Ha 2010; Lahav 2004; Money 1997) very few have explored their indirect effects. Citrin et al. (1997), for example, examined the extent to which living in counties with large foreign born populations affected preferences toward immigration as a main effect but failed to interact it with self-interest. Even though context appears to have played a minimal role, it could be argued that geographic proximity to immigrant populations exacerbates the effects of self-interest. The economically vulnerable may be most opposed to immigration when they live in areas with large immigrant communities. The interaction between geographic location and self-interest thus may be an important avenue for revealing a complex relationship.

Additional research has investigated the effect of geographic context on policies dealing with immigrants like Proposition 187<sup>2</sup> in California (see Branton et al. 2007; Hood and Morris 2000; Tolbert and Hero 1996). Alvarez and Butterfield (2000) in fact find geography to play an important role in explaining preferences for this controversial policy. More specifically, voters living in close proximity to immigrants were more likely to support Prop 187 than those living more distant. They did not however examine the interaction between self-interest and geographic location. As such it is difficult to know if the most economically vulnerable living in areas with large immigrant populations were likely to express the greatest support for the measure.

To date there has been but one attempt to examine the interaction between proximity to immigrants and self-interest. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) explored the extent to which immigrant concentration moderated the relationship between self-interest and immigration preferences. Interestingly, they were unable to demonstrate that individuals with fewer skills were more supportive of immigration restrictions when they

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<sup>2</sup> Proposition 187 made it very difficult for illegal immigrants in the state of California to receive social welfare benefits.

lived in areas with higher concentrations of immigrants than in areas with smaller numbers of immigrants.

One strong plausible explanation exists for their null findings. The variable for threat proximity was created by placing individuals either in a metropolitan statistical area (where counties were lumped together into one MSA) or a county if the individual did not reside in a MSA. A dichotomous measure was then created where high immigration areas were defined as having 10% immigrant populations<sup>3</sup>. Amalgamating the two could have diluted the variable's ability to predict meaningful relationships however. More specifically, it is likely that the city was too broad an area to accurately capture the relationship of interest. Research suggests that the county is the most appropriate level of analysis for investigating occupational competition (Branton and Jones 2005, discussion forthcoming). Consequently, forcing the counties into one MSA could have diluted the results. Research using the county as the sole geographic unit for the representation of threat should prove to be more illuminating.

Furthermore, forcing the immigration areas into a false high/low dichotomy severely limits the variance of the measure. In other words, a great deal of nuance is lost by forcing the immigration communities into a dichotomous measure. As a result, the limited variance on this variable could have affected its ability to significantly predict meaningful relationships. The authors should be commended however for investigating something which had not been previously done.

Moreover, it seems likely that geographic proximity could assume many forms other than the one it has traditionally assumed. Geographic threat is often quantified as an absolute percentage. Citrin et al. (1997), for example, included the level of foreign born at the county level. Other numerical representations of threat besides absolute percentages may be equally interesting however. Research has in fact demonstrated that changes in minority populations from a small-baseline are associated with higher levels of racially motivated crimes (Green, Strolovitch and Wong 1998). It is feasible then that changes in existing immigrant populations could be more threatening than maintenance of the status quo. Thus, economically disadvantaged individuals living in areas with large

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<sup>3</sup> They also tested 5% and 20% specifications as well as a continuous variable of the percentage of immigrants in the local population.

increases in immigrant populations could be more attuned to the threat than self-interested individuals living in areas with smaller changes. Consequently, investigating variations in change may be quite compelling.

In general, it seems highly likely that the interaction between self-interest measures and geographical context should be fruitful in assessing the political effects of self-interest. More specifically, the extent to which individual level variables are able to influence immigration attitudes should be dependent upon proximity to immigrants. Contextual information could include both absolute numbers and changes in numbers however. Therefore, close proximity to either a stable immigrant population or a changing population should be a substantial factor in determining attitudes toward immigration policies. As a result, the success of the individual level factors in explaining immigration attitudes should be contingent upon the racial makeup of the individual's surrounding area.

### **Locating Threat**

A major consideration in creating contextual data lies in the determination of the proper geographic unit of measurement. Is threat best measured at the neighborhood level, the zip-code level, the city level or the county level? Using past research as a guide demonstrates the employment of many distinct demarcations. Scholars have typically utilized regions (Quillian 1996), counties (Quillian 1995; Giles and Evans 1977) and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) (Frisbie and Neidert 1977) in attempting to capture inter-racial threat. Recently however studies have investigated smaller geographic units such as zip-code areas (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000) and even census block groups (Oliver and Wong 2003) in order to capture inter-racial animosity. Interestingly, the results of this research largely contradict much of the existing group threat literature. For instance, individuals living in homogenous communities expressed stronger negative racial attitudes than those individuals living in more heterogeneous communities (Oliver and Wong 2003).

The discrepancy between the results may be largely attributed to residential selection bias. Whites living in close proximity to black populations most likely do so by

choice. A great deal of research points to the effect of white flight and discriminatory housing policies, where there exists hyper-segregation in white and black residential patterns (Wilson 1996; Massey and Denton 1993). This suggests that whites who are threatened by incoming black populations simply leave the immediate area. Thus, those who remain are those who are not threatened. Therefore, results from studies using zip code as the geographic unit of analysis should be discrepant from findings using larger areas of analysis, like the county. Individuals choosing to live in heterogeneous communities should naturally feel less negative affect toward out-groups than those who have chosen to move away. Consequently, using the zip-code as the geographic unit of analysis may be an inappropriate choice for investigating realistic threat.

The ability to adequately answer the question of which geographic location is best most likely depends upon what is being threatened. It is likely that different types of threat may be differentially captured within varying geographic units. Thus, if housing is threatened the geographic unit of analysis would need to capture where this competition arose (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). Smaller units of analysis would probably be appropriate as community characteristics are weighed heavily in moving decisions. However, if the threat is occupational a larger geographic area might be warranted. Given the distance that many people travel to work, it seems likely that the zip-code area is unable to capture job competition (Branton and Jones 2005). Commuting to work likely increases the exposure of individuals to more wide spread threat. Therefore, a more appropriate measure would be able to gauge broader threat. For this reason county level information will be employed as the geographic unit of analysis capturing threat. As it stands, county level information should be sufficiently large enough to measure conditions that may lead to conflict between Latinos and the working class.

## **Summary and Expectations**

Overall it seems likely that the literature related to the effects of self-interest on immigration attitudes remains inconclusive because researchers have failed to test it in a meaningful way. First, empirical tests would be improved by including numerous measures of self-interest. Using existing research as a guideline, the following variables

should simultaneously be included in tests of self-interest: occupational grouping, union membership, income and employment status.

Moreover, the field would greatly be improved by identifying concrete populations affected by immigration within very specific geographic locations. It seems far-fetched to believe that everyone in a particular occupation (or of a particular income for that matter) would feel the same threat. Instead, threat should be most apparent in areas of high immigration. These are the general expectations:

*HypSI1: Individuals in blue-collar occupations will profess greater support for immigration restrictions.*

*HypSI2: Individuals in occupations with a heavy Latino presence will be more likely to support greater immigration restrictions.*

*HypSI3: Union membership should significantly predict an inclination to support greater immigration restrictions.*

*HypSI4: Individuals with lower incomes should endorse immigration restrictions.*

*HypSI5: The unemployed will have greater preferences for immigration restrictions.*

Because proximity to immigrant populations should moderate the preceding relationships the following is expected:

*HypSI6: Individuals in blue-collar jobs living in areas with large immigrant populations will profess greater support for immigration restrictions.*

*HypSI7: Individuals in occupations with a heavy Latino presence living in areas with large immigrant populations will be more likely to support greater immigration restrictions.*

*HypSI8: Union members living in areas with large immigrant populations should be more supportive of immigration restrictions.*

*HypSI9: Individuals with lower incomes living in areas with large immigrant populations should endorse immigration restrictions.*

*HypSI10: The unemployed living in areas with large immigrant populations will have greater preferences for immigration restrictions.*

Finally, with the exception of Citrin et al. (1997), Burns and Gimpel (2000) and Wilson (2001) very little research has controlled for racial prejudice. Consequently, being able to rule out prejudice as an explanatory mechanism is not feasible. In sum, in order to truly demonstrate the existence of self-interest attempts must be made to include variables which accurately capture threat as well as rule out the possibility of prejudice.

### **Group Level: Group Interests**

As well as posing threats to self-interest, it is possible that immigration poses a threat to group-interests as well.<sup>4</sup> Fortunately, a great deal of literature already exists providing empirical and theoretical guidance on expectations concerning the impact of group interests on immigration attitudes. One of the most influential theories suggests that interactions between groups continually reflect real world threats to resources between groups, known both as realistic threat theory and/or the power approach (Blumer 1958; Sherif 1966). For example, realistic conflict theory (RCT) states that hostility and conflict are likely to arise as a result of competition for limited resources (Taylor and Moghaddam 1994). As such, RCT assumes inter-group hostility to be the result of real conflicts over specific interests. One of the most prominent illustrations of RCT, the robber's cave study (Sherif and Hovland 1961; Sherif 1966), found that individuals demonstrated strong in-group biases even within randomly created groups, when resources were finite and competitive. Moreover, subjects perceived their in-group as playing more fairly and performing better than the out-group.

According to these theories, resources can include tangible or concrete objects such as money, jobs and land or more abstract goods such as status and power. Consequently, the hostility that a dominant group may feel toward a sub-ordinate group would be the result of the subordinate group posing a threat to the dominant group's interests (Fosset and Kiecolt 1989; Giles and Hertz 1994; Taylor 1998). It is further believed that conflict between groups involves a struggle over resources in which each group seeks not only to gain the desired good but to prevent competing groups from

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<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that these two theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One could conceive of an individual who looks out for his self-interest as well as his group-interest.

doing so, by definition a zero-sum game (Bobo 1988; Wilson 2001; Glaser 2004). In many studies threat is presumed to exist simply due to the size of the out-group population (e.g., Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989; Giles and Herz, 1994; Taylor 1998).

Previous research investigating the interplay of intergroup relationships and racial attitudes are seemingly contradictory and focus mostly on white attitudes toward blacks. Studies have found, for instance, that proximity to large populations of African Americans is often correlated with heightened white racial animosity (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996). Similarly, close proximity to African-Americans has been shown to predict opposition to racially-targeted policies (Taylor 1998). Paradoxically, additional research contradicts these findings by demonstrating that interracial proximity can actually promote interracial contact and lessen racial antagonisms (Ellison and Powers 1994; Sigelman and Welch 1993). This effect however is dependent upon the existence of numerous conditions (Aberbach, Ellison and Powers 1994; Pettigrew 1998).<sup>5</sup> Given these limiting circumstances it is not surprising that discrepant findings have been demonstrated. It is nevertheless noteworthy that contact has the ability to reduce racial antagonisms.

Two major weaknesses exist within the inter-group relations literature. The first concerns issues of measurement. An implicit assumption in the realistic conflict model is that in-group identification actually exists (Wilson 2001). Somewhat surprisingly however, most of the inter-group literature has employed objective, aggregate-level measures of group as proxies for feeling threatened. Very little research has actually attempted to measure the subjective group identification of those who were purported to be threatened. Because aggregate, objective measures have been employed there is no real way to determine if the individuals involved actually identified with the threatened group. Consequently, the observed phenomena may not be one that involves groups at all. The findings of the entire literature could be erroneously established on spurious relationships. Therefore, in order to be able to definitively state that the observed phenomena is one that concerns the interactions of groups, group identification must be measured. Without this measurement, being able to distinguish individual level

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<sup>5</sup> Allport (1954) suggests that in order for contact to be successful in reducing racial animosities it must be institutionally sanctioned, that groups must not be in competition with one another, and that groups should work together to achieve common goals, in addition to the groups having equal status.

phenomena from group level phenomena is impossible. Thus, deciphering between self-interests and group-interests is not feasible.

Furthermore, there is reason to believe that individuals vary both in the extent to which they identify with groups as well as the intensity to which they do so (Huddy 2003). While original theories on group identification failed to mention intensity, it seems likely that group attachment is not dichotomous by nature (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979). This differentiation has real significance for attitudes and behaviors. Research demonstrates, for example, that strong African American identification predicts the endorsement of policies encouraging integration and diminishment of racial inequalities (Tate 1993). Similarly, research on political activity suggests that strength of partisan identification plays a role in voting behavior (Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 2006). Therefore, measuring strength of group identification could provide the greatest precision in testing existing theories.

The second major weakness of the inter-group relation's literature is its focus on black/white relations. Very few studies exist which investigate attitudes toward other minority groups (i.e. Latinos and Asian Americans) and even fewer look at minorities' opinions toward whites and/or other minority groups (Cummings and Lambert 1997; Hood and Morris 1998; Gay 2006; Taylor 1998; Welch and Sigelman 2000). This is surprising given changes in the racial landscape over the past fifty years. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, Latinos currently constitute 13.4% of the nation's population, making them the largest racial or ethnic minority group in the country. In addition it is estimated that by 2050 whites will no longer enjoy majority group status (Oliver and Wong 2003). Consequently, research investigating interracial relationships and/or conflict between groups other than those traditionally studied (e.g. black and white) needs to be conducted. A normative appeal exists for the investigation into the ability of extant theories to explain broader group phenomena.

### **Realistic Conflict and Class Interests**

It seems likely that realistic conflict theory will be of great use in illuminating attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. This is in large part due to the fact

that recent escalations in unskilled immigration have affected certain individuals, or groups, more than others on the labor market (i.e. the working class). Moreover, as a group the working class have been particularly hard hit by recent trends in the changing economic environment. While the service industry has experienced tremendous growth over the past few decades, the manufacturing sector has declined significantly. Many manufacturing jobs have in fact disappeared from the United States for good. At the same time low-skilled labor has been drawn to the US to perform jobs that are not especially attractive to Americans. Overall, the working class has been greatly affected by these trends-good blue-collar jobs have left the United States and workers have entered the country to increase competition for low-skilled positions. Consequently, it seems likely that working class individuals should endorse immigration restrictions.

Class however is thought to play a more limited role in American politics as compared to Europe (Ware 1996). Many scholars claim that economic classifications, once meaningful in a post-Depression era, have been supplanted by newer, emerging issues. Some have asserted that improvements in the standard of living have decreased the importance of material issues while concomitantly increasing the importance of non-material issues such as those dealing with self-actualization (Inglehart 1997). Still others claim that race plays an eminent role in shaping political attitudes and behaviors undercutting the effects of class (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Whites, for example, vary in their willingness to donate assistance depending upon if program recipients are black or white (Kinder and Mendelberg 2000). Along with race, religion has been thought to replace economic issues as being more meaningful to the populace (Layman 1999). Perhaps most controversial is the notion that the Republican Party successfully convinced working class individuals to vote against their self-interest by selling the importance of cultural values under threat (Frank 2004).

Research investigating partisanship and voting as it pertains to class hierarchies contradicts much of the aforementioned literature however. Stonecash, for instance, found that “less-affluent whites have not moved away from the Democratic Party and that class divisions have not declined in American politics” (2000, 118). Any Republican gains have come from those who are more affluent rather than those of lesser income. Thus the gap associated with affluence and partisanship has only grown wider since the

1950s. Similarly, using NES data over a period of twenty years, Bartels (2004) found that working-class individuals attached greater significance to economic issues than to social issues. The opposite was true of the more affluent. Working class individuals have also been demonstrated to exhibit group consciousness (Gurin et al. 1980). Further research suggests that working class Americans seem quite capable of placing themselves in a particular class (Argyle 1994). In the 2004 NES, for example, 34% of respondents self-identified as average working class, 8% as upper working class, 37% as average middle class and 15% as upper middle class, and less than 1% upper class. Consequently, it appears that the concept of class is quite alive for Americans. As such, the working class will be used as a test of RCT as it applies to immigration policy. It is my belief that individuals who closely identify with the working class will hold more restrictive views towards immigration policy than individuals who identify with the middle class.

*HypGII: Individuals who closely identify with the working class will hold more restrictive views towards immigration policy than individuals who identify with the middle class.*

### **Group Interest in the Immigration Literature**

Research investigating the role of group-interest in shaping policy preferences toward immigration is somewhat limited. Some European studies have found that the average degree of prejudice towards immigrants in various European countries is strongly related to the size of the minority group in the host country (Quillian 1995). Furthermore, national economic conditions play an additional role in increasing the likelihood of prejudice. This supports past research suggesting that negative affect toward minority groups is often based upon size and economic threat (Blumer 1958; Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989; Giles and Herz, 1994). Consequently, these two determinants of prejudicial sentiments seem to be robust across groups.

In related research, Tolbert and Hero (1996) investigated the role of group conflict theory in local politics in the U.S. Looking at aggregated vote tallies, they found that counties with higher percentages of immigrants were more likely to vote for Proposition 187 in California. Moreover, economic circumstances were a significant

factor. Counties with higher unemployment rates were more likely to endorse the proposition than counties with lower unemployment rates. The authors claim that the results strongly substantiate group conflict theory.

Paradoxically, additional research seems to contradict these findings. Taylor (1998) demonstrates that local concentrations of both Asians and Hispanics have no bearing on levels of prejudice and inter-group hostility. Similarly Hood and Morris (1997) found that majority-group approval of minorities is actually higher in U.S. counties with greater concentrations of Asian minorities. The effect for Latino concentrations was insignificant however.

The conflicting results could be the consequence of measurement issues. In each case, group threat was objectively measured as the percentage of dominant group members in an area as compared to minority group members. It seems likely however that perceptions of group threat would be strongest for those who actually identify with the group. Each of the aforementioned studies assumes that respondents attach themselves to the relevant group. This may not necessarily be the case however. Group identification is not necessarily universal and should not be assumed to be so. Thus, measuring subjective group identification could strengthen findings of being threatened.

As was the case with the literature on inter-group relations, the ability to differentiate between self-interest and group-interest is severely circumscribed as group identification was not measured. Because aggregate, objective measures have been employed there is no real way to determine if the individuals involved actually identified with the threatened group. Consequently, the observed phenomena may not be one that involves groups at all. The only real way of determining if the stated phenomena actually involve groups is to measure group identification. To date, no research in the immigration arena has attempted to do this. Thus, deciphering between self-interests and group-interests is virtually impossible.

It also seems likely that proximity to immigrants should play a role in strengthening the relationship between group interests and immigration preferences. As was the case for self-interest, it's feasible that group members living in close proximity to large immigrant populations should feel more threat than those who do not. Evidence of

threat should more likely be found in areas of high immigration. As such, I expect the following

*HypGI2: Individuals who closely identify with the working class living in areas with large concentration of immigrants will hold more restrictive views towards immigration policy than individuals who identify with the middle class.*

Overall it seems apparent that the literature on group interest and its consequences for immigration attitudes is limited and inconclusive. This is in large part due to issues of measurement. Consequently, in order to truly demonstrate the existence of group interests in determining attitudes toward immigration policies group identity needs to be assessed. Moreover, it is expected that proximity to immigrant populations will moderate this relationship.

### **Subjective Group Identification**

The ability to place an individual into an objectively defined group does not mean that the individual internalizes this identity. For example, while racial characteristics are generally noticeable assuming that subjective group identification automatically arises from objective group membership seems presumptuous. Unfortunately, most of the previous literature using realistic group conflict as a prism for understanding inter-group relations has made this error. Relevant studies have either ignored the relevance of group identification or have equated objective group membership with subjective identification. However, individuals have the ability to think of themselves as either belonging to a group or not belonging to a group. Therefore, identification is better conceptualized as a voluntary sense of solidarity. Consequently, incorporating subjective group identification into the analysis should allow for greater nuance and predictability.

Two types of attachments are generally associated with a subjective sense of group membership: social identity and a sense of common fate (Huddy 2003). Social identity is often conceived of as both an awareness of group membership as well as a sense of attachment to the group (Tajfel 1981). Therefore, any attempt to measure group identification should incorporate these conceptualizations. In political science, group

attachment has often been assessed using measures of felt closeness. This is due in large part to its routine employment in the NES. This measure, however, fails to adequately measure group identification as it is unable to account for sense of common fate (Huddy 2003). Better measures would attempt to incorporate both attachment and linked fate as a means of capturing group identification.

In terms of realistic group conflict, shared interests have typically been assessed as both the sense of common fate among members of the group as well as the common sense of grievance. Some research suggests that sense of common fate alone predicts political attitudes. A study concerning gender identity, for example, found that linked fate was able to significantly predict political cohesion even in the absence of common grievances (Gurin and Townsend 1986). Research by Kinder, Adams and Gronke (1989), however, suggests that both are necessary in the manifestation of political attitudes. Looking at the effect of group economic perceptions and identity on presidential voting in the NES they found that the two were able to indirectly influence voting through perceptions of the national economy's health. More specifically, perceptions of the national economy were influenced by both an individual's sense of economic interdependence with their group as well as the sense that their group's economic situation had deteriorated, which in turn affected presidential voting. Consequently, whether one or both are needed in the determination of attitudes remains unsettled. Therefore, attempts to specify shared interests in realistic group conflict research should incorporate both.

## **Prejudice**

Rather than reflecting economic threat, attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy could instead reveal racial prejudices felt toward non-group members. Prejudice has been found to play a strong role in influencing all sorts of attitudes and behaviors (Allport 1954; Green, Strolovitch and Wong 1998; Huddy and Sears 1995). For example, feelings of animosity toward out-group members can influence preferences for programs targeted at the out-group (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Feldman and Huddy 2005; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000). Similarly, negative feelings toward Latinos have been

demonstrated to predict immigration preferences (Citrin, Green, Muste, Wong 1997; Hood and Morris 1997; Wilson 2001). Consequently, it seems likely that prejudice will affect immigration attitudes within this study as well. As a result, it will be included as a control within the analysis of realistic threat. Moreover, because prejudice is a strong competing argument its role as an alternative to self-interest is investigated a bit more thoroughly in a later chapter.

## **Conclusion**

The preceding review demonstrates that theories of conflict and realistic interest should be particularly apt in explaining attitudes towards immigration. While research on race relations generally supports group threat theory as an explanation of black and white racial attitudes, research examining the role of self-interest has been more inconsistent. Similarly, the literature on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration has produced mixed results. It is the contention of this paper that these discrepancies are in large part due to issues of measurement. One such issue has been the failure to include numerous self-interest indicators simultaneously. Moreover, geographic context should be taken into consideration. In addition, past research has failed to differentiate between threats to self from threats to group as well as accurately test the group interest hypothesis by differentiating between the policy attitudes of those identifying with the affected group (in this case the working class) from those who do not. These failures should be able to explain the discrepancies within the literature as well as illuminate areas that have yet to be examined.

## **METHODS AND ANALYSIS FOR SELF- AND GROUP- INTEREST**

### **National Election Studies**

#### **Sample**

The empirical analyses are based on data from the 1992, 1994 and 2004 American National Election Survey. The ANES is a series of national surveys conducted bi-annually before and after an election. Generally, the same questions are asked making them useful for academic studies and rigorous research. The survey typically covers a wide range of topics, such as political attitudes, political behaviors, moral and religious beliefs and social interactions. Often however, special attention is made to particular issues of importance. The ANES was selected because it is the only nationally respected survey to have asked questions related to immigration repeatedly as well as to have contained specific county level information related to the participant.

Not all ANES datasets contain questions related to immigration. Over the past twenty years only five have actually done so. These include 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2004. Because prejudice is a compelling competing argument to realistic threat, measures ascertaining prejudicial attitudes are also critical. Consequently data sets should contain assessments of prejudice. A few such measures were included in the 1992, 1994 and 2004 surveys. As a result the 1996 and 1998 datasets were not employed. Moreover, the 2004 study contained many items related to prejudice while the 1992 and 1994 survey only included two measures, feeling thermometers and racial resentment identifiers. The 2004 dataset on the other hand contained measures related to stereotyping as well as authoritarianism. These questions will be useful in subsequent chapters.

The American National Election Studies typically employs a cross-sectional, equal probability sample as its study design. In some years, certain populations are over-represented. This was not the case for the studies employed in this work. Consequently, weighting the sample as a way to ensure representativeness is unnecessary. Each of the surveys employed face-to-face interviewing at the respondent's home. During

Presidential elections, the ANES interviews respondents twice, once before the election and once after the election. In years of Congressional elections, participants are interviewed once just after the election. The pre-election response rate and post-election re-interview rate for the 1994 survey were 74% and 89.3% respectively. For the 2004 pre-election survey they were 66.1% and 88%. The 1994 response rate was 74.1%.

The total sample sizes for the 1992, 1994 and 2004 surveys were 2485, 1975, and 1212 respectively. Because many of the hypotheses involve a number of control variables the 1992 and 1994 data sets were pooled together to create one large database. This larger sample should allow for the detection of significant relationships. The total size of the 1992/1994 pooled database came out to 4280. Because most of the hypotheses involve self-interest, the sample was limited to working respondents. Including those who no longer compete for jobs makes little sense if labor market threat underlies opposition to immigration. Consequently, 166 individuals were dropped from 2004 and 674 from 1992/1994.

Following the example of other scholars, minorities were excluded from the analysis (Branton, Dillingham, Dunaway, Miller 2007; Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and Morris 2000). In 1992/1994 520 Blacks, 63 Asians, 113 Native Americans and 233 Hispanics were omitted. Similarly, in 2004 176 Blacks, 29 Asians, 12 Native Americans, 75 Hispanics and 51 Others were deleted. Due to the omission of both the retired and minorities, the samples for testing the realistic threat hypotheses were 2611 in 1992/1994 and 703 in 2004.

## **Measures**

### **Immigration Restrictions**

The main dependent variable in all analysis involving self- and group-interest is support for greater restrictions on immigration. Because this question was asked during the post interview in both in 1992 and 2004, respondents who were not re-interviewed did not receive it. Of the initial 869 white survey participants, 782 participated in the

post-interview in 2004. In 1992, 156 white respondents did not participate again, therefore only 3,041 individuals answered the question pertaining to immigration policy.

The frequencies reveal an overall tendency to support greater restrictions. In 1992/1994, for example, roughly 54% of white respondents supported immigration reductions. Similarly, in 2004 slightly less than half of all white respondents (43%) supported immigration restrictions. Interestingly, this represents a drop over time. The variable is coded from zero to one such that high values represent support for greater immigration restrictions.

### **Self-Interest Approach**

According to the self-interest viewpoint, immigration policy preferences are informed by personal circumstances. Because Latino immigrants often lack skills when entering the United States, their search for employment is limited to specific occupations (Borjas 1995). Therefore, some Americans should be affected more by immigration than others. The expectation is that those who are negatively affected on the labor market by immigrants should be most supportive of restrictive immigration policies. Moreover, individuals who are economically insecure (e.g. the unemployed, the poor) should be more opposed to liberal immigration policies than those who are economically secure and better able to weather financial difficulties. Surveys have demonstrated that individuals fearing competition from immigration the most are those employed in low-skill, low-wage occupations (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). As a result, the economically vulnerable, broadly defined, should be most opposed to liberal immigration policies. Given that any one economic variable might not routinely capture the effects of self-interest, numerous measures are employed throughout. It is expected that each will capture distinct components of economic threat. To be sure, the measures are not interchangeable. Their correlations reveal their weak relationship (see Tables 3 and 4). As such, they have the potential to capture unique components of threat. Each is discussed below.

## *Occupation*

Using the occupational classification scheme within the NES, respondents were divided into one of two categories; blue-collar workers and white-collar workers (see Tables 5 and 6). In general, blue-collar jobs involve some degree of manual labor. This differentiates them from white-collar professions which typically require less physicality at the work place. Seemingly, low-skill workers may generally find it easier to gain employment in blue-collar occupations. This is not to say that all blue-collar jobs are low skilled. Some trades are very specialized. However, it seems probable that those who lack job skills will likely find employment in blue-collar occupations over white-collar occupations.

For both 1992/1994 and 2004 the following work groups were considered blue-collar: service occupations, farming, forestry and fishing occupations, precision production, craft and repair occupations, and operators, fabricators and laborers. As a result of these classifications, roughly 35% of workers in the 1992/1994 sample were considered blue-collar. Similarly, 28% of the 2004 sample was considered blue-collar. These proportions roughly coincide with estimates of the working class within the general population (Gilbert 2002; Thompson and Hickey 2005). The variable is coded such that one represents blue-collar professions and zero represents white-collar professions.

It is interesting to note that the number of blue-collar workers declined over the time period being studied. Individuals were much less likely to claim belonging to blue-collar professions in 2004 than in 1992/94. Furthermore, the decrease was quite substantial. The original percentage decreased by about 20%. Given that blue-collar workers are competing for increasingly scarce jobs it seems likely that they will be more inclined to oppose immigration, especially if the volume of non-skilled workers has increased concomitantly.

### *Occupational Proportion*

This measure is employed in an attempt to more precisely assess occupational threat. At its core it measures racial breakdowns within occupational groups. Thus, it captures anxiety that may arise as a result of direct competition. Individuals working in occupations that have high proportions of immigrants may feel more threatened than those working in occupations with few immigrants. The variable is precise in that it gauges threat at the county level. As discussed within the literature review, this geographic environment is believed to encapsulate threat as it relates to the labor market.

In order to create this variable, information regarding racial breakdowns of occupations at the county level was obtained from the Census Bureau's website. Unfortunately, data involving Latino immigrants was not available at this geographic specification. Racial breakdowns of minority groups (i.e. Latino, African-American, Asian-American) were however. Consequently, information regarding Latinos was employed as a rough proxy. This is done acknowledging that the variable is unable to fully capture the true threat immigrants might pose as it pools together all Latinos (i.e. both Americans and non-Americans) into a homogenous grouping. However, given the restrictions of the data it is a viable rough proxy.

The variable runs from zero (at its lowest value) to .887 (see Graph 1)<sup>6</sup>. This means that some individuals within the sample faced minimal occupational threat from Latinos. More specifically, no Latinos worked within their occupation at the county level. For example, one survey respondent living in Decatur Indiana working as a manager faced no threat because the percentage of Latinos within his field at the county level equaled zero. On the other hand, some individuals faced great occupational threat from Latinos. For those in the highest category, Latinos made up roughly 89% of the work force within their occupation at the county level. One participant living in Hidalgo County Texas working in sales had 89% of his profession made up of Latinos. High levels of occupational threat are not common however (as evidenced in Graph 1).

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<sup>6</sup> This variable is only found in the 2004 analysis. It was first generated for this dataset as a general test of its utility. If it was found to predict immigration attitudes, it was to be generated for the 1992/1994 dataset as well. As will be demonstrated in the findings section, the results for the 2004 analysis did not warrant the effort in creating the 1992/1994 variable.

Roughly 90% of the white survey respondents worked in occupations where Latinos made up less than 20% of the workforce at the county level. The variable is skewed heavily to the right.

Furthermore, and not surprisingly, occupational threat coincides strongly with the overall percentage of Latinos within the county. More specifically, white respondents faced the greatest occupational threat in areas with large concentrations of Latinos. Similarly, areas with fewer Latinos at the county level were less likely to have high levels of threat within any one occupation. As such, it is very difficult to disentangle the effects of geographic location from occupational threat. The two are very highly correlated (.8681). This multi-collinearity issue makes it extremely challenging to successfully detect the effects of each separately; an issue to be discussed in the findings section.

### ***Household Union Membership***

The question of immigration has been of great importance for unions over the course of these studies. Unions in the early 1990s took a hard stance on immigration (Ness 2005; Watts 2002). Organizations such as the AFL-CIO openly endorsed restrictive immigration policies. Asserting that immigrants depressed native wages, severe limitations on immigration were proposed. Because unions have often sent strong messages concerning their positions, it is likely that union members hold strong attitudes regarding immigration policy. More specifically, it is expected that those belonging to unions will be less supportive of liberal immigration policies. In the analysis, union membership is dummy coded with one representing union members.

### ***Income***

Income is often difficult to capture as survey respondents reveal this information reluctantly. Within the 1992/1994 survey 165 respondents refused to answer the income question (roughly 6% of the sample). In 2004, roughly 10% of the sample did the same (69 respondents out of 703). There did not appear to be a systematic reason for not

responding, however. For example, roughly one-third of the respondents who refused to answer were non-skilled which is the same percentage of non-skilled workers within the survey. Consequently, due to the non-random nature of the missing data, estimates were imputed using a variety of measures. These included, but were not limited to, occupational information, industry of respondent, educational level and marital status. Using these estimates, the non-response rate dropped to 0% for each of the time periods. The range of values didn't change significantly with the imputation (see Tables 8 and 9).

Income was reported slightly differently within the ANES over the two time periods. For 1992/1994, the income of the individual related to where the individual was grouped within the income bracket. For example if the respondent reported a relatively low income he was placed in a lower percentile group. In sharp contrast, the 2004 ANES reported the income range of the individual. If, for instance, the participant claimed to make \$15,000 annually he was placed within the \$15,000-\$16,999 bracket. While the 2004 item has greater nuance, the fundamental concept of income ranking remains the same within each. The income variable was reversed and recoded zero to one. Higher values represent lower levels of income.

### ***Employment status***

Of the 2,611 non-retired white respondents in the 1992/1994 data base 230 (roughly 9%) were unemployed. Similarly, 60 of the 703 (roughly 9%) white survey participants in 2004 were unemployed. Within the analysis a dummy variable captures employment status where one represents the unemployed. If there has been a reduction in blue-collar type jobs, manual laborers would probably make up more of the unemployed. Thus, they should be more likely to support immigration restrictions.

## **Group Interest Approach**

### ***Subjective Group Membership***

Instead of thinking about immigration as a threat to self-interest, it could be conceived as a threat to class interests. Therefore, working class populations should be most threatened by incoming immigrants. Realistic threat to the group is assessed using subjective measures of class identification. Both the 1992/1994 and 2004 surveys probed the extent to which respondents identified with a certain class (see Table 10, question wording appears below table). Because certain categories (i.e. Lower class and Upper class) had few responses the variable was compressed into four groupings. Within this categorization, lower class, average working class and working class were grouped together; upper working class was its own category; average middle class and middle class were grouped together; and upper middle class and upper class were clumped. Within the analysis, the variable is coded zero to one with high values representing the working class.

### **Contextual Information**

In conjunction with investigating the nature of economic insecurities as it pertains to the job market, geographic contexts are examined to see if they serve to intensify existing relationships. Because these anxieties should be somewhat dependent upon proximity to immigrants, the previously specified relationships are expected to be strongest where there are greater concentrations of immigrants. As a result, the success of the individual level factors in explaining immigration attitudes should be somewhat contingent upon the racial makeup of the individual's surrounding area.

I investigate a variety of specifications involving geographic context. First, I examine the absolute number of immigrants. Much of the literature operationalizes threat in this manner. It is assumed that economic insecurities will be heightened by living in close proximity to large populations of immigrants. I advance the literature, however, by investigating alternative specifications of geographic threat. For instance, I believe that

changing populations could also potentially be threatening. Thus, economically vulnerable individuals living nearby increasing immigrant concentrations should be most opposed to liberal immigration policies. Similarly, changes in the magnitude of the population could be threatening. Thus, individuals living in close proximity to immigrant populations with huge growths should be more anxious.

Information regarding geographic contexts was obtained from the Census Bureau. Because individuals are often employed outside their immediate neighborhood county level information on immigrant percentages are employed instead of zip code information (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). The Census however does not provide specific information regarding immigrant populations at the county level so a proxy was created. As in the case of occupation, racial breakdowns were substituted for immigrant breakdowns. Consequently the same caveats must be kept in mind.

### ***Percentage of Latinos within County***

A variable was constructed which captures the percent Latino at the county level. While it appears to take on a wide range of values, the data is actually quite skewed (see Table 11, Graph 2 and Graph 3). For example within the 2004 ANES, Latinos made up less than 1% of the population for some counties, yet 85% for others. The average county had a population of roughly 9% Latino however.

Also noteworthy are the changes in the distribution of the variable. For the most part, across the decade the Latino population grew. For instance counties with the lowest levels of Latinos actually decreased from roughly 57% of the sample to about 40% of the sample (see Graphs, compare 1<sup>st</sup> bar). This means of course that fewer counties had small Latino populations. In addition, the mean value Latino population increased from 6.4% to 9.3%. Perhaps more telling given the outliers is the fact that the median value Latino population increased from 2.2% to 5.1%. Thus it appears that over the course of the decade more counties gained higher percentages of Latinos.

### ***Changes in Proximity to Immigrants***

Changes in the numbers of immigrants could also be threatening to local populations. This threat was captured by subtracting the present number of Latinos at the county level from their previous Census estimates. For the 2004 data set, for example, the percent Latinos present at the county level in 2000 was subtracted from the percent present in 1990. The variable ranged from -.3 % to 13.7% for the period between 1980 and 1990 and .01 % to 13.4 % for the period between 1990 and 2000 (see Table 12). Interestingly, between 1980 and 1990 some counties experienced declining Latino populations. This was not the case for the more recent time period however.

This variable is also skewed to the left. Most of the change is in fact minimal (see Table 12). The distribution of the variable was altered a bit however over the time period being investigated (see Graphs 4 and 5). The distribution was a bit more centered from 1980 to 1990 with nearly half of the sample experiencing either negative or close to zero change. In sharp contrast, from 1990 to 2000 the distribution was more spread out. In addition, roughly 20% of the sample in the latter time period demonstrated close to zero change. This means of course that more counties realized greater levels of change between 1990 and 2000.

Instead of settling predominately in gateway cities, immigrants have recently begun to settle into smaller towns across the country (Massey and Capoferro 2008). Areas such as Colorado and Kansas have experienced tremendous amounts of growth. Roughly 6 % of Salt Lake City Utah, for instance, was Latino in 1990. This percent increased to 13 % in 2000, representing a growth of 7 percentage points. Because many counties have been confronted with large changes in their populations, it seems likely that this variable will be of particular use within the analysis.

### ***Percentage Change in Immigration Population***

It seems likely that changes as a proportion of the initial population could be startling as well. Chicot county Arkansas and Muscogee county Georgia, for example, both experienced a .019 growth in their local Latino population between 1990 and 2000.

Because Chicot county's Latino population was originally lower than Muscogee's (.0101 versus .0295), the magnitude of change was larger for the former (200% versus 66%). Thus, economically vulnerable individuals living in Chicot could have perceived greater threat from Latinos than those living in the Georgian county.

This variable was created by simply subtracting the current Latino population from the past Latino population, then dividing the resultant value by the past Latino population. Using Polk Iowa as an example:  $.056 - .006 / .006 = 8.33$ . It becomes a percent simply by multiplying the number by 100. Thus, Polk Iowa experienced an 800% increase in its Latino population over the course of the decade. Because changes can assume negative values, the percentage change can also be negative (see Table 13).

The variable itself is skewed by nature (see Graphs 6 and 7). The values for the time period 1980 to 1990 are centered around zero. Between 1990 and 2000 the majority of values fell between zero and two (representing increases of 0% to 200%). In general, places that have never experienced immigration are now confronted with dramatic increases in their Latino populations. St. Clair Alabama, for example, had a Latino population of .6% in 1990 and 1.1% in 2000. While the overall percentage may seem small, the magnitude of the change is large.

## **Control Variables**

### ***Prejudice***

Prejudice was assessed with the feeling thermometer included within the NES. Participants in both surveys were asked the extent to which they felt warmly/coldly toward a variety of groups (i.e. Blacks, Jews, Feminists, see Appendix for wording). Illegal immigrants were included as a group during both time periods. Consequently, I used the responses to create a scale gauging the degree of negative affect felt toward illegal immigrants. The measure was reversed and recoded zero to one. Thus, higher values represent feeling coldly toward illegal immigrants. The mean for the feeling thermometer in 1992/1994 was .687 and .614 in 2004.

## ***Education***

The level of educational attainment is controlled for within the analysis. A great deal of literature demonstrates that education levels are often linked to tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and Wood 1995). More specifically, those who have attained higher levels of education are more likely to display greater tolerance toward different lifestyles. As such, education is likely to predict support for liberal immigration policies. Those who are intolerant of dissimilar lifestyles are generally more likely support immigration restrictions. The levels of attained education are displayed in Table 14.

## ***Ideology and Partisan Identification***

Both ideology and partisan identification are controlled for within the analysis as well. As national survey data on partisan trends reveal, immigration issues have been more salient (e.g. as measured by issue attachment) for conservatives. For example, conservatives were significantly more likely in the 2004 ANES to agree that controlling and reducing illegal immigration was an important foreign policy goal. Similarly, they are more likely than liberals to list immigration as the number one problem facing the United States (CBS Poll 2005; 2006). In addition, Republicans are generally more likely to frame immigration as a problem for the country than are Democrats. Consequently, both Conservatives and Republicans are likely to have strong attitudes about immigration.

In both the 1992/1994 and 2004 data sets, some participants were hesitant to state their ideological preferences (513 and 137 respectively). As a result, missing ideology responses were imputed from a variety of measures related to political attitudes. These included, but were not restricted to, beliefs about government spending, feelings toward particular politicians, likes/dislikes about the political parties, and beliefs about abortion and religion (see Table 15). The imputed values were generally centered around the middle, meaning Moderates were more likely to refrain from answering. This is not surprising given that those toward the center of the scale are more likely to express

attitudinal ambivalence. Both ideology and partisan identification were scaled zero to one. High values represent having strong Conservative tendencies as well as being strongly attached to the Republican Party respectively. See Table 16 for levels of partisan attachment.

## **Analysis**

I employ only one dependent variable throughout the entire analysis of self- and group- interest. This item gauges preferences toward immigration policy. As previously demonstrated, it only has five response categories. Because it is not continuous by nature, OLS is not an appropriate estimator as some of the assumptions surrounding the use of OLS are not met, namely error term homoskedasticity. Consequently, I estimate all models using ordered logit. As such, the interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward. In order to make sense of the results, I also estimate predicted probabilities where needed. These probabilities represent the chance that an individual would endorse a specific response category of the dependent variable. In general, because each of the hypotheses is directional by nature one-tailed tests of significance are employed. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the findings represent white working males.

Table 1. Sample Demographics of White Working Respondents

<b>Demographics</b>	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
Gender		
Male	48%	46%
Female	52	54
Marital Status		
Married	58	54
Non-Married	42	46
Urbanicity		
Central Cities	22	22
Suburban and Rural Areas	78	78
Region		
Northeast	18	19
North Central	33	29
South	31	28
West	19	24
Average Age	42	43
N	2,611	703

Source: American National Election Study

Note: Percentages were rounded up. Consequently, they may not add to 100.

Table 2. Support for Immigration among Working White Respondents

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
Decreased a lot	30 % *	17 %
Decreased a little	24	26
Left the same as it is now	33	37
Increased a little	4	5
Increased a lot	2	2
Don't Know/Refused	3	1
No Post-Interview	5	12
N	2,611	703

Source: American National Election Study

\*Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Question Wording:

“Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be: increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?”

Table 3. Correlation between Self and Group-Interest Variables for White Working Respondents

	Blue-Collar	Union	Income	Unemployed	Class
Blue- Collar	1.00	----	----	----	----
Union Member	.1013	1.00	----	----	----
Income	.1827	-.1048	1.00	----	----
Unemployed	.1186	-.0453	.2305	1.00	----
Class	.3153	.0850	.3827	.0770	1.00

Source: 1992/1994 NES

Table 4. Correlations between Self and Group-Interest Variables for White Working Respondents

	Blue Collar	% Occupation Latino	Union	Income	Laid Off	Class
Blue- Collar	1.00	----	----	----	----	----
% Occupation Latino	.1593	1.00	----	----	----	----
Union Member	.0315	-.0826	1.00	----	----	----
Income	.2958	-.0021	-.1397	1.00	----	----
Laid Off	.0899	-.0198	-.0421	.3493	1.00	----
Class	.3173	-.0242	.0045	.4079	.1274	1.00

Source: 2004 NES

Table 5. White- Collar Occupational Breakdowns for White Respondents

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
<b>Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations</b>	27.96	32.30
<i>Managerial Occupations</i>	12.53	12.00
Executive, administrative, and managerial	9.27	8.00
Management-related occupations	3.26	4.00
<i>Professional Specialty Occupations</i>	15.43	20.30
Engineers, architects, surveyors	1.99	1.29
Mathematical and computer scientists	1.34	1.86
Natural scientists	0.65	0.57
Health diagnosing	0.57	1.29
Health assessment and treating	1.95	3.00
Teachers, postsecondary	0.80	1.29
Teachers, except postsecondary	3.49	4.57
Social scientist and urban planners	0.61	0.14
Social, recreation, and religious workers	1.00	2.43
Lawyers and judges	0.69	0.86
Writers, artists, entertainers, and athletes	2.34	3.00
<b>Technical, Sales and Administrative Support Occupation</b>	24.24	28.85
<i>Technicians and Related Support Occupations</i>	2.87	2.71
Health technologists and technicians	1.34	0.71
Engineering and related technologists and technicians	0.42	0.57
Science technicians	0.11	0.00
Technicians, except health, engineering, and science	1.00	1.43
<i>Sales Occupations</i>	9.65	12.14
Sales occupation supervisors and proprietors; sales representatives, finance and business services	4.63	5.43
Sales representatives, commodities except retail	1.49	1.29
Sales workers, retail and personal services	3.49	4.71
Sales related occupations	0.04	0.71
<i>Administrative Support Occupations</i>	11.72	14.00
Clerical supervisors	1.15	2.57
Computer equipment operators	0.34	0.00
Secretaries, stenographers, and typists	3.22	3.14
Information clerks	1.00	2.86
Records processing occupations, except financial	0.65	0.29
Financial records processing	1.49	1.71
Duplicating, mail and other office machine operators	0.04	0.00
Communications equipment operators	0.04	0.00
Mail and message distributing occupations	0.50	0.29
Material recording, scheduling, and distributing clerks	1.03	1.14
Adjusters and investigators	0.61	0.29
Miscellaneous administrative support occupations	1.65	1.71
N	1363	430

Source: American National Election Study

Table 6a. Blue- Collar Occupational Breakdowns for White Respondents

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
<b>Service Occupations</b>	10.73	10.56
Private household	0.42	0.00
Protective service	1.15	1.71
Food preparation and service	3.49	4.43
Health service	1.15	2.14
Cleaning and building services, except household	1.61	1.14
Personal service	2.91	1.14
<b>Farming, Forestry, and Fishing Occupations</b>	2.72	1.57
Farm operators and managers	1.69	1.14
Farm occupations, except managerial	0.42	0.00
Related agricultural occupations	0.61	0.29
Forestry and logging occupations; fishers, hunters, and Trappers	0.00	0.14
<b>Precision Production, Craft and Repair Occupations</b>	10.38	8.57
<i><b>Mechanics and Repairers</b></i>	2.91	3.15
Mechanics and repairers supervisors; mechanics and repairers, vehicle and mobile equipment	1.49	1.57
Mechanics and repairers, except vehicle and mobile Equipment	1.11	1.29
Miscellaneous mechanics and repairers	0.31	0.29
<i><b>Construction Trades</b></i>	3.87	4.57
Supervisors, construction occupations	0.54	1.71
Construction trades, except supervisors	3.33	2.86
<i><b>Extractive Occupations</b></i>	0.15	0.00
Extractive occupations	0.15	0.00
<i><b>Precision Production Occupations</b></i>	3.45	0.85
Production occupation supervisors; precision metalworking	1.80	0.71
Precision woodworking	0.19	0.00
Precision textile, apparel, and furnishings machine workers	0.19	0.00
Precision workers, assorted materials	0.23	0.00
Precision food production	0.50	0.00
Precision inspectors, testers and related workers	0.27	0.00
Plant and system operators	0.27	0.14


Source: American National Election Study

Table 6b. Blue- Collar Occupational Breakdowns for White Respondents, cont.

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
<b>Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers</b>	10.68	7.00
<i>Machine Operators, Assemblers and Inspectors</i>	5.16	2.43
Machine operators and tenders, except precision: metalworking and plastic working machine operators	0.61	0.43
Machine operators and tenders, except precision: metal and plastic processing machine operators	0.23	0.00
Machine operators and tenders, except precision: woodworking machine operators	0.15	0.00
Machine operators and tenders, except precision: printing machine operators	0.19	0.29
Machine operators and tenders, except precision: textile, apparel, and furnishings machine operators	0.46	0.14
Machine operators and tenders, except precision: machine operators, assorted materials	1.76	0.57
Fabricators, assemblers, and hand working occupations	1.30	1.00
Production inspectors, testers, samplers, and weighers	0.46	0.00
<i>Transportation and Material Moving</i>	5.52	4.57
Motor vehicle operators	2.11	2.14
Rail transportation occupations; water transportation	0.04	0.14
Material moving equipment operators	0.96	0.43
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers	0.46	0.43
Freight, stock, and material handlers	1.07	1.00
Laborers, except construction	0.88	0.43
<b>Non-Members of Work Force</b>	13.29	11.15
Current member of the armed forces	0.42	0.58
Nonworking homemaker, student, NA, DK	12.87	10.57
N	1248	273

Source: American National Election Study

Graph 1. Percent Latino within Occupation of Respondent at the County Level



Source: American National Election Study and Census Bureau Data

Table 7. White Non-Retired Survey Respondents from Union Households

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
Union Household	17.00%	18.35%
Non-Union Household	83.00	81.65
N	2,611	703

Source: American National Election Study

Table 8. Income of White Non-Retired Respondents Before and After Imputation

	<b>1992/1994 (Before Imputation)</b>	<b>1992/1994 (After Imputation)</b>
Zero to 16 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	6.54 %	6.13
17 <sup>th</sup> Percentile to 33 <sup>rd</sup> Percentile	35.57	33.32
34 <sup>th</sup> Percentile to 67 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	33.07	33.43
68 <sup>th</sup> Percentile to 95 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	13.29	16.32
95 <sup>th</sup> Percentile to 100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	11.53	10.80
N	2,446	2,611

Source: 1992/1994 American National Election Study

Table 9. Income of White Non-Retired Respondents Before and After Imputation

	<b>2004 (Before Imputation)</b>	<b>2004 (After Imputation)</b>
None or less than \$2,999	1.26	1.14
\$3,000-\$4,999	1.26	1.14
\$5,000-\$6,999	1.10	1.00
\$7,000-\$8,999	1.58	1.42
\$9,000-\$10,999	2.21	1.99
\$11,000-\$12,999	1.42	1.28
\$13,000-\$14,999	1.89	1.71
\$15,000-\$16,999	2.37	2.13
\$17,000-\$19,999	1.10	1.00
\$20,000-\$21,999	2.52	2.28
\$22,000-\$24,999	2.84	3.98
\$25,000-\$29,999	4.42	4.97
\$30,000-\$34,999	4.73	5.26
\$35,000-\$39,999	4.42	5.69
\$40,000-\$44,999	5.36	7.26
\$45,000-\$49,999	5.21	6.11
\$50,000-\$59,999	8.36	8.39
\$60,000-\$69,999	9.62	8.68
\$70,000-\$79,999	8.04	7.25
\$80,000-\$89,999	7.57	6.83
\$90,000-\$104,999	6.47	5.83
\$105,000-\$119,999	3.94	3.56
\$120,000 and over	12.30	11.10
N	634	703

Source: 2004 American National Election Study

Table 10. Subjective Class Identifications of White Working Survey Respondents

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
Lower Class (Volunteered)	> 1%	>1%
Average Working Class	36	30
Working Class-NA if Average or Upper	1	> 1
Upper Working Class	8	9
Average Middle Class	38	38
Middle Class-NA if Average or Upper	1	1
Upper Middle Class	12	18
Upper Class (Volunteered)	>1	>1
DN,NA; Refused	3	3
N	2,611	703

Source: American National Election Study

Note: Percents are rounded, as a result the total may not equal 100.

“There's been some talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging in one of these classes? If yes: Which one? If no: Well, if you had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle class or working class? Would you say that you are about average middle/working class or that you are in the upper part of the middle/working class?”


Table 11. Latino Population at the County Level

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
Lowest Value	.002	.004
Median Value	.022	.051
Highest Value	.852	.883
Mean Value	.064	.093

Note: Numbers represent percentages.


Source: Census Bureau Website

Graph 2. Percentage of County Population that is Latino in 1990



Source: Census Bureau Website

Graph 3. Percentage of County Population that is Latino in 2000




Source: Census Bureau Website

Table 12. Changes in the Latino Population at the County Level

	<b>From 1980 to 1990</b>	<b>From 1990 to 2000</b>
<b>Percent Change</b>		
Lowest Value	-.003568	.00093
Median Value	.00463	.0234
Highest Value	.1374	.1343
Mean Value	.0179	.0287


Source: Census Bureau Website

Graph 4. Change in the Latino Population at the County Level from 1980 to 1990



Source: Census Bureau Website

Graph 5. Change in the Latino Population at the County Level from 1990 to 2000




Source: Census Bureau Website

Table 13. Percentage Change in the Latino Population at the County Level

	<b>From 1980 to 1990</b>	<b>From 1990 to 2000</b>
<b>Percentage Change</b>		
Lowest Value	-.8228	.0167
Median Value	.3792	.5794
Highest Value	29.20	8.45
Mean Value	.4358	.9744


Source: Census Bureau Website

Graph 6. Percentage Change in the Latino Population at the County Level from 1980 to 1990



Source: Census Bureau Website

Graph 7. Percentage Change in the Latino Population at the County Level from 1990 to 2000



Source: Census Bureau Website

Table 14. Education Levels among White Working Participants

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
8 Grades or less	5 % *	3
9-12 Grades, No Diploma	9	4
12 Grade, Diploma	33	30
Some College, No Degree	24	30
BA Level Degree	18	20
Advanced Degree	8	13
No Answer	2	1
N	3,197	703

Source: American National Election Study

\*Percents may not add to 100 given rounding.

Table 15. Ideology of White Working Respondents Before and After Imputation

	<b>1992/1994 Reported</b>	<b>1992/1994 Imputed</b>	<b>2004 Reported</b>	<b>2004 Imputed</b>
Strong Liberal	1.74 %	1.39	2.43%	1.95
Weak Liberal	9.70	7.75	12.30	9.86
Leaning Liberal	12.08	9.64	10.44	8.37
Moderate	30.77	31.97	29.33	31.88
Leaning Conservative	20.79	28.18	16.02	19.73
Weak Conservative	21.27	18.11	25.18	24.77
Strong Conservative	3.64	2.91	4.29	3.44
N	2,098	2,611	566	703

Source: American National Election Study

Table 16. Party Identification of White Working Respondents

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
Strong Democrat	13 % *	14
Weak Democrat	17	12
Leaning Democrat	13	16
Independent	11	9
Leaning Republican	14	13
Weak Republican	17	16
Strong Republican	16	21
N	2,577	694

Source: American National Election Study

\*Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding.

## **SELF- AND GROUP- INTEREST FINDINGS**

This chapter empirically tests the influence of economic threat as it relates to the job market on immigration policy preferences. In general, I contend that the propensity to endorse immigration restrictions is augmented by economic insecurities. Individuals who are economically vulnerable will be most threatened by immigration. Moreover, this tendency should be exacerbated by geographic context. As such those experiencing economic hardship living in close proximity to immigrant populations should feel the most endangered. Consequently, this group of individuals should express the greatest opposition to liberal immigration policies.

The chapter is organized such that the impact of self and group-interest on immigration attitudes are examined first. Given that any one economic variable might not routinely capture the effects of self-interest, numerous measures are employed throughout. As a result the analysis contains six key economic independent variables — occupation type, percent Latino within occupation, union membership, income, employment status and class identification. It is expected that each of these variables, or at least some of them will be able to predict immigration preferences. In order to understand the unique effect of each, a separate analysis is run for all key factors. Next, all the variables of interest are included within the same model. This is done to determine whether their unique effects hold in the presence of the other variables. The results for these analyses are displayed in Tables 17, 18a, and 18b.

In conjunction with investigating the nature of economic insecurities as it pertains to the job market, I also examine if geographic context works to intensify this relationship. Both within the literature review and the data and methods chapter I proposed various geographic contexts which could potentially be considered threatening. Within the analysis however, I focus primarily on changes to the Latino population at the county level. This is done both for simplicity as well as necessity. First, displaying the results for each geographic threat for all types of economic threats across two datasets quickly becomes unwieldy. Furthermore, as will become obvious shortly, the

specification of geography does not make a huge difference in the overall interpretation of the results. There are not great discrepancies between the models. As a result, I have made the decision to highlight one type of geographic measurement. There will be a brief discussion regarding alternative contexts at the end of the chapter.

This means that changes in the Latino population at the county level will be one of the constituent terms within the interaction variable. The total Latino population is included however as a control variable. A great deal of literature operationalizes threat as the size of the proximate minority group (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996). In keeping with past work, it is included in each of the models. The results are displayed in Tables 21-22.

As discussed within the data and methods section, the model is estimated using ordered logit. Consequently the interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward. In order to make sense of the results, I estimated the probabilities associated with believing immigration should be decreased when controlling for each of the variables of interest (see Tables 19 and 20). The probabilities for the main effects are estimated from the full model (i.e. including all economic variables simultaneously). Those associated with the interactions are estimated from each individual model. In general, because each of the hypotheses is directional by nature one-tailed tests of significance are employed. It should also be kept in mind that the findings represent white working males.

In terms of temporal ordering, I begin each analysis by first describing the results for the 1992/1994 data set. I then move forward to investigate the 2004 sample. This allows me to examine the extent to which the findings are robust. Even though a decade separates the two data sources, not much variability is expected. As mentioned previously, the economic insecurity felt by some Americans as a result of immigration should not have lessened during this time frame. In fact, given that immigration has increased it might have increased.

## **Self- Interest Main Effects**

### **Occupation Type**

I asserted that blue-collar workers should be more opposed to immigration than white-collar workers (see HypSI1). The evidence for this assertion is somewhat mixed however. There appears to be a limited unique effect of being a blue-collar worker on immigration preferences for the 1992/1994 data set (see Table 17, Model 1). While the coefficient is in the correct direction, it is not significant. Unfortunately, this effect held when controlling for the other economic variables of interest (see Table 17, Model 6). There was no discernable difference between the two types of workers. Looking at the predicted probabilities further highlights the insignificant relationship. Each group had a .59 probability of supporting further restrictions on immigration (refer to Table 19). Consequently, at least for the 1992/1994 dataset, there is no real difference in the beliefs of blue-collar and white-collar workers regarding immigration.

Interestingly, this finding is not stable across the two surveys. The 2004 results (see Table 18a, 2<sup>nd</sup> Model) reveal a statistically significant relationship between occupation type and immigration attitudes. Moreover, the correlation between occupation and immigration preferences is in the right direction. Individuals in blue-collar occupations are more likely to endorse immigration restrictions than those in white-collar positions. In addition, including other economic variables within the equation does little to diminish the effect (see Table 18b). Occupation type remains a strong predictor of immigration preferences. The predicted probabilities demonstrate this nicely. The probability of a blue-collar worker supporting greater restrictions is .57 while for white-collar workers it is .45 (Table 19).

While occupational type is clearly significant in 2004, its lack of influence in 1992/1994 raises interesting questions. Why does occupation play a more substantial role in 2004 than in 1992/1994? A feasible explanation involves the changing nature of the labor market. Over the course of the past few decades, many labor intensive jobs have been relocated over seas to areas with low-wage labor markets. Consequently, blue -collar type occupations have experienced substantial losses. This trend was in fact apparent within the two different datasets. The percentage of individuals claiming to hold blue-collar occupations actually decreased between 1992/1994 and 2004 (35% to 28%). It seems likely

that native blue-collar workers are fighting for increasingly scarce jobs. As a result, they are more economically threatened than in previous time periods. This heightened threat seems to be manifesting in increased support for immigration restrictions.

### **Presence of Latinos within Occupation**

Individuals could also be sensitive to the number of immigrants within their occupation (see HypSI2)<sup>7</sup>. A large immigrant presence within one's occupation could be particularly threatening. For some it could signal greater competition and thus anxiety. The evidence to support this assertion is somewhat limited however. In general, the effect of holding a job with a heavy Latino makeup has a marginal influence on shaping attitudes toward immigration (see Table 18a, Model 2). Looking at the results, it is evident that the percentage of Latinos holding the same job as the respondent at the county level has very little effect on immigration attitudes. Those individuals in occupations with high levels of Latinos are no more likely to support restrictions on immigration than are individuals in occupations with low levels of Latinos. Not surprisingly, controlling for other key economic variables does not alter the results (see Table 18b). The predicted probabilities highlight this relationship nicely. The chance of an individual in an occupation with a large Latino presence supporting greater immigration restrictions is .4968. The same chance is .4843 for individuals in occupations with few Latinos (see Table 19).

### **Union Household**

The relationship between union membership and immigration preferences is intriguing. It was hypothesized that union members should be more likely to support immigration restrictions than non-union members (see HypSI3). The 1992/1994 results substantiate this claim (see Table 17, Model 2). Individuals in union households were more likely to endorse restrictions on immigration than were individuals living in non-union households. Curiously, when controlling for the other economic variables union

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<sup>7</sup> I would like to remind the reader that this variable exists only for the 2004 dataset.

membership loses some of its effect. It fails to reach significance in the presence of the remaining variables. This loss is evident in the predicted probabilities. The probability of an individual living in a union household supporting decreased immigration is .6153. The same probability for someone living in a non-union household is .5796. The difference is significant at the .1 level.

For the 2004 analysis, individuals living in union households were not more likely to support immigration restrictions than were individuals in non-union households (Table 18a, Model 3). The effect however, barely misses significance at the conventional .05 level. Somewhat surprisingly, when controlling for other self-interest variables, the influence of union membership becomes statistically significant (Table 18b). The probability of a union member supporting greater immigration restrictions is about 56%. The chance of a non-union member doing the same is roughly 10 percentage points lower (47%).

Even though it is a bit erratic, union membership appears to predict immigration preferences. This relationship holds true across time. It is dependent, however, upon the other key economic variables of interest. In 1992/1994 union membership lost its significance in the presence of other key variables. Interestingly, the opposite was true in 2004. Union membership only became influential when controlling for other crucial independent variables. In general, belonging to a union household seems to play an important part in informing immigration preferences.

## **Income**

Similar to occupational type income plays an inconstant role in predicting immigration attitudes. It was posited that the less well off would feel greater economic threat from immigration. Consequently, they should be less supportive of liberal immigration policies (see HypSI4). Looking at the 1992/1994 results reveals an insignificant unique effect of income on immigration preferences (see Table 17, Model 3). Those making less money are not more likely to support immigration restrictions. Worse yet the coefficient is negatively signed (i.e. in the wrong direction). Because the relationship is not significant however, any analysis should be weighed lightly. When controlling for the other key independent economic variables, income remains

insignificant. The rich have a slightly higher probability of endorsing decreases in immigration levels (60%) than do the poor (56%).

There also appears to be a limited unique effect of income in the 2004 analysis (see Table 18a, Model 4). Individuals who earn less money are not more supportive of decreasing immigration. It just barely misses conventional tests of significance however. Interestingly, when controlling for other variables of interest, income becomes statistically significant (Table 18b). Those low in income are much more likely to support immigration restrictions (61%) than are individuals who have high incomes (43%), a difference of 18 percentage points.

In general, the relationship between income and immigration attitudes appears complicated. At the very least it is inconsistent. In the earlier time period, income failed to significantly predict immigration preferences. Roughly a decade later, the influence of income increased. While its unique effect was marginal, income did play a strong role in influencing immigration preferences when other key variables were included in the equation.

## **Employment Status**

Employment status appears to play a limited role in informing immigration preferences. It was posited that because the unemployed are economically vulnerable, they would be less likely to support liberal immigration policies (see HypSI5). There is very little evidence to substantiate this claim however. In 1992/1994 the unemployed are no more likely to support immigration restrictions than are individuals who hold jobs (see Table 17, Model 4). Furthermore, the direction of the relationship is in the wrong direction (i.e. negatively signed). Because the effect is insignificant though, this should be taken lightly. Nothing changes when employment status is modeled with the other key variables of interest. The difference in the probability of an unemployed person preferring immigration restrictions (.55) was not much different from an employed person (.59).

The insignificance of employment status in explaining immigration policy preferences holds across both time periods. Those laid off in 2004 were not significantly more likely to support immigration restrictions than those who were employed (Table 18a,

Model 5). This remained true even after controlling for other relevant variables (Table 18b). Thus, it appears likely that employment status plays a limited role in influencing immigration preferences.

## **Summary**

In summary, self-interest plays an interesting role in shaping immigration preferences. Union membership has the most consistent effect across both time periods. Individuals belonging to union households are generally less supportive of liberal immigration policies than are non-union members. There are strong effects for both income and occupational type within the 2004 dataset, however, when controlling for other economic variables. These changes are not altogether surprising given the recent increases in immigration. Thus, it seems likely that these respondents are experiencing higher levels of threat. Individuals in blue-collar occupations, for example, may feel greater job market pressure today than in the past given work force reductions. This possibly explains the change in the importance of the variable. Overall, compelling evidence exists to suggest that self-interest influences immigration preferences.

## **Group- Interest Main Effects**

### **Class Identification**

In addition to measures of self-interest, it seems likely that group interests could assume an important role in explaining immigration attitudes (see HypG11). Individuals identifying with the working class could be more supportive of immigration restrictions as a way to protect the collective interests of the group. The 1992/1994 analysis bolsters this hypothesis. Class appears to have a significant effect on immigration preferences during this time period. Identification with the working class strongly predicts support for immigration restrictions (see Table 17, Model 5). Moreover, the effect remains intact when controlling for other key economic variables. Individuals who self-identified as working

class had a 62% chance of preferring immigration reductions. Those who self-identified as being a part of the upper middle class, on the other hand, had a 53% chance of doing so. At the very least this suggests a real difference in the way class influences immigration attitudes.

Interestingly, the results for 2004 differ dramatically from those of 1992/1994. Unfortunately, the effect is not robust across time. In the 2004 analysis, class plays a limited role in influencing immigration attitudes (see Table 18a, Model 6). Furthermore, the sign is in the wrong hypothesized direction. Those who considered themselves to be a member of the working class were less likely to support immigration restrictions. Again this should not be taken too seriously, given the insignificance of the effect.

It is difficult to imagine the set of circumstances which could explain the difference in results between the two time periods. What would make the working class more supportive of immigration restriction in the early 1990s than in 2004? Unlike occupational type, there does not appear to be an easy answer. If both time periods demonstrated null results, a discussion addressing the inconsequence of group interests would be appropriate. This is not the case however. Class identification is a strong predictor of immigration preferences within the 1992/1994 time frame. In general, both group- and self-interest play an interesting role in informing immigration preferences. Group-interest seems to be largest in the earlier time frame while self-interest assumes a larger part in the 2004 analysis.

## **Control Variables**

In addition to self-and group-interest, a few of the control variables had strong and consistent effects across both analyses. Women were generally more supportive of immigration restrictions than were men. In 1992/1994, for example, females had a 61% probability of supporting immigration reductions while males only had a 56% chance of doing so (see Table 20). The difference between the two expanded somewhat in the 2004 time period (54% and 44% respectively). In general, women appear to be less tolerant of liberal immigration policies than men.

Education had a consistent and strong effect on support levels for immigration. The poorly educated are much more likely to support immigration restrictions than are the

well educated. In 1992/94 the difference between the two was an astonishing 30 percentage points. Individuals with low levels of education had a 74% likelihood of supporting immigration reductions, while those with high levels of education had a 45% chance (Table 20). The difference in the 2004 period is equally striking (35 percentage points). Thus education seems to play a pivotal role in the determination of immigration support.

Similarly, the results suggest that prejudice seems to play a defining role in immigration attitudes. Those who felt coldly toward illegal immigrants were much more likely to support immigration reduction than those who felt warmly toward illegal immigrants. Individuals who felt coldly had an 80% likelihood of supporting immigration restrictions in 1992/1994 as opposed to those who felt warmly who had an 18% (see Table 20). The effect for the 2004 time period is very similar (80% and 16% respectively). The influence of prejudice is both strong and consistent across the surveys. Moreover, as revealed by the predicted probabilities, the effect is quite large. The consequence of which will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing chapter.

Interestingly, ideology is influential in the 1992/1994 survey but not the 2004 dataset. In the earlier time period, liberals had a 50% chance of supporting immigration restrictions. Conservatives, on the other hand, had a 65% likelihood of endorsing reductions in immigration. The difference between the two in 2004, however, is negligible. Each has a probability of 49% of opposing increased immigration.

### **The Direct Effect of Geographic Context**

Interestingly, geographic context seems to play a limited role in directly affecting immigration attitudes. As the Latino/Hispanic population of an area increases there is very little concomitant change in immigration preferences in either of the time periods. This was also true for Latino populations that had increased at the county level over the span of the decade. Consequently, these findings are unable to substantiate the notion that geographic proximity to certain populations plays an important function in directly informing immigration attitudes. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that out-group threat is often conceptualized as group size. Moreover, compelling evidence suggests that geography influences both prejudicial attitudes as well as policy preferences. Animosity

toward out-group members is often a function of the out-group's volume and proximity (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996). Similarly, opposition to racially-targeted policies has been shown to be related to out-group proximity (Taylor 1998). This is not substantiated here however. Context does not seem to influence immigration policy preferences. Why is this? One explanation is that geographic threat could work to heighten the insecurities of those who are economically vulnerable. As such, context would work indirectly to influence immigration preferences. This possibility is explored within the following section.

### **Economic Threat and Geographic Context**

Investigating the effects of economic insecurity as it pertains to the labor market has been illuminating. However, I am also interested in exploring the conditional nature of geographic context. It is expected that geography will play an important role in heightening economic anxieties. Consequently, individuals facing economic hardship living in close geographic proximity to changing Latino/Hispanic populations will be the most supportive of immigration restrictions. Thus, I am interested not only in the main effect of the economic variables but how they are conditioned by geographic context. As such, this section will focus on the interaction between economic threat and geographic location.

In general, because the relationships of interest are interactive the effects of the coefficients are themselves conditional. Examining the influence of geography on income, for instance, requires investigating two coefficients. This is given by the following;

$$Y = \beta_1 (\text{Changing Latino Population}) + \beta_2 (\text{Income}) + \beta_3 (\text{Changing Latino Population} \times \text{Income})$$

Because I'm interested in the moderating effect of changing Latino population on income, I need to look at both  $\beta_2$  and  $\beta_3$ .

$$\beta_1 (\text{Changing Latino Population}) + (\beta_2 + \beta_3 \text{ Changing Latino Population}) \text{Income}$$

The  $\beta_3$  coefficients give information regarding the direction of the moderating effect. A positive coefficient means that as Latino populations increase, the impact of income on

immigration attitudes will also increase. A negative coefficient implies that the impact of geography reduces the effect of income on support for immigration preferences. These effects are potentially offset by the  $\beta_2$  coefficient. In general, I expect positive relationships with all of the variables of interest. In addition, because the model is run using ordered logit interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward. As a result, I estimated the probabilities associated with supporting greater immigration restrictions. This is done under varying geographic contexts using both small and large changes in the local Latino population. The 20<sup>th</sup> and 80<sup>th</sup> percentile values were selected to illustrate the relationships of interest. Thus less than 20% of the sample across both time periods lives in areas with smaller changes in the Latino population than the 20<sup>th</sup> percentile value selected. Similarly, 20% of respondents live in areas with greater changes in the Hispanic population than the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile value.

### **Self-Interest and Context**

#### **Occupational Type and Geographic Context**

Even though the main effect of occupational type was somewhat limited in the 1992/1994 dataset geography could act as a moderator to enhance the relationship. If this is the case then blue-collar workers in areas with large increasing Latino populations should be the most supportive of immigration restrictions (see HypSI6). Unfortunately this does not appear to be the case. First, the coefficient of the interactive term is not significant (Table 21, Model 1). Moreover it is not in the correct direction. The predicted probabilities illustrate this nicely (see Table 23). An individual in a blue-collar job living in an area with small changes in the Latino population has a 60% chance of supporting immigration restrictions. A white-collar worker living in a similar context has a 59% chance. I would expect that geographic proximity to increasing Latino populations would heighten threat assessments for the economically vulnerable. Blue -collar support for immigration

reductions actually declines (57%) in these contexts, however. Interestingly, the same is true for white-collar workers (58%). Moreover, the gap between the two is marginal (1%) in areas of great change. Thus, at least for this time period, geographic location fails to substantiate the proposed relationship.

While occupational type had a strong main effect in 2004, the conditional relationship between location and occupation is similar to that of the 1992/1994 dataset, insignificant (Table 22, Model 1). The direction of the relationship is in line with the suppositions however. The difference between blue-collar workers and white-collar workers is slightly larger in areas with large increasing Latino/Hispanic populations (13 percentage points versus 11). The growth also seems to be driven by blue-collar workers (an increase of 4 percentage points vs. 2 for white-collar workers). The relationship is not statistically significant however, so extrapolation should be limited.

### **Presence of Latinos within Occupation and Geographic Context**

Even though the presence of Latinos within one's job failed to demonstrate a significant main effect on immigration policies, it is feasible that geographic context moderates the relationship. Consequently, it would be expected that individuals in occupations with heavy Latino concentrations living in areas with large increases in the Latino population should be less supportive of liberal immigration policies (see HypSI7). This assertion is not supported by the evidence however (Table 22, Model 2). The interactive term in the equation is not significant. It seems likely that this is in part due to the large standard errors however. As noted in the Data and Methods chapter, this variable is highly correlated with the percent Latino population at the county level. This multicollinearity makes it difficult to distinguish significant relationships due to the large standard errors associated with each of the coefficients. Running the model without the geographic context control however did not alter the results (see Table 24). Thus it seems unlikely that the presence of Latinos within one's occupation influences an individual to support immigration restrictions.

## **Union Household and Geographic Context**

Belonging to a union household had one of the most consistent relationships with immigration policy preferences. Thus, it will be interesting to see if geographic context moderates this association. I anticipate that union members living in areas with large changes in the Latino population should be more supportive of immigration restrictions (see HypSI8). Evidence supporting this hypothesis is strong within the 1992/1994 dataset (Table 21, Model 2). The difference between union members and non-union members living in counties with small changes in the Latino population is negligible. Each has a 59% change of supporting immigration restrictions (see Table 23). The gap increases, however, in areas with large changes in the Latino population (8 percentage points). Moreover the effect is driven by belonging to a union. Support for immigration restrictions increased for union members across the varying geographic contexts but decreases for non-union members. Thus, geography appears to play an important role in moderating the effect of belonging to a union.

Interestingly, the nature of the relationship changes somewhat for the 2004 dataset. While the conditional relationship between geography and belonging to a union household is again significant, it is not in the proposed direction (Table 22, Model 3). The difference between union and non-union members is actually much larger in areas with small changing Latino populations (.1943 versus .0273). Moreover, union members were actually more likely to support restrictions in areas with small changes than in areas with large changes (.63 versus .47). Non-union members were more likely to support immigration restrictions in areas with large changes than union members (.50 and .47). Thus, even though the nature of geographic is significant, it runs counter to expectations.

## **Income and Geographic Context**

I posited that those earning less money in areas with large increases in the Latino population should be most supportive of immigration restrictions (HypSI9). The evidence to support this claim within the 1992/1994 dataset is somewhat limited however. The overall significance of the interaction term is in fact insignificant (see Table 21, Model 3).

It is also in the wrong direction. While the difference between the two income groups is slightly larger in areas with substantial increases (.0493 versus .0314), the effect is driven by low income individuals decreasing their support for restrictions in these areas. Those with large incomes had stable levels of support across the varying geographic context. Endorsement of reductions actually waned among the poor in areas with large increases. Because the relationship fails to pass conventional tests of significance however, not too much should be made of this finding.

While the magnitude of the relationship changes in the 2004 time period its interpretation is similar (Table 22, Model 4). As in 1992/1994 the coefficient for the interaction term is negative. The difference in the willingness to support immigration restrictions across the contexts between the two groups is much larger in areas with small changes than large changes (.3793 versus .0236 respectively). Moreover, most of the effect seems to be driven by the poor being more willing to support restrictions in areas with small changes than large changes. Their level of support actually decreased across the contexts by 25 percentage points. Interestingly, changes in geography had quite the opposite effect for the wealthy. High income earners living in areas with large Latino increases were substantially more likely to support restrictions on immigration than those living in areas with small changes. Thus, geography seems to play a complicated role here.

### **Employment Status and Geographic Context**

It was conjectured that the unemployed living in areas with large increases in the Latino population would be most supportive of immigration restrictions (see HypSI10). Even though unemployment had an insignificant main effect its influence could increase when geographic location is taken into account. The 1992/1994 dataset does not substantiate this claim, however. First, the interactive term is insignificant (Table 21, Model 4). Furthermore, difference in support between the unemployed and employed is actually larger in areas with small changes than large changes (.0606 vs. 0194). For both groups, support actually declines in counties with large increases. In addition, the employed tend to be slightly more supportive of restrictions than the unemployed. These relationships are tenuous however as the associated coefficient is insignificant.

The general nature of the relationship changed a bit over the 10 year time frame (Table 22, Model 5). The difference between the two groups is actually somewhat larger in counties with large changes (.0608 and .0473). Moreover, the effect seems to be driven by the unemployed. Those without jobs living in areas with small changes have a 43% chance of supporting immigration reductions. This jumped to 56% for the unemployed living in counties with substantial increases. The employed were also more likely to support restrictions in areas with large changes. The difference across contexts, however, is much smaller (roughly 2 percentage points). The interpretation of these relationships is again qualified with the caveat that the interactive term failed to pass tests of significance.

### **Group-Interest and Context**

#### **Class Identification and Geographic Context**

I proposed that individuals living in close proximity to changing Latino concentrations who identified with the working class should be more supportive of immigration decreases (see HypGI2). The interactive term is both insignificant within the 1992/1994 dataset and in the wrong direction, however (see Table 21, Model 6). The difference between the classes is largest in counties with small changes in the Latino population (.1150 and .0632). Moreover, those who identify with the working class actually have a greater probability of supporting immigration restrictions in areas with small increases in the Latino population than in areas with large increases (.64 versus .60 respectively). Individuals who self-identify as part of the working-class are generally more likely to support reductions than those who identify with the upper- middle class. This supports the main effect of group-identification.

While the 2004 findings reveal a significant interactive term, similar to 1992/1994 it is in the wrong direction (Table 22, Model 6). Even though the difference between the two groups is largest in areas with substantial increases, it looks to be driven by the upper middle class. The working class are actually more likely to endorse restrictions in counties with small increases than large increase (50% versus 41%). The opposite is true for the upper-middle class. These individuals are more likely to support restrictions in locations

with large increases as opposed to small increases. Thus, while context appears to play a meaningful part, it does not support the hypothesis.

## **Summary**

In general, it seems that geographic context does very little to modify the relationship of economic vulnerability in the proposed direction. The only instance of it working in the expected direction was in the 1992/1994 dataset with union membership. In areas with small changes in the Latino population, the difference between union members and non-union members was negligible. Each had a 59% change of supporting immigration restrictions (see Table 23). The gap widened, however, in areas with large changes in the Latino population (8 percentage points) with the effect driven by belonging to a union. Union members were more likely to support restrictions in areas with large increases in the Latino population. For the most part, however, the effect of geography does corroborate the anticipated relationships. While it does play a significant role, especially in 2004, its effects were not as proposed. Thus, for my purposes, I must conclude that geography does little to heighten the anxiety of the economically vulnerable.

## **The Influence of Geographic Context**

As was the case in the previous analysis, geographic context seems to play a limited role in affecting immigration attitudes. As the Latino/Hispanic population of an area increases there is very little concomitant change in immigration preferences in either of the time periods. These findings contradict research emphasizing the importance of geographic proximity in influencing belief systems (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998). Similarly, changing geographic contexts did very little to heighten the insecurities of those who were economically vulnerable. In fact, it seemed to play a larger role in moderating the relationship of those who were not vulnerable (i.e. the affluent and the upper-middle class in 2004). As such, the indirect effect of geography was largely unanticipated.

## **Control Variables**

The effect of the control variables was not altered in any way when investigating the indirect effects of geography. Females continued to be more likely than males to support immigration restrictions across both time frames. Moreover, education and prejudice remained very strong predictors of immigration preferences. The poorly educated were more likely to endorse restrictions than were those with greater education. Similarly, the prejudiced had a greater likelihood of supporting reductions over the non-prejudiced. The inconsistent effects of ideology (significant in 1992 but not 2004) remained stable as well.

## **Alternative Geographic Specifications**

Throughout the analysis, I emphasized one geographic context in the investigation of a conditional relationship. Within both the literature review and the data and methods chapter I proposed various geographic contexts, however, which could potentially be considered threatening. I focused on one variable for reasons of simplicity as well as necessity. First, displaying the results for each geographic threat for all types of economic threats across two datasets would have been unwieldy. Perhaps more importantly, however, the specification of geography did not make a huge difference in the overall interpretation of the results. There are not great discrepancies between the models (see Tables 25-32). For instance, the total percent of Latinos within the county failed to ever directly affect immigration preferences (see Tables 25-28). Moreover, its indirect effects were minimal. Similarly, large percent increases had no direct effect on supporting liberal immigration policies (see Tables 29-32). The indirect effects of geography were also non-existent across the time periods. In general, not one of the geographic contexts had a significant direct effect on immigration preferences across the various time frames. Moreover, the indirect effects of each were limited and ran in unexpected directions for the most part. Consequently, it seems likely that geographic context plays a limited role in influencing immigration preferences.

## **Prejudice**

On a related note, animosity toward out-group members has often been demonstrated to be a function of the out-group's size and proximity. It is likely then that the effect of geographic context could be felt through prejudice (to be discussed in the following chapter). As a check, I conducted the analyses without prejudice to see if the influence of the economic variables increased (see Tables 33-36). Excluding the prejudice measure had no discernable effect. In fact, some of the variables lost significance when prejudice was excluded. This was especially true of the 2004 dataset. Both union membership and income were no longer significant predictors of immigration preferences when prejudice was not specified. At the very least, this suggests that prejudice is not mediating the relationship between economic insecurities and immigration attitudes.

## **Summary**

In summary, it appears that variables which capture economic insecurities as they pertain to self- and group-interest play interesting roles in influencing immigration preferences. In total, union membership has the most consistent effect across the two data sets. Individuals belonging to union households are generally more supportive of immigration reductions. This relationship is somewhat dependent upon model specification however. While the inconsistency of the other variables can sometimes be explained, other times it's just plain perplexing. The changing effect of occupational type makes sense given the changing labor market. Individuals in blue-collar occupations may feel greater threat to their jobs in the latter time period given work force reductions. This possibly explains the change in the importance of the variable. The variability in income as well as class identification does not have similar justifications, however. I remain at a loss in explaining their inconsistencies.

Bringing geographic context into the fold did very little to clarify the nature of the relationships. It was expected that economic insecurities would be heightened within the context of large changes in the Latino population. First, almost none of the interactive

variables were significant across the datasets. The interaction between union membership and geography was the sole influential predictor across time periods. However, the nature of the relationship was not consistent. While in 1992/1994 it performed in the hypothesized direction it failed to do so in the 2004 dataset. In general, it's difficult to say with confidence that the intersection of geography and economic insecurity plays a meaningful role in informing immigration preferences.

Table 17. Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model*	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	.085 (.10)	---	---	---	---	.020 (.09)
Union Household	---	<b>.210</b> (.10)	---	---	---	.148 (.11)
Family Income (High-Low)	---	---	-.149 (.16)	---	---	-.163 (.18)
Unemployed	---	---	---	-.172 (.14)	---	-.148 (.15)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	---	---	---	<b>.339</b> (.12)	<b>.361</b> (.13)
Latino Population in County	1.09 (.84)	1.11 (.84)	1.16 (.84)	1.12 (.84)	1.04 (.84)	1.11 (.85)
Change in Latino Population	-2.75 (2.9)	-2.71 (2.9)	-3.19 (3.0)	-2.87 (3.0)	-2.23 (3.0)	-2.39 (3.0)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.017 (.14)	.062 (.14)	.008 (.14)	.015 (.14)	.055 (.14)	.078 (.14)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	<b>.680</b> (.22)	<b>.657</b> (.22)	<b>.664</b> (.22)	<b>.662</b> (.22)	<b>.647</b> (.22)	<b>.627</b> (.23)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.233</b> (.09)	<b>-.214</b> (.08)	<b>-.214</b> (.08)	<b>-.205</b> (.08)	<b>-.223</b> (.08)	<b>-.237</b> (.09)
Age	-.329 (.20)	-.347 (.20)	-.352 (.20)	-.340 (.20)	-.176 (.21)	-.167 (.21)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.31</b> (.19)	<b>1.38</b> (.17)	<b>1.44</b> (.19)	<b>1.42</b> (.18)	<b>1.19</b> (.19)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.44</b> (.19)	<b>3.45</b> (.19)	<b>3.44</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.19)	<b>3.46</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0793	.0800	.0793	.0794	.0808	.0818
N	2328	2323	2328	2328	2277	2272

Source: 1992/1994 ANES

\*All models within this chapter are estimated using ordered logit.

Table 18a. Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.598</b> (.20)	---	---	---	---	---
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	---	1.94 (1.5)	---	---	---	---
Union Household	---	---	.272 (.20)	---	---	---
Family Income (High-Low)	---	---	---	.411 (.34)	---	---
Unemployed	---	---	---	---	.039 (.29)	---
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	---	---	---	---	-.084 (.24)
Latino Population in County	.191 (.90)	-1.48 (1.6)	.303 (.87)	.296 (.87)	.250 (.87)	.035 (.88)
Change in Latino Population	-2.02 (4.3)	2.22 (4.5)	-2.29 (4.2)	-2.23 (4.2)	-2.28 (4.2)	-1.26 (4.3)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.290 (.32)	.279 (.34)	.218 (.32)	.244 (.31)	.228 (.32)	.263 (.32)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.073 (.47)	.004 (.50)	.002 (.47)	.006 (.47)	-.047 (.47)	-.138 (.48)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.457</b> (.17)	-.313 (.17)	<b>-.308</b> (.16)	-.300 (.16)	<b>-.312</b> (.16)	<b>-.320</b> (.16)
Age	<b>.751</b> (.39)	.766 (.45)	.696 (.39)	.749 (.39)	.686 (.39)	.624 (.40)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.89</b> (.34)	<b>2.18</b> (.36)	<b>2.22</b> (.32)	<b>2.08</b> (.34)	<b>2.22</b> (.32)	<b>2.19</b> (.37)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.59</b> (.40)	<b>3.42</b> (.42)	<b>3.52</b> (.39)	<b>3.51</b> (.39)	<b>3.50</b> (.39)	<b>3.53</b> (.40)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1111	.1033	.1066	.1064	.1052	.1030
N	593	522	593	595	594	573

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 18b. Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	7 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.492</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	.436 (1.59)
Union Household	<b>.384</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.741</b> (.44)
Laid Off	-.002 (.32)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.205 (.28)
Latino Population in County	-.215 (1.8)
Change in Latino Population	3.40 (4.7)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.428 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.035 (.51)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.419</b> (.18)
Age	.812 (.47)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.72</b> (.42)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.54</b> (.43)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1091
N	500

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 19. Probability of Supporting Immigration Restrictions for White Working Respondents

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
<b>Occupation</b>		
White-Collar (0)	.5842	.4503
Blue-Collar (1)	.5889	.5702
<b>Latino Presence in Occupation</b>		
Low (.0144)	----	.4834
High (.1395)	----	.4968
<b>Union Household</b>		
Non-Union (0)	.5796	.4707
Union (1)	.6153	.5622
<b>Income</b>		
High Income (0)	.6039	.4323
Low Income (1)	.5639	.6132
<b>Employment Status</b>		
Employed (0)	.5886	.4894
Unemployed (1)	.5533	.4902
<b>Class</b>		
Upper Class (0)	.5342	.5156
Lower Class (1)	.6220	.4647

Source: Predicted from the ordered logit results presented in Table 1 (Model 6) and Table 2b. All variables, beside the one of interest, were held constant at their means. Estimated using Clarify.

Table 20. Probability of Supporting Immigration Restrictions for White Working Respondents

	<b>1992/1994</b>	<b>2004</b>
<b>Party Identification</b>		
Democrat (0)	.5759	.4305
Republican (1)	.5948	.5368
<b>Ideology</b>		
Liberal (0)	.4998	.4945
Conservative (1)	.6518	.4858
<b>Gender</b>		
Female (0)	.6134	.5428
Male (1)	.5558	.4384
<b>Age</b>		
Young (0)	.5990	.4198
Old (1)	.5664	.5431
<b>Education</b>		
More Education (0)	.4467	.3253
Less Education (1)	.7405	.6691
<b>Feelings Toward Immigrants</b>		
Warm (0)	.1818	.1626
Cold (1)	.8063	.7974

Source: Predicted from the ordered logit results presented in Table 1 (Model 6) and Table 2b. All variables, besides the one of interest, were held constant at their means. Estimated using Clarify.

Table 21. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	.059 (.11)	.021 (.10)	.020 (.10)	.023 (.10)	.013 (.10)
Union Household	.149 (.11)	-.008 (.13)	.150 (.11)	.146 (.11)	.153 (.11)
Family Income (High- Low)	-.159 (.18)	-.172 (.18)	-.123 (.20)	-.160 (.18)	-.154 (.18)
Unemployed	-.151 (.15)	-.149 (.15)	-.149 (.15)	-.241 (.17)	-.142 (.15)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	<b>.359</b> (.13)	<b>.365</b> (.13)	<b>.363</b> (.13)	<b>.455</b> (.13)	<b>.485</b> (.15)
Latino Population in County	1.18 (.86)	.968 (.85)	1.14 (.85)	1.06 (.85)	1.15 (.85)
Change in Latino Population	-1.93 (3.1)	-3.17 (3.1)	-1.39 (3.9)	-2.69 (3.1)	1.30 (3.7)
Occupation*Latino Change	-2.85 (3.7)	---	---	---	---
Union*Latino Change	---	<b>11.3</b> (5.1)	---	---	---
Income*Latino Change	---	---	-2.53 (6.1)	---	---
Unemployed*Latino Change	---	---	---	5.79 (5.7)	---
Class* Latino Change	---	---	---	---	-7.65 (4.4)
Party Identification (Dem- Rep)	.084 (.14)	.067 (.14)	.078 (.14)	.069 (.14)	.089 (.14)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	<b>.620</b> (.23)	<b>.635</b> (.23)	<b>.625</b> (.23)	<b>.639</b> (.23)	<b>.612</b> (.23)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.236</b> (.09)	<b>-.235</b> (.09)	<b>-.236</b> (.09)	<b>-.237</b> (.09)	<b>-.239</b> (.09)
Age	-.165 (.21)	-.147 (.21)	-.168 (.21)	-.169 (.21)	-.169 (.21)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm- Cold)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.46</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.46</b> (.20)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0819	.0827	.0819	.0820	.0824
N	2272	2272	2272	2272	2272

Source: 1992/1994 ANES

Table 22. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	.462 (.32)	<b>.451</b> (.24)	<b>.490</b> (.23)	<b>.433</b> (.23)	<b>.491</b> (.23)	<b>.452</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	.303 (1.9)	2.59 (2.6)	.443 (1.6)	1.88 (1.7)	.328 (1.6)	1.84 (1.7)
Union Household	<b>.384</b> (.22)	<b>.387</b> (.22)	<b>.964</b> (.34)	<b>.444</b> (.22)	<b>.374</b> (.22)	<b>.404</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.741</b> (.44)	<b>.777</b> (.45)	<b>.774</b> (.44)	<b>2.02</b> (.62)	<b>.749</b> (.44)	<b>.826</b> (.45)
Unemployed	-.001 (.33)	-.006(.33)	.019 (.33)	-.055(.33)	-.319 (.47)	-.032(.33)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.205 (.28)	-.213(.28)	-.212(.28)	-.178(.28)	-.212 (.28)	.457 (.38)
Latino Population in County	-.087 (1.9)	-.958(1.9)	-.302(1.8)	-1.59(1.8)	-.117 (1.8)	-1.7 (1.8)
Change in Latino Population	3.01 (5.4)	7.54 (6.1)	6.44 (4.9)	<b>18.0</b> (6.7)	2.44 (4.8)	<b>16.8</b> (6.9)
Occupation* Latino Change	1.28 (9.3)	---	---	---	---	---
Latino Presence* Latino Change	---	-30.6 (28)	---	---	---	---
Union*Latino Change	---	---	<b>-23.6</b> (10)	---	---	---
Income*Latino Change	---	---	---	<b>-46.7</b> (15)	---	---
Unemployed*Latino Change	---	---	---	---	12.5(13.4)	---
Class* Latino Change	---	---	---	---	---	<b>-26.2</b> (10)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.428 (.35)	.424 (.35)	.349 (.35)	.469 (.35)	.429 (.35)	.424 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.038 (.52)	.021 (.52)	-.046(.52)	.063 (.52)	-.054 (.52)	.053 (.52)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.418</b> (.18)	<b>-.414</b> (.18)	<b>-.444</b> (.18)	<b>-.427</b> (.18)	<b>-.434</b> (.18)	<b>-.416</b> (.18)
Age	.811 (.47)	.791 (.47)	.821 (.47)	.783 (.47)	.796 (.47)	.799 (.47)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.73</b> (.42)	<b>1.72</b> (.42)	<b>1.67</b> (.42)	<b>1.74</b> (.42)	<b>1.74</b> (.42)	<b>1.67</b> (.42)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm- Cold)	<b>3.54</b> (.43)	<b>3.53</b> (.43)	<b>3.58</b> (.43)	<b>3.51</b> (.43)	<b>3.57</b> (.43)	<b>3.53</b> (.43)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1091	.1110	.1129	.1163	.1098	.1144
N	500	500	500	500	500	500

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 23. Probability of Supporting Immigration Restrictions by Proximity to Changing Latino Populations for White Working Respondents

	1992/1994		2004	
	Small* Increases in Latino Population	Large Increases in Latino Population	Small Increases in Latino Population	Large Increases in Latino Population
<b>Occupation</b>				
White-Collar (0)	.5916	.5769	.4372	.4640
Blue-Collar (1)	.6044	.5697	.5499	.5899
<b>Latino Presence in Occupation</b>				
Low (.0144)	----	----	.4406	.5129
High (.1395)	----	----	.5120	.5421
<b>Union Household</b>				
Non-Union (0)	.5920	.5703	.4344	.4996
Union (1)	.5928	.6489	.6287	.4723
<b>Income</b>				
High Income (0)	.6092	.6002	.3418	.5085
Low Income (1)	.5778	.5509	.7311	.4849
<b>Employment Status</b>				
Employed (0)	.6000	.5811	.4770	.5007
Unemployed (1)	.5394	.5617	.4297	.5615
<b>Class</b>				
Upper Class (0)	.5273	.5359	.4326	.5922
Lower Class (1)	.6423	.5991	.5009	.4109

Source: Predicted from the ordered logit results presented in Tables 5 and 6. All variables, besides the ones of interest, were held constant at their means. Estimated using Clarify.

\*Small increases represent the 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of changes in Latino population. Large increases the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile.

For 1992/1994: Small Increases = .0010787, Large Increases = .0298925

For 2004: Small Increases = .0074708, Large Increases = .0461021

Table 24. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents with Latino Percentage Excluded

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	---	<b>.499</b> (.22)	<b>.488</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low- High)	.831 (.80)	.271 (.85)	1.58 (1.6)
Union Household	---	<b>.383</b> (.22)	<b>.383</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	---	<b>.741</b> (.44)	<b>.771</b> (.44)
Unemployed	---	.001 (.33)	.003 (.33)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	-.201 (.28)	-.198 (.28)
Change in Latino Population	.216 (3.9)	3.13 (4.1)	5.76 (4.9)
Latino Presence* Latino Change	---	---	-25.3 (26)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.486 (.34)	.430 (.35)	.433 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.029 (.49)	-.040 (.51)	-.009 (.52)
Gender (Male)	-.311 (.17)	<b>-.421</b> (.18)	<b>-.422</b> (.18)
Age	.717 (.44)	.805 (.47)	.772 (.47)
Education (High- Low)	<b>2.25</b> (.35)	<b>1.72</b> (.42)	<b>1.73</b> (.42)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm- Cold)	<b>3.45</b> (.42)	<b>3.54</b> (.43)	<b>3.55</b> (.43)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1027	.1091	.1098
N	522	500	500

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 25. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Geographic Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for Working White Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	.089 (.10)	---	---	---	---	.022 (.09)
Union Household	---	<b>.211</b> (.10)	---	---	---	.150 (.11)
Family Income (High-Low)	---	---	-.129 (.16)	---	---	-.149 (.18)
Unemployed	---	---	---	-.172 (.14)	---	-.149 (.15)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	---	---	---	<b>.346</b> (.11)	<b>.366</b> (.13)
Latino Population in County	.437 (.42)	.467 (.43)	.400 (.42)	.431 (.43)	.506 (.44)	.540 (.44)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.017 (.14)	.062 (.14)	.008 (.14)	.015 (.14)	.055 (.14)	.079 (.14)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	<b>.683</b> (.22)	<b>.659</b> (.22)	<b>.667</b> (.22)	<b>.665</b> (.22)	<b>.649</b> (.22)	<b>.630</b> (.23)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.233</b> (.09)	<b>-.213</b> (.08)	<b>-.211</b> (.08)	<b>-.204</b> (.08)	<b>-.221</b> (.08)	<b>-.237</b> (.09)
Age	-.328 (.20)	-.346 (.20)	-.349 (.20)	-.339 (.20)	-.173 (.21)	-.164 (.21)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.32</b> (.19)	<b>1.39</b> (.17)	<b>1.45</b> (.19)	<b>1.44</b> (.18)	<b>1.20</b> (.19)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.44</b> (.19)	<b>3.45</b> (.19)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.19)	<b>3.46</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0792	.0798	.0791	.0794	.0807	.0817
N	2328	2323	2328	2328	2277	2272

Source: 1992/1994 ANES

Table 26a. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Geographic Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.599</b> (.20)	---	---	---	---	---
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	---	1.83 (1.5)	---	---	---	---
Union Household	---	---	.277 (.20)	---	---	---
Family Income (High-Low)	---	---	---	.411 (.34)	---	---
Unemployed	---	---	---	---	.037 (.29)	---
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	---	---	---	---	-.084 (.24)
Latino Population in County (Small-Large)	-.109 (.63)	-1.08 (1.4)	-.025 (.63)	-.026 (.63)	-.078 (.63)	-.146 (.63)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.291 (.32)	.278 (.34)	.219 (.31)	.244 (.31)	.227 (.31)	.263 (.32)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.059 (.47)	-.011 (.50)	.019 (.47)	.024 (.47)	-.029 (.47)	-.128 (.47)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.456</b> (.17)	<b>-.314</b> (.17)	-.306 (.16)	-.298 (.16)	<b>-.309</b> (.16)	<b>-.319</b> (.16)
Age	.757 (.39)	.749 (.45)	.704 (.39)	.757 (.39)	.694 (.39)	.629 (.40)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.89</b> (.34)	<b>2.19</b> (.36)	<b>2.23</b> (.32)	<b>2.08</b> (.34)	<b>2.22</b> (.32)	<b>2.20</b> (.37)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.57</b> (.39)	<b>3.45</b> (.41)	<b>3.49</b> (.38)	<b>3.49</b> (.38)	<b>3.48</b> (.38)	<b>3.51</b> (.40)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1110	.1031	.1066	.1062	.1050	.1030
N	593	522	593	595	594	573

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 26b. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Geographic Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents, continued

	7 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.497</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	.259 (1.58)
Union Household	<b>.377</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.740</b> (.44)
Laid Off	-.001 (.33)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.203 (.28)
Latino Population in County (Small-Large)	.408 (1.5)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.425 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.057 (.52)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.422</b> (.18)
Age	.787 (.47)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.72</b> (.42)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.58</b> (.43)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1087
N	500

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 27. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Geographic Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	.085 (.11)	.024 (.10)	.023 (.09)	.026 (.10)	.020 (.10)
Union Household	.151 (.11)	.040 (.13)	.153 (.11)	.147 (.11)	.151 (.11)
Family Income (High-Low)	-.141 (.18)	-.151 (.18)	-.067 (.20)	-.145 (.18)	-.146 (.15)
Unemployed	-.156 (.15)	-.155 (.15)	-.152 (.15)	-.257 (.17)	-.145 (.15)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	<b>.364</b> (.13)	<b>.367</b> (.13)	<b>.369</b> (.13)	<b>.357</b> (.13)	<b>.423</b> (.15)
Latino Population in County	<b>.862</b> (.52)	.278 (.47)	1.16 (.88)	.392 (.46)	1.02 (.74)
Occupation*Latino Population	-1.19 (.98)	---	---	---	---
Union*Latino Population	---	<b>2.20</b> (1.3)	---	---	---
Income*Latino Population	---	---	-1.41 (1.7)	---	---
Unemployed*Latino Population	---	---	---	1.76 (1.6)	---
Class* Latino Population	---	---	---	---	-.983 (1.2)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.084 (.14)	.068 (.14)	.078 (.14)	.069 (.14)	.081 (.14)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	<b>.620</b> (.23)	<b>.638</b> (.23)	<b>.624</b> (.23)	<b>.649</b> (.23)	<b>.626</b> (.23)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.235</b> (.09)	<b>-.236</b> (.09)	<b>-.235</b> (.09)	<b>-.236</b> (.09)	<b>-.238</b> (.09)
Age	-.165 (.21)	-.154 (.21)	-.168 (.20)	-.166 (.21)	-.168 (.21)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.46</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.46</b> (.20)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0820	.0822	.0818	.0819	.0818
N	2272	2272	2272	2272	2272

Source: 1992/1994 ANES

Table 28. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Geographic Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.765</b> (.26)	<b>.482</b> (.23)	<b>.497</b> (.23)	<b>.466</b> (.24)	<b>.497</b> (.23)	<b>.467</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	1.57 (1.7)	1.45(1.82)	.230 (1.6)	.811 (1.6)	.242 (1.6)	1.13 (1.6)
Union Household	<b>.375</b> (.22)	<b>.386</b> (.22)	<b>.574</b> (.29)	<b>.394</b> (.22)	<b>.376</b> (.22)	<b>.388</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.753</b> (.44)	<b>.760</b> (.44)	<b>.743</b> (.44)	<b>1.12</b> (.52)	<b>.739</b> (.44)	<b>.805</b> (.45)
Unemployed	-.014 (.33)	-.005 (.33)	.007 (.33)	-.022 (.33)	-.043 (.39)	-.021 (.33)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.196 (.28)	-.203 (.28)	-.198 (.28)	-.192 (.28)	-.204 (.28)	.123 (.33)
Latino Population in County (Small-Large)	-.429 (1.5)	1.20 (1.7)	.648 (1.6)	.951 (1.6)	.394 (1.5)	-1.17 (1.6)
Occupation* Latino Population	<b>-3.54</b> (1.4)	---	---	---	---	---
Latino Presence* Latino Population	---	-3.47 (2.7)	---	---	---	---
Union*Latino Population	---	---	-2.74 (2.5)	---	---	---
Income*Latino Population	---	---	---	-4.55 (3.2)	---	---
Unemployed*Latino Population	---	---	---	---	.610 (3.3)	---
Class* Latino Population	---	---	---	---	---	<b>-4.36</b> (2.2)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.359 (.35)	.422 (.35)	.407 (.35)	.431 (.35)	.424 (.35)	.416 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	.067 (.52)	.021 (.52)	-.104 (.52)	-.019 (.52)	-.059 (.52)	.015 (.52)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.423</b> (.18)	<b>-.411</b> (.18)	<b>-.433</b> (.18)	<b>-.423</b> (.18)	<b>-.423</b> (.18)	<b>-.421</b> (.18)
Age	.841 (.47)	.830 (.47)	.758 (.47)	.735 (.47)	.788 (.47)	.719 (.47)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.65</b> (.42)	<b>1.70</b> (.42)	<b>1.68</b> (.42)	<b>1.74</b> (.42)	<b>1.73</b> (.42)	<b>1.71</b> (.42)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm- Cold)	<b>3.69</b> (.43)	<b>3.54</b> (.43)	<b>3.57</b> (.43)	<b>3.56</b> (.43)	<b>3.58</b> (.43)	<b>3.57</b> (.43)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1133	.1100	.1096	.1103	.1087	.1115
N	500	500	500	500	500	500

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 29. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	.089 (.09)	---	---	---	---	.023 (.09)
Union Household	---	<b>.211</b> (.10)	---	---	---	.150 (.11)
Family Income (High-Low)	---	---	-.136 (.16)	---	---	-.153 (.18)
Unemployed	---	---	---	-.172 (.14)	---	-.150 (.15)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	---	---	---	<b>.345</b> (.12)	<b>.364</b> (.13)
Latino Population in County	.442 (.43)	.472 (.43)	.405 (.43)	.436 (.43)	.509 (.44)	.543 (.44)
Latino Percent Change	-.020 (.05)	-.019 (.05)	-.024 (.05)	-.021 (.05)	-.010 (.05)	-.014 (.05)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.017 (.14)	.062 (.14)	.008 (.14)	.015 (.14)	.055 (.14)	.078 (.14)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	<b>.681</b> (.22)	<b>.658</b> (.22)	<b>.666</b> (.22)	<b>.663</b> (.22)	<b>.648</b> (.22)	<b>.629</b> (.23)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.233</b> (.08)	<b>-.214</b> (.08)	<b>-.214</b> (.08)	<b>-.204</b> (.08)	<b>-.222</b> (.08)	<b>-.237</b> (.09)
Age	-.327 (.20)	-.346 (.20)	-.349 (.20)	-.338 (.20)	.173 (.21)	-.164 (.21)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.32</b> (.19)	<b>1.39</b> (.17)	<b>1.45</b> (.19)	<b>1.44</b> (.18)	<b>1.20</b> (.19)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.45</b> (.19)	<b>3.45</b> (.19)	<b>3.44</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.19)	<b>3.46</b> (.19)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0792	.0799	.0792	.0794	.0807	.0817
N	2328	2323	2328	2328	2277	2272

Source: 1992/1994 ANES

Table 30a. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.602</b> (.20)	---	---	---	---	---
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	---	1.81 (1.4)	---	---	---	---
Union Household	---	---	.275 (.20)	---	---	---
Family Income (High-Low)	---	---	---	.417 (.34)	---	---
Unemployed	---	---	---	---	.038 (.29)	---
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	---	---	---	---	-.077 (.24)
Latino Population in County (Small-Large)	-.168 (.65)	-1.10 (1.4)	-.076(.64)	-.080 (.64)	-.128 (.64)	-.197 (.65)
Percent Change in Latino Population	-.029 (.06)	-.017 (.06)	-.025 (.06)	-.027 (.06)	-.025 (.06)	-.027 (.07)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.286 (.32)	.275 (.34)	.214 (.32)	.239 (.31)	.222 (.32)	.257 (.32)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.048 (.47)	-.003 (.50)	.029 (.47)	.036 (.47)	-.019 (.47)	-.119 (.48)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.453</b> (.17)	-.312 (.17)	<b>-.303</b> (.15)	-.294 (.16)	<b>-.306</b> (.16)	<b>-.316</b> (.16)
Age	<b>.771</b> (.39)	.754 (.44)	.714 (.39)	.769 (.39)	.704 (.39)	.638 (.40)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.88</b> (.34)	<b>2.18</b> (.36)	<b>2.22</b> (.32)	<b>2.07</b> (.35)	<b>2.21</b> (.32)	<b>2.19</b> (.37)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.58</b> (.39)	<b>3.45</b> (.41)	<b>3.50</b> (.38)	<b>3.50</b> (.38)	<b>3.49</b> (.39)	<b>3.52</b> (.39)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1111	.1032	.1065	.1064	.1051	.1031
N	593	522	593	595	594	573

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 30b. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents, continued

	7 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.503</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	.202 (1.5)
Union Household	<b>.375</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.739</b> (.44)
Laid Off	-.001 (.33)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.196 (.28)
Latino Population in County	.394 (1.5)
Percent Change in Latino Population	-.033 (.07)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.419 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.046 (.51)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.421</b> (.18)
Age	.792 (.47)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.71</b> (.42)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.59</b> (.43)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1089
N	500

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 31. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	-.035 (.11)	.023 (.10)	.024 (.10)	.023 (.10)	.024 (.10)
Union Household	.149 (.11)	.001 (.15)	.147 (.11)	.150 (.11)	.148 (.11)
Family Income (High-Low)	-.159 (.18)	-.155 (.18)	-.216 (.19)	-.153 (.18)	-.149 (.18)
Unemployed	-.159 (.15)	-.147 (.15)	-.149 (.15)	-.164 (.19)	-.149 (.15)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	<b>.369</b> (.13)	<b>.364</b> (.13)	<b>.365</b> (.13)	<b>.364</b> (.13)	<b>.337</b> (.14)
Latino Population in County	.552 (.44)	.547 (.44)	.537 (.44)	.542 (.44)	.538 (.44)
Latino Percent Change	-.036 (.05)	-.029 (.05)	-.043 (.06)	-.015 (.05)	-.026 (.06)
Occupation* Latino Percent Change	.139 (.14)	---	---	---	---
Union*Latino Percent Change	---	.348 (.25)	---	---	---
Income*Latino Percent Change	---	---	.168 (.18)	---	---
Unemployed*Latino Percent Change	---	---	---	.038 (.34)	---
Class* Latino Percent Change	---	---	---	---	.065 (.15)
Party Identification (Dem- Rep)	.074 (.14)	.079 (.14)	.070 (.14)	.078 (.14)	.074 (.14)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	<b>.634</b> (.23)	<b>.624</b> (.23)	<b>.636</b> (.23)	<b>.629</b> (.23)	<b>.633</b> (.23)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.239</b> (.09)	<b>-.233</b> (.09)	<b>-.237</b> (.09)	<b>-.238</b> (.09)	<b>-.237</b> (.09)
Age	-.164 (.21)	-.144 (.21)	-.168 (.21)	-.164 (.21)	-.165 (.21)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)	<b>1.26</b> (.21)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)	<b>1.27</b> (.21)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.46</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)	<b>3.45</b> (.20)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0819	.0821	.0819	.0817	.0818
N	2272	2272	2272	2272	2272

Source: 1992/1994 ANES

Table 32. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.497</b> (.29)	<b>.464</b> (.24)	<b>.484</b> (.23)	<b>.425</b> (.24)	<b>.542</b> (.23)	<b>.488</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	.209 (1.6)	-.874(1.7)	.236 (1.6)	.075 (1.6)	.107 (1.6)	.382 (1.6)
Union Household	<b>.376</b> (.22)	<b>.403</b> (.22)	<b>.682</b> (.27)	<b>.366</b> (.22)	<b>.378</b> (.22)	<b>.398</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.739</b> (.44)	<b>.773</b> (.44)	<b>.762</b> (.44)	<b>.956</b> (.52)	<b>.743</b> (.44)	<b>.740</b> (.44)
Unemployed	.001 (.33)	-.023 (.33)	-.009(.33)	-.001(.33)	-.629 (.44)	-.008(.33)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.196 (.28)	-.187 (.28)	-.245 (.28)	-.193 (.28)	-.218 (.28)	-.391 (.33)
Latino Population in County (Small-Large)	-.387 (1.1)	.909 (1.6)	.457 (1.5)	.525 (1.5)	.466 (1.5)	.141 (1.6)
Percent Change in Latino Population	-.035 (.09)	-.072 (.08)	.044 (.08)	.034 (.11)	-.076 (.07)	-.163 (.14)
Occupation* Percent Change Latino	.006 (.15)	---	---	---	---	---
Latino Presence* Percent Change Latino	---	2.64 (2.1)	---	---	---	---
Union* Percent Change Latino	---	---	<b>-.310</b> (.16)	---	---	---
Income* Percent Change Latino	---	---	---	-.226 (.28)	---	---
Unemployed* Percent Change Latino	---	---	---	---	<b>.611</b> (.28)	---
Class* Percent Change Latino	---	---	---	---	---	.208 (.19)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.420 (.35)	.405 (.35)	.405 (.35)	.408 (.35)	.400 (.35)	.424 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.046 (.52)	.023 (.52)	-.010 (.52)	-.047 (.52)	-.021 (.52)	-.021 (.52)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.420</b> (.18)	<b>-.416</b> (.18)	<b>-.416</b> (.18)	<b>-.437</b> (.18)	<b>-.435</b> (.18)	<b>-.426</b> (.18)
Age	.793 (.47)	.789 (.47)	.809 (.47)	.810 (.47)	.715 (.47)	.799 (.47)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.71</b> (.42)	<b>1.66</b> (.42)	<b>1.76</b> (.42)	<b>1.72</b> (.42)	<b>1.69</b> (.42)	<b>1.70</b> (.42)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.59</b> (.43)	<b>3.54</b> (.43)	<b>3.65</b> (.43)	<b>3.59</b> (.43)	<b>3.58</b> (.43)	<b>3.58</b> (.43)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1089	.1102	.1117	.1094	.1128	.1098
N	500	500	500	500	500	500

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 33. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents without Prejudice

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.169</b> (.10)	---	---	---	---	.116 (.09)
Union Household	---	<b>.227</b> (.10)	---	---	---	.140 (.11)
Family Income (High-Low)	---	---	-.270 (.16)	---	---	-.277 (.17)
Unemployed	---	---	---	-.205 (.14)	---	-.172 (.14)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	---	---	---	<b>.309</b> (.12)	<b>.327</b> (.13)
Percent Latino in County	1.13 (.80)	1.20 (.80)	1.25 (.81)	1.16 (.80)	1.08 (.81)	1.22 (.81)
Change in Latino Population	-3.52 (2.9)	-3.72 (2.9)	-4.29 (2.9)	-3.74 (2.9)	-3.05 (2.9)	-3.43 (2.9)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.163 (.14)	.210 (.14)	.146 (.14)	.162 (.14)	.192 (.14)	.202 (.14)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	<b>1.08</b> (.22)	<b>1.04</b> (.22)	<b>1.05</b> (.22)	<b>1.04</b> (.22)	<b>1.03</b> (.22)	<b>1.01</b> (.22)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.176</b> (.08)	-.133 (.08)	-.134 (.08)	-.121 (.08)	-.129 (.08)	<b>-.178</b> (.08)
Age	<b>-.474</b> (.20)	<b>-.516</b> (.20)	<b>-.516</b> (.20)	<b>-.499</b> (.20)	-.356 (.20)	-.339 (.20)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.47</b> (.19)	<b>1.61</b> (.17)	<b>1.72</b> (.19)	<b>1.66</b> (.17)	<b>1.46</b> (.19)	<b>1.50</b> (.20)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0250	.0255	.0250	.0249	.0257	.0275
N	2329	2324	2329	2329	2278	2273

Source: 1992/1994 ANES

Table 34. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for White Working Respondents without Prejudice

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	.140 (.11)	.118 (.10)	.116 (.10)	.119 (.10)	.114 (.10)
Union Household	.141 (.11)	.021 (.13)	.140 (.11)	.139 (.11)	.143 (.11)
Family Income (High- Low)	-.274 (.17)	-.283 (.17)	-.274 (.19)	-.273 (.17)	-.272 (.17)
Unemployed	-.174 (.14)	-.172 (.14)	-.172 (.14)	-.274 (.17)	-.169 (.14)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	<b>.326</b> (.12)	<b>.329</b> (.12)	<b>.327</b> (.12)	<b>.320</b> (.12)	<b>.387</b> (.14)
Percent Latino in County	1.25 (.82)	1.12 (.81)	1.21 (.82)	1.17 (.81)	1.23 (.82)
Change in Latino Population	-3.14 (2.9)	-4.02 (3.0)	-3.37 (3.8)	-3.77 (2.9)	-1.59 (3.6)
Occupation*Latino Change	-1.69 (3.6)	---	---	---	---
Union*Latino Change	---	<b>8.47</b> (4.9)	---	---	---
Income*Latino Change	---	---	-.167 (5.8)	---	---
Unemployed*Latino Change	---	---	---	6.33 (5.6)	---
Class* Latino Change	---	---	---	---	-3.69 (4.2)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.206 (.14)	.194 (.14)	.202 (.14)	.193 (.14)	.208 (.14)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	<b>1.01</b> (.22)	<b>1.01</b> (.22)	<b>1.01</b> (.22)	<b>1.02</b> (.22)	<b>1.01</b> (.22)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.178</b> (.08)	<b>-.177</b> (.08)	<b>-.179</b> (.08)	<b>-.178</b> (.08)	<b>-.179</b> (.08)
Age	-.337 (.20)	-.325 (.20)	-.339 (.20)	-.342 (.20)	-.340 (.20)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.50</b> (.20)	<b>1.50</b> (.21)	<b>1.49</b> (.21)	<b>1.50</b> (.21)	<b>1.50</b> (.21)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0276	0.0281	0.0275	0.0278	0.0277
N	2273	2273	2273	2273	2273

Source: 1992/1994 ANES

Table 35a. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for Working White Respondents without Prejudice

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.464</b> (.20)	---	---	---	---	---
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	---	1.82 (1.4)	---	---	---	---
Union Household	---	---	.221 (.19)	---	---	---
Family Income (High-Low)	---	---	---	.421 (.33)	---	---
Unemployed	---	---	---	---	.156 (.27)	---
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	---	---	---	---	---	-.004 (.24)
Percent Latino in County	-.844 (.77)	-2.45 (1.5)	-.747 (.76)	-.747 (.76)	-.763 (.76)	-.941 (.77)
Change in Latino Population	2.45 (3.9)	6.72 (4.2)	2.18 (3.9)	2.26 (3.9)	2.14 (3.9)	3.01 (3.9)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.594 (.31)	.605 (.33)	.544 (.31)	.563 (.31)	.547 (.31)	.587 (.31)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	.217 (.46)	.202 (.49)	.272 (.46)	.294 (.46)	.241 (.46)	.180 (.47)
Gender (Male)	-.270 (.16)	-.151 (.16)	-.156 (.15)	-.139 (.15)	-.155 (.15)	-.157 (.16)
Age	.569 (.38)	.708 (.44)	.521 (.38)	.583 (.38)	.515 (.38)	.454 (.39)
Education (High-Low)	<b>2.13</b> (.33)	<b>2.34</b> (.35)	<b>2.40</b> (.31)	<b>2.25</b> (.34)	<b>2.38</b> (.31)	<b>2.29</b> (.36)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0524	.0501	.0493	.0498	.0488	.0455
N	603	532	603	605	604	583

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 35b. The Main Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for Working White Respondents without Prejudice, continued

	7 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.377</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	.609 (1.5)
Union Household	.310 (.21)
Family Income (High-Low)	.616 (.44)
Laid Off	.151 (.31)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.041 (.27)
Percent Latino in County	-1.41 (1.6)
Change in Latino Population	7.91 (4.3)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	<b>.768</b> (.34)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	.183 (.50)
Gender (Male)	-.232 (.18)
Age	.689 (.45)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.79</b> (.41)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0527
N	510

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 36. The Interactive Effects of Realistic Threat and Changing Geographic Context on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy for Working White Respondents without Prejudice Control

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model	5 <sup>th</sup> Model	6 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	.238 (.31)	.331 (.23)	<b>.377</b> (.23)	.310 (.23)	<b>.375</b> (.23)	.331 (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low-High)	-.013(1.8)	3.22 (2.4)	.543 (1.5)	2.19 (1.6)	.547 (1.5)	2.09 (1.6)
Union Household	.309 (.21)	.312 (.21)	<b>.735</b> (.33)	<b>.373</b> (.21)	.305 (.21)	.337 (.21)
Family Income (High-Low)	.619 (.44)	.653 (.44)	.637 (.44)	<b>2.05</b> (.60)	.621 (.44)	<b>.717</b> (.43)
Unemployed	.145 (.31)	.147 (.31)	.169 (.31)	.052 (.32)	.001 (.44)	.099 (.31)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.042(.27)	-.050(.27)	-.039(.27)	-.015(.28)	-.042 (.27)	<b>.684</b> (.38)
Percent Latino in County	-.828(1.8)	-2.37(1.7)	-1.39(1.6)	-2.88(1.7)	-1.35(1.6)	-2.91(1.7)
Change in Latino Population	6.09 (5.1)	<b>13.3</b> (5.8)	10.1 (4.5)	<b>23.6</b> (6.6)	<b>7.40</b> (4.4)	<b>21.7</b> (6.6)
Occupation* Latino Change	6.09 (9.0)	---	---	---	---	---
Latino Presence* Latino Change	---	-38.0 (28)	---	---	---	---
Union*Latino Change	---	---	<b>-17.1</b> (10)	---	---	---
Income*Latino Change	---	---	---	<b>-51.5</b> (15)	---	---
Unemployed*Latino Change	---	---	---	---	6.32(13.1)	---
Class* Latino Change	---	---	---	---	---	<b>-28.2</b> (10)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	<b>.767</b> (.34)	<b>.762</b> (.34)	<b>.712</b> (.34)	<b>.793</b> (.34)	<b>.773</b> (.34)	<b>.761</b> (.34)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	.169 (.50)	.249 (.51)	.185 (.50)	.310 (.51)	.172 (.50)	.272 (.51)
Gender (Male)	-.226(.18)	-.231(.18)	-.243(.18)	-.249(.18)	-.239 (.18)	-.237(.18)
Age	.686 (.45)	.671 (.46)	.867 (.45)	.671 (.46)	.676 (.46)	.679 (.46)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.82</b> (.41)	<b>1.79</b> (.41)	<b>1.75</b> (.41)	<b>1.82</b> (.41)	<b>1.81</b> (.41)	<b>1.75</b> (.41)
Pseudo R-Squared	.0531	.0542	.0549	.0616	.0529	.0588
N	510	510	510	510	510	510

Source: 2004 ANES

## **PREJUDICE**

### **Introduction**

As established previously, self-interest seems to play a somewhat complicated role in predicting attitudes toward immigration policies. Prejudice, as demonstrated by feelings toward illegal immigrants, however was both strong and consistent in influence. Across the various specifications of self-interest, feelings toward illegal immigrants had a robust effect on immigration preferences in analyses presented in the previous chapter. The more coldly an individual felt toward illegal immigrants the greater the likelihood he would endorse restrictions on immigration. Moreover, the effect of prejudice was consistently larger in magnitude than all of the other variables. Those who felt coldly toward immigrants had an 80% chance of supporting immigration reductions across both data sets. In sharp contrast, those who felt warmly toward them had approximately a 17% probability of doing so. This is the largest difference of all the variables yet examined. As such this chapter will investigate in greater detail both the nature and antecedents of prejudice. This should help to illuminate the role that prejudice plays in informing attitudes toward immigration policies.

Two broad themes will be addressed within this chapter. First, I spend time examining different conceptions of prejudice and their implications for policy preferences. Much of the literature on immigration fails to attend to prejudice as a strong alternative explanation for opposition to immigration. When it is included however, it is done somewhat haphazardly. In general, there is little thought to measurement. Nor is there discussion of the literature related to prejudice (see Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997; Wilson 2001). Some political scientists have employed stereotype measures as a way to assess prejudice, while others have used feelings toward out-group members. A great deal of research suggests however that the components of prejudice have divergent predictive powers (see Plous 2003). Consequently, arbitrarily selecting one measure over another may lead to insignificant findings. Moreover, much of the literature employs measures relating to Latinos (or Asians) in general. Few of them assess prejudice toward

immigrants. It seems likely that feelings toward immigrants should be stronger predictors of immigration attitudes than generalized feelings toward Latinos. As a result, I investigate whether some measures of prejudice are inherently better at predicting immigration preferences than others. This could potentially serve the literature well.

The second general theme I expand upon involves the antecedents of prejudice. Even though realistic threat had a limited effect on immigration attitudes, it seems highly plausible that it could assume a larger role for prejudice. Much literature suggests that prejudice is the product of environmental surroundings. Consequently, if prejudice has a realistic element then environmental determinants should influence attitudes toward low status groups. On the other hand, prejudice has also been determined to be the result of individual level variables. Factors such as authoritarianism could play a meaningful role in predicting prejudicial sentiments. Through careful examination, I attempt to decipher the function of both context and long-standing predispositions in contributing to out-group antipathy. This investigation is especially important as its findings have special consequence for policy directions. If prejudice toward immigrants has roots in realistic threat, programs can be tailored to address this specific problem. The government, for example, can impose more restrictive immigration policies to alleviate tensions. Prejudice arising out of psychological components, on the other hand, would require different kinds of action. Greater effort could be spent on creating environments of tolerance, for instance.

### **The Nature and Measurement of Prejudice**

For the most part, the literature on immigration fails to address the issue of prejudice as a compelling counter-argument to self-interest. Much of the existing work explains immigration preferences as a consequence of either self-interest or cultural threat. Research which has included prejudice has done so seemingly as an afterthought. There is generally very little discussion concerning the nature of prejudice and its manifestations. To date, no work exists examining how antipathy would best be measured as it pertains to immigrants. While much research suggests that prejudice has both diverse components and divergent predictive powers, this knowledge has not been applied to the literature on

immigration. Consequently, I investigate whether some measures of prejudice are inherently better at predicting policies related to immigration than others.

Attempts at measuring the latent theoretical conceptions of racism and prejudice have proven to be both difficult and controversial. In his seminal work Allport (1954) defined prejudice as “an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is group member” (pg. 9). This antipathy can manifest in a variety of forms involving cognition, affect, and/or behavior (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein 1969; Secord and Backman 1974). An individual may not necessarily express all three forms in order to be considered prejudiced (Plous 2003). Someone who has negative feelings toward out-groups may never actually act upon these feelings. Even though many would agree that prejudice generally involves these entities, figuring out the best way to assess prejudice has been hotly contested.

## **Behavior**

Behavior, unlike the other two elements of prejudice, exists outside mental representations. Behavioral components of antipathy involve expressing negative beliefs or feelings through action. This has often been studied through acts of discrimination and/or social distancing. While most scholars would agree that intentionality is an important component of discrimination (i.e. wanting to do harm), some argue that all forms of discrimination are manifestations of prejudice (Pettigrew and Taylor 2000). At the aggregate level, scholars have revealed correlations between racist behaviors and upsurges in local minority populations from a low baseline (Green, Abelson and Garnett 1999; Green, Strolovitch and Wong 1998).

Discrimination is often quite difficult to study, however, as its practices have been illegal for many years now. Consequently, individuals have strong incentives to conceal discriminatory behaviors. One particularly clever manner of exposing these types of actions involves experimentation. Individuals of similar socio-economic status but different ethnic backgrounds are selected to engage in activities where discrimination is suspected (e.g. renting apartments). If, after examining many cases, there appears to be

differences in renting based upon race discrimination is said to have occurred. These types of studies have been successful in unearthing discriminatory behavior in both the realm of employment and the housing market (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Fischer and Massey 2004).

## **Affect**

Individuals who hold negative feelings for group members are believed to characterize the affective element of prejudice. Much research suggests that negative feelings toward groups affect attitudes toward these groups (Esses, Haddock and Zanna 1993; Jackson, Hodge, Gerard, Ingram, Ervin and Sheppard 1996; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Haddock, Zanna and Esses 1993). Harboring negative feelings toward homosexuals, for instance, predicts general attitudes toward them. Similarly, affect felt for both Asians and Latinos has been demonstrated to predict preferences toward immigration (Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong 1997). Individuals who expressed high levels of negative feelings toward these groups were more likely to support immigration restrictions than those who expressed warm feelings.

While it is often assumed that affective prejudice takes the form of disliking out-groups some scholars have argued that this is not necessarily the case. Individuals may not automatically hold negative biases toward non-group members. Instead, individuals may value the group to which they belong (Brewer 1999). If this is the case then individuals exhibit a positivity bias, in that they reserve positive emotions for those in their group. As a result, in-group bias does not necessarily translate into out group denigration. Even if this is the case, however, out group negatively should still be conceived of as prejudice.

## **Cognition**

The cognitive component of prejudice usually takes the form of stereotyping. Contemporary accounts of stereotyping view it as a natural process of cognitive

functioning. In order to make sense of the world, our brains naturally attempt to classify social stimuli (Allport 1954). Stereotyping is simply cognitive categorization where group traits are learned. Individuals can apply these traits when encountering individual members of the respective group. Consequently stereotypes, like other generalizations, serve a necessary function of assisting the brain in economizing energy. Someone who is pressed for time, for example, will likely rely on generalizations to inform decisions (Gilbert and Hixon 1991). Because the brain automatically attempts to categorize all types of information to facilitate processing, stereotypes are thought to be prejudicial when they are negative in nature.

Stereotypes can also be activated without an individual's conscious awareness (Greenwald and Benaji 1995). Motivational goals, like egalitarianism, however can enhance the ability to override these automatic attitudes (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, and Schaal 1999). Consequently, it is unclear if stereotypes are in fact manifestations of prejudice. There exists heated debate concerning whether knowing stereotypes actually signifies prejudice. Because group generalizations are transmitted through social environments knowledge of them becomes inescapable (Erlich 1973). However, just because an individual is aware of contemporary stereotypes does not mean he actually endorses them. Knowledge of group generalizations does not necessarily translate into the personal adoption of these stereotypes. Research has demonstrated, for example, that sharing similar stereotype knowledge does not necessarily signify the acceptance of these same stereotypes (Devine 1989).

### **The Predictive Power of the Different Facets of Prejudice**

Even though prejudice is generally believed to be made up of these three components, the factors themselves are often only weakly related. Negative affect, negative stereotypes and discriminatory behavior are frequently not strongly correlated with each other (Brigham 1971; Lalonde and Gardner 1989). Current literature, for instance, suggests that stereotypes are only weakly linked to the other components of prejudice (Jackson et al. 1996). As a result, stereotype measures may not necessarily be the most effective way of gauging prejudice. There is evidence to suggest, however, that

stereotypes have the potential to affect attitudes and behaviors. Studies have found that individuals primed with age based stereotypes were more likely to exhibit behaviors typical of the old (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Furthermore, racial stereotypes of blacks have been found to influence preferences toward welfare (Peffley, Hurwitz and Sniderman 1997). In regards to immigration, holding negative stereotypes of Latinos has been demonstrated to influence immigration policy preferences (Burns and Gimpel 2000).

A better indicator of prejudice, however, may involve measuring how individuals feel toward non-group members. Fiske (1998) has gone so far as to suggest that prejudice should be conceived primarily as negative affect. Much research points to the fact that affect better predicts general attitudes and behavior. Haddock, Zanna and Esses (1994), for instance, found that negative feelings expressed of ethnic groups were stronger indicators of attitudes toward these groups than were stereotypes. Similarly, Stangor, Sullivan and Ford (1991) observed that group favorability was better predicted with feelings toward these groups than the stereotypes of these groups. As such, affective dimensions may be more fruitful measures of prejudice.

### **Assessing Prejudice in the Immigration Literature**

Within the immigration literature various indicators of prejudice have been implemented, somewhat haphazardly. As mentioned previously, it is rare to see a discussion of prejudice within the existing research. While some social scientists have included it as a control, none have entertained it as a compelling counter-argument. As such, the operationalization of the measure is often ad hoc. There is no consensus, nor discussion for that matter, concerning ways to capture prejudice as it pertains to immigration.

Much of the existing research employs negative stereotypes as a way to assess prejudicial sentiments (see Burns and Gimpel 2000; Hood and Morris 1997; Wilson 2001). These measures have actually been quite successful in predicting policy preferences related to immigration. Burns and Gimpel (2000) demonstrate, for example, that negative Hispanic stereotypes positively predict attitudes toward immigration policy.

Similarly, Wilson (2000) finds that harmful immigrant stereotypes influence opposition to policies benefiting undocumented immigrants. Consequently, stereotypes appear to play a meaningful role in predicting individual preferences related to immigration.

To my knowledge, only one work has operationalized out-group antipathy as an affective dimension (see Citrin et al. 1997). Their research compellingly demonstrates immigration attitudes to be a function of negative feelings toward Latinos and Asians. As such, affect appears to positively predict immigration policy preferences. It is striking that no other political scientist has employed this type of measure given the research within social psychology illuminating the potency of affect as a general predictor of prejudice. Moreover, feeling thermometers have been included within the NES since the 1960s. As a result, researchers making use of these datasets as a way to explore immigration attitudes have no real reason to pass them over. Moreover, if affect is indeed a better conceptualization of prejudice than stereotypic controls may not have compellingly captured out-group dislike.

Most of the aforementioned works have assessed prejudicial sentiments as they pertain to Latinos and/or Asians. It is argued that because these two groups comprise the majority of incoming immigrants, they roughly capture feelings toward the latter. To be sure, the measures are quite successful. Negative Hispanic stereotypes, for example, strongly predict immigration preferences (Burns and Gimpel 2000). This suggests that Americans may not necessarily differentiate between immigrants and the larger groups that comprise them.

Very few datasets actually contain measures assessing sentiments toward immigrants. This then precludes the possibility of including it as a control within respective analyses. Wilson (2001) is one of the few researchers to employ a measure of immigrant prejudice in his work. Consequently, much of the contemporary literature fails to directly capture antipathy felt toward immigrants. Feelings toward immigrants could be stronger predictors of immigration preferences than feelings toward related minority groups.

## **General Expectations**

Given the extant research on prejudice and immigration I expect the following. In general, feelings toward immigrants should be a better predictor of immigration preferences than feelings toward Latinos. In addition, because affect has generally been found to be a stronger predictor of group attitudes, I anticipate affect having a greater impact on immigration preferences than cognitive components. Cognition will not be without consequence, however. I expect that degree of stereotypy will have a distinct influence on immigration preferences above and beyond the effect of affective.

*Hyp 1P: Negatives feelings toward immigrants will be stronger predictors of immigration preferences than negative feelings toward Latinos.*

*Hyp 2P: Negatives feelings toward Latinos will be stronger predictors of immigration preferences than negative stereotypes.*

*Hyp 3P: Individuals who employ negative stereotypes of Latinos should be more likely to support restrictions on immigration. This effect should remain strong above and beyond affective dimensions of prejudice.*

## **Contemporary Prejudice and Issues of Social Desirability**

In early surveys social scientists were able to ask explicit questions gauging levels of prejudice and feel confident that the responses reflected racial animosity. Racism was upheld as an acceptance in the inferiority of people of color. However, as overtly racist behavior in the public arena has slowly become both illegal and unacceptable it is subsequently much harder to detect these beliefs in survey settings. While some contend this is in part due to its amelioration (Sniderman and Carmines 1997) others have argued that racists have learned to camouflage their beliefs in subtle and covert ways (Jackman 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000).

Several theories suggest that older, more overt racism has been supplanted by a new, more subtle and socially acceptable form of racism. Because old-fashioned racist behaviors are no longer socially tolerated, modern day racists couch their beliefs in

denying equal access of opportunity to people of color and other targets of systemic oppression. Consequently, modern day racism manifests as a blending of negative black affect and ideological beliefs. Negative feelings for blacks are based upon violations to moral values such as individualism, self-reliance and the Protestant work ethic (Kinder and Mendelberg 2000). This can take the form of resistance to neighborhood integration as well as to redistributive policies (Jackman 1994).

The concept of new racism has not been without controversy however. Critics have asserted that the proponents of symbolic racism have failed to both coherently articulate and adequately measure the latent construct. Furthermore, some have argued that the employment of ideology as a rationalization for racial attitudes is based upon principles, not prejudice (Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Using experimentation, Feldman and Huddy (2005) found that racial resentment strongly predicted support for race-based scholarship programs for liberals but not conservatives. Because conservatives oppose the policies regardless of recipient it is impossible to disentangle the effects of racial resentment from ideology.

One major weakness of this literature has been its focus on Black-White relations. While theoretically it could easily be applied to other groups, as of yet it has not been empirically demonstrated. The measurements assessing racial resentment all reference African Americans. Moreover, the experiments attempting to decouple ideology from antipathy have concentrated on Black- White relationships. Consequently, it remains unclear if whites have learned to couch their disdain for other groups in ideological language as well. Furthermore, the conditions which have given rise to Black antipathy most likely differ from those of other groups. African Americans as a group have shared a long and difficult history involving slavery and systematic oppression. This differs dramatically from the Latino experience. As such, it remains unclear if Latino aversion would be couched in the same language as that for African Americans.

In general, as the aforementioned research demonstrates, racism has become ever more difficult to detect. At the very least, social desirability issues have ensured that some individuals have learned to disguise aversive attitudes toward out-group members. This sort of bias has great political consequence as it severely undermines the ability of racial measures to predict relevant political phenomenon (Berinsky 1999). Consequently,

sensitivity to measurement should always be considered when dealing with racial attitudes.

### **Explaining Prejudice: Environmental Contexts versus Individual Predispositions**

There are currently two dominant theoretical explanations describing the manifestation of prejudice within the literature (Duckitt 2003). At their most basic these two theories have foundations in two very different schools of thought; sociology and psychology. The sociological school generally explains the development of prejudice as the consequence of environmental contexts. Thus, the manifestation of prejudice is dependent upon the social milieu encircling an individual. An outgrowth of this thinking posits that out-group antipathy arises out of struggles for scarce resources (Blalock 1965; Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif and Sherif 1961; Tajfel and Turner 1979). As such, proximity to rival racial and ethnic groups generates prejudicial attitudes.

In stark contrast, the psychological camp explains hostility between group members as a manifestation of individual predispositions. Many scholars have argued that personality traits, like authoritarianism, influence an individual's likelihood of holding prejudicial attitudes. (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford 1950; Altemeyer 1988). Accordingly, some people are psychologically predisposed to feel out-group animosity. Thus environmental contexts are not necessarily important in the generation of prejudicial sentiments. Individuals who are psychologically predisposed to feel out-group aversion do not need to be in close proximity to group members in order for prejudice to manifest.

Because both strains of research have compelling arguments and histories, each will be explored. Disentangling the contribution of each to out-group antipathy is especially important for political science. Understanding the antecedents of prejudice would be of particular relevance to politicians constructing social policies. For instance, if prejudice is the result of environmental contexts those in decision making positions would be best served to shape these contexts. Therefore, if animosity is the consequence of competition politicians could attempt to create more and better jobs for those

competing. These policies might not be effective for prejudice that is the result of psychological dispositions. As such, understanding how prejudice manifests has great political implications.

### **Prejudice as Explained by Environmental Contexts**

Scholars who study the sociological underpinnings of prejudice view out-group animus as an element of environmental contexts. Within this school of thought lies the belief that inter-group animosity is the consequence of competition for power and resources (Blalock 1967; Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif and Sherif 1961; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Essentially groups vie for advantage and resources within the confines of their environment. According to these theories, resources can include tangible or concrete objects such as money, jobs and land or more abstract goods such as status and power. Consequently, the hostility that an individual feels toward an out-group member is the result of threat to the in-group's interests (Fosset and Kiecolt 1989; Giles and Hertz 1994; Taylor 1998). Therefore, conflict arises as a result of geographic proximity to rival groups. Moreover, threat is presumed to be a function of the size of the out-group population (e.g., Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989; Giles and Herz, 1994; Taylor 1998). Larger out-group populations heighten in-group insecurities.

Realistic conflict theory (RCT), for example, posits that intergroup relations are influenced by competition for limited resources (Taylor and Moghaddam 1994). Its basic premise is that hostility toward non-group members likely arises when resources, which can be either economic or political, are scarce. Individuals could compete on the labor market for jobs, for example, or in the political sphere as beneficiaries of government programs. As such, RCT assumes inter-group hostility is the result of real conflicts over specific interests. One of the most prominent illustrations of RCT, the robber's cave study (Sherif and Hovland 1961; Sherif 1966), found that individuals demonstrate strong in-group biases when resources are finite and competitive even when groups are arbitrarily created. These findings have been supported in a great deal of additional research. Studies have found, for instance, that larger proximate populations of African Americans correspond with greater white racial animosity (Fosset and Kiecolt 1989;

Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996). This hostility is believed to be a function of intergroup competition over resources. Moreover, evidence suggests that attitudes toward immigrants become more negative during downturns in the economic cycle as compared to more prosperous times (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Quillian 1995).

While very similar to realistic threat theory, relative deprivation theory (RDT) differs in important ways. Feelings of hostility arise out of grievances over relative standing rather than finite resources (Stouffer et al. 1949). This process occurs when individuals subjectively perceive themselves to be unfairly disadvantaged when comparing themselves with others. Because feelings of deprivation surface as a result of perceived societal norms, the standards involved are relative rather than absolute. Therefore, a citizen from an affluent country, for example, who is objectively wealthier than a citizen from a poorer country may actually feel greater deprivation if the gap between what members of his reference group have and what is personally possessed is larger for the former than for the latter. As a result it is the individual's relative status, not the objective environment, which determines levels of discontent.

Recent research by Gay (2006) supports the notion that relative economic standing strongly influences racial attitudes. According to this study, Blacks living in neighborhoods with Latinos in better economic standing were more likely to express anti-Latino sentiment than Blacks who were comparatively better off than Latinos. Moreover, Blacks holding a comparative disadvantage were more likely to demonstrate reluctance in extending policy benefits to Latinos and to view the goals of each group as incompatible. This was not true of Blacks who were comparatively better off than their supposed competitors. The findings suggest that hostility and conflict can be attenuated through attention to economic insecurities.

In sharp contrast, instead of suggesting that inter-group contact results in increased animosity a disparate line of research proposes quite the opposite. More specifically, contact theory argues that animosity is actually ameliorated when individuals from different groups are brought together. Rather than viewing the environment as a means by which racial antipathy is intensified, it is considered something which enhances inter-group communication and understanding. Moreover, there is compelling evidence for its substantiation. Studies have found, for instance, that

interracial proximity promotes interracial contact and lessens racial antagonisms (Ellison and Powers 1994; Sigelman and Welch 1993). On face value, it would seem that reconciling the two discrepant findings would be difficult. However, the effect of contact mitigating racial tensions is dependent upon the existence of numerous conditions (Aberbach, Ellison and Powers 1994; Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). Without these conditions, group conflict is more likely. Contact does, however, still retain the ability to reduce racial antagonisms. Consequently, it remains a strong alternative explanation for what transpires when groups are brought into close proximity with each other.

In general, there exists much research theorizing how environmental contexts impact inter-group relationships. If realistic elements are in fact a compelling explanation, then they should be specific to geographic circumstances. For example, if animosity for immigrants is the product of job competition then those affected on the labor market should be the most prejudiced. In addition, proximity to immigrants should be able to predict feelings toward immigrants but not feelings toward other groups. Therefore, living nearby large concentrations of immigrants should not influence attitudes toward African-Americans if antipathy has a realistic basis. This is not to say that animosity toward other groups would not exist. Their justifications would not necessarily be similar however.

### **Prejudice as Explained by Individual Predispositions**

An alternative explanation to the sociocultural underpinnings of group hostility views prejudice as resulting from certain personality constructs. Much scholarly research suggests that prejudice is the consequence of individual predispositions. One such theory describes the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988). Motivated by the Holocaust, Adorno et al. sought to uncover the roots of ethnocentrism and anti-Semitism. In search of generalizable measures, they investigated the extent to which fascist (or anti-democratic) orientations could explain antipathy toward others. In their theorization, they asserted that differences in childbearing greatly affected authoritarian tendencies. More specifically, they argued that being raised in an authoritarian household influenced Fascist orientations. All together, they conceived of nine traits likely to cluster

together to create the authoritarian personality. From these traits they constructed a measure of authoritarianism called the F-scale.

While their findings were initially met with great enthusiasm, criticisms of both the research method and the resulting scale soon followed. Scholars have found flaws in the original research design (Brown 1965) as well as taken issue with the scale itself. For example, Ray (1984) raises concerns regarding the scale's conflation with agreement tendencies. As such, it is both a gauge of authoritarianism as well as acquiescent bias. Others argue that the scale confounds personality constructs with ideology (Shils 1954). Thus even though authoritarianism is believed to be a psychological disposition, the scale captures ideological beliefs. Perhaps most damaging, Altemeyer (1981) identifies several poorly related factors within the F-scale. While these flaws have prevented scholars from wholeheartedly adopting the original scale as a measure of authoritarianism, it has not prevented them from abandoning the research altogether.

Recent work has resuscitated the literature by creating new ways of conceiving of the authoritarian personality. Altemeyer (1981), for example, found that three of the original nine dimensions (conventionalism, authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission) do in fact cohere nicely together. From these findings he constructed a unitary measure of authoritarianism called the Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale. Further research has demonstrated the scale's ability to predict many social and political issues as well as inter-group phenomena such as prejudice and sexism (Lippa and Arad 1999; McFarland, Ageyev and Abalakina 1993; Whitley 1999). Individuals who score highly on the scale tend to respect authority figures as well as denigrate non-group members. The scale has been criticized however as it too conflates ideology with personality. For example, authoritarianism as measured by RWA is much more likely to be correlated with the right than the left. Therefore, it could be measuring ideological beliefs rather than personality constructs.

Newer viewpoints on authoritarianism are concerned with how authoritarianism manifests itself. For example, some suggest that the expression of authoritarianism is contingent upon threat perceptions (Stenner and Feldman 1997). Other research suggests that authoritarianism increases generally as a result of external threats such as economic duress (Doty, Peterson and Winter 1991; Sales 1972; 1973). This of course suggests that

authoritarianism needs external stimuli in order to become activated. Therefore it is not levels of authoritarianism which change during times of stress but the activation of authoritarianism. Of course, this implies that during times of relative peace and harmony, authoritarianism remains dormant.

## **Expectations**

Realistic elements are in fact a compelling explanation for the manifestation of prejudice. Thus environmental contexts could prove worthwhile in understanding attitudes toward immigrants and related ethnic groups. Because the manifestation of prejudice is dependent upon social milieu, I would expect geographic proximity to immigrants to be an important antecedent of animus. Studies have found, for instance, that white racial animosity toward African Americans is associated with large proximate populations of the out-group (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Quillian). Thus, whites may experience perceptions of threat living nearby large concentrations of Latinos. These perceptions could be related to group status being threatened or the competition over real, tangible resources. Either way it is expected to be specific to Latinos. Antipathy for immigrants based upon realistic group interest should not be able to predict animus toward African Americans. As such, living in close proximity to immigrant populations should only influence attitudes toward immigrants. It should not be able to predict sentiments toward African Americans. Moreover, I anticipate that living in close proximity to growing populations should be particularly anxiety inducing. This is the same line of argument previously proposed in prior chapters. Thus, I expect the following:

*Hyp 4P: Individuals living in close proximity to large immigrant populations will harbor greater prejudicial feelings toward them than those that do not. This variable should not influence affect toward other ethnic groups (i.e. African Americans)*

*Hyp 5P: Individuals living in close proximity to increasing immigrant populations will harbor greater prejudicial feelings toward them than those that do not. This variable should not influence affect toward other ethnic groups (i.e. African Americans).*

Similarly, if prejudice has realistic elements related to economic insecurities, then the economically vulnerable should express greater antipathy toward immigrants. For instance, blue-collar workers should feel greater aversion toward immigrants than white-collar workers if prejudice has a realistic basis. Thus, I anticipate:

*Hyp 6P: Realistic threat as it relates to general economic vulnerability will strongly predict prejudice toward immigrants. Thus, occupational type, presence of Latinos within one's occupation, union membership, income and employment status are likely to influence immigrant antipathy.*

This is not to say that psychological elements will not play a role in the manifestation of prejudice. Personality constructs, like authoritarianism, are likely to strongly influence feelings of animosity toward out-groups. This disposition, however, should be significant for all groups. Those high in authoritarianism should dislike immigrants as much as they dislike African Americans. Consequently, this psychological disposition should explain general feelings toward all groups.

*Hyp 7P: Authoritarianism will be a general predictor of prejudice toward out-groups in general (i.e. African Americans, Jews). It will not be specific to Latinos and/or immigrants.*

## **Data and Methods**

This analysis will focus on the 2004 ANES dataset as it contained a greater variety of prejudice measures. The 1992/1994 survey for example only included two measures which could potentially gauge racism, feeling thermometers and racial resentment identifiers. Because stereotyping questions were not included, I would be unable to test all of my hypotheses concerning prejudice measurement. In addition, the 2004 survey assessed authoritarian tendencies. This enables me to better examine the determinants of prejudice as well. Unfortunately, neither study assessed prejudicial behaviors. As a result, I lack the ability to empirically test its significance. Because the latter NES contained so many useful questions regarding racial prejudice it should prove beneficial to my analyses.

I have retained many of the same measures already discussed in previous sections as they are relevant. For instance, if realistic interest is a component of prejudice then indicators of occupational threat should be able to predict it. As such, many of the same constructs will be employed again within this analysis. However, new measures are introduced which should provide assistance in investigating the proposed relationships. They are listed below (see appendix for question wording on all new measures).

### **Feeling Thermometers**

The affective component of prejudice was captured in previous analyses using feeling thermometers. In the previous chapter, affect toward illegal immigrants was used as the primary control for prejudicial sentiments. The survey however also queried feelings regarding other groups as well (e.g. Hispanics, Blacks, Jews). Thus I am able to examine if feelings toward immigrants better predict immigration attitudes than feelings toward Latinos. Because immigration is often associated with Latinos it seems likely that feelings toward the latter will also predict immigration attitudes, albeit to a lesser extent. Moreover, measures gauging feelings toward Blacks will be employed in the investigation of prejudice manifestation. Thus I am able to examine if proximity to Latino populations predicts feelings toward immigrants alone, as opposed to other groups as well.

The construction of the feeling thermometers remains constant. They were reversed and recoded from their original 0-100 range to a zero to one scale. Lower scores are equated with feeling warmly toward the stated group, higher scores with feeling coldly. In general, respondents felt more coldly toward illegal immigrants than Latinos. The average response for working white participants to the illegal immigrant thermometer equaled .614. For Latinos it was .334. Feelings of coldness are nearly double for illegal immigrants than for Latinos. A greater percentage of respondents were likely to fall to the right of the thermometer when stating their feelings toward illegal immigrants. The opposite was true for Hispanics. Consequently, social desirability issues do not seem to prevent individuals from disclosing how they truly feel about immigrants. This may not necessarily be the case for Hispanics however. The average score implies

that most respondents felt warmly toward this group. Other groups have low means as well (see Table 37).

### **Stereotype Measures**

Cognitive components of prejudice were assessed with stereotype measures. Survey participants were asked to express their beliefs concerning the extent to which listed groups (i.e. Latinos, Blacks, Asians, and Whites) fulfilled certain stereotypes. More specifically, they were asked if members of the specified groups were hard-working, intelligent, and trustworthy (see Table 38). Each of these questions was recoded from zero to one with one representing negative stereotyping. Interestingly, the average score on each of the items for Hispanics was relatively high compared to the other groups. For example, the average score for Asians on being portrayed as hardworking or lazy was .301 while it was .401 for Latinos. Blacks, however, had the highest mean with .497. Surprisingly, Asians were seen as more hardworking than Whites (.370), even though the scores represent white respondents.

The likelihood of saying something positive and/or neutral about Hispanics, however, was much greater than saying something negative (see Table 39). Roughly 88% of the sample had neutral or positive things to say about the work ethic of Hispanics. Even so, there were some individuals who were negative in their evaluations. About 15% of the sample believed that Hispanics were either untrustworthy or unintelligent. Less than 5% believed the same of Whites.

From these questions a scale was created to measure the extent to which individuals believed that Latinos held negative attributes (i.e. not hard-working, unintelligent and untrustworthy). The variable was coded zero to one with zero representing a low degree of belief in the negative stereotypes and one equaling a high degree of belief in the negative stereotypes (see Table 40). The scale created using these questions has a relatively high level of reliability with an alpha coefficient of .712. While there is a bit of a skew with individuals hesitant to approach high levels of stereotyping, there is a good deal of variation.

## **Authoritarianism**

The 2004 ANES survey also included questions assessing authoritarianism. These questions gauge the child-raising preferences of those taking the survey. It is believed that individuals with a deep respect for authority will also demand things such as obedience out of children (see Feldman and Stenner 1997; Kam and Kinder 2007). As such this measure disentangles ideology from the authoritarian construct. The survey contained four items of this nature, the responses to which are listed in Table 41. The questions were scaled to create a measure of authoritarianism, coded zero to one. High scores represent greater authoritarian tendencies. Unlike the other scales, this one has a lower level of reliability with an alpha of .576. The overall mean of the variable equaled .527.

## **Measurement of Prejudice Analysis**

As discussed in the preceding section, prejudice can express itself in a variety of dimensions involving cognition, affect, and/or behavior (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein 1969; Secord and Backman 1974). A great deal of research suggests, however, that the components of prejudice have divergent predictive powers (see Plous 2003). Consequently, arbitrarily selecting one measure over another may lead to insignificant findings. Much of the preceding analyses have focused on the affective component of prejudice. The principal control representing prejudice within all of the self-interest models gauged feelings toward illegal immigrants. Overall, it proved to be one of the strongest and most reliable predictors of immigration attitudes. Given that prejudice could potentially have other components, it would be wise to investigate the role that each plays. If prejudice has both an affective and cognitive manifestation, then it could rightfully be expected that each would play a distinctive part.

Because I am using the same dependent variable as previous analyses, I will also estimate the model using ordered logit (see Table 43). Consequently the interpretation of the coefficients is again not straightforward. In order to make sense of the results, I also estimated the probabilities associated with believing immigration should be decreased

holding all other variables at their means (see Table 44). Furthermore, because I would like to examine the unique effect of each I analyze them separately. They are then combined into the same model to determine if their effects hold in the presence of each other. In general, because each of the hypotheses is directional by nature one-tailed tests of significance are employed. It should also be kept in mind that the findings represent white working males.

### **Correlations between Prejudice Measures**

Past research suggests that prejudice is composed of various distinct components. Consequently, I computed correlations between each of the various prejudice measures to see how they were related (see Table 42). Constructs similar in nature generally have significant associations. As a result, prejudice dimensions that are indistinguishable from each other should also be highly correlated. This does not appear to be the case, however. For the most part, the correlations barely rise above .33. This suggests that each item measures distinct facets of prejudice and provides compelling evidence that the constructs have unique components. An assessment of correlations is not necessarily the strongest test however. A more robust method examines the performance of each in predicting immigration preferences while in the presence of the others.

### **Feelings toward Latinos vs. Feelings toward Illegal Immigrants**

It was proposed that feelings toward illegal immigrants would be a stronger predictor of prejudice than measures related to Latinos in general (see Hyp 1P). As demonstrated in the previous chapter, feelings toward illegal immigrants had a very strong effect on immigration policy preferences. Individuals who felt coldly toward immigrants were much more likely to support immigration reductions (80%) than those who felt warmly toward illegal immigrants (about 17%). This remains to be the case. I would like to see, however, if feelings toward immigrants are generally better at

predicting preferences than general feelings toward Latinos. In order to do this, I examined the effect of each separately (see Table 43, Models 1 and 2).

Interestingly, each is significant in predicting immigration preferences. As such both appear to have strong effects on immigration attitudes. The model including feelings toward immigrants, however, explains a larger part of the variance associated with the dependent variable as measured by the pseudo R-squared. The explained variance for the preceding analysis is .1091 (or roughly 11%) while it is only .0687 (roughly 7%) for the equation including feelings toward Latinos. Thus incorporating feelings toward immigrants appears to explain a greater percentage of the variance. This tentatively suggests that it is a better predictor of immigration preferences.

The probability of supporting immigration restrictions for those who feel coldly toward illegal immigrants is also much greater than the probability associated with feeling coldly toward Latinos (77% versus 56% respectively, see Table 44). Moreover, individuals who feel warmly toward Hispanics have a 42% likelihood of supporting immigration restrictions, while those who feel warmly toward illegal immigrants have a 20% chance of doing so. It seems feasible that these findings might be partly the result of social desirability. Individuals expressing warm feelings toward Hispanics should not also have a high probability of supporting immigration restrictions. Rather, it's highly probably that this group of individuals may have camouflaged their true feelings toward Hispanics. If this is the case, feelings toward illegal immigrants would indeed be a better predictor of immigration preferences than feelings toward Hispanics.

It should be emphasized however that feelings toward Latinos had a very real and strong effect on immigration preferences. Feeling coldly toward Latinos increases the likelihood of endorsing restrictive immigration policies as compared to feeling warmly toward Latinos (56% versus 42%). This effect is generally stronger than the effect of many of the self-interest variables. Interestingly, income loses significance when feelings toward Latinos are controlled for. At the very least, the findings suggest that many Americans associate immigration with Latinos. General feelings toward Hispanics are an important component of immigration preferences.

## **Negative Stereotypy**

In terms of the existing research, cognition has played a conflicted role with some studies finding it to be influential and others failing to substantiate its use. Nevertheless, I posited that the cognitive aspect of prejudice, measured here by stereotypy, would influence policy preferences (see Hyp2P). Looking at the results substantiates this claim (see Table 43, Model 3). Cognition appears to play a strong role in influencing immigration preferences. Believing negative Latino stereotypes significantly affects immigration attitudes. Individuals who endorse negative stereotypes are more likely to support immigration restrictions than those who endorse positive stereotypes (see Table 44, 61% chance versus 37% chance). Degree of negative stereotypy also trumps self-interest in predicting immigration preferences. Interestingly, none of the self-interest variables are significant in the presence of prejudice as measured by stereotypy. Overall, there is strong evidence to support the idea that cognition plays an important role in predicting policy preferences toward immigrants.

## **Controlling for Both Measures of Prejudice**

While each of the prejudice constructs is successful in predicting immigration policy preferences alone, it is important to examine how these results hold up when each is in the presence of the other. Model 4 (Table 43) examines all forms of prejudice simultaneously to see if their individual effects remain strong. Quite surprisingly, all of the variables retain their effect. The influence of negative feelings toward illegal immigrants, for example, remains a significant predictor of immigration preferences when degree of stereotypy is included within the model. Moreover, individuals who endorse negative stereotypes of Latinos remain likely to support immigration restrictions when other prejudice constructs are included within the model. This further substantiates the second hypothesis.

## **Affect vs. Negative Stereotyping**

The last test involves the evaluation of affect in comparison to cognition. I posited that the effect of affective dimensions of prejudice would be stronger than cognitive dimensions (Hyp 3P). A great deal of research suggests that the affective component of prejudice is a better predictor of attitudes than the cognitive component. Interestingly, the probability of an individual who feels coldly toward illegal immigrants supporting immigration restrictions is about 56%. Similarly, the probability of an individual who has a high degree of negative stereotyping stating the same is about 61%. Moreover, individuals who feel warmly toward immigrants have a 42% probability of supporting immigration reductions. Those low in stereotyping have a 37% chance of doing so. In general, there appears to be little difference between the two measures in terms of their ability to predict immigration preferences. Furthermore, the variance explained by each equation is very similar (.0687 for the feeling thermometer and .0703 for stereotyping). Thus, the difference between the two measures in predicting responses to immigration policy is marginal at best. Consequently, there is not overwhelming evidence to substantiate the third hypothesis.

## **Summary**

In general, the results suggest a variety of things. First, feelings toward illegal immigrants appear to be the best predictor of immigration preferences. This is not altogether shocking given the fact that immigration pertains directly to immigrants. The other variables, however, stand up surprisingly well across the models. Moreover, feelings and attitudes toward Latinos are strong predictors of immigration policy preferences. Thus Americans may not strongly distinguish immigrants from Latinos. In addition, because each of the prejudice constructs remains strong when controlling for the other dimensions it seems likely that prejudice can materialize in different ways. Similarly, there appears to be both a cognitive and affective element to prejudice which are distinct from each other.

In summary, the results indicate that prejudice seems to play a defining role in immigration attitudes. Those who feel warmly toward illegal immigrants are more likely to support increases in immigration. This effect remained consistent across model specification as well as across differences in measurement. It is the most robust finding of the research. This of course suggests that prejudice plays a substantial role in informing immigration attitudes. As such, the next section will focus on examining the contexts which give rise to prejudicial attitudes. More specifically, I investigate the extent to which racial antipathy is driven by individual predispositions or environmental constructs.

### **Predicting Prejudice Analysis**

In addition to better understanding how prejudice associated with immigrants is best measured, I would like to investigate the dynamics which contribute to the manifestation of out-group antipathy. One such factor is believed to involve realistic interests. In recognition of the literature on prejudice the definition of interest is not so heavily constrained. Much research suggests that struggles occur both over tangible goods such as money, and more abstract goods such as status and power. I remain agnostic as to which is most important. Moreover, past findings reveal that conflict is heightened by proximity to out-groups. As such, greater levels of prejudice are expected where concentrations of out-groups are large. Consequently, I anticipate that geographic proximity to immigrants should explain white antipathy toward them (see Hyp 4P and 5P).

Similarly, if prejudice has realistic elements related to economic insecurities, then the economically vulnerable should express greater antipathy toward immigrants. For instance, blue-collar workers should feel greater aversion toward immigrants than white-collar workers if prejudice has a realistic basis. Thus, I anticipate that economically insecure individuals will be more likely to have feelings of antipathy toward illegal immigrants.

If the determinants of prejudice are truly the result of contextual information then geographic proximity to immigrants should not predict feelings toward other groups (i.e.

Blacks). Prejudice arising out of realistic conflict should be nuanced and dependent upon circumstance. Thus the effect of geography is expected to vary across ethnic groups. If, however, prejudice is based upon a personality disposition then context may not matter. Constructs like authoritarianism should influence out-group feelings regardless of context. If this is the case then prejudice would exist outside of threat. Moreover, it means that authoritarianism should predict feelings toward all out-groups (see Hyp 7P).

While the dependent variables differ, each is continuous by nature. Consequently, the analysis will be conducted using OLS regression (see Table 45). As a result, the interpretation of the coefficients is a bit more straightforward. Predicted probabilities are not needed to make sense of the results. Furthermore, with the exception of the geographic indicators each of the variables is scored zero to one. As such, the effect sizes within each model are comparable. It should also be kept in mind that the findings represent white working males.

### **Realistic Threat**

Geographic context plays a very interesting role in influencing feelings toward illegal immigrants (see Table 45, Model 1). Contrary to expectations proximity to large Latino populations actually has a negative effect on feelings toward illegal immigrants (see Hyp 4P). Those individuals living in close proximity to large Latino populations are less likely to feel coldly toward illegal immigrants than those living nearby small Latino populations. The effect is statistically significant at the .05 level.

This result is intriguing for many reasons. First, geographic context played a minimal role in predicting immigration preferences. This is not the case here however. Proximity to Latinos significantly influences levels of out-group antipathy. Moreover, the findings completely contradict my expectations. I had anticipated that geographic proximity would have a positive effect on the manifestation of hostility, not a negative effect. Proximity to larger Latino populations, however, predicts the amelioration of prejudicial sentiments. This finding generally supports contact theory. Rather than

heightening racial antipathy, proximity to large Latino populations actually appears to promote feelings of tolerance and general liking.

Somewhat interestingly, the effect of geographic proximity to large Latino populations in predicting prejudice did not hold across the different specifications of prejudice. Individuals living in close proximity to concentrations of Latinos were no more likely to express negative feelings toward Hispanics than those who did not. This finding extends to the cognitive measure of prejudice as well. Geographic proximity to large Hispanic populations had no effect on the likelihood of endorsing negative stereotypes. In addition, this variable had no effect on negative feelings toward blacks. This tentatively supports the idea of prejudice arising out of realistic interests. If prejudice has realistic elements proximity to Latino populations should not predict affect toward blacks.

While proximity to large Latino concentrations had a negative effect on feelings toward illegal immigrants, changes in the Latino population performed in the expected direction (see Hyp 5P). Greater increases in the local Latino population between 1990 and 2000 actually led to more negative feelings toward illegal immigrants. This finding is interesting in that it suggests that individuals are not sensitive to the absolute number of Latinos but to changes in this number. This differentiation actually makes a great deal of sense. Individuals may acclimatize to stable out-group populations. Thus, threat would not be expected to heighten under these circumstances. Changes, however, may signal competition that was not present before. As a result, individuals may be more sensitive to variability than stability. This finding strongly supports the proposed hypothesis.

Similar to the effect of geographic proximity to large Latino populations, changes in Latino populations performed poorly in predicting prejudice across the various specifications. Individuals living in close proximity to changing concentrations of Latinos were no more likely to express negative feelings toward Hispanics than those who did not. Similarly, these same individuals were no more likely to endorse negative stereotypes than those living nearby populations experiencing little growth. In addition, this variable had no effect on negative feelings toward blacks. This greatly supports the idea of prejudice arising out of realistic interests. Proximity to changing Latino

populations should not be able to predict negative feelings toward blacks if animosity is realistically based.

In terms of the last hypothesis, economically insecure individuals (e.g. union members, blue-collar workers, the poor, the unemployed) should feel higher levels of animosity toward illegal immigrants than those who are not so threatened. Looking at the results in Table 45 (Model 1) reveals some complicated relationships. It is immediately evident that very few of the self-interest variables are significant in predicting negative feelings toward illegal immigrants. Being laid off is the only variable representing self-interest which significantly influences attitudes toward illegal immigrants. None of the other variables influences the rated feeling toward illegal immigrants. Furthermore, each of the self-interest variables is in the wrong direction. Not a lot should be made of this finding however as the variables are not statistically significant. On average, it seems unlikely that threat as it pertains to economic insecurities informs prejudice toward illegal immigrants.

Interestingly, when looking at prejudice toward Latinos, the effects of self-interest as it relates to economic insecurities are stable (see Table 45, Models 2 and 3). While the majority of the interest variables fail to significantly predict attitudes toward Hispanics there are some intriguing relationships. Subjective class identity, for instance, plays a positive role in informing feelings toward Hispanics. Individuals who self-identify as working class are more likely to report feeling coldly toward Hispanics than are individuals who identify with the upper-middle class. Similarly, blue-collar workers are more likely to endorse negative Hispanic stereotypes than are white-collar workers. Because the effects differ across the specifications, it is hard to make anything out of these patterns. In general, however, it seems likely that various forms of prejudice are informed by realistic interests.

### **Prejudice as a Psychological Disposition**

Even though prejudice toward illegal immigrants seems to be informed by realistic interests, it is feasible that psychological elements play a role as well. If

prejudice is the consequence of psychological dispositions, then authoritarianism should be able to predict feelings and beliefs surrounding out-groups (see Hyp 7P). This effect should be consistent across groups however. Individuals with psychologically based prejudices should not be discriminating in their dislike.

Perusing the results quickly demonstrates the inconsistent nature of psychological predispositions toward prejudice. While authoritarianism proves to be a significant predictor of feelings toward illegal immigrants, it does not hold across the different models (see Table 45). Individuals high in authoritarianism are more likely to feel negatively toward illegal immigrants than are those low in authoritarianism. This is not the case for the other prejudice constructs however. For the most part authoritarian attitudes do not influence negative feelings or attitudes toward Latinos. Moreover, individuals high in authoritarianism are no more likely to express negative feelings toward blacks than are those low in authoritarianism. These findings do very little to substantiate the psychological underpinnings of prejudice. If authoritarianism truly represents an individual disposition to dislike out-groups then all out-groups should be affected. At this point, it seems likely that attitudes toward illegal immigrants are informed more by realistic threat than by psychological dispositions.

## **Summary**

The evidence to support the manifestation of prejudice as a consequence of realistic interest is both quite strong and intriguing. Specifically, geographic context seems to play a substantial role in influencing feelings toward immigrants. Moreover, the nature of context is quite nuanced. Individuals living in close proximity to large Latino populations were not more likely to express negative feelings toward immigrants as hypothesized. In fact, the opposite occurred. Living in close proximity to large concentrations of Latinos actually reduced the likelihood of expressing animosity toward immigrants. Feelings of animosity were heightened, however, when the population changed. This suggests that individuals are sensitive to changes in the out-group not to their absolute numbers. In addition, this nuanced contextual variable failed to predict

feelings toward African Americans. This further substantiates the idea that feelings toward illegal immigrants are the consequence of realistic interest.

Furthermore, authoritarianism failed to play a consistent role in predicting prejudice. While it significantly influenced feelings toward illegal immigrants, it failed to significantly predict feelings toward other ethnic groups. Its strong prediction of feelings toward illegal immigrants might be related to rule-obedience. By their very nature, authoritarians generally have great respect for both those in positions of power and the rules they create. Thus, authoritarians may take issue with the fact that illegal immigrants have broken the law in coming to the United States. Therefore, their basis for dislike may be predicated upon rule breaking rather than general dislike for out-groups. This is the only way to explain why authoritarians would dislike illegal immigrants but not other groups.

Table 37. Average Feeling Thermometer Rating for Various Groups among White Working Respondents

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Group</b>		
Illegal Immigrants	.607*	.233
Hispanics	.333	.191
Whites	.273	.192
Blacks	.307	.184
Asians	.327	.192
Jews	.327	.196
Gays	.503	.271

Source: 2004 NES

\*Note: The variables were recoded from 0 to 1 where 0 equaled warm feelings and 1 equaled cold feelings.

Table 38. Mean Trait Ratings of Racial Groups among White Working Respondents

	Mean	Standard Error
<b>Hardworking vs. Lazy</b>		
Whites	.370*	.169
Hispanics	.401	.194
Blacks	.497	.180
Asians	.301	.192
<b>Intelligent vs. Unintelligent</b>		
Whites	.345	.179
Hispanics	.456	.164
Blacks	.449	.174
Asians	.329	.190
<b>Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy</b>		
Whites	.382	.174
Hispanics	.462	.181
Blacks	.477	.181
Asians	.412	.177

Source: 2004 ANES

\*Note: The variables were recoded from zero to one where zero equaled positive stereotypes and one equaled negative stereotypes.

Table 39. Percentage of White Working Respondents Giving Negative, Neutral, and Positive Responses to Racial Stereotype Items

	<b>Negative Response</b>	<b>Neutral Response</b>	<b>Positive Response</b>
<b>Stereotypic Ratings For Hispanics</b>			
Lazy	12%*	42%	46%
Unintelligent	15	56	29
Untrustworthy	17	51	31
<b>Stereotypic Ratings For Whites</b>			
Lazy	5%	41%	54%
Unintelligent	3	41	56
Untrustworthy	5	44	51

Source: 2004 ANES

\*Note: Due to rounding percentages may not add to 100.

Table 40. Average Stereotype Scale Ratings of Racial Groups among White Working Respondents

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Stereotypic Ratings</b>			
Whites	.366*	.150	616
Hispanics	.440	.144	614
Blacks	.474	.153	615
Asians	.347	.155	612

Source: 2004 ANES

\*Note: The variables were recoded from zero to one where zero equaled positive stereotypes and one equaled negative stereotypes.

Table 41. Authoritarianism among White Working Participants

	Frequency
Independence or Respect for Elders	
Independence	20%*
Respect for Elders	71
Both	9
Curiosity or Good Manners	
Curiosity	35
Good Manners	54
Both	11
Obedience or Self-Reliance	
Obedience	44
Self-Reliance	44
Both	12
Being Considerate or Being Behaved	
Being Considerate	68
Being Behaved	19
Both	13

Source: 2004 American National Election Study

Note: Due to rounding percentages may not add to 100.

Table 42. Correlations between Prejudice Measures for White Working Respondents

	Illegal Immigrant Affect	Hispanic Affect	Hispanic Stereotypes	Black Affect
Illegal Immigrant Affect	1.00	-----	-----	-----
Hispanic Affect	.2911	1.00	-----	-----
Hispanic Stereotypes	.2223	.3205	1.00	-----
Black Affect	.2539	.6646	.2020	1.00

Source: 2004 NES

Table 43. The Effects of Various Prejudice Constructs on Immigration Attitudes for White Working Respondents

	1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	4 <sup>th</sup> Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.492</b> (.23)	<b>.421</b> (.23)	.275 (.23)	<b>.442</b> (.24)
Latino Presence within Occupation	.436 (1.6)	.446 (1.6)	.550 (1.6)	.341 (1.6)
Union Household	<b>.384</b> (.22)	<b>.411</b> (.21)	.310 (.21)	<b>.379</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.741</b> (.44)	.571 (.44)	.603 (.44)	.696 (.45)
Unemployed	-.002 (.32)	.161 (.31)	.063 (.32)	-.057 (.33)
Subjective Class (Upper-Lower)	-.205 (.28)	-.154 (.28)	-.025 (.28)	-.248 (.28)
Latino Population within County (Small-Large)	-.215 (1.8)	-.923 (1.7)	-1.47 (1.7)	-.289 (1.8)
Change in Latino Population	3.40 (4.7)	6.85 (4.5)	<b>8.84</b> (4.4)	4.39 (4.7)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.428 (.35)	.681 (.343)	.805 (.34)	.467 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.035 (.51)	.364 (.51)	.280 (.51)	.063 (.52)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.419</b> (.18)	-.277 (.18)	-.264 (.18)	<b>-.434</b> (.18)
Age	.812 (.47)	.766 (.46)	.809 (.46)	.936 (.48)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.72</b> (.42)	<b>1.69</b> (.42)	<b>1.82</b> (.42)	<b>1.73</b> (.43)
Feelings toward Illegal Immigrants (Warm-Cold)	<b>3.54</b> (.43)	---	---	<b>3.04</b> (.45)
Feelings toward Hispanics (Warm-Cold)	---	<b>2.33</b> (.47)	---	<b>.985</b> (.51)
Belief in Latino Stereotypes (Low-High)	---	---	<b>3.09</b> (.64)	<b>1.92</b> (.68)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1091	.0687	.0703	.1181
N	500	502	504	494

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 44. Probability of Supporting Immigration Restrictions by Prejudice Construct for White Working Respondents

	Probability of Supporting Immigration Restrictions
<b>Feelings Toward Illegal Immigrants</b>	
Warm (.15)	.2000
Cold (1)	.7679
<b>Feelings Toward Hispanics</b>	
Warm (0)	.4151
Cold (.6)	.5618
<b>Belief in Hispanic Stereotypes</b>	
Low (.167)	.3718
High (.667)	.6070

Source: Predicted from the ordered logit results presented in Table 1 (Model 4). Besides the one of interest, all variables were held constant at their means.

Table 45. Predicting the Antecedents of Prejudice among White Working Respondents

	Feelings Toward Illegal Immigrants	Feelings Toward Hispanics	Hispanic Stereotypes	Feelings Toward Blacks
Blue- Collar Occupation	-.013 (.03)	-.011 (.02)	<b>.030</b> (.02)	-.007 (.022)
Presence of Latinos within Occupation	-.010 (.19)	.121 (.16)	.056 (.12)	.187 (.16)
Union Household	-.019 (.03)	-.022 (.02)	-.004 (.02)	-.008 (.02)
Family Income (High-Low)	-.035 (.05)	-.002 (.04)	-.002 (.02)	-.010 (.04)
Unemployed	<b>.064</b> (.04)	.018 (.03)	.023 (.02)	.008 (.03)
Subjective Class (Upper-Lower)	.010 (.03)	<b>.047</b> (.03)	-.019 (.02)	.026 (.03)
Latino Population in County	<b>-.289</b> (.20)	-.247 (.17)	-.016 (.12)	-.187 (.16)
Percent Change Latino in County	<b>1.08</b> (.52)	.536 (.45)	.001 (.32)	.292 (.42)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	<b>.102</b> (.04)	.023 (.03)	-.003 (.02)	.021 (.03)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	.082 (.06)	-.046 (.05)	-.038 (.04)	-.014 (.04)
Gender (Male)	.021 (.02)	.022 (.02)	.006 (.01)	.022 (.02)
Age	-.034 (.05)	-.029 (.05)	-.048 (.03)	-.042 (.04)
Education (High-Low)	<b>.079</b> (.05)	.049 (.04)	.026 (.03)	.045 (.04)
Authoritarianism (Low-High)	<b>.086</b> (.04)	-.008 (.03)	.035 (.02)	.002 (.03)
R-Squared	.1088	.0380	.0357	.0238
N	507	509	511	509

Source: 2004 ANES

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

### Self-and Group-Interest

In general, the findings involving self- and group- interest are both complex and interesting. There is indeed evidence to support the idea that self-interest influences immigration preferences. Without accounting for geographic proximity to changing Latino populations, union membership and to some extent occupational type seem to play a meaningful role in determining attitudes toward immigration. In both data sets, union members were more inclined to support immigration reductions than were non-union members. Similarly, blue-collar workers were less likely to support liberal immigration policies than those who held white-collar occupations. Why were these two variables influential while the others remained inconsequential? I would posit that they were prominent for different reasons.

In regards to union membership, it seems likely that elite messaging may have played a pivotal role. Unions in the early 1990s took a hard stance on immigration (Ness 2005; Watts 2002). Organizations such as the AFL-CIO openly endorsed restrictive immigration policies. Asserting that immigrants depressed native wages, they proposed severely limiting immigration. It seems understandable then that union members would too oppose immigration. Union rhetoric facilitated the ability of individuals to recognize their best interest. Therefore, union survey respondents were merely reflecting the elite rhetoric of the group to which they belonged.

Even though the effect of occupation wavered somewhat, the variability is justifiable. Its inconsistent influence is not surprising given the nature of the changing labor market. As mentioned previously, the structure of the job market has changed dramatically in recent decades. The composition of the sample demonstrates this nicely. Fewer respondents in the 2004 dataset were likely to have blue-collar type occupations than in the earlier survey. Consequently, blue – collar workers may have felt greater job market threat in the latter time period given the cut backs in manual labor. This would explain why

occupational type played a larger role in the 2004 dataset as opposed to the 1992/1994 survey.

This justification could also explain the inconsistent nature of the income variable. Individuals earning less money were much more likely than those earning more to support immigration restrictions in the 2004 survey as opposed to 1992/94. If income truly captures economic vulnerability, it's not surprising that those who earn less would be in favor of reductions. As mentioned previously, this time period experienced a substantial boost in the number of low-skilled immigrants to the United States. Consequently, there should be a contemporaneous increase in opposition to immigration among the economically vulnerable. In order to test the robustness of these two findings, future research will investigate additional datasets from 2008. Unearthing significant results with more recent datasets would further substantiate the idea that immigrants have grown increasingly threatening as a result of the changing economic climate.

Including geography into the picture, however, complicates the story. In general, context failed to directly affect immigration preferences in a way that was meaningful. Moreover, geographic environments did very little to sharpen the relationship between economic vulnerabilities and immigration attitudes. It was anticipated that large changes in the local Latino population would heighten economic insecurities. First, almost none of the interactive variables were significant across the datasets. The interaction between union membership and geography was the sole influential predictor across time periods. However, the nature of the relationship was not consistent. While in 1992/94 it performed in the hypothesized direction it failed to do so in the 2004 dataset. As a result, it is difficult to say with confidence that the intersection of geography and economic insecurity plays a meaningful role in informing immigration preferences.

In general, the findings suggest that self-interest seems to play a limited but important part in influencing immigration preferences. Because some of the results are a bit unexpected, however, I intend to discuss a few alternative explanations. One such account involves the media. It seems feasible, for example, that individuals obtain information regarding immigrants and immigration from the mass media. As a result, media usage may be useful in explaining immigration preferences. In addition, the unanticipated findings could be the consequence of measurement error. If this is the case then uncovering

significant relationships could have been made more difficult. Consequently, I explore how some of the measures could be flawed. These include but are not limited to the dependent variable as well as a variety of the key independent variables.

### **Alternative Explanations**

As a whole it's interesting that attitudinal beliefs were not conditioned by geographic proximity to immigrant populations. Of course this leads one to wonder what the findings might signify. Or to ask how self-interest is consequential in areas where there are not large local immigrant populations. It seemed logical to assume that geographic location would heighten or exacerbate anxiety felt about immigration among the economically vulnerable. This was not the case however. As mentioned previously context failed to significantly predict immigration preferences, either directly or indirectly. Why then did individuals behaving self-interestedly when not in close proximity to immigrant populations? A few alternative explanations are briefly explored as a way to illuminate the findings.

### ***Media Effects***

As an institution the media plays an integral role in informing the public. While historically some scholars have questioned the ability of media to persuade (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) there currently exists a great deal of research demonstrating its importance in the daily lives of Americans. It is widely accepted, for example, that the mass media plays a critical part in helping to set the national agenda as well as to select and frame news stories for audience consumption (Entman 1993; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Gamson 1992; Graber 1988). Consequently, it seems likely that this powerful institution has the ability to shape public opinion on immigration. While media frames regarding immigration can be either positive or negative, a great deal of research suggests that the media tends to be biased toward the negative (Padin 2005; Santa Ana 1999; Santa Ana, Moran and Sanchez 1998). For example, content analysis of 283 news

articles conducted by Coutin and Chock (1997) revealed that illegal immigrants were often described using negative language such as criminal, impoverished, and threatening. Conversely, additional research demonstrates that frames on different sides of the debate (i.e. those endorsing immigration restrictions versus those embracing a welcoming environment) were given equal time on television news (Hayes 2008). The frames, however, did differ in their sourcing. The restrictive news frames were more likely to employ government officials and politicians as sources while liberal news frames were more likely to employ immigrants themselves or individuals at rallies. Because credible sources have a greater likelihood of shaping public opinion, this finding is of great importance (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman 2001).

Given these circumstances it seems likely that individuals who obtain their information regarding the latest immigration trends via the mass media would hold negative attitudes toward immigration. Moreover, it seems feasible that these effects would be recipient dependent. More specifically, the economically vulnerable should pay greater heed to media coverage of immigration as it pertains directly to their livelihood as opposed to those who are less vulnerable. This coincides with surveys indicating that individuals employed in low-skill, low-wage occupations are more likely to fear competition from immigration than those who are not (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Research does in fact suggest that media effects are moderated by individual level variables (Druckman 2001; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997). Moreover, self-interest has been demonstrated to be relevant to issues concerning persuasion (Petty, Cacioppo and Goldman 1981). Thus it seems likely that individuals affected by immigration, even if only in the future, would be most influenced by negative news coverage. While current research does not specifically address this idea, it could easily be explored with an experimental method design (i.e. by creating different news frames and seeing if self-interest acts as a moderator).

### *National versus Local Circumstances*

Rather than using information involving personal circumstances to inform opinions and decision making individuals may instead be influenced by affairs at the

national level. This phenomenon has been demonstrated within the literature on voting behavior. Evaluations of the national economy are more persuasive than personal economic status in determining candidate preferences (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). Similar findings have been established in the immigration literature as well. Individuals appear to weigh concerns for the national economy over personal circumstances when deciding immigration preferences (Citrin, Green and Muste 1997). Lahav (2004a), for instance, found that fears surrounding the economic situation of the nation as a whole were more predictive of immigration preferences than were individual level circumstances such as employment status. As a result she concludes that fear as it relates to immigration is associated with larger societal trends not personal factors. Unfortunately, when a national variable was included within the current research no effect appeared (see Table 46). Individuals who feared that the national economic situation was getting worse were no more likely to support immigration restrictions than those who felt it was either getting better or had remained the same. Furthermore, the effects of self-interest remained strong. Individuals belonging to blue-collar occupations, union members and the poor were more likely to support immigration restrictions. This is not to say that national circumstances are not of importance in general, only that the current research was unable to detect a significant effect. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that immigration attitudes are driven by perceptions of national well-being rather than individual circumstances.

### **Measurement Concerns**

Even though the findings support the idea that self-interest plays a role in informing immigration preferences, they are somewhat limited. I propose this may be the result of measurement issues. Some of the concepts may have played a limited role due to the manner by which they were assessed. Quite a few of the independent variables, as well as the dependent variable, could have been measured better and/or differently. Their poor assessment may have led to difficulties in detecting meaningful relationships. These concerns will be addressed in the ensuing sections. I will first discuss issues related to some of the independent variables before I address the dependent variable.

## *Independent Variables*

### *Defining Threat*

Perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses of the analysis lies in the difficulties associated with capturing threat. Within the literature, scholars often objectively define populations purported to be threatened. In political science researchers select self-interested individuals based upon whether or not they are affected by the policy in question. Women, for example, are believed to feel greater anxiety over legislation proposing to limit insurance benefits for abortions. Therefore, scholars often impose threat on those whom they believe should feel threatened. It is feasible however that some of those selected never actually experience feelings of threat. Thus, in the case of this analysis, blue-collar workers may never feel endangered by changes in the local Latino population. As threat is not directly measured it is uncertain if it is being captured. This decreases the likelihood of unearthing statistically significant relationships.

Moreover, it is debatable if objective standards can actually define threat. By its very nature threat may be subjective, thus precluding the possibility of measuring it impartially. Therefore, individual measures (i.e. assessments of threat perception) may ultimately be better gauges of endangerment than objective ones. The latter may only lead to spurious generalizations. At the very least, individuals who are objectively determined to be threatened should state feelings of threat. As such, subjective perceptions of threat would ideally corroborate objective identifiers.

There are compelling reasons to use objective identifiers, however. Perhaps the most cogent argument involves the tendency to couch prejudicial sentiments in subjective measures. Individuals who dislike Latinos may assert feeling economically threatened even if no threat exists. Because overt prejudice is socially unacceptable some individuals may communicate their feelings of antipathy through feelings of endangerment. As a result, subjective measures may be nothing more than expressions of prejudice. Consequently, even though objective identifiers may not always accurately classify individuals at least the measures don't reflect something they are not. Thus, even though

using objective identifiers may make detecting significant relationships more difficult the variables are at least what they purport to be. This ultimately justifies the use of objective measures over subjective ones.

### *Occupational Change*

As mentioned previously objective measures may not necessarily be the most precise tools in gauging threat. I have done my best, however, to increase precision where possible. Occupational type is a great example. Even though there was a great deal of variation in regards to occupational groupings I forced workers into a somewhat arbitrary blue-collar/white-collar dichotomous division. This arrangement groups together individuals who may actually have very little in common in regards to feeling threatened by Latino immigrants. It is not necessarily the case that all blue-collar workers are threatened by changing Latino populations. Consequently, the dichotomous variable most likely lacks precision. In order to address this issue, I assessed the presence of Latinos within an individual's occupation. Even though its effect was limited within the analysis, theoretically it should have been better able to capture threat. A further improvement would involve investigating changes in the number of Latinos in one's occupation. It seems likely that sudden influxes of immigrants within certain industries, like construction, could be more threatening than the mere presence of Latinos. A variable capturing this could better gauge threat and any consequent attitudes towards immigration.

An attempt at generating this measure was made, albeit unsuccessfully, as the Census implemented major changes in its occupational classification schema between 1990 and 2000. In order to maintain comparability across the time periods the NES provided both classifications schemes within the 2004 dataset. Thus it was possible to relate each respondent's 2000 occupation to a 1990 occupation. Major issues arose, however, in matching the occupational codes at the county level within the same time period. As mentioned in the Data and Methods chapter, the Census provides racial breakdowns of certain occupations at the county level. These breakdowns are not consistent across the years though. Thus it is impossible to compare racial changes at the

county level across the two time frames. While this information could have yielded a more precise measure of occupational threat creating the indicators is not feasible.

### *The Conflation of Immigrants and Latinos*

Because information is not available regarding immigrant populations at the county level, a rough proxy (i.e. Latinos) assessing geographic threat was employed. Consequently, throughout the entire analysis Latinos are conflated with immigrants. However, many Latinos have been living within the United States for generations. As such they may not necessarily share the same attributes of newly arrived immigrants (e.g. education levels, skill levels, proficiency in English). Thus proximity to Latino populations may not actually capture geographic threat as it relates to immigration from Central and South America. The only way this would invalidate the research, however, would be if immigrants did not actually settle into areas with long standing Latino populations. There is much research suggesting this is not the case. On the whole, immigrants typically flock to locations with established immigrant communities (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, and Taylor 1993). Furthermore, in the case of the United States, just a few states (i.e. California, Texas, Arizona, New York and Florida) have been host to a majority of the incoming immigrants (Frey, Liaw, Xie and Carlson 1996). This also happens to be where a vast majority of the Hispanic population habituates (Pew Hispanic Center 2006-Table 14). As such it seems likely that immigrants are living alongside American Latinos. Consequently, the Latino population at the county level remains a respectable proxy for immigration threat. If anything it only diminishes my ability to detect meaningful relationships.

### *Group Interest*

In general, it is not clear if group interests were measured effectively. The ANES merely asks respondents to state class affiliation. Theories on group attachments, however, commonly attribute two factors associated with subjective group membership:

social identity and common sense of fate (Huddy 2003). Social identity is often conceived as both an awareness of group membership as well as a sense of attachment to the group (Tajfel 1981). The measure within the NES fails to account for sense of common fate (Huddy 2003). Better measures would attempt to incorporate both attachment and linked fate as a means of capturing group identification.

Furthermore, there is reason to believe that individuals vary both in the extent to which they identify with groups as well as the intensity to which they do so (Huddy 2003). This differentiation has real significance for attitudes and behaviors. Research demonstrates, for example, that strong group identification predicts a variety of attitudes and behaviors related to the political world (Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 2006; Tate 1993). Therefore, measuring strength of group identification could provide the greatest precision in testing existing theories. Unfortunately, the class measure within the ANES captures neither sense of common fate nor identity strength. Consequently, it seems unlikely that class identification was optimally assessed.

Interestingly, however, group membership was inconsistent in its influence. While there was no evidence of a significant relationship between class identification and immigration preferences within the 2004 data set, there was a statistically significant association in the 1992/1994 dataset. Thus, it can not be confidently asserted that issues of measurement were at play. If this were the case then the concept would have been insignificant across the two time periods.

### ***Dependent Variable***

#### *Precision Concerns*

One potential problem with the dependent variable is that it lacks precision. It queries whether individuals would like to see general reductions or augmentations in immigration levels. It does not specify or refer to specific groups of people or countries. Consequently, the current dependent variable is unable to parse out the extent to which immigration attitudes are a function of country of origin. As a result, immigrants from India are lumped together with immigrants from Mexico. Theoretically, if an individual

feels threatened on the labor market as a result of low-skilled immigrants he should not support reductions in the number of people allowed to enter from places such as India, which typically sends high-skilled immigrants. A better question would assess the extent to which respondents are accepting of immigration from specific geographic locations. If certain immigrants pose greater labor market threats this would manifest in the responses. For example, blue-collar workers would be more likely to oppose immigration from places like Central America. They should not realistically oppose immigrants from areas like India. Opposition to all immigrants regardless of realistic threat takes on the appearance of prejudice and xenophobia.

#### *Paucity of Immigration Measures*

The analysis is also somewhat limited in that it employs just one dependent variable throughout. Unfortunately, none of the ANES surveys includes questions pertaining to other immigration policies. As a result I am unable to test if the findings are robust across various policy arenas. It could be that individuals respond differently to various immigration policies. For example would a self-interested individual be more likely to support liberal immigration policies if they were based upon the unification of families rather than meeting the needs of the labor market? It would also be interesting to see if respondents behave in accordance with their beliefs. Would someone acting in their self-interest vote for a political candidate who was strict on immigration for instance?

#### *Relation to Immigrant Policies*

Moreover, it might be worthwhile to investigate the extent to which self-interest informs opinions on immigrant policies. These policies typically deal exclusively with immigrants once they are in the United States. Immigration policies, on the other hand, decide who is allowed and/or denied entrance. Individuals negatively affected economically by immigration might be more punitive toward the groups that threaten them. Consequently, they may be more likely to seek the enactment of harsh policies toward those living in the US. They could be more likely to agree, for instance, that immigrants who do not have legal documents should be sent back to their countries.

Furthermore, they could be more willing to deny government benefits like Social Security and Medicaid to newcomers. Of course, the wealthy could also support restrictions on these benefits as they would be the ones to foot the bill.

### **Economic Threat versus Symbolic Threat**

Rather than being explained by economic threat, sentiments toward immigration could be influenced by cultural threat. Much scholarship theorizes conflict arising as a result of differences in 'symbolic' interests (Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999). These issues typically involve differences in morals, values and group norms and are likely to stem from a concern for the preservation of traditional culture. Research has found, for example, that cultural unity preferences have a greater effect on immigration attitudes than do economic issues (Sides and Citrin 2007). As a result, hostility is the consequence of threats to culture and national identity, not self and/or group-interest. This theory is particularly compelling in regards to immigration as immigrants share neither a culture nor a history with their host country. Consequently, natives could fear that immigrants will defile the dominant culture by imposing their values onto it. This could explain opposition to attempts to make English the national language.

Because neither data set includes questions regarding cultural threat it is impossible to directly test this competing hypothesis. However, if cultural threat is truly related to national identity it can be measured somewhat indirectly. The 2004 ANES included five patriotism questions, one of which queried the importance of being American to the respondent. It seems likely that individuals with strong American identities might also feel culturally threatened by immigrants. This relates to research showing that American identity is often associated with being white (Devos and Banaji 2005). Moreover, this association is positively correlated with strength of national identity. Individuals with strong national identities are more likely to associate the American identity with being white. Thus it seems probable that those who strongly identify as American would also express greater opposition to immigration.

Including importance of American identity into the analysis does have a strong overall effect. Individuals for whom American identity is important are more likely to

support immigration restrictions than are those who do not believe it to be important (see Table 47). The effects of self-interest remain strong however. Individuals belonging to blue-collar occupations, union members and the poor are more likely to support immigration restrictions than their counterparts. Thus, it can not be said that the effects of identity mitigate the influence of economic variables.

While including the patriotism measure into the analysis is informative, nothing substantial can be deduced from it as the concept does not directly test the idea that culture is being harmed. Threat is inferred from the measure but not directly measured. Even though individuals who place greater importance in American identity are more likely to support reductions in immigration it says very little about threats to identity. The findings suggest, but do not truly test, the idea that individuals feel culturally threatened as a result of immigration. A better assessment would gauge the extent to which individuals believe immigrants to harm the existing culture.

### **Does Public Opinion Matter**

There currently exists a heated debate within the political science literature concerning whether or not public opinion actually translates onto policy outcomes. Some scholars argue that actions taken by politicians while in office are quite disconnected from what the public desires and believes (Beck and Camarota; Fetzer 2000; Freeman 2005). More specifically, liberal immigration policies tend not to reflect the restrictionist attitudes of the public at large. Some have argued that the two do not actually diverge by demonstrating that elites hold opinions that reflect those of the public at large (Lahav 2004b). Additional research suggests that public opinion regarding immigration is actually nuanced in that individuals base their opinions upon region of origin (Lahav 2004a). As such, individuals differentiate between persons from EU countries and persons from non-EU countries. Support for restrictions among the population is consequently the result of surges in the latter group but not the former.

Looking to research that investigates linkages between parties and immigration numbers unearths similar findings. Lubbers and Scheepers (2001) demonstrate the importance of contextual factors in explaining support for extreme right-wing voting.

More specifically, right-wing popularity is contingent upon the number of asylum seekers within a country. As the number of asylum seekers increases so too does the popularity of these parties. Additional research reveals that the endorsement of right-wing groups supporting immigration restrictions is often strongest among manual workers as well as the unemployed (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Lubbers and Scheepers 2001). Likewise, support for discrimination toward immigrant groups is generally highest in times of high immigration (Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers and Verkuyten 2008). Thus there appears to be a direct connection between public opinion and the election of elites who reflect similar viewpoints.

In general, public opinion seems to matter most in regards to its effect on public policy when issues are salient or important to those involved. When an issue is salient, politicians are more likely to listen to public opinion (Hill and Hurley 1999) and candidates have a greater probability of taking an issue position (Graber 1989). In addition, individuals are more likely to pay attention to the behavior of politicians on an issue that is relevant to them (Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990). Consequently, public opinion regarding immigration should have a great impact on legislative outcomes. This is due in part to the fact that Americans have repeatedly ranked immigration as one of the top ten issues facing the nation (see Dunaway, Abrajano and Branton 2007). As a result, it seems likely that immigration attitudes should inform the public policy discourse. At the very least, the probability of public opinion affecting the behavior of politicians on this issue is greater than it is on issues that lack salience.

## **Prejudice**

### **Measuring Prejudice toward Immigrants**

In general, the analyses provide strong support for the idea that prejudice plays a defining role in immigration attitudes. Those who felt coldly toward illegal immigrants were much more likely to support immigration restrictions than those who felt warmly toward them. This effect remained consistent across model specification as well as across differences in measurement. Individuals who feel coldly toward Latinos are more likely to

support reductions as well as those who endorse negative stereotypes of them. The effect of prejudice is the most robust finding of the research. Moreover, the results on prejudice measurement suggest a variety of things. First, feelings toward illegal immigrants appear to be the best predictor of immigration preferences. This is not altogether shocking given the fact that immigration pertains directly to immigrants. The other variables, however, stand up surprisingly well across the models. Feelings and attitudes toward Latinos are strong predictors of immigration policy preferences. Thus Americans may not strongly distinguish immigrants from Latinos. In addition, because each of the prejudice constructs remains strong when controlling for the other dimensions it seems likely that prejudice can materialize in different ways. Similarly, there appears to be both a cognitive and affective element to prejudice which are distinct from each other. In general, however, prejudice appears to play an influential role in informing immigration preferences.

### **Explaining Prejudice**

The findings also support the idea that prejudice toward immigrants manifests as the result of realistic interest. The evidence to substantiate this claim is both quite strong and intriguing. Specifically, geographic context seem to play a substantial role in influencing feelings toward immigrants. Moreover, the nature of context is quite nuanced. Living in close proximity to large Latino populations did not predict the expression of negative feelings toward immigrants as hypothesized. Quite surprisingly, the opposite occurred. Living in close proximity to large concentrations of Latinos actually reduced the probability that an individual would harbor animus toward immigrants. Feelings of animosity were heightened, however, when Latino populations changed. This suggests that individuals are sensitive to the variability in out-group numbers not their absolute levels. In addition, this nuanced contextual variable failed to predict feelings toward African Americans. This further substantiates the idea that feelings toward illegal immigrants are the consequence of realistic interest.

Moreover, authoritarianism failed to play a consistent role in predicting prejudice. Even though it influenced feelings toward illegal immigrants, it was not a significant

predictor of feelings toward other ethnic groups. Furthermore, its influence on feelings toward immigrants could be related rule-obedience. Authoritarians generally have great respect for both those in positions of power and obedience to rules. As such, they would probably take issue with the fact that illegal immigrants broke the law in coming to the United States. Therefore, their basis for dislike may be predicated upon rule breaking rather than general dislike for out-groups.

### **Stereotypes as a Measure of Prejudice**

Concerns could be raised about the stereotypy measure of prejudice however. As mentioned previously it is unclear if stereotypes are in fact manifestations of prejudice. Because group generalizations are transmitted through social environments, knowledge of them becomes inescapable (Erlich 1973). However, just because an individual is aware of contemporary stereotypes does not mean he actually endorses them. Knowledge of group generalizations does not necessarily translate into the personal adoption of these stereotypes. Consequently, awareness of Latino stereotypes might not convert to negative feelings toward Latinos. As such, it is unclear if the stereotype measure actually captures prejudicial sentiments.

### **Social Desirability**

In past decades social scientists were able to ask explicit questions gauging levels of prejudice and feel confident that the responses reflected racial animosity. However, as overtly racist behavior in the public arena has slowly become both illegal and unacceptable it is subsequently much harder to detect these beliefs in survey settings. While some contend this is in part due to its amelioration (Sniderman and Carmines 1997) others have argued that racists have learned to camouflage their beliefs in subtle and covert ways (Jackman 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000). Consequently, it seems likely that some of the prejudice measures may not accurately gauge out-group animosity. It's not apparent that the current research is affected by this very real dilemma

though. While survey respondents were reluctant to admit negative feelings for Latinos this was not the case for illegal immigrants. Participants were very willing to admit feelings of animosity for the latter group (the mean thermometer score for Hispanics was .333 as compared to .607 for illegal immigrants). Therefore, it seems likely that survey respondents were not hindered by issues of social desirability in stating their feelings for illegal immigrants. This can not be said for the Latinos however.

### **Obedience to Law Concerns**

In addition, it seems likely that individuals who dislike illegal immigrants may do so as a result of them having broken the law. These respondents may generally believe that laws must be upheld and obeyed. Consequently, the measure assessing feelings toward illegal immigrant may actually represent dislike for disobedience rather than dislike for immigrants. A better measure would assess feelings toward immigrants in general. Unfortunately, the NES does not include this variable. As a result it is impossible to examine if the feeling thermometer captures dislike for disobedience rather than dislike for illegal immigrant. There are no measures within the 2004 dataset gauging appreciation for law obedience.

### **Prejudice as the Result of Sociocultural Factors**

One limitation of the research on prejudice in general is that it fails to address prejudice as the manifestation of sociological learning. Scholars who study the sociocultural elements of prejudice believe it arises as a result of the external environment. One manner by which this occurs is through socialization. According to this theory, group antipathy develops out of historical and cultural processes. Dominant groups within society create negative portrayals of low status groups as ways of

justifying their superiority. These portrayals are then communicated both across time and between individuals as part of the socialization process (Blumer 1958; Sears 1988; Simpson and Yinger 1985). Consequently, prejudice is the result of information environments. Exposure to negative information regarding specific groups affects personal beliefs regarding these groups. These beliefs are difficult to eradicate as they remain relatively stable throughout an individual's life (Sears 1988). Indeed, Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) find that an environment's educational composition best explains negative racial attitudes. Consequently, out-group antipathy is greater in environments with many poorly educated people. This implies that animosity is the result of the socio-economic composition of an area not the result of its racial make up. While this could be true, I find strong evidence of realistic interests informing attitudes about immigrants.

### **Implications**

The implications for this research within the political realm are tremendous. If immigration is the result of competition then those in decision making positions would best be served to shape these contexts. Therefore, if animosity is the consequence of competition politicians could attempt to create more and better jobs for those competing. These policies would not be effective, however, for prejudice that is the result of psychological dispositions. Moreover, if prejudice manifests out of realistic interests it should vary over time with the realities of that competition. As such, it would be expected to be variable by nature as well as context- dependent. In sharp contrast, explanations based on enduring predispositions suggest more stable views on immigration policy. In terms of governmental action, political servants could feasibly address prejudice arising out of realistic interests successfully. Animosity that is the consequence of predispositions is much harder to address however. As such, understanding how prejudice manifests is of great importance for both political scientists and politicians as well.

Table 46. Effects of Realistic Threat and National Well-Being Perceptions on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy

	Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.451</b> (.24)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low- High)	.539 (1.6)
Union Household	<b>.415</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.730</b> (.44)
Laid Off	-.064 (.33)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.197 (.28)
Percent Latino in County	-.245 (1.8)
Change in Latino Population	3.42 (4.7)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.489 (.37)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	.032 (.52)
Gender (Male)	<b>-.395</b> (.18)
Age	.759 (.47)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.72</b> (.43)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm- Cold)	<b>3.51</b> (.43)
National Economic Perceptions (Much Better- Much Worse)	.364 (.38)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1066
N	494

Source: 2004 ANES

Table 47. Effects of American Identity and Realistic Threat on Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy

	Model
Blue-Collar Occupation	<b>.470</b> (.23)
Latino Presence in Occupation (Low- High)	.725 (1.6)
Union Household	<b>.384</b> (.22)
Family Income (High-Low)	<b>.862</b> (.45)
Laid Off	.027 (.33)
Class Identification (Upper-Lower)	-.216 (.28)
Percent Latino in County	-.432 (1.8)
Change in Latino Population	4.06 (4.7)
Party Identification (Dem-Rep)	.375 (.35)
Ideology (Lib-Cons)	-.228 (.52)
Gender (Male)	-.348 (.19)
Age	.724 (.47)
Education (High-Low)	<b>1.69</b> (.42)
Feelings toward Immigrants (Warm- Cold)	<b>3.53</b> (.43)
Importance of American Identity (Not Important-Very Important)	<b>1.31</b> (.50)
Pseudo R-Squared	.1140
N	499

Source: 2004 ANES

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## Appendix

### Question Wording

#### Immigration Level

1992/1994-(variable # in NES-vcf0879)

“Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be: increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?”

2004- (V045115)

“Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be: increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?”

#### Occupation

1992/1994-(vcf0154a)

2004-(V043262N)

“What is/was your main occupation? (If not clear)What are/were your most important activities or duties?”

#### Class

1992/1994-(vcf0148)

2004-(V043298)

“There's been some talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging in one of these classes? If yes: Which one? If no: Well, if you had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle class or working class? Would you say that you are about average middle/working class or that you are in the upper part of the middle/working class?”

#### Union Membership

1992/1994-(vcf0127)

2004-(V043290)

“Do you or anyone else in this household belong to a labor union?”

## **Income**

1992/1994-(vcf0114)

2004-(V043293X)

“Please look at this card/page and tell me the letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in [previous year] before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. (If uncertain:) What would be your best guess?”

## **Work Status**

1992/1994-(vcf0118)

2004-(V043289A)

“We'd like to know if you are working now, temporarily laid off, or are you unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, a student, or what? (If student or homemaker:) Are you doing any work for pay at the present time? (If retired:) Are you doing any work for pay at the present time? (If disabled:) Are you doing any work for pay at the present time? (If student or homemaker and answered working for pay:) About how many hours do you work on your job in the average week? (If retired or disabled and answered working for pay:) About how many hours do you work on your job in the average week?”

## **Prejudice Measures**

### **Feeling Thermometers**

Illegal Immigrants

1992/1994- (vcf0233)

2004- (V045081)

Hispanics

1992/1994-(vcf0217)

2004-(V045081)

Blacks

2004- (V045077)

I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person and I'd like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person. If we come to a person whose

name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.

1992: Hispanic Americans

1994: Hispanics or Latinos

2004: Hispanics (If necessary: Hispanic-Americans)

1992,1994: Illegal Aliens

2004: Illegal Immigrants

### **Stereotypes**

2004-(V045224, V045228, V045232)

Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be "hard-working." A score of 7 means that you think most people in the group are "lazy." A score of 4 means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in between.

Where would you rate Hispanic-Americans on this scale?

The next set asks if people in each group tend to be "intelligent" or "unintelligent".

Where would you rate Hispanic-Americans on this scale?

The next set asks if people in each group tend to be "trustworthy" or "untrustworthy".

Where would you rate Hispanic-Americans on this scale?

### **Authoritarianism**

2004-(V045208, V045209, V025210, V045211)

Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: independence or respect for elders

Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: Curiosity or Good Manners

Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: Obedience or Self-Reliance

Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: Being Considerate or Well Behaved

## **Education**

1992/1994- (vcf0140a)

2004- (V043254)

What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?

Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test?

What is the highest degree that you have earned?

## **Ideology**

1992/1994- (vcf0803)

2004- (V043085)

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

## **Party Identification**

1992/1994- (vcf0301)

2004- (V043116)

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what? Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party?

## **Subjective Evaluations of the Economy**

1992/1994- (vcf0871)

2004- (V043098)

Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? If respondent thinks economy has gotten (better/worse) in the last year: Much [better/worse] or somewhat [better/worse]?

## **Subjective Evaluations of Personal Financial Situation**

1992/1994- (vcf0880a)

2004- (V043062)

We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you (and your family living here) are better off or worse off than you were a year

ago? If respondent's family has been [better/worse] off in last year: Much [better/worse] or somewhat [better/worse]?

**Patriotism Measure**

2004- (V045149X)

Is being an American extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important to you personally?