PILGRIMAGES THROUGH MOUNTAINS, DESERTS AND OCEANS: THE QUEST FOR INDIGENOUS CITIZENSHIP (PUNO 1900-1930)

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At the dawn of the twentieth century, the initiative of a group of peasants from the province of Chucuito (Department of Puno, Southeastern Peru) produced a wave of peasant mobilization that shook the control hacendados had over the area establishing an unprecedented dialogue with the state. Peruvian peasants historically have been denied a political role in the nation: their political contributions being reduced to violent revolts. This study, focusing on a southern highland region characterized by indigenous majorities and ethnic diversity (Aymaras and Quechuas), aims at showing the existence of an alternative peasant national project based on ethnic citizenship. Peasants developed short and long term strategies and projects, which argue against the images of irrationality and millenarian thought that have characterized peasant studies. I will argue that revolts were far from being the main political tool of Puno's peasantry. Instead, they countered abuse mainly through the means of litigation, civil disobedience, and renegotiation of the 'tributary pact' with the state.

I have tried to retrieve the peasant voices that claimed justice and full citizen rights from 1900 to 1930, by drawing information from the documents presented by peasant representatives to the state, administrative reports, official correspondence, lawsuits, national and regional newspapers and secondary sources. Following the footsteps of traveling messengers, I have analyzed their proposals, petitions, and actions—particularly the building of communal schools and creation of defensive organizations. I have also tried to understand why this projected multiethnic nation slammed up against a wall of repression due to hacendado, peasant, and state misconceptions and clientelistic relations of power. By adopting hacendado racial prejudices, the Peruvian state forced the peasantry to abandon its discourses on ethnic citizenship and move on to class-oriented discourses with very different consequences for the country.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGN: Archivo General de la Nación
ARP: Archivo Regional de Puno
CPDIT: Comité Pro Derecho Indígena Tahuantinsuyo
DGAI: Dirección General de Asuntos Indígenas
DGCC: Dirección General de Comunidades Campesinas
MA: Ministerio de Agricultura
MI: Ministerio del Interior
MT: Ministerio del Trabajo
PRI: Patronato de la Raza Indígena
SAI: Sección de Asuntos Indígenas
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INTRODUCTION

Peru has always defied becoming a nation. After almost two centuries of republican life the country remains divided in geographic and racial terms. It suffices to look at some of the political events that have baptized the new century. In the 2006 presidential elections, two middle class candidates born and raised in Lima (and curiously both French speakers) disputed the votes of a population divided over racial identifications. The election was won by the Coast’s white candidate, Alan García, though his sun-tanned mestizo opponent Ollanta Humala obtained over 70% of the votes in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurimac, Cuzco and Puno.¹ These strong racial-geographical divisions have not translated, however, into strong ethnic political movements as in Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Mexico.² Peruvians had to wait until the twenty-first century to see an ethnic representative sitting in Congress: Aymara woman Paulina Arpasi representing Puno. In 2006, two representatives from Cuzco took their oath in Quechua: Hilaria Supa and Maria Sumire. They were harshly criticized by a sector of Congress for using their mother tongue in an official ceremony. Supa, a daughter of hacienda colonos that worked as domestic servant before becoming an activist for the peasant women’s movement, was at the origin of a media scandal when in April 23, 2009, a newspaper published a page of her notes pointing at evident orthographic and grammatical mistakes. The newspaper questioned Supa’s right to sit in Congress given her limited knowledge of Spanish…

In the Peruvian Republic, the political rights of non-Spanish speakers are still questioned. It is a country where Quechua and Aymara citizens can be linked to irrationality and granted a pre-political character. On 2004, the mayor of Ilave (Puno) Cirilo Robles Callomamani, accused of corruption, was lynched and assassinated by a mob. In 2006, the mayors of Pucará and Arapa were sequestered. Newspapers and analysts talked about the “efecto Ilave”: the expression of social discontent through violence towards authorities. Though the situation evidenced restrictions to citizen participation, corruption, intransigence, authoritarianism, opposition to established political customs and the absence or ineffectiveness of proposals from the central State, the focus was put on violence and on the irrational character of Ilave’s Aymara population.³

The present study will focus on the inability shown by the Republic to embrace or accommodate indigenous majorities. “Peru is a country and society where the concepts of ethnicity and race have been and are very much suppressed, both in society at large and within the marginalized indigenous populations.”⁴ Mobilization has developed along class lines trying to ignore entrenched racial codes even within the racialized other. The result has been a violent and

³ Social scientists have pointed out to Aymara identity as the only important ethnic identity in Peru. This paradigm was reinforced by the events of Ilave in 2004. After mayor Robles’s assassination, the general explanation that remained within the national imaginary was that these events were the expression of the idiosyncrasy of a different and particular people: the Ayamaras. Ilave became in the national memory the symbol of lynchings, popular justice and violence. Personal conflicts resolved with violence have been thrown at the peasantry masked as communal justice to avoid judicial persecution, thus feeding the common belief in indigenous violence.
disconnected nation fractured by socio-political conflicts. According to Thorp, Caumartin and Gray-Molina, Sendero avoided ethnicity because it was "a potentially self-defeating move for the essentially mestizo/ladino leadership", but repressive forces saw in ethnicity ground for suspicion and associated it with political activism. Indigenous people accounted for 73% of the casualties during the conflict. Only then, affirm the authors conflicts became 'ethnicised'. (Thorp, Caumartin & Gray-Molina 2006: 456)

I will argue that social conflicts in Peru were always ethnicised and only became class-conflicts in the late 1920s. Colonial racial identifications remained after Independence and gained strength after the War with Chile. As Jacobsen pointed out, castes did not disappear and the legacies of colonialism remained. (Jacobsen 1993) In the late nineteenth century, ethnic discourses spread all over the country at all levels, reaching their apotheosis in the early 1920s when peasant initiatives came close to establishing a new tributary contract with the Central State. Ethnic discourses will only be abandoned in the late 1920s due to the failure of ruling elites to overcome their fear of politically active peasant masses and cope with the idea of a multicultural society. Cultural racism prevailed and repression forced ethnic politics into hiding, behind class discourses. 1960s historians and sociologists espoused the idea of a transition from a caste to a class society, erasing Indianness. Ethnicity seemed to be negative for the country. (Jacobsen 1993: 2) This dissertation will narrate the story that forced ethnic discourses underground, hindering the possibility of building a plural and integrated nation, in which Indianness and citizenship could be compatible terms.

The Department of Puno, located between 3,500 and 4,000 meters over the sea level (12,000 and 14,000 feet), constitutes a privileged area to study peasant-elites and peasant-state relations. Puno is the fourth largest department in the country with the greatest indigenous population. In relation to its resources the area is overpopulated and since the late colonial period (with the end of the mining economy) it depends almost solely on the export of wool (sheep and alpaca). Hence it is an area extremely vulnerable to changes within the market. The arrival of capitalism through the wool market generated a harsh process of land concentration that produced a strong peasant mobilization: Puno concentrates a large part of the peasant revolts signaled for this period. The Department also offers a wealth of geographical, cultural and socioeconomic factors creating an extremely diverse rural population. The department is situated in the border with Bolivia and only separated from Chile by the Department of Tacna. Its population is a mix of three different languages and cultures: Aymara, Quechua, and Spanish (urban areas). Quechuas occupied Northern more tempered climates with less productive soils and more scattered populations; areas of pastoral activities were haciendas expanded the most. Aymaras prevailed in the South, in more densely populated areas bordering the lake and Bolivia. Small properties have predominated in these areas with a more diversified economy (agriculture and fishing) depending less on livestock raising and haciendas.

According to Dan Hazen, “there has been remarkable consensus in contrasting the “passive and melancholy” Quechua with the “warlike and aggressive” Aymara.” Aymaras were described by Western anthropologists as “hostile, deceitful and insecure”. (Hazen 1974: 12; Briggs et al 1986:

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5 National censuses set the population of the Department in 537,345 in 1896 and 646,385 in 1940. According to the 1940 census, Puno was the most indigenous department: only 7.5% of the population was registered as "whites or mestizos". At the national level, whites and mestizos accounted for 52.89%, while Indians accounted for 45.88% of the population. The distinction between whites and mestizos had been erased since the previous census of 1874, yet the difference between mestizos and Indians remained as elusive. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 3; Bourricaud 1967: 7; Hazen 1974: 11-12)
They were able to maintain their economic independence to a larger extent than Quechus. (Tamayo 1982: 37, 171) And yet, Quechua areas more prone to hacienda expansion were the site of some of the bloodiest revolts since colonial times. More recently, scholars have described Aymaras as tenacious and anchoring to their culture and way of life. Aymaras tend to identify themselves as active, independent and entrepreneur and to describe Quechas as pacific and conservative. Aymaras in fact have benefited from commercial and cultural ties to Bolivia, the valleys of the Southern coast of Arequipa, Moquegua, Tacna and even Ica, and with the jungle of Puno, Cuzco and Madre de Dios. The specificity of this process of economic conquest is that it has been accompanied by ethnic revindication. The movement of revindication of ethnic citizenship that we will be studying will start in an Aymara area (Santa Rosa, Chucuito) and end in an Aymara area (Wancho Lima, Huancane) pointing to the existence of a stronger ethnic organization. Nevertheless, many Quechua peasant groups will keep up with their Aymara peers especially in the provinces of Azangaro (where Rumi Maki’s revolt occurred) and Puno (where Spanish and literacy were more diffused).

This study has also focused in Puno due to the specificities of its mestizo and white population. Puno did not have a large white population as the neighboring department of Arequipa. It lacked a strong political party, had only one secondary school (until a few decades ago) and did not count with a university gathering and guiding most intellectuals. Unlike Cuzco, Puno could not call upon the legacies of a glorious Inca Empire. (Tamayo 1982: 30; Bourricaud 1967: 35; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 2) In spite of this or maybe due to this, Puno developed a more diverse but also more militant brand of indigenismo going from complete identification with the Indian to open paternalism. This mostly autodidactic and organic indigenismo was evidenced by a strong involvement and collaboration of the middle classes with indigenous groups. Puno’s peasant mobilization would not have reached the organicity levels it reached without the support of indigenistas. But this support was sometimes given at a high price, diminishing peasant agency and developing competing images of the nation and of the role of indigenous majorities in it.

This dissertation will try to recuperate peasant agency, stressing the rationality and pragmatism of peasant discourses and initiatives. A key issue is to destroy “the myth of peasant incapacity to organize autonomously and participate independently in the political arena”. (Fioravanti 1974: 1) In 1896, illiterates were banned from voting. Indigenous peasant majorities were deprived of political force at the moment they faced an increased pressure on their resources due to capitalist growth and pre-capitalist forms of production. Starting in 1901, peasants approached the central State with an ethnic discourse that aimed at recuperating political power and State protection underlining indigenous contributions to the State, economic capacity and means for self-development and growth. “Indigenous citizens” addressed the President of the Nation to denounce local authorities and hacendado abuses and claim protection of their rights to free labor, property and education. They were heard by the State, especially by governments that tried to co-opt peasant organizations to strengthen their political force and interests. For a couple of decades, peasants and State maintained an ethnic dialogue that fed the anxiety of provincial elites until 1927. This story ends when the administration, unable to sustain its pro-indigenous promises, abandoned its support of the Comité Pro Derecho Indígena Tahuantinsuyo, the most important organization created by the peasant movement to reach citizenship.

This situation, I will argue, was produced by three interrelated factors. First of all, peasants were unable to overcome racial discourses identifying Indianness with illiteracy and irrationality.
Though peasant intellectuals\(^6\) developed an acute analysis of the situation, an empowering discourse with pragmatic solutions, and even a broad network of support, they failed to create binding relations with the sectors that could guarantee their gains, mainly middle classes and ruling elites. One of the main reasons why they failed to create a lasting compromise with the sectors holding political power, I believe, was the parallel existence of a paternalist discourse that maintained a clientelistic pattern of subordination to ruling sectors. Second of all, Puno developed a militant indigenista activism that supported peasant claims and initiatives but was also unable to build long lasting ties with the central government and was, in the end, reduced to act at the local level. Indigenismo failed in Puno because only a few individuals overcame racial preconceptions and personal interests to respond positively to peasant’s appeals for help. Finally, the State understood the need to integrate the peasant majorities into the nation but it failed absorb peasant discourses into a totalizing hegemonic project. The strength of racial discourses hindered the ability of the State to reach its goal of granting full citizen rights to indigenous majorities. Ruling elites could not imagine a multicultural national and amazing political developments based on ethnic discourses were identified as revolts, repressed and replaced by ideologically brewed and conducted class discourses that only increased social and political violence.

This situation would explain why, though peasants mobilized and developed non-violent strategies to participate in the ethnic configuration of the nation, they have hardly appeared in historical accounts. In the early 1990s, Marta Irurozqui, a Spanish scholar studying Andean republican elites questioned the need to study peasant political participation:

\[\ldots\text{en lo referente al gusto y casi imposición académica de estudiar a los sectores populares para encontrar otro camino de construcción nacional, sería importante hacer mención a la trampa ideológica que supone dar relevancia teórica a grupos sociales que en términos materiales y mentales se mantienen en la mayoría de las ocasiones, políticamente marginales. (Irurozqui 1994: 92)}\]

In her rejection of academic currents and ideological tendencies, Irurozqui erased centuries of peasant political activity and assumed the mental and political marginality of the peasantry. These were the arguments that maintained for a long time Indigenous masses away from the writing of Peruvian history.

In the 1960s, structuralist historians stressed the need to study the lower classes. Through the analysis of the social and historical conditions that produced collective violence, peasants were seen as playing an active historical role.\(^7\) Latin American historians followed this lead strongly

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\(^6\) Steven Feierman developed the term “peasant intellectual” while studying rural political discourses in the Shambaii Kingdom in Tanzania. He emphasized the connection between culture (ideas and cultural objects) and social action (agency). Peasants as political agents modeled and remodeled their discourses according to their social position and interests within larger areas of power and cultural production. Continuity and creativity were compatible phenomena, since the continuity of certain discursive tools did not indicate political conservatism. Shambaii peasants did not lack a discursive consciousness; they lacked practical consciousness, the knowledge to effectively play the game (bureaucratic habits). (Feierman, Steven. Peasant Intellectuals. Anthropology and History in Tanzania. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).

influenced by the structuralism of the CEPAL, dependency theory and the agrarian reformist thought of the 1950s and 1960s. They focused on hegemonic processes and turned social actors into expressions of economic forces (hacendados, bourgeois, merchants, middle classes, workers, and peasants). The official political scene was a reflection of the confrontation of these forces’ economic interests, and it could be explained in terms of oppressors and oppressed. As a result, revolt became the main (and sometimes only) mode of peasant political action and it was doomed to fail due to the absence of class-consciousness.

In the 1970s, peasant studies still imbued with structuralist perspectives saw the need to reinterpret the past to respond to recent political events. Most of all they needed to understand why going against the grain of regional political developments (right wing military dictatorships), Peru had developed a radical left-wing militarism that carried out an agrarian reform with a rather weak opposition from the landowner class. Most of all, scholars needed to explain why this agrarian reform turned out to be a failure and why peasants started to unionize only in 1960s. The underlying premise was once more the lack of class-consciousness in spite of oppression. This analysis, trapped in the conceptual and ideological frames of the period, could only see in the past feudal modes of production, rural traditionalism, a remote market and peasants incapable of adopting the socialist ideas brought to them by urban activists.

For Wilfredo Kapsoli (1977), the period between 1919 and 1924 was a period of rebellions. It was the first sample of rural collective consciousness, but it was due to middle-class indigenistas who took over the millenarian ideas of the peasantry, worked them and popularized them through their writings. Peasant ideology was seen as confusing mix of millenarian arguments, social, economic and political reivindications (legalization of property titles, elimination of taxes, suppression of forced and unpaid labor, and punishment of corrupt and abusive authorities). Kapsoli granted a very limited role to peasant leaders and their political proposals. A similar argument was developed by Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo (1979) who affirmed peasant revolts showed a growing consciousness but also the participation of external elements, intellectuals and organizations, which caught upon peasant initiatives. These authors pointed at the coexistence of two parallel discourses: a rational political discourse developed by peasant organizations such as the Comité Pro Derecho Indígena Tahuantinsuyo and an irrational or less rational utopian discourse that explained the anachronistic or inexistent national consciousness of the peasantry. Millenarism was a widespread ideology among peasant intellectuals but it was not strong enough to settle the differences capitalism had created among peasant groups. By emphasizing utopian traditions, these scholars viewed rural political culture as a response or reaction to repression (not an initiative) based on irrational elements.

In the 1980s, in an attempt to incorporate the peasantry into historical analysis, peasant studies emphasized everyday forms of resistance, violent and non-violent acts of confrontation that
went beyond sporadic or isolated revolts.11 These studies acknowledged that the emphasis on structural and economic topics had silenced peasant political participation beyond uprisings and revolts, viewing them as atomized in their politics and social existence and “parochial in their ideological outlook lagging behind national developments”. (Cooper et al. 1993: 14) Steve Stern proposed localized long-term studies to analyze peasant mobilization beyond revolt, integrating peasant economic strategies, labor processes, social networks and culture. The goal was to evidence peasant political ideas and their evolution within the context of social and cultural networks both in peaceful and violent times. (Cooper et al 1993: 14) It was not, however, until the 1990s that peasant studies finally surrendered the need to find class-consciousness focusing on peasants as national political actors.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, studies stressed creativity and political participation beyond the local environment to determine the peasantry’s role in the process of State formation. Post-revisionist historians studying the Mexican Revolution came up with the concept of negotiation from below, stressing how popular classes challenged the Mexican revolutionary State and forced it to redraw its forms of power. William Roseberry evidenced forms in which popular political culture produced alternative meanings to those imposed by authorities.12 Repression occurred due to the need of the dominant order to establish forms of acceptance and discontent, but the lack of a common language and the multiple forms of understanding and translation produced breakings and silences that allowed for the understanding of the relation between popular culture and State formation.13 Following the lead of these studies, this dissertation has focused on localized (Puno), long term (1900-1930) and non-violent political action and the formation of interclass and intercultural alliances to recuperate the role of rural masses in the development of the nation state, and find out how peasants articulated their political claims and visions into the broader political and intellectual debates of the period, negotiating from below their role in the nation.

I have also tried to respond to some of these studies arguing against the idea of a peasantry silenced by repression. In the mid 1990s, Florencia Mallon studied the formation of the State and national identities in Mexico and Peru. She concluded that unlike Mexican elites, Peruvian elites developed an insecure state unable to absorb popular discourses in an “official” version of the nation. Peruvian intellectuals remained isolated and thus incapable of articulating local and national projects. After Tupac Amaru’s rebellion was crushed, potential popular nationalisms fractured. The result was exclusion not coalition or cooptation. The peasantry confronted with constant repression was unable to participate in the nationalist narrative. Peruvian elites failed in the long run process of nation building due to the pervasiveness of clientelist systems that weakened hegemonic nationalism. Popular discourses were left with no effect in the national agenda and the consolidation of the State.14 Though I agree with Mallon’s arguments of an insecure state unable to


become hegemonic and isolated intellectuals caught in clientelism, I disagree with the argument of a numbed popular discourse unable to participate in the nationalist narrative.

As Irurozqui has pointed out, Mallon’s perspective would imply that popular discourses are only listened when they enter the national sphere, thus ignoring and underestimating the existence of alternative or parallel political cultures that might still be affecting society. Peasant discourses on ethnic citizenship did not effectively shaped state policy they did however remain in indigenista and official discourses and imaginary for decades. They also survived in the historical memory of Puno’s peasant groups and intellectuals as a legacy of ethnic pride and leadership. Furthermore, as I have argued, when peasant mobilization was repressed, peasant intellectuals were not silenced. They changed their strategies abandoning ethnic discourses and state alliances to adopt class discourses and unionist support. These strategic adjustments would explain the relative absence of a strong ethnic movement in contemporary Peru.

Another path-breaking work of the late 1990s was Mark Thurner’s From Two Republics to One Divided. Thurner analyzed the legal discourses of Huamanga’s indigenous groups in the nineteenth century to elucidate meanings and political strategies developed after the fall of the colonial regime. Huamanga’s peasants maintained or re-elaborated colonial definitions of their role in society and remained a constant political actor involved in the creation of meanings. Thurner’s rich analysis concluded that indigenous culture developed as a different dimension, separate from and even confronted to the coastal “national” culture. Repressed Peruvian peasants were silenced or kept outside the national narrative. Much like Huamanga’s peasants, Puno peasants elaborated ethnic discourses drawing from colonial peasant-state relations developing a parallel and often confronting discourse of nation-building. Thurner’s conclusion of a silenced peasantry and of an abyss separating peasants and state is, however, too pessimistic and disempowers peasant leaders. Peruvian peasants are once more suppressed as actors from the national political scene due to the bourgeoisie’s failure to find its historical destiny as hegemonic elite. State and elite repression could silence discourses not people.

Furthermore, I will argue that ethnic discourses were silenced not just because ruling elites were unable to cope with them. Ethnic discourses were silenced because they were not voiced appropriately. I will not blame the peasantry for a not developing a class consciousness but I will blame the peasantry for its attachment to paternalist discourses and clientelistic relations. Paternalist discourses trying to gain the protection and good will of the State through images of Indian passivity and helplessness had proved useful before. In the early twentieth century however they worked against empowering discourses of indigenous citizenship. Restoring peasant agency entails giving peasant leaders a role in the failure of Peru’s hegemonic processes. The Peruvian nation has lacked a hegemonic ideology not just because of bourgeoisie limitations; peasant leaders had their own limitations. They were unable to impress on the state a power-loaded political discourse of ethnic citizenship.

Paternalist discourses and clientelistic relations had helped the peasantry maintain its partial autonomy. According to Allen F. Isaacman’s, the peasantry’s ability to mobilize its own work force, access to land and overall control over its subsistence has determined the degree of autonomy from the State and the dominant classes. The power of the State in rural areas has been mediated by local and political institutions; but the power of these institutions has been limited by the degree of autonomy of the peasantry, circumscribing its capacity to penetrate rural society. “In short, the

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peasant labor process enabled them to shield critical resources and to implement individual remedies to combat state and ruling-class oppression. Partial autonomy and the realization of their limited power would explain why peasants preferred localized or isolated forms of resistance instead of large social movements and remained attached to paternalist discourses and clientelistic relations. For both oppressor and oppressed the main terrain of contention was negotiation to redraw this partial autonomy. The rationality of either one is not questioned. (Cooper et al. 1994: 208)

A similar argument was developed by Nils Jacobsen in 1993. Jacobsen rejected the teleological view of Latin American societies as changing to ineluctably reach capitalism. In Puno, market impulses, labor process, legal norms on property did not bring capitalism, but monopoly, clientelism and communal solidarity. Transition to capitalism never materialized; it remained a mirage. Local hacendados lacked a profit optimizing perspective and were caught in local disputes for power with their peers and with peasant communities. Even foreign merchants who benefited the most from the wool export failed to transform production. The changing aspirations of colonos and communal groups and their fight for autonomy and power in an era of major land concentration and export expansion, also explained the failed transition. Besides giving us an excellent social and economic perspective of Puno in the early twentieth century, Jacobsen showed how the legacy of colonialism prevailed due to all the groups involved, including the peasantry. Peasant intellectuals were rational actors taking decisions according to the circumstances and developing discourses carrying old and new meanings. Their decisions and discourses influenced the political scene and are partially responsible for what resulted in the long run, including repression.

This dissertation owes much to Marisol de la Cadena’s study of indigenous mobilization in Cuzco, mainly to her discussion of racial discourses, Southern elite’s exaggeration of peasant violence, the limitations of indigenista support and the role of the CPDIT in the peasant movement. I have also drawn a great deal of input from Dan Hazen’s doctoral dissertation, an impressive effort to identify the forces that brought change to Puno in the first half of the twentieth century. Through a thorough review of the period’s newspapers and publications, Hazen drew important conclusions mainly related to peasant private education initiatives, Adventist labor and the responses of the State.

During the research and writing of this dissertation I was obviously confronted with Spivak’s question: can the subaltern speak? Before being able to answer this question I was confronted with many difficulties. In 1985, the Prefecture of Puno caught fire burning a large section of Puno’s archive. What could be recuperated was thrown into a courtyard and watered down. Many of the documents I reviewed were disintegrating in my hands and could not be photocopied. Others were unreadable or hard to read because the firemen’s water had dissolved the ink. Large amounts of judicial and prefectural documents were bundled by decades with no real order. The archive has

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17 “In short, the process of change in the Peruvian altiplano was driven by the same forces that propelled the transition to capitalism elsewhere – impulses from the market, the labor process, and the legal norms on property. Yet these forces provoked a reawakening and readjustment of an older set of social forces that constituted serious obstacles to the emergence of capitalism: monopoly, clientelism, and communal solidarity.” (Jacobsen, Nils. Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano, 1780-1930. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993: 6)

moved at least twice since the fire and has lacked the resources and personnel needed to reorganize the materials in a faster and more effective way. In Lima, the Bureau of Indigenous Affairs had no documents older than the 1980s. The Ministry of Labor denied having any documents from the early twentieth century. The documents taken by the SINAMOS (organism coordinating the creation of cooperatives during the agrarian reform of the early 1970s) seem to have vanished. The Archivo del Fuero Agrario was clearly maimed, as were many other archives I tried to reach.

In spite of these limitations, I was able to analyze a large amount of material showing the development of rural ethnic political discourses in Puno in the early twentieth century. The archives of Lima and Puno are sowed with traces left by peasants defending their rights and their communities, traces that multiply exponentially thanks to the absolute love for paperwork of an anxious and often disconcerted bureaucracy. I worked mostly with memorials or letters written by or in the name of indigenous messengers and sent to the Executive, the Prefect of Puno, the Bureau of Indigenous Affairs, the Patronato de la Raza Indígena and even the Ministry of War. These documents allowed me to approach peasant demands and strategies. Court cases and official reports offered a rich amount of information about the contention or discursive encounters of peasant, middle class and elites. I complemented these primary sources with pamphlets and articles issued or printed by indigenous and indigenista organizations, radical and conservative newspapers.

I have approached these documents defining culture politically as the texts and practices of everyday life, the terrain of conflict and contestation, consent and resistance, "a key site for the production and reproduction of the social relations of everyday life." (Storey 1996: 2) Popular culture is a privileged source to study the continual struggle over meanings "in which subordinate groups attempt to resist the imposition of meanings which bear the interests of dominant groups." (Storey 1996: 4) I have tried to analyze the way peasant articulated their discourses for and within indigenista, hacendado, and official audiences.19 "A text or practice or event is not the issuing source of meaning, but a site where the articulation of meaning –variable meaning(s)- can take place. And because different meanings can be ascribed to the same text or practice or event, meaning is always a potential site of conflict." (Storey 1996: 4) As my dissertation progresses I hope to unravel the different meanings peasants and their audiences assigned to "Indigenous", "citizenship" and "gamonal", nation-building terms that became the main sites of conflict in this story.

Chapter One develops the national and regional framework for understanding peasant unrest and political mobilization. Focusing on the four issues driving State peasant relations (land, labor, taxes and suffrage) this chapter contextualizes the political story that will unravel in the next chapters. Chapter Two follows the rise of grassroots leadership networks and their mobilization for justice to stop growing local abuses in the early 1900s. Chapter Three unveils the climate of rising violence in the Department produced by increased hacendado pressure on communal land and fear of peasant mobilization. This chapter will focus on the unrest prevailing in Azangaro in 1915 trying to reveal the role played by the famous external element "Rumi Maki Qori Soncco". Responding to preconceptions of a violent peasantry, Chapter Four deals with the issue of education, a recurrent theme and demand in peasant discourses evidencing a long-term, peaceful,

19 Stuart Hall’s term “articulation” (double meaning to express and to join together) is used to explain the processes of ideological struggle since meanings are always expressed in a specific context, conditioned by the context of articulation. (Storey, John. Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture: Theories and Methods. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996: 4)
cultural strategy of insertion into the nation. Chapter Five marks the zenith reached by the peasant-state dialogue initiated in 1901. The new administration of Augusto B. Leguía aimed as modernize and centralize the country and developed for this purpose strong pro-indigenous discourses and initiatives that fostered a boom in peasant mobilization. This was the time the Comité Pro Derecho Indígena stirring peasant hopes and hacendados' worst fears. Chapter Six explains how local, regional and national elites responded to peasant initiatives developing their own strategies to stop the advance of peasant ethnic citizenship. Chapter Seven follows the peasant movement after the death of the CPDIT pointing at the new directions taken by peasant leaders and their constituencies.

Thus will progress this story placed in Puno, a story of rational political actors struggling to be inserted into a multicultural nation, actors with long time strategies, acting beyond violence. By stressing peasant initiatives, strategies, networks and alliances at the local, regional and national level, I hope to show Puno's indigenous peasants as active producers of meanings that could effectively respond to political changes and windows of opportunity, changing their strategies when confronted with failure and repression. I also hope to show the limitations of peasant, elite and official ethnic discourses to explain why, at the dawn of the twenty first century, the political rights of non-Spanish speakers are still questioned in the Republic of Peru.
CHAPTER ONE
THE INDIAN AND THE REPUBLIC:
THE ELUSIVE RIGHTS OF PUNO'S RURAL MASSES (1860-1900)

By the mid nineteenth century, Puno was a rural department, over 95% Aymara and Quechua. Though social hierarchies were rigid and mobility scarce, there were few differences between town and country and the department’s economy was dominated by peasant activities. In the last decades of the century, however, many factors affected peasant life and economy, diminishing the power and autonomy of indigenous groups. Capitalist modernization, the growth of the wool export market, the pressing needs of an unstable state always in crisis and the weakness of local and national elites produced an unprecedented pressure on peasant resources and labor. Peasants were carrying the burden of building a nation that kept curtailing their autonomy and political power, and they were growingly aware of it. The following pages will unravel the basis of rural unrest and mobilization in early twentieth century Puno, focusing on the four aspects that, I believe, have shaped peasant relations with the rest of society and the State: land, labor, taxes and suffrage. Peasants bore the blunt of capitalist modernization and State fragility.

ENDANGERED LANDHOLDING

The Department of Puno is a vast extension of plains between 3,500 and 4,000 meters over the sea level surrounded by two mountain chains: the Cordillera Oriental that explains the little impact of the Amazonian forest on the area’s climate, and the Cordillera Occidental, desertic, volcanic, and with little possibilities of agricultural production. Puno has developed mainly as a pastoral area, with over 60% of its surface covered by natural pastures. Arable lands account for barely 3.2% of Puno’s regional surface and production is subject to constant climatic uncertainties (sudden frosts, cyclical or periodical droughts, unexpected inundations, etc.). (Tamayo 1982: 34; Bourricaud 1967: 2-5) The roughness of these conditions, the dependency on nature and the reliance on human labor explain the interdependency that has prevailed in Puno’s peasant society.

During the nineteenth century, most of the indigenous population lived in an ayllu or parcialidad.20 (Bourricaud 1967: 87-89) Substantial differences of wealth and position sprang from the number and antiquity of a clan, the resources available, state impositions and the growing privatization of communal lands. Nevertheless, communities strove to maintain the common ownership or usufruct of pastures, agricultural lands with a fixed crop rotation for common consumption (barley, oats, quinoa or lima beans), lands set aside for the payment of fees to religious and civil authorities (yanasis) and special appurtenances such as lakes, watering holes, springs and mineral deposits. (Jacobsen 1993: 261) The ideal of Andean society was self-sufficiency inside a group of relatives. Economic and commercial (exchange) activities were

20 The term parcialidad usually referred to “all landholdings within a geographic area demarcated more or less clearly along customary lines. Even estates owned by hispanized large landholders were described as situated within a parcialidad. Parcialidad was also the preferred term for the institutional aspects of the community, the hierarchies of religious and civil offices that gave form to the organization of communal solidarity and articulated the relations with governors, justices of peace, and parish priests in the districts.” The term ayllu was used with essentially the same meanings as parcialidad while the term comunidad referred to common property or usufruct. (Jacobsen 1993: 260) Though Bolivarian decrees identified peasant groups as “communities of Indians”, peasants did not use the term until the 1920s. They preferred the terms “ayllu” and “parcialidad”. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 21)
organized through family links. (Manrique 1988: 67) According to Bourricaud, peasant links to the community responded to the image of the community as being of their own and authentically Indian. The community served as a defense against the serfdom that weighed on hacienda Indians and as a form of expression of their originality. (Bourricaud 1967: 128)

The colonial regime had decreed "only land held outside the community guaranteed relatively safe possession to the peasant." Communal lands in Puno were irreversibly affected. According to Jacobsen, only a considerable increase in private landholding by Indian peasants in late colonial Azangaro could explain "the paradoxical combination of low population density, incipient hacienda formation, and the scarcity of communal land." (Jacobsen 1993: 90) Still, a widespread concern about peasant impoverishment and fiscal revenues had led colonial and early republican governments to worry about the scarcity of land. They were forced "to keep a watchful eye on the preservation of the Indians' land base." (Jacobsen 1993: 127)

In 1824, Simon Bolívar declared Indians owners of the lands they worked, which they could sell or transfer in any way they wished. Communal lands should be distributed according to ordinances among landless Indians who would become owners. The rest should be sold as State lands, at two thirds of the legal price, giving preference to those already established, working, renting or inhabiting such lands. (Lynch 1979: 1) In July 1825, Bolívar's decree was added a precision: those denominated Indians were to become absolute owners of the lands they occupied with the limitation that those lands were unalienable until the year 1850. The law of March 31, 1826, established yet another limitation. Justice and convenience demanded Indians and mestizos to be landowners, however, given the tutelage under which they had lived for centuries and the need to develop primary instruction to take them out of such state, the State limited property sales to literate owners and declared land surplus to be used for funds for a local school. (Lynch 1979: 14-15) Indians were deemed unable to handle private property; they were rule "incapable."

The indigenous community was a growing political problem. Property was the most stable foundation of citizenship and the landowner was the most suited to exert civil rights since the political corps of citizens ruled the country as they did their properties. (Demélas 2003: 394) The liberal ideal was a minimum state that would easily enforce the respect of a small number of natural laws for a medium landowner society: the large landowner would not perceive the general interest and the poor or landless were unconscious of their rights and were easily controlled by despotic adventures. The most pervasive project of the most diverse political leaders was the destruction of the community. (Demélas 2003: 396, 519) Indigenous rights to land, mainly to communal land, had been ensured so far by the State's dependence on the personal contribution. Guano incomes tilted the balance. The Supreme decree of July 5, 1854 pointed out that Indians continued to live as slaves, and the main reason was that they paid an unfair contribution imposed three centuries and a half ago that destroyed all possibility of progress. Once free of this humiliating tribute, and elevated by the effect of civilization, Peru would have a numerous and productive population offering a wealthier contribution not bathed in tears and blood. (Lynch 1979: 5) Once the State guaranteed its fiscal independence with guano incomes, it lost interest in protecting peasant lands, and liberals started once more targeting indigenous communities. The Community was seen as an obstacle to progress, a cultural factor to be replaced by the homestead production unit (family property, unsizable due to debts). No law or decree dared to outlaw Indian communities. "Not even the civil code of 1852 abolished communities; it merely followed the legislative tradition, well established by then, of disregarding the institution altogether." (Jacobsen 1993: 128; Lynch 1979: VII; Larson 2002: 105-106)

In 1876, the State declared Indians free to establish contracts amongst themselves without the intervention of authorities. The local state was not to interfere in the repartition of lands belonging
to indigenes allowing them to dispose of them in complete freedom. (Lynch 1979: 16) This decree was confirmed on October 1893: the State ruled that indigenes were the legitimate owners of the lands they possessed then. (Lynch 1979: 15, 45-46) This according to José Frisancho, puneño lawyer serving as fiscal agent of the Province of Azangaro in 1916, removed all legal barriers to the greed of mistis. (Rénique 2004: 39) Constant hesitation and indecision regarding communal lands will allow the growth of latifundia and turn communities into bastions of resistance and peasant independence.

Though communal lands were essential for a group’s survival they were not increasing. Human and livestock population was. From 1876 to 1940, Puno’s population rose in 250%. (Rénique 2004: 26) “The land resources in the communities were often becoming too scarce to provide the buffer that would allow amiable settlements of conflicts arising out of greater pressure of livestock populations on available pastures within the descent groups.”21 (Jacobsen 1993: 286) By the early twentieth century parcialidades continued to provide some institutional cohesion to peasant groups, but growing internal communal differentiations made them more vulnerable to internal and external pressures. Ayllus with extra pasture lands rented plots to other laborers or foreigners to pay communal taxes or avoid mandatory services. This weakened the close relation between access to land and labor obligations and redefined land as a commodity, a source of rent rather than a part of all the productive resources of the community. Resources were seen as private property and alienated from the social relations structure (rights and responsibilities that led to communal help and labor). (Larson 2002: 118)

Private property ensured (most of the time) landholding for either individuals or communities, while the periodical redistribution of communal lands meant the leveling of poverty for those who continued acting within the system of social relations. Those who had gone out of the system turned their lands into private property and often searched to increase their holdings at the expense of former fellow communal peasants. The pressures brought by regional and extremely competitive export markets threatened even further the subsistence, autonomy and symbolic space of communities of peasants, shepherds, artisans, merchants, muleteers and seasonal workers. (Larson 2002: 120-121)

When wool demand started to rise, communal Indians were its main producers. According to Spalding, “the hacienda was not the dominant agrarian institution in the Southern Sierra until the early twentieth century.” (Spalding 1977: 29) Until the 1850s, the transference of land from the peasant sector to the hacendado sector was rather slow. (Jacobsen 1982: 245; Calisto 1991: 172; Rénique 2004: 29) In 1840, however, Titus Salt installed weaving machines adapted for alpaca fiber creating a British demand for this product. (Appleby 1982: 59) Between 1840 and 1920 the exports of sheep, llama and alpaca wool remained relatively constant, with some cycles of expansion (1850-1872, 1915-1919) and contraction (1872-1897, 1914-1915). (Spalding 1977: 30) Hacendados eager to increase their participation in this growing market faced however many limitations, mainly the coarseness and poverty of pastures, the lack of enclosures and the unavoidable presence and pressure of shepherds with their own cattle. This translated into a low

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21 The growing economic differentiation among families within the ayllu produced conflicts over access to land resources. “Even where land was used jointly by all nuclear families of descent groups, they usually operated their own livestock herds. Inevitable this independence led to a differentiation of wealth. As one peasant increased his herds by marriage, purchased some livestock, and was able to keep down the mortality of his animals, his relative might have lost sheep during a harsh winter or might be forced to sell animals to defray the costs associated with communal office. (…) In such a situation the more affluent peasants within the group sought to augment usage rights to the land in any way they could.” (Jacobsen 1993: 268)
productivity that in the best of cases amounted to five pounds of wool per adult animal. (Martínez 1982: 76) Unable to increase production through technical improvements or modern relations of production, hacendados chose to encroach on peasant resources. The growing demand for wool fostered the expansion of haciendas over small landowners, Church and communal lands. The number of haciendas in the department of Puno rose from 703 in 1876 to 3,599 in 1915. (Flores Galindo 1977: 153; Calisto 1991: 173; Tamayo 1982: 89)

The expansion of haciendas was done by a relatively new regional bourgeoisie: merchants and money-lenders, militaries and civil servants arriving to the region. Some acquired their lands through inheritance or marriage, others as military prices. They sought prestige by becoming landowners more than wealth. But they were also reacting to the paralyzed economy. Land was one of the few securities or deposits of wealth on the long run, together with the gold and silver accumulated by the family as jewels or craftsmanship. The financial and commercial oligarchy that became landowning reproduced the agricultural commercial system developed during the colony: they did not base their economy on one sole export product; they also produced for internal consumption and supply which allowed them to protect themselves in times of price changes. (Glave 1986: 218-224)

Sometime around 1860, Carlota Echenique (issued from a mining family) inherited hacienda “Sollocota” located between the districts of Azangaro and San José. She managed to increase the livestock and infrastructure of the property and passed it onto the two sons she had from two marriages with military men Colonel Cecilio Urquiaga and Arequipeño Colonel Bernardino Arias. The two half brothers José Sebastián Urquiaga Echenique (born in 1857) and Bernardino Arias Echenique (born in 1860) expanded their property, while going into business as alcohol and wool merchants in the town of Azangaro. Between 1891 and 1905 they bought together sixty-five separate properties near the hacienda. Up to 1915 they absorbed the properties of peasants and weaker landowners taking hold of almost the whole district of San José and extending to neighboring districts San Anton and Potoni. In twenty-five years they formed another large hacienda, “Quimsacallco” later called “San José” (new names were used to erase any souvenir of usurpation), place of origin of the Rumi Maki revolt. (Tamayo 1982: 160-162; Jacobsen 1993: 227-228)

Peasants were seldom willing to give up control over their land. However, the “heightened volatility of prices for pastoral goods, demographic pressure, and a consolidated hispanized elite with more power and money all contributed to force thousands of poor and middling peasants to relinquish control over their lands and become colonos on estates. In most cases the sale of land was not the consequence of long-term impoverishment but of a relative loss of autonomy. The capacity of many peasants to minimize the effects of the cyclical crises on their household economy through the solidarity of the community was diminished. An increasing share of their exchange relations was with the hierarchy of hispanized traders, shopkeepers, and commercial agents.” (Jacobsen 1993: 285) These clientelistic links were not always based on deceit or coercion. Peasants could obtain protection, credit, and foodstuff in times of need. “Some peasants accepted dependence on a paternalistic gamonal as a prudent course of action without being a victim of specific entrapment beyond that constituted by the structure of society.” (Jacobsen 1993: 230-231) These voluntary alliances were not however the norm; the main mechanisms of expansion were forced sales, foul systems of buying and selling and violent usurpation. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 55)

Hacendados remained aware of conflicts within a community or a family. They offered their help in money and resources, as well as in lawyers, notaries and private connections. Their protégés often won the trials and acquired the legal property rights over a plot or plots. At this
point, the *hacendado* asked for reimbursement, forcing his or her “protégés” to sell or surrender lands to pay or to avoid further confrontations and losses. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 58-59; Cáceres Olazo 2007: 147-149) *Hacendados* took advantage of families in dire straits or weak moments. They acted when male integrants were away, called to military service or other duties (denouncing them if they failed to attend military conscription). They also profited from the death of a peasant to present themselves to the family with legalized papers of a debt contracted by the deceased or a promise of land sale. (Jacobsen 1993: 231) The debts could be real: peasants borrowed money to face an illness, the costs of a marriage, a political appointment or a *cargo* in a religious feast. However, many debts were forged or simply inflated through exaggerated interest rates. Micaela García was, in 1860, a small landowner from the district of Asillo (Azangaro). In less than ten years she became a large landowner based on usury and forced sales. She lent money to peasant families and recovered it in the form of lands. Adoraida Gallegos was another *hacendado* from Azangaro that increased her *hacienda* “Micullani” by lending money to her peasant neighbors. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 58-59)

*Gamonales* used their personal power and clienteles to falsify documents, facts, witness and boundaries. They usually counted with the connivance of justices of peace, provincial judges and an army of *colonos* to do this. *Colonos*, instructed about the location, name and boundaries of an estancia, its owners and neighbors, were presented as rightful owners of the land to forge a legal buying contract.22 (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 62-63) In 1911, the parcialidad of Cocra in the district of Santiago (Province of Azangaro) was torn apart by the pressure of two *hacendados* coveting its lands: a Vocal of Puno’s Court Alejandro Cano and the Governor of the district Felipe Aguirre. When Cano initiated a lawsuit to usurp the communal lands of Tiendapampa through pretended co-owners of the parcialidad, he was faced with the opposition of Governor Aguirre, a man endowed with military education who led an armed group called the “chacuris” (ants) that formed a small but implacable army. Furious, Cano instigated peasants to accuse Aguirre of hostilities, cattle theft and even assassination of several Indians, but many communal peasants of Cocra, afraid of losing their lands, were willing to sell them to Governor Aguirre who would maintain them as *colonos*. (Rénique 2004: 44; AGN, MI 143, Vp-Zp 1911)

*Hacendados* had several cards in their hands: they constituted an economic power based on land tenure, they manipulated several client networks both in the indigenous and *mestizo* worlds, monopolized public posts through their prestige as illustrated professionals and they acted as intermediaries with departmental and national authorities. They controlled elections and once in Congress negotiated their interests with the dominant fraction of the executive. In an electoral system based on provincial representation, departments like Puno could have a disproportionate weight. Between 1895 and 1929, Puno elected a total of 73 representatives while Lima 72 and La Libertad (coastal department housing the largest sugar plantations) barely 37. (Rénique 2004: 45)

Luis Felipe Luna Tamayo, natural of Urubamba (Cuzco) owned no land. He was a teacher brought to Azangaro by *hacendado* José María Lizares to teach his children. For several years he witnessed the atrocities committed by the Lizares in their determination to extend their lands and power. He even married into the family (María Lola La Rosa Lizares), becoming himself a

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22 As Sabine Dedenbach-Salazar has pointed out, contracts between *hacendados* and indigenous peasants involved a large number of people. The documents had to be signed by the notary, the buyer and its witness, the interpreter and a “rogado” signing in the name of the seller who was usually identified as “ignorant in the Spanish language.” Thus there was no proof of the presence of the seller in the conclusion of the contract or its notary inscription and no proof of the seller’s ownership of the land since titles were never presented. Ownership of the land was almost impossible to prove since all members of a family were recognized as heirs and owners by the law. (Cáceres Olazo 2007: 135)
hacendado and starting a fruitful political career that led him all the way to Congress. During this period he formed several haciendas in Puno such as Cuturi (2000 sheep), Sañata (1000 sheep), Tiruyo and Tarucani. His larger finca Santa María, received through his wife's inheritance, was increased through the acquisition of 38 neighboring estancias. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 105-106; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 78)

Only the wealthiest and most powerful landholders could produce large agglomerations of land. “This was a slow and tedious process, requiring contact with numerous Indian peasants, some of whom might hold rights to only minuscule plots.” (Jacobsen 1993: 228) Economic or legal transactions were not always viable. Direct usurpation was the most extended form of expansion. Hacendados made use of their private armies and large amounts of arms and ammunitions circulating through the frontier with Bolivia to expel of kill owning families. Josefa Quiñones was famous for her beauty, dissipated life and witchcraft (oral tradition in Azangaro affirms she flew). She obtained from her different conquests pieces of land that originated the fortune of the family. In 1866, her son José María Lizares (born in 1826) gathered peasants from Añaypampa community, offering to free them from military service, and formed a military corps to defend the Fatherland from the Spanish invasion: the 66th battalion. By 1899 his quipos commanded a montonera of over 400 mounted peasants wearing military garb that attacked and ransacked neighboring properties. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 104) José María Lizares and his son José Angelino were famous in Azangaro for their use of violence to acquire Indian lands. Their estancia “Muñañi Chico”, as its name indicates was a small piece of land that was forcefully enlarged to cover most of the district eliminating almost completely the local indigenous communities that claimed they had lost over 5,000 hectares to the hacendado. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 72-77; Tamayo 1982: 163; Jacobsen 1993: 109).

Hacendados profited from periods of social and political unrest (taxes, political changes, etc.) to raise the masses. They often fed into peasant discontent then crushed the movement themselves, brutally, to take over peasant lands while claiming they were saving the white civilized race. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 64-65) For hacendados, it was easier to acquire peasant lands in districts with a long-established hacienda-community complex, since there, peasants were more closely tied into patterns of dependence and paternalism. The district of Azangaro was one such case with the estates formed by Juan Paredes and José María Lizares. In districts such as Potoni and San Anton, “peasants had traditionally lived and worked outside the sphere of influence of estates” and generated a strong resistance to hacienda expansion. The tide of land transfers that began after 1890 did not touch districts such as Muñani or Caminaca with little remaining peasant land. If focused on districts such as Potoni, San Anton and San José generating a spiral of violence that led to the Rumi Maqui revolt in 1915. (Jacobsen 1993: 223)

The power of the elite was brutal but fragile. Their power was not set on economic advantage but on the absence of a strong central power with effective control over its territory and on the lack of a separation between civil society and State. Puno lacked a Superior Court of Justice and an established judicial apparatus until 1850. During most of the nineteenth century it functioned as the typical frontier territory. Traditional hacendados assumed the vacuum of political power created by

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23 Sabine Dedenbach-Salazar offers the oral testimony of Manuela Ari, an Aymara woman from Chucuito, who lived with her husband in lands located next to hacienda Collacachi, property of Edelmira Valle. Valle was married to Agustín Tovar, an important Civilista politician from Puno. Tovar announced he desired the lands placed in the middle of his properties. If they did not willingly sell he threatened to find a way to expel them. The family refused to lose its means of subsistence and Tovar ordered the burning of their house and the taking of their cattle. After this, neighboring families agreed to sell. (Cáceres Olazo 2007: 131-133)
the departure of the Spanish administration to join economic and political power. (Tamayo 1982: 83-85, 153-154) But even among traditional families, private fortunes were built through Indian labor and resources. Any change, from the creation of a school to the election of a functionary could be a major threat. Only with absolute political control could hacendados ensure monopoly over the economic benefits of the wool market. The elite became therefore extremely conservative and reactionary to ensure its survival. (Spalding 1977: 34-35)

This is why hacendados were identified with the term gamonal, issued from a plant (gamonito) growing in the roots of trees at their expense, in prejudice of the fruits. Gamonalismo was according to Giraldo and Franch an economic and political phenomenon that appeared after the wool commerce reconfigured the region. Gamonales could only maintain their situation by exploiting the indigenous population abandoning the norms of reciprocity of Andean society. The term could refer to landlords, authorities, lawyers, priests, wool traders and merchants; owning land not being the only or major criteria. The gamonal system was characterized by violence, paternalism, racism, the limited development of productive forces, low productivity, servile labor and the rentist mentality of landowners. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 210; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 102; Tamayo Herrera 1982: 152-154) Gamonalismo was the product of a perceived scarcity. Puno was a society in which each coin counted. Available resources were deemed limited and the acquisition of wealth could only come at the expense of others and in relation to power. (Demélas 2003: 497-499, 506)

Demographic pressure and internal differentiation in the late nineteenth century were making it more difficult for peasant communities to face the hardships of the natural environment, the demands of the wool market and a growing hacendado encroachment on communal lands. Hacendados were eager to profit from the growth of the wool market but unable to modernize their haciendas they had opted for an extensive production enlarging the size of their landholdings. Resorting to forced or foul sales and violent usurpation, hacendados generated a critical situation in the peasant world: with their lands peasants lost the partial autonomy they had managed to keep after Independence and were caught in the clientelistic web securing hacendado domination. The need to encroach on peasant lands showed however the dependence of Puno’s rural elites on peasant economy. Hacendados’ wealth was based on the appropriation of peasant resources; their status was based on the exploitation of unpaid peasant labor.

THE ANDEAN RESERVE: AN INDISPENSABLE LABOR FORCE

After the Spanish conquest the native population was identified by the term Indian and associated to manual labor without the monetary value of a slave (his or her loss meaning a loss of capital). Mestizos were not forced to serve in the mita and did not pay tribute. Only Indians, due to their strength and capacity to work, were regularly forced to realize heavy physical tasks for others. This led to their identification with servile labor and with an inferior and subordinated status. (Spalding 1974: 167-168) All sectors of urban and rural society in the Southern Andes benefited from Indian labor and fought over their economic surplus. Hacendados, priests, prefects, sub-prefects and governors imposed faenas for the construction and maintenance of enclosures, canals, schools, prisons, roads, inns, churches and cemeteries, etc. Through unpaid labor they ensured the functioning of mail and transport services. Without communal help, the army would have had no intendancy: communities transported war materials, fed the troops and their horses, turned in wood for heating, weaved uniforms, made sandals, etc. (Demélas 2003: 369, 496; Larson 2002: 107; Manrique 1988: 115)

French historian Jean Piel coined the term “Andean reserve” to refer to vertical social formations that in the absence of true capitalist relations constituted the only source of rent and
accumulation. For the landlord, the “Andean reserve” was his colonos and adjacent communities; for the prefect the popular sector of the department; for local wool traders their clientele. (McEvoy 1997: 116) Virtual battles were fought in municipal councils controlled by small number of families competing for indigenous labor amongst them and with the central State. The litany of conflicts between priests and local authorities always dealt with mutual accusations of living at the expense of the indigenes. Wealth seemed to have only two sources: the exploitation of indigenous labor and state posts.

Azangaro’s hacendado José Sebastián Urquiaga explained how each parcialidad had to appoint one segunda, at least two alcaldes, hilacatas, aguaciles, propios (used for mail delivery), mitanis (woman for domestic service) and pongs to work for the governor. Most communal officers were chosen for a term of one year in elaborate ceremonies held each January 1. The segunda, main Indian authority of each parcialidad, was obliged to present himself to the governor every Sunday and on feast days with his subordinates to obey the governor’s orders: buy wool, cattle and other Indian products, collect taxes, distribute duties, work in the governor’s fields, etc. The segunda coordinated all the work and obligations of the whole parcialidad toward the governor, priest, and justice of peace. His immediate subordinates, alcaldes and hilacatas, represented the various barrios, estancias, and descent groups within the parcialidad and fulfilled the same function within their sector, supervising the lower officers, pongs and mitanis. The priest was granted one alcalde, one sacristan, one pongo and one mitani; the justice of peace received one alguacil, one pongo and one mitani. While in service, many Indians had to abandon their families, fields and cattle, and in many occasions they had to surrender their children less than twelve years of age to be sent to the Prefect, sub-prefect or their friends as domestic servants. They also were expected to pay for cargos during expensive religious feasts and forced to receive wool from the governor to turn it into textiles without payment. (Tamayo 1982: 155, 157-158; Jacobsen 1993: 274-275)

The State was unable to pay salaries or give substantial benefits to local authorities such as Governors and lieutenant Governors; thus, it looked away and ignored forced unpaid labor in rural areas. Indigenous complaints produced recurrent prohibitions that were constantly overlooked. On July 4, 1825, in Cuzco, Simon Bolivar abolished serfdom and decreed the freedom of labor: “Que ningún individuo del estado exija directa o indirectamente el servicio personal de los peruanos indígenas sin que proceda un contrato libre del precio de su trabajo.” (Lynch 1979: 2) In 1880, Nicolas de Piérola (1879-1881), self-denominated “Protector of the Indigenous Race” decreed that all servitude or contribution imposed on Indians and not on the rest of the population would be considered public damage. (Lynch 1979: 6) The State constantly acknowledged the physical and economic exploitation of the indigenous population. However, its policies responded to the

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24 According to Peruvian historian Nelson Manrique, haciendas had an internal social structure that linked them with their social surroundings, copying hierarchical models. Manrique identifies a dual internal structure: one formed by the hacendado, the administrator and his men of trust; the other formed by the varas who had an authority of communal nature, not necessarily linked to the labor needs of the hacendado and to the exploitation of the economic surplus produced by colonos in the hacienda. (Manrique 1988: 157) Communal life was the superstructure that legitimated and made possible a complex system of reciprocal labor exchanges that ensured the production and social reproduction of the groups, whether in ayllus or in haciendas. Both groups needed more labor in high points of the agricultural cycle than the nuclear family could support, as well as for important works such as the construction and conservation of water canals. Thus the double structure of hierarchies in the hacienda: one to ensure the hacendado’s reach of labor surplus, the other to ensure the reproduction of peasant economy and the surplus to be given to the hacendado. (Manrique 1988: 161-162) Hacendados allowed this double structure, participating in peasant rituals, because they benefited from it.
country’s international situation more than to a desire to redress the situation. In 1880, Piérola was trying to draw the support of the indigenous population in the midst of a war with Chile. Indians were expected to save the nation with their lives and money. Instead of calling upon their good will with a constitutional, patriotic or even legal rhetoric, Piérola backed into an absolutist and contradictory paternalism that ignored the continuity of unpaid services and imposed new war taxes, mandatory drafts and provision requisitions while leaving Indians and communities legally unprotected. (Larson 2002: 113; Manrique 1988: 45-50) Servitude made the term citizen an empty word. Legislation passed to stop unpaid service was fruitless; the State was overcome by its economic needs and too entrenched in its paternalist and clientelist modes.

According to Manrique, the communities themselves opened the channels of extortion. If one communal member rejected the post, he or she was considered a bad element with no rights to communal services. (Manrique 1988: 152-155) Traditional indigenous authorities, appointed by the communal assemblies to protect communal interests, were of vital importance in a land where state presence was precarious. Some traditional indigenous authorities were in some areas treated by political and religious authorities as staff they could dispose at will, even in tasks that went beyond public service (from police and tax collection duty to domestic services). And the labor demands kept growing as the dependency of the elite sectors increase. Peasant economy subsidized middle and upper class economy.

Within haciendas, each peasant family was trusted with the supervision of a herd of sheep or bovines and had to take turns to serve in the hacienda house as pongos.25 The family was remunerated with the use of a parcel of land in which they could cultivate papas and quinoa and with the right to have their own animals, mostly llamas and alpacas. Though colono herds constituted almost half of the cattle in a hacienda, their surplus tended to be inferior to those of ayllu peasants. Colonos ensured their reproduction through the family’s labor force; social division of labor was scarce. Due to hacendado control of production, labor and even consumption, colonos had only limited access to the market. (Bourricaud 1967: 130-133; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 19-20, 97, 100)

Indian livestock herders viewed “market transactions with hispanized traders as important regular parts of their household subsistence economy” but strove to control the rate and incidence of exchanges. A large number of peasants were aware of market prices and opportunities. They combined subsistence agriculture with participation in the market. With the decline of the mining economy in the eighteenth century, the war of independence, the creation of artificial national borders and the political instability brought by caudillismo, the region’s economy had become more fragmented and based on small production. Peasants dominated the regional economy. (Manrique 1986: 248; Piel 1986: 327-328) Indigenous communities reserved part of their production of wool, meat and other foodstuffs for the market; they produced manufactures to sell and rented excess lands to other producers. They sent members to the annual fairs of Vilque, Rosaspata and Pucará where they sold alpaca wool and other products and could obtain products from other departments as well as from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Great Britain. In Vilque natives and mestizos made arrangements eight to twelve months in advance to supply certain quantities of wool to Arequipa.

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25 Colonos received presents and rewards during feasts and ceremonies (baptisms, weddings, etc.) to generate a close link between the worker and the patron in a paternalist relation of submission. The patron was a father who had all the rights over his children and the duty to protect and grant favors from time to time. (Auroi in Briggs et al 1986: 117) The hacendado administered justice, approved marriages, ensured the presence of a priest in religious events and the availability of coca and alcohol in traditional rituals. In connivance with the local priest, he played an important role in ensuring colono subjection.
receiving half of the amount due. They received a lower price than if they had sold their production directly in Arequipa, but they were ensuring their business and receiving needed amounts of currency at a better price than if they sold locally in their communities. (Jacobsen 1993: 193)

According to Jacobsen, “commercial agents, itinerant traders, and shopkeepers sought to strengthen their business and stabilize their profits by creating quasi-monopolistic ties to their suppliers and customers through credit, symbolic kinship (compadrazgo), or brute force.” (Jacobsen 1993: 4-5) In her novel, “Aves sin nido,” Clorinda Matto de Turner denounced how rescatistas forced Indians to accept money advances for their future wool production that set the product at a price so low it yielded over 50% the buying price. (Manrique 1888: 125-132) “In Puno’s Chucuito province the authorities themselves practiced a forced system of wool bulking as late as 1920. A few weeks before the shearing season, in December or January, the district governor would distribute money, lent to him by wool traders, to the Indian livestock herders, obliging them to deliver a specified amount of wool. If they refused to accept the conditions, the governor employed the communal authorities to deposit the money for the wool at the peasants’ hut, and the latter knew that they had to supply the equivalent amount of wool. Mayors and sub-prefects entered the wool business because they had power to guarantee supplies to exporters. (Jacobsen 1993: 194; Calisto 1979: 185; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 41)

Though small producers controlled up to two thirds of the alpaca fiber production, they were often too small to negotiate directly with Arequipa and were subject to different kinds of fraud: lowered prices in advance sales, altered weighting devices (rigged scales), discounts of up to a pound per arroba due to dirtiness, humidity or weight of the rope, imposition to buy from the agent some articles (alcohol, sugar, chancaca, figs, corn and flour) at altered prices and weighs that benefitted the agent.26 Traders discounted “one pound in every quintal for dirt, wetness, and the weight of the rope holding the bales together, although such weight losses were calculated in the basic price for unwashed wool.” (Jacobsen 1993: 193) But Indian livestock producers had their own ruses and tricks to counter unfair market relations: they “mixed hay and dirt into the wool, moistened it, and even poured sugar water over it to increase the weight.” They also adjusted to market fluctuations. Ricketts’s agent Hipólito Sánchez from Moho (Huancane) informed in September 1926 that Indians were holding back their wool in expectation of price improvements, selling only the amounts indispensable for satisfying their most pressing needs. “In 1932, when Bolivian customs agents began to collect export duties on wool, alpaca herders from south of the border ceased to sell their wool to Peruvian traders in border towns such as Cojata and Moho, instead establishing relations with merchants in Puerto Acosta on the Bolivian side.” (Jacobsen 1993: 186)

Peasant producers held back much wool from the export trade even during boom years, saving it for internal family and social needs (religious festivities and events). “Before celebrations such as carnival or patron saints’ festivities, wool sales increased, as did alcohol purchases;” nevertheless, the “everdenser network of itinerant traders and wool-buying agents, especially after 1890, made it more difficult to escape their purchasing pressures.” (Jacobsen 1993: 194-196) In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, new developments and events were changing the economic settings of the region and its power balance. In 1870, steam ships were crossing Lake Titicaca and replacing part of the traffic made in locally constructed totora rafts. This allowed an intense commerce between small ports (Moho and Huancane in the north, Ilave, Juli, Yunguyo and Desaguadero in

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26 “In 1920, for example, wool-buying agents in Santa Rosa paid five soles less per quintal of sheep wool to peasants than they did to hacendados, at a current price of fifty-five soles per quintal, a discount of nearly 10 percent.” (Jacobsen 1993: 193)
the south) and the city of Puno as well as a stronger connection with Bolivian ports. (Tamayo 1982: 82-83; Jacobsen 1993: 183) In 1873 the railroad line from Arequipa to Puno (Ferrocarril del Sur) was inaugurated and new roads started to be constructed for the traffic of the new motorized vehicles. The distance between Puno and Arequipa covered in ten to twelve days now was made in 12 hours. By the late 1920s “Puno’s road network, with about two thousand kilometers of improved roads completed, was the most extensive in the whole republic.” (Jacobsen 1993: 185) This was due to the favorable terrain (broad pampas), the abundance of Indian labor as well as the departmental elite’s influence in national politics during the first third of this century. (Jacobsen 1993: 186)

Though the growth of trade and production remained relatively modest, this sudden modernization of the transport industry in Puno meant a heavy blow for the old systems of transportation and wool selling that had sustained the Aymara and Quechua communities of the region. Arrieraje (service transporting goods with mules and human porters) and local fairs had allowed the Indian population avenues to ensure the extra income they needed to meet internal and state demands. With this transportation revolution, they started to decline and in certain areas completely disappeared. Wool transported by mules and llamas could now be transported directly from the producer to the entrepot city without being handled in towns and fairs, though passing through several layers of middlemen. The railroad condemned several towns that were not on its way while creating others around its stations. The branch Juliaca-Cuzco gave rise to four railroad stations (Calapuja, Laro, Estación de Pucará and Tirapata) benefiting Azangaro’s livestock raising zones. (Appleby 1982: 65; Tamayo 1982: 81-82; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 122-123; Jacobsen 1993: 183-184)

By 1870, twelve large import-export houses had opened in Arequipa including Gibbs, Gibson, Stafford, Forga, Braillard, Sprinckoller, etc. The economy of the region was becoming more dynamic but it was controlled from Arequipa by foreign capitals, mostly British and North American, and a few local power groups. (Spalding 1977: 32; Larson 2002: 115) The new commercial economy opened a large market for the production of wools and fibers but heavily hit the native textile production due to the large wool requirements of the market and the introduction of wool and cotton European textiles Andean production could not compete with. Local textiles were limited to satisfy local, mostly indigenous consumption. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 29, 32)

Local authorities (mayors, governors, sub-prefects, judges) and large and medium landlords avid for profits soon became the intermediaries of these commercial houses. The first decades of the wool commerce were characterized by a strong alliance between merchants, authorities and hacendados in detriment of Indian producers. There was not a considerable change in the volume of production and the income of the region but rather a change in the distribution of wealth, concentrated on fewer and fewer hands. (Appleby 1982: 62; Spalding 1977: 27-34; Tamayo 1982: 82) From 1829 to 1929, the number of heads of cattle in the province of Azangaro rose from 345,215 to 1,169,665; however the proportion held by communities fell from 64% to 32%, while haciendas passed from 36% of the cattle in 1829 to own 68% of the cattle in 1929. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 111)

Even the already scarce middle sectors were affected by the new repartition of power and wealth. In a shrinking market with limited means to compete with indigenous production many Europeans and their descendants fell economically and socially to the level of their indigenous

27 The train reached Juliaca in 1874 and Puno en 1876. Arequipa-Puno was the largest line of the railway service in 1908 with 351 kilometers. (Basadre 1983: VIII 162)
neighbors accentuating the changes brought by the internal differentiation within indigenous society. (Spalding 1977: 29) The lack of basic industrialization and the instability of the wool market limited their opportunities for investment and produced an exodus of resources in the area. Familiarized with laws and political structures and customs, they started allying with peasant intellectuals and politicians. (Spalding 1977: 33-34)

The Chilean invasion and occupation interrupted the élan created by the new means of transportation in Puno. The war devastated the region and Peru lost some of its importance in the market due to the growth of production of Argentinean and Uruguayan estancias. Exports only recuperated in the late 1880s proceeding to a slow but steady growth. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 34) The war did not change the pre-war dynamics; it did worsen them. Those in charge of the mechanisms to organize the war effort were the traditional enemies of the peasantry: landlords, bureaucrats and subaltern authorities. All of them, from their parcels of power, had always benefited from the free labor of Indians and the circumstances produced by the war opened new possibilities of control and exploitation. (Manrique 1988: 110-111) "Recruitment drives by the army and the Guardia Nacional continued even after the termination of the War of the Pacific and the ensuing civil war of 1895." (Jacobsen 1993: 25)

For Karen Spalding and Nelson Manrique, the war with Chile and the civil war that followed cancelled the process of autonomous regional development and opened the way for the control of Lima and of imperialist capitalists in the early twentieth century. The reconstruction of the central and Southern Andes was done under the aegis of the coastal elite that took control of the political machinery in 1895. The alliances with the coastal elites and mercantile capital were due to the need of these sectors to access the Andean reserve of material and human resources through landowning and elite groups.

One of the main colonial legacies was the identification of the indigenous peasantry with manual and servile labor. Indians were forced to perform unpaid services that went from the construction of infrastructure to domestic service. Only thus could hacendados, priests and even state authorities maintain their status. The state overlooked decrees and laws prohibiting servile labor due to its own economic needs and entrenched clientelism. Even access to the market, once dominated by small producers, was reduced by elites and authorities eager to control the profits of a growing wool demand. Modernization and capitalism increased the control of Arequipa’s merchants and foreign capitals as well as the desperate attempts of gamonales to squeeze profits out of peasant labor and resources. The war with Chile and the civil war that followed worsened the situation further increasing elite encroachment on peasant economy. The State torn by political instability and in permanent deficit was no different: its main strategy remained trying to reconstruct the nation through peasant incomes.

DEALING THE INDIGENOUS TRIBUTE CARD

After Independence, economic uncertainty, regional fragmentation and political instability pushed the republican governments to maintain the colonial personal contribution or head tax, which fell primarily on the indigenous population. It was the State’s major source of income and it ensured some sort of logic in the relations between Indians and State, allowing for the existence of corporative legal rights and obligations. Sub-prefects were responsible for the entire value of taxes; they were authorized to replace those who died or were absent with those who came of age to contribute or those who had not been registered. This system gave way to many abuses but it ensured an effective collection of tributes considering the difficulty of keeping adequate records of contributors (deaths, new taxpayers, migrations, enrollment in the army, changes of name in the registration). According to a report made by the Ministry of Finances to the Chamber of
Representatives, the personal contribution made up for over 70% of the resources of the Departmental Junta in the Serrano departments. (Manrique 1988: 167-170)

Republican governments began to consider suppressing the head tax only under the acute material and ideological pressures brought by world capitalism in the mid nineteenth century. (Larson 2002: 15) The 1854 revolt that deposed General Echenique decreed the abolition of slavery and of the personal contribution. General Ramón Castilla’s administration trusted the massive income obtained from guano exports would help pacify and modernize the nation. But the abolition of the head tax due to liberal pressures and the guano boom had unforeseen consequences for reformists, mainly the retraction of production followed by inflation in the interior provinces and the separation of the Indian from the “national solidarity.”28 The state lost a constant income of about $1,400,000 soles and lowered the pressure on rural economy to enter the market. (McEvoy 1997: 127) The departments with large indigenous populations such as Puno had been self-sufficient and even remitted surplus to the capital. The abolishment of the indigenous tribute by Castilla’s government led to the impoverishment of the provinces and their complete fiscal dependence on the capital, even to build a small bridge or a school. (Contreras & Cueto 1998: 120) Furthermore, the abolition of the head tax suppressed corporative rights to the land, to local self-government and to State protection of indigenous lands. (Larson 2002: 15) The breaking of tributary links between Lima and the provinces paved the way for the symbiotic relation between the central power and local powers. The state fed by large guano sums was able to distribute economic favors to the provinces in exchange for loyalty and obedience. In Puno, this alliance allowed the “legalization” of the enrichment and abuse by autonomous but loyal authorities and the formation of political machineries dependent on the central power but with relative local autonomy. (McEvoy 1997: 94-95)

To make matters worse, guano incomes were dilapidated to buy social peace (through the creation of a civic-military national bureaucracy) and to finance civil wars. The State soon realized it could not cope without the secure and substantial contribution of the rural population though it was unwilling to redraw a tributary contract. The peasantry, restricted from entering the profitable wool market and subject to various forms of forced services and payments to authorities, was now confronted with growing demands from an absent but financially ill State. In 1865, Arequipeño Colonel Mariano Ignacio Prado, an ardent nationalist, initiated a “Restoring Revolution” that was to recuperate the nation in crisis. Minister of Hacienda Manuel Pardo was given the task to reorganize the state budget and end the deficit crisis. A new head tax was imposed to every male between 21 and 60 years of age. (McEvoy 1997: 128) In the midst of these reforms, the Spanish army took the guano islands depriving the state for several months of the only resource that sustained a growingly unmanageable national budget.29

Thus in 1866 peasants in Puno faced several tributary charges: five pesos of a national credit to help pay the expenses of the defense against Spain, two reales to help finish the cathedral of Puno and the new head tax of one peso and a half. The popular reaction was particularly strong in Huancane, where the collection of taxes generated all kinds of abuses from the authorities. The tax was particularly burdensome for livestock raising communities affected by a long drought, border

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28 The personal contribution perceived twice a year (Feast of San Juan and Feast of San Miguel) generated an economy of its own: its perception included almost every authority in the Department, from the Prefect to the local Hilacata, each keeping 1 to 2% of the amount they collected. (Demélas 2003: 495)

29 The Spanish attack disorganized completely the precarious national budget, and the fiscal reforms employed to stop the guano crisis and create an economically autonomous state through a modern tributary system were by mid 1867 deactivated. (McEvoy 1997: 80-81, 126-129)
disputes and military incursions. (Jacobsen 1989: 94-95) Although the Constitutional Convention abolished the head tax on March 15, the unrest continued and even rose in the area of Puno, where the collection of tributes continued illegally. Upon the demands of the Indians of Huancane, the prefect of Puno abolished the taxes and tolerated the replacement of some local authorities with men of their own choice. Insurrection spread to neighboring villages, but the bishop of Puno and several small military contingents temporarily pacified the rebellious peasants by December 1966.

The early stages of this uprising were a spontaneous reaction to taxes, labor exactions by local authorities, and other local grievances. 30 Local landowners had immediately reacted organizing militias to defend themselves against Indian “hordes”. They sent alarmist reports, published in Lima’s newspapers, of race wars and Indians conniving to exterminate whites and mistís in Puno. Peruvian historian Martín Monsalve affirms this was a public campaign against communal Indians to prepare Lima’s public opinion for the approval of a law that would allow for an all out repression of the region’s indigenous movements. (Monsalve 2009: 217) On May 8, 1867, three of Puno’s representatives, the hacendados José Luis Quinones, Federico Luna and Santiago Riquelme, presented to Congress a project to dramatically repress the revolt. They demanded martial, summary courts to judge and execute leaders, the removal of rebels to the jungle zone of Carabaya and confiscation of their lands. Only thus would “civilization” be safe in Puno. (Jacobsen 1989: 96; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 67)

In Lima, newspapers like “El Comercio”, run by Manuel Amunátegui, and “El Nacional” started a campaign to counter hacendado racist arguments and present peasant demands for justice. A section called “Indios” exposed a different version of the events:

The reading of the law (...) has produced in our spirit the saddest impression. It is known that Puno’s unfortunate Indians have been damaged, their goods ransacked, and whipped to reap off suffrage and contribution. It has continued to be collected even after being abolished by Congress, and the causes of their revolt have been no other than those extortions and violence. (my translation, Ossio 1995: 228)

The newspaper remarked Indians were deprived of political rights and subject to economic extortions and accused Puno’s representatives of using a caste war argument to justify repression (including a liberal use of the death penalty). The project was deemed anti-republican and uncivilized and nicknamed the “law of terror”. (Monsalve 2009: 218) In response to these articles, a commission of representatives was appointed by the government to analyze the causes of Huancane’s unrest. It ended up rejecting the legislative project of Puno’s representatives and dictating that the government would only use force to contain Indigenous rebellion as last recourse. The insurgents would be amnestied if they gave up their arms and abusive authorities would be punished.

At the local level, indigenous and mestizo leaders and intermediary were trying to renegotiate

30 Jacobsen 1989: 94-95; Larson 2002: 109; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 89-90. Puneño authors (Choquehuanca, Frisancho, Cáceres Olazo) affirm the revolt began as a movement to destabilize Prado’s government led by a local Sub-prefect Colonel Recharte. The movement soon surpassed Recharte’s intentions and the sub-prefect was replaced by a pro-indigenous authority Antonio Riveros, one of the collaborators of Juan Bustamante. (Cáceres Olazo 2007: 109)
local conditions with the central state. One such intermediary was the puneño politician Colonel Juan Bustamante Dueñas. Born in the town of Vilque (province of Puno), on June 24, 1808, Bustamante was the offspring of a Creole from the city of Arequipa, junior officer in the royal Spanish militia, and a mestiza from Vilque who had inherited several livestock haciendas. (Jacobsen 1989: 83) Though born “into a family of relative privilege and wealth,” Bustamante considered himself of mixed racial ancestry identifying with the skin color of his mother. (Rénique 2004: 28) Bustamante was a cunning businessman who benefited from the increase in wool exports between 1835 and 1840 establishing “an extensive web of personal ties of trust and mutual obligations with business associates, transport entrepreneurs, local and provincial authorities, and Indian peasants.” (Jacobsen 1989: 85)

He managed to do this because he was a very liberal man. In 1862 he commanded from Europe twelve seminal sheep that he distributed freely amongst several growing areas of the South. (Torres Luna 1968: 249) When he held administrative and elective offices he strove to be an example of public servant, showing probity, a strong sense of sacrifice and dedication to his constituency (Intendant of Lima, prefect of Huancavelica, Cuzco and Huánuco and inspector general of the postal service for Southern Peru). He even spent personal funds for public works. He paid for the construction of the bridges over the rivers Pucará and Cabanillas (Puno), the works to increase the flow of the Rimac River (Lima), and a flood-gate at the Huatanay River (Cuzco). (Torres Luna 1968: 250)

According to Jacobsen, his agenda remained the same throughout his political life: racial equality, no restrictions on trade or privileges, and a broad-based lay education system. (Jacobsen 1989: 86) He believed the state had ignored for too long the Indian while weighing on him its sustenance. His strongest critiques were aimed at local authorities protected by a distant state: Prefects, sub-prefects, military, priests, as well as gamonal landlords. (Jacobsen 1989: 86-87)

He was elected national representative in 1839, 1845 and 1855. He participated in the Constitutional Convention of 1855-1857 yet none of his legislative proposals were approved (a law to appoint bishops with the participation of parishioners, free schools in all districts of the nation, a national network of roads, the control of militia promotions, prison debts for ill will debtors). (Rénique 2004: 31) He attacked all factions and was therefore often isolated and ridiculed by politicians, pamphleteers and newspaper writers, aroused by Bustamante’s complaints of backwardness and corruption and his comparisons with Europe and the rest of the world born from his travels. Lima’s satirical press targeted him with racist comments. Manuel Atanasio Fuentes called him “Don Burro Andante” (“Mr. Wandering Donkey”) or “bestiamante” (“beast-amante”) mocking his “llama smell”, his accent and appearance. (Jacobsen 1989: 93-94; Rénique 2004: 32)

In 1854, Bustamante joined General Ramón Castilla’s forces and became colonel. (Jacobsen 1989: 94) After Castilla retired in 1862, he joined reformist Mariano Ignacio Prado with new hopes of change. When rebellion spread in Huancane, Bustamante acknowledged peasant demands but rejected the anarchical situation of uprisings and the destabilization of Prado’s administration. In February 1867, “he contacted local authorities in the areas of the uprising and counseled them to...

31 He paid for the construction of the bridges over the rivers Pucará and Cabanillas (Puno), the works to increase the flow of the Rimac River (Lima), and a flood-gate at the Huatanay River (Cuzco). (Torres Luna 1968: 250)

32 Bustamente journeymen from 1941 to 1944 across the Caribbean, the East coast of North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia, visiting factories, banks, post offices, cathedrals, museums and theatres. He even had an audience with Pope Gregory XVI. His second journey started in 1848 (Northern Europe, Russia, and a six month stay in Paris). He wrote two travel accounts: “Viaje al antiguo mundo por el Peruano Juan Bustamante, natural del departamento de Puno” (Lima 1945), “Apuntes y observaciones civiles, políticas y religiosas con las noticias adquiridas en este segundo viaje a la Europa” (Paris 1949). He denounced human misery produced by bad government and “pernicious social customs” even in the “most civilized” areas of the world. These travels gave him the nickname of “mundu-purikoq” (globetrotter). (Jacobsen 1989: 87-88)
remove abusive officials and grant redress to the peasants. At the same time, he pleaded with the Indians to halt any acts of insubordination or violence and to work with him for the legal redress of their complaints. In February he dispatched a manifesto to be printed in “El Comercio”. The manifesto very generally stated the case on behalf of the Indians and more fully explained and justified his own conduct. He denied trying to instigate a race war or plotting to lead the Indians for his own personal advantage. He knew about the dangers to “the civilized and progressive part of the nation” posed by “brutal uprisings of semi-barbaric masses.” (Jacobsen 1989: 95) In July, Bustamante returned to Lima “as the plenipotentiary of the Altiplano peasantry” to launch “an energetic campaign to push the convention to adopt measures in favor of the Indians and to rally public support for their cause." (Jacobsen 1989: 97)

In August and September 1867, Bustamante mobilized the political networks he had built inside the army and a number of respected citizens in Lima to produce a national project to solve the “Indian issue.” The goal was to make effective the civil rights of Indians (especially on educations) and convince Lima’s public opinion that the incorporation of the indigene was fundamental to the consolidation of the nation. (Monsalve 2007: 215) The association included distinguished intellectuals and politicians, many of whom had occupied political posts in the Southern departments. General Jose Miguel Medina, Manuel Amunátegui and Guillermo Seoane formed the society’s first directory (President, Vice-president and Secretary respectively). General Medina had served as prefect of Cuzco, Ayacucho, Puno and senator for Ayacucho. He was president of the “Sociedad Fundadores de la Independencia” and counted with some influence among retired officials around the country to spread the society’s work. Manuel Amunátegui, journalist, had been editor in 1925 of the journal “El Indígena” published in Ayacucho, and since 1839 directed “El Comercio,” one of Lima’s most influential newspapers. He belonged to several civil associations and brought to the “Sociedad Amigos de los Indios” a great wealth of connections. According to Monsalve, this society was the first national associative network of the Peruvian Republic. It rounded up intellectuals, businessmen and militaries linked to the state, to media organs and to local Quechua and Aymara divulgers giving the “indigenous question” a national dimension. (Monsalve 2009: 215, 220-222; Ossio 1995: 224; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 66-67)

The institution received correspondence from several places of the Republic, in particular from Tarma, Ayacucho and Puno. Its members met every fifteen days and published denunciations of abuses against indigenes in “El Comercio” and other newspapers. (Tord 1978: 37) Colonel Miguel S. Zavala and Cuzco’s senator Pío Mesa presented law projects in favor of indigenous peasants. The Society’s president, General Medina traveled throughout the Departments of Puno and Cuzco requesting authorities to follow the Constitution and the laws protecting Indians. In 1867, Bustamante reprinted “in both Spanish and Quechua, a key Bolivarian decree of July 4, 1825, which outlawed personal services and forced labor by Indians.” (Jacobsen 1989: 86)

33 The society included among its founding members: Juan Rennes, Sebastián Lorente, Federico Lembcke, José Casimiro Ulloa, Eusebio Escobedo, Francisco de Lama, Pantaleón Falconi, Cipriano Coronel Zegarra, Tomás Lama, Agustín Reynaldo Chacaltana, Luis Carranza, Manuel Rodríguez Casío, Graña, Juan Francisco Zelaya, Fernando Lozano, Dámaso Castilla, Pío Meza, Juan de la Cruz Lizárraga, Eugenio Amunátegui, Manuel Espinoza de la Torre, Mariano Loi, Fernando O’Phelan, Nicolás Hurtado and army officials Manuel de Aparicio, Ramón Vargas Machuca, Manuel Morote, Rudesindo Beltrán (served as Prefect of Puno) and Miguel S. Zavala. (Monsalve 2009: 221-222)

34Dámaso Castilla, indigene and legal representative of several communities in commercial conflicts with hacendados was one of the founding members of the Society. Tomás Mamani was another indigene from Puno linked to the divulgation of the Society’s work and ideas. (Monsalve 2009: 231-233)
The Sociedad published in “El Comercio” its main postulates, in letters addressed to Indians, landlords and priests. It called Indians to defend themselves against political and religious abuses offering itself as intermediary in the task, through journalism, congressional lobbying and local interventions. (Ossio 1995: 224) It also offered to mediate as free judge or arbiter to solve peasant conflicts. Indians to be granted the support of the Sociedad had to satisfy five conditions: 1) profess affection and respect for the President and the Republic avoiding any violent or armed confrontation with constitutional authorities and disrupting public order; 2) work and invest on children education, avoiding brutal and noisy feasts only producing sickness and brutalization; 3) learn Spanish to become teachers, priests, artisans, mayors, governors, sub-prefects, representatives, positions to which they had as much right as whites and mestizos; 4) keep good hygienic, dressing and nutrition practices; 5) follow religiously all contracts made. (Rénique 2004: 33)

Though the postulates show the Society was hearing the demands of Puno’s indigenes (political rights, education, prohibition of unpaid services, support from the government and public opinion), its attitude remained paternalistic. The conflict in Huancane acquired national dimensions because it allowed the members of the Society to stigmatize their political enemies and present themselves to public opinion as Indian redemptors, a moral reserve opposed to a corrupt State. (Monsalve 2009: 216-217) To adopt this role they needed to present the Indian as backward, debased by centuries of abuse but capable of being regenerated. The Society responded to attempts to reconstruct citizenship through civil associations not electoral participation, and the power of these associations depended on their ability to appropriate the representation of a subaltern sector presented as “exploited” and inferior but redeemable. (Monsalve 2009: 220)

From this ambivalent position, the Society could do little to respond to peasant demands. Indian unrest had spread from Huancane to Putina, Chupa and Samán (Province of Azangaro). In Samán, indigenes managed to repel the forces of Sub-prefect of Azangaro Andrés Recharte. Urged by the “Sociedad Amiga de los Indios”, the government sent a force led by General Baltazar Caravedo in July 1968. Understanding the fairness of indigenous protests, Caravedo granted his protection to Indians. He took control of the region replacing abusive officials with men more concerned with the peasant cause. A new prefect (Manuel Pino) was appointed to listen to peasant complaints against sub-prefects, governors, judges and priests. (Rénique 2004: 36-37) Communal indigenes of Samán and Taraco who had participated in the uprising signed acts showing their gratitude towards Caravedo, Bustamante and even President Prado. These written recognitions identified Prado as a father and king just like Manco Capac founder of the “Peruvian empire”. (Ossio 1995: 228; Rénique 2004: 36) In spite of this, however, a few authors report that provincial militia units deported several hundred peasants suspected of rebellion, and carried out numerous brutal acts, such as executions, burning of peasant houses and robbery of cattle. (Jacobsen 1989: 96; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 67)

Bustamante urged Indians to avoid insurgency and think about education to reach positions of power citing the Mexican example of Benito Juarez. (Rénique 2004: 37) In June and July he visited communities and made indigenous leaders sign a declaration that “integrated his liberal constitutionalist principles, his longing for order, and his strong Christian faith into a vision of a divine order on earth that sounded rather millenarian.” The president was a fair king, a modern Manco Capac. Defending Prado became a holy crusade. Bustamante was using an Andean redemptionist discourse to tie peasant loyalties to Prado and his threatened liberal project. In August 1867, a new liberal constitution establishing the freedom of religion and press had been approved creating strong reactions mainly in Arequipa. Bustamante traveled to Arequipa in October to mobilize the Indian peasantry in support of the regime. “For the first time he saw a need
to mobilize peasants, to plunge into a grass-roots campaign of armed struggle, in order to advance
his goals. The repressive campaigns by Puno’s notables had convinced him that they would
institute a type of order that was tyrannical in nature and absolutely incompatible with his struggle
for justice for the Indians.” His liberal republican ideals no longer conflicted with militant action.
Now political partisanship was needed to redeem the Indian and save the Prado administration.
(Jacobsen 1989: 98)

But in Puno, only Huancane remained loyal to Prado and appointed Bustamante “Superior
Military Chief.” Bustamante was vilified in Lima as a madman instilling “savage communism” to the
Indians to end with whites and to crown himself Inca. In late December Prado attempted one final
assault on Arequipa while Bustamante took Puno at the head of Indian peasant troops. “There was
some minor looting, but by and large his “hordes” must have behaved in a remarkably disciplined
fashion, as even his enemies could not find any atrocities to report. (Jacobsen 1989: 99) When
news reached Puno on January 1 that Prado had been defeated in Arequipa and had abandoned
the siege, Bustamante and his troops withdrew from Puno in the direction of their redoubt in
Huancane. On the following day, well-armed anti-Prado forces under Colonel Andrés Recharte
surprised Bustamante’s forces close to the northern shore of Lake Titicaca. For four hours the two
sides engaged in an unequal battle: the rifles of Recharte’s troops against the clubs, knives, and
rocks of Bustamante’s peasants.” (Jacobsen 1989: 99) They were defeated and hardly anyone
escaped to an “implacable repression”. Those who had not died on the field were taken to Pusi
with their commanders.

While Bustamante’s white and mestizo associates suffered only brief imprisonment and fines
(returning afterwards to their homes and businesses), Indian followers met no mercy. On January
3, 1868, seventy one Indian leaders were locked in a peasant hut and put to the torch. Recharte’s
troops prevented women from Pusi to intervene to extinguish the fire. Those who survived slow
death by asphyxiation were finished off with sabers when the hut collapsed. According to
Jacobsen, Bustamante was ordered to carry the bodies of his companions outside Pusi to a mass
grave. Then “he was stripped of his clothes, hung by his feet from a tree on the plaza, insulted,
flogged, and then decapitated with a soldier’s machete. His body, wrapped in a blanket, was
interred close to Pusi’s church.” (Jacobsen 1989: 100; Tord 1978: 37) The Congressional response
to peasant insurrection was a campaign of State terror. Mercenary armies massacred people and
destroyed hamlets. Large groups of peasants were exiled to labor camps in Carabaya’s jungles.
The most tangible results of the revolt and its repression were an intense concentration of lands
and productive resources and the definition of Indians as potential enemies of the nation deserving

Bustamante’s detractors downplayed issues of taxation and abuse by filling newspapers with
articles denouncing his millenarian and racial war goals. In 1916, hacendado José Sebastian
Urquiaga asserted that Bustamante appointed himself “Restoring General of the Inca Empire”,
profiting from the Indians’ ignorance to make them believe he was the messenger of the Empire’s
kings who ordered the extermination or banishment of all white exterminators. (Giraldo & Franch
1979: 95) From the perspective of Puno’s elite, Bustamante had committed the awful crime of
giving free rein to Indian savage instincts. Bustamante’s credulous troops, says Urquiaga, burned
people alive, extracted the eyes and tongue of some and even ate many, drinking the blood of their
victims. The government had to kill hundreds of Bustamante’s victims, who finally reacted and
killed him. Using the topos of their shawls, Indian women had murdered him and dismembered his
body. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 95; Rénique 2004: 38)

Bustamante’s lieutenant sent a letter to the Society relating his tragic end and that of dozens of
his followers. An emergency assembly showed the internal divisions. Some demanded the
immediate punishment of the murderers. Others proposed the formation of a commission that
would investigate the facts in place. None of these proposals was followed. (McEvoy 1997: 116)
The institution was bombarded with accusations of feeding the excesses of the lower class
majorities and exerting a dangerous tutelage. It was paralyzed by public opinion and by its own
moralizing and paternalistic discourse.\[35\]

The revolt’s fate was linked to that of the liberal and reformist dictatorship of Prado and it
forced Lima’s circles to reassess their political models. The report presented by minister Manuel
Pardo to Congress after Bustamante’s assassination showed how much the revolt was inserted in
the national political debate. Pardo argued Huancane was just a glimpse of what was happening all
over the republic. The guano political model had produced a crisis of authority and social overflow
due to the isolation of the provinces and the lack of work and industry condemning the indigenous
race to backwardness and whites and mestizos to social uneasiness. He proposed increasing
production and developing a more efficient administration focusing on instruction and tribute.
Calling upon the Inca system, he affirmed that the head tax was a way to link indigenous producers
with the nation ensuring the retribution for exploiting communal land that was their property neither
before nor after the colony. (McEvoy 1997: 96-97)

The centralist, authoritarian, guano-funded state had tolerated loyal authorities’ abuses to
ensure control over the provinces. New groups were questioning this alliance; groups formed by
the white and mestizo sectors that supported Bustamante’s plead and even his rebellion: Sub-
prefect Antonio Riveros, Colonel Moya, hacendado and former Sub-prefect of Azangaro Manuel
Modesto Choquehuanca, hacendado Narciso Solorzano. They supported Prado’s regime and the
liberal Constitution of 1867 hoping to free the Indian labor force from gamonales. It was extremely
hard for new local political and economic groups to assert their material and ideological bases
before the traditional landlord aristocracies, whose power rested on a complex network of socio-
political alliances. The conflict between the successful wool exporter Juan Bustamante and the
sub-prefect of Azangaro Andres Recharte showed the dispute of two divergent ideological projects
that converged however in their main goal: to control the Andean reserve. (McEvoy 1997: 91-94;
Giraldo & Franch 1979: 68, 92-93)

In spite of Recharte’s repression campaign against the peasantry, guerrilla continued for some
months in the border area between Huancane and Azangaro. This showed that “Indians had an
agenda of their own, quite apart from the paternalistic leadership of Juan Bustamante.” (Jacobsen
1989: 101) It also showed the interconnections established between the peasantries of the
provinces: the movement had spread from Huancane to Azangaro, Lampa, Chuquito and Puno.
There were reports of uprisings even in the Island of Amantani. Peasant mobilization persisted
because the collection of the head tax continued during the war with Chile and was maintained by

\[35\] The Society did not disappear in 1868, however, it continued with only relative success to defend Indian causes. On
December 3, 1868, Punoño member Dámaso Castilla, acting as proxy of the Indians of the province of Chuquito,
appealed to the Congress and the executive power to demand some justice for the Indians of Puno. The appeal
accused certain haciendados of Chuquito of acquiring their fortune at the expense of the labor of helpless Indians.
These haciendados forced Indians to sell their wool production at prices arbitrarily set by them. Protected by local
judges, they had managed to annul any attempt of the Indians to find justice. Castilla does not mention the names of
the haciendados in this document mentioned in an annexed appeal. The appeal is missing. Castilla complaints about
the sad Indian whose condition is the most humble a man can be led into. The lack of resources, ignorance and
degraded servilism of the Indian have caused his inability to reach justice. He asks thus the executive power to appoint
as soon as possible, two judges in charge of the trials against the accused that should inform also about the situation
in the Superior Court of Puno. (Memorial of Dámaso Castilla, AGN RJ. Legajo 69 according to Cáceres Olazo 2007:
112)
the administrations of Iglesias (1882-1884) and Cáceres (1884-1885, 1886-1890, 1894-1895). Even though the disorder produced by the international and civil wars made its collection irregular, its rents were the most important income of the regions’ authorities until 1895. (Manrique 1988: 163)

In 1886, the Rustic Contribution was added to the head tax. It was a tax on land that indigenes had to pay if the income from their lands exceeded a yearly fixed amount. This tax hit with particular intensity areas like Chucuito characterized by indigenous property. "It was public knowledge that assessed peasants paid a proportionally higher rate than did most hacendados. Not only did estate owners frequently underreport their livestock capital, resulting in a low assessed tax rate, but tax commissioners also liberally estimated stocks for many landholdings of illiterate peasants, who had little chance to do anything against this abuse."36 (Jacobsen 1993: 279) In 1886, the Sub-prefect of Puno informed that Indians were moved by caste hatred and blamed whites for their slave condition instigated to revolt by a Bolivian woman who predicated under the title of the Virgin of the Rosary. In 1887, mobilization had extended to Chucuito and Huancane and some prefects affirmed movements were in coordination with events in Cuzco. Revolts ignited in the Aymara zones next to the Lake (they were endemic between Yunguyo and Chucuito between 1896 and 1906) and then expanded to Quechua districts to the North. They all started as anti-fiscal disturbances addressed against local authorities and the hacienda system. In some cases, military forces intervened producing violent massacres. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 111; Rénique 2004: 43)

This was possible because Cáceres’s regime, supported by Serrano landlords, focused on pacifying the country and weakening the central State through a clientelistic and decentralizing political organization that would defend the corporative interests of Serrano landlords: the Constitutional Party.37 Serrano landlords had two goals: 1. loading the weight of reconstruction over the shoulders of indigenous peasants through the personal contribution and repression of peasant movements; 2. strengthening local powers to debilitate central power through the “Law of Fiscal Decentralization” (November 13, 1886). This law increased the power of Departments, giving them direct control of the economic surplus taken from the peasantry through the head tax. Departmental Juntas formed by delegates from the provinces (elected for four years) created a continuous confrontation between Prefects as representatives of the central power and the Juntas representing local powers. Their power kept growing and they became instruments of Gamonalismo against state centralization. (Manrique 1988: 142, 173-175, Larson 2002: 36; McEvoy 1997: 260)

For this reason, Juntas became the first target of the administration that deposed Cáceres.

36 “By legislative resolution of October 30, 1893, all landholding units producing income below 100 soles m.n. – equivalent to a livestock capital of up to 500 head of sheep- were exempted from paying property tax. Most peasants owned smaller livestock herds. Nevertheless, until 1907 tax commissioners entered many peasants with annual incomes of below 100 soles m.n. in the rolls; in the 1897 rolls more than 80 percent of all assessed peasants fell into this category. Even so, most peasants were not assessed for the property tax (...); in some communities, and even entire districts, hardly any peasants were entered.” (Jacobsen 1993: 280)

37 The Constitutional Party, founded by Andres Avelino Cáceres during the civil war that confronted him to Iglesias, was created as an instrument to reach power. Several of the military chiefs that led the resistance to the Chilean army, mostly landowners, filled its ranks. Soon the party became the voice of southern landlord’s interests. When Cáceres returned from exile, in July 1902, ready to redress his image as a social caudillo, the party promoted an alliance with the Civilistas to avoid Piérola’s return to power. From then on, the Constitutional Party played a subordinate role, using its last card in an alliance with Leguía in 1919. The party maintained a significant political presence until Cáceres’s death in the early 1920s. (Basadre 1983: VIII 62, 89; Manrique 1988: 142, 183)
After ten years in power, Cáceres tried to remain in power for one more term facing the strong opposition of a Coalition formed by the Civilista\(^{38}\) and Democrat parties.\(^{39}\) These political forces came together to cut Serrano landlord (and military) hegemony in 1894, putting Democrat politician Nicolás de Piérola in power. On October 19, 1895, Minister of Hacienda Bresani presented a law project to suppress departmental Juntas due to the excessive power such local organisms had accumulated along the years. The minister affirmed the Juntas were fragmenting the country’s policies and would end up absorbing all the functions of the Executive. Punoño congressman Mariano Cornejo backed by a large group of provincial representatives tried to defend the Juntas against centralism. He pointed out how the fight against cacerismo was borne by the idea that each region defended its local liberties and the autonomy of its municipalities and Juntas. It was the only organism that could counter the power of prefects and Lima’s centralism. (McEvoy 1997: 353-355) After intense debates, Cornejo’s clan prevailed so the government, unable to dismantle the Juntas, opted to drown them economically by suppressing the personal contribution. (Jacobsen 1993: 277; Mannique 1988: 173-175; McEvoy 1997: 353)

The Juntas, the regional nuclei that had been carrying on the task of economic reconstruction were hit hard. “But far from helplessly accepting this shrinkage of regionally controlled funds, authorities in the altiplano reacted by shifting the tax burden on the Indians…” The head tax was only temporarily dismantled and was soon replaced by other forms of contribution to the State, mainly by a revamped rustic contribution (contribución de predios rústicos). In one decade, “the mean tax assessment grew more rapidly in districts with relatively few estates and a predominant peasant sector, such as Saman and Achaya, than in those with high concentration of estates.” (Jacobsen 1993: 277) Besides the rustic contribution and military conscription, peasants devoid of voting rights were forced to pay a “Republican tax” (“Impuesto de la República”). This tax allowed prefects and governors to force peasants to offer unpaid labor in public works. Between 1896 and 1904 new taxes on salt, sugar and alcohol were added to these contributions. Peasants started to openly refuse to pay or fled their homes when collectors approached. (Calisto 1991: 194-195)

The tax on salt resulted as onerous on Indians as the personal contribution had been. In 1896,

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\(^{38}\) The Civil Party was the first party founded in Peru to promote the election of Manuel Pardo in 1872. It was born as a vigorous reaction against militarism, old state forms, official imposition in elections, and to protect the interests of the coastal merchant class threatened by the government’s control of guano exports (Nicolás de Piérola and his minister José Balta had opted to give the control of the business to Dreyfus. Manuel Pardo proposed to solve this crisis through the exploitation of the saltpeter of Tarapacá). For scholars like Julio Cotler, Bonilla and Manrique, the Civil Party was but the expression of the guano elite looking for an outbound development. McEvoy and Gootenberg affirm there was a constant effort in many national intellectuals to create a cohesive ideology: the Republic. McEvoy in particular describes the Civilista project of a “República Práctica” (1871-1876) as proof of the existence of values and objectives in a sector of the Peruvian bourgeoisie able to reach the popular classes. Identifying itself as a “civic society”, the party called for the liberty of suffrage. It was formed by an approach, rare in Peru, between the aristocracy, the intellectual elite and the masses. (McEvoy 1997: xii, 6-7, 52)

\(^{39}\) The Democrat Party was founded by Nicolás de Piérola in 1884 in the search for a government forged by direct suffrage. Piérola’s democratizing discourse against post-war authoritarianism led him to exile in 1885, but he returned a year later with increased popularity. Democrats appropriated the republican discourse and the mobilizing strategies of the first civilismo. (McEvoy 1997: 323) In 1890, Piérola was jailed and his party outlawed. He fled and continued his opposition to military authoritarianism holding the image of republican idealism. The Party counted with educated and prosperous professionals like engineer Joaquín Capelo and miner Guillermo Billinghurst, hacendados like Benjamin Boza (Ica), and even some guilds as that of Lima’s coach drivers. The charisma of Piérola and the ideological discourses made the party more appealing to popular sectors than any other. Yet the party lost its drive after 1902 once it lost majority in the Senate. (McEvoy 1997: 327)
the Piérola administration established the state salt monopoly and instituted a tax on salt.\textsuperscript{40} Salt was a basic resource for indigenous peasants since it was used in the conservation of food and the feeding of livestock. It was particularly important for the communities living around the Lake of Salinas in Azangaro, whose income was based on the exploitation of salt. When the State imposed in 1896 a tax of one cent per kilogram of salt, it obliged buyers and sellers to monetarize their exchange and pay higher prices. Peasants lost the commercialization of salt and faced a price increase of some 400 to 800 percent (5 and 10 cents to 51 and 56 cents per quintal). The tax that seemed insignificant to Lima’s administrators dealt a heavy blow even on hacendados whose cattle pastured next to colonos' huacchos prone to diseases such as the "gusanera", cured with salt. Violent responses in Salinas and Juli were instigated and even promoted by gamonales themselves due to the far-reaching consequences of the new fiscal policies. (Basadre 1983: 69, 75; Rénique 2004: 43; Jacobsen 1993: 263; Spalding 1977: 33-34; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 110) The State repressed indigenous protests with massacres in Huanta, Cuzco and Juli. (Manrique 1988: 175)

Pierola’s administration generated an even stronger malaise within Puno’s rural population by entrusting the collection of the property tax to an official organism, the Compañía Nacional de Recaudación. This measure weakened the position of traditional communal officers who used to collect the personal tribute for district and provincial authorities. The breakup of these "tributary pacts" damaged internal communal relations as much as the relations of indigenous groups with the State and the rest of society. (Larson 2002: 19) Tax collection ceased to be an issue for the parcialidad as a whole (addressed to heads of households) and started to be seen as an opportunity to strengthen title to the land, “furthering the transfer of solidarity from the old parcialidad to their own smaller groups.” (Jacobsen 1993: 279)

The forces that had closed ranks against Serrano landlords represented different factions of the bourgeoisie. They came together to protect a centralized bourgeois state project, yet they were too weak to dismantle local powers. A large part of the political game was played by the State and competing centrifugal provincial forces. The adoption of modern political regimes tending to strongly centralized models was paradoxically accompanied by a tendency towards the privatization of power in towns and country. (Demélas 2003: 23-24) While rejecting them, the Republic could not go without intermediary powers. Lima dominated the Andes but in the midst of an open or latent hostility in the provinces and the threat of its siege. Political instability responded to the power relations between provincial capitals, parties in power and local networks. (Demélas 2003: 491, 507) Unable to hegemonize power, the Coalition opted to become the minor partner of imperialist capitals giving up the perspective of a project of national capitalist development. By allying with imperialism and giving up a national project, the confrontation with Serrano landlords became unnecessary. They had no need to create an internal market by breaking the bonds of servitude and creating a free labor market. Landlords were no obstacle as long as they did not try to control the State. If they joined the group in power as a subordinate force they were perfectly in accord with the domination model: they could guarantee social order. (Manrique: 142-145, 181-183)

The personal contribution continued to maintain the government after Independence, yet the Republic set on the idea of a homestead was unwilling to honor the tributary pact it had inherited.

\textsuperscript{40} In April 1901, an anonymous society took the administration of the salt tax which was to be implemented starting in January 1902. The company (“Compañía Salinera del Perú”) had the power to use exclusive rights to exploit State salt mines and sell the salt inside and outside the Republic. These incomes were to be destined to the rescue of Tacna and Arica, deposited in a bank account as “sacred money.” Yet it was all taken to buy arms and pay public employees.
from the colony protecting indigenous resources and corporative rights. Several attempts to annul the contribution, especially during the guano boom ended up in unmanageable finances fed by political instability and clientelistic practices. The reposition of the head tax and of new taxes generated abuses, corruption and a wide variety of peasant movements that like Bustamante’s revolt were crushed with violence. Violence further increased with the arrival of a civilian government in 1895. Taxation policy focused on increasing the control of the central State over peasant incomes. The personal contribution was eliminated but only to be replaced by other taxes and impositions that were directly collected by a centralized state agency. This fiscal centralization was not accompanied however with the formation of a modern and efficient bureaucracy and a new tributary pact. Clientelism and gamonal power cliques continued to dominate the local scene under the surveillance of the new civilian government. The paternalist attitude of the President that declared himself “Protector of the Indian Race” did not hide the government’s intentions: in 1896 Piérola’s administration banned illiterate vote.

REPUBLICANS WITHOUT RIGHTS
The installment of a democratic regime lay on the conception of Indian citizenship. Universal male suffrage was adopted after independence, giving indigenes the right to vote. (Ossio 1995: 213) The electoral law of 1860 allowed for a large universe of voters since vote was mandatory for any citizen older than twenty or married, able to read and write, leading an atelier, owning land or paying taxes to the state. Indians, though usually illiterate, owned land and paid the contribution thus were tacitly allowed to vote. (McEvoy 1997: 107) Indians were the vast majority of taxpayers, thus the majority of voters. This, according to many politicians of the period, created irregular situations in electoral campaigns since Indians were conducted like cattle by caciques to the electoral tables without having an exact idea of what that ceremony meant. (Planas 1994: 19)

Upon its birth, the republic had refused to recognize ethnic differences. One of San Martin’s first decrees discarded the word “indio” replacing it with the word “Peruvian.” Such proposals however did not change established behaviors and the republic ended up assigning the Indian a civic minority. Internal divisions led to hesitant and contradictory policies addressing indigenous populations. Popular and permanent sovereignty was a danger for the regime’s stability; civilian peace could only be ensured in the hands of a few. (Demélas 2003: 363) The weight of the peasant electorate and the weakness of a divided elite explain why the State tried in more than one occasion to restore the head tax or impose similar taxes without considering a new political pact.

According to Peruvian historian Carmen McEvoy the first Civilista government is the only period characterized by a republican system of democratizing tendency. The Civil Party framed a nationalist, republican ideology, consciously constructed to broaden the bases of power and generate national political integration. It was constituted by a socially heterogeneous vanguard in which the “middle sectors” played a fundamental role and where wealthy landlords and merchants of Lima, Trujillo, Arequipa, Cuzco, Puno and the central sierra converged with intellectuals, liberal professions, university students, journalists, teachers, artisans and small farmers. (McEvoy 1997: 14, 56) Its founder, Manuel Pardo (President between 1872 and 1876), hoped to profit from the great prosperity produced by guano and saltpeter, to build railways to civilize the sierra, foster the arrival of European immigrants and create a free labor market. Indians were to be freed from material and moral ties created by feudal haciendas, subsistence communities and religious feasts. This would allow them to satisfy the changing labor needs of the modernizing nation. Civilistas supported strong State intervention to force or persuade Indians to enter modern political economy without eliminating racial categories from public census and registers. (Larson 2002: 111)

As Civilista and former member of the “Sociedad Amiga de los Indios” General Medina
manifested, it was urgent to save three fourths of the country’s population from misery and humiliation, and the best way to do it was to turn them into "useful citizens." (McEvoy 1997: 94)

Medina proposed to resurrect the “Tributary Pact” to implement traditional mechanisms of reciprocity: construction of roads and schools in exchange for mandatory payment. This payment would ensure peasant access to communal lands protecting them from local authorities. The Indian would thus enter the economic circuit and produce wealth for his locality. The first step to reach this was to break the *hacendado*-prefect-priest block of intermediaries to create a direct link between producers or “industrious men” and the State in the Southern Andes. (McEvoy 1997: 97)

Manuel Pardo, however, was assassinated in 1878, and after the war the Civil Party almost disappeared until the early 1890s. Its material bases had been destroyed as well as its symbolic legitimacy fragmenting and atomizing the organization. Also, new parties were contending for power.41 In the late 1880s *Civilistas* left aside the democratic discourse of the past to seal an alliance with Cáceres’s militarism; adopting an elitist and positivist discourse. They focused on the material development of the country through the exporting economy. No stability would come unless a solid economic base could be constructed. Ideals had to be sacrificed. Imported positivism fed into a more authoritarian and elitist discourse. (McEvoy 1997: 14-15, 250-251, 262-263)

Nineteenth and early twentieth century parties had little defined character. They had inherited the personal leadership of their founders and did not always reflect legitimate currents of political thought. Three figures Cáceres, Piérola and Durand explained the existence of three of the four main parties. (Planas 1994: 62-63; Bullick 1999: 51)

This was to a large extent due to the pervasiveness authoritarian patrimonialism. This system created by Ramón Castilla’s first administration proved to be rather successful in handling the political and economic turmoil faced by the State, due to its flexible nature, based on personal vertical relations or unequal exchanges generating dependence. It was a vertical, monetarily based network established directly by the central power with local power groups (both liberal and conservative) while disregarding its links to civil society. In spite of the pretense of legality, the executive power placed itself above the law to construct clienteles, and assert the power of authority under the guise of “common good” and conciliation. Hence, it was the power of the central state as arbiter and source of privileges and rewards, not the empire of the law that prevailed. (McEvoy 1997: 24, 30, 43-44) The system could articulate heterogeneous groups that grew downwards linking an extremely complex and divided society. A patron could establish personal or interest relations with very different groups offering and demanding favors of different nature. *Caciquismo* was the real skeleton of the country’s social and political life. Institutions were a facade. (Demélas 2003: 493)

This authoritarian patrimonial system turned into paternalism when dealing with indigenous constituencies. Between 1890 and 1892, one of the most intense debates between authoritarian and liberal sectors dominating the political scene was on universal suffrage. A group led by *Civilista* ideologue Isaac Alzamora saw the need to exert greater control over a mass of provincial voters that could turn unmanageable. Indians were seen as not assimilated to the nationality and in need of protection from political manipulation of local authorities. They viewed literacy as an indispensable requisite for voting rights. This would help control the electoral process and would diminish the power of provincial authorities that controlled large sectors of electorate. Another *Civilista* group led by puneño representative Luis Estevez understood that denying voting rights to

41 Mainly the Liberal Party (1901) a secession of the left wing of the Democrat Party and the National Union founded by anarchist thinker Manuel Gonzalez Prada.
illiterates would leave nine tenths of the country without any political influence. Estevez asserted the existence of two types of Indian: yanaconas, depending on a feudal lord and not needed for the electoral process, and those Indians who paid contributions and were as citizen as the rest. They could not be deprived of their citizen rights with such perfidy considering they had taken active part in numerous elections and had given in 1872 the victory to the Civil Party. Estevez belonged to the most reformist wing of the historical Civilismo which tried to penetrate and consolidate Civilista power in the southern provinces. Estevez was also the greatest defender of a national industrial development based on Indians. His efforts, however, were fruitless. (McEvoy 1997: 270-271)

Illiterate vote was banned in an effort to get closer to a “true suffrage.” Indians lost the vote and the personal contribution was cancelled to prevent them from claiming voting rights.

On November 20, 1896, Congress approved direct suffrage for literate citizens and the centralization of the process in the hands of a National Electoral Junta. The law suppressed electoral violence (street violence) and dispersion of electoral colleges (leading to irregularities) as much as popular participation. Elections were at the mercy of the political party that would control the National Electoral Junta. Political mobilization was not needed anymore as a political strategy. Political spaces were privatized and electoral outcomes were decided in Lima. The continuity of the regime was ensured at least in legal terms. (McEvoy 1997: 353-355)

Moreover, the constitutional reforms of 1896 were not complemented by a change in electoral circumscriptions. While the average voter obtained more certainty in voters’ intentions, electoral districts and representation by provinces remained. Representation was not set by the number of voters in each district; this preserved the artificial representation of caciques (local lords). Most representatives were elected by provinces with a reduced number of voters, under the influence of feudal landlords. The Aristocratic Republic excluded the vast majority of its citizens securing the gamonal system and the link between political and economic power. This is why most studies of this period conceive it as a time of no political pluralism, with a reduced group of people or families dominating the scene with an uncontested capacity to define and reach its interests. (Planas 1994: 25)

According to Burga and Flores Galindo, the “Aristocratic Republic” (1895-1919) was an oligarchic State that only appeared to be national. Regional fragmentation divided the oligarchic families of the North (sugar exporters), Center (mining and livestock raising) and South (wool merchants), dividing their hegemonic power. Haciendas and mining enclaves maintained political control of their areas of influence, as local feudals. Political power was privatized and monopolized by groups of families. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 85-86) According to Bullick, though the State was a restrained and rather closed space and though the Civil Party managed to remain in power for a long term, the coastal oligarchy was not able to form a homogenous class in power, with a defined political project. They had to share power with old aristocratic regional families, which gave between 1895 and 1919 more presidents than the coastal oligarchy. The shadow of the gamonales remained over all political life. (Bullick 1999: 50) The name of “Aristocratic Republic” showed not the existence of a Peruvian aristocracy but the contradictions of the republican formation, the abyss between State and Nation. (Pajuelo 1998)

After independence, the democratic regime remained a chimera. From the birth of the Republic, Indians’ right to vote was questioned under the pretext that they constituted a malleable electorate under the control of local caciques. The peasant electorate was in fact too large and politically dispersed for the reduced and factionalized elite in power, which was not eager to eliminate racial categories. The Civilista attempt to create an integrated nation died with the party’s founder in 1878. To survive, the party replaced its democratic discourse with a more elitist and positivist discourse. Clientelism remained the main tool to control or negotiate with regional elites.
Thus, in 1896, literacy became a requirement to vote. Most of the population was deprived of political representation and thus citizenship. Non-Spanish speaking peasants were the most hardly hit. Ironically this measure did not end political Caciquismo, much to the contrary. The central State was too weak to break the power of local cliques that ended up strengthened by the new electoral system. It is in this context that our story begins.

CONCLUSION

In the late nineteenth century, Puno was a rural society characterized by social stratification and interdependency due to the rough geographical conditions and the absolute reliance on human labor. Communal lands were essential for peasant survival but were threatened by demographic and livestock growth, privatization and capitalist advance. These factors were creating internal tensions and weakening communal solidarity. Liberals ruled Indians were unable to handle private property and collective ownership was seen as a political problem. The expansion of the wool market after 1840 further threatened peasant subsistence and partial autonomy by increasing demands on peasant products, labor and lands. Unable to increase production through technical improvements and modern relations of production, a new regional bourgeoisie raised its profits by encroaching onto peasant resources.

The first decades of the twentieth century were marked by the expansion of hacienda lands at the expense of communal lands. Latifundia grew mostly through forced sales, foul systems of buying and selling and violent usurpation. In periods of social and political unrest, hacendados often profited to raise the masses or to forge revolts to repress peasant communities and appropriate their lands. The power of the elite was brutal but fragile, based on the absence of a strong central power and built through Indian labor and resources (thus the term gamonal). Available resources were deemed limited; fortune could only come at the expense of others and in relation to power. Any threat to hacendado power meant a threat to hacendado economic and social status. Hence the elite was paternalist and extremely conservative, fearing any change.

All sectors of urban and rural society benefited from Indian labor and fought over their economic surplus. Peasants had since colonial times participated in the market, especially when they needed cash to pay for taxes, cargos and family events. They had learnt to adjust to market fluctuations and transactions. However, with the growing demands of the wool market and the modernization of the transport industry (that hit local fairs and traditional transportation services) local authorities and large and medium landlords started to act as intermediaries allying in detriment of indigenous producers. Hacendados took control of their colonos’ production. Authorities acted as rescatistas obliging communal peasants to sell their wool in advance at lower prices. The volume of production did not change as much as the distribution of wealth that concentrated on fewer hands.

The war with Chile worsened the situation of exploitation increasing the demands of authorities and elites that hoped to put the costs of the war on rural population. Indianness was further identified with labor not with citizenship. The war also marked a less autonomous regional development and the greater power of imperialist capitalism and coastal elites that needed to access the Andean reserve. The central State’s stronger encroachment on native resources was done through unpaid services and taxation. The State appointed but did not pay to district governors who were granted, however, the benefits of unpaid services from the local indigenous population. Unpaid services were constantly forbidden by law but continued due to the state economic needs. To continue with these services, the state needed to ensure protection of Indian resources and access to land. The problem however was that as state demands increased, its protection of peasant resources diminished.
The head tax had been the state’s most important income since colonial times, and it had ensured official protection of Indian lands and resources. The abolition of the contribution retracted production, produced inflation and made provincial governments dependent on the central state and its guano incomes. Moreover, corporative rights to the land and local self government were no longer protected by the state. Guano incomes however were dilapidated in financing clientelism. Once they became exhausted, the State realized the head tax had been its greatest and most secure income. In 1866, Mariano Ignacio Prado tried to restore the personal contribution but it was too late, the contribution had already been replaced by other taxes perceived mostly for the benefit of provincial and departmental governments. The Central State’s initiative only produced social unrest.

Rural mobilization in Huancané in 1866 responded to the breaking of the tributary pact and the restrictions local authorities and elites were putting on peasant access to the market. The movement created momentum and was responded in Lima mainly through the creation of the “Sociedad Amiga de los Indios”. This civic association was born of initiatives and alliances built by puneño Juan Bustamante within the most liberal sectors of the army and the elite. It was the first national associative network in Peru rounding intellectuals, businessmen and militaries with media organs and local Quechua and Aymara divulgers. Unfortunately it responded to peasant claims not by promoting electoral participation but by appropriating the representation of a subaltern sector deemed inferior. The association thus could do little when Bustamante, raising an Indian army to defend Prado’s regime, faced a gory campaign of repression that downplayed the initial issues of taxation and abuse.

The movement showed however the strong national resonance of events occurring as far from Lima as Huancané and it showed peasants had an agenda or their own and connections with peasant leaders of other provinces. Organization and mobilization continued since new taxes continued to appear in addition to the head tax. In 1895, this contribution was once more eliminated for political purposes (to weaken departmental governments) but was soon replaced by other even more onerous contributions such as the tax on salt. Violence due to peasant discontent over taxation only increased with the arrival of civilian government that centralized tax collection without counting with a modern and efficient bureaucracy and refused to draw a new tributary pact.

In 1823, Indians had been granted voting rights as taxpayers and they constituted the majority of voters in the nation; thus the eagerness of ruling elites to suppress the contribution. The weight of the peasant electorate, the weakness of a divided ruling elite and the political weight gained by foreign capitalists explain why the state was not eager to renegotiate a new pact. Not even the Civilista democratic project was able to give up racial categories renouncing to Indian subordination. Cáceres patrimonialist model based on personal vertical relations or unequal exchanges prevailed enhanced with Civilista positivist ideas of progress and economic growth. Parties deprived of any ideological base revolved around political and military caudillos that were unable to produce hegemonic projects integrating peasant constituencies into the nation. It was the power of the central state as arbiter and source of privileges and rewards, not the empire of the law that prevailed, articulating heterogeneous groups that grew downwards linking and extremely complex and divided society.

Caciquismo turned to paternalism when dealing with indigenous groups. Peasants were seen as politically manipulated by feudal lords and thus not trustworthy as citizens. In 1896, illiterate vote was banned and the personal contribution was cancelled to prevent illiterates from claiming voting rights. Electoral outcomes were decided in Lima but the coastal oligarchy unable to form a homogeneous class with a defined political project had to share with regional elites its power. The shadow of gamonalismo remained throughout the Aristocratic Republic, hindering the development
of a hegemonic project and maintaining a gap between the State and the Nation.

The inability of the elite to create a hegemonic process integrating the Indian created a weak and insecure Republican State distrustful of peasant political participation. Its livelihood depended on Indian subordination. One such state could not uphold the long held colonial tributary pact. It needed to see the Indian as debased to maintain unpaid services and irregular contributions targeting peasant incomes and resources. Peasant reactions to the growing contradiction between the State’s discourse and actions were met with fierce repression by militarized clientelistic regimes that failed to give way to a republican project. The result in Puno was an exacerbated process of deterioration of peasant livelihood to the point of threatening real subsistence. The loss of political participation added the last drop to this politically explosive cocktail generating a strong wave of peasant participation. Mirroring the political turmoil at the national level, studies of the period have argued about how peasants violently tried to negotiate a direct relation to the State and the market being usually defeated and forced to return to the status quo. I will show how in spite of the many restrictions they faced to participate in civil society and national debates, peasants managed to reach a national audience (including the Executive power) to expose the project of an ethnically diverse yet integrated nation.
CHAPTER TWO:
“IT IS JUSTICE THAT WE EXPECT FROM YOUR EXCELLENCY”
THE RISE OF GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP NETWORKS (1900-1914)

By 1900, the Republic had struck severe blows to peasant participation in the national political sphere. The breaking of the colonial “tributary pact” during the guano era tore down the peasant independence that Bolivarian decrees (1824-1826) and the ideal of a homestead society dreamt by Lima’s politicians had already weakened. The breaking of the tributary pact fostered the consolidation of gamonalismo and its growing encroachment on indigenous resources. The restriction of suffrage on the basis of literacy (1896) just crowned this situation, taking away the little political power left to peasant majorities. They were not needed as voters anymore and had now little power to influence local, provincial and departmental political authorities. Furthermore, a growingly centralist state had all but eliminated Juntas Departamentales by taking away their resources; deprived of fiscal autonomy to pursue their policies and interests, local power groups were increasing the pressure on peasant labor and resources. At the turn of the century, the situation was becoming unbearable. Puno’s peasantry was aware of the need to engage the central State in a new “tributary pact” to re-open the social and political space they had lost.

This chapter will analyze the broad variety of short and long term strategies peasants used to reach this goal drawing from past experiences and present developments. Peasant initiatives ranged from everyday forms of resistance and violent protest to personal interviews with the President of the Republic and literacy campaigns. Their mobilization for justice built up creating networks of grassroots leadership that build alliances with pro-indigenous intellectuals to carry local protests into the national political and public spheres. These networks faced intense discrimination but they contended and even absorbed the racial-cultural discourses targeting “uncivilized” rural masses to foster a project of indigenous integration into the nation as full citizens. I will argue that their success in creating a viable and legitimate national project was evidenced by the intensification of elite racial discourses and middle class contention for rural leadership and representation.

TRADITIONAL PEASANT DEFENSE STRATEGIES

In the early twentieth century, puneno intellectual and politician José Antonio Encinas worried about the “pleitomania indígena”, peasants’ habit of litigating to defend their rights since colonial times. He was worried because the lack of professional morality of political authorities, judicial functionaries and lawyers made lawsuits last for ages, and forced Indians to litigate over generations. (Encinas de Zegarra, 1999:66) Due to the special status they were granted and the heavy load of legislation produced during the Colony, peasants had centuries of experience using tutelary legislation on their behalf, mainly to protect their land and livestock, source of their autonomy. And yet, as Encinas pointed out, lawsuits were costly and often time consuming. Litigants had to pay for lawyers, transcribers and translators, and they were often subjected to the whims of the authorities that used the procedures and laws to their advantage, as and when they saw fit. This eagerness to litigate was deemed irrational by many contemporaries who

42 A large number of lawyers, scriveners and notaries thus lived from the litigant “nature” assigned to Indians due to the constant lawsuits they established amongst themselves and landlords. Law did not always constitute a source of wealth and prosperity especially for those lawyers dealing with indigenous affairs, yet they could draw prestige, utilities and most of all land. (Bourricaud 1967: 53-54)
wondered why peasants persisted in the use of legal means though aware they would not necessarily find justice.

Many factors explain peasant belief in the power of litigation. Social differences and opposed interests did not give peasants and hacendados different views of the world. Both Indian and elite groups imagined social relations as shaped by personal links. Society was seen as a system of interpersonal relations between a subject, his parents, godparents, godparents of their children and friends. People were obliged not by rules or laws but by wills. Elites and authorities expressed their good or ill will through their demands and decisions. They turned demands into obligations, graces or favors that were to be conceded on a strictly personal basis. That is why indigenes believed any matter could be arranged if the judge thus wanted it. (Bourricaud 1967: 230-232) Legal and political denunciations offered if not full at least partial solutions and could buy peasants precious time to find other ways to negotiate or find their way out. Once a piece of land was in litigation, political authorities could not intervene in the conflict since the affair was under the jurisdiction of the judicial power.

In Serrano provincial society, courts served as “an arena for testing the power” of litigants. “The outcome of a case did not necessarily rest on which party had the law on its side but rather on who could bring to bear more influence in court. Such influence could take the form of better legal preparation, more money to spend on the suit (...) and more leverage for concluding quid pro quo deals with court personnel, requiring bargaining chips of value outside the court system.” Lawyers and magistrates usually responded to financial gains and from Indians they could obtain small but constant incomes as well as plots of land. (Tamayo 1982: 314-316) Moreover, Hispanized large landholders were not always triumphant since peasants could be “backed by another hacendado whose client they had become. The suit thus became a contest between two hacendados, and the outcome was by no means certain.” (Jacobsen 1993: 234-235) To an inherited understanding of the workings of the State and the administration of justice, Indians could add a cunning awareness of intra-elite conflicts. They knew how to play authorities, townspeople and landlords against each other. Electoral alliances, labor contracts and spiritual relationships were extremely important in these cases.

While peasants recurs to legal means hacendados preferred local arrangements and more direct means, especially when they did not manage their own property. Many hacendados feared lawsuits with indigenes since they could be disagreeable and long. A long process could give prestige and power to the plaintiff indigenous group, while being socially disturbing or embarrassing for a landlord. (Jacobsen 1993: 235) A lawsuit could also mean for the master the permanent ill will of his colonos or neighbors causing several problems in the hacienda. The petitifogger exploited the litigant passion of the indigene because he understood the landlord’s fear and doubts in the face of a long, confusing and difficult process. (Bourricaud 1967: 142)

The strength of tutelary thought further promoted peasant preference for litigation. The Republic contributed to the enormous amount of legislation inherited from the colony producing innumerable supreme dispositions that outlawed forced and unpaid services. Between 1909 and 1920 more than fifty theses were published on the indigenous issue. In almost all of them, intellectuals adopted a tutelary perspective that followed Spanish colonial tradition avoiding any sort of radical change. Legislative solutions were long term strategies preferred to the more dangerous short term political solutions. They rose from racial premises and emphasized the need for change (of indigenous cultures) not the need for inclusion or acceptance of indigenous difference. Emphasis was put on State initiative and legal protection not on peasant agency and political participation; nevertheless, State, elite intellectuals and peasants seemed to agree on the need for some sort of protective pact.
The “tributary pact” was an essential element in peasant long term memory constituting the single most important source of political autonomy and identity. As Jacobsen observed, the link between fulfilling public duties and claiming the land survived well within the twentieth century. Communal peasants willingly took part in public work projects, mainly the construction of roads and the repair of churches, because they saw in them a guarantee on their resources. Arequipeño liberal Francisco Mostajo sustained in 1923: “They have internalized the social concepts of the Inca Empire or of still earlier societies so much, that they believe that these collective labor projects give them the title to the property and usufruct of the land on which they live and plant crops.” Mostajo cited the case of a group of protestant Indians who refused to participate in the repair of the local church. They were criticized by Catholic Indians who told them they should have no land and should avoid using “their” roads. (Jacobsen 1993: 276) “Peasants thus appealed both to notions of private property and to the older notions of reciprocal obligations and rights as legitimizing their possession of land. It was a kind of insurance policy in the face of threats against their land resources arising from various quarters of the local hispanized elite.” (Jacobsen 1993: 276)

Legalism could be considered a form of resistance. But indigenous activities went far beyond resistance. Puno’s peasants were constantly breaking their isolation from the State coming into contact with it through juridical instances and petitions to authorities. Starting a lawsuit was a way of demonstrating citizenship and inclusion in the system. It was a way of claiming and setting individual and collective rights straight in the public sphere. Through legal claims and memorials peasants were imposing their presence on the State and even questioning its legitimacy. One of the main demands produced by indigenous litigation was the replacement of bad authorities.

This has been seen by many scholars as a lack of vision: indigenous peasants failing to question the power structure and developing no conscience of the need for a radical transformation of society. (Calisto 1991: 187; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 192) These scholars took for granted the need for a change in the social structure, but Puno’s peasantry did not desire a radical change in the social structure. It expected justice and freedom to maintain its own social and cultural evolution. Peasant society was far from static and it was aware of the slow though constant changes of its social and economic structure. To cope with change through their own institutions, peasant groups needed to neutralize the abuses of local authorities and maintain their partial autonomy, ensuring the free and peaceful access to lands and resources. The growing encroachment of hacendados on their resources and their impingement on local and provincial positions of power was hindering efforts to cope with internal changes.

Peasants demanded changes of authority because authorities were indeed changed. Local authorities served for brief intervals. Subprefect often remained in office for less than a year, and they appointed new district governors just as frequently. This revolving administration hindered the regular collection of taxes, the imposition of power and it allowed the State to respond to peasant claims for authority replacement. In 1912, the Minister of Government dismissed a governor and replaced the Sub-prefect of Chucuito accused of abuses against local Indians.44

43 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui has identified peasant relations with the State as the element organizing the collective memory of Andean communities. In Bolivia, long term memory perceived a continuity of the colonial situation and produced efforts to break the political model and recuperate the past. Short term memory saw the cuts in the colonial continuity after 1952 and the transit from Indians to peasants through the revolutionary power of unions and peasant militias. However, long term memory prevailed over short term memory as evidenced by the perception of colonial continuity. Long term memory was a source of autonomous political identity and admitted no replacement. (Rivera 1986: 167)

44 “El Deber Pro-Indígena”, year 1, nº 3, December 1912.
Peasants were not completely devoid of negotiating power. When the tributary pact failed, natives could refuse to obey State demands. Not even for a salary, affirmed the governor of Acora in 1904, were Indians willing to participate in public works or lend their animals for state businesses (chaqueo) often responding with violence. In 1906, the Prefect solicited the governor of Zepita (province of Chucuito) to make an inventory of the district's public lands. The envarados proceeding with the inventory were seriously threatened by the peasants of the locality who claimed ownership of those lands. The governor acknowledged he was incapable of proceeding with the Prefect's request. (Calisto 1991: 190-191) In 1907, the Governor of Acora informed the Prefect that tax collectors (envarados) showed little inclination to accomplish the task. He proposed his superior to offer them money or provide them with soldiers to collect the rustic contribution. In 1911, the Governor of Puno was ordered to provide workers and loads of sand, offering thirty cents per day and six cents for each load of sand. The governor, however, was unable to carry on with the task because indigenes demanded forty cents a day and would only provide sand for ten cents a load. (Calisto 1991: 195-198)

Direct opposition to the local authority, from silent and pacific disrespect to frontal attacks, was a common and extended procedure. Governors often avowed themselves unable to collect taxes, conscripts and workers demanded by the State due to generalized disobedience. They usually argued that from October to December and from April to June indigenes were dedicated to agricultural tasks or had migrated to other provinces. With the support of hacendados, colonos avoided unpaid services. Communal peasants argued unpaid services had been abolished or rejected the salaries and prices paid by the State for their labor and products. Governors greatly depended on peasant collaboration. If peasants refused to exert the posts of envarados, the local authority had no power of action. Such was the case of two governors ten years apart. The Governor of Atuncolla (1904) and the Governor of Vilque (1914) confessed to their superior they were powerless since peasants had not proceeded to elect envarados on the first day of the year. The difference between the two cases is that in 1914, the governor did not complain about the loss of authority but about the lack of repressive forces available. On the long run, the lack of support of envarados led to the abuse of authority. (Calisto 1991: 191-192)

For years in many districts, governors had competed with haciendas for indigenous labor. However the growing crisis of authority, the lack of an institutionalized repressive system, the growth of haciendas and the impoverishment of the peasantry in spite of market growth changed the situation. Lacking the support of peasant authorities, governors turned more and more to mistis and especially to powerful and well armed hacendados to overcome their powerlessness, becoming often their servile clients to maintain their authority over the peasantry. This greatly affected peasant ability to negotiate with local authorities. At the turn of the century, peasants were growingly deceived by local authorities and confronted the need to send their claims and recourses to higher instances of power. After 1920, peasants tended to overlook more and more local authorities and even the prefecture, addressing their claims directly to the central government. (Calisto 1991: 180)

For centuries Puno’s peasantry had used litigation, passive resistance and open disobedience to cope with power abuses and threats to its partial autonomy. Litigation remained a useful strategy of defense and empowerment but it was increasingly undermined by a system that was superimposing an aggressive and dependent capitalism on a vanishing colonial pact. The circles of power created by local elites were closing down on them. Powerless authorities eager to benefit from the wool market at the expense of peasant labor and resources were entering the clientelistic circles of hacendados hungry for communal lands. Peasant partial autonomy was becoming more and more restricted hindering resistance. New tactics were needed. Responding to this situation, a
group of peasants from the province of Chucuito took the initiative of appealing to the Nation’s highest authority producing “the first stirrings of modern discontent among Puno’s Indians”. (Hazen 1974: 21)

BARGAINING A NEW CONTRACT

In 1901, the authorities of the district of Santa Rosa, province of Chucuito, decided to move the district’s capital from the town of Santa Rosa to a hamlet denominated “Huanacamaya”, seven leagues to the north. The decision was fateful for the district’s population forced to raise the new town (carrying stones, laying foundations and fabricating adobes). Peasants from local communities were obliged to work for free eight to ten days, without food or coca and under an extreme discipline (during the day they were watched over by my guards, at night they were sequestered without food or bed in a house under the custody of armed guards). Anyone missing work was subject to a house requisition: locks and doors were broken and the house ransacked. If sick, they had to pay a fine of two soles per day. Native authorities who had dared oppose such a treatment had been punished with the pillory and other corporal punishments (Domingo Chambilla, segunda of Chichillape, Manuel Capacuti from Apupata, Sebastian Calisaya, hilacata of Llusta) causing the death of one of them.

This “unusually harsh treatment provoked protests and eventually a work stoppage” but the communities of Santa Rosa were unable to find justice. (Hazen 1974: 25-26) They opted to send a commission to Lima, collecting alpaca wool and selling it in Tacna to raise money for the journey. José Antonio Chambilla, Mariano Yllachura and Antonio Chambi were appointed “messengers” by the communities of Apupata, Orccooyo, Chichillape, Llusta, Ccasani, Sullcanaca, Chocorasi and Puntaperdida and sent to the capital in October 1901. Once in Lima, they were assisted by a network of puneño peasants who had migrated earlier and worked as load carriers in the market or as street sweepers. The messengers were recognized due to their local garb by an Aymara speaking student issued from a landowning family of Chucuito who helped them find their way to the office of Santiago Giraldo, Representative from Puno known for his campaigns in defense of the Indian. With him they wrote memorials to be presented to the president, congress and the press. (AGN, MI, Prefecturas 88 – 1902; AGN, MI 100 “Ap-Cp 1904”; Rénique 2004: 47, 91; Hazen 1974: 26)

After meeting Chambilla, Yllachura and Chambi, Civilista President Eduardo López de Romaña was moved to tears and exclaimed: “Soy un desgraciado, soy presidente del Perú y no puedo comprender a mis conciudadanos.” (Rénique 2004: 47) Lima’s ruling coastal elite felt worlds apart from vast areas of large native population. Chambilla, Yllachura and Chambi were willing to close that gap. Their personal appeal to the President responded to a clientelistic political model, inherited from the colony, which had persisted throughout the nineteenth century. Chucuito had been a royal encomienda administered by colonial functionaries not by encomenderos or landlords. The three messengers confronted an awfully long trip to establish a personal link with the State’s higher authority, gain his trust and reach the justice they could not find in Puno. They were not rejecting the traditional institutional polity but elite and local authorities’ disruption of a long established moral economy. They recognized the urgent need to close the gap between them

45 Eduardo Lopez de Romaña, an engineer, served as the first Minister of Development under Pierola’s regime. During his presidential period (1899-1903) he maintained the principle of authority and was one of the few presidents of this period who did not practice nepotism. (Basadre 1983: VIII 93-94)

46 “How ungrateful I am! I am the President of Peru and I cannot understand my fellow citizens.” (my translation)
and the State and they bet on a personal audience with the President himself to reach a fairer negotiation. Influenced by their cultural background and oral tradition, they hoped to prove the facts they were denouncing through direct eye and verbal contact, as sources of information.47

The men that approached President López de Romaña were prosperous peasants whose economic well-being was threatened by local authorities searching their own advancement or notables controlling the local market. Unlike Azangaro or Lampa (Quechua provinces), Chucuito had few haciendas and Aymara peasants had kept possession of lands in diverse ecological floors. Gamonalismo was present but it was a “Gamonalismo sin hacendados”, affirms Ramón Pajuelo. Gamonalismo was expressed in the entanglement between the commercial network and the local bureaucracy: authorities were often appointed amongst local notables that alternated positions amongst themselves. The relations of domination and resistance confronted peasants with merchants and authorities or rather with merchant-authorities. (Pajuelo 1998) Santa Rosa’s messengers feared the local patron’s feast and fair would be moved to the new capital, thus diminishing their hold on the local market.48 They rejected forced sales and demanded guarantees on their property and resources.

Messengers presenting memorials to the Central government usually represented the most endowed sectors of their community. Their names or last names appear in most of the fines presented as evidence of their accusations. Only the poor, who could not afford paying fines, could be forced to render services. Forced services added to the natural expenses of living and the harm of leaving land and work, the obligation of paying the value of broken or lost things and animals in the authority’s house, which often amounted to more than the exemption fees. The level of Indian population with possibilities to generate and accumulate an economic surplus was receiving most of the fines, taxes and all kinds of illegal contributions since they could afford them. This group raised sheep and alpacas and had strong aspirations to enter the commercial sphere without the restrictions tied to the indigenous condition.

Their situation had for long been one of abuse: required personal services without remuneration (servicios and cargos), high fees to be exempted from those services (multas), sequestering of cattle under the pretext of judicial deposits or for official use (chaqueo), arbitrary fines for imaginary faults, forced selling of their wool and mules for half the market price (reparto forzoso), mandatory contributions for religious and profane feasts and more. The forced labor in the construction of the new capital just came to topple all these abuses. Therefore, Chambilla, Yllachura and Chambi, spending money they did not possess and time they needed to gain their living, had dared to cross hundreds of leagues of mountain, desert and ocean and face the “deadly coastal weather”. (AGN, MI, Prefecturas 88 – 1902)

Messengers developed and transmitted a discourse of differentiation and recognition. They expected to be recognized as “indigenous citizens” by all instances of the State. Difference (“Indianness”) deserved not isolation but recognition and protection. This was owed considering all the services indigenes rendered to the State in money and labor. Santa Rosa’s communal

47 Aymara language is characterized by the stress put on whether the information is from a direct or an indirect source. The choice of verb tense indicates whether the speaker, the listener or both are discussing a direct experience or whether they are discussing an indirect experience (second hand information, rumors, events outside the control of the dialoguers). (Briggs et al 1986: 18)

48 The district of Santa Rosa was an important economic post that counted with ten commercial agencies dealing directly with Arequipa. It produced in the early 1920s, per month, one thousand quintals (one hundred pounds) of alpaca wool, one hundred thousand quintals of sheep wool, three hundred quintals of bovine leather and five thousand of parchments and sheep leather. (Sociedad de Propaganda del Sur 1921: 207-213)
peasants believed the obligations imposed on them were, according to the document, foreign to their "condition of free citizens recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution..." (AGN, MI, Prefecturas 88 – 1902) Political authorities of the Department produced only bureaucratic transactions based on partial reports from accused subaltern authorities. The President with his broad constitutional faculties could avoid formulations that blocked any effort to reach justice and dictate a general measure in favor of the indigenous race of the whole Department of Puno (exemptions from all mandatory, non remunerated labor without penalties, restitution of requisitions of money and cattle, exemption from forced sale of their products and other obligations).

In a bold though fair move, they asked the President to command the Prefect to deposit in the Departmental Treasury the amount corresponding to the last compulsory sale done in August: they had been forced to accept money for the wool they would produce in January, at half the market price. This money was to be used to construct a school for native children in the town of Santa Rosa. They also requested a written document they could personally give to the Prefect of Puno informing him of the measures taken in response to this memorial. The document ends with a call of attention bearing the controversial plight of indigenous rights: “It is justice that we expect from Your Excellency.”

Leaders were peasants with a greater knowledge of the world outside their communities. As Feierman pointed out, peasant intellectuals had a sphere of competent knowledge that defined their place within the ensemble of social relations. (Feierman 1990: 18) The weight of their knowledge though reduced for a bureaucrat in Lima was extended for peasant constituencies in Puno. Many messengers spoke or understood Spanish; some could even read or write a bit. José Antonio Chambilla could sign his name with a rubric, which indicates he might have spoken Spanish, and had learned or was learning to read and write. These prosperous or more informed peasants strove to educate their children to create a space for themselves in the national society and especially in the commercial sphere. They were renegotiating with the President their place in the national ensemble of relations.

They were probably not the first. Through the “Sociedad Amiga de los Indios” puneño leaders of peasant origin had tried to reach a wider audience for peasant claims. Dámaso Castilla and Tomás Mamani were Aymara leaders who traveled to Lima and used peasant communication networks to diffuse their ideas and those of the Society. Castilla was unable to meet with President Balta but returned to Puno with all kinds of pamphlets and information furnished by the Society and was accused of being one of the instigators of a revolt in Chucuito in 1870. Tomás Mamani was accused of instigating Indian violence and mobilizing peasants to recuperate usurped lands in Vilquechico (Province of Huancane). They both organized meetings in churches, hills and regional fairs, gathering hundreds of people. They maintained an ethnic and communitarian discourse that was not in accord with the liberal and tutelary thought of the “Sociedad Amiga de los Indios” but that shows the seeds of an ethnic discourse on indigenous citizenship. (Monsalve 2009: 232-233) Puno’s peasantry, particularly Aymara peasantry, had developed a strong leadership willing “to experiment with new alternatives among a group generally dismissed as hermetic and tradition-bound.” (Hazen 1974: 28)

The example set by the communities of Santa Rosa was soon followed by other communities who were also trying to recuperate some of the political power they had lost, establishing a direct link with the central administration and its treasury as in colonial times. Another memorial was written in Lima on November 24, 1902 by request of a group of messengers sent from Acora (Province of Puno). Paulino Lope, Mariano Istaña and Carlos Chipana introduced themselves to the President as representatives of 33 ayllos, which according to the census counted 5,229 inhabitants, more than two thirds of the total population of the district. In this document they
proceeded to a minute description of the fiscal revenue collection of the district. The Pequeña o Ccama was a contribution that obliged them to four months of free services to the governor and other authorities. To be exempted they had to pay $25 pesos for three alternated periods of two years, so that in six years they paid $75 pesos. The Pequeña was mandatory from birth: a six years old child already owed an enormous contribution, dealt between the governor, the lieutenant and the priest who also demanded the “tanda de alferes.” A population of more than 7000 souls like Acora, with more than 3000 males, produced more than $200,000 pesos every six years.

This enormous amount was compared to the cost of putting one school for indigenous children in each of the thirty three ayllus represented. This would cost $40,800 pesos per year, which was almost one fifth of the amount that local authorities could amass with the Pequeña. If the central administration took over collecting the taxes they already paid, the solution to “the social problem of the civilization of our race would be immediate and the results efficient”. The messengers from Acora assured the President they were not exaggerating. Their calculations might even run short considering that the census of 1876 was “tiny” (“diminuto”) and the population of Acora had doubled the official figures of a quarter of a century ago.

The messengers enumerated the amount of duties they were forced to pay stressing how they would largely suffice for the creation of the schools they so urgently needed. They also complained about the forced selling of alpaca wool at one third the market price ($5 instead of $15 pesos) added to repartos of sheep and llama wool, meat, mules, chuño, potato, barley, etc. To avoid confiscations and incarcerations, they also had to pay the Sisa (an amount per head of cattle pasturing in the community lands), arbitrary surcharges, fines, widows’ contributions, and the terrible tasa, that counted with the support of the law. They were writing a separate memorial for the tasa so that it would be solved separately to obtain rectification of the tax listings. Lope, Istaña and Chipana were given political representation to defend a large number of solvent constituents who felt abused as tax payers. The natives of the thirty three communities of Acora showed no intention of stop paying taxes but did expect guarantees on their resources and education for their children in exchange for their taxes. The document closed the same way the Chucuito memorial did: “Es justicia que esperamos de V.E.”

The initiatives of the communal peasants of Chucuito were soon followed by others producing a wave of messengers from other Aymara and even Quechua provinces. Messengers from Acora, Lope, Istaña and Chipana affirmed in their memorial that they “dared” to bother the President, following the steps of the messengers from Chucuito, Ilave, Huancane and Azangaro. They identified themselves as successors and predecessors, as joining a movement in progress that

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49 “It is justice that we expect from your Excellency.” It was signed by Paulino Lope (barely readable), Mariano Istaña (fairly well), and in the name of Carlos Chipana who did not sign and was sick Buinavintura Ayunta. [ARP, Colección Arce Borda]
could only grow due to the circumstances. And they identified their quest as an “odyssey of liberty and justice” that would “be followed by all those who like us suffer the evils of serfdom.” “El Deber Pro Indígena”, leading indigenista publication noted in 1915, “the surprising persistence of Puno’s Indians in sending messengers to Lima” though they were constantly “advised” to seek “more positive results through local court action”. (Hazen 1974: 27)

Peasant leaders and their constituencies did not expect to change the system, but they were slowly evolving from everyday forms of resistance to an organized mobilization to protect their political autonomy. Indigenous groups gathered *ramas* and paid for written documents not just to see them pass from authority to authority until filed in an obscure ministry archive or judicial cabinet. They included in their expenses and proceedings the publication of their documents in local and regional newspapers as well as in Lima’s newspapers. Newspapers like “El Comercio” and “El Nacional” had led a campaign against the “law of terror” that proposed to crush insurrection in Huancane in 1867. These newspapers had columns for editorials and correspondents or subscribers bringing up the “indigenous question” debating problems such as the abuse of indigenous labor force in the Andes and the jungle, immigration, indigenous legalism, etc… Messengers relied on newspapers because they grasped the role of Lima’s public opinion and remained connected to events in Lima.

As messenger from Acora (Province of Puno) Mariano Huanca explained, authorities and neighbors put all kinds of obstacles to their trips to Lima advertising they were wasting their money. Yet, it was their own money they were spending in a licit, humanitarian, civilized and reasonable way. Huanca had no doubt that until they were not granted guarantees; messengers would keep going not just to Lima, but all the way to Rome. (AGN, MI 100, “Fp-Lp 1904”) In December 1903, Mauricio Llallacachi and others neighbors of the capital of the Province of Cailloma (Department of Arequipa) arrived in Lima looking for justice (guarantees and the replacement of an authority) to

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50Events in neighboring Bolivia might have influenced messengers’ initiatives. Bolivian communities showed in the late nineteenth century great ability to organize and reach a compromise with the State. As in Peru, Bolivian creoles in power blamed the Indian population for the defeat in the war against Chile. Their main policy between 1880 and 1900 was the disappearance of communities, legally suppressed in 1866 by President Melgarejo. Between 1881 and 1883, the government carried on a wave of confiscations that were decisive in the department of La Paz. The poorest elements had to leave. Others followed the desires of liberal politicians becoming small landowners. A large part of the despoiled Aymara communities however initiated an enduring resistance using Creole political conflicts. (Demélas 2003: 399-401) In December 1898, La Paz’s major party, liberal and federalist, initiated a revolt to overthrow the government of Southern conservatives. Indigenous communities in suspension had been waiting such a moment for twenty years; in 1899 they joined the liberal Creoles for six months to defeat conservative sectors. Indigenous leaders lead by a peasant named Zarate Willka had developed a multiethnic state project with no references to the Inca Empire utopias; a republican, democratic, pluriethnic state that would include or represent each of the nation’s elements without the need of intermediaries with indigenous priests and teachers in their towns. Their project preserved the republican form but recuperated colonial estates: Indians and whites would have their own representation and guarantees, especially regarding communal property. The insurrection’s leaders placed themselves in the intersection between traditional peasant revindications and the beginnings of a liberal society. (Demélas 2003: 411-412)

51 Since the early colony, communities used to gather exceptional contributions or *ramas* from their members to pay for the expenses of a collective work: the buying of a cult object for the Church, the finishing of a public building, the construction of a defense or infrastructure, etc. (Demélas 2003: 410) With the growth of haciendas and the end of the fiscal pact, it turned into a custom by which the members of one or more communities allotted in proportion the expenses of a legal process of land or cattle recuperation and other claims. (Deustua & Rénique 1984: 90) It was an essential tool for peasant revindications and a strong test for communal solidarity. Indigenes gave according to their situation either money, wool or products. (Giraldo y Franch 1979: 175) Proceedings were not always successful and the *rama* could be a long heavy burden, especially if communal leaders abused this tool. (Deustua in Deustua & Rénique 1984: 96)
avoid the extreme to which the Province of Chucuito had arrived scandalizing the whole nation. They specified measures should be taken without entering in the cycle of bureaucratic reports from inferiors and assured they would voice their complaints as much as necessary. (AGN, MI 92, 1903) In spite of local repression and threats, the activities of messengers continued and produced strong repercussions within the national public.

The travel of three messengers from Santa Rosa, Chucuito, to the capital had unforeseen consequences at the local, regional and national level. They crossed mountains, deserts and seas, faced Lima’s pernicious climate and surmounted the social, economic and cultural distances that separated them from the coastal ruling elite to speak to the highest authority in the Nation and obtain justice. They had a clear goal: they hoped to resume a tributary pact with the State. They were willing to continue paying taxes and rendering services to the State in exchange for education and protection of their political autonomy, mainly protection of their labor force and resources from abusive demands of local authorities (unpaid services and repartos). The tenacity they showed spoke of the righteousness they felt about their cause, but also of an empowered leadership aware of the existence of a public sphere and unwilling to give up to growing gamonal pressure. Their example was followed by hundreds of peasant intellectuals initiating a wave of demands that could not be ignored by the State.

President López de Romaña, moved by Santa Rosa’s messengers’ situation, offered to take matters into hand. However, following the usual pace of the Peruvian state, resolutions lingered. Basadre pointed out how Congress in the early twentieth century was little prone to discuss or confront serious social problems in the provinces, immersed as it was in factional disputes over power and central administration. The complaints of Santa Rosa’s messengers were turned in to the accused local authorities for the usual procedure of administrative reports. The messengers were left to the mercy of their persecutors. Chambilla, Yllachura and Chambi, sent back with letters of recommendation, were persecuted and jailed upon their arrival. (Basadre 1983: VIII 42) But they were not silenced and it was, once more, their initiative that brought changes.

In a second memorial, Chambilla, Yllachura and Chambi assured they would not dare give the “wise” President advice on how to govern, but abusing of the familiarity he inspired in them when they met, they recommended a measure proposed in an article published in “El Comercio” (written by an anonymous correspondent probably their adviser and lawyer Santiago Giraldo). The article annexed to the memorial proposed the sending of a Supreme Government Delegate to the Province of Chucuito to investigate the abuses and take measures. It also recommended the dismissal of authorities for the free exercise of the functions of the delegate.

The administration finally reacted with this second memorial. Minister of Government Cárdenas decreed on 26 November 1901 the creation of a commission, formed by lawyer Dr. Alejandro Maguña (professor of philosophy at the University of San Marcos and vocal of the Supreme Court) and Don Guillermo Lira. This commission had two months to visit each district of the Province of Chucuito to uncover the truth about the Indian situation. Lira soon resigned and Maguña was given all functions. His trip started on January 8, 1902, and closely followed the instructions given by the government. (Macera et al 1988: 21-55; Réniqque 2004: 47) Maguña left Puno accompanied by the three messengers from Santa Rosa and their proxy and defender Presbyter Valentín Paniagua.52

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52 Valentín Paniagua was born and raised in Pomata (1860s or 1870s), in a large family that included several artists. He studied in the Seminary of Saint Ambrose in Puno standing out for his intelligence and search for social justice. He obtained a doctorate in theology in Lima through a fellowship. He was first appointed Chaplain of Peru’s Naval School, where he remained for only a short time. He asked to be sent to the parish of Santiago de Pupuja in the province of Azangaro. There, he dedicated himself to preach fraternity among men and faith in the homeland’s future. He was soon sent to Pomata, his native land. (Frisancho Pineda, Album de Oro, volume VIII, pp. 157-160)
Paniagua was a native from Pomata known for his search for social justice. From the pulpit, he preached Indians about liberation. Once in Chucuito, Maguiña hired a translator of the Aymara language: Telésforo Catacora, distinguished alumni of the San Carlos School of Puno, former teacher of the male school of Juli and student of law at the University of Arequipa.

Maguiña was pulled back and forth by all social forces and had a hard time trying not to become entangled by them. In Juli, capital of the Province, Maguiña was informed of threats sent by the lieutenant governor to the messengers. He informed the Sub-prefect but hostilities continued. Chambilla, Yllachura and Chambi had to take inroads and sleep outside the towns changing lodgings two or three times a day. Governors threatened them, forbidding entrance or permanence in the towns. Authorities denied this while accusing messengers of instilling subversive ideas in their fellow Indians and preparing a subscription to develop a revolutionary plan to overthrow the government and restore the Inca Empire. Soon enough, Catacora and Paniagua were targeted by the persecutions and waylays of gamonales, political and municipal authorities and provincial judges. Neighbors of Juli and Pomata wrote a letter against Paniagua that led the Provincial Judge of Chucuito to open a suit against him. Paniagua was accused of inciting the Indians to insubordinate. Catacora was accused of impartiality and of not speaking Aymara. Catacora remained but Paniagua had to leave for some time. (Macera 1988: 27; Basadre 1983: VIII 226)

Maguiña could see the natives’ fear and their absence in the towns. He noted how Paniagua helped the Indians lose their natural fear and sustain their complaints in front of those they were directed to. Peasants asked him several times to stay in their estancias to speak more freely. He did this in Sullcanaca, a community of the district of Santa Rosa. There communal peasants related extensively about the customs and abuses they were subjected to. Yet once in front of the authorities and townsmen in Santa Rosa, they hid when called to declare, came forth denying what they had said or evading a response. (Macera 1988: 30)

Maguiña’s image of the Indians was as contradictory as indigenous testimonies. He was not exempt from the racism of the period that imbued state policies and went from abjection to understanding and back. The Indian, he affirmed, experienced no pain, had no sense of nationality (soldiers, citizens and voters only by force), exhibited the selfishness of savages and walked towards “decadence and annihilation”. However, he was not responsible for his own degradation, which was produced by the State itself as well as white society. From the State he knew only charges and duties, never benefits for even in school he was not free from mandatory service and charges imposed by the teacher. The white race by inheritance and education was used to treat with indifference cruel acts and tyranny against the Indian. (Macera 1988: 31) Maguiña concluded the Indian of Chucuito had no value as social or as political element. (Rénique 2004: 48)

Hence, Maguiña stressed the need for education and immigration to solve the Nation’s indigenous problem. Education would turn the indigenous population into a useful element for society. Schools should be constructed not just in the district’s capitals but also in hamlets, haciendas and ayllus to impart an education directed to developing hygienic and moral habits and creating “needs of a superior grade than those of a savage”. Schools should be also for adults, especially young adults to train teachers for the schools in the ayllus. (Macera 1988: 53-54) Immigration would further transform the towns and hamlets of Chucuito by introducing in them a few thousand men of vigorous, intelligent and creative race. Maguiña’s report was the legacy of an illustrated man who wanted to see the rise of a civil society but shared the limitations of the State and lawmakers to accept the place of indigenous constituencies and their role in the construction of a national project. He shared the reformist and modern mentality of a sector of the Peruvian State that was trying to face the indigenous challenge through a practical though still prejudiced
attitude. A righteous bureaucrat, Maguiña believed in the State and in change from the top down. His final report (March 15, 1902) evidenced fear: the fear of a State uncertain about siding with Indian constituencies, afraid of including into the nation indigenous masses with full citizen rights.

For the Executive power, Maguiña’s report “confirmed, once more” the “innumerable abuses” committed against the Indians by governors, lieutenant governors, parish priests, mayors, justices of peace and all those exerting authority through their fortune and relations. The abuses, said the office addressed to the Prefect of Puno (dated June 30, 1902), would have disappeared a long time ago if superior authorities exerted vigilance and repressive actions against violations to the law. It was a problem of indifference not of lack of laws and it was in the hands of the Prefect to make abuses disappear. (AGN, MI 88) Sub-prefect of Chucuito Mariano Vicente Cuentas was replaced and Puno’s Prefect M. Eleuterio Ponce was moved to Apurímac (though they both returned to Puno as authorities in 1907). Juan de Dios Salazar y Oyarzabal, a young lawyer who had just left the cloisters of the University, was selected as the new Prefect of Puno. He was commissioned to attend and resolve all the complaints of the new messengers that had arrived from Puno and were sent back with him.

In October 1903, a “Third Commission” (as the messengers called it) arrived in Lima from the district of Acora. It included José Antonio Calamullo, Mariano Istaña, Mariano Charaja, Mariano Huanca and other messengers. They presented a general memorial as well as individual claims and complaints to the newly elected President, Manuel Candamo. After months in Lima, the messengers were verbally asked by President Candamo to go back to Puno with letters of recommendation from him and from war hero and former president General Andrés Avelino Cáceres. (Basadre 1983: VIII 226) The messengers presented their complaint letters to the new Prefect as soon as they got on the steamboat in Callao. Decrees were promised upon their arrival to Puno. Once in Puno, however, the situation turned out differently. The new Prefect was too cautious to decree anything upon his arrival. He might have been afraid of turning departmental authorities and elites against him. He refused to decree about indigenous claims and forcefully retired some messengers from the Prefecture with soldiers. Furthermore, he did not undertake the visit of the Department that President Candamo had established as first diligence in his new post. According to peasant accounts, the Prefect busied about everything except the sort of the “indigenous class” whose complaints motivated his appointment. [AGN, MI 100, “Fp- Lp 1904”]

53 Maguiña confirmed the absolute need to change authorities and warn new ones about the abuses and customs that should be eradicated. Governors were particularly hard to control and the State needed to start paying salaries or instituting the post as the first step of an administrative career. Young and educated men would start their practical education as governors, and through a rigorous system of promotion would find in public administration the stimulus of an honorable career. Maguiña expected authorities to periodically address detailed written reports about their actions to their superiors. These reports would be made public to create some respect and fear of the sanctions of public opinion and the law. To verify these reports, the government would send special commissions with extraordinary faculties. (Macera 1988: 51)

54 This report appeared as an annex in the memoires of Minister of Government Leonidas Cárdenas in 1902. (Basadre 1983: VIII 226)

55 Three of these messengers Charaja (ayllu Hilacatura), Huanca (ayllu Sulcaccollana) and Istaña (ayllu Alay-Choquela) had to return a year later, in 1904, and through their personal letters we can learn about the success of the “Third Commission.”

56 Manuel Candamo, leader of the Civil Party, initiated a regime of political conciliation but became ill soon after reaching power and died on May 7th 1904 after only eight months of government. (Basadre 1983: VIII 107-108)

57 The document was written in the Bay of Callao, on board of steamboat Mendoza, on 30 November 1903, and signed by José Antonio Calamullo (scrivener?) by request of Huanca. [AGN, MI 100, “Fp-Lp 1904”]
Salazar y Oyarzabal imbued with Maguña’s reformist spirit strove to improve local administration and create Indian schools. Many government schools were created during this period and Salazar encouraged peasants to form their own facilities. His successor, Antonio Menéndez informed he had to counter orders to end all free services for it was an extremely useful practice and venerable tradition. (Hazen 1974: 31-32) But Salazar y Oyarzabal was an ambitious man starting his political career in the region (he became Representative of Huancane in the 1920s when the province was the scene of some of the most serious rural conflicts caused by latifundia expansion), and soon the situation worsened. Salazar appointed Melitón Arroyo (a merchant turned hacendado) as governor of Acora. Arroyo was a declared nemesis of messengers Charaja and Istaña and dominated the district for the next three decades. Repression increased: Charaja was assaulted by a gang of employees of Arroyo who beat him, and ransacked and burned his property. (AGN, MI 100 “Ap-Cp 1904”, Rénique 2004: 49-50) Arroyo uttered all kinds of threats affirming that the post had cost him money, and he was authorized to burn messengers in the middle of the plaza. He was not boasting: Miguel Aro had been hanged from a ccollí (native tree) in the woods of Ccaruma by orders of Arroyo.58 (AGN, MI 100, “Fp-Lp 1904”)

In April, Istaña went to town to listen to Sunday mass and to check if the band offered by Candamo and the Prefect on the suppression of free services and duties had been published. It had not, so he returned to his land with his companions Rufino and Vicente Catacora (godparent and friend of Istaña). They were surprised by two agents who took them to Arroyo’s house and put them in an empty room used as jail to punish Indians. Once there, Arroyo took a zurriago (whip with a hard end incrusted with lead) and punished Istaña cruelly for an hour, protected by a company of armed, immobile and mute men frigid with fear. Even Mrs. Arroyo participated in the punishment, slapping Istaña in the face. They both uttered terrible threats and injuries such as:

...indio liso y alzado, con que sabes ir a quejarte a Lima contra las autoridades y townsmen, yo te quitaré las ganas y te cortaré los pies para que no vayas otra vez, ladrón pillo estás robando a los indios: que has sacado yendo a Lima, nada, mientras que yo soy Gobernador sin ir a Lima porque me cuesta mi plata, yo seré siempre tu amo y te azotaré siempre con este zurriago cuantas veces quiera...59 (AGN, MI 100, “Fp-Lp 1904”)

Istaña’s companions were punished in the same way, accused of having contributed, as heads of their aylus, to the messengers’ trip. When he tired himself, Arroyo ordered his men to jail the messengers overnight, reminding them to remain silent to avoid more punishments. Tired of trying to obtain from them the promise of not returning to Lima, Arroyo released them but not without threatening to do the same with Mariano Charaja. He affirmed he would jail him until he starved. Charaja and Huanca understood they could not reach justice in Puno. Once again they left for Lima, arriving in July 1904.

In the meantime, Istaña, Rufino Catacora, Anselmo Cutipa and Joaquín Ramos went to the Prefecture and told of the punishments and torments they had suffered, reporting also about undue extractions and contributions, unpaid services, forced sales and other abuses done by Arroyo

58 Crime cited in the manuscript of the Third Commission in 1903.

59 “... uppish and brazen Indian, so you know how to complain in Lima against authorities and neighbors. I will take away that desire and will cut your feet so you will not go again. Thief, rogue, you are stealing from the Indians: what have you won going to Lima, nothing, while I am the Governor without going to Lima because I spent my money in it. I will always be your master and will whip you always as many times as I want...”
(even a collection of food under the false pretext of the arrival of a new State delegate). The Prefect received the recourse with stoic indifference and sent them off. Their plead obviously reached the governor, who put Rufino Catacora in jail, accused of creating schools for Indians and exhorting the communities in the chapel of the Natividad to put free schools for the children of Indians.60 Catacora was also accused of “heresy” for seemingly proposing the destruction of the images of the saints in the chapel.

Alarmed with the impunity and rebellion of governor Arroyo, the communities of Acora sent 100 representatives to the Prefecture to claim for guarantees on their lives and property and for the punishment of the defiant governor. In the patio of the Prefecture they found the Prefect in amiable conversation with Arroyo (“tertulizando muy cortés y amistosamente”). They exposed their complaints in front of both of them. The Prefect said nothing leaving the Governor to answer proudly that it was all false and that he recognized none of the complaining Indians. No complaints and denunciation seemed to reach or touch the Prefect who maintained an indifferent attitude and supported the claims of Arroyo. (AGN, MI 100, “Fp-Lp 1904”) Istaña decided then to join his fellow messengers in Lima. This was his third trip to the capital.

The three memorials sent to the President by the communities of Acora deal with similar claims and demands. Their situation was excruciating: they were at the complete mercy of the governor without being able to complain to the Prefect or to any other authority in Puno. They asked for the restitution of their lands, cattle and goods, the dismissal and judicial punishment of Governor Arroyo, the publication by the prefect of bands banishing unpaid services, forced sales and contributions, and in the case of Istaña, official government protection for the establishment of Free Indigenous Schools. The pleas of memorials grew more and more dramatic and though initially messengers insisted on the rightfulness of their demands, they soon asked for mere equity or grace. Their situation was increasingly dismal.

Reports of these persecutions and reprisals persuaded the Chamber of Representatives in Lima to discuss the appointment of another commission to study the situation in the Southern Andes. José Salvador Cavero, attorney general of the Supreme Court, was appointed commissioner of the new parliamentary commission designed to solve the problems faced by the indigenous race. In March 1904, Puno’s messengers were informed of the appointment of the new Delegate. Gamonales were “fermenting” with the news61 and messengers thought the hour of justice had come; the new delegate of the government would do justice to the disgraced Indians and chastise the Prefect for not having accomplished the President’s instructions. Charaja, Huanca and Istaña erre through the capital for months in vain; the congressional delegate never left.

President Candamo had died.62 Decrees and decisions were postponed and to make things worse, Cavero was nominated as candidate to the Vice-presidency of the Republic. The parliamentary commission was left in suspense. (Basadre 1983: VIII 226) Was it a mere coincidence or was this appointment fostered by gamonal representatives to hinder Cavero’s trip as Delegate? The messengers learned that the visit had been cancelled when their situation had

60 Indeed three schools were founded at their expense: one in the parcialidad of Sullcacollana in the house of Rufino Catacora himself, one in Hilacatura in the house of Damián Catacora and a third in Chanca in the house of Hilario Chaccolla.

61 The three memorials two dated 3 October and the other one dated 5 December 1904 seem to have been written by the same person (José Antonio Calamullo?) since they share similar paragraphs and metaphors such as that of the “fermenting” landlords.

62 He was succeeded by Serapio Calderón, second Vice-president, on April 22, 1904. (Basadre1983: VIII)
become unbearable. While waiting for Cavero’s trip they had spent all their resources and were living of daily wages gained in public works. The messengers went to see Cavero and were counseled to write to the President. They presented three documents to the Executive, with little success. Even their petitions of return tickets to Puno and safe-conducts were denied. Their documents were sent back to Cavero, as “antecedents” for his special commission. (AGN, MI 100, “Fp-Lp 1904”)  

Fortunately, Candamo’s administration had taken other initiatives that did not go blank. In October 1903, the administration, responding to the messengers’ petitions, had appointed a new sub-prefect for Chucuito. Teodomiro Gutierrez Cuevas, a pro-indigenous military who was instructed to calm peasant unrest. He immediately announced he had been appointment by presidente Candamo to end abuses and restore justice. He aimed at the complete rehabilitation of the Indian and his positive incorporation to the national collectivity. On 25 December and January 1, Gutierrez published manifests announcing the definite abolishment of all kinds of forced unpaid services and wool sales. He took measures to eliminate excessive taxes collected by municipalities for public works, and he authorized private settlements for damage done by loose animals to neighboring properties. This meant bypassing the municipalities and causing great damage to their income.

Gutierrez’s period inspired the natives of Chucuito and other provinces to disobey “established traditions” creating “havoc” according to some local authorities. The Governor of the district of Chucuito (province of Puno), Eladio Romero, was summoned by Sub-prefect Loza to respond to accusations of abuse of authority. Romero explained to the Sub-prefect (in a letter dated February 9, 1904) that he had called upon indigenous authorities but they had all thrown their varas. They had rejected their posts because they were fed up with the disobedience of their ayllus and tired of the many unjust accusations that they systematically received. Exhorted to return to their posts, the majority had refused and fled to avoid being forced to. They had gone to the valleys of Moquegua or formally renounced their posts leaving their ayllus acephalous. Nobody would replace them because of the “demoralization” of the “indiada.” According to Governor Romero, following the bad example of the province of Chucuito, Indians obeyed no one, and the obvious consequence was the complete breakdown of the administration at all levels. The decisions of judges had no effect for the commissions sent to perform a legal act were avoided or thrown out at stone point. Even religious principles were disrespected for Indians buried their dead wherever they saw fit. (ARP, Chucuito 1904) Governor Romero reported with alarm that Indians gathered at the sound of “the horn of revolt”… to run to the hills to avoid the commissions. Neighbors were rightfully worried about their lives and interests during the coming carnival when Indians would turn to unconscious drinking and barbarian acts. Romero saw no difference between revolt and civil disobedience and strove to depict the scene of a race war. He pleaded: “Today, Sir, I do deserve the high honor of being believed, there are in this district no services of any class at all, not even the four document-carrier posts that, for the imperious need of the official service, were designated a year ago to exist.”63 Romero was aghast: were Indians pretending that governors, perceiving no salary, would carry the voluminous packages of the judges?

Superior authorities were used to alarmist reports and took them with a grain of salt. Sub-prefect Loza’s short and vague response (“Ordénese lo conveniente.”) echoes the colonial state weakness and contradictions (“Obedezco pero no cumple.”). The situation was as difficult for local authorities as for their superiors who could not contradict supreme decrees called upon by a fellow

63 My translation, my highlighting. (ARP, Chucuito 1904)
Sub-prefect, yet had to ensure the continuity of local administration without assigned state funds. The dramatic, even alarmist, tone of Romero’s letter unveils some of the difficulties governors faced to impose their authority as well as the unremitting resistance of the peasantry. Governors had to work through force, negotiations or a complex mixture of both. In each case they needed to count with private resources (arms, men, land, money or goods) to impose their authority and actually profit from the position. Thus it was often local landlords and merchants who searched or obtained the position. Poor towns men made weak authorities while prosperous towns men, like Meltiôn Arroyo, made strong authorities that could ensure social control while taking advantage of their political situation. The equation was hard to balance and could turn against local powers if disrupted. This explains the absolute fear of external influences shown by gamonales.

Led by former sub prefect Mariano V. Cuentas, landlords and merchants started all kinds of lawsuits against Gutierrez. (Macera 1988: 67) According to delegates of the communities of Pomata and to Santa Rosa’s delegate José Antonio Chambilla, Cuentas went to every single town of the province of Chucuito to incite the neighbors to rise against the Sub-prefect. 64 Messengers complained in writing (10 February 1904) about the moves of Cuentas and the attentive ear given to his lies by Prefect Salazar y Oyarzabal. It was Cuentas who as Sub prefect had imposed a forced contribution to construct the bridge of Ilave, the Pino monument and the town of Huanacamaya. He had collected the personal contribution including women and male children over ten years of age, and was responsible for a massacre of Indians in Ilave in April 1897. With such a curriculum vitae, it was not surprising to see Cuentas fight Gutierrez’s nomination with rage. As “commissioner ad hoc” of the neighbors of the province of Chucuito, he sent the President a memorial (15 March 1904) presenting an alarming situation of “division of castes,” demoralization and disorder. He affirmed services were neither forced nor done for personal profit. Yet, he also concluded that by officially declaring services against the law, Gutierrez was leading Indians to believe they could refuse accomplishing those services, and was resurrecting the specter of a race war. Gutierrez was threatening the life and interests of the pacific men that represent industry, capital, work and the interests of civilization in Chucuito. (AGN, MI 100, 1904)

Fearless in spite of the situation, Gutierrez continued his quest for justice targeting notable neighbors such as Espezua, Manrique and Caro. 65 Tension rose: “enraged mestizos dynamited Gutierrez’s house; hacienda Indians refused to work”. (Hazen 1974: 33) After President Candamo died, pressure on the government increased, and Gutierrez was transferred in August. He did not finish his term, serving in Chucuito from November 1903 to August 1904. He had created too much unrest by enforcing Indian rights. Lima was not completely oblivious to these indigenous attempts for justice and state reactions. Gonzalez Prada in his article “Autoridad humana” mentioned Gutierrez Cuevas’s deeds as Sub-prefect of Chucuito and denounced the way he was calumniated and persecuted. 66

In 1904, Gutierrez’s indigenous constituencies were greatly disappointed. They had greatly enjoyed the experience of substantial support from the State. The reaction to Gutierrez’s dismissal

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64 Mariano V. Cuentas will be an omnipresent figure in Chucuito’s political scene. His restless activity to protect hacendados’ interests will lead him to create in 1918 one of the first committees to support Leguía’s presidential election. (AGN, MI 213, “Mp-Up” 1921)

65 Making them responsible for the death or mistreatment of some Indians, he deprived them of guarantees. He was accused of attacking the home of Judge Caro breaking the doors of his house and taking him prisoner under the pretext of having a criminal suit against him. This led to accusations of irregular and arbitrary conduct. (AGN, MI 100, Ap-Cp 1904)

66 The article was reproduced in “Prosa menuda”. (Basadre 1983: VIII 227)
was particularly strong in Pomata where parish priest Valentín Paniagua, former participant of the Maguíña commission and close friend of Gutierrez, kept preaching about liberation of the race. On the eve of the festival of the Virgin of the Rosary (October 4, 1904) rumors of an indigenous revolt spread about the town. At dawn, groups of Indians had gathered in the summits of surrounding mountains. They made bonfires and threw stones in the direction of the town, though too far to reach it. The townspeople, alarmed tried to reach the new provincial sub-prefect but the wire had been cut. They sent a mestizo that was able to mingle in the crowd surrounding the town and escape to Juli to ask for troops.

At dusk, the Indians made no move towards the town but they sounded their pututos all night. The terrorized townspeople took refuge in the church carrying with them their most valuable belongings. They put outside the door the image of the town’s patron saint, Santiago Matamoros (the Spanish conquistadors’ patron saint) high on his horse and stepping on a Moor. Some guilt ridden and terrified townspeople must have wished he would turn into “Santiago Mata-indios.” The image was obviously a warning of future reprisals and a reminder of who was to be on top of the situation. The townspeople and their families spent the night in prayer while the tower bells rang in alarm and supplication. Local lore has it that a newly married couple, thinking they would die eaten by savage Indians, surrendered to love inside the Church to die together before God, savior of “unfortunate mistis.”

Early the next morning, October 5, a vapor appeared in the horizon approaching Pomata at full speed. Mistis rejoiced but not as much as Indians, who thought the boat was bringing back Sub-Prefect Gutierrez Cuevas. They had asked Puno for the return of Major Gutierrez and the continuance of his policies of social justice, and they had gathered around Pomata expecting the change of authority. Their expectations met however with brutal repression. From the boat came a troop of armed guards who advanced to a much different rang of the church bells followed by now less frightened and armed townspeople. They attacked the Indian leaders who were coming forward. Repression was brutal and included rapings and cold blooded murders of unarmed individuals. That night, the town celebrated until dawn. The next day, they started a raid over the communities of Qollini, Wapaca, Tukina, Lliaqepa, Lampa Grande and Putuma, ransacking, robbing cattle and goods and breaking and spoiling what they could not take with them. The corollary of this repression was the creation of haciendas Wariphujo, Wakani, Lama Chico, Putuma, Tukina, P’oqoaque, Laramiri and others. (Frisancho Macedo 1973-76: II 159) They took few prisoners for most had fled to Bolivia or to the mountains. Cirilo Cordero, a veteran of the war with Chile, was identified as the leader of this tumult. Priest Valentín Paniagua was however considered the promoter of this “revolt” and he was captured and taken to Puno to face a military tribunal.

The persistence of Chucuito’s messengers finally obtained an effective response from the State. The Maguíña Commission confirmed the denounced abuses, fostered a change in authorities and supported indigenous claims for education. The arrival of new authorities, especially of Major Gutierrez Cuevas, further indorsed peasant claims and served as a powerful


68 After several months in jail he fled with the help of a brother to the port of Guaqui in Bolivia, from there he sent a telegram to Prefect Colonel Barriga: “Prefect.- Puno. I arrived without news. Greetings. Paniagua.” After reading the telegram, the Prefect ordered a search. They only found his cassock on his bed. Paniagua worked for some time in a textile factory in La Paz then he moved to Arica (Department occupied by Chile since the war). Nostalgic of his homeland, he did not dare return to Pomata where he had left too many enemies. He later established himself in the town of Mañazo where he opened a private school, through a license granted by Moisés Encinas, brother of José Antonio and Enrique Encinas. (Frisancho Macedo 1973-76: II 160)
incentive for messengers from other provinces and even departments. But these were only partial or fleeting successes of Puno’s peasant mobilization. The State bombarded by gamonal anxiety fluctuated between the need to respond to peasant claims granting justice and the fear of “unruly” peasant masses. It faced the dilemma “justice or order”, and it often chose order contradicting its pro-indigenous and modernity discourses. Two interconnected factors promoted this swinging attitude in the State: racial discourses reifying social categories and the issue of leadership and representation.

CIVILIZATION VERSUS BARBARISM

Republican notions of citizenship and individual rights threatened elites, mainly provincial elites, who unloaded their fear of masses on racial ideas. The racial discourses that predominated after the war with Chile impaired even the idea of the mestizo as a unifying race or cure for national reconstruction. (Larson 2002: 144) Intellectuals and civil servants believed in a hierarchy of races. “Significantly, modern Peruvian race-making paralleled a political process of place-making as it assigned races to spaces and evaluated these within evolutionary temporal schemes. (...) Following this racialization of geography, people were ranked according to their surroundings: the higher the geographical elevation, the lower the social status of its inhabitants.” (De la Cadena 2000: 21) Puno’s inhabitants were pretty much at the end of the list.

Punoño society developed its own racial discourse fed by and feeding those of the Coast. It was an intense discourse, loaded with the emotional charge caused by direct contact between two groups that strove for survival. Hacendados and Indians alike aimed at social differentiation and official recognition using race as a discursive tool. Both groups used similar racial arguments to advance their interests. Jacobsen pointed out to “the tendency of most social groups in the altiplano –Indian community peasants, hispanized large landholders, traders, priests, government officials, police, and military- to use polarized visions of society, such as those of colonizers/colonized, Spaniards/Indians, civilized notables/barbaric peasants, to construct, define, and fortify their own power and social identity.” (Jacobsen 1993: 4) Such polarized visions distilled from the past were used to “increase or defend their access to economic resources”. (Jacobsen 1993: 4) Two racially loaded images were particularly recurrent: “civilization versus barbarism” and “nationhood”.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the new republican elite “appropriated liberal notions of civilization as the basis for its preeminence vis-a-vis the vast Indian majority.” (Jacobsen 1993: 147) During most of the nineteenth century, social categories had tended to vary according to the interlocutor or audience and circumstances. The turn of the century however experienced a reification of these categories that were losing flexibility. By the 1900s, elites (estate owners, traders and governmental authorities) were not the same as the ones in the late colonial period. Many were from humble backgrounds (muleteers, petty traders, modest landholders). They justified their overtaking of lands and laborers in their haciendas by claiming smallholding Indian peasants were unproductive and culturally degenerate. (Jacobsen 1993: 4) Provincial elites were formulating national projects juggling with an imprecise notion of race which could include biological features subordinated to morality. Morality and decency were characteristics of the gamonal elites not of alcoholized, coca consuming Indians. “Implicitly –yet not necessarily-associated with whiteness, decency was a class discourse the elite used to distinguish racial categories culturally and morally in a society where phenotype was useless to define social boundaries. Putative lineages of gente decente were those in which moral purity –or cradle education, as the elites referred to it- had been inherited through generations.” (De la Cadena 2000: 48)
Gamonales used the dichotomy “us” against “them” essentializing “them” as the other who did not have a place in the national project. The essentialized category of “Indian” allowed generalizations and the adscription of unmovable traits that were extremely contradictory: Indians were deemed savage, cruel and revengeful, but also submissive, passive, resigned, devoid of initiative and lazy. Thus, hacendados pointed out to their essential role as tutors and supervisors. They assured that in haciendas, shepherds had their own cabins, pastures for their animals, agricultural lands, medicines and foodstuffs in times of famine. Colonos were also protected from abuses committed by governors and authorities. Hacendados and colonos were “industrial associates” and it was communal Indians who hindered or disrupted this prosperous association. (Zevallos 2002: 80)

Elites “relied on their self-righteous conviction of representing progressive civilization in a backward Indian province to justify innumerable forms of exploitation and abuse of the peasantry.” (Jacobsen 1993: 148) Civilization and barbarism were used to legitimize measures such as the free services Indians were forced to give to local authorities. After the messengers from Chucuito obtained the appointment of the Maguíña Commission, authorities manifested their outrage with the “calumnies” of Indians. They denied everything... or almost everything for they did not deny the existence of unpaid services. Their defense focused on tradition and order: unpaid services were an “immemorial” custom established in colonial times to teach them respect and the discipline they needed to enjoy their citizen rights and was essential for the subsistence of local governments. (AGN, MI 88, “M” 1902)

In 1902, Arequipeño Colonel Salvador Zavala acquired the salt mines “Boratiras de Azangaro”, located in the vice-parish of Salinas (district of Azangaro) and surrounded by four ayllus (Hilata, Pucará, Orurillo and Asillo) counting some 3,000 inhabitants. The district’s lands were not apt for extensive livestock raising and it was mostly populated by small and medium landowners and indigenous communities. The salt mines were an indispensable resource that local ayllus had exploited in common for centuries. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 53) State modernization allowed the concession of apparently “unclaimed” mines and resources without considering already existing forms of exploitation and use generating disturbances. In March 1904, limeño lawyer Manuel Pío Portugal was hired by Zavala to demand from the state armed contingents. Portugal affirmed workers had not been able to enter the salt mines due to the fanaticism and superstition of the Indians that did not understand what progress and industry meant. Zavala paid his taxes and wanted to develop a serious industry. The armed force was needed to guarantee the rights of his client “as demanded by a well organized society and as required by an illustrated government.” The situation was not presented as a competition for the usufruct of a particular resource but as civilization and progress versus fanaticism and irrationality. Portugal obliterated the fact that the district’s Indians were defending a long time exploited and invaluable local resource. [AGN, MI 100, 1904]

Ismael Cornejo, Sub-prefect of Azángaro, reported the inhabitants of these ayllus “son de carácter discolo y atrevido, concervando (sic) entre ellos una unión admirable como si fuesen una sola familia.”69 These ayllus were cohesive and maintained with the “indiada” of the neighboring districts of Chupa and Arapa an offensive and defensive alliance against any stranger coming to the lagoon. Sub-prefect Cornejo and Prefect Salazar y Oyarzabal argued that the presence of twenty five men to protect the interests of Mr. Zavala would not be enough considering the number

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69 They “are of an unruly and daring character, maintaining amongst them an admirable union as if they were a single family.” (my translation)
of Indians involved, their fanatic attitude and superstitious spirits. The Prefect recommended persuasion. The helplessness of local authorities and of the absentee owner in the face of organized peasant resistance was evidenced by their choice of violent repression to cope with the situation. Subprefect Galvez decided to postpone any measure, leaving the decision to the upcoming commission of Cavero. [AGN, MI 100, “Azangaro 1904”]

The element that most clearly fed gamonal discourses about civilization and barbarism was fear, a fear proportional to their awareness of being a reduced privileged class surrounded by a multitude they despised and exploited. Memorials, letters and telegraphs from local authorities, hacendados and neighbors warned about movements of more or less organized indigenous armies (from “indias” to “montoneras”) gathering in the hills around their towns. They imbued Indian motivations with racist principles and assured their aim was to assassinate and even eat all white and mestizo population to transform haciendas into communities and restore the Inca Empire. They accused peasant intellectuals of feeding the masses with antinational and caste war ideas to justify the violent repression of peasant collective initiatives.

In May 1913, Nicanor Zavaleta, a shoemaker from Arequipa residing in Saman (Azangaro) opened a lawsuit against the Indians of Samán, in rebellion for several months. He affirmed that on May 5, 1913, a mob of about 500 Indians had come out of Asencio Valera’s house to go to Hacienda San Juan hailing the indigenous race and calling for the death of hacendado Mariano Abarca Dueñas and his aunt Rosa Dueñas. On May 6, around 11 am, some fifteen hundred Indians or more gathered in the hills surrounding Saman and besieged the town, making it impossible to flee on foot. The situation was desperate; the ladies took refuge in the church. Governor Amador Urquizo ordered all males to arm themselves and defend the town. He gathered five men, including himself and Zavaleta, who opened fire managing to contain the hordes and saving the town from “esa indiada de antecedentes antropófagos.”70 Governor Amador Urquizo, also born in Arequipa, identified twelve indigenes as leaders of the revolt asserting they had been planning this attack for a while. Indians advanced to the sound of a horn, armed with slingshots, sticks and firearms. The town’s women and children would have been devoured or beheaded by drunken subversives who threatened to drink their blood if they had not intervened. (ARP, Expedientes Judiciales, Legajo 003: Azangaro, 1913)

Only two indigenous testimonies are available in the file and though short and brisk they show a much different situation.71 Rafael Caccasaca, a communal peasant had died and his death was blamed on Abarca Dueñas and his aunt. His funeral was held on May 5 and was followed by a gathering in the hill “El Calvario” on May 6. One of the witnesses had heard only one shot coming from Samán and directed to the hill. Most townsmen had not joined the urban guard and one of them had sent his wife to Taraco, alone, when the attack began. Asencio Valera, identified as leader of the revolt, affirmed there had been no revolt. Communal peasants had gathered to receive the sub-prefect whose arrival was announced. The Sub-prefect had been summoned to investigate accusations of exploitation made against landlord family Abarca Dueñas. He offered to visit Samán and the neighboring area around those days. Shoemaker Zavaleta rejected the investigations made by the province’s authority accusing him of usurpation of jurisdiction!

The story continued to build around racial arguments. Visente Hermogines Zavaleta, a young shoemaker, born in Huancane and residing in Taraco, was summoned as a witness though he

70 “that Indian mob of cannibalistic antecedents.” (my translation)

71 Andres Machaca (28 years old, married, peasant, born in Saman, translator José Carvajal) affirms that on his way to Juliaca he saw on May 6 a multitude of about 100 Indians near “El Calvario”, he heard a shot in town in direction of the hill but did not see anything else. Silvestre Condori says on May 5 he was in his godfather’s funeral (Rafael Caccasaca) and had no knowledge of the events. (ARP, Expedientes Judiciales, Legajo 003: Azangaro, 1913)
learned the facts from two people not living in Samán. According to his account, bellicose Indians had gathered on May 6, around 10 am in Ccaccapata hoisting a black banner. To the sound of a cornet, over a thousand Indians and ten horsemen came down the hill of Huchoy Chucaripo and tried to cross the river. Other contingents were ready to respond to the sound of the cornet in surrounding hills. They were waiting for the sign and it came from Ccaccapata when an Indian woman tossed in circles a pink shawl. Three lines of “numerosos guirrillas” (numerous guerillas), one after the other initiated the attack lead by over thirty horsemen. They ran and sometimes trotted to form a horseshoe to encircle the town. The governor and urban guard saved the population from complete extermination, from being murdered, roasted and eaten by the indigenes. Zavaleta was certain of this because since January Indians threatened to kill Abarca Dueñas and all the local mistis that had appropriated their cattle, properties and goods.

New details made the story much juicier: a black banner, a woman circling her pink shawl, multiple contingents of savage and cannibalistic Indians organized as a standing army. Gamonales and even local authorities wanted to convey an image of organized violence for savage purposes. The provincial judge, Manuel Bejar, in his final report, ascertained that rebellion had blossomed throughout the department for the re-establishment of the Inca Empire, the extermination of whites and the predominance of Indians in the State’s Government. Indian mobs had incurred in all kinds of excesses, “destroying all sacred, noble and intellectual things.” The extermination of the revolted, an act of bravery to be immortalized in the hearts of the greatest, had been the only way to save the most deserving, intellectual and moral part of society. (ARP, Expedientes Judiciales, Legajo 003: Azangaro, 1913)

The concept of Indianness, essentialized by gamonales, had two facets: Indians were threatening and savage when they acted collectively and pitiful and submissive when alone. On one hand it was imperative to avoid indigenous organization and mobilization for it endangered the nation, especially when savage and rebellious peasant groups were manipulated by subversive external elements. Peasant collective action needed to be violently repressed for the survival of civilization and of the nation itself. On the other hand, the nation was also endangered by the passive and resigned nature of Indians that fell prey to vices such as alcohol and coca. Indians could not reach an individual personality and this lack of individuality disqualified them to become citizens; thus the need of a special juridical status and tutelary legislation. The nation needed individuals respecting rules and norms endowed with initiative and willfulness. Indians were morally incapable of becoming citizens. (Zevallos 2002: 80-81)

This racially polarized vision of society had helped Creole elites respond to the ominous defeat in the War with Chile, as well as to the advance of capitalism and of European scientific definitions of race which placed them in a subordinate position. It was invoked in diverse contexts to conceal or downplay obstacles to development, rationalize cultural violence and propose legal and moral reforms. (Larson 2002: 17) Creole elites needed to explain failure and the “indigenous problem” seemed the most convenient answer. The war had been lost because Peruvian indigenes lacked a concept of the Peruvian nation and national sentiment and had not fight as they ought to. Indigenes wished to restore the Inca Empire, partitioning the country, often in connivance with Bolivia. The integrity of the national territory was at stake, and this exacerbated the feeling of national humiliation that followed the war. Since the 1880s, the politics of ethnicity implied the ethics of nationalism.

Representative of Azangaro, hacendado Bernardino Arias Echenique had eagerly waited for the coming of the Minister of War to the secret sessions of the Chamber of Representatives. It happened on September 25, 1913. The hacendado representative readily petitioned to speak and called upon his audience’s attention announcing that in the provinces of Huancane and Chucuito a
“considerable number of Indians” had insurrected acclaiming the neighboring nation of Bolivia as a more “convenient” place to live. Arias Echenique blamed “backward” communal peasants for their lack of national identification and accused them of irrational acts of treason. Colonos were not the problem since they were imbued with the higher civilization of hacendados. (CEHM) Communal Indians out of the reach of hacendado power were untamed, fierce, devoid of national identity and easy prey for foreign agitators and communist agents who used them to promote a Bolshevik conspiracy.

While hacendados used the proximity of the Bolivian frontier and the links between Aymara communities to demonstrate indigenous lack of nationalism, peasants borrowed from post-independence identifications accusing hacendados of being Spaniards or Chileans and conniving against the Nation’s interests. The colonos of hacienda Yanarico (district of Vilque Mañazo) affirmed, in a memorial written in Lima on January 13, 1923, that they had served Salustiano Olivares as shepherds for free and outside the law for over 50 years. They labored daily, even feast days and Sundays. If they missed one day he obliged them to work twice as much in the wool laundry of the Cabanillas station, or as muleros, mitanis and pongos. They could not sleep, were robbed and even beaten by Yanarico’s administrator and the employees of the Cabanillas Station, who had government weapons, had threatened to murder them. This was inconceivable considering Olivares and his administrator were Spaniards. They asked for justice, protection, freedom, education, a salary according to the law and payment for their past services and for the cattle they were robbed. They wanted to retire to educate their children according to the law 1183.

Messengers made profuse use of moral and nationalist language in their memorials to challenge gamonal concept of Indianness and claim citizen rights. In 1901, Santa Rosa’s messengers affirmed that their cause was “essentially Peruvian, national and thus deserving the support of the highest instances of government” [f. 15v]. The messengers from Acora identified their trip as an “odyssey of liberty and justice” and their group as “pariahs” and “helots,” suffering “the evils of serfdom.” On January 17, 1902, a family of Indians from the jurisdiction of Juli addressed a Memorial to Maguña, affirming that “en pleno siglo XX”, the unfortunate indigenous race of the province did not constitute a social class with civil rights and duties equal to those of citizens, but “una gleva de esclavos que tiene que rendir homenajes a todo el pueblo desde la primera autoridad hasta el último personaje.” This went against modern civilization and was irrational considering they were the most dedicated to work and constituted “a powerful factor” giving “life to the province”. Authorities and townsmen were only white parasites. (AGN, MI 88, “C” 1902)

Puno’s peasant intellectuals developed different discourses according to their audience, using traditional social and political language to explain current problems to their constituencies and concepts of morality and social justice and visions of a desired future when addressing the State. They denounced the hypocrisy of ruling elites, which did not recognize their patriotic contributions to the Republic. Racial discourses went hand in hand with the liberal discourses of Creole elites that clung to the language and politics of internal colonialism dressed in a modern racial language to control indigenous labor and hinder any commotion similar to the Mexican revolution. (Larson 2002: 23) Attuned with State demands and needs, messengers identified themselves as peaceful, honest and productive family men contributing to the development of the country and yet absolutely

72 Cristóbal Alvarez signs for all and for himself and Samuel Nuñez for the CPDI. (ARP, Folder PRI, f. 42-43)

73 They constituted “a lump of slaves who had to render homage to the entire town from the first authority to the last character.” (my translation)
devoid of individual rights and state protection. They pointed out they were not citizens just mere inhabitants of the country although they had given up their lives and their sons’ lives for the defense of the country during the war.

Messengers and their intermediaries questioned the moral bases of the post-tributary State and the nature itself of the Peruvian nationality, but they were not calling for a radical change or creating a new vocabulary. They were pragmatically appropriating elements of the republican vocabulary that had developed along the century. (Steinberg 1999: 17) They used ideas of national honor and images of self-immolation to impose their own alternative and inclusive notions of citizenship. Mariano Istaña took leave from the President with a declaration translated from Aymara to Spanish by newspaper El Indio (nº 1, December 18, 1903, p. 6):

*Volvemos a Puno a luchar con nuestros terribles enemigos. Recomendamos bien al Prefecto y al Subprefecto para que nos proteja con el escudo de la ley contra quienes abusan. Si así fuere, podremos llegar a ser ciudadanos de la República. Pero si así no fuere quedaremos pues siempre en nuestra condición de vicuñas y alpacas, en nuestras frías punas. Recuerda Señor Presidente que nuestros padres, Tupac Amaru, Pumacahua, Olaya y otros mil indios murieron por la liberación. Si el Gobierno, el Congreso y la Corte Suprema nos protegen llegará el día en que también podamos morir por la Patria.*

(Mariano Istaña’s declaration in Rénique 2004: 49)

Messengers were trying to create a revindicative discourse that would give peasant actions a sense of justice and legitimacy recognized by other spheres of society.

Messengers faced the titanic task of undoing the image of a “savage”, “minor”, “ignorant” and easy manipulated Indian that separated them from reaching full citizen rights. Starting in the 1910s, more and more messengers identified themselves as discharged soldiers registering in memorials their conscription numbers. Electoral rolls had been transitory and made during the heat of political processes granting suffrage rights arbitrarily or even selling them; however, in 1914, Benavides’s administration passed a new electoral law whose main novelty was the use of the military conscription registers as the basis to elaborate suffrage lists. (Basadre 1983: IX 107) Indigenous peasants who had gone through military conscription training could be included in suffrage registers and act as citizens with political power. Messengers were thus striving regain a political identity to empower themselves and their discourses on ethnic citizenship and rights.

Racial discourses were a key factor in the quest for power and state support. Both *hacendados* and peasants developed their own racial discourses trying to define “Indianness”. Elites recurred to racialized discourses of morality and civilization to maintain their socio-economic status based on the exploitation of peasant labor and resources and to racialized discourses of nationhood to keep the masses away from the political scene. Elite racialized categories turned peasant collectivities into savage and threatening mobs and peasant individuals into debased and pitiful beings. These were images hard to overcome for messengers who responded drawing from racialized and moral

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74 “We return to Puno to fight with our terrible enemies. We recommend the Prefect and Sub-prefect to protect us with the shield of the law against those who abuse. Thus, we will be able to become citizens of the Republic. Otherwise, we will stay forever in our condition of vicuñas and alpacas, in our cold lands. Remember Mister President that our fathers, Tupac Amaru, Pumacahua, Olaya and another thousand Indians died for the liberation. If the Government, the Congress and the Supreme Court protect us the day will come we will also died for the fatherland.”
discourses themselves. They linked the sort of the Nation to peasant labor and self-immolation and strove to endow "Indianness" with the image of a hard-working family man that though abandoned by the State and exploited by gamonales continued to toil for the benefit of the Nation. This quest for racial redefinition depended, however, on their ability to empower themselves as leaders and to situate themselves as peasant representatives in local, regional and national political scenarios. To do this, they asked for the help of cultural mediators, a help that often came at a high price.

LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL MEDIATION

Many authors have identified a historical legacy of lack of indigenous politics and leadership caused by the decimation of indigenous leading classes in the late eighteenth century and the lack of cohesion due to internal differences. (Thorp, Caumartin & Gray-Molina 2006: 468) These studies have usually explained indigenous mobilization (mainly revolts) through the presence of an external element impelling peasants to take action. Indians would not act unless prompted and led by someone they considered equal or superior to their dominators. Peasants being in a subdued situation had to be guaranteed the justice of their claims and rights as well as the impunity of their actions. (Tamayo 1982: 198) Juan Bustamante, Valentín Paniagua and Teodomiro Gutiérrez Cuevas are brought forth as exemplary case. They were educated nationalist leaders that constructed a political language to penetrate and win over non-literate rural constituencies.

Considering there were several dozen revolts or peasant movements between 1895 and 1925, the argument of an external catalyst or leader for these movements is hard to maintain. Puno had in fact a strong leadership, especially in Aymara areas and this leadership had an agenda of its own. As Rénique has pointed out, the presence of Maguiña and of Gutiérrez in Chucuito was the result of the initiatives of ayllus such as those of the district of Santa Rosa. In May 1902, the governor of Santa Rosa informed that the ayllus refused to obey him affirming they had no need for white authorities. They had elected their own governor and judge. (Rénique 2004: 48) In 1914, nine envarados of the district of Puno were taken by assault, forced to offer free labor in agricultural tasks and to sell their animals at low prices. After a written complaint to the prefect asking for the governor’s destitution and offering their services to the district if they were treated with consideration, the governor was removed from his post. Nine months later, however, the same “bad” authority was appointed and envarados produced a second document comparing local authorities’ political practices and traditional communal political practices. The latter were identified as having a higher sense of justice and democracy since hilacatas, alcaldes and segundas were elected by the chiefs of the domestic units and if they failed the community could be replaced. (Calisto 1991: 189) Peasant intellectuals claimed their own political traditions were imbued with concepts of justice, democracy and political participation and were more suitable and efficient. They did not need a radical transformation but an adaptation of the local system of government to their own political practices.

Leadership and ideas were nevertheless not easily conveyed to the Executive power that had little or no knowledge of Aymara or Quechua. After a few months in Lima, the messengers of Santa Rosa expressed their disappointment with the measures taken by the President. He had ordered bureaucratic reports to the authors of the abuses. They had warned against this measure that they deemed unnecessary for they presented documentary proof of their situation. They admonished the President about the arguments used by their enemies to repudiate them:

Perhaps interested gamonales have lead Your Excellency to believe that we are instruments of ambitious aspirants to the government of Santa Rosa and the Sub-
prefecture of Chucuito; but you must be convince that, as degraded as you suppose our race to be, it is not possible to believe that, for a simple pittance and to someone else’s profit, we have given ourselves to abandon our homes, our families, our children and wives, our friends, our piece of land, our animals, that may be the most loyal and humanitarian companions with which we count in this, for us, arid desert of life. After all, what would we win with this farce? Nothing but to change one master for another even crueler, since to his official title he would add that of being our briber.75

The messengers understood the President might doubt their words because they were written in a language they did not master, so they asked for an audience with official translators to voice their pleas. They thus expected to show they were no puppets and there was no obscure mestizo puppeteer behind their moves. They even argued that considering them puppets was to debase them to moronic, immoral and dishonored serfs. These peasant intellectuals felt the pressing need to change the perspectives held on “the race” but it was hard to replace a strongly embedded image of ignorance and degradation when they could not say the words themselves.

Messengers understood the urgent need to travel to Lima, talk to the Central State and publish memorials in newspapers read nationwide to redefine their role in the political game, to challenge symbolic definitions that led them to a growing powerlessness. To be sure, they needed external help and were in constant search for allies, counseling and directions. Cultural mediators were essential to reach the President and a wider, national audience. Migrant networks provided important support for messengers. Puneños were used to migrations due to seasonal labor, commerce, and Army and National Guard recruitment. (Jacobsen 1993: 25) This outward migration fostered a powerful network of support for indigenous initiatives. Puneños working in Lima as street sweepers housed, fed and translated for incoming messengers. Mobility granted them a mediating role that allowed the circulation of material and cultural goods. (O’Phelan & Salazar 2005: 473)

Mediators were also urban intellectuals, small or medium landowners, local lawyers or priests that acted as translators and scriveners. They had developed pro-indigenous attitudes from their own indigenous background, their ideological and moral stance (free thinkers, liberals, masons, anti-clericals, anarchists, atheists, Adventists) or from trade relations. (Macera 1988: 65-69; Rénique 2004: 59)76 Support of peasant leaders’ initiatives could be part of clientelistic relations. The scarcity of cash in the region threatened vital routine commercial transactions and led to the creation of a “dense network of small, reciprocal credit transactions, organized through ties of kinship and trust” more or less asymmetric. (Jacobsen 1993: 181)

Messengers also found a support within the Lima’s rising urban intelligentsia. Their presence in Lima was feeding into a growing concern for “the situation of the Indian” that developed into what has been called “indigenismo”, an intellectual, cultural and sometimes political movement of Indian revival developed by non-indigenous, middle-class elements. Incentivized by indigenous discontent, student activism and a developing labor movement, “Indigenistas” took over the task of creating an organic movement that would allow the integration of the indigenous population into the Republic. In Peru, the tragedy of Bustamante showed that nineteenth century liberalism had failed

75 My translation. Third Memorial presented by José Antonio Chambi, Mariano Yllachura and Antonio Chambi, messengers from Santa Rosa de Chucuito in Noviembre de 1901. (AGN, MI, Prefecturas 88, 1902, f. 14v-15)

76 Puno counted with a reduced proletariat. The “Sociedad Fraternal de Artesanos” of Puno recognized in 1909 its short numbers, yet managed to organized on May 1st, two processions and a shooting competition among its members. (ARP, Prefecturas 1920-1930) Its connections with peasant leaders will soon be shown.
to produce a doctrine of national construction, a doctrine integrating the Indian to the imagined
nation. (Rénique 2004: 40) According to Vich, Indigenismo was the first movement of Peruvian
cultural history based in a vigorous interaction between the capital and the provinces that played a
major role in diffusing racial discourses and ideas. (Vich 2000: 15) It emerged as a cultural-
ideological force backed by a sector of the middle class that had decided to represent the
indigenous peasantry, articulating indigenous revindications with their own interests. (Vich 2000:
58) Provincial urban intellectuals were aware that the country's development was centering on the
coast and that they needed to develop a discourse that would give them a place at the national
level.

Between April and July 1909, a series of conferences concerning “the Indian Problem” took
place in Lima at the Student Center of San Marcos University. The participants included Democrat
students, professionals and politicians such as congressman and engineer Joaquín Capelo,
German-born, naturalized Peruvian journalist Dora Mayer, Oscar Miró Quesada (President of the
Student Center), Víctor Andrés Belaúnde, the Alayza Paz Soldán brothers, José de la Riva Agüero,
Pedro Dulanto, punoño student Adrián Cáceres Olazo and former pro-indigenous sub-prefect
Captain Teodomiro Gautierrez Cuevas. (Flores Galindo 1988: 323-324; Basadre 1983: VIII 377;
Mayer 1925: 19; Ramos Zambrano 2003:68; Kapsoli 1980: 7) After these conferences, in October
1909, many participants gathered to form an association with three basic goals: promote
indigenous revindications through public opinion, the press and public powers; legally assess
Indians and foment the study and diffusion of questions relative to the social improvement of the
Indian race. The Asociación Pro Indígena (Pro-indigenous Association) was, according to Kapsoli,
a reaction against racist theories demanding the extermination of the Indians that accompanied the
growing economic voracity for communal land and indigenous labor. They even hoped to obtain
the designation of adequate political authorities and the establishment of adequate conditions of
state admission and promotion. These practical goals were strengthened by a call to the national
consciousness to sensitize the dominant classes and give more confidence to the Indians. (Kapsoli
1980: 2; Hazen 1974: 91)

The association was formed by a Central Committee in Lima, 3 delegates in the departmental
capitals, and personal delegations in the provinces. The central committee in Lima organized the
informants, correspondents and delegates (also called “messengers”) that kept the Central
Committee in contact with the indigenous world. The Pro-Indígena developed a truly national
network but its members were basically from Lima or the province’s petite bourgeoisie and
exceptionally workers and artisans. (Kapsoli 1980: 3) Its directive board in 1912 gathered: Senator
Joaquín Capelo (President), university student Pedro S. Zulen (Secretary General), Vitaliano
Berroa (treasurer), Dora Mayer (Publications), Emilio Segui (Librarian). 77 It had in 1912 sixty five
delegates or correspondents in the provinces, almost all young students that later formed the most
extraordinary indigenista generation (Francisco Mostajo, Modesto Málaga, Luis Ángel Escalante,
Uriel García, José Gabriel Cossio and Luis E. Valcárcel). Francisco Chuñíwanqa Ayulo (Lampa),
José Antonio Encinas, Remigio H. Franco, Horacio H. Arteaga, Ezequiel Urviola, Feliciano R.

77 From the Senate, Joaquín Capelo, an engineer from Junín, persecutedнакоales and defended the Indian cause
fostering pro-indigenous laws. He spent most of his energy in trying to build roads to connect Lima with the rest of the
country. Pedro Zulen (1889-1925) was the son of a Chinese merchant and a Peruvian mestiza. He was a philosopher
and librarian that directed the University’s library until his untimely death (tuberculosis). Dora Mayer arrived from
Germany at an early age, influenced by social thought she took in charge the Association’s bulletin publishing 89
numbers from 1912 to 1915. Segui was the director of the newspaper “Voce d’ Italia”. (Tord 1978: 154; Kapsoli 1980:
9)
Sánchez (Ayaviri), Manuel A. Quiroga (Pomata, Chucuito) and Carlos R. de la Fuente (Sandia) served as delegates in Puno. (Kapsoli 1980: 9-11; Planas 1994: 30)

Delegates corresponded regularly with the Central Committee informing of the situation of the Indians in their circumscription, denouncing abuses, propagating the publications favoring the Indian and defending their rights in the press and with local authorities. (Kapsoli 1980: 10) Some delegates were Indians themselves, or at least identified themselves as such. The Zulen archive counts for the year 1915 one hundred and seventy five contacts sending denunciations from the provinces. The most abundant and poignant were the denunciations coming from Puno, Huancayo and Huánuco. The association was active in Puno for almost seven years and helped connect indigenous messengers with indigenista middle sectors affiliated to it.

On December 27, 1910, Dora Mayer published an article in La Prensa explaining the situation of two messengers from Puno: Lorenzo Velasquez and Dionisio Godoy. They came from the community of Coollana, district of Paucarcolla (Province of Puno), with recommendation letters for the API, to complain against gamonal Juan Bautista Monje. Monje had for the last twenty five years promoted a lawsuit against the community to usurp part of its lands. They had suffered violent attacks from Monje’s lawyer (Dr. Corzo Gutierrez) and could not find in Puno a lawyer to defend them. They found themselves obliged to come to Lima, being persecuted until the moment they took the train to Mollendo. The API published in “El Comercio” the interview Capelo had with the two messengers and a memorial addressed to the Chamber of Representatives (November 28 and December 19, 1910). The association also investigated the colonial property titles brought by the messengers and asserted their authenticity. Through Representative Tudela (member of the API), the messengers obtained the office from the Minister of Justice addressed to the Court of Puno they had requested. They also obtained letters from the Directive Board of the API addressed to the delegates in Puno and to Representative Benjamín Pacheco to stop the attacks. The association lodged the two messengers in the house of Mrs. Gaudencia Seoane de Gomez Sanchez and obtained from the Ministry of Government return fares for the messengers.

In 1911 Zulen contacted the Central government to denounce the hostilities Felipe Aguirre, Governor of Santiago (Azangaro), committed against the community of Cocra to usurp its lands. Aguirre had destroyed houses and fields, killed several Indians and stolen their cattle, putting over 50 families on the verge of starvation. According to the Subprefect’s report Cocra’s peasants were advised by Dr. Alejandro Cano, vocal of the local court, to complain, but distrustful the lawyer and afraid of losing access to their land the victims had decided to sell it for $600 soles to Aguirre who would keep them as colonos as was the custom. The Subprefect denied the killing of Indians and stealing of cattle due to the lack of criminal action or identified victims. The complaints of the API were deemed unfounded and produced by the instigation of a third party, Cano. It seems however,

78 E. Rivero Caballero reported complaints against the Governor of Santa Rosa (Chucuito). (El Deber Pro-Indígena, year I, nº 3, December 1912) Carlos R. de la Fuente, reported on the condition of indigenous labor in Sandia (1913) and obtained the liberty of an Indian arbitrarily jailed after presenting recourse of habeas corpus to the Superior Court of Puno. In 1913, Remigio H. Franco and Manuel A. Quiroga, directors of newspaper “La Revolución” were appointed delegates for Chucuito. Franco was especially commissioned to investigate the attacks suffered by the Adventist mission and school of Platería (district of Chucuito, Province of Puno). (El Deber Pro-Indígena, year 1, nº 4, 5, 9)

79 The Zulen archive contains several issues or cuttings of “El Eco de Puno” as well as a large number of payment receipts, the majority of which correspond to the payment of industrial and land taxes paid by natives of the Department of Puno since 1878. (Paredes Lara 1998: 3, 8-11, 13; AGN, MI 134, MI 143, MI 162)

80 “La Labor de la Pro-Indígena: La misión de los delegados de Paucarcolla.” La Prensa, Lima December 27, 1910, p. 3.
the pressure of the Association helped governor and peasants reach an agreement outside the legal apparatus. (MI 143, Vp-Zp 1911)

On August 4, 1911, Capelo denounced in the senate the abuses committed in Chucuito with military conscription (enrollment of minors and married men), robberies and abuses. On August 11, 1911, he asked for judicial actions against abuses in Puno, Andahuaylas and Ayón. He made the Pro-Indigenous Commission proposed the abrogation of the 1903 Mining Regulation that allowed prison terms for Indians in debt and obliged them to work with penalty of jail. The initiative was approved by the Senate in October 1911 but was not made effective until 1914. (Basadre 1983: VIII 378; Planas 1994: 31)

According to Mayer, the API was well served by Lima’s journalism. One of its members was the editor of newspaper “La Integridad”, Abelardo Gamarra. “El Comercio”, “La Prensa”, “La Crónica” offered their columns for the articles of the association. Propaganda in the press and through separate leaflets constituted according the main axis of their work. (Mayer 1948; Planas 1994: 30) “El Deber Pro-Indígena”, the API’s publication, was the link among its members and aimed at unifying the association’s doctrine. It was directed by Dora Mayer from its first number which came out in October 1912 to the last in December 1917 (51 monthly issues). (Kapsoli 1980: 5; Hazen 1974: 92) The API also published two extraordinary bulletins related to peasant mobilization in Puno: n° 40 “La situación en Puno” (report of Francisco Chuqwanqa Ayulo on the revolt of Rumi Maqui) and n° 48-49 on “La Historia de las sublevaciones indígenas en Puno” from Dora Mayer. (Kapsoli 1980: 5)

The activities of the API raised discomfort and opposition within the hacendado sector that assured the association was manipulated by private interests. On September 25, 1913, Bernardo Arias Echenique, Representative from Azangaro, warned about the situation of emergency in Azangaro, Huancane and Chucuito due to Indian insurgency. He affirmed property was under “imminent danger” and the API was being irresponsible and hasty in its actions. The Pro-Indígena, he affirmed, was “always deceived” by wrong information coming from unknown and barely trustworthy sources: simple papers with the signature of Indian Manuel Quispe or Manuel Mamani. What could these names mean? Who were these Indians sending reports and denunciations to the association? Arias Echenique advised the API should proceed more cautiously and show some distrust toward its many informants. Arias made sure not to attack the institution itself repeating it was a valuable institution that deserved praise for its goal. Though the association’s moral mission was not questioned, its activities were harshly criticized and deemed unnecessary. (CEHM 25/09/1913)

The Association had a strong moral drive and strove to defend indigenous rights (free education, freedom of labor and association, right to land) but was not always able to reconcile its members’ ideas and opinions. Though tied by the belief in the need of peasant redemption, the association’s members were divided by ideological goals and means. While some like Zulen and Mayer became more involved and radical81, others like José de la Riva Agüero, Oscar Miró Quesada and Víctor Andrés Belaúnde soon left the association to find other more political or intellectual endeavors. (Kapsoli 1980: 24-34) Caught within their time, the members of the API fell into racial discourses as they confronted the lack of results of their many resolutions and attempts.

81 After 1914, Zulen adopted a more radical tendency expressed in the publication La Autonomía (1914-1915) dedicated to decentralist and federalist causes. Zulen believed in an agrarian revolution conducted by Indians, the need to destroy latifundia. Congress and suffrage were not enough, a radical change was needed and he started speaking in terms of social revolution especially after his 1918 trip to Jauja where he met workers and peasants. He ended up in jail accused of sedition. (Rénique 2004: 63)
Most API members believed Indians had been degraded by the system of exploitation inherited from the colony and it was their obligation and moral duty (as civilized people) to regenerate them. Francisco Mostajo (Arequipa) believed that when weak the Indian took refuge in hypocrisy and submission not by vocation or proclivity but because servitude generated alterations of character. When in a stronger situation, Indians could be abusive and commit execrable crimes and perversities. This was due to the state of war generated by the stigma of secular exploitation, which had made hostility natural. (Kapsoli 1980: 35)

Zulen believed that the perseverance showed in courts to find a solution to their problems proved Indians’ great will, but their short intelligence led them to be tricked and deceived systematically by that same justice. Zulen was appalled by the lack or scarcity of the use of violence considering the huge abuses and injustices faced. (Kapsoli 1980: 26) One of the premises of the association was the lack of intelligence of the Indian. The indigenous population constituted the arms, legs and sometimes the heart of the nation’s body, never its brain. Caught within so many contradictory thoughts and racial preconceptions, the association ended up falling into a paternalist attitude. Tutelary thought predominated. The Indian lacked the “material and moral aptitudes” to defend his endangered property. Hence, he could not be the direct and absolute owner of his land. The State should become protector and guarantor of indigenous rights becoming the direct owner of all peasant land and developing different lease contracts with the peasantry. In this way, the Indian would be protected against immoral individuals and taught to follow up compromises and obligations vis a vis the State. Indian property and rights were threatened by “isolated” and “selfish” individuals, not by an organized dominant class.82 The association had drifted away from peasant discourse and fallen into a comfortable paternalist discourse that strengthened the power of the State and eased the consciousness of the hacendado sector. For Demélas, the API put too much weight on the indignation capacity of public opinion underestimating the strength of the opposition. Public life rested in a direct and indispensable alliance between Lima’s leadership and the provinces’ gamonales. When private initiatives resulted impotent, they resumed the argument of State intervention and denied peasants any agency. (Demélas 2003: 381)

The continuous arrival of messengers confronted API members with a growing feeling of impotency. By 1915, voices inside the association showed impatience with indigenous messengers. An anonymous article read: “Sólo la imponderable tenacidad del indio peruano puede hacer que los indígenas de Puno después de doce años de tan inútiles idas y venidas, no piensen en cambiar el método de sus procedimientos.”83 The API should not perpetuate “such a farce” played with messengers who should carry their legal fights in their own jurisdiction with the help of local lawyers instead of paying for useless trips to the Capital and useless documents. (Rénique 2004: 64) Disconnected as it was from peasant intellectuals and initiatives and plagued by internal conflicts, the association was unable to renovate itself or find new roads of action beyond discourse. It practically disappeared in 1917, existing in little more than name until 1920. (Hazen 1974: 95)

Its legacy remains controversial. For Basadre, it was the voice of national conscience, many times weak, constantly unheard and sometimes scoffed at. (Basadre 1983: VIII 378) For Rénique, 82 Circular de Pedro Zulen a los delegados de la asociación, Lima 8/3/1915; Kapsoli 1980: 44. Joaquín Capelo will also stress the need for State intervention in his articles for “El Deber.” (Capelo 04/1914, Kapsoli 1980: 60)
83 “Only the imponderable tenacity of Peru’s Indian can make indigenes from Puno not think about changing the method of their procedures, after twelve years of useless comings and goings.” (my translation)
it generated a debate of ideas that set a precedent for the “Amauta” period. As a pro-indigenous “lobby” they constituted an access door to higher governmental authorities. They received and assessed messengers and their propaganda labor put them in the center of the debates of the period. (Rénique 2004: 60-61) I believe that the API left behind bouts of consciousness about the national situation in Lima’s society and in the provinces but at a very high price for the peasantry. The API denied agency to peasant intellectuals and hindered their initiatives perpetrating racial prejudices.

Gamonales were not the only ones defining “Indianness” to silence peasant voices. Indigenistas were trying to represent the peasantry, articulating indigenous revindications with their own interests, and many seemed in conflict with the idea of giving messengers a voice of their own. Gonzalez Prada had sentenced that the indigene himself would change his situation. Non Indians could only dignify this task by teaching Indians to read and write and by showing respect: “el indio se redimirá merced a su esfuerzo propio, no por la humanización de sus opresores. Todo blanco es, más o menos, un Pizarro, un Valverde o un Areche.”84 (Tord 1978: 45-49; Romero & Levano 1969: 75; Planas 1994: 29; Ossio 1995: 237) But Gonzalez Prada’s clarity was irremediably inconvenient for almost everyone.

In a letter sent to “El Comercio”, Dora Mayer commented:

Hemos visto la comisión de mensajeros de Puno que actualmente se encuentran en Lima. Estos individuos son ejemplares más puros de la raza incaica que los que habíamos conocido antes (en Chanchamayo). Su talla revela que ninguna influencia debilitante les ha quitado el prístino vigor. No poseen el español, y desde luego están aislados de cualquier clase de informaciones que pudieran ser útiles o indispensables al ciudadano. Se comprende que no se hallan de ninguna manera preparados para defenderse contra los abusos que las personas más avisadas pudieran perpetrar contra ellos.85

Coming from an intellectual known for her commitment to subaltern causes, this comment shows the inability of indigenistas to respect peasant agency. Mayer not only echoed racist discourses of racial purity (commenting on the messengers’ appearance); she also identified them as isolated and deprived of knowledge due to the fact that they did not speak Spanish. She turned these “pure specimens of the Inca race” into defenseless beings desperately needing tutors.

While some intellectuals doubted the capacity of Indian messengers; others identified them as “the Indians’ greatest exploiters” producing unfounded complaints in order to collect fees and expenses. The role of peasant intellectuals and local cultural mediators has been stigmatized, by nineteenth and twentieth century writers alike, through the word “tinterillo” (hack lawyers).

84 “The Indian will be redeemed by his own effort, not by the humanization of his oppressors. Any white is, more or less, a Pizarro, a Valverde o a Areche.” (my translation)

85 “We have seen the commission of messengers from Puno that is presently in Lima. These individuals are samples of Inca race purer than those we met before (in Chanchamayo). Their height reveals that no debilitating influence has taken away their pristine vigor. They speak no Spanish, and are of course isolated from any type of information that could be useful or indispensable to the citizen. It is understood then that they are in no way prepared to defend themselves against the abuses that more aware persons could perpetrate against them.” Mayer, “Los Indígenas del Perú” in El Comercio, Lima November 5, 1903, p. 3.
Contemporary scholar Manrique has described tinterillos as a sector of vociferous pettifoggers issued from landlord society exploiting the economic surplus of peasants though accomplishing for them a key role as intermediaries to relate to the larger society and in particular to the State. (Manrique 1988: 112) This reification of tinterillos evidences the important role played by legal advisors in rural Puno and how much legal procedures plagued peasant-hacendado relations. But such caustic remarks also responded to the need to silence peasant voices and initiatives. In an essay published in La Crónica on May 29, 1930 (“Ensayo sobre el tinterillo provinciano”), hacendado Lizandro Luna described the tinterillo as an unmistakable character endowed with the most debased traits of humankind: “una especie parasitaria de las clases necesitadas”, “una lepra social que es necesario extirpar”, “la caricatura del abogado”, “montón de fracasados y de hombres truncos”, “el hombre sin moral ni escrúpulos.”

He affirmed tinterillos interpreted the law to their convenience, created false witnesses, forged documents, and exploited the ignorance of the Indian producing long and expensive litigations to appropriate Indian lands as honoraries for their ignominious work. According to Luna, it was the tinterillo who made the Indian believe that he or she could declare anything freely and under oath without punishment by putting an old coin under the tongue during the declaration. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 238-239) The critique of tinterillos was an argument heavily used by gamonales to nullify peasant claims. “Ignorant” and “gullible” peasants were turned into puppets of discontented elements or social climbers trying to subvert the social order. As Marisol de la Cadena pointed out, literate Indians “whose demands were rational, were considered racial/cultural transvestites, ex-Indians who maintained the markers of their previous identity (like indigenous clothes) to manipulate actual (irrational) Indians”. (De la Cadena 2000: 308) They defied the dominant definition of Indianness and were identified as pettifoggers. (Deustua & Rénique 1984: 85-86)

Deustua ventures that the critiques of indigenistas targeted radical or more autonomous indigenous leaders who in their proposals of social liberation contradicted moderate, reformist indigenismo. (Deustua and Rénique 1984: 96) “Natural” peasant leaders constituted a challenge for urban indigenista intellectuals with whom they disputed the representation of indigenous masses. Indigenistas tried to channel peasant movements and change society through existing institutions and social preaching. Peasant leaders used other channels; they asked for personal interviews with the President, acted as coordinators and if necessary organized civil disobedience movements. Dora Mayer described the rama as: “Nombre que designa la cuota mediante la cual los comuneros se imaginan contribuir al éxito de un plan de redención forjado en realidad por aventureros que explotan el perenne y justo descontento de la raza nativa de nuestro continente.”

Her frustration resounds of the inability of indigenista discourse to cope with the peasant movement or respond to the national problem raised by indigenous majorities. The anger shown by indigenistas towards peasant leaders (rejecting them as phonies and tamers) might show who won the battle over the masses. (Deustua & Rénique 1984: 90)

Zevallos Aguilar considers that, following a similar trajectory as orientalism, indigenismo studied a reality characterized by its resistance to knowledge. Indigenes developed different behaviors as a form of resistance remaining in attitudes of respect, submission and mutism

86 “a parasite species of needed classes”, “a social leprosy needing extirpation”, “the caricature of the lawyer”, “a bunch of failures and truncated men”, “the man without moral or scruples.” (my translation)

87 “Name designating the fee through which communal Indians imagined their contribution to the success of a redemption plan actually forged by adventurers exploiting the perennial and fair discontent of the native race in our continent.” (my translation)
towards whites and mestizos, while expressing themselves differently with their peers. (Zevallos 2002: 126-128) This double behavior created a rift that broke discursive meaning. This rift was created by peasant resistance strategies and ensuing elite misunderstandings. Indigenismo failed to develop into a coherent political phenomenon representing the peasant masses and endorsing their insertion into the Nation. Indigenistas questioned indigenous leadership further promoting the fluctuating attitude of the State towards peasant demands.

But indigenismo had several facets and I will argue that one of the reasons why puneño messengers kept arriving into Lima was the activity developed by local indigenistas in Puno. Indigenismo developed with particular strength among southern urban intellectuals. Puno had a strong indigenista movement, as diverse as Cusco’s indigenismo, but in many ways more organic. Cusco’s indigenismo based on history and positivist sociology expressed itself mainly through academic production. Puno had no university and only one high school. It had no glorious imperial past to resurrect as ideological base, and only a tiny mestizo middle class that had to migrate to Arequipa to continue studying. Enthusiasm and intuition made up for the lack of educative and cultural institutions, traditions and methodologies. A strong characteristic of Puno’s indigenismo was its autodidact nature, which explained the more practical and sometimes rather eclectic and subjective perspectives developed. The choice of readings, the multiplicity of influences from neighboring Bolivia, Chile and Argentina, and the lack of a dominating institutionalized perspective led sometimes to a disordered and anarchic formation nourished by Puno’s strong liberal tradition. While gamonafls were set upon excluding indigenous majorities from mercantile and cultural activities, there was a liberal bourgeois sector anxious about educating and promoting the integration of indigenes in national society. (Tord 1978: 62; Tamayo 1982: 320, 328)

Pro-indigenous activity brought as natural consequence the incorporation of younger generations to public life and political decision-making. According to Valcárcel, Puno’s indigenismo precociously adopted more rebellious attitudes, collaborating with revolts and creating all sorts of publications to diffuse their ideas. Journalism was a useful outlet for these autodidactic intellectuals challenged by cultural isolation. It was an intellectual activity that substituted the university in many regions and personal cases (José Carlos Mariátegui and Gamaliel Churata), and it was a means more adapted to the cultural characteristics of the environment and society: more literary than scientific, as oral as written. Puneño indigenistas produced links with the peasant movement at the political (Santiago Giraldo, Ezequiel Urviola), legal (José Frisancho Macedo, Manuel Quiroga, Francisco Chuqianwa Ayullo), cultural (Narciso Aréstegui, Manuel Z. Camacho, José Antonio Encinas, Gamaliel Churata and the Orkopata Group, Emilio Romero, musician Rosendo Huirse) and even scientific (Manuel Nuñez Butrón and Rijch’arsimo) level.

Another characteristic of Puno’s indigenismo was its localism: its concern for regional topics, for the reality of the department, province or town. For some it responded to a sense of loneliness and isolation, for others to an Aymara and Basque inheritance of distrust and introversion. Whatever its source, Puno’s indigenismo did try to take upon the task of solving local problems, of revaluing the regional and cultural medium. Puno’s urban intellectuals studied local geography, history, folklore and music. This search for the vernacular led them to a nativism that exalted not only past glories but also the Indian as an idealized character: strong, healthy, simple, honest, pure deprived of the vices of exploiters. (Tamayo 1982: 322-324) Some of the best examples of this self-taught, localist, telluric and nativist indigenismo are given by early indigenistas José Domingo Choquehuanca89, Narciso Aréstegui90 and Chucuito messengers’ advisor, lawyer Santiago Giraldo.91

Giraldo was a profoundly democratic and nationalist man who considered himself the “personal enemy of any principle of authority”. As a congressman in the late 1890s, he turned into a bitter critic of the Piérola administration and the power of political parties, opposing many of the measures forwarded by the executive with interventions full of irony and a blatant common sense that thrilled worker and student audiences.92 (Bermejo 1950: 20-27) Francisco Mostajo identified Giraldo as a disciple of limeño anarchist thinker Manuel Gonzalez Prada, but Bermejo believes Giraldo preceded Gonzalez Prada in many of his criticisms.93 Giraldo rejected the position of the Democrat Party as protector of the worker. He promoted the legality of worker-patron arbitration,

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89 José Domingo Choquehuanca was a lawyer from Pucará that wrote in the late 1920s a social, economic and political study of the province of Azangaro. In his work, he described the mistreatments and abuses suffered by Indians from a very young age forced to humiliating obligations. Fifty years before Clorinda Matto de Turner he pointed out that the main scourge of the Indian were the sub-prefect, the judge, the priest, the governor and their helpers. He denounced unpaid forced services and the “Gamonalismo” of local authorities and sustained the need to redeem the Indian social and economically. (Tamayo 1982: 296; Basadre 1970: XI 256-7)

90 Narciso Aréstegui (Puno 1820-1869) was a teacher and lawyer graduated from San Antonio Abad University (1852). His liberal ideas were evidenced by his participation in Castilla’s movement in 1855 and in the Sociedad Amiga de los Indios in 1867, acting as its vice-president. He was appointed Prefect and Commanding General of Cusco in 1868 then Puno until he drowned in Lake Titicaca. He is most famous for “costumbrista” novels “El Padre Horán” (1848), “El Angel Salvador” and “Faustina” (1872). “El Padre Horán”, published by chapters in 1848 in Lima’s El Comercio, was the first republican narrative to deal with the social condition of the Indians blaming it on authorities, clergy and hacendados. He saw the Indian plight, the unfairness of tributary legislation, the lack of adequate public services for the subaltern. Though he was deeply concerned with the situation, he could only address it in a tutelary or paternalist way. (Tord 1978: 30-33; Tamayo 1980: 126; Torres Luna, 1968: 255; Valcárcel 1981: 130; Cáceres Olazo 2007: 109)

91 Santiago Giraldo (San Antonio de Putina, Azangaro, 1850-Lima 1929) was the son of a local hacendado family, and was registered in the baptismal record as “Spaniard.” He studied in the district’s school his elementary years and finished his secondary education in the Seminary of San Ambrosio in Puno, due to the recommendations of Bishop Huerta. Between 1874 and 1876, he studied law at the University of Saint Agustin in Arequipa, but practiced in Puno in the office of assistant attorney Guillermo Pino, one of the most notable magistrates of his time. In 1877 he obtained the title of lawyer from the Superior Court of Arequipa and founded the newspaper “El Tribuno”. He traveled through Europe, learned French and English, and returned through the U.S. After the triumph of the Coalition he was elected representative of Huancane in 1896. He died in Lima on October 6, 1929, in exemplary modest conditions, frustrated with politics and almost forgotten. (Bermejo, 1950: 3-5; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 186)

92 During the second extraordinary congress of 1898, discussing the budget deficit, he strongly opposed the approval of a new tax on alcohol and tobacco since he considered imperative to first discuss the reasons for the budget deficit.

93 From the beginning of the War of the Pacific, Giraldo denounced the situation created by a: “nación licenciosa y despilfarrada, sin Estadistas ni generales, sin Ejército ni Escuadra, sin crédito ni trabajo, sin orden ni administración, en una palabra, Nación impotente para hacer la guerra…” (Bermejo 1950: 14)
the inspection of workshops and industries, compensation for work accidents, old age pensions, limitation of women and children’s labor, diffusion of public assistance and eight hour labor days. (Basadre 1983: VIII 192) His origins and political beliefs led him to the defense of rural populations. According to Ramos Zambrano he was one of the loudest denouncing the sending of communal Indians to the battle field as cannon fodder during the war with Chile. He was accused and persecuted for these statements but sustained these ideas until time proved him right. This also led him to a greater activism among indigenous groups whom he considered had been left out by government and society alike. He edited newspaper “El Indio”, “defender of the social interests of the indigenous race”, published eventually (only twelve numbers) and with little diffusion between 1903 and 1910. He also published two pamphlets: one transcribing the original memorials from Santa Rosa (1902), the other transcribing subsequent memorials detailing abuses and “requesting more effective government action”. (Hazen 1974: 34; Basadre 1983: VIII 192; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 68, 84; Tamayo 1982: 299)

Encinas considered Giraldo the only politician interested in the Indian that never gave up. Mostajo also sees him as the most consequent with his ideals. (Valcárcel 1981: 248; Encinas 1932: 86; Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 180) He viewed politics as a personal, ethic compromise with the people he represented. He was drawn by the idea of sacrifice and social justice that opened him to constituencies that were claiming to be represented. With Juan Bustamante and Valentín Paniagua, he constitutes one of the precursors of an indigenismo that was by far one of the most active, involved and self-denying of the nation. Puno indigenistas participated in indigenous demands and were known locally as advisers of the peasantry but often became invisible at the departmental and national level not to silence the voices of messengers.

Historians have often questioned peasant leadership, endowing peasant mobilization, mainly, revolts, with a non-indigenous outside chief and organizer. Archival documents, however, point at the existence of peasant leaders with political ideas, questioning local authorities and stressing the efficiency of traditional communal governments. Messengers were aware that their leadership and power of representation was doubted from above mostly due to their reliance on cultural mediators. Hack lawyers, indigenistas and institutions such as the Asociación Pro-Indígena came from urban, middle class elements with an agenda of their own who often failed to understand and acknowledge peasant initiatives and agency, falling back into racial prejudices. This weakened the position of messengers vis a vis the State. Puno indigenistas, however, counted with a more organic group of intellectuals that helped them continue with their grassroots activities and legal fights. The specificities of Puno’s cultural environment produced a socially aware middle sector that was willing to support peasant ventures and demands for ethnic citizenship.

CONCLUSION

Confronted with a growing encroachment on their labor and resources and a State less and less involved, Puno’s peasants recurred to old and new strategies to protect their partial autonomy and resist abuse. They had centuries of experience using tutelary legislation and personal relations in court to protect their resources. Peasants appealed to electoral alliances, labor contracts and spiritual relationships and used intra-elite conflicts to play authorities, townspeople and hacendados against each other. Hacendados often dreaded lawsuits with indigenes that could be long, socially disturbing or embarrassing. Legal denunciations offered if not full at least partial solutions and precious time to negotiate the outcome of the fight.

Peasant legalism was fed by the legal system itself. State builders heavily relied on tutelary legislation. They did so, however, to claim the need for indigenous special status and avoid inclusion and full recognition of citizen rights. In spite of this, peasants kept using the legal system
to break their isolation from the State and claim citizenship and inclusion into the system. The “tributary pact” was an essential element in peasant long-term memory. It had been an important source of political autonomy and identity. Through legal claims and written memorials peasants imposed their presence on the State and in the public sphere.

Puno’s peasants were not expecting or even desiring a radical social change. They called for justice and freedom to maintain their partial autonomy (mainly access to land, collective rights, self-government and education). They were aware of their demographic weight and they used it to respond to elite and authorities’ abusive demands through open disobedience. Disobedience ranged from silent and pacific disrespect to frontal attacks. Governors constantly complained to higher authorities they were unable to carry on orders (collect taxes, conscripts, workers or animals) due to generalized opposition. If peasants refused to carry on the posts of envarados, the local authority had no power of action and could only appeal to local *mistas*. As the decades progressed, authorities turned more and more to *hacendados* and their private armies to overcome their powerlessness becoming involved in their clientele networks. This hindered the ability of the peasantry to resist increasing the use of violence in the area.

As the circles of power created by local elites closed down, the peasantry saw the need to develop new tactics. Overcoming geographical, economic, social and cultural barriers, peasant leaders traveled to Lima to appeal to the President of the Nation and negotiate, in person, a new tributary contract. The memorial of Chucuito and succeeding events showed the organized mobilization of communities and groups led by the more educated, wealthy and hurt sectors of peasant society. There was an active and involved internal leadership that was not subject to external instigators or manipulators and that was clearly set on its main goal: aware of the roles and needs of the State, it hoped to obtain justice by establishing personal (clientelistic) links with the Executive power. Puno’s messengers bet on differentiation, stressing Indianness as an argument for state protection and the granting of rights while struggling for the recognition of the many services they paid to the State (taxes, corvée labor, military service and food production). The first memorials arriving from the provinces of Chucuito and Puno clearly stated the amount of duties peasants were forced to pay stressing they sufficed for the creation of local schools much needed for their improvement.

Peasant leaders and their constituencies were evolving from resistance to an organized mobilization that included the raising of *ramas* to pay scriveners, advisors, trips and ensure the publication of peasant memorials in Lima’s newspapers. They were targeted and attacked by *hacendados* and local authorities but stubbornly continued with memorials and trips. The tenacity showed spoke of the will for justice reached by an empowered leadership aware of the existence of a public sphere and unwilling to give up to growing *gamonal* pressure.

Their efforts led to the sending of a special investigative commission to Chucuito in 1902 (headed by lawyer Alejandrino Maguña), the appointment of a second one in 1903, and the appointment of new authorities including pro-indigenous military Teodomiro Gutiérrez Cuevas. Gutiérrez took the post of Subprefect of the province of Chucuito in mid 1903 determined to end abuses and restore justice. His discourses and measures inspired the natives of Chucuito and of many other provinces to openly resist abuse generating panic within the elite sector, which often cried “revolt” to repress peasant initiatives through violence. Bombarded by *gamonal* anxiety, State responses fluctuated between direct open support and conscious blindness to abuse and repression. The response depended on the administration’s fear of “unruly” masses and its ambivalent acceptance of elite and peasant racial arguments.

Racial discourses were used by *hacendados* and Indians alike as a tool for social recognition and differentiation. These discourses focused on images of civilization and barbarism and on the
issue of nationhood. The regional elite constituted a relatively new social group that had sometimes risen from humble backgrounds (muleteers, petty traders or small landholders). Whiteness was not a defining feature so they claimed morality and decency to set themselves apart from alcohol and coca consuming “degraded” Indians. Indianness was essentialized as a racial category with unmoving though contradictory traits: Indians were deemed savage, cruel, revengeful when acting collectively and submissive, hypocritical, resigned and lazy as individuals. The element that most clearly fed gamonal racial discourses was fear, due to their awareness of being a reduced privileged class surrounded by a multitude they despised. This duplicitous reification allowed hacendados to acquire an essential role as tutors and supervisors (able to exploit Indian labor and resources) while maintaining control of the legitimate use of violence. It also allowed elites to deny Indians citizenship status: being violent and savage or passive and pitiful made them morally incapable of becoming citizens.

Messengers also used moral and nationalist language to challenge the gamonal concept of Indianness and claim citizen rights. They faced the titanic task of undoing the images of savagery and immorality hacendados used to reject integration and maintain their socio-economic and political status. Messengers responded to accusations of lack of nationalist feelings and ties to Bolivia denouncing foreign, mainly Spanish, hacendados. They stressed the “peruvianness” of their cause: they were mere “inhabitants” of the country, not citizens in spite of their social, economic and military contributions to the nation. To address the state, messenger appropriated elements of the republican vocabulary, ideas of national honor and images of self-immolation. They often identified themselves as discharged soldiers, especially after 1914 when a new electoral law used military conscription registers to elaborate suffrage lists.

Messengers understood the need to reach the Central State and published memorials in nation-wide read newspapers to challenge symbolic definitions and redefine their political role. Puno’s peasants, especially Aymara peasants, counted with a strong leadership with a developed agenda focusing on labor and resource protection, self-government and education. They were helped by urban intellectuals, small or medium landowners and local lawyers and priests concerned with mounting abuse and social tension that served as translators, legal advisors and scriveners. They also received the support of a sector of Lima and of the provincial bourgeoisie through the Asociación Pro Indígena. These cultural mediators, however, were endowed with their own agendas and imbued with a paternalist thought that undermined recognition of messenger’s agency. Indigenistas were trying to represent the peasantry, articulating indigenous revindications with their own interests, and were seldom willing to give messengers a voice of their own. Peasant leaders were a challenge to their authority and representation.

The stigmatization of the figure of the tinterillo as a vociferous pettifogger exploiting the economic surplus of peasants evidenced the important role of legal advisors but also the inability of elites and indigenistas to accept peasant agency. Indigenistas were unable to cope with the peasant movement and discourses to respond to the national problem raised by indigenous majorities. By questioning indigenous leadership, Indigenistas further promoted the fluctuating attitude of the State towards peasant demands. The activity of local indigenistas, however, explains why messengers kept arriving to the capital from Puno. Puno’s indigenista movement was more diverse, less institutionalized and especially more involved with the peasant movement, more organic. Puno’s indigenismo was precociously rebellious, more localized and pragmatic. It collaborated with protests and mobilizations, legal battles and publications. Bustamante set the trail for politicians such as Santiago Giraldo, lawyers such as José Domingo Choquehuanca, teachers and writers such as Narciso Aréstegui. With the help of these local allies, messengers faced the difficult undertaking of showing to the State that revolts were only hacendado shams to deprive
Indians of their rightful place in the Nation.
CHAPTER THREE:
FACTS AND FICTIONS OF ORGANIZED RURAL VIOLENCE (1909-1919)

Faced with a growing pressure on their labor, Puno’s peasantry deployed old tactics of defense (litigation, negotiation, peaceful resistance or disobedience) taking them to new levels. They appealed to the Executive power to renegotiate peasant-State relations. Gamonal repression and racial preconceptions challenged peasant leadership and representation but Puno’s messengers were enduring and pugnacious and they were backed by an organic and pragmatic group of intellectuals. Their task, however, grew exponentially after a boom in wool demand in the early 1900s. Hacendados responded to national and international demands with a huge wave of hacienda expansion that further threatened peasant subsistence. Messengers now had to defend not just their labor but also their lands, their source of livelihood. The obvious result was a spiral of violence that produced the biggest and most controversial peasant revolt of the period: Rumi Maki’s revolt. Most studies of the period have focused on peasant use of violence and millenarian discourses, pointing out at their limitations and counterproductive results. In this chapter, I will argue that hacendados and local authorities overstated peasant violence to monopolize legal forms of violence and increase their hold on the area. I will try to explain why this overstated violence prevailed in historical records fed by millenarian discourses of dubious origin as evidenced by the Rumi Maki revolt. As a matter of fact, all sectors involved in this story used millenarian references State, intellectuals, hacendados and peasants developed their own millenarian version of the situation though for much different purposes. This multiplication of millenarian discourses produced constant disencounters between the peasantry and its allies making it difficult for peasant intellectuals to maintain a fluid dialogue with the State. Peasant intellectuals hunted by images of irrationality and violence had to carry their efforts to new levels of organicity and response.

RESISTANCE AND REVOLT

From 1872 to 1897, the volume of exports maintained an increasing tendency. Sheep and alpaca population grew even faster than wool exports due to the opening of modern woolen mills in southern Peru (mainly Cuzco) and Lima and the continual growth of peasant household processing. (Jacobsen 1993: 174) During the 1900s and 1910s, the international market increased its demands for wool to unsuspected levels raising the volume of exports and the prices of wool. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 34) In the peak year of 1917, the volume of sheep wool exports more than doubled the average of the record years 1855-1859. This cycle of expansion of the wool economy led to a process of land concentration or incorporation of indigenous “estancias” into large fincas including people and cattle. New haciendas were created while others expanded at the expense of smaller landowners and indigenous communities. Between 1876 and 1915, the number of haciendas in the province of Puno grew from 237 in 1876 to 373 in 1915; in Azángaro from 184 in 1876 to 611 in 1915. Considering the whole department, the number of haciendas grew from 705 in 1876 to 3,219 in 1915, a record increase of 456%. (Calisto 1991: 172-173; Jacobsen 1993: 158, 174-175; Spalding 1977: 32-33; Appleby 1982: 61-62; Tamayo 1982: 92)

The peasantry’s initially reaction to this aggressive hacienda expansion was passive resistance. Due to their partial autonomy and their limited power, peasants preferred localized or isolated forms of resistance to large social movements. For peasants, elites and the State, the main terrain of contention was negotiation to redraw partial autonomy. Opposition was mostly hidden and pacific, a persistent daily action in a context of weak authorities and poverty (theft of improved stock, destruction of fences, etc). Communal indigenes resisted through control of their own labor force (flight, lack of work) but they also had to resist collection of taxes and military draft,
which were always subject to conflicts and contention. Sabotage was more common among labor tenants (colonos) than communal Indians who had more control over their means of production. Colonos engaged in concealment of production, under-reporting and collusion, refusing to work in extreme situations. In the early 1910s, discontent was growing among colonos of hacienda Collacachi (province of Chucuito). The Tovar family obliged them to work for free receiving barely the minimum necessary for their survival. Colonos decided to claim for more food with a strike: they stopped pasturing the hacienda’s cattle. They also occupied the hacienda house forcing the owner to flee to Puno from where he sent rations of figues, coca and chancaca to convince the Indians to return to work. Unable or unwilling to hold on to the property, the family sold it in 1918 to the Arequipeño brothers Muñoz Nájar. Colonos remained defiant however, to the point that in 1920, the Muñoz Najar family had to transfer the Acora-Pichacani police detachment to their land to evict “unneeded” colonos. (Hazen 1974: 135; Cáceres Olazo 2007: 131-133; Rénique 2004: 95).

Resistance could sometimes turn into banditry, which was possible due to the weak control the State had over the population. Governors and hacendados from all over the Department reported that due to the miserable state of the population, groups of peasants organized in bands and stole cattle and crops from haciendas and even peasant estancias. In January 1915, Leandro Zúñiga, former lieutenant governor now replacing the Governor of Vilquechico (Huancané), solicited his resignation confessing he was unable to carry on the orders of Provincial Judge Zúñiga Bejar to capture and send eight Indians of the ayllu Cazador (district of Viquechico) accused of tumultuous attack and other crimes. The Governor affirmed to the Sub-Prefect of Huancané Celso Chávarri:

Esta Gobernación a pesar de sus esfuerzos no puede ni podrá dar cumplimiento a las reiteradas solicitudes del señor Juez de 1ª Instancia no por impotencia ni incompetencia del suscrito sino por carecer de los ausilios (sic) indispensables. Abolido como está el servicio de embarados, reducida la guarnición y siendo como es el ayllu Cazador completamente insubordinado, imposible me es capturar a los que el señor Juez de 1ª Instancia me pide en dicho oficio. Además se ha mandado muchas veces comisiones y que también me he constituido pero se atumultaron en un número de doscientos indios quienes en actitud ostil (sic), nos ha repelido, no solo conmigo han hecho esta acción sino que también los Gobernadores anteriores que fueron a pescarlos a las personas pedidas, han sido atacados a valazos (sic) quedando la comisión inútil, porque por no exponer la vida de los mandones han tenido que dar media vuelta. (ARP, Prefectura, Legajo 442, 1914)

Subprefect Chávarri did not accept the resignation of the governor, infuriating Judge Zúñiga Bejar who accused him to the Superior Court of Puno. The lack of a professional bureaucracy and the weakness of the coercive power of the State gave more leeway to violence and private confrontations at all levels. Banditry was not a peasant monopoly and it usually responded to vandalic actions produced by hacendados or authorities specialized in the sheep business. (Calisto 1991: 180)

Puneño lawyer José Frisancho assured that before 1910 the Indians of Samán (Azángaro) surpassed the neighbors in the intensity of their agricultural and commercial activities. They traveled long stretches to exchange their products. In 1910, a hacendado proceeded to despoil them of their communal lands so the Indians rose in a defensive attitude. It was a legitimate
attitude considered by hacendados as a crime of rebellion that brought a numerous detachment of soldiers. After crushing the Indians the soldiers, accompanied by mercenaries of the hacendado, burst in the scattered houses of the area burning all they could not take with them. By right of conquest they kept all the cattle. The only survivors were the hundreds of men, women and children that returned from the plains after the tragedy. From then on, the region turned to crime: “En Samán la indiada resolvió la dubitación que conflagró su conciencia, lanzándose a la criminalidad. La hasta entonces pacífica comarca sería en adelante guarida de bandoleros. De allí saldrían, en noches de horror, ululantes matones que, en pos de presa, matarían y robarían, no importa que a sus propios hermanos...”  

(Frisancho cited in Basadre 1983: VIII 380-381)

Valcárcel narrates the story of prosperous shepherds of the ayllus Samán and Ayapata, owning llamas, alpacas, bovines and savings. The mistis of the town accused them of having stolen the cattle and managed to have a judge and gendarmes arrest the Indians. Livestock was taken; houses were ransacked and burned; ayllus were raised. The shepherds eventually fled from prison and the affair was forgotten. However, a few months later, men with black-painted faces irrupted in the Judge’s hacienda killing him and his family. The attacks continued in several haciendas of the province producing robberies, rapes, murders and burnings. This gave birth to the myth of the band of the “vampires.” (Valcárcel 1927: 56)

The first decades of the twentieth century are considered the period of the most violent movements of Puno’s peasantry. Revolts were reported in Amantaní Island (1884 and 1914), Zepita and Pomata (1904), llave (1905), Chupa (1909), Azángaro (1910 and 1911), Pomata (1912), Juli (1912), San Antón (1912), Huancané (1913 & 1922), Samán, Arapa, Caminaca and Achaya (1913), Escanchuri (1913), San José (1915), Huata –Chucuito (1916), Santiago de Pupuja (1916), Hankoyo (1917), Chacamarca (1917), Chucuito and Azángaro (1917), Muñani and Callacaca (1920), Ayaviri (1920), Llallahua (1920), Putina (1921), Toroya –Lampa (1921), Inquillani (1922), Asillo (1922), Acora (1922), Wancho-Lima (1923), Choquechambí (1923). (Tamayo 1982: 193-194)

While late nineteenth century insurrections sprung in Aymara areas in relation to abusive taxation, forced sales and increasing labor demands. In the early twentieth century, particularly after 1910, violence responded to land usurpations and occurred predominantly in Quechua areas where the process of land concentration was stronger. Most movements happened in Azángaro, the most studied Quechua province due to the profuse development of the hacienda system. Azángaro was the area of residence of the most feared gamonales of the region: José Angelino Lizares Quiñones and Bernardino Arias Echenique. (Tamayo 1982: 195; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 111)

Flores Galindo and Burga spoke of a Great Rebellion, but most scholars have seen this period as dominated by mutinies and localized agrarian conflicts caused by a cruel hacendado or by a brave and keen peasant leader pretending to slow down or stop the abuse. Revolts were acts of pure and passionate violence, mass actions that followed no tactical plan or strategy, the dialectic response to previous facts. The nature of gamonalismo, mainly its medieval, religious and juridical forms of servitude, hindered the peasantry from a clear vision and a consciousness of the situation. They could only develop a partial understanding of the enemy and of the way out of exploitation. Peasant movements were condemned to fail because they failed to develop clear objectives at the national level and build alliances with urban elements. (Piel 1986: 403; 94 *In Samán Indian mobs resolved the doubts that perturbed their conscience thrusting themselves into criminality. The up to then pacific territory became from then on a den of bandits. From there they went out, in nights of horror, ululating killers that, in pursuit of a prey, killed and stole, even their own brothers...* (my translation)
Peasant revolts were “rituals of rebellion” portrayed as “structural safety valves in which hostilities toward the rulers were acted out by their subjects in a way that preserved the social order.” (Isaacman in Cooper et al. 1993: 211)

This perspective narrowed the terms of the debate ignoring peasant political ideas and discourses. Disconnected peasant movements were devoid of any real historical significance due to the lack of a class based subversive ideology. Tamayo affirmed that even when provided with a strategy, masses tended to overwhelm their leaders producing disorganized violence during hours, days and sometimes even weeks, consuming large amounts of alcohol. Revolts were the logic response to an aggressiveness repressed for generations that produced killings, burnings, ransacking and sometimes cannibalism. (Tamayo 1982: 200) Tamayo echoed hacendado discourses in his analysis of peasant political movements.

Violent resistance was not always an irrational decision. As Valcárcel pointed out, revolts could lead to more despoliation and repression, but could also neutralize an abusive situation. Lawsuits and denunciations of mutinies followed but Indians sometimes managed to keep the lands they had forcefully recuperated. (Valcárcel 1927: 74-75) Nonetheless, many of these so-called revolts were simple acts of legal opposition, peaceful civic disobedience or strikes. They were turned into revolts by anxious hacendados and authorities trying to justify exploitation and violent repression. In 1906, indigenous communities of Azángaro cut the roads to Escanchuri, Asillo, Cuturi, Samán, Achaya, Caminaca, Chupa and Llallahu. This was not seen as a rural protest but as sedition and revolt, an uprising of the “indiada” to attack white civilization. The mobilization was violently repressed.

On July 15, 1910, peasants of the district of Chupa (Azángaro) protested against the illicit appropriation of lands by José Angelino Lizares Quiñones. Lizares had forged a sale that included all of the parcialidad of Hilahuata situated in the Province of Azángaro and part of another five parcialidades of the Province of Huancané. He had burned peasant huts, stole cattle and threatened communal leaders. Lizares counted with the support of his father in law, Provincial Judge Federico Gonzáles Figueroa, the governor of the district, the justice of peace and the priest. Communal peasants panicked, some surrendered all their belongings fleeing to Bolivia and other areas, others decided to complain to the Prefecture and began a trial. On the day of the boundary demarcation, the guards sent by the prefect supported the expansionist action of Lizares attacking the peasants that refused to give up their lands. The indigenous memorial presented to Congress and published in “El Ariete” (Arequipa 1910) spoke of 2000 refugees, six dead and several wounded. Departmental authorities accepted the version of the hacendado and judge, qualifying the events as a “self-defense” to indigenous rebelliousness. The Senate decided to send a commission to investigate this “uprising”, but it never arrived in Puno. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 166) Only a few weeks later, August 26, 1910, Lizares Quiñones, Representative of Azángaro, supported the petition of Lizardo Franco, Representative of Huancané, to appoint an official delegate to investigate the abuses that the indigenous race was suffering in Puno. He was personally worried and confirmed the need for energetic measures to stop the abuses done to unprotected indigenes. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 165)

Official historical sources have traditionally ignored or downplayed gamonal violence while exaggerating peasant violence. Gamonal violence was denounced in peasant memorials but these testimonies often became lost in the bureaucratic procedure of requesting reports from the accused authorities themselves or in gamonal manipulation of legal files. On February 1, 1911, there was a massacre of peasants neighboring hacienda Cuturi, property of the Church of Arapa, rented to Antonia and Dolores Lizares. Peasant complaints spoke of assassinations and
despoliations. A similar event occurred in the district of Asillo on March 1913. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 166) Commenting on these massacres, Fiscal Agent José Frisancho denounced the disappearance of files and written denunciations: “... los subprefectos, por tratarse de delincuentes adinerados, no han hecho otra cosa que concertar transacciones entre damnificados y agresores para asegurar la impunidad por ese medio vedado por la ley; y en otros de aquellos casos delictivos, se ha llegado por juez a incoar sumarios que no han pasado de actuaciones formulistas y de mera rutina: sin que exista ahora en el despacho y archivos del Juzgado ni uno solo de estos cuerpos sumariales seguidos sobre los hechos...”95 (Basadre 1983: IX 27)

The origin of most written material left as historical source explains the overstatement and simplification of peasant actions and initiatives. Administrative reports, official correspondence and legal records, exaggerated or forged peasant violent movements to condone local repression and extirpation. Puno’s hacendado elite and its clientele of local authorities needed to maintain a monopoly on legal violence to be able to expand their estates and increase their profits in response to the wool market. There was too much at stake for them to acknowledge peasant rationality.

And yet, when peasants resisted, they strove to clearly state and convey their economic (free access to the market), political (participation in local government and the end of gamonal monopoly on violence), legal (equal treatment in courts) and even cultural (education and the continuity of peasant customs) revindications. The rationality of their movements was further proved by the active participation of women in mobilizations and decision taking. Women were called upon to testify in lawsuits or were mentioned in testimonies.96 Political invisibility gave them some immunity facilitating their activism. They were judged with less severity as “involuntary” accomplices (being wives, sisters or mothers of the accused) and because of their supposed ignorance and illiteracy. The cost was losing a part of their public voice. (Feierman 1990: 25)

To counter an aggressive wave of hacienda expansion, peasants deployed hidden or pacific forms of resistance, from strikes to sabotages. When it appeared, violence took the form of banditry, and it was often produced by gamonal abuses and by the weak hold the State had on the population. Nevertheless, studies focusing on peasant politics have bought into gamonal discourses ignoring peasant rationality and failing to see the actual sources of violence. Peasant political initiatives have been subject to narrow interpretations of a passionate and ritualistic peasantry with no clear subversive ideology and thus no historical significance. “In Flores Galindo’s view, whether rebellions were real or invented was irrelevant to the more important issue as to what the indigenous rebellions produced: they made Indians visible in the political and academic discourse.” (De la Cadena 2000: 127) I would argue that this kind of “visibility” was far from benefiting peasant interests. Upper class and academic discursive awareness increased indeed but it did not foster an effective commitment with peasant demands, mainly because peasant demands were being subsumed under pretended revolts. Revolts were the strongest arguments gamonal had to impose their power through their private militias with the support of local authorities. As Marisol de la Cadena affirmed “what the rebellions did was to reinforce the specific, dominant image of Indians as illiterate and prerational.” (De la Cadena 2000: 128) One of the main arguments to foster this image was millenarian discourses.

95 “the subprefects, facing rich delinquents, have done no more than concerting transactions between victims and aggressors to ensure the impunity by such means prohibited by the law. In other criminal cases, judges have produced reports that have remained tied to formulas and mere routines, documents that are now inexistent in the offices and archives of the Judiciary system...” (my translation)

96 Peasant wills gave equal shares of property to sons and daughters. “Indian women routinely appear as owners of parental landholdings in all types of notarial contracts, from wills to bills of sale.” (Jacobsen 1993: 273)
THE MANY FACES OF MILLENARIAN AND MESSIANIC DISCOURSES

Millenarism and messianism have long been considered characteristic of peasant movements and constitute probably the best examples of how regional groups disputed the meaning of the same events. Millenarism is the hope of a change that will end the social organization imposing domination and bring an egalitarian society. In Peru millenarism has landed on the ideal of the Tahuantinsuyo, projecting to the future an idealized image of the Inca state, ignoring Inca autocracy and stressing the wellbeing and security of its inhabitants. (Cáceres Olazo 2007: 95) It is what many scholars, mainly Burga and Flores Galindo, studied as the “Andean utopia.” Andean millenarism has usually been accompanied by messianism, the belief in the arrival of a redeemer that will end or change a situation establishing a new order of justice and happiness. Andean messianism would mean the faith or hope of the peasantry in the actions of outside leaders such as Bustamante whose actions they believed would end abuses and injustices. (Basadre 1996: 86; Cáceres Olazo 2007: 95) Millenarism and messianism have characterized Peruvian politics all the way from Independence to the twenty first century with each caudillo or leader incarnating a “Patria Nueva”, a “Peru Posible”, a new beginning.

For Hobsbawm peasant millenarism was “blind and groping” or “prepolitical”, but millenarism has served as a cultural tool actively used, constructed and even contested. Millenarian ideas were not just imposed from above or inserted from below. The same text could mean different things to different people whose interpretations would vary according to their resources and needs. “An image both draws from the cultural repertoire and at the same time adds to it. (…) Which codes are mobilized will largely depend on the triple context of the location of the text, the historical moment and the cultural formation of the reader.” (Storey 1996: 92) In early twentieth-century Peru, millenarian and messianic ideas plagued the discourses of readers with different cultural capitals. The meanings and expressions developed were narrow or limited at the top, becoming broader and more diversified going down the social scale and approaching the peasantry.

State millenarism was born out of the need of state builders to develop a nationalist consciousness. They understood that to form the nation they needed to develop a millenarian discourse that would be the base of the imagined nation and of feelings of national pride. Each historical accident set at naught the recent past. Each new leader or state builder felt the need to create a new fatherland. Even Manuel González Prada spoke of the need to start anew to his public in the Ateneo de Lima. By rejecting the recent past, mainly the colonial past, state builders made their task even harder. They needed something to build from. In the independentist iconography, Manco Capac replaced Santiago Matamoros. (Demélas 2003: 356)

Creole discourse focused on restoring the thread of history broken by the Conquest, to avenge and continue the Inca project. Legitimacy was rooted in the autochthonous composition of American society, hence the need to fight for a civilization devastated by Spanish barbarism. In this way, Indian society could be endowed with the innocence of an uncorrupted civilization. Inca government became the model of a paternalist and illustrated monarchy that opposed Spanish despotism. Inspired by the ideas of Marmontel, state builders found in the Incas the model of political rationality they could follow or at least call upon in their discourses. (Demélas 2003: 376-377) The past made the indigenous race intrinsically valuable and its exploitation irrational.

This is why the State supported the birth of Peruvian archaeology financing studies of Andean ancient civilizations and their cultural achievements. In 1907, the State sponsored an exhibition of Peruvian antiquities in the Academy of Sciences of Munich (Germany). The article announcing this
exhibition was entitled: “El triunfo del Indio”. In 1911, the discovery of Macchu Picchu fed into this movement of exaltation of cultural accomplishments of the past. Many museums of Andean antiquities were created in this period to mature regional mentality about the nation and the race. Many mestizos saw them as part of their cultural inheritance. (Tamayo 1980: 140)

The height of this state sponsored millenarism came with Leguía’s second regime (1919-1930). It developed an official millenarian discourse to obtain the support of peasant masses for the new state project, producing all sorts of demagogic measures (such as the Day of the Indian) and rhetoric appeals. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 169) He used pictures and maps of Inca roads to show a model of his road building policy in the Andes and promote the Vial Conscription Law (mandatory labor on roads). He also sponsored the telurism of José Santos Chocano who published in 1908 “Indo-Spanish" poems with titles like “The treasure of the Incas" and “The condor’s vision.” Chocano's poems described immense highlands in need for population, or inhabited only by Inca princes and princesses, their soldiers and slaves. In his poem “Blazon", he affirmed: “The blood is Spanish and Inca the heartbeat." (Chocano 1908) The blood could not be Indian, only the beating sound. The glorification of ancient achievements of Native Americans did not hinder the rejection of their contemporary descendants and the will to acculturate them. Inca achievements were used to underline the backwardness of their indigenous contemporaries.

The ruling elite rejected the present contributions of the native population developing millenarism as a racist argument to maintain rural masses outside the circles of power. It is interesting to point out at the duplicity of the ruling elite’s millenarian discourse. While the President and upper class poets and intellectuals could recall and praise the political and cultural achievements of the Inca Empire, peasant intellectuals could not even mention the word Inca without raising suspicion and fears of revolt. Appalled by the cynicism used in newspapers “La Crónica" and “Variedades" to refer to Rumi Maki and to the hundreds of peasants assassinated with total impunity in Azángaro, Dora Mayer sentenced that racist jokes about Indians were not a mere accident; they unveiled a “national pathology”. (Kapsoli 1980: 83) Satire was the escape valve when public liberties were pared. A derisive attitude prevented the rise of outrage and allowed ruling elites to forget their principles. Indian efforts to participate in the nation were thus mocked and put aside with derision to ensure the place of Lima’s white minorities. They needed to downplay Indian political initiatives to maintain their political and social preponderance. Lima also needed Rumi Maki and peasant millenarism.

Indigenista millenarism responded to provincial resentment against the authoritarian centralism of the national government and the snobbism of Lima’s society. (Deustua and Rénique 1984: 197-199) According to many indigenistas, the war had been lost not because of a lack of national consciousness of the Indians, conforming most of the army, but because of the lack of consciousness of dominant classes that ignored the country’s history. (Zevallos 2002: 58) Provincial intellectuals believed that only in the pre-Hispanic past could they find a foundational myth for the nation. To assimilate the native population, its history and culture needed to be revalued and even praised. They hoped to create a national identity based on autochthonous elements of pre-Columbian origin which had survived the conquest and colonial period. (Zevallos 2002: 61; Deustua and Rénique 1984: 197-199)

Nativism is the expression of the search for cultural authenticity; it is a belief in the value of what is our own. The Spanish conquest had destroyed the political and social organization of the Empire not its culture. The history and culture of the ethnic nation were morally superior, since they

expressed the energies and intimate experiences of the people, the authentic sources of being and collective dignity. Inca strength and cultural inheritances mixed with socialist ideas to imagine a vital indigenous proletariat living in an egalitarian world.\(^{98}\) Nativism responded to the needs of Puneños intellectuals, usually self-educated mestizos. (Bourricaud 1967: 222) Intellectual and pro-indigenous activist Chukiwanka Ayulo identified Quechua and Aymara and national languages proposing a transformation of Spanish grammar and spelling in accordance with these languages.

Indigenistas took upon themselves the task of rescuing the indigenous world, a self-legitimizing strategy that gave them enormous social authority. (Zevallos 2002: 62) The main problem they faced was did they not trust Indians or indigenous agency. Valcárcel pointed out that even those that did not identify with the oligarchy and gamonalismo had no faith in the capacity of the Indian to change his situation. (Valcárcel 1981: 237) And it was not just a doubt about the Indian’s intellectual capacity; it was a doubt about the Indian’s virility and moral strength. Many intellectuals and politicians expressed millenarian ideas while supporting eugenic measures with gendered racial arguments: Indians had lost the virility of Inca kings but could recover it and be regenerated through miscegenation. Europeans were to bring virility to Indian women’s offspring.

Cusqueño intellectual Luis Felipe Aguilar, impressed by the early 1920s peasant unrest and mobilization, condemned the false indigenistas or “ramalistas” who made propaganda amongst illiterate Indians, sold costly newspapers and pamphlets, and perceived quotas for the supposed defense of their rights. They were worse, he affirmed, than gamonales for they made Indians believe in the restoration of the Inca Empire, the devolution of lands and the conversion of whites and mestizos into servants of Indians. (Tamayo 1980: 218) Some indigenistas confronted with peasant messengers tried to echo their pleas and exalt their courage through a romantic messianism. Valcárcel viewed messengers as examples of the “new Indian” rising to change his sort and restore the justice of Inca society. “Above all, the new Indians will reacquire peremptorily their quality of human beings; they will proclaim their rights and tie the broken thread of their own history to re-establish the cardinal institutions of the Inca Empire.”\(^{99}\) Valcárcel’s messianic hopes for the future evidenced a rather dark picture of the present: Indians devoid of human condition. Indigenistas were torn between their haciendo origins or conexions and their need to redeem the peasant world.

**Hacendado millenarism** was not too different from the millenarism ascribed to the peasantry. Hacendados made a heavy use of magical religious elements to reinforce their prestige as exceptional beings. In two works written in the 1910s by hacendados José Angelino Lizares Quiñones (“La Mancha que Limpia”) and Luis Felipe Luna’s (Biografía criminal de los Lizares), the Lizares are endowed with almost supernatural qualities. In 1826, the birth of José María Lizares coincided with strange meteorological phenomenon that announced the arrival of a fateful being: a huge tempest with terrible hailstorms as big as balls, and lightning that produced silver mines. José Angelino Lizares Quiñones was born (August 1, 1866) feet first, after screaming in the womb for several days. Once born, people heard a powerful scream and trembling though the creature was sound asleep. When he was only two months old, José Angelino had all his teeth and wanted to eat meat not milk. Instead of using diapers, his mother wrapped him in a Sacred Shroud she had

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\(^{98}\) “Peñascos i tempestades arman la vida kolla / Se saben fuertes i feroces en la sangre / Los abuelos dejaron recuerdos de piedra / …El Inca era un duro i buen camarada / TAWANTINSUYO / …El Sol era el Padre Igualador / …La tierra era para todos…” (“Kollas”, Alejandro Peralta, 1934, p. 33-34) “Rocks and tempests build kolla life / They know they are strong and ferocious in the blood / Grandparents left stone memories/ … The Inca was hard and a good comrade/ TAWANTINSUYO/ … The Sun was the equalizing father/… The earth was for all…”

\(^{99}\) Conference read at the University of Arequipa (January 22, 1927). (Mariátegui & Sánchez 1975: 26)
bought in a fair in Azángaro. Forty children died in Lizares’s haciendas so that Angelino could play soccer with their skulls. Esoteric and religious factors were mixed with horror stories creating a magic realism that would make Latin American boom writers applaud. Local lore affirmed that Lizares Quiñones could spend a week under the water without drowning or a week buried in the soil without rotting. Besides being amphibious and compost-proof, Lizares shared similarities with Jesus Christ: he was known for having cured the ulcers of indigent peoples and for having a special relation with animals. Lizares had boasted about being able to domesticate bears, foxes and other wild animals that would descend upon his calling from the hills. Lizares himself assured he was a predestined, exceptional being with magical powers that had been intuitively raised for war. Lizares wished to be the new Messiah, and he enhanced his power with a prestige fed from and by local folklore. (Tamayo 1982: 177-179; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 108; Rénique 2004: 52)

As explained by Mariano Lariqo: “The personality of the gamonal was formed by a confluence of power, despotic control, exacerbated paternalism, Christian piety and respect for peasant habits and curtip of Andean roots.” Gamonalismo was a social and economic phenomenon maintained by a compromise or accord between the two worlds and cultures and its strength lay in the fact that it appropriated the more traditional elements: Catholicism and traditional religiosity, Western rentist mentality, and a way to look at the past, especially to the Inca, to find solutions for the present. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 108) It was Lizares Quiñones who in 1909 proposed a new constitution in Spanish and Quechua, the rechristening of the nation as “Tahuantinsuyo” and the recuperation of ancient Andean traditions (applying the symbolism of the number 4 even on the organization of the hacienda). The project was not considered in Congressional discussions dominated by urban and coastal themes, but Lizares maintained his efforts to create a new legal body presenting a less aggressive version in 1919 with clear federalist connotations. A rechristened “United States of Peru” ought to be divided in four states, each state in four provinces, and each province in four communities as in the Inca Empire. The new version of the project was a mixture between the rebirth of the Inca Empire and a Latin version of the USA. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 107-108)

Hacendados thus used millenarian ideas for personal and political goals. A new Inca federalism would bring autonomy to local governments, increasing gamonal power. Millenarian ideas were also very useful to justify domination and repression of rural masses. A puneño correspondent, writing under the alias of Coraquenque, published a letter in El Comercio on February 11, 1868, where he affirmed that Bustamante had instigated Indians first to bring down then to sustain Prado leading them from the beginning until the end with the ridiculous idea of proclaiming himself Inca and with the horrible plan of exterminating the white race. Coraquenque affirmed that the “tragic” death of Bustamante would produce “the salvation of the white race and of the great interests of the Republic.” (cited by Ossio 1995: 232) Hacendado writer José Sebastián Urquiaga had come to the same conclusion in 1867 after asserting Juan Bustamante had appointed himself “General Restaurador del Imperio Incaico” affirming he had been sent by the Kings of the Empire to throw out of the territory the white or exterminator. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 95)

Millenarian and messianic arguments were brought together to depict the worse of scenarios. Alarmist racial arguments of a race war went hand in hand with accusations of the return of Inca kings. Messianic beliefs were particularly useful to prove the existence of a subversive outsider fooling the gullible and “unconscious” Indian mass. Arguments such as the arrival of a Messiah or the imminence of a caste war were developed by gamonal sectors to either increase their hegemonic power or repress the indigenous population. The strength with which these arguments
were voiced was proportional to *hacendado*’s minority situation and their dependence on peasant resources and labor. To control the situation, *gamonales* imbued themselves in a peasant cosmovision trying to mold it to their advantage. Millenarian and messianic discourses were so permeable that they could be shared by *hacendados* and peasants alike, the only difference being who ought to be on top.

**Peasant millenarism** has been the focus of analysis of many historians since the 1960s. Messianic and millenarian factors were found in almost all revolts moving the magic mind of indigenous peasants: the promise of a “pachacuti”, the violent and immediate reversion of the system of land tenure, the restoration of the Inca Empire, the liberation of conditions of oppression from authorities. (Tamayo 1982: 201) In these studies, peasant revolts were not based on rational political or economic goals producing “real” structural changes but on a millenarian return to the past.

… peasants find the ideological base of their revolts not in a possible future society (socialism or the anti-imperialist state), or in the search for some possible changes (salary, cost of life), but fundamentally in the recuperation of traditional culture and the invocation of messianic and millenarian motives. (…) The image of the Tahuantinsuyo is rebuilt and thought as a harmonic and fair society. Far from advancing, they want to go back. The elements of tactic and strategy (political rationality) pass unto a secondary place in a conception that admits and also revindicates the action of magical and religious factors: traditional cults. (Burga & Flores Galino 1987: 174, my translation)

Burga & Flores Galindo (1987) identified in millenarism an authentic peasant ideology, a move against the established order and towards the predominance of the indigenous race. Those at the bottom would rise to the top: this was the fundamental and utopian goal of “the Great Revolt” of 1920-1923. Peasants did not develop a progressive thought. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 123; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 162-163) In 1986, Burga affirmed peasant rebellions in the 1920s were “a utopian project that emerged from the popular indigenous imagination” but he dismissed the restoration of the Inca Empire as landowner invention. For Burga, “peasants followed the landowners’ invention and developed it into a vision of utopia, the millenarian restoration of Tawantinsuyu.” (De la Cadena 2000: 122-123) Jean Piel linked the Incanist discourse of Leguía to the revival of latent Andean mythic ideologies within the peasantry. Incaic themes were thoughtlessly exalted by the government and communicated a hope of the mythic rebirth of the Andean “nation”. (De la Cadena 2000: 118) Following this argument, Cusqueño intellectuals could also be at the origin of millenarian ideas of Inca resurrection.

I would start from a different perspective: the lack of millenarian or messianic references made by peasant messengers in their memorials. Traces left by peasants in State archives show almost no millenarian references. Peasant intellectuals pictured a different future for themselves and their constituencies not as Inca subjects but as Indian citizens recognized as such by the State and society, with the right to elect their own authorities, to freely participate in the market and to reach justice and education. They were betting on Spanish education as a means to even out social relations and come out from their condition of domination and marginalization. If references were made to the past, they were usually references to the colonial not the Inca past. Peasants needed to recuperate a political role and protect their land and cattle. To this end, it was far more useful to
draw from the colonial past: the “Republic of Indians” had guaranteed native authorities and State protection. Creoles suspected Indians of being nostalgic about the Inca Empire while ayllus recalled their titles consolidated by the King of Spain. (Demélas 2003: 406) Peasant discourse reminisced of the colonial tributary pact not of a distant and recreated Inca socialism.

Mariano Lariqo Yujra, messenger from the community of Wilakunka (Azángaro), affirmed his community participated in the attack on hacienda “San José” in 1915 because Arias Echenique was ready to convert the community into a hacienda. The gamonal had brought people from Azángaro and Arequipa, as well as firearms and dynamite. Thus the community decided to join Gutierrez’s effort to kill Arias and make the haciendas of Azángaro into a “Republic for the Indians”. (Rénique 2004: 79) This “Republic for the Indians” would have no forced services, no vial conscription and would be led by peasant authorities able to speak Spanish (peasant representatives, senators, police officers, generals). This “Republic of Tahuantinsuyo” would engage in commercial ventures and businesses with the “Republic of Perú” without abuses. (Rénique 2004: 97) If in the 1920s peasant organizations used millenarian references it was partially in response to official and indigenista millenarian discourses, as Piel argued.

Indeed, peasants reinvoked their ethnic identity and designed the fight for their citizen rights inside the parameters of their own cultural universe. (Zevallos 2002: 120) Millenarism though seldom used to address the State was often used to project a possible future of pride and hope when the present could not be. While hacendado Urquiaga accused Bustamante of using messianic ideas to promote a race war, the oral tradition transmitted by puneño peasant intellectual Mariano Lariqo Yujra points at a need for local heroes and figures to look up to for encouragement. Bustamante had not died, his body was put back together and a woman sawed and cured his wounds. He roamed around Pusi and Taraco on his black horse. Lariqo affirmed: “y yo creo que es cierto, porque una persona así no muere jamás, no muere aunque quisieran volverlo a matar.” After Bustamante’s execution, rumors spread the belief that his body had been found uncorrupted and remained hidden from the profane eyes of mestizos. This image of a conserved and revered body reminds us of pre-Hispanic burial traditions but also of medieval Catholic history, plagued with martyrs, uncorrupted bodies and relics. Peasant reservoirs of meaning and identity were broad enough to encompass pre-Hispanic and colonial traditions.

Peasant intellectuals did not draw from “a single stream of discursive practice” for their constituencies were not “an undifferentiated and homogeneous mass”. (Feierman 1990: 24) The word Tahuantinsuyo, if mentioned, meant different things to different groups and individuals. Indians could give Inca category to representatives of national politics who favored them. General Caravedo, sent by the government to pacify Puno in 1867, was compared with Manco Capac for his prudence, courtesy and other attributes by a group of Indians from Taraco (Huancané) in a letter to the executive of July 4, 1867. (Ossio 1995: 233) Peasants played their own game in power struggles, with various levels of radicalism, to conserve autonomy in the decision-making process and ensure their economic and cultural survival. They developed different discourses for different audiences.

Allusions to the Tahuantinsuyo could be used as unifying metaphors producing a general motivation that did not subsume the political objectives of the rural fight. (Rénique 2004: 95) It served as a common image of justice and fair government or an example of abundance and equity. It was used as a tool to imagine the ideal future not a return to the past. “When peasants organize political movements, or when they reflect on collective experience, they speak about how politics

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can be ordered to bring life rather than death, to bring prosperity rather than hunger, and to bring justice rather than inequity. The means for achieving these are defined by peasants themselves. It is peasants who draw upon a rich variety of past forms of political language; it is peasants who create new political discourse.” (Cooper et al. 1993: 262) Peasant intellectuals created new language and spoke with inherited words, all at the same time.

Native versions of “Rumi Maki’s revolt” showed the need of the peasantry to imagine a world of social justice and to reaffirm the fairness of their pleas. Ramos Zambrano affirmed that indigenous leaders with different degrees of participation in Rumi Maki’s movements told him about their hopes for a return to the Tahuantinsuyo system. Ramos also mentioned an intellectual from Pucará, Andrés Avelino Idme Huaracallo who arrived at the same conclusion while talking to relatives and friends from the area. (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 83) Oral histories of resistance and revolt helped the peasantry counter a discourse of passivity and submission that disempowered them. “Notions of justice, vengeance, and legitimacy are historically derived and, with symbols of past resistance, are a powerful vehicle to mobilize peasant protest.” (Isaacman in Cooper et al. 1993: 255)

Projecting to the future an image of the past, in this case the Tahuantinsuyo, did not mean expecting the arrival of a new Inca Messiah. Coarse Inca-wannabe identifications were always denied by peasant leaders, pointing to hacendado manipulations. In 1916, Gutiérrez Cuevas denied using millenarian discourse. In 1924, an Indian from Coolquepata (Paucartambo, Cuzco) gathered a large following among the Indians of his province and even beyond (Puno and Ayacucho) Hacendados panicked expecting a widespread revolt of Indians led by “Inca” Miguel Quispe. Quispe was interviewed by Luis Valcárcel, Luis Felipe Aguilar and other cusqueño indigenistas to whom he assured he did not want to become Inca, for he had no ascendancy from the Inca nobility. He presented himself as an Indian of Paucartambo who claimed the devolution of land usurped to his kind. Valcárcel and his fellows introduced him to teachers and students of Cuzco’s university to entice them to act as defenders of the indigenous causes for free. Quispe disappeared after a while without leaving trace. (Valcárcel 1981: 237) Indigenista nativist language and attempts to restore pride in native culture could empower peasant intellectuals. Pre-Hispanic millenarism appears in peasant discourses mostly when in contact with indigenista intellectuals. Peasants could also adopt indigenista discourse to gain new allies within the middle class and the government. “The changing significance of the discourse is related to the shifting compromises and alliances between dominant groups and mediating intellectuals.” (Feierman 1990: 22)

State, intellectuals, hacendados and peasants produced images and meanings that drew from a common cultural repertoire while adding to it. (Storey 1996: 92) Ruling elites used millenarian discourses to develop a national consciousness but also to deny the indigenous rural masses access to the national project. Intellectuals strove to develop a national identity through images of the indigenous past yet were unable to integrate indigenous present. Hacendados recognized and used the power of local myths to enhance their power yet they also used them to deploy an intense propaganda war against “savage” and “cannibalistic” rural masses and their “Messiahs” (messengers) who dared challenge their power endangering civilized misti society. Peasants did not use millenarian discourse to address the State claiming for justice. They would rather call upon the colonial past and its tributary pact. The Inca regime remained, however, a powerful tool to depict a world of justice and abundance among indigenous constituencies. This wealth of speakers, interpretations and audiences explains why millenarian discourses have been so controversial. It suffices to take a look at the famous Rumi Maki’s revolt.

LOCAL DISPUTES, REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND NATIONAL POLITICS
The districts of Samán and Caminaca in the Province of Azángaro had experienced only a limited expansion of haciendas onto peasant lands after 1900. The peasantry of Samán, Caminaca and Achaya had reached important levels of organicity and defense. The area had a large peasant concentration due to previous waves of spoliations and constituted a true fortress against hacienda incursion. Its peasantry was characterized as fierce and brave by the peasants of the other districts of Azángaro.101

In 1913, news of an attack on the properties of livestock trader Mariano Abarca Dueñas102 in Caminaca and Achaya spread over the region reaching Lima. It seems that peasants refused to acknowledge district and provincial authorities. Alarmist hacendado reports claimed an Indian revolution was spreading across the department to overthrow the government and re-establish the Inca Empire: Indians were marching with all kinds of excesses destroying all that was sacred, noble and intellectual. Troops were sent in September to “restore order”. They took prisoners causing an indigenous attack to liberate their peers. About a hundred insurgents died, as well as four soldiers. Military forces reported that Indians had shown knowledge of military discipline. Gamonal repression strengthened to silence the survivors. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 168; Rénique 2004: 52)

News of the disturbances in Azángaro reached Lima through hacendado representatives and peasant messengers. Some newspapers had supported peasant claims: on November 8, 1913, Arequipa’s newspaper “Integridad” affirmed the revolt of Samán had never existed and had been made up by gamonales to tighten their hold on the area. A commission of indigenous delegates reached Billinghurst’s administration with several memorials claiming for justice. The central State had sent lawyer Cáceres Olazo to investigate the facts, but decided to appoint an investigative commissioner. The appointment fell upon a man who was already familiar with the area and circumstances, Major Teodomiro Gutierrez Cuevas, former Sub-prefect of Chucuito (1903). Gutierrez recruited the help of his API contacts, puneño lawyer Francisco Chukiwanqa Ayulo and teacher Julián Palacios, and sent declarations in Quechua to the conflictive area.

His presence in the region generated intense rejection from the gamonales who asked for his removal through hacendado and representative of Azángaro Bernardino Arias Echenique. On November, the Commissioner returned to Lima accompanied by twenty two indigenous leaders. They had a personal interview with President Billinghurst and visited several newspapers being photographed by La Crónica in late November 1913 with Gutierrez and Palacios. (Rénique 2004: 52) Gutierrez elaborated a voluminous report that was lost, however, after the coup that deposed Billinghurst (February 4, 1914). Only a copy of it remained, saved and kept by a local historian, Fortunato Turpo. It spoke of bodies burnt alive, rapings, castrations, ransackings and destruction of foodstuffs to create famine. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 168-170)

Representative Bernardino Arias Echenique and the gamonal click in Lima accused Gutierrez of instigating Indians to rebel, blaming him for the events in Samán. Pro-indigenous educator and API member Maria Jesús Alvarado Rivera denounced that persecution of the plaintiffs continued led by the governor and sub-prefect (burning of houses, arbitrary jailings). The governor of Samán announced in the main square that he had been authorized by the president of the Republic to kill Indians with troops from Arequipa and Cuzco. He also carried on expeditions with soldiers jailing

101 “In the short run gamonales could inflict losses of land, material belongings, and even life on peasants. But in Samán the balance of power between peasants and haciendas was such that after 1940 no hacienda survived.” (Jacobsen 1993: 221)

102 According to the communal peasants of Saman, Abarca Dueñas was the son a priest from Taraco who arrived to Azángaro with no fortune. In 1890, he served as tax collector and Governor of Samán. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 168)
several indigenes and mistreating women tied to horses and dragged along. (Kapsoli 1980: 112-113) Mariano Abarca Dueñas formed hacienda “San Juan” and went to live in Juliaca where he opened a store. All lawsuits remained pending. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 171)

However discontent and unrest continued. Puno’s representative Manuel Alberto Zaa expressed during the second extraordinary legislature of 1915, the need for an indigenous tutelary legislation after careful study of the agrarian question, the revision of property titles, the facilities to register small property in the Property registers, the labor in haciendas, illiteracy and hacendado obligations about education, reform of the law of military conscription, cooperation of the clergy in the campaign against ignorance and determination of rights and obligations, legal capacity of Indians to participate in contracts and receive protection of the State, reform of the system of contributions and authorities. A parliamentary commission was appointed to prepare an integral pro-indigenous legislation without reaching this goal. (Basadre 1983: IX 206)

The peasant protests that started in Samán and spread to Caminaca and Achaya inaugurated a period of conflicts over the land in Azángaro that reached their culmination in San José in 1915. In early December, news of an indigenous rebellion in Azángaro directed by Sergeant Major Teodomiro Gutierrez spread all over the nation. Newspapers from Puno, Arequipa, Cuzco, Lima and even regions as distant as Chiclayo and Catacaos informed about the events. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 174) On December 1 and 2, 1915, some three hundred communal Indians had gathered in the hills of Cerro Inampo, Soratira and Kakenkorani, where they were joined by Indians from other provinces and departments (Cuzco and Apurimac). According to “El Eco de Puno” (30 March 1916), the attacks were made by over 200 indigenes. “El Pueblo” (22 March 1916) mentions one thousand attackers. An employee of Arias Echenique reported by telegraph the attack of two thousand Indians. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 176; Tamayo 1982: 209)

In the afternoon of December 1 they attacked hacienda “Atarani” of Alejandro Choquehuanca. In spite of the resistance of administrator Lino Toro they took over the hacienda and ransacked its warehouse, drinking all they found in the cellar. Then they proceeded to hacienda “La Unión” owned by Bernardino Arias Echenique, finding it guarded by the Subprefect of Azángaro and gendarmes. They thus turned to another of Arias Echenique’s haciendas, “San José.” The attack took place in the middle of the night. Gutierrez directed the attack with his lieutenant, discharged soldier Casimiro Huaracha, but it seems that his troops were too drunk. The employees of “San José” had been warned and were already armed. They were soon helped by employees of hacienda “Sollocota”, owned by Arias Echenique’s half-brother José Sebastián Urquiaga Echenique. The fight lasted until dawn. Unable to take over the hacienda house, Gutierrez’s troops had to withdraw being persecuted by the employees of Arias and Urquiaga until Putina Puncu where they were massacred. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 176-177; Tamayo 1982: 208-210)

According to hacendado sources like Eugenia Chukiwanca and Urquiaga, Gutierrez was nicknamed “Rumi Maki Ccori Zoncco” (Hand of stone-heart of gold) and adopted the titles of “General and Supreme Director of the peoples and armies” and “Restorer of Indigenes of the State of Tahuantinsuyo”. He established a hierarchical military apparatus including an “Estado Mayor”, appointing the leaders of his movement in documents that bore a seal of the “Federal State of Tahuantinsuyo”. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 174) Gutierrez affirmed the government had loaned Indian land to mestizos for one hundred years. The time was up and he was there to help them recover their lands. (Hazen 1974: 145)103 His goal was: “Establecer por primer vez en el Perú, el

103 Two documents apparently issued by Rumi Maki were cited one appointing Santiago Chuquimia “cabecilla restaurador” for the district of Phara (Sandia Province) the other appointing Gaspar Condori “cabecilla restaurador” (September 8, 1915), (Hazen 1974: 143-145)
imperio de la libertad, de la legalidad y la justicia, abatiendo el poder funesto y embrutecedor del gamonal." (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 174) For this, he sent messengers throughout the department and to other departments (as far as Bolivia) to announce the uprising and its main goal: the taking and repartition of hacienda lands among the peasantry. He established a rama or contribution according to each family’s economy, and set up military headquarters in San Antón, where he trained peasants (between one and two hundred a week). Warned by panicked hacendados, José Pardo’s administration sent armed forces from Cuzco and Arequipa to Puno and ordered the capture of Gutierrez. The attack planned for carnival 1916 was then advanced weakening the coordination of the forces involved. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 175; Tamayo 1982: 212, 215)

According to Giraldo and Franch, the revolt failed because employees of Arias had poisoned the alcohol they had stored, knowing the attackers would immediately consume it. According to Mauro Paredes, the Indians entered the infirmary of the hacienda and drank all the medicines and brews destined for the cattle thinking it was alcohol. Lesser arms, drunkenness and poisoning or intoxication would explain the defeat of the movement and the dispersion of the attackers before the arrival of military contingents. Paredes reported three hundred dead; Severo Castillo barely forty; Jove and Canahuiro over one thousand. Arias Echenique in a letter addressed to Lizares Quiñones (December 22, 1915) in response to an article against him published in “El Indio” acknowledged 132 dead. Julián Bellido Mamani, only indígena known to have survived the attack mentioned no more than twenty corpses that were summarily buried in a neighboring field. Those who managed to escape took refuge in the hill of Inampo but were persecuted for days by two cavalry battalions from Cuzco. Hacendados formed an army of over five hundred men with fire weapons and horses. The final result was an endless wave of killings and reprisals that many hacendados (Alejandro Choquehuanca, Arias Echenique, Urquiaga, Carlos Sarmiento, Abarca Dueñas, Cano, Zamora, etc.) used to increase their haciendas. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 176-177; Tamayo 1982: 210-211)

News about the revolt continued to appear affirming it was spreading to other districts of Azángaro (Samán and Caminaca) as well as to districts of neighboring provinces Huancané and Sandia. After the events, Chukiwanka informed Zulen about the abuses being carried against the Indians of Samán, Caminaca, Achaya, Coata and Capachica who were daily shot at by the Sub-prefects of Azángaro and Huancané and the Commisary of Juliacá. One hundred and eighty five men and forty women were jailed in Puno, and rumors of killings continued to circulate. Indians claimed justice in the Capital, asking for a special commission presided by an illustrated, energetic and human person with the power of the Prefect. They requested the return of Dr. Alejandrino Maguña. (Rénique 2004: 80-81)

Personal histories, interests and vendettas imbued in the events have diffculted the task of sorting out the facts. Sources go from denying the existence of a revolt to affirming the existence of a peasant army with people from other departments and even from Bolivia. The information available was so manipulated it is filled with contradictions and one ends up wondering if there really was a revolt. In a personal interview with Dan Hazen, Julián Palacios (the commissioner’s former secretary) affirmed “Gutierrez had resolved to balance the scales for gamonal massacres and atrocities, such as he had investigated at Samán, by leading a real Indian uprising.” (Hazen 1974: 140) Indeed, Teodomiro Gutierrez Cuevas had many reasons to be bitter about his situation and that of Puno’s peasants. He was a bright and aspiring soldier with strong political tendencies and convictions, who had not received a fair treatment from the army having to fight for recognition of services and pensions. Gutierrez was a staunch cacerista. In 1884, he was Field Attendant of the President General Cáceres passing then to the Escort Squadron of his Excellency the President. After the victory of the Coalition in 1895, caceristas officials were persecuted and
disappeared from the Army’s registers. Their pensions were suspended. In 1902, Gutierrez complained of insolvency due to this suspension but the administrative procedures lingered and payments never arrived.104 (CEHM, Rumi Maki folder) Starting in 1903, he served as Sub-prefect in different provinces: Huánuco (January-April 1903 and October 1904-July 1905), Chachapoyas (April-July 1903), Canta (July-November 1903), Chucuito (November 1903-August 1904), Ayacucho (July 1905-March 1906) and Huancayo (October 19 06-August 1907). In Ayacucho, he received a “treacherous” attack that had him long in bed. He also began to suffer from chronic nephritis. (Bustamante 1987; Macera et all 1988: 67; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 112; CEHM, Rumi Maki folder, ff. 144-146)

In 1908, Leguía’s administration granted him temporary retirement and a pension of Lp 6,7,66. His pension, however, was soon reduced by a third for various discounts. To make matters worse, he was fired in December accused by his superior the Sub-prefect of Canas of abandoning his post in Yanaoca (Cuzco). In 1911, Gutierrez was in Lima facing an honor trial in an anguishing economic situation. Fortunately, the Tribunal appointed by the Ministry of War ruled in his favor, affirming that the firing of Gutierrez from his post should not in any way affect his military honor.105 Gutierrez was also involved in another appeal: he wanted to be declared participant in the battles of Pucará (5 February 1882) and Marcavalle (9 July 1882) against Chilean forces and bear the medals decreed by Congress. He cited as witnesses several Colonels and General Cáceres. They all responded positively, affirming that he participated in combat and that his behavior as an officer was always commendable and dignified. Cáceres affirmed he deserved the recognition for his behavior was always “exemplary”. (Rumi Maki file, CEHM, ff. 164-165) The medals were denied to him because he failed to present his request while the Commission established for that purpose was in activity. His request was declared extemporary and filed in April 1913. (CEHM, Rumi Maki folder, ff. 166-167v)

In addition to these many disappointments, Gutierrez had met strong opposition to his labor and even attacks due to this pro-indigenous attitude. In 1904, he left his post as Sub-prefect of Chucuito with numerous enemies led by gamonal Mariano Vicente Cuentas. In 1909, Gutierrez Cuevas was in Lima, witnessing the foundation of the Pro-Indigenous Association and acting as proxy of the indigenes of Chucuito and Puno. He presented to Congress a memorial with letters and testimonies of different ayllus complaining of forced services and undue contributions. In 1912, he visited President Guillermo Billinghurst to present him a book he wrote detailing the abuses gamonales exerted in the Southern provinces. Accompanied by communal indigenes he visited several printing shops in Lima to publish his manuscript. (Basadre 1983: IX 27; Réniqne 2004: 50) In early February 1913, he was sent to Madre de Dios to study the condition of the road from Tirapata (Puno) to Puerto Maldonado. In 1913, as especial commissioner in Samán rebellion, he won the permanent enmity of Bernardino Arias Echenique and other hacendados. He was accused of enticing the Indian to react against “whites”, ransacking haciendas. Arias affirmed there had been cases of cannibalism and that Gutierrez had proclaimed himself the “messiah” that would redeem the indigenous population. (Basadre 1983: IX 27; Bustamante 1987; CEHM 1913; Tamayo 1982: 205) As a cacerista turned populist military of indigenista beliefs, Gutierrez was a serious threat for hacendado representative Arias Echenique who intrigued to have Gutierrez eliminated

104 The Disbursement Office affirmed all suspended pensions had been paid. It had no idea why Gutierrez’s payments were done through the Office of the Ministry of Hacienda. He persisted in claiming the payment of his pensions without success. The claim was held until 1910 then filed. (CEHM, Rumi Maki folder, f. 118)

105 CEHM, Rumi Maki folder, “Expediente seguido al Sargento Mayor D. Teodomiro A. Gutierrez con motivo de la investigación practicada para la Corte de Honor”.
from the military roster. On February 4, 1914, Colonel Oscar R. Benavides overthrew President Billinghurst transforming Gutierrez from special governmental agent into ill-fated outcast. It seems that he left for Chile, passing then to Bolivia and to Punoclandestinely.

Gutierrez’s unfortunate career and compromise with the indigenous cause turned him into an appealing figure for scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, especially puneño scholars using oral sources of information. Puneño historian Mauro Paredes collected much of his information from his father in law, Agustín Román, administrator and man of confidence of different hacendados of Azángaro. He backed this oral source with articles from “El Comercio”, puneño newspapers and official reports. He asserted that Rumi Maki gathered some 2000 Indian rebels from different parts of the Southern Andes. He idealized Gutierrez and described him as a smart and sensitive military that spoke Spanish, English, Quechua and Aymara and fought in San José with the bravery of a lion. Writing in the early years of Velasco Alvarado’s military regime, Paredes exalted the figure of Gutierrez as precursor of the agrarian reform. (Bustamante 1989: 150) Antonio Rengifo in the mid 1970s recognized the vacuums and limitations of the sources available and extended his search to periodicals from Puno and Lima, books and pamphlets written in that period, as well as an interview with Julián Palacios. He believed Gutierrez had planned an insurrection that presented great projections and his memory could feed the historic consciousness of the peasantry. (Macera et al 1988: 152-153)

In the late 1970s, Giraldo and Franch saw the attack on hacienda San José as a logic suite to the events of Samán. Gutierrez had for years maintained a pro-indigenous stance, publishing pamphlets, bands and articles in Quechua against gamonales. He had earned the confidence of the peasantry and maintained connections with them through the years. He understood the peasant need for land, the importance of tradition and hierarchical organization and indigenous symbolism. He aimed at redistributing hacienda lands and creating an autonomous power with military formed leaders to restore the prosperity of the past. Though asserting the millenarian content of Gutierrez’s discourses, they wondered why he had been unable to evaluate and perceive the strength of the reigning system, of the institutionalized structure of power in which he had participated through the army. They wondered if he trained his forces considering a confrontation with regular forces. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 179-180)

Puneño scholar Ramos Zambrano has maintained the existence of Rumi Maki’s millenarian revolt based on three letters addressed to Chuqiwanqa Ayulo, apparently written by Gutierrez in 1914 and by a character from Potosí nicknamed General Huayna Cápac in 1937. The latter informed Chuqiwanqa of the death of Rumi Maki and mentioned a plan elaborated by him to create a “Great South American Confederation of the Pacific.” For Ramos, these letters should erase all doubt about the existence of Rumi Maki and his self proclamation as “Supreme Restorer of the Tahuantinsuyo Empire”. (Bustamante 1989: 157) Ramos seems to have had access to unseen documents that would need more careful study.

Puneño scholars have sternly defended the existence of a millenarian revolt led by pro-indigenous outsider Gutierrez in accounts deeply rooted in local lore; mostly of hacendado origin. Their accounts were not just characterized by the oral history they had access too, they were also characterized by a search for a leader capable of raising peasant historical consciousness. Gutierrez emerged from their studies as a local hero, a source of pride and peasant empowerment. By focusing on the mythic figure of Rumi Maki, they were however leaving out other possible interpretations. Rumi Maki could become “a symbol for Indian resistance to injustice and oppression, and a warning for reform” but Azángaro’s hacendados were the only ones who benefited from the revolt. (Hazen 1974: 150)

Two scholars, Bustamante and Tamayo, analyzed the revolt as a social episode intimately
linked to the politics of the period and the complicated social relations between landowners and between landowners and peasants. (Bustamante 1989: 156-157) They suggested that Gutiérrez might have been encouraged or provoked by some *gamonales* hoping to quell in blood the existing social tension with the intervention of the army and behind it of *hacienda*’s private armies. After the events, Arias Echenique’s power and wealth continued to increase until the late 1920s when his debts with the Casa Gibson in Arequipa forced him to surrender his properties. (Tamayo 1982: 215-216) These scholars stressed the need to pay a closer look at *gamonal* rivalries and to characters that were downplayed due to the precedence given to Gutiérrez, characters like José María Turpo of *ayllu* Soratira.106 (Bustamante 1989: 158) Arias Echenique wanted to annex Turpo’s estancia. He sent his employees to harass the peasant affirming their master had bought the estancia from the government. In August 1915, Arias accused Turpo of preparing an anarchist revolt, an accusation that Azángaro’s fiscal agent José Frisancho Macedo deemed unfounded. Gutiérrez Cuevas agreed to help Turpo resist the annexation. As a result, Indians from all over the Department and even from other departments started to appeal to him. He might have agreed to train indigenous militias in the communities of Pacastiti, Sillota, Tumuyo, Jila Machairiri, Q’olampa, and others that had suffered the aggressions and forced annexations of the Echenique brothers. According to Tamayo, the revolt was fundamentally a local action of communal Indians from the districts of San José and San Antón, dispossessed or threatened in their possession by a *gamonal* with national influence with which Gutiérrez had a personal and political conflict. (Tamayo 1982: 209-213)

These last interpretations though questioning the figure of Gutiérrez did not question the existence of a revolt. And yet, the texts available are plagued with arguments denying the revolt. To start, Gutiérrez “vehemently denied any participation in what he considered a counterfeited rebellion”. He had been arrested in Arequipa in April 1916 accused by Pardo’s administration of treason to the Fatherland: trying to separate Puno from Peru to incorporate it to Bolivia. In an interview with Arequipeño newspaper “El Volcán”, he assured he had never given himself the titles of Generalísimo and Marshal, nor taken the name of Rumi Maki, nor sought the secession from Peru and the union with Bolivia. He affirmed the *gamonales* of Azángaro, criminal monsters, had forged a revolt in Azángaro trying to involve him in it to take revenge. The “*gamonales* make a practice of fabricating uprisings as a pretext for requesting armed force from the always complaisant authorities they have installed…”, he said. (Hazen 1974: 146)

The State soon reached similar conclusions or at least discarded Gutiérrez’s guilt in the events. The investigations carried out by political authorities vexed *hacendados*. Lizare Quiñones, in his newspaper “El Indio” (October 10, 1016), accused Investigator Major Cereceda of adopting a spurious indigenista position lamenting the number of victims and the disorders shaking Azángaro. On January 6, 1917, Gutiérrez managed to escape from prison, disappearing mysteriously. Julián Palacios affirms he fled to Bolivia where he directed an indigenista newspaper. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 177; Tamayo 1982: 207-212; Basadre 1983: IX 205; Bustamante 1989:145-6; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 112) There is no evidence of further persecutions or trials. Gutiérrez continued to perceive his pension and military records indicate he retired to the jungle, near Puerto

106 The governor of the district of Capachica affirmed having discovered the real Rumi Maki: an Indian called Huamán. (Hazen 1974: 143)
Maldonado, dedicated to agricultural activities until he passed away.\textsuperscript{107}

Juan José Nuñez, Prefect of Puno, informed the Minister of Government in two telegrams (9 and 14 December 1915) that the data about the insurrection had been exaggerated and that he had found the towns in relative tranquility and was fully confident he could re-establish public order effectively and pacifically. ("El Comercio", Friday 17/12/1915 evening edition) Prefect Nuñez had assigned gendarmes to the districts of San José and San Antón; their reports did not mention Gutiérrez but gave detailed charges implicating \textit{hacendados} like José Sebastián Urquiaga, Bernardino Arias Echenique, Alejandro Choquehuanca and Carlos A. Sarmiento. (Hazen 1974: 147-148) A few years later, the Prefect of Puno searched the \textit{haciendas} after several denunciations of the Pro-Indigenous Association and found huge arsenals in the hands of these \textit{hacendados}. Arias Echenique was by far the most armed with 186 weapons, followed by his half-brother Urquiaga with 104 and Macedo with 138. Isaac Zamora had over 80, Sarmiento and Enriquez around 70 and Alejandro Choquehuanca at least 50. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 176-177; Tamayo 1982: 210-211)

To counter denunciations about \textit{hacendado} violence, José Sebastián Urquiaga Echenique wrote "\textit{Sublevaciones de indígenas en el Departamento de Puno}"; ironically, a major primary source to study the events. Urquiaga wrote his account in a distant and impersonal way, omitting the fact that he was half-brother of Arias Echenique, co-owner of \textit{hacienda} "San José", and that his employees (\textit{colonos} of \textit{hacienda} Sollocota) participated in the repression. He also omitted the illegal growth of \textit{haciendas} affirming Indians were discontented mainly with corrupt political authorities, judges of peace, priests, and a few \textit{gamonales}. He assured the region was peaceful until the arrival of Gutiérrez as special commissioner and that the pro-indigenous military had planned a revolt since 1913, winning the Indians’ confidence by telling them \textit{hacienda} lands belonged to them and whites would be expelled to reconstruct the Inca Empire. The \textit{hacendado} Representative magnified the movement, mentioned goals it did not have and accused leaders of profiting from defenseless and uncultured Indians. He was trying to justify the violent repression of the peasant movement. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 146-147; Bustamante 1989: 146-147)

This account was contradicted by other \textit{hacendados} from Azángaro.\textsuperscript{108} In his newspaper "El Indio", José Angelino Lizares Quiñones’s accused Arias and Urquiaga of trying to establish their hegemony in Azángaro. (Tamayo 1982: 214) Another \textit{hacendado}, Representative from Lampa Luis Felipe Luna also took an anti-Echenique stance passionately defending Gutiérrez in Parliament. In the session of October 18, 1916 he affirmed:

\begin{quote}
El mayor Gutiérrez no tuvo más delito que ser espíritu y aliento dentro de un orden estrictamente moral, proclamando y reivindicando la libertad, la igualdad, los derechos y las garantías perdidas, para esa raza más débil por su ignorancia que es la raza indígena. He allí el delito por el que el mayor Gutiérrez fue arrojado en las
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107} In 1932, Chavarri asked for a new warrant of retirement for her husband according to the salary scale of 1912. Her husband resided in a distant mountainous (or selvatic “montañoso”) place of the country dedicated to agricultural tasks so he did not know the benefits of the new laws passed. She presented a letter of authority signed in Maldonado on March 3 1931. In September 1936, Gutiérrez asked through his daughter Olinda Gutiérrez a new warrant with new benefits. The petition was signed by Olinda as legal proxy of her father. No more records appear afterwards in the archive of the CEHM.

\textsuperscript{108} Arequipa’s newspaper “El Siglo” denounced the abuses of \textit{gamonales} and authorities against indigenes and blamed Prefect Nuñez for summoning troops for repression. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 178-179)
cloacas de una cárcel, inventando para ello la fantasía de los terratenientes, la utopía ridícula de un conflicto de razas, de una restauración del imperio incaico y de planes siniestros de cesiones territoriales a la vecina República. Todo inventado, todo supuesto por el poderoso gamonalismo para correr un velo sobre sus enormes crímenes para atraerse la fuerza moral de la opinión pública e inclinar hacia sí la simpatía y el apoyo de las autoridades. (Basadre 1983: IX 206)

Luna was profiting from the events to attack the Echenique brothers, his personal enemies. Arias Echenique, Democrat Congressman, was according to messenger Mariano Larioq Yujra a bloody gamonal endowed with his own army that “bought the haciendas by hill” and “made whatever he wanted with the Judicial Power” since he gave judges pieces of his hacienda. (Rénique 2004: 79) In connivance with his half-brother Urquiaga, Arias had disappeared from the map almost all of the estancias of the district of San José. He was a powerful competitor for the control of the province and even the Department. He constituted a modernizing figure that knocked against the wall of Lizares Quiñones more feudal and regionalist form of gamonalismo. The threat of rebellion did not unite gamonales; on the contrary it increased their confrontations creating provocations to push Indians to attack their rivals and political enemies.

According to Dan Hazen, Arias Echenique “had charged Indian leader José María Turpo with plotting an anarchist-inspired revolt. Since no evidence was presented, prosecutor José Frisancho refused to take legal action.” Soon thereafter, the API also received an anonymous letter announcing a counterfeit Indian uprising to expand haciendas. While conservative newspaper La Prensa accused Gutierrez of an uprising in Tirapata (Azángaro), the API and Lizares Quiñones’s newspaper “El Indio” denounced attacks in Pucará by Arias and Urquiaga and peasant discontent against the two hacendado brothers in San José and San Antón. (Hazen 1974: 140-141)

The accounts of local indigenistas also denied the existence of a revolt led by Gutierrez Cuevas. According to pro-indigenous lawyer Chuqiwanqa Ayulo, the events were the result of a repressive tactic of gamonales looking forward to usurping communal land. On December 1, 1915, the authorities of the district of San Antón (Azángaro), with guards and employees of Arias Echenique’s hacienda “La Unión”, plundered peasant estancias taking prisoners first to “La Unión”, then to “Quinsacallco” and “San José”, all of them property of Arias. On the next day, the relatives and friends of the imprisoned Indians went to “San José” where they were received with shots. They were hunted down and massacred in the following days by the employees of Arias Echenique, Urquiaga, Carlos Sarmiento (Mayrapata) and Alejandro Choquehuanca (Atarani). Chuqiwanqa presented a list of the peasants murdered, wounded or captured, a list of the estancias ransacked and of the atrocities committed by the hacendado militias. He assigned no guilt to peasants identified as mere victims incapable of rising, only capable of fleeing and denouncing the abuses. The pro-indigenous lawyer also denounced similar events in neighboring districts of Sandia and Azángaro where kidnappings, robberies of cattle and ransackings were

109 “Major Gutiérrez’s only crime was to be the spirit and breath inside a strictly moral order, proclaiming and revindicating the liberty, equality, rights and guarantees lost for that race weaker due to its ignorance that is the indigenous race. That was the crime for which Major Gutiérrez was thrown to the sewers of a jail, inventing for that purpose the fantasy of landowners the utopia of a racial conflict, a restoration of the Inca Empire and sinister plans of territorial concessions to the neighboring Republic. All invented, all supposed by the powerful gamonalismo to close a veil over its enormous crimes and attract the moral force of public opinion tilting in its favor the sympathy and support of authorities.”
carried on a large scale. (Bustamante 1989:140)\textsuperscript{110} Chuqiwanqa did not mention the presence of Gutierrez Cuevas in his report. The lawyer was a leading member of the Asociación Pro Indígena in Puno, and had maintained a close friendship with Gutierrez (also a member of the API) since his visit in 1913. By leaving out Gutierrez, Chuqiwanqa was probably protecting the military and the Asociación Pro Indígena he represented in Lampa. (Bustamante 1989:142)

Gutierrez was a modern man, a positivist that believed in the need for a professional bureaucracy to end abuse and discrimination towards the Indian. Echoing Maguiña’s report, Gutierrez confirmed the need for well paid governors appointed from outside the Departments. Carlos Contreras and Jorge Bracamonte studied Gutierrez’s activities as Sub-Prefect of Huancayo in 1907 and pointed out he despised vagrancy, idleness and alcoholism, and believed that Andean feasts caused the anguishing and miserable situation in which many Indians lived. Such traditions were colonial remains that expressed backwardness and ignorance, and were perversely used by more modern sectors on their behalf. Contreras and Bracamonte depicted a Gutierrez fascinated with progress and willing to end with any Andean tradition hindering it. Could this positivist creed succumb to Andean “cultural” magic? (Contreras & Bracamonte 1988: 9-11)

In the early 1970s, Dan Hazen questioned Rumi Maki’s legend after consulting journals of the period, prefects’ reports and even oral sources. For Hazen, contradiction was the only consistent trait of the different versions of the story. Though he acknowledged that Gutierrez’s indigenista past made him an ideal candidate to lead a rebellion, Hazen suggested Rumi Maki might have never existed. (Hazen 1974; Bustamante 1989: 150-152) Ten years later, Flores Galindo reached a similar conclusion after a radical change of perspective. He abandoned the idea of an anti-feudal and revolutionary fight with mythic goals to suggest the idea of a legend invented by landowners to confirm a dreaded Caste War or to justify exactions and the growth of properties. The legend could be some sort of gamonal revenge against Gutierrez. (Bustamante 1989: 154)

As Bustamante pointed out, Gutierrez’s presence was overblown by many hacendados due to the many advantages they could drag from it. (Bustamante 1989: 158) Hacendados made the name Rumi Maki the epitome of caste war and manipulated this image to their advantage at will. In September 1917, Manuel G. de Castresana, owner of hacienda Picotani, asked the Prefect of Arequipa J.E. Velarde Chocano for a permit to import arms. He was coming back to his hacienda from a medical leave in Valparaiso and assured that he faced the harassment of Rumi Maki. (ARP, Rumi Maki folder) In 1921, several hacendados from Puno addressed a memorial to President Leguía (signed in Arequipa) accusing Gutierrez of planning to convert all the haciendas into communities. They presented a letter that Rumi Maki had supposedly sent to Arequipa’s newspapers after his escape. The letter confirmed the need to destroy gamonales and create an alliance with the “more powerful, wealthier and more noble and Christian” Bolivia. (Basadre 1983: IX 205)

Gutierrez Cuevas was not an innocent pawn in the scene. For journalist and Pro-Indigenous Association co-founder, Dora Mayer, Gutierrez Cuevas was as an ambiguous, selfish character, animated by economic penury, crazy dreams of greatness and “racial sympathy” for the indigenous people but lacking enough abnegation to fight for them openly. Gutierrez’s egotism had turned him into an instrument of the machinations of gamonales, mainly of Angelino Lizařes Quiñones, who was trying to impose his hegemony on the region simulating protection of the Indians and looking for servants among caceristas and pardistas to eliminate his rival Arias Echenique. Mayer backed

these assertions pointing that Gutierrez was only been captured after Juan Jose Nuñez, friend of Lizares, had been replaced by Zapata, protégé of Arias Echenique. (Bustamante 1989: 160) Mayer also compared Gutierrez's fantastic plans of restoring the Tahuantinsuyo with the constitutional proposition that Lizares Quiñones had presented as a representative in 1909: the Tahuantinsuyo as a model for a federal state. Cacerism linked Lizares and Gutierrez and linked old plans of the former with new plans of the latter. (Bustamante 1989:144-145; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 180)

Without discrediting the pro-indigenous and moral stance of Gutierrez, I believe that the character he embodied grew beyond the man’s expectations through elite and peasant manipulations. Hacendados needed a scapegoat, a classroom case to legitimate repression and extend their domains and power. Indigenous leaders needed legal attendance, military training to face hacendado armies and governmental support. Gutierrez was a figure of authority with many assets: military officer, former authority and representative of the President, member of the API and friend of powerful hacendados. He seemed to be the hero they needed to unify efforts, entice the people to resist abuses and promote their cause. Gutierrez was, however, overflowed. They demanded from him more than he could accomplish. Gutierrez was caught in a web of personal and collective conflicts that went beyond the local realm and reified the tares upon which the nation was being constructed: discrimination, distrust, impossibility to see the other as equal.

The events could have started on December 1, 1915, not with an attack on Hacienda San José but with an attack on the community of Soratira by Arias Echenique’s employees. Arias had not reached an agreement with Turpo or with other leaders of the community and decided a violent attack. Later, the dead were carried to the hacienda to bolster claims of an attack on Arias’s property. Armed guards were posted on Azángaro’s roads so world would not get out. (Hazen 1974: 141-142) Lizares and Luna were among the few hacendados that did not benefit from the attack on peasant lands and the increased power of Arias; hence they denied the revolt. Once more, local resistance to hacienda expansion was turned into a massive anti-patriotic uprising of drunken Indians, though now events were magnified by local and regional rivalries and the political conjuncture. Once more the peasantry was depicted as backwards, savage, irrational and easily manipulated by a socially frustrated individual with subversive ideas. Nevertheless, the peasantry partially recuperated millenarian versions to turn them into sources of pride and empowerment.

San José’s revolt could have gone down as one more of the revolts denounced and repressed by gamonales in the period. Several ingredients, however, turned it into an explosive mix: the precedent of peasant resistance and repression in Samán, the intervention of Gutierrez Cuevas, his political compromise with Puno’s peasantry and discontent with gamonales and the central administration, the strength of local hacendados enmeshed in local, regional and even national power conflicts through Congress, the absolute manipulation of information and of millenarian ideas and the subsequent interpretations by historians with their own ideological backgrounds. After reviewing the many sources and interpretations asserting and denying the events, I would argue that Rumi Maki’s revolt was forged by gamonales. Hacendados like Arias Echenique needed to put down peasant resistance to increase their haciendas. Profiting from Gutierrez’s presence in the area, they provoked or counterfeited a revolt to quell their challenges maintaining a monopoly on violence. Gutierrez’s activities were blown out of proportion through millenarian arguments thus ending his already unfortunate military and political career.

SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE

The area remained convulsive after 1916. Alarmist cries of revolt multiplied to back repression and land usurpation producing violent peasant resistance and meek responses from the Central State. In the district of Santiago de Pupuja (Azángaro), hacendados Bustinza and Dianderas tried
to annex to their haciendas indigenous estancias. Peasants resisted ferociously leading to more violence. In 1917, unveiling a supposed revolt indigenes were massacred in the community of "Chacamarca" between the provinces of Azángaro and Huancané. It turned out the Sub-prefect of Huancané and some gamonales had attempted to enlarge their properties and cattle murdering sixteen indigenes, including a woman and six children, and wounding over 27 people. Prefect Ballón sent a commission to the area that demanded the peasantry large sums of money to investigate the facts. The peasantry claimed it could not pay; the commission returned having "accomplished" its mission. No more measures seem to have been taken. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 181)

In July and August of 1916 two of Puno's newspapers ("La Voz del Obrero" and "El Siglo") denounced the killing of Indians by a recognized landowner family, the Pinazo family. Don Jorge Fulgencio Pinazo, owner of Tata Amaya (property situated between the ayllus Inca, Maquera, Ajjara, San Pablo and Balsero) tried to appropriate lands of those ayllus. Jorge Fulgencio Pinazo was one of the most influential and powerful hacendados of the district of Chucuito (Province of Puno). He had been governor of the district in 1905-1906, and after this period no other governor or authority was able to overcome his power. He was for years accused of attacking and ransacking peasant estancias, stealing cattle and usurping lands using physical violence.

Many Indians went to court, asking for an ocular inspection of the lands. The judge of the Province of Puno practiced and inspection and left a document saying the Indians could make effective their rights of possession and domination in the terrains illegally taken away. Pinazo reacted accusing the plaintiffs of revolting and creating disorder. With the help of the governor and the local armed force, he formed an urban guard and threatened his peasant neighbors. On Monday July 3, 1916, Pinazo's colonos and several townsmen of Chucuito gathered in Tata Amaya. They were joined by the governor of Acora, José Patrón, and several townsmen of Acora with soldiers of the gendarmerie. According to "La Voz del Obrero", the Pinazos gave the troops alcohol with powder (pólvora) to incite them to violence. On the next day, they left early to attack the house of Andrés Quispe, to whom Pinazo had taken by force four estancias. The Pinazo brothers and others shot Quispe to death finishing him with knives. The soldiers were firing in the air. More died in Pucani, Lacara, Perca killed by Juan, Emilio and Marcos Pinazo, Gerónimo Meneses, his son Isaac and Juan de Dios Nuñez. The wounded escaped with difficulty, abandoning their houses which were ransacked and emptied. What could not be taken was destroyed. Soldiers and neighbors of Acora and Chucuito committed all kinds of violations on old and young, married and single women.

The attacked peasants tried to obtain justice in Puno taking with them the corpses of Antonio Alcca, Eusebio Medina, Quintin Nina, Santos Manzano, Andrés Quispe and Leonardo Apaza. They tried to reach the Prefecture but were stopped at the Pino Park by the police receiving beatings with whips and sticks. The police took the corpses to the hospital of San Juan de Dios for an autopsy, then threw them into the cemetery unburied and naked. On July 8, Martín Mamani was killed in Ccarana. Criminal Judge Jacinto Zúñiga Bejar, subprefect M. I. Ballón and doctor Macedo Pastor went to the area and confirmed the kidnapping of a multitude of Indians and the existence of stolen cattle in fincas of the Pinazo family. ("La Voz del Obrero" 07/15/1916, "El Siglo" 08/02/1916) Judge Zúñiga, bypassing legal formalities, freed the captured peasants and ordered the cattle to be returned to them without trying to find out which belonged to whom.

A war of articles and pamphlets followed: the Pinazos published a leaflet with a long defense against the "calumnies of their enemies" in the press of "El Eco de Puno". Cecilio Velasquez, a relatively prosperous and probably literate man whose property had also been attacked, refuted them from the pages of "El Siglo." He immediately received the support of messengers from other
provinces who became involved in this propaganda war. In a printed document sent to “El Eco de Puno” (July 14, 1916) and addressed to “the peoples of the nation”, representatives of the parcialidades of Juliaca, Caracoto, Capachica, Atuncolla, Coata, Huatta (Cercado de Puno), Santa Rosa, Macarí (Ayaviri), Azángaro, Asillo, Potoni, San José, Santiago, Samán (Azángaro) and Sandia affirmed they could not remain indifferent in front of the savage assassinations of “our brothers of the peninsula of Chucuito” perpetrated by Jorge Pinazo through his sons and nephew with the support of the public force. They specified they were not acting out of particular interest; they had no ulterior goals other than justice. Out of compassion they fraternized: “the Indians of the department constitute just one man in our protest.” Chucuito's peasants were also supported by university students Ezequiel Urviola and Enrique Encinas who had marched with them through Puno and spoken against gamonalismo.

Key in this peasant fight was the support of Puno’s incipient proletariat, mainly the Fraternal Society of Artisans of Puno and its publication “La Voz del Obrero.” According to this newspaper, Puno's workers could not remain inactive either in the face of the treatment received by the victims and the deceased. The Fraternal Society organized the burial of the remains. Dressed in white as martyrs they were buried in a common tomb. This action, though praised by several townsmen, was criticized by the Prefect. The workers also directed a document to the President of the Republic and collected contributions to help those who had come from Chucuito.

Lima's newspaper “El Perú” printed two articles (Lima, February 4 and 6, 1917) about the claims for justice of a new commission sent from Puno. The commission was formed by Cecilio Velasquez, Timoteo Flores (from the peninsula de Chucuito), Cornelio M. Torres and Mariano Mamaní (from the island of Amantaní), Mariano Martín Ordóñez, Eduardo Quispe, Antonio Mandamiento, and José Antonio Chambilla (Santa Rosa, Chucuito). They presented themselves as messengers, speaking for the indigenous citizens of the whole Department. They represented the majority of the population who had sacrificed lives in the national war, service in public works and labor producing provisions for all the inhabitants of the country. In spite of this, they were treated as animals in haciendas that had once belonged to their communities, due to the covetousness of gamonales enjoying immunity through violence, corruption, venality, political links and threats of expelling authorities trying to listen to their claims. They were tired of finding no justice and no support in the defense of their persons and properties, tired of being condemned to slavery. This group of messengers constituted a caste conscious group aware of the exploitation they suffered and their status as second class citizens. Their contributions to the nation remained unrewarded or unmatched by a corrupt State.

They denounced the Pinazos were never jailed even though their crimes were proved. The gamonal family knew how to play with the judicial system. First, they had doubted the competency of Zúñiga Bejar and asked for a military tribunal affirming they had suffered an armed attack of Indians. After the prosecutor denied this, Pinazo father asked for his sons to give their declarations in Chucuito with the justices of peace there. He even asked the Superior Court of Puno to intervene. The defender of Chucuito’s peasants, Dr. Pineda, denounced these legal manipulations but the Court concluded that although there was a proved crime there was no evidence of guilt. Pineda’s appeal to nullify this sentence was denied by the Superior Court. While the Pinazos walked freely around the province, seven Indians from the Peninsula were still in jail. Messengers concluded there was no justice for those who had no money.

Since 1901, they had created networks of organization. Messengers from different provinces associated to fight abuse and usurpation against themselves and their “brothers”. They formed circles of support and protection that included the local, provincial, departmental and national level. They were supported by urban workers, university students, liberal professionals and conscious
authorities as well as by organizations (Víctor Maúrtua lawyer from the API who appealed to the Supreme Court asking for disciplinary measures for the Court of Puno), newspapers and even national figures such as war hero and former president Cáceres (“who has given us all kinds of facilities to accomplish our mission”). This support opened denunciations and propaganda to a wider public increasing awareness and putting pressure on the government. Criticisms now directly targeted the government and in particular local authorities and courts.

Peasant mobilization was also spreading to new areas previously outside of its reach. In 1917, the province of Sandia witnessed one of the first revolts of colonos of the period. Colonos used to resist individually, abandoning the hacienda to join the fight of communal peasants. This “movement however was born amongst the colonos of hacienda “Anccoyo” or “Hankoyo” and spread to the communal peasants of Sandia and even Azángaro. The hacienda was owned by a well know hacendado, Pío León Cabrera, issued from a family of Cuzco that settled in Sandia. During the civil war of 1894, Cabrera was accused of fooling both parties in conflict and not playing fair. He was jailed and sent to Puno then to Arequipa. Once free he organized a pierolista montonera and defeated cacerista forces, ensuring his political future: in August 1895 he was appointed Sub-prefect of Sandia. From then on, he kept alternating the positions of sub-prefect and governor of Sandia between 1895 and 1914. He was thus able to forcefully expand his haciendas over communal lands and exploit the unpaid labor of communal indigenes forced to work on “state” lands (“yanasis”).

Pío León Cabrera made a fortune by combining his power as hacendado and as political authority. Being Sandia a peripheral province far away from the main instances of government, Cabrera’s system was used by all authorities in Sandia, but he went beyond all others. He profited from free labor to grow potato and graze his herds in the high areas, grow corn and coca in the low mountains adjacent to the jungle and collect quinine and cascarilla as well as search for gold in the jungle. As Manrique pointed out, he managed to achieve a maximum control of ecological floors. He owned a store in Sandia where he bought the gold from the locals at a fixed price obviously inferior to market price. He was extremely well connected with the large commercial houses of Arequipa, Puno and Juliaca. He also collected tribute from the Indians twice a year, paid in species or money. All the political organization based on governors and alcaldes worked for him for free. Alcaldes, tenientes and hilacatas had to go to his house each Sunday to inform him, receive orders and turn in the production they had collected. If they failed to attend the meeting they were physically punished. Over the years he became the wealthiest man in the province (probably paying in gold for his successive appointments). According to Tamayo it is the only case in which a gamonal exerted so complete a domination over a region, domination that surpassed even that of the Lizares in Azángaro. (Manrique 1988: 146, Tamayo 1982: 218-224, 229)

He owned haciendas Hankoyo, Waqchani, Ticani, Limata, Pachen, Soracucho and Huyuni in Sandia and haciendas San Carlos, Visallani and Parpuma in Azángaro covering an extension of 54,000 hectares approximately. The center of this system of haciendas was Hankoyo, situated in the frontier between Azángaro and Sandia. There, the tension was growing as in the rest of Azángaro where peasants had been converted in colonos. The hacienda was far from the protection of gendarmes and its administrator was asking departmental authorities for help and protection since March. The hacienda was administered by a brother in law (Felix Pineda) and a nephew (Víctor Cabrera), both extremely abusive. (Tamayo 1982: 224)

Sandia, northeastern province of Puno, was a jungle province with a population 94% Indian and 6% mestizo. It was endowed with gold, cascarilla, cocoa and rubber besides wool, potato, corn and other tropical and non-tropical agricultural products. (Tamayo 1982: 221)
The revolt started at dawn on April 8, 1917, when two hundred and thirty Indians some of them armed with carabines surrounded the hacienda house. Colonos ransacked the warehouse, burnt the hacienda house down and killed all dwellers, administrators and servants before retiring. According to Ramos Zambrano, the attackers ate the dead after the fire and cut the heads of the seven servants. The hacienda house was never rebuilt but the hacienda remained the property of Cabrera who only changed its name to “Waqchani.” A detachment of forty soldiers was sent but the area was peaceful and they did not find the attackers. Ramos Zambrano affirms there was no massacre after the revolt. The Judge of Sandia opened a lawsuit against one hundred and fifty peasants some of which were jailed first in Sandia, then in Puno. Only a dozen were condemned to fifteen years in prison, the rest were declared innocent for lack of proofs against them. It was a long and ill conducted process that in spite the efforts of the heirs of Pio León Cabrera was annulled by the Supreme Court on July 27, 1923. (Tamayo 1982: 227-228)

The leaders seem to have been men from the district of Patambuco and Puno Aillo, forcefully turned into colonos. They might have hoped to recuperate their lands and to end the abusive labor system imposed on them. Many accounts added however the existence of external instigators. Puno’s newspaper “El Tiempo” affirmed that a lieutenant of Rumi Maki was responsible for raising colonos and peasants with the promise of repartition of hacienda lands: Tomás Condori. He was from Phara (community close to hacienda “Anccoyo”) and had survived the persecutions of 1915.112

Even the Province of Lampa “formerly known for its tranquility” produced a large-scale uprising denounced by local hacendados in 1921 suggesting a “new trend toward Indian organization”. Mobilization and disturbances “shifted from community-hacienda confrontations over land toward more complex struggles involving communities, towns, and haciendas.” (Hazen 1974: 150) Three haciendas were assaulted in the district of Lagunillas (Lampa Province) in September 1921. All three had offices in the main commercial centers. This indicated the participation of colonos interested in the wool market and linked to urban natives hoping to increase their role in the trading business. (Hazen 1974: 151)

Peasant mobilization managed to retard or difficult the formidable expansion of latifundia produced by the rise of wool prices, but was almost always followed by violent repression. This has led many historians such as Tamayo to see revolts as counterproductive: land was not recovered, peasants were massacred and their lands and resources forcefully usurped. Tamayo concludes that revolts happened too early, when landlord power was in its culmination and counted with the military and repressive support of the State since there was no consciousness of the land problem within the upper classes. (Tamayo 1982: 201-202) I would argue, however, that even the elitist Pardo113 administration could not avoid facing the problem of Puno’s peasantry and other popular problems that weakened its hold on power and forced it to rely on the army to survive. The increased intensity of peasant mobilization further evidenced the inability of ruling elites to cope with change and popular mobilization.

With the election of José Pardo in 1904 the groups searching stability and order in the country strengthened their hold on power while popular tendencies were eliminated; conservative republicanism stationed in power. (McEvoy 1997: 376, 382-383) But even this growing

112 Other versions pointed to neighboring landlords as the intellectual authors of the colono movement: Juan Luis Mercado, (rebuffed suitor of one of Cabrera’s daughters) and contending gamonal Rosa Bocángel de Portillo, her husband and sons. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 182; Tamayo 1982: 225-226)

113 President Pardo traveled through the country in several occasions, reaching Puno in 1906.
conservatism fell prey to social movements. The growing militancy of industrial and agricultural workers and miners, the formation of anarchist circles and rural mobilization forced periodically the State to legislate in favor of the lower classes. In October 1909, Congress established a special pro-indigenous commission in charge of reviewing memorials presented by indigenes and formulating law projects to protect them. While repressing his political opponents, Leguía tried to counter popular agitation by allowing the passing of laws prohibiting non remunerated Indian labor and modifying the system of enganche. (Basadre 1983: VIII 379)

In 1912, Billinghurst announced a government of the people, by the people and for the people. His regime set a favorable conjuncture for indigenous peasant initiatives. (Tamayo 1982: 197; Basadre 1983: VIII 404-405) The appointment of Gutiérrez Cuevas was not the only measure Billinghurst took in favor of Puno's indigenes. In June 1913, Dr. Pedro Villena was appointed commissioner to investigate the complaints of Indians of the department of Puno. President Billinghurst gave Villena a list of plaintiffs and requested a careful report on the motives of the growing indigenous complaints. Villena studied the general causes of exactions and the particular cases he managed to confirm in the province of Lampa for one month. His report (Arequipa, September 14, 1913) was published by the State's printing press in Lima that same year but there was no administrative response to it. (Basadre 1983: IX 28) "Just before his overthrow, Billinghurst named Puno lawyer Dr. Adrián Cáceres Olazo as an attorney for Puno's Indians". (Hazen 1974: 45)

After the events of Azángaro in 1915, a special commission was appointed to elaborate a new pro-indigenous law project. Considering the "urgency" of finding an "immediate" solution to "the problem of the indigenous race," a problem that worried the country for a while now, and considering the movements that had taken place in Puno threatening the guarantees given to indigenes and to private property, Congress decided to appoint a special commission. (Archivo Parlamentario, 2ª Legislatura Extraordinaria 1915-1916, Legajo 3, cuaderno 2) The Commission was formed by congressmen Jiménez, Salazar Oyarzábal (former prefect of Puno 1903), León, García Bedoya and M. Alberto Zaá (puneño lawyer). Other projects included the creation of a commission in charge of elaborating a law of Patronato, instruction and civic education for the indigenous race. In 1918, by initiative of Congressman M. Igunza Delgado, Congress resumed a project of 1913, dealing with the appointment of commissions to study the social, legal and economic conditions of Indians endowed with five thousand Peruvian pounds for investigation expenses. Congress also approved projects to improve the living conditions of the indigenous race and establish requisites for the transference of their lands. (Archivo Parlamentario, Legajo Ordinario 1918, Legajo 20, cuaderno 1: 48-49) Congress kept receiving Indigenous memorials

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114 The commission was formed by congressmen Mariano N. Valcárcel, Luis Julio Menéndez, Víctor Criado Tejada, Miguel Apaza Rodríguez and Francisco Tudela. In 1910, the Comission was formed by congressmen Víctor Manuel Santos, J. M. Miranda and J. A. Añaños. (Archivo Parlamentario, Legajo Ordinario 1909, Legajo 4, cuaderno 1: 4; Legajo Ordinario 1910, Legajo 7, cuaderno 1: 20)

115 In 1911, the government also approved new legislation of work accidents (indemnifications) after the first general strike in Lima's history lead by the textile workers of Vitarte. (McEvoy 1997: 408)

116 The commissions would be formed by three members chosen from Congress, the Supreme Court and the Pro-Indigenous Association appointed for a year, and endowed with a salary of vocals of the Superior Court of Lima. (Archivo Parlamentario, Legajo Ordinario 1910, Legajo 6, cuaderno 1: 126)

117 Congress decided to appoint regional commissions of people "sufficiently illustrated" and able in native languages to study social, legal and economic conditions of the Indigenous race. (Archivo Parlamentario, Legajo Ordinario 1918, Legajo 7, cuaderno 1: 10)
through these commissions, even when they were not active.118

José Pardo’s second administration passed in October 1916, the law nº 2285 prohibiting unpaid labor. The daily wage of indigenes in the highlands could not be lower than twenty cents, even if given rights to arable land, irrigation and pastures. If given foodstuffs, the amount was never to exceed the value of weekly wages. This law obliged hacendados to pay colonos in cash. Moreover, the indigenous worker could not be obliged to live in the hacienda, plantation or industrial center against his will. The State could also intervene in lawsuits against patrons about services. (Basadre 1983: IX 206-207) The unending stream of claims, memorials and complaints received by the Central State finally convinced the Pardo administration of the need to send a special commission to the department. In 1917, the government received from the Province of Azángaro alone 4,180 complaints for land usurpation and 231 claims for gamonal abuses according to newspaper “La Voz Obrera de Puno”. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 183) The commission did not arrive in Puno until 1920, but once there it was surprised to find thousands of Indians gathered in the town of Zepita. When they asked indigenous leaders how they could summon so many in such short notice, they responded that they had their own system of communication. They used fires, pututos, and screams uttered from the highest hills in intervals of one or two leagues. The commission was surprised to see how in Azángaro, at the sound of the pututo, thousands would gather as if called for war. (Rénique 2004: 86)

The country was demanding a more aggressive political agenda, one including greater social investment. Pardo chose instead to balance the budget and improve tributary mechanisms. (McEvoy 1997: 418) The repetitive nature of government measures shows the inability of the each regime to follow upon its legislation or find new solutions. The State though responding was unable to significantly change the situation. Basadre affirms the road was paved for the ultimate fall hitting public institutions, the Civil Party and the elite. (Basadre 1983: VIII 122, 127) The State could do little in terms of reform since enforcement fell upon local governments controlled by local powers in a fragmented society. The peasantry nevertheless had never been more aware of its need to organize to protect its resources and maintain its partial autonomy. Peasant mobilization increased throughout the decade, empowered with each initiative regardless of its outcome.

CONCLUSION

By the 1910s, the boom of the wool market had worsened the peasant situation: hacienda expansion became more and more aggressive. Peasants tried to resist hacienda advance and hacendado abuse through hidden or pacific forms of resistance (breaking of fences, sabotage, strikes). When all else failed, peasants violently despoiled and unable to resist recurred to banditry. They seldom engaged in organized violence producing acts of rough justice (moral dimension) to gain specific goals (instrumental dimension). The lack of a professional bureaucracy and the weakness of the coercive power of the state gave more leeway to violence and private confrontations. Banditry, however, more often originated on the gamonal side. Hacendados exacerbated by peasant resistance, were eager to settle things up through repression with their

118 In 1910, neighbors of Huancané and Samán asked the commission for guarantees and for the destitution of the Sub-prefect of Juli. (Archivo Parlamentario, Legajo Ordinario 1909, Legajo 7, cuaderno 1; Legajo Ordinario 1910, Legajo 7, cuaderno 1:17-21) In 1912 and 1913, Congress passed a law authorizing the construction of a night school for artisans and a school for indigenous children in Puno. (Archivo Parlamentario, Legajo Ordinario 1913, Legajo 4, cuaderno 1)

119 This law was born from a project presented by Joaquín Capelo in 1910 that included the adjudication of plots of lands for Indians and the creation of a bank for the expropriations and subsequent adjudications. (Lynch 1979: 7)
private armies and constantly produced alarmist cries of peasant revolt.

This is why the first decades of the twentieth century were characterized by a succession of peasant movements identified by scholars such as a period of great revolts. However, while nineteenth century insurrections sprung in Aymara areas in relation to abusive taxation, forced sales and increasing labor demands, in the early twentieth century violence sprung more often in Quechua areas, endowed with better pastures and subject to greater concentrations of land. Scholars studying this period concluded Indians had only a partial understanding of the situation and carried on acts of pure violence that followed no plan or strategy and only responded to an immediate abuse. They were "rituals of rebellion" that acted as safety valves preserving the social order. Disconnected peasant revolts were devoid of any real historical significance due to the lack of a class based subversive ideology. These perspectives narrowed the terms of the debate and departed from false situations. Official historical sources have traditionally ignored or downplayed gamonal violence while exaggerating peasant violence and overstating or simplifying peasant initiatives. When peasants resisted they strove to clearly state and convey their economic, political, legal and cultural goals but these were seldom registered in hacendado and official documents.

Scholars like Flores Galindo enhanced the role of real made up revolts as instruments of "visibility" projecting Indians into the political sphere. Upper class and academic awareness increased but did not foster an effective commitment with peasant demands. Revolts were the strongest argument gamonales had to control legal violence and impose their coercive power with the support of local authorities. Revolts reinforced the image of irrational, savage Indians imbued with millenarian ideas.

Millenarian and messianic ideas were arguments heavily used to prove Indians were pre-rational and pre-political. Yet these ideas were often imbued from the top down being more constrictive and reified at the top. State millenarism was born out of the need of state builders to develop a nationalist consciousness. Rejecting the colonial past they could only draw from pre-Hispanic tradition claiming the restoration of a civilization devastated by Spanish despotism. The Inca Empire was held as an example of innocence and virtue. This glorious past, however, was set against the background of a degraded indigenous present in need of tutelary protection from a paternalist State. State millenarism served a dual purpose: it provided a national founding myth and it helped ruling elites reject the insertion of rural masses deemed irrational. Through millenarism, peasant political initiatives were downplayed to maintain elite social and political preponderance.

Indigenista millenarism searched for cultural authenticity to create a national identity. Their efforts, however, responded to a provincial resentment against centralism and the snobbism of Lima's society. Rescuing the indigenous world was a self-legitimizing strategy that gave indigenistas great social authority and led them to reject peasant agency and even intellectual capacity, approaching hacendado millenarian discourses. For hacendados, millenarism was the proof of peasant savagery and rebelliousness. Messianic beliefs were particularly useful to prove the existence of a subversive outsider fooling gullible and irrational Indians. Their discourses, however, were filled with millenarian references that strengthened their social prestige and power at the local level. They molded millenarism to their own advantage as did peasant intellectuals.

Peasant millenarism was seen until the 1980s as a utopian ideology of the peasantry that could not develop a progressive thought. Furthermore, this peasant millenarism was coming from official or hacendado discourses not from an original indigenous perspective. I have argued that peasant millenarism was a tool that peasant intellectuals used according to their audience. When addressing the State, messengers pictured a different future not a utopian past. They demanded
rights, economic independence, self government and Western education. If references were made to the past they referred to the colonial, not the Inca past. In its dialogue with the State, peasant discourse reminisced of the colonial tributary pact not of a distant reconstructed Inca socialism. Peasants used millenarian references, mixing Inca and colonial elements, when dealing with socialist indigenistas or when addressing peasant audiences, as a means to promote collective pride and identity. The Inca Empire could thus become a common image of justice and fair government, an example of abundance in equity. It was nevertheless a tool to image an ideal future, not a return to the past. Peasant intellectuals created new language and spoke with inherited words at the same time.

These many facets and uses of millenarism help explain why the events of 1915 have been read both as the biggest peasant revolt of the period and as the biggest fraud of the period. The presence of pro-indigenous military Gutierrez Cuevas in the region allowed a group of hacendados to forge a revolt and carry one of the strongest waves of repression and hacienda expansion seen in the province of Azángaro. Local resistance to gamonal expansion was strong but it was the presence of Gutierrez Cuevas that turned this case into a textbook case for all parties involved both at the historical and historiographical level. From a historical perspective, we can argue that peasants profited from Gutierrez’s presence to strengthen resistance and validate their claims. Hacendados like Arias Echenique used him to put down peasant resistance and increase their haciendas. Competing hacendados (mainly Luna and Lizardes) profited to attack their political enemies. From a historiographical perspective, Gutierrez's character was molded according to ideological needs, for some historians he was the proof of peasant messianism and gullibility. For others, especially for puneno historians, he was a hero, a figure promoting peasant collective consciousness and local pride through a millenarian ideology. The events called Rumi Maki's revolt are a clear example of historical and historiographical manipulation of information.

After 1915, the area remained shaken by repression. Alarmist cries of revolt multiplied to back repression and land usurpation. The State tried to react to it with only limited success. Ruling minorities faced by a growing wave of popular movements wavered between conservative change and repression. Peasant mobilization, however, did not halt or recede; it grew spreading to hacienda colonos. It formed wider networks of action including messengers from all over the department, an incipient urban proletariat and liberal middle sectors growingly concerned with the rising violence. Peasant mobilization managed to retard or difficult latifundia expansion in the midst of a wool boom and forced a growingly insecure and conservative State to legislate in favor of the lower classes, though with little success. The country needed strong measures the Civilista government was not strong enough to produce. Fortunately, the peasant movement was not just trying to renegotiate a tributary pact with the State. It was also working at the local level on a more effective strategy: private education.
CHAPTER FOUR
“ESCUELAS LIBRES INDÍGENAS”:
THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN INDIGENOUS POLITICS

After six or seven decades of republican life Peru still faced the task of building a nation. With the advent of the new century the task became even more pressing, and long time postponed or contained issues burst into the national, regional and local forums. One such issue was the education of the Indian. Indigenous claims for education had long been left unheard, political changes, rural turmoil and repression had postponed them. Though education was envisioned as the solution to all of the country’s evils, the State lagged behind in its educative proposals for rural populations. The growing consensus on the need for social changes brought, however, new spaces for non elite initiatives and proposals on education. Many of these came from the “distant” Department of Puno, where indigenous messengers and some very perceptive sectors of mestizo society set up to present to the national fore the projects they were trying to develop locally. This chapter will show the inadequacies and limitations of state and elite proposals on rural education. Once more, real change came from Puno where peasant initiatives found responses within an involved indigenista group and the local activism of the Adventist Church. Puno’s peasants developed their own discourses on education and developed an alternative system of private schools that challenged gamonal power and even State structures.

THE MAZE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

The Constitution of 1823 established the need to give all citizens access to education (article 18) and fixed as a goal the creation of a university in each department’s capital and a school in each town (article 184). This was complemented by the decree of February 23, 1823, obliging convents to maintain a primary school. The Constitution of 1834 even ruled the gratuity of primary education for all children (article 171). (Demélas 2003: 344) In 1826, the State made Indians legitimate and absolute owners of their communal lands yet limited property sales to literate owners. It was necessary to ensure primary instruction as the most efficient means to take Indians out of such a state of tutelage. Land surplus was to be used for funds for a local school. (Lynch 1979: 14-15) Education was deemed imperative to build the nation.

A wave of school construction followed independence, yet schools soon started to disappear for lack of resources. A limited number of parish schools remained, regulated by Ramón Castilla’s administration, but even during the guano era, the State failed to allot appropriate revenues for education. (Demélas 2003: 345-346) The republican State could not even establish the national contents of public education. Lawmakers did not design school programs; they did not stimulate the use of manuals, and failed to regulate teachers’ salaries and requisites. Faced with the linguistic differences of the native majority, they were unable to resolve which language would be used to alphabetize the Indians and abandoned the countryside well into the twentieth century. Missing an efficient school and national conscription system, republican beliefs and patriotic symbols had a reduced or unequal diffusion. (Demélas 2003: 351)

The State seemed unable to develop a “civilizing mission” that could unify divided elites of the Coast and Sierra. They both reviled the indigenous race, diagnosed by experts as inept for voting and dangerous for the nation’s health, yet they disagreed on how to confront the issue. (Larson 2002: 108) Education could be dangerous for it could hinder the capacity of the State and the elites of controlling the indigenous labor force. Civilistas supported strong State intervention to force or persuade Indians to enter modern political economy without eliminating racial categories from
public census and registers. It was to be a slow and selective assimilation through a system of primary state schools run by municipalities. (Larson 2002: 111)

For decades, education continued to be hailed by politicians and governments as the panacea to the national problems, the main motor of national transformation. (Rénique 2004: 55) The War of the Pacific had forced elites to take conscience of the despairing situation of the education system. In the face of European racial theories, education became the quintessential instrument of the limeño project for constructive miscegenation. “Francisco García Calderón, a lawyer and major ideologue of the aristocratic Civilista Party, spoke of the need in Peru for a strong leadership from a cultivated, unified progressive oligarchy that would move to capitalize the economy, centralize and modernize the state, and gradually incorporate the Indian masses into the nation by way of a system of universal education.” (De la Cadena 2000: 18)

In 1901, President Eduardo López de Romaña issued an “Organic Law of Instruction” inspired in the Anglo-Saxon education model (stressing the formation of leading sectors). From 1905 to 1922, the number of primary schools doubled (from 1,425 to 3,107) and the number of teachers tripled (from 85 to 196 thousand) promoted by the creation of the Normal Schools. (Rénique 2004: 55) This, however, was not enough, for the issue remained the same. Education was a discursive tool that belonged more to oratory than to action. School had a paradoxical place in State preoccupation: omnipresent in its discourses it did not figure in its budget. (Demélas 2003: 341)

Discourses on Indian education did not become strong budgetary decisions mainly due to the racially defined role of the rural masses. Beliefs in the inheritance of acquired traits suited the intellectual’s hopes in the redemptive power of education but also subordinated external phenotypic markers to internal racial characteristics such as intelligence and morality. The dominant intellectual and political definition of Indianess “rigidly defined Indians as illiterate agriculturalists.” (De la Cadena 2000: 87) Literate Indians became mestizos and mestizos were considered a sinuous group, culturally bendable and hard to pigeonhole and control. Discourses on education and morality had a text between the lines that hindered the concrete development of an educative system. In Peru education “retained both its contestatory edge and its discriminatory potential.” Culture was racially constructed, it preserved “its authority as a rhetoric of exclusion, discrimination and dominance embedded in the apparent egalitarianism of culture talk.” (De la Cadena 2000: 27-28) For many, “Indianess” was a social condition reflecting “an individual’s failure to achieve educational improvement”. (De la Cadena 2000: 5-6)

A nation of indigenous citizens went against the grain of the elite’s imagined nation, haunted by the spectrum of whiteness. Hazen has argued that the “heavy stress on mass education may have reflected the continuing slim chances for land reform or income redistribution.” (Hazen 1974: 16) Education could be a dangerous move if it was used to increase a darkening upper class. Social differences were legitimated through consumption of culture: “the making of cultural distinctions secures and legitimates forms of power and domination which are ultimately rooted in economic inequality." “Moreover, the dominant class’s commitment to culture is an attempt to establish a mode of legitimation equivalent to the aristocracy’s ‘blood’ or ‘right of birth’. Thus: the source of difference is symbolically shifted from the economic field to the field of culture, making power appear to be the result of cultural distinction. In this way the production and reproduction of cultural space produces and reproduces social space and class difference.” (Storey 1996: 116) Readers are always in potential conflict with producers and institutional voices who work insistently on the authority of textual meaning. If the peasantry became literate and fluent in Spanish, it would be able to read the constitutional text amongst others and could start redefining its place and role in society. It would also increment the role of mestizaje and mestizo society.
Ideologically orphaned, the State surrendered to a more practical and economic perspective: education as a means to create a more modern and efficient labor force. Special commissioner to the province of Chucuito, Dr. Alejandrino Maguiña, emphasized in 1902 the need for Indian education. It was, he pointed out, the most secure and efficient means to improve the Indian’s actual condition and produce a “useful” element for society; by this he meant an active participant in the market economy. According to Maguiña, schools should be constructed not just in the district’s capitals but also in hamlets, haciendas and ayllus to impart an education directed to developing hygienic and moral habits and creating “needs of a superior grade than those of a savage”. (Macera 1988: 53-54)

The commissioner believed that through education Indigenous efforts could be veered in favor of the State. He proposed the creation of schools for adults, especially young adults to train teachers for the schools in the ayllus. There could be an institute of such sort in the capital of each district, with interns under the most severe educative regime from six to eight months per year, taking turns. They were used to being outside their homes doing personal services of usually more than two months so it would not raise much resistance, affirmed Maguiña. In two or three years enough people would have been trained to create schools in ayllus and haciendas. He even suggested a corps of traveling teachers where it was yet not possible to have permanent schools. (Macera 1988: 53-54) This, he affirmed was not unrealistic or impossible considering the amount of legal and illegal contributions collected from the Indians and the good will they manifested to continue contributing with the State.  

The underpinnings of Maguiña’s proposals denoted a very practical cynicism that characterized the State “pro-indigenous” initiatives. Indians were a degraded and inferior population that needed to be saved from savagery and civilized as much as possible before being allowed to enter the nation. To reach this goal, the State could use the same elements gamonal society was using to exploit the Indian: labor and contributions. Since Indians were used to perform personal services for months, the State should alienate them from their homes and put them as interns in a school at their district’s capital to be taught and trained as teachers. Who would pay for these schools? Indians themselves could pay the costs since they were used to pay for legal and illegal contributions of all sorts and eagerly sought to educate their children. Elaborating on Maguiña’s plan and on State needs, it seems obvious that young interns would do more than just study in such institutions. They would also be asked to perform services inside and outside the institution, services identified as part of their education and training and as due contributions to the State for granting them the privilege of an education. These services could include household and maintenance duties at the institution, personal services for teachers beyond school duties, special contributions for local, provincial or departmental events or for the local state administration, etc.

Education was a particularly gloomy issue in Puno. In the early 1900s, Puno was a small city of no more than 12,000 inhabitants, with no university, only one secondary school, a small number of professionals and almost no academics. The educative apparatus was inefficient and almost nonexistent. Schools were mud huts with dirt floors and straw roofs with no textbooks, blackboards or furniture. Students needed to be given rations of food when they came from far. Indigenous children sat on the floor and were sometimes mistreated by their teachers. Teachers were terrible even illiterate and they were seldom paid on time. “Teaching methods were archaic—corporal punishment, memorization, tight discipline, and inaction predominated in even the best schools.

120 These ideas were probably developed through conversations with his interpret Telésforo Catacora, a teacher and student of law in the University of Arequipa. Catacora was proud of his Aymara origin and firmly believed in education. He must have strongly defended the cause of indigenous education in front of Maguiña.
Most teachers were mestizos, which led to all manner of abuses in the few facilities located in the Indian countryside. Equally important, virtually all instruction was in Spanish." (Hazen 1974: 62) The education offered was not attractive to the students since it was discriminatory and unrelated to their world and preoccupations. There was little concerned in Lima, though taxes were constantly collected. Teachers had to solicit resources from private civilians or raise it themselves. (Valcarcel 1981: 174)

Education was indispensable to exert positions of power so the elite had for long monopolized the weak educational system. (Tamayo 1982: 84) An incipient rural education system had been developed by the government with the collaboration of the Church but with little results. Puneno intellectuals harshly criticized this rural education system affirming it produced only sacristans. According to pedagogue Julián Palacios it had failed to define an objective and did not respond to the specific needs of indigenes.121 Emilio Vásquez affirmed rural schools had lost all prestige, were absurd and even harmful. Children refused to attend because they were mistreated and vexed by a coercive system where teachers turned students into their private unpaid labor force or captive market. Parents threatened their children with sending them to school if they misbehaved. (Zevallos 2002: 54-55) The Catholic Church was unable to carve for itself a predominant space in Puno's education system.122

In 1903, President Candamo appointed a new Prefect for the Department of Puno. Young lawyer Juan de Dios Salazar y Oyarzabal was instructed to visit the department, end abuses and execute the new educational reform approved in 1903. The 1903 education reform was based on two particular measures: the centralization of the school system and a new division of primary education. The 1870s Civilista project had entrusted education to municipalities. Misti control of municipalities explains why education in the Indian countryside was generally ignored. “Puno’s eighty-six official schools of 1905 were overwhelmingly located in district and provincial capitals.” (Hazen 1974: 54) With the new reform, the Ministry of Education was to receive the resources and allocate them as it considered fit. “This was expected to allow more adequate financing, better teachers, and improved and more generalized instruction.” (Hazen 1974: 54) Primary education was divided in two sections, elementary school (two mandatory years of schooling for both sexes) and the Centro Escolar which was to furnish the students with three more optional years to complement elementary education. The results, however, were not those expected. (Encinas1932: 71-73)

The division of primary school in two periods supposed that indigenous and poor proletarian children needed no more than two years of instruction: they only needed to learn to read, write, count and pray. The petite bourgeoisie and some workers could aspire to give their children three more years of education in the Centro Escolar while secondary school and university were reserved for the elite. The new reform maintained the class and ethnic division of Peruvian society.

121 “La educación rural, todavía no planteada en nuestro país, tiene que resolver ante todo, la finalidad: ¿qué vamos a hacer de los niños indios? ¿tinterillos, empleados, intelectuales o sacristanes? ¿O vamos a pensar en que la masa indígena es rural, productora, i necesita seguir siento agricultora, ganadera, manufacturera, comerciante, en fin, productora i no consumidora ni parasitaria?” (Palacios cited by Zevallos 2002: 54)

122 Heir of the counter reformist spirit, the Church in Puno (and Peru) had focused on elite education, disregarding popular education beyond catechism. The vast geographical extensions, the harsh climate and the mediocrity of the ecclesiastic staff had led to a very superficial and uneven penetration of the colonial Catholic Church in the Department. (Rénique 2004: 73-74, 150) According to Encinas, the Church built no convents or monasteries in Puno because it found no “spoiled, rich and ignorant aristocracy” to sustain it. When the Church tried to impose its lost hegemony it was too late, the Masonic flag was waving in front of the Cathedral and the protestant pastor at the task. (Encinas 1932: 146)
(Encinas 1932: 93-94) Less than a decade later, when the scholar reform campaign ended (1911),
the number of schools in the country had diminished as well as their quality (except for those
directed by Normal School graduates123) and political favor prevailed in the appointment of
inspectors. (Encinas 1932: 73)

The central government could not take care of local schools the way municipalities had.
Reparation permits took months to arrive and often arrived too late, when the buildings were
useless. Schools did not receive the required supervision from Lima’s bureaucracy. In 1912, the
newly appointed Inspector of Education for the Department of Cuzco (under Billinghurst’s
administration) Luis E. Valcárcel and his secretary Luis Felipe Aguilar, both indigenistas, avowed it
would be useless to try to introduce pedagogic changes. First it was imperative to create schools
where they were missing and help the existing ones survive in spite of the abandonment.
Instruction Inspectors lacked the preparation and responsibility needed. They were bureaucrats
without preparation or pedagogic knowledge, often appointed through political favors or to work as
electoral agents. (Encinas 1932: 25) In 1915, Joaquin Capelo lamented the effects of the educative
reform in the loss of old school teachers. Older teachers with invaluable experience were
separated from their posts or deprived of any stability and thus pride in their task. Capelo believed
the reform had been a calamity for the country increasing instead of decreasing illiteracy. (Kapsoli
1980: 76)

In this period, secondary education was made mandatory, but it was not free so only urban
families with sufficient incomes could afford to send their children to secondary school. (Deustua &
Rénique 1984: 20) The Department of Puno counted with only one secondary school, San Carlos
(founded in 1825), which often faced dire economic problems. It was closed down several times for
political problems (Peru-Bolivian Confederation in 1837, the War of the Pacific in 1879) or lack of
funds (1865).124 In 1923, San Carlos was to be closed down again for lack of funds. Wealthy
punenos did not support it and the local administration had to decree a tax on dry meat exports to
save it. Landlords tried to annul the tax, defended in Congress by representative Encinas, but they
failed to do so even after Encinas was deported. (Tamayo 1982: 84; Encinas 1932: 160)

This went against the grain of the period characterized by the appearance of regional
intellectuals (the number of newspapers and magazines published in the country almost tripled, the
number of university students tripled and the number of students registered in the Normal Schools
in the country passed from 142 in 1906 to 1,610 in 1930). Middle sectors were expanding and
searching social mobility through education. (Deustua & Rénique 1984: 2-9, 11, 34) This gave the
period an unexpected dynamism evidenced by the creation of the Universidad Popular Gonzalez
Prada. In May 1920, after the university reform and the First National Student Congress held in
Cuzco, a group of university and high school students gathered at the Student Federation to
promote free education for the lower classes. They gave free lectures on general and specific
topics at the student centers as well as conferences in factories and some popular neighborhoods.

123 In 1905, a Normal School for men was created in Lima. “General teacher quality was abysmal. Most lacked any kind
of diploma, and only one percent had university training. Qualified instructors were essential if educational innovations
were to take hold, so the Lima Normal School was a sorely-needed institution.” (Hazen 1974: 55) It produced a host of
“outstanding” educators that “helped spread new methods and instill a sense of duty and pride among educators.”
(Hazen 1974: 55-56) They all showed a concern for more practical education and studies based on local conditions.
“Teachers were exhorted to each from nature rather than books...” (Hazen 1974: 57-58)

124 The University of San Carlos was installed in 1859. It counted with five students the first two years, one of which
graduated in 1861. In 1865 the university was closed down with San Carlos School for lack of funds. It only lasted six
years. (Tamayo 1982: 84)
Each course included 24 lectures and a printed summary in the end, to be redistributed later in factories and ateliers. The classes were at night (two per night) and were followed by 20 to 25 minutes of artistic topics (verses, traditions, music with general explanations). They proposed the creation of pedagogic and artistic murals as in Mexico. This movement even requested to the University's council the access of their popular students to libraries and museums. The propaganda would spread to the other departments through pamphlets and conferences.\textsuperscript{125} This was the most ambitious project ever designed to create a national-popular culture, to link the cultural expansion of the middle class to the popular classes. University students were trying to diffuse academic knowledge down and hoped to learn from their own students themselves. Though in 1921, a Universidad Popular was installed for some time in Puno, this effort remained an urban effort that reached workers and suburban hacienda peons in the coast, mainly Lima. (Deustua & Renique 1984: 39-40)

The early twentieth century was a generous period for university works on tutelary legislation, rural education and other aspects that could improve the Indian situation. Indian education was needed for national progress and even security (only the Indian could preserve national independence). Some of these propositions literally reproduced indigenous claims while others were blatantly racist. Yet they were all imbued with the idea of the preeminence of Western and of the State as foremost or only source of change. Only a handful of intellectuals dared to imagine pragmatic solutions. One such intellectual was educator Julia Delaway who in 1909 proposed ethnic or bilingual education: a professorship of Quechua to educate the Indians in their own language. (Kapsoli 1980: 2-8, 27-28)

Even the Asociación Pro-Indígena had a hard time dealing with rural education. Its founders believed there was still time to regenerate the Indian, and it was their obligation, their duty as civilized people to incorporate them into the nation. Delegates of the Association agreed that the State had to assume a general stance on education but they could not find a consensus about what kind of education should be enforced. Senator Capelo, head of the association, rejected the proposals of a special education geared to the Indian since he was not from a degenerated class. The Indian was a person like any other and no one with an average culture could sustain the race difference, he affirmed. Men only differed in the dosage of liberty and justice they were accorded by the social organization to which they belonged. In Peru, liberty and justice were scarce and diminished with the social and economic situation of the individual, but for Indians they were null. Pariahs were not educated; they needed to be liberated first, returned to the condition of men. (Kapsoli 1980: 76-77)

J. J. del Pino, collaborator of El Deber Pro-Indígena from Huanta, believed in a practical education for Indians using modern techniques and technology. Del Pino expected the government to hire a cinematographic industry to prepare movies on national history, geography, natural sciences and moral practices. These movies would be played in free sessions in villages and towns. This would be paid by suppressing the budget for elementary school supplies! (Kapsoli 1980: 124) Another member proposed the adaptation of the boy scouts system for the “rehabilitation” of the race. Delegate Delgado maintained that the scout code could give indigenous children self-confidence, dignity and patriotic ideals. They did not need to learn to obey or endure hard tasks: Indians were innate boy scouts in their mores. But, they could learn initiative and responsibility of their acts surmounting timidity and reacting against their luck. They would learn

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loyalty and courtesy and be appreciated by other scouts without social distinctions. (Kapsoli 1980: 88-89)

According to Kapsoli, it was Modesto Málaga, delegate from Arequipa, who developed the topic more coherently and consistently. He seemed more attuned with or receptive of indigenous discourses and arguments. Málaga believed it was first necessary to ensure the radical suppression and prohibition of all unpaid mandatory services and imposed devotions by political and ecclesiastical authorities. Services, cargos and exploiters hindered Indians from developing their free will and individuality, rendering them timid, resented and reactionary. Second of all, the State had to ensure the appointment of Quechua-speaking professors of proved morality and aptitudes. The teachers had to be well remunerated and reside in the districts of action to effectively perform their task. Málaga also supported the use of penalties and incentives to enforce school attendance. Unpaid services and religious cargos were efficiently accomplished by Indians because they were imposed through fines, confiscations and jail threats. Why not use the same principles to increase literacy and education replacing services and cargos with the obligation to attend school? Málaga thus proposed to give power to sub-prefects, rather than provincial inspectors, to obtain coactively the attendance of indigenous children, through the assignment of penalties to parents who failed to send their children to school. Parents and students could also be induced through exoneration from the industrial contribution for parents of children with perfect attendance and scholarships to Normal Schools for assiduous and devoted students. (Kapsoli 1980: 146-147)

The Asociación Pro Indígena established a free school for Indians in Jauja in 1910, promoted by delegates Carlos Valdez de la Torre and Augusto Cazorla. Emphasizing rights and obligations, it accepted Indians of all ages gave lessons of history, geography and moral education, condemned the mistreatment of women and inspired self confidence, love of work and of the fatherland. (Kapsoli 1980: 30) It was said to be the first of its kind but, as Jauja’s delegate Augusto Cazorla reported, the school was paralyzed for lack of students. This was not due to peasant cycles; Indians were reluctant to attend the Association’s school due to suspicion. Cazorla intended to use governors to force Indians to go to school: once they had confirmed there was no danger, they would go voluntarily. (Paredes Lara 1998: 5) The association’s emphasis on history, geography and morality might not have been in the interest of its intended public. What Cazorla’s account seems to show is the inadequacy of a school modeled on the Association’s assumptions and principles not on the needs of Jauja’s indigenous population.

Since the nineteenth century, state builders claimed rural education was the solution to the “indigenous problem”. This assertion, however, never reflected in budgetary decisions. Culture was used as a racial marker to legitimate social superiority and confirm subordination. It was a source of difference that could not be appropriated by the lower classes since it could hinder the control over their labor force. When education was promoted by liberal statemakers, it was to produce a more prepared labor force tied to the market, not to foster upward mobility. Weak or inappropriate State initiatives went parallel to the disdain of Puno’s local elites for public education and their open rejection of rural education. At the turn of the twentieth century, however, popular demands for education were on the rise and upper and middle classes needed to respond to such demands. Intellectual elites tried to follow upon this movement but were not always able to give positive or effective responses for the issue of rural education. Some were open and bold enough to understand and emphasize the inexorable link between education and social and agrarian reform. Some were listening and reproducing peasant claims. However, few of these intellectuals seemed open enough to understand the nature of peasant demand for education.
INDIGENOUS AND INDIGENISTA EDUCATIVE PROPOSALS

In 1901, the messengers of Santa Rosa, José Antonio Chambilla, Mariano Yllachura and Antonio Chambi, demanded education as free citizens protected by the Constitution, and they gave the President a straightforward proposal: the Prefect of Puno should deposit in the Departmental Treasury the amount corresponding to the last forced sale of wool done in August. This money would be used to construct a school for native children in the town of Santa Rosa. (AGN, MI 1903, Prefecturas) Chambilla, Yllachura and Chambi understood that learning Spanish and becoming literate was the surest way to be included in the nation and recuperate political power. Through a better grasp of basic mathematical concepts they would ensure a more successful participation in the market. Education was the most effective strategy to counter the cultural power or cultural capital of landowners and authorities.

According to Tristan Platt (1982) and Rivera Cusicanqui (1986), in the 1910s Bolivian peasants saw in the ambivalent theme of the school a form to renegotiate its reciprocity pact with the State, to combat the power of local landlords and neighbors, assuming as their own the task of learning the language of their oppressors. (Rivera 1986: 59) In a similar way, Puno’s messengers offered the State contributions in exchange for education. Indian leaders stressed the fact they needed to learn Spanish as the mistis spoke Aymara and they were ready to take over their own education. In 1902, messengers representing the 33 ayllus from the district of Acora (Puno Province), Paulino Lope, Mariano Ystaña and Carlos Chipana, summed up the contributions paid in excess to the benefit of local authorities and assured that they covered five times the amount needed to maintain one school in each ayllu. Thus they asked the government to proceed with the installation of rural schools exclusively for their children. If the central administration took charge of collecting the taxes they already paid for the personal benefit of local authorities, the solution to “the social problem of the civilization of our race would be immediate and the results efficient.” (ARP, Colección Arce Borda)

The message was twofold. It was asking the State to improve its tax collection system banning corruption, and it was asking the State for public schools. Peasants were ready to pay legal taxes that would go straight to the State for the benefit of the rural population. Messengers were not demanding schools for free; they were proving their solvency and offering to pay for those schools. They were aware that the State was not prepared to provide them with the schools they needed and demanded, so they offered to fund the schools themselves. In this way they could ensure a better use of the taxes they paid. They were certain their ply was right and just but were ready to negotiate their inclusion in the nation and in the fiscal education program. They were prepared to fix with the State the price of their education.

Less than a year later, the State passed the Education Reform of 1903 decreeing the centralization of the school system and a new division of primary education. The State seemed to be responding to peasant constituencies offering a more rational use of fiscal resources and the spread of elementary education (two years of basic education for both sexes) through rural schools. By then, however, the ayllus of Acora were already setting rural schools at their own expense. Rufino Catacora a native of the district of Acora was jailed and beaten by orders of Governor Melitón Arroyo for creating schools for Indians and exhorting the communities in the chapel of the Nativity to put independent schools for their children. Three schools had already been founded: one in the parcialidad of Sullicollana in the house of Rufino Catacora, one in ayllu Hilacatura in the house of Damián Catacora and a third one in Chanca in the house of Hilario Chaccolla. In 1903, Rufino Catacora was accused of “heresy” for proposing the destruction of the images of the saints in the chapel, indicating a probable protestant influence. His case was exposed to the central government by Mariano Ystaña in 1903. In this memorial, Ystaña solicited

This case shows the commitment and influence of a strong leadership with basic formal education and clear goals, epitomized by the Catacora family. School teacher and promoter Rufino Catacora was god-parent of Mariano Ystaña, the messenger sent to Lima. Mariano Ystaña made at least three trips to Lima representing his ayllu Alay-Choquela and others of his district. The messenger signed the documents presented to authorities in Puno and Lima of his own hand and in a fairly clear way. He was learning to speak, read and write Spanish. Both Catacora and Ystaña were kidnapped, taken to the Governor’s house, beaten by Arroyo (and his wife) and threatened to be burned in the main plaza of Acora. [AGN, MI 100, “Fp-Gp-Hp-Ip-Lp 1904”] This, however, did not stop them. Messengers wanted power, respect, freedom of action and guarantees on their property. They were improving their tools (or cultural capital) and becoming in time more knowledgeable and independent. Messengers were learning Spanish to speak with the President in personal meetings, respond to questions when interviewed by newspapers and, last but not least, obtain voting rights. They identified the Spanish language as the way to be part of an imagined community represented by the nation.

The failure of the 1903 educative reform seems to have further promoted private initiatives for education. In 1920, a special commission sent by the State to survey the area was surprised by the cohesion shown by communities around the need to educate their children. They built schools with their own hands and with their own resources; painted them white as “a sign of civilization” and found their own teachers. Many teachers turned out to be discharged soldiers for commissioners pointed out repeatedly the formation of students in columns, with music bands and flags. (Rénique 2004: 86) Ilave educator Emilio Vásquez (of the Orkopata Group) pointed out to the many indigenous women and discharged soldiers who opened schools to educate indigenes anxious to learn to read and write in Spanish. However he also pointed out these schools did not last more than a year for teachers did not receive salaries or tired of the problems they could not solve due to their personal incapacity. Vásquez accused the government of negligence in the regulation, economic help and supervision of private schools created by request of the Indians. He criticized the fact that educative materials came from bordering countries and taught foreign values and knowledge. He also believed no one was in charge of educating improvised teachers. Vásquez believed that the negligence and carelessness the State showed towards rural schools, both public and private, hindered the modernization of the country and endangered its territorial integrity. (Zevallos 2002: 55, 111)

Communities were creating their own schools and selecting their own teachers, thus they were deciding how much and what kind of education they wanted for their children. They were aware, however, of the many deficiencies presented by the schools and that is one of the reasons why they searched the support of the State. In 1908, a commission of nineteen messengers from the district of Chucuito (Puno) presented to the President a memorial asking for official support for the schools they had implemented. In 1903, they had built two rural schools in the parcialidades of Potojani-Platería (Züñiga) and Ccota (teacher Lino Solano) that worked regularly with a means of fifty students of both sexes. Juan Huanca, one of the petitioners had built in his property a large room for the rural school of Pallalla. His resources, however, had not been enough to provide doors, windows and floor. They had come to know, from an altruist and liberal citizen about the government’s education program and they solicited for the benefit of their children and the fatherland a moderate subvention (once a month or unique) for their private schools, desks for students and teachers, blackboards, maps, reading panels, materials for the teaching of writing, geometry, drawing, natural history, physics and industry, and reading texts, in particular the State
Constitution. They also asked the Direction of Instruction to cover these expenses and the construction of an adjacent room for the female teacher. (Kapsoli 1980: 139-140) These communities were willing to turn their schools into public schools to receive financial support from the State but only as long as the regency was maintained by teachers Camacho and Solano “quienes, por vivir en nuestra sociedad i poseer nuestro idioma aimara, conocen mayor nuestras condiciones i alcances intelectuales, i porque, para la instrucción elemental i enseñanza del castellano usual, mejor que académicos a quienes no comprendemos se requiere instructores abnegados i de buena voluntad, como aquellos.”

This case brings forth several interesting points. Peasant leaders were negotiating who would keep control of the schools. They wanted to avoid the inconsistencies and abuses their children would suffer in public schools. They had found a female teacher (Daría López) who would live right next to the school dedicated to their children’s education. The teacher was expected to cover a wide variety of subjects that included geometry and even physics. And all of these would be taught to boys and girls alike. As a matter of fact, few indigenous petitions specified the creation of a school for male children. Lists of actual or future students provided by indigenous messengers often included boys and girls. This contrasts with the disproportion of male and female schools in urban areas. Feminine education was seldom furnished beyond elementary school. It was seen as a waste of time and resources for parents and the State since women were to stay at home in household and child rearing tasks. Women were forbidden to enter universities until 1908 and only Normal Schools and journalism (autodidacts) gave women a public intellectual space. (Deustua & Rénique 1984: 39)

Another peasant initiative to obtain education and citizenship recognition was “extra-official military training”. Indians were usually rounded up in raids on villages and sent as prisoners. In Puno, voluntary military preparation gradually supplemented conscription”. In 1922, a group of delegates from Juliaca represented by Pascual Coaquira requested the Governor of Juliaca, E. M. Briceño, the appointment of lieutenant governors in each of their ayllus and permission to carry on with military exercises in their own ayllus.126 Again, the presence of discharged soldiers made this possible. “Several Indian units, usually under mestizo command, were formed with names like “Batallón Movilizables de Yunguyo”. The “Guardia Peruana de Voluntarios Indígenas del Sur” (Peruvian Guard of Indian Volunteers of the South) participated in the 1922 celebrations of Independence anniversary, with natives from Huatta, Coata, Acora, Cabana, Vilque, Tiquillaca, Pichacani, Paucarcolla, and Chucuito. “Sixty Adventists marched in from Platería in 1920 for the unprecedented purpose of depositing four conscrits.” (Hazen 1974: 126) In 1927, Valcárcel affirmed he had met many Indians from Moho and Platería which had learned to read and write and were registered in the military rosters. They could thus vote and elect their own representatives since they made the majority of the population. Valcárcel believed that in twenty years there could be an “Indian Democracy.” (Valcárcel 1927: 101)

Subaltern oral cultures produce their own notions of education, State and nation. Peruvian and peruanist intellectuals have worried with no end about the need to destroy or transform indigenous cultures for the sake of their incorporation to a capitalist modernity. Scholars as far apart the political edge as Arguedas and Vargas Llosa have been haunted by the possibility (or desirability) of cultural miscegenation. (Zevallos 2002: 13) Puno’s peasantry did not seem to share these concerns. Quechua and Aymara peasants were not worried about acculturation or transculturation.

126 Briceno sent the request to the Prefect who responded the time for that had not arrived yet and was to be resolved by the Provincial Military Chief. (ARP, Legajo 445: Prefectura 1921-1930)
They demanded education as indigenous citizens, not just as tax payers and solvent citizens. Peasant leaders did not envision schools as a threat to their cultural inheritance and traditions; they did not expect to surrender their way of life. They understood the cultural capital that was underneath and maintained the power of *mistis*, and in a very pragmatic way, they envisioned schools as a way to appropriating part of the cultural power that would ensure access to the State and the market.

By learning Spanish and basic mathematics they would ensure their livelihood (Jacobsen’s “conservative modernization”). Though they seemed to agree on the strategy, messengers and the State had different goals for education. While messengers envisioned themselves as Quechua or Aymara citizens, as bilingual citizens of the nation defending their communal rights and resources, state officials such as Maguiña envisioned a Hispanicized labor force that would conform to European “civilization” standards. While indigenous constituencies hoped to gain more power to counter *gamonal* demands and enforce their citizen rights, State officials wished for a hegemonic process that would slowly dilute Indianess. These contradictory goals will eventually lead to two parallel processes of indigenous education: one based on indigenous initiatives supported by non-governmental organizations and one based on State initiatives or responses to indigenous demands. As we will see these two projects will not always coincide and often clash hindering the power of education both as an empowering and hegemonizing tool. “La transculturación no ‘trasciende’ una posición subalternna. La ‘ciudad letrada’ no incorpora a lo indígena o a la oralidad; una cultura oral emplea pragmáticamente un elemento de la cultura letrada para sus propios fines, que no son los mismos de esa cultura. Por lo tanto, no hay un movimiento teleológico hacia una cultura nacional sincrética en la cual oralidad y escritura, indígena y no indígena, europeo y no europeo se reconciliarían.” (John Beverley in Zevallos 2002: 15)

State expectations explain the weak or wavering positions taken by ruling elites on education of the indigenous peasantry. Moreover, Puno’s elites tirelessly bombarded the State with the message that, once educated, Indians lost their working habits and the respect for “their superiors”. Education was a threat for authorities that depended on unpaid services prohibited by the law. Education was mostly a threat for *hacendados* who were expanding their landholdings through forged or manipulated contracts with illiterate communal peasants. The existence of schools could also harm the weak balance of *hacendados* hold on their *colonos* and their demands since communal projects had a strong influence on them. “Indio leído, indio perdido” (Zevallos 2002: 112) was the motto *gamonales* used to oppose the advance of rural education.

I will also argue that *gamonal* opposition and central State prejudices managed to hinder the progress of rural education due to peasant pragmatism. The goal of peasant leaders was not immersion into a different culture but grasping the cultural elements that would increase their sphere of action and protect their partial autonomy. In order to do this they accepted Western culture as the dominant culture and Spanish as the dominant language. They put limits to Western education according to their needs, but they also put limits to their own power since they did not dare to impose their language as a national language or demand bilingual education. This may be due to the fact that Quechua and Aymara were oral languages and cultures that were learned at home and did not need schools. Yet books (especially religious books) and dictionaries had been printed in these native languages since colonial times. The elaboration of a bilingual education project, however, needed the active collaboration of an involved intelligentsia co-opting native languages to develop a national hegemonic project. Few indigenistas were ready for the task.

Education was summoned both by intellectuals and peasants in Puno, though not always for the same purposes. Narciso Aréstegui, author of the indigenista novel “El Padre Horán” (1848), believed Indians were made servants of another culture and thus should be educated to be
redeemed from servitude. Education would slowly erase the biological, cultural and socio-economic differences produced by race. (Tamayo 1980: 126) Juan Bustamante also believed education was the key to turn peasants into priests, governors and representatives, following the example of that “pure Indian” of Mexico Benito Juarez who had reached the presidency, fought the best armies of the world and even sentenced to death the son of the most important noble families of Europe. Bustamante designed an accelerated educative plan: parents would send caravans of children to Cabanillas. The governor would grant them donkeys and lunch and send them to Arequipa where Punoño Mariano Escobedo would send them to the port of Islay. In Islay they would embark to Callao. Once in Lima, generals and former prefects of the Sociedad Amiga de los Indios and virtuous ladies of Lima’s selected society would receive them and place them in the best houses. There, children would learn Spanish as well as the way a free person should be treated. Once they were familiarized with the language, the government would help them begin their scholarization. Eventually they would return to Puno to teach their brothers and become authorities. Through this “civilizing” process they would let go their dress, dialect, customs, hairdo, and all the elements reminding the traditions of the Conquest and their sad and dejected condition. “Ciudadanos sí, indios no.” (Citizens yes, Indians no) That was the basic idea. These were, according to Rénique, the “unavoidable incongruities of a liberal “misti” of nativist inclinations”. (Rénique 2004: 37-38, 70)

Early twentieth century intellectuals went beyond acculturation sharing some of the more practical views of the peasant sector. Santiago Giraldo, the progressive intellectual and politician that became the adviser of the messengers from Santa Rosa, affirmed Puno’s secondary school (San Carlos) had not contributed “to the liberty nor to the emancipation of the Indian, that true proletarian slave.” He proposed to turn the school into a Normal centre that would prepare most needed teachers. He also proposed free high school education for the Indian. (Bermejo 1950: 28)

Telésforo Catacora, Maguiña’s interpreter, was one of the first to react to the new stimulus of the environment and support indigenous claims for education. Catacora was a fourth-year student of law at the University of San Agustín in Arequipa when he decided to abandon his studies flustered with the artifice of law, which had little or no impact on the life of the Indian. Catacora returned to Puno to create, in 1904, an association called “Escuela de la Perfección” with the goal of stripping off the prejudices that paralyzed society through the open study of science, moral virtues and hygienic practices. The school was visited by workers (such as shoemaker Demetrio Peralta) as well as students, and probably indigenous leaders. According to Churata (Arturo Peralta, Demetrio’s son), this school was the precursor of the Universidades Populares. (Encinas, 1932: vii-viii) The “School of Perfection” was however an experiment and it soon disappeared. In 1905, Catacora joined the newly created Normal School of Lima, convinced of the need to transform schools into an element of social renovation away from caciquismo and gamonalismo. Teaching was for him essential: the Indian needed, and claimed for, educators not lawyers. Unfortunately, Catacora fell ill and died before finishing his second year at the Normal School. (Encinas 1932: 85) He left many projects undone, but his social crusade was carried on by other
punoño students of the Normal School of Lima such as Alfonso Torres Luna\textsuperscript{127}, Emilio Vásquez\textsuperscript{128} and José Antonio Encinas, “perhaps Peru’s most renowned educator”. (Hazen 1974: 60)

Encinas (Puno 30/5/1886 – Lima 15/7/1958) was the eldest of eight children from a middle class family of Puno. He did his elementary school in Puno’s municipal school, and high school in San Carlos. He spent most of his childhood in a rural environment, living with Aymara peasants who were his first friends. He could thus compare the life of his first friends to that of the city’s childhood, and he did so in an essay during the celebration of the Spanish Foundation of Puno (November 4). In this essay entitled “El niño indio”, he explained how the indigenous child was taken to the city to be turned from a young age into a servant everybody slanted. He lived stressed, hungry, with no shoes or appropriate clothing, doing jobs and living in conditions that hindered his or her physical development (sweep with a 20 centimeter broom, sleep on the kitchen floor). School was denied to the indigenous child who could only aspire to learn to read or write his name if he could attend school as an adult. This essay moved the jury of teachers who gave Encinas the first prize. (Encinas de Zegarra 1999: 22-25)

At age 15 (1901), he was arrested for participating in an indigenous protest that had arrived to Puno to complain about the many abuses they faced from gamonales. (Encinas de Zegarra 1999: 24-25) In 1904, he won a scholarship to study at the Normal School in Lima. He graduated in 1909 and returned to Puno to apply the modern pedagogical techniques he had learned. He was appointed Director of the Centro Escolar n° 881 in Acora. Created in 1906, this school covered the five years of primary education and included small shops of carpentry, ironworks, shoemaking and tailoring. It was the only school that existed to educate poor children, offspring of rural migrant labor. He set out to renew the school while publishing articles and giving talks about psychology and pedagogy. (Encinas de Zegarra 1999: 28)

As director of the Centro Escolar n° 881, he applied an educative system that was revolutionary for his time and place trying to transform the school into a source of social activity both for teachers and students. Teachers were assigned not by school year but by subject. They had freedom of action to help the students develop their own aptitudes, without prices or punishments. The stress was not on the amount of knowledge accumulated but on how it was assimilated and used. The school imparted a lay education, respecting the children’s free criteria and spontaneous will. Learning was based on direct observation; the children were taken to commercial centers, hospitals, the peer, railroad stations, hills and other habitats. Visits were accompanied with selective readings. Adventist Inspector MacKnight supported the initiatives of

\textsuperscript{127} Alfonso Torres Luna (Puno 1901- Lima 1935) issued from Puno’s middle class was granted a scholarship to attend the Normal School of Lima graduating in 1923. He was appointed School Commissioner and Director of the Centro Escolar de Niños n° 891 in Juli (Chucuito Province), with his wife, Consuelo Ramírez, also an elementary school teacher (Director of the Centro Escolar de Niñas n° 892). In 1929 he obtained a Ph.D. in Natural Sciences from Arequipa’s University. He was concerned with indigenous education and was appointed in 1931 Visitador de Centros Indígenas of the Central Region, traveling with a suitcase, a tent and a cot all over the region. Fluent in Aymara, he wrote “Libros Bilingues para los aborigenes peruanos.” In 1932, he was appointed Chief of the Indigenous Section of the Ministry of Education and wrote a manual for indigenous education entitled: “El problema de la educación del aborigen peruano.” In 1934 he graduated as Doctor of Law and Economic Sciences and wrote the book “Foundation of the Inca Empire.” (Torres Luna 1968: 280-285) Torres Luna died at a very young age but others continued with the task.

\textsuperscript{128} Emilio Vásquez was a poet, writer and teacher born in Puno in 1904, member of the Orkopata Group. He published a study of the 1867 events of Huancané (“La Rebelión de Juan Bustamante” 1976) as well as several essays and books dealing with Indigenous education: “Negación de la Escuela Peruana,” “Manual de Educación Rural,” “La educación rural en los países andinos,” “Pedagogía General,” etc. (Tamayo 1982: 292)
the Centro Escolar of Acora, mainly the suppression of official texts and the creation of a new text based on national interests that had greater success among indigenes trying to learn to read and write. This turned the Centro into a propaganda center.

The Centro Escolar organized weekly conferences on pedagogy, founded the first Teachers Association in Peru and edited the first magazine of Pedagogues in Puno, “La Educación”. (Encinas 1932: 162) The Center also founded the periodical “El Educador de los Niños” to diffuse its ideas, and organized (without help from the Ministry of Education) the First Southern Congress of Normalists in 1912 in Arequipa to discuss problems such as education of the Indian, the reform of the education system, Normal Schools, etc. (Encinas 1932: 172)

Encinas’s educative program centered on the social problems of the highlands. It was not a matter of teaching the children charity, but solidarity. (Encinas 1932: 220) By inserting them into their context and the indigenous problem Encinas considered he was preventing them from betraying their history and race. (Encinas 1932: 237) They had to learn to intervene in the life of their collectivities to make a difference. This was the only way to go in Puno. Some of the most distinguished intellectuals and indigenistas from Puno came out of this school: Doctor Enrique Encinas (José Antonio’s brother)129, journalist Gamaliel Churata130 and poet Alejandro Peralta, historian and geographer Emilio Romero. (Encinas 1932: 46, 224-225, 232)

Encinas faced a lot of opposition. He was appointed against the will of Prefect Manuel Eleuterio Ponce who wanted to give the school to his personal secretary. Moreover, his credentials were highly suspicious for the gamonal elite: Encinas was a young professional educator appointed from Lima, openly critical of civilismo (he had opposed the election of Candamo and Pardo) who professed radical ideas. (Encinas 1932: 96) One of his stronger enemies was Bishop Ampuero who considered Encinas’s Centro Escolar a focus of liberal activism. One day, the Bishop arrived at the Centro Escolar dressed in silk and gold to ask whether it was the focus of protestant propaganda and if children and teachers were evangelists. Encinas refused to answer but allowed the Bishop to visit the school. Ampuero distributed prints of his consecration and left. Later he visited the homes of several parents to entice them to take their children out of the school. He had only partial success, since most of those who left went to the Colegio San Carlos and many decided to go back to the Centro Escolar son afterwards. (Encinas 1932: 151-154)

When the school year ended, after Encinas read his report, Ampuero accused him of heresy, affirming the subordination of the State to the Church in a catholic country. He exhorted parents to withdraw their children but found no echo in the audience which applauded when Prefect Rubina declared he was satisfied with the Centro’s labor. Ampuero engaged the help of congressman Bernardino Arias Echenique to accuse Encinas and others of teaching doctrines against the national Constitution. The intervention of Puno’s Inspector of Education, protestant educator J.A. Mac Knight, annulled the accusations of Ampuero. The Minister of Education Dr. Matías León

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129 Enrique Encinas experienced his first jailing at 14 in Juli for protesting against local landlords’ abuses. As a student of medicine he started a campaign in favor of the Indian with Ezequiel Urviola, during his vacations of 1920. This cost him a criminal suit, citations to the tribunals and a jail mandate for pretending to excite the Indians to rebel (“sublevar a los indios”). Later, as a doctor, he returned to Puno on a scientific mission fulfilling his devotion to the indigenous race. (Encinas, 1932:219-220)

130 Gamaliel Churata (Arturo Peralta) one of the school’s most brilliant students described it as a proletarian school. Armed with the social sensibility of its director it opened its doors to poor children, many of which attended without shoes and after working hard in shops to obtain a few minutes of mental education. (Encinas, 1932:iv). He also considers it “una escuela audaz donde los muchachos adquirían pronto el concepto claro de su personalidad.” El centro “injertó inquietud ideológica en sus discípulos... había un ORGANUM interno que lo sustentaba: lo indígena.” (Encinas, 1932: v-vi)
himself sent a written approval of the task performed by Encinas in the Centro Escolar. (Encinas 1932: 155-156)

Due to the persistent complaints, however, the Ministry of Education finally decided to send Encinas to Iquitos. The latter refused the post and returned to Lima to study law. He became delegate of his faculty and even President of the Student Federation. (Encinas de Zegarra 1999: 29) He obtained a degree in Humanities in 1913, with a thesis entitled “Education. Its social function in Peru in the problem of nacionalization” and a degree in Law in 1918 with the thesis “Causes of Indigenous criminality in Peru”. In 1920, he became doctor of law with the work “Contribution to an indigenous tutelary legislation.” (Encinas de Zegarra 1999: 29-30)

By then, he had already decided to enter into politics. He joined the “germancistas”, a group of young professionals from the provinces’ and the capital’s small bourgeoisie led by Germán Leguía y Martinez. “Germancistas” were at the origin of the social and tutelary legislation included in the constitutional reform of 1920. (Encinas de Zegarra 1999: 60, Lynch 1979: XIX) José Antonio Encinas openly exposed his ideas within this group. The Indian could not be a positive element for the nationality if he lacked a clear concept of the Nation and political links. With the arrival of the republic nothing had changed, the Indian was in a lower social scale and his intellectual activity was at its lowest. Raising the cultural level of the Indian could produce conflicts as bloody as in Mexico, but it was an inevitable task since the Indian was a primordial factor difficult to replace in the economic progress of the country. (Tord 1978: 57-58)

Encinas pointed out at the contradiction and even uselessness of a national project that would not include the Indian demanding above the prompt restitution of indigenous lands. First it was necessary to solve the social and agrarian problem then bring education. (Encinas 1932: 67; Tamayo 1982: 303) He demanded mandatory free education until eighteen years of age and lay education that would form free critical consciences. He proposed a practical rural education including Spanish, reading, writing as well as agriculture and cattle raising techniques. Encinas dedicated his efforts to improve education in Puno and at the national level.

In 1924, Encinas was deported to Panama with Erasmo Roca for leading the opposition to Leguía’s reelection and refusing to agree with his administration. Normal School graduates were accused of rousing the popular masses and awaken the energies of the Indian disregarding the Church and pretending to intervene in politics. (Encinas de Zegarra 1999: 26) Though exiled, he continued his quest for justice and education for the Indian. Encinas’s legacy was a long lasting and effective legacy of enthusiasm for self-formation and reading, and respect and interest for native cultures and indigenous problems. (Tamayo 1982: 254) However, he did not envision bilingual education and gave preeminence to the Spanish language and Western culture.

Another outspoken and involved promoter of rural education was Julián Palacios (Santa Rosa-Chucuito, 1887) He had studied elementary education in the Seminary of San Ambrosio and secondary education at San Carlos. He studied philosophy at the University of San Agustín in Arequipa. In 1913, he acted as secretary and translator of Teodomiro Gutierrez Cuevas, while investigating the events of Samán, being exiled to Chile after Billinghurst's overthrow. Upon his return to Peru he entered the Normal School graduating as a pedagogue in December 1915. He was close to Abelardo Gamarra and suffered the persecution of the clergy due to his anticlericalism. (Tamayo 1982: 305) He returned to Puno and established close links with the Adventists. He worked in Puno as attendant to the Southern Regional Director of Education Glenn Caulkins. In this post, he visited almost all the department fostering indigenous education, advising the Indians to contact the Adventists or form their own private schools. For some time he directed the School of Sandia. After being attacked by the clergy he started to work with Adventists in the School of Chullunkiani. He traveled with the members of the Adventist Mission all over the Altiplano
In 1926, he was stationed in Puno working in the Normal Section of the National School of San Carlos. During this period, he participated in the Orkopata Group, published the periodical “El Educador Andino” as well as “Pututo” with Manuel A. Quiroga. In 1931, his political activism led him to join the APRA while continuing his labor as educator. He worked in Sandia and Huancané, directed the first Brigada de Culturización Indígena and served as Inspector of the Brigadas de Alfabetización of 1940. He was Sub-director of Indigenous Education and collaborated in the alphabetization campaign carried on in Puno in 1944. The campaign reported having instructed over seventy thousand indigenes in twelve months. Two years later he was chief of rural education in the department participating in the most ambitious pedagogic plan applied in the Peruvian sierra: the establishment of the rural educational nucleus. After working for some time in private education and at the Universidad Comunal del Centro he retired in 1965. He had devoted over fifty years of his life to pedagogic work mainly oriented towards the Indian. (Tamayo 1982: 305; Rénique 2004: 142)

Palacios developed one of the strongest national educative projects produced by puneño intellectuals. He started from the assertion there was no nation in Peru. There was no community of citizens endowed of rights and duties defined by a common body of laws. To create a nation, affirmed Palacios, the national educative system, and in particular the rural education program, needed to be reorganized. (Zevallos 2002: 53, 85) Palacios insisted in the need to turn the education system into a mechanism of self-renovation and cohesion of the population to reach a modern nation. Like his companion Gamaliel Churata, Palacios believed the educative plan designed should aim at the fusion of the main social and racial groups of the country.

Palacios provided an organic conception of Indigenous culture that took in consideration all aspects of indigenous cultural life as integrated systems that gave it coherence. He believed that the indigenous family education had been more efficient in building a social network than the official education system. Local education system had all the potential to build the nation integrating all Peruvians. Palacios thus suggested the study of the indigenous education system which had allow the conservation of their customs, rituals, institutions and collective work ethic. This would be more effective than imposing foreign educative doctrines in the education system. He also considered the past as a major tool to reach these goals. Palacios rescued the foundation myth of the Inca Empire and found efficient pedagogic antecedents in the teachings of Manco Cápac and Mama Ocloc. The principles and fundamental values taught by these founders, “Ama suwa, ama llulla, ama quella” (do not be a thief, do not be idle, do not be a liar) were extremely effective because they were based on family education and closely linked to economic activities. This education was the opposite of public education characterized by rigid schedules, programs and rules.131 (Zevallos 2002: 60, 108-109)

Palacios promoted the study of native languages offering offering his services as translator and teacher, even by correspondence, of Aymara and Quechua. He shared this emphasis with contemporary scholar and collaborator, lawyer Francisco Chukiwanka Ayulo (Pucará, 24 July 1877-Lampa, 10 April 1957). Chukiwanka studied at the Normal School of Lima before opting to

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131 Some of Palacios’s writings include “Cancionero andino para niños Aimaras y Quechuas,” “El niño indígena y la escuela rural,” “Maycu Qqapa y Colla Ujilla Huacu y su Pedagogía,” “La mentalidad del indio del Altiplano del Titicaca” (Puno: Editorial Los Andes, 1970). In the latter publication, Palacios profiting from his labor with the Adventists realized an inquiry within the peasantry. He gathered valuable information about indigenous animism, magic and the luminous mentality of indigenous children, topics barely studied by then. (Tamayo 1982: 305; Torres Luna 1968: 278)
study law. He mentioned with pride his Aymara origins (he signed his name Chukiwanka or Chukiwanqa instead of Chuquiwanca, following an Aymara version) and was often set apart for his radical ideas of renovation. Chukiwanka faced the indigenous problem with realism through journalism and law. In 1908, he participated in the foundation of the periodical "Huajchacuyay", in 1910 "El Indio", in 1922 the magazine "Pututo". He also collaborated in important reviews such as "Sierra" and Mariategui's "Amauta." Chukiwanka produced in the mid 1920s an “indoamerican orthography” to promote an intercultural education. He designed a phonetic alphabet that allowed indigenes to write in their native tongue since it respected Aymara and Quechua pronunciation. This alphabet (a project Chukiwanka started in 1914 with Palacios) permitted natives to write in their own language overcoming orality and thus be taught in their own language. It also facilitated the teaching of Spanish.

This project was supported and diffused by the indigenista publication “Boletín Titikaka” (1926-1930) that strove to imprint the idea of a multicultural nation and of the need of an intercultural education. It had, however, little resonance. According to Zevallos Aguilar it was too radical for its audience and especially for a State more interested in linguistic homogenization. (Zevallos 2002: 91-92) I would add it failed to appeal to the right audience: the peasantry.

In fact, many scholars adopted racialized discourses that responded to Lima’s elite. Emilio Vásquez acknowledged the fact that peasants sent their children to school to learn to read and write Spanish but he insisted that moral and civic education were more important since the indigene understood morals only from an economic perspective and had no notions of civism. Indigenes identified themselves as citizens because they paid taxes and left their homes for two years to perform military service. Indigenous economic moral was based on cooperation in construction, agricultural activities and celebrations, but the lack of moral values endowed them with bad customs such as revengefulness, criminal instincts, lies, alcohol and coca, as well as a lack of hygiene. Vásquez defined patriotism as work, production, institutional calls and respecting the norms and laws through the conscious assimilation of his or her obligations. This notion of patriotism was linked to the idea of modernizing the country through Indigenous hands. Vásquez projected the school as a means for the State to control the life and labor of indigenes. (Zevallos 2002: 87-88)

Discourses on education and morality had a text between the lines that hindered the concrete development of a system of rural education that would respond to peasant demands and even to the country's needs. While nationalist discourses affirmed the need to educate Indians to form citizens. Elites' imagined a whitening nation with busy masses not rising from the dark corners of the country. Culture was used as a shield. Cultural distinctions secured and legitimated forms of
power and domination ultimately based on economic subordination. (Storey 1996: 116) Many indigenistas trying to carve themselves a space in the intellectual and political national scene fell into the trap of cultural discrimination.

Since the early 1900s Puno’s peasantry demanded basic education to enforce their citizenship. They were ready to pay for their education if the State managed to end the corrupt system of tax collection. They imagined themselves as Spanish speaking and literate indigenous citizens, endowed with full rights and the protection of the State. Peasant communities were already creating their own private schools and finding their own teachers but they were aware of the rudimentary character of these schools and of their many deficiencies. They solicited the support of the State while rejecting the vices of public schools (discrimination, forced services and abuses from the teachers). They used the banner of civilization to counter the reluctance of a ruling elite that hoped education would produce a modern labor force (not social mobility) and the litanies of authorities and landowners who affirmed Indians were spoiled by education. Indigenous educative proposals did not uphold acculturation but a selective appropriation of dominant Western culture for the defense of their livelihood and partial autonomy. In fact, their pragmatism led them to acknowledge and accept the predominance of the Spanish language. To develop an education project in their own language they would have needed the help of middle and upper class intellectual allies willing to develop a bilingual or trilingual education project to confront State and gamonal cultural discourses. Many Punoño intellectuals absorbed indigenous claims for education materializing them in discourses, institutions and activities at the local, regional and national level. They showed a strong social sensibility but few were actually hoping to integrate peasant culture into the nation. Moreover, their compromise with rural education linked them to the peasantry but their actions were geared to middle-class and elite audiences more than to a native audience. These intellectuals expected more of an institutionalized change. Yet peasants needed direct help, at the local level, to put in practice their educative plans. Such help came from the outside, with the arrival of Adventist missionaries.

THE ROLE OF ADVENTIST MISSIONS

The protestant Church had been actively promoting private education since the nineteenth century in Lima, Callao, Mollendo and Arica. Protestant stress on an integral education (intellectual, physical and moral) had attracted the most modern sectors of the elite and progressive intellectuals, and their influence was growing. In 1911, the Normal School was entrusted to protestant pastor, Joseph Mac Knight, who stressed the need to reduce dogmatism and increase tolerance. Joseph MacKnight was the most important of American advisors and began his work in Puno as Inspector of Instruction, personally inspecting most of its schools with José Antonio Encinas. He developed teacher-training workshops and conferences, and advocated native-language instruction for Indian children. (Hazen 1974: 60-61)

Unable to find a way to solve the problem of rural education, the State allowed alternative initiatives. Creating schools for Indians would demand important changes in the perception of taxes and the allocation of benefits that the Civilista government could not afford, permit or enforce since the interests of landlords were well represented and fiercely defended among its rank and file. The Civilista government could not directly attack local notables, but it could allow the intervention of a relatively powerful and independent group, depending on foreign not local resources and completely alien to the local mechanisms of power. In 1907, Leguía’s first administration consented
to the entrance of Adventist\textsuperscript{132} groups in Aymara areas along the Lake and their dissemination across the department. Leguía probably hoped public schools would improve and expand in open competition with Protestant schools. (Hazen 1974: 118)

In the early twentieth century, a sector of Puno’s middle class endowed with a progressive attitude was looking for a change in life and society. Many found an answer in Protestantism. Demetrio Peralta, a shoe maker native from Arequipa, after a long religious crisis, converted in the early years of the twentieth century. He was, according to Encinas de Zegarra, the first to receive and shelter the Adventists that came to Puno. He was the father of future indigenistas Gamaliel Churata and Alejandro Peralta. In spite of the attacks, insults and calumnies received from the Catholic Church and society, Peralta and Bonifacio Aragón, another artisan, supported the formation of the first protestant church in Puno. (Encinas 1932: 149) The Adventist Church soon became the dominant protestant group in the department. Adventists spread in the Andean world denouncing Catholic festivals and rituals. They affirmed these rituals produced exorbitant expenses and fostered the consumption of alcohol, idolatry and superstition. Instead they proposed that the only obligations of cult be Saturday prayers. They became particularly active around Lake Titicaca, mainly in Aymara areas (Chucuito and Huancané). (Bourricaud 1967: 209)

An essential figure in the peasant quest for education was young Aymara man, Manuel Allqa Camacho, later known as Manuel Zuñiga Camacho. Camacho was born on December 25, 1870, in the ayllu Cutimbo a small community near Lake Titicaca, bordering Hacienda Collacachi then property of Agustín Tovar.\textsuperscript{133} An armed band led by the hacienda’s administrator started steeling communal peasants’ cattle and lands, obliging them to enter the hacienda as colonos. Manuel’s parents, Benedicto Allqa and Eudocia Cruz Camacho, had lost their lands and dreaded the idea of their only son, then 12 years old, becoming a colono tied to the land. Manuel was entrusted to an muleteer from Moquegua, who often stayed with the Allqas during his trips to Puno. Manuel’s parents asked the arriero to give their son an education. Once in Moquegua, the arriero gave the child to Dr. Higinio Herrera and his wife Juana Pomareda, both Methodists, who took him in their house. Camacho attended a Methodist elementary school in Iquique (Chile), served in the army in Arequipa and traveled with Methodist missionaries to Mexico and California. While visiting Mexico in 1892, Camacho understood the need for rural education, and after attending an evangelical meeting in San Francisco in 1895 he decided to go back to his birthplace to start an education project. (Teel 1989: 254)

In 1898, Camacho held a clandestine school for 25 native adults in the house of Felipe Salas, teaching them reading, writing, health, temperance and the basis of Methodist beliefs. (Teel 1989: 256) His plan was to open a school for indigenous children in Utawilaya, district of Platería (province of Chucuito). He travelled to Lima to search the financial support of Protestant Churches, with only relative success. (Teel 1989: 253) He was certain that indigenous revindication could only be attained by destroying priests’ influence. That is why he searched for American evangelists, who, as he had seen in California, dealt very well with authorities. (Encinas, 1932: vii)

Camacho had experience, from his arrival, “the kind of terror to which aspiring Indians were subject. At least once he was set upon by a gang of mestizos in the town of Acora when he dared

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\textsuperscript{132} The Adventist congregation is a protestant Church of Anabaptist inspiration that believes in the second coming of Christ to the World, based on a literal interpretation of the apocalyptic texts of the Bible. It became particularly strong in the U.S.A. through its discourses proclaiming the end of the world (or age) closing down. These millenarian beliefs are at the origin of one of the Church’s strongest characteristics, its proselytism. The main task of an Adventist missionary is to convert or win as many souls as possible to the cause, to save them from eternal doom.

\textsuperscript{133} Agustín Tovar was a Civilista well placed in the Aristocratic Republic’s Congress.
to appear in Western dress; his assailants beat him, dunked him in the town well, and destroyed his clothes." (Hazen 1974: 36) He was soon confronted by authorities and jailed for his "subversive" ideas. Yet, as soon as he got out, on December 24, 1901, and without even having a set place, he started to work on his project. He taught for a while in the open. (Teel 1989: 256) He painted in white one of the walls of his house and then traced the alphabet to educate sixteen teachers that he would send to Kota, Pallalla, llave, etc. (Encinas, 1932: vii) In 1902, he opened the “free school” of Utawilaya which became in July 1903 the First Rural Evangelical School of Utawilaya, and organized informal meetings in his home to celebrate the Adventist cult. (Teel 1989: 256) He confronted bribes, threats and all kinds of attacks but did not give up. Camacho spoke Spanish, Quechua and Aymara and had a strong vocation. The school accepted not only Indian children of both sexes but also adults. They were taught reading, writing, hygiene, health, craftsmanship and improved techniques of cultivation, and they were preached against alcoholism and consumption of coca.

Camacho wrote and signed petitions for the creation of new schools or the protection of already existing ones. He even conducted some of the indigenous delegations that traveled to Puno and Lima asking for justice. In 1908, Zuñiga Camacho accompanied the eighteen peasants of the district of Chucuito (Puno Province) that presented to the President a memorial to receive state support for local private education. They had built two rural schools in the parcialidades of Potojani and Ccota led by preceptors Zuñiga and Lino Solano. The school of Potojani had been working regularly for over five years, with a means of fifty students of both sexes in a building and with materials owned by the teacher. But they were constantly harassed by mistis that were mistreating them with infamous punishments, arbitrary prison and calumnies of subversion. They were called subversives because acknowledging themselves as free citizens they resisted unpaid services. They were accused of heresy and immorality because they read the Bible (a Roman Catholic one they had at hand) and because they refused to drink alcohol and thus did not participate in religious feasts. They had come to ask for a subvention, material support, and admonitions to departmental, provincial, and subaltern authorities of Chucuito to avoid hindering the work of the schools and stop persecutions. (Kapsoli 1980: 139-140)

It is hard to know how much support they received from the State but Adventista missionaries were already on their way. Albino Allen arrived in 1906 at Camacho’s request. Then came Frederick “Fernando” and Ana Stahl. This couple had migrated with their children from the United States to La Paz (Bolivia) in 1909 to do missionary work. They did so on their own initiative and at their own expense. For two years Ana had worked as a nurse and Fernando had sold missionary magazines in indigenous towns, both confronting a harsh reality of indigenous illiteracy and oppression. As soon as they met Camacho in 1911 they decided to join him in the development of indigenous schools in Puno. They understood the enormous potential created by the desperate demand for two essential services: education and health care. In the locality of Occa Pampa in the district of Moho they were received by a delegation waving flags, with a music band and women throwing flower petals at them. They informed themselves of the needs of the community and attended on their first day over 106 patients. (Teel 1989: 252-3; Rénique 2004: 72-73)

They Stahls began sharing Camacho’s house which served as school during the week and church on Saturdays, but they managed to make the school prosper and increase. In 1911, Camacho and Ana Stahl had 150 students, from children to adults. They bought a piece of land for $30 gold dollars and with the effort of the community constructed what in 1913 was inaugurated as the Adventist School of Platería with 200 students of both sexes learning to read, write, basic arithmetic, as well as hygiene and religion. Teachers brought from abroad could not stand the altitude and the cold climate so Ana Stahl ended up directing the institution with the help of
Camacho and his disciple Luciano Chambi. The school was open all year long for the demand was multiplying and they needed to prepare teachers. The school soon began to work as the Normal School of Platería. (Teel 1989: 257) They often used converted army veterans as teachers and propagandizers; their youth “helped modify traditional Indian views linking knowledge and leadership capability with age.” (Hazen 1974: 114) During all this time, Fernando Stahl traveled by mule, horse and finally on a Harley Davidson motorcycle throughout the area (mostly the province of Chucuito) funding schools, chapels, clinics and even free markets. (Teel 1989: 258)

Adventists were strongly opposed by the clergy and gamonales. Literate, holding the Bible and rejecting Catholic tradition, the Adventist Indian was a clear danger to gamonal interests. He or she had a reputation of being skilled, resourceful and at the same time search revindication. Even when they did not profess the new faith, Indians close to Adventist missions became suspicious of the Catholic Church, priests and festivities (seen as retrograde and exploitative) hailing instead the lay moral values of order, cleanliness and temperance. (Bourricaud 1967: 210) In 1908 the school of Platería was closed down by local authorities under the pretext of administrative omissions. Pedro Zulen, student of San Marcos University and co-founder of the Asociación Pro Indígena, assumed the defense of the school, denouncing a transgression against national culture, since it was probably the only school with a map of the nation, teaching materials, adequate premises and devoted teachers. Camacho affirmed the school was closed because it proclaimed the Indian’s redemption, rejected free services and labor, promoted the reading of the Bible, and refused to participate in religious festivals (defending themselves against “the venom of alcohol” and their few belongings against the priest and governor). After a heated debate the school was reopened and more schools were created. (Kapsoli 1980: 30) The Stahls and other Adventists voiced their stronger criticisms towards Indians intoxicated with alcohol becoming savages, generating violent arguments, participating in bullfights, feeding into superstition and coca consumption; all in the name of Jesus. These attacks to local customs were not always welcome and tolerated and they often produced the harassment of angry mobs incited by priests and local powers. (Rénique 2004: 74)

One of the fiercest enemies of Adventist schools was Puno’s bishop Valentín Ampuero (Moquegua 1869- Puno 1914). Ampuero was sent to Puno in 1910 to quench pervading liberalism and Protestantism. He was impulsive and intemperate. In his first discourse at Puno’s Cathedral he affirmed he had heard from the Rimac River (Lima) to the Misti Mountain (Arequipa) that Puno was a shelter of masons, heretics, free thinkers and atheists. The enormous concurrence to Church told him otherwise but he stated confidently that he would put in the right way those who were strayed. A unanimous protest followed in all newspapers. The Bishop threatened to excommunicate anyone collaborating with the Adventists. He took over the repression of the movement in person, ordering in more than one occasion the arrest of Camacho and the Adventists. (Encinas 1932: 147-150; Torres Luna 1968: 293; Tamayo 1982: 304)

Ampuero tried to destroy the Mission of Platería, claiming it was a center of heretic diffusion. At the head of a mounted party, he organized in 1913 an assault on the houses of several protestants (including Camacho and the Stahls), vandalizing the school. Adventists accused of heresy for not participating in festivals, were required to kiss the Bishop’s hands. Many refused and were taken prisoner. Among them was Camacho and his 11 year old son, together with 6 others they were tied with leather ropes, taken to Chucuito and forced to walk to Puno (30 kilometers) without hat or coat and under constant aggressions. Lawyer Francisco Chuquiwanqa Ayulo, took over their defense. Several liberal intellectuals from Puno moved in support of the mission. The press of Puno and Lima voiced its disapproval. Platería was set as a symbol of altruism and the actions of the Bishop were ridiculed. Denouncing voices found support from Billinghurst’s administration and the School
was reopened in spite of continuous attacks. In August 1913, an ashamed Senator for Puno, Severiano Bezada, proposed to his Chamber the alteration of the Constitution to include the freedom of religion. This incident is considered one of the main causes for the approval of the constitutional amendment of 20 October 1915 guaranteeing the freedom of religious expression. (Teel 1989: 269-271; Kapsoli 1980: 29-30; Rénique 2004: 74; Chambi 1985: 10; Hazen 1974: 116)

During the second administration of Pardo, the Church’s reaction against protestant advance strengthened and its pressure on the government caused the dismissing of non catholic teachers such as Normal School Director Mac Knight. (Planas 1994: 153) In Puno, the Church was weak and plagued with institutional problems. Ampuero died in 1914 and Puno remained bishopless until 1922. (Basadre 1983: IX 184) But private attacks continued. In 1916, the Stahls were savagely attacked by a mob lead by two catholic priests (Julio Tomás Bravo and Fermín Manrique) while establishing a school in a private home in Queñuani (Province of Chucuito). They barely saved their lives, and this attack raised the indignation of many Catholic citizens who, in newspaper El Siglo (06/21/1916) compared the pious labor of “gringos” who healed and taught Indians for free to the labor of the Catholic Church which for 300 years had maintained the Indian in an inhumane condition. (Teel 1989: 267-268)

The accusations faced by Adventists went from heresy to subversion of the peace and even communism. A document presented by some ladies of Azángaro in September 1923 and published in the reactionary newspaper El Heraldo (III-144, 2 June 1927, p. 7) resumed the main accusations. Adventist missions were false schools feeding ignorant Indians with false and fantastic promises, teaching them depraved and heretic practices, preaching the extermination of Catholics and the Church as well as antipatriotic communist doctrines and dangerous concepts of racial and class equality that went against the social order and the property system. (Teel 1989: 272)

In 1921, the Sub-prefect of Lampa Mariano Vicente Cuentas (former arch enemy of Gutierrez Cuevas) explained to the Prefect that he had been forced to call to his office the local evangelical teacher Asencio Sosa because he was accused of inducing the indigenes to disobey the governor and his subordinate officers creating a rift between neighbors and indigenes. (ARP, Legajo 446: Prefectura 1921-1930) Criticisms also rose from the left, and even from indigenistas like Dora Mayer who saw the Adventists as an outpost of North American imperialism. (Teel 1989: 266) In his pamphlet “J. A. Lizares Quiñones se presenta ante la consideración de su pueblo", the hacendado accused Protestants of perverting Indians, turning them from religious and orderly beings into immoral heretics to generate chaos and allow imperial penetration, leading eventually to the extermination of Indians. (Tamayo 1982: 167)

The penetration of the Northern Quechua area of the department was probably the hardest challenge faced by Adventists. This cattle raising area counted with stronger and more aggressive local powers than the more agriculturalist Southern areas. Over twenty Protestants were assassinated in Azángaro by 1920. (Rénique 2004: 75) Stahl had tried in the early 1910s to answer the petitions of Quechua communities in Azángaro and Sandia. Local authorities and notables had forced him out and jailed indigenous leaders. Stahl asked his superiors for a new missionary with strong character, courage and faith who could establish himself in these provinces. The Adventist Church sent Pedro Kalbermater, an Argentinean-born Adventist of great faith and character. In 1919, Kalbermater was sent to Platería with his wife and two young children.

134 David Chambi affirms that Captain Teodomiro Gutierrez Cuevas, sent as special government commissioner to investigate the events of Saman, visited Utawilaya and confirmed the accomplishments of Adventist missionaries, meeting with Camacho and Stahl and giving them useful advice. (Chambi 1985: 10)
Pedro Kalbermater narrates how he succeeded in his first test. For over a decade, the mission had been constantly victimized by a mob protected by the landowner family Pinazo, especially don Emiliano Pinazo the youngest of three brothers. The Argentinean Adventist decided to talk to the hacendado family. He presented himself with two other missionaries offering their medical services and proposing a pacific relation. This first commission failed: in less than 3 weeks the attacks resumed. Colonos of the Pinazo family sacked and destroyed Adventists' property. They tried to obtain the Prefect's support in Puno but his forces were always busy on commission. Kalbermater asked then for a written order, signed and sealed by the Prefect authorizing him to enter Pinazo's estate with Indians of the mission to catch the thieves and recuperate the stolen goods. The Prefect was dumbfounded: it was a serious and dangerous business, he warned the pastor; the Pinazos had well armed bands that had already killed one of his soldiers. The Adventist insisted however until he received the written authorization.

With “a good army” close to 400 men and women with slingshots, whips and clubs, most of them on foot, Kalbermater set out to find the robbers and stolen goods. The story seems taken out of a Hollywood western. Kalbermater leading the attack of a house was trapped inside surrounded by eighteen bandits. In the dark he managed to escape their beatings, which fell on the robbers’ chief instead, who killed one of his own followers. Desperate, Adventist peasants put the roof on fire to force them out of the house. Kalbermater managed to escape unscathed. The bandits were captured and taken to the mission to be cleaned, cured, fed, taught the “true principles of the Gospel,” and then sent to Puno’s jail. The Pinazo family replied attempting to attack the mission but the “Adventist army” was well prepared with bonfires and trumpets. For the next twenty years, says Kalbermater, no more robberies and assaults were committed in the region. Even the Pinazos gave up and became the best of neighbors. (Kalbermatter 1930: 52-68)

Kalbermater’s biography breathes self-sufficiency and paternalism. The pastor is overtly proud of his deeds. Nothing seems impossible for him and his faith. Yet, according to his director Stahl, after successfully working eleven years among the Aymaras, he was unable to do it among the Quechuas due to the opposition of the clergy, authorities and landlords. In Samán, Adventists had bought one hectare of land for $300 soles. Helped by some thirty peasants, Kalbermater started building a mission. Drunken peasants threw stones and insults at them; the interpreter soon disappeared making his work even more difficult. In a more violent attack, the missionary was trapped in a well for a whole day. Once he managed to finish the well, a 25 meter mission and a small house, he went to find the materials needed for the roof, only to find on his way back that the walls had been destroyed and the well filled again by an army of Indians led by priest Hinojosa of Samán and local hacendados.

Kalbermater left Samán to start again in a neighboring valley near the town of Santiago, where he had been invited by three local chiefs. He had some 700 men, women and children helping with enthusiasm and in a month they were raising walls. But they were under constant vigilance and threats from Azángaro. Kalbermater was more careful than in Samán: the walls were piled with stones for slingshots and he had two Winchesters caliber 44, a shotgun caliber 16, a Colt revolver caliber 44 and ammunitions. The three native chiefs were also armed. They were merely defending their property, he affirmed, which counted with all the guarantees from the Ministry of Education.

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135 “Twenty years as a missionary among the Indians of Peru. Autobiographic notes.” And Subtitled: “The many miracles that God in defense and good of his work made saving his life among the many great dangers he had to sort in the defense of the poor and unfortunate Indian slave.”
and superior authorities in the capital. He was joined by men and women with clubs, whips and slingshots.

They were informed that an army was forming in the town of Santiago. Over 200 well armed men arrived one afternoon. Kalbermater lost half of his followers; only 400 remained to defend the mission. He bravely confronted the enemy holding his Bible. The attackers were furious when they realized that “us Argentineans do not backup nor escape in face of the threats of the enemy.” He was called a heretic by Priest Velarde and Don Arturo Díaz Dianerras pointed at him his gun. Accused of having no soul he said he had more soul than them for his conscience was not dirty and spotted with innocent blood of Indians whom they despoiled. Desperate, some hacendados fired shots over the missionary’s head. Nervous, one of the mission’s curacas responded with the only three shots he had in his revolver. The hacendado army did not expect the Adventists inside the mission to be armed. Their fear of “the indiada”, their inner fear of a race war worked against them. They started to hesitate and ended up leaving. (Kalbermater 1930: 69-86) Similar stories plague Kalbermater’s account illustrating the many difficulties and threats faced by protestant missionaries and natives in their attempts to take over their education and destiny.

They managed to form 25 more schools. The natives built the school and a small house for the teacher and paid registration to help with the teacher’s salary. In most cases, as soon as classes started, the schools were burnt down or destroyed. Some of the schools were reconstructed two or three times, some could not survive. The comunales of Chuquechambé had a 25 meter school lead by teacher Julián Yanqui and his wife Segunda. The place was burnt down at midnight after the first day of classes, yet the school was rebuilt and continued. In Condorcuyo, during the first day of class, the teacher Juan Huanca and his students were locked up and the attackers started throwing stones inside until parents arrived. One of the children died. In another mission, the chief of the community who had given the land for the school was shot in the leg while the teacher was shot dead. (Kalbermater 1930: 92-93)

The Prefects’ responses were sometimes positive and immediate: governors were dismissed, commissions were sent to investigate. After a savage attack in the district of Santiago that left several Indians dead, Kalbermater searched justice with the prefect. The Prefect ordered the sub-prefect to send an armed force accompanied by a doctor, experts, a criminal judge (Pedro Villena) and a prosecutor (Adrián Cáceres Olazo) with a photographic camera. After receiving the Prefect’s report, the Minister of Government ordered the detention of all the attackers and of the local authorities who allowed it. Many fled; others left for the mountains and jungle or to Bolivia and Argentina. Even the priest of Santiago was persecuted and involved in the suit. The judge decided in favor of the Adventist peasants and the mission. (Kalbermater 1930: 89-91)

On several occasions, President Leguía was urged to decree the expulsion of Adventists from Puno and the closing of their schools but he refused to do so. He personally told Encinas: “Catholics must do what Protestants do.” (Encinas 1932: 149) The Minister of Government often had to confirm the government’s support of Adventist schools and give them written guarantees to continue their task. Authorities were forced to respond to Adventist complaints responding often sometimes with little efficiency. Manuel Eduardo Burgos, Commander of the Guard of Huancané, was sent in September 1922 to Moho. The mission of Muchi was receiving threats from Indians instigated by the authorities of Vilquechico. The mission had needed armed protection before, still Commander Burgos, after hearing testimonies, basically concluded there was nothing to do. The confrontations were produced by private businesses and antagonisms between religions which should not need to worry the authority, he reported. (ARP, legajo 452: Prefectura 1921-1930) State protection was often indecisive. Few authorities were eager to risk their position and men to defend Protestant groups.
Nevertheless, Adventists managed to make important local allies thanks to their medical training, which they seldom refused to offer. They also received support from local intellectuals, politicians and local newspapers, which took their defense in several cases, especially after Catholic attacks. Gamaliel Churat a wrote articles describing the benefits acquired by the Indian from Adventist altruism and healing practices, and praised the simplicity and straightforwardness of their evangelical teachings. Encinas avowed that he shared Adventist goals, though through different means. (Encinas 1932:149) He praised Stahl, who before putting the Bible in illiterate hands, taught the indigene self-confidence and love of life, and treated him as a comrade not a proselyte, caring about his health. (Encinas 1932: 148) Manuel Gonzalez Prada in Lima saw with positive eyes the sacrifices of Adventists in the highlands, contrasting them with the elitist activity of Jesuit private schools in Lima. (Teel 1989: 266-267) With few exceptions, the indigenista movement saw with positive eyes the advance of Adventism.

Adventists reached a very high degree of organization to spread and defend themselves. The “Misión del Lago Titicaca de los Adventistas del Séptimo Día” led by Superintendent E. H. Wilcox in the 1920s had telegraphic and postal offices in Puno. Other such offices were installed in many local dependencies to denounce threats and attacks as well as fend off denunciations against pastors accused of instigating ideas of subversion. The mission kept reasserting its conservative stand: the respect of authority and private property and thus the falseness of accusations of subversion. [ARP, Legajo 444: Prefectura 1921-1930] Bourricaud stressed how moralization and rupture with the traditional order did not go hand in hand with disorganization and dissolution; much to the contrary Adventist Indians showed great solidarity and worry to improve their condition as well as that of their community. (Bourricaud 1967: 210)

Adventists proselytized rapidly among the peasantry in spite of virulent attacks of priests, neighbors and authorities, and received support even from non-Protestant peasants. Their success responded to several factors. They only expanded upon a community or village’s request. They counted with funds from abroad and the support of the American embassy in Lima so they did not need to impinge on indigenous resources to survive. Their teachings were practical and came with direct services and benefits. Adventists played down doctrinal controversies (stressing only Saturday worship, the end of idolatry and the second coming of Christ) to focus on cleanliness, temperance, morality improved modes of living and literacy. The student was not just taught to understand the Bible and discuss it, he could learn to read and write other documents from publications to legal papers, which was particularly useful for contracts and legal suits. Adventists also taught what peasants wanted to hear, about their rights and obligations as citizens. Moreover, they were taught basic arithmetic to avoid being deceived in the markets. With these teachings, students had access to medical services and medicines at little or no price, open markets not subject to the impositions of townsmen and if they joined the Adventist religion they were freed from expensive festivals and taxes for Church services and rituals. They were just asked to avoid drinking, practice temperance and follow simple rituals. (Teel 1989: 258-260; Hazen 1974: 113; Macera et al 1988: 70)

Hazen has pointed out that the movement for Indian private schools blossomed in the 1920s because: “Many area Indians were by this time explicitly linking the abuses they suffered to their ignorance. As some recent converts declared: “All this is due to our ignorance, and this is why we have become Evangelists. The pastors protect us and teach our children to read and write.” (Hazen 1974: 122) Adventists could become entangled in webs of paternalism as indigenous “protectors”. Moreover, implicit in the idea of empowerment through education was the idea of indigenous ignorance devaluing local knowledge and the wisdom of traditions. In spite of this it is clear that the presence of Adventist missionaries empowered indigenous peasant groups.
Missionaries treated *hacendados* as equals, showing no fear. Yet they also treated peasants as equals, calling them “brother” and “sister”. This broke the stiff hierarchies that had characterized a paternalist rural society. Adventist peasants did not call landlords “tayta”. According to Hazen, missionaries “embodied a less status-conscious lifestyle than local *mestizos* and whites, resulting both from more democratic national and religious heritages and from their necessary alliance with Puno’s underdogs…” (Hazen 1974: 113) American or Argentinean missionaries came with a self-righteous attitude that could counter *Hacendado* anger and disdain, making Adventists authoritative figures in the peasant world. “The 1940 census indicated 27,822 self-professed Protestants in Puno, almost all of whom would have been Adventists: the sect’s official membership list only totaled 6,579 in the same year. Identification with the Protestants was clearly desirable to many Indians.” (Hazen 1974: 121)

With the support of the Normal School of Platería, over 200 schools were created around the lake. The official statistics indicate 80 schools that would include a wide variety of institutions with different lifespan (from intermittent home schools to permanent missions with boarding school like Platería and the Colegio Adventista del Titicaca in Chullunquiani, district of Juliaca). In 1916, there might have been over 2000 students in 19 Adventist schools. In 1919 there were three large missions directed by other North American missionaries, two sub-stations led by Indians trained in Platería and some twenty schools in neighboring communities with over one thousand five hundred children baptized and a thousand more in preparation for such a ceremony. In 1922 Adventists established in Chullunquiani, close to Juliaca, a secondary school. It was a boarding school for children of both sexes that by 1968 counted with 356 students. They also established a hospital in Juliaca, the “Clínica Americana” with 54 beds and a “Wandering Clinic” (“Clínica Rodante”) that visited the department. (Torres Luna 1968: 295-296) Adventists were preparing for the penetration of the Quechua area of the department. In 1924 there were over 4000 students in 80 schools. The highest numbers were reached in 1947 with 7000 students in 109 schools. Puno became the seat of the Southern Mission including the departments of Apurimac, Arequipa, Cuzco, Madre de Dios, Moquegua and Tacna. Diplomas granted in Platería by the “Colegio Adventista del Titicaca” were officially recognized in 1952, when over 5000 students had graduated. (Hazen 1974: 119-120) By 1968, the Southern Mission counted sixty two schools, fifty one of them in Puno (with 3,147 students and 619 teachers). The 1920 commission visiting Puno pointed out that evangelists seemed to be the only ones who had been able to solve in a practical way the problem of indigenous education. (Teel 1989: 260-261; Tamayo 1982: 304; Rénique 2004: 74, 86)

Some of the results of Adventist labor were remarkable and went beyond simple education. Luciano Chambi (1893-1981), Camacho’s long time disciple and co-worker, was the founder of a large family of Adventists dedicated to indigenous education. He joined Camacho’s school when he was twelve, then he entered the school of Platería spending large periods of time in Stahl’s private library. He taught for thirty four years founding schools and mission. In 1929 he studied at the Industrial Institute of Miraflores in Lima and in 1930 he represented his kind in San Francisco, California, as the first Indigenous Delegate to the General Adventist Congress. The four children he had with Julia Chambilla (Rubén, Ricardo, Pedro and David) continued his missionary and pedagogic activities. Ruben Chambi graduated from the Normal School of Platería, continued his studies in the University of Cuzco and then in Lima at San Marcos University. In 1972, he was elected representative of Puno as part of the list of the Democratic Christian Party (he was not able to fill the post due to a military coup). By the 1980s, Luciano Chambi counted among his grandchildren twelve doctors, four nurses, one architect, one civil engineer, one lawyer, one public accountant, three teachers and two missionaries. (Chambi 1985: 93-95; Teel 1989: 263)
Ascencio Sosa Arpasi (1892-1981) entered the school of Utawilaya in 1911. He had barely finished his second year of primary instruction when he started teaching children. In July 1914 he enlisted in the army voluntarily being released the next year for he was still a minor. Upon his return he resumed his studies in Platería and taught in several ayllus. He married another teacher María Mamani with whom he founded the school of Ojje in the frontier with Bolivia. They were among the first missionaries sent to found schools in Quechua areas of Lampa (Huayta, Laro) and Azángaro (Condorcuyo). In Huayta he had to fight the aggressive resistance of Subprefect Mariano V. Cuentas who jailed him. In 1926, he gathered his savings and moved to Puiggari, Argentina, to study nursing. (Chambi 1985: 97-99)

Mariano Huayllara (1904-1977) taught and predicated over forty four years leaving seven children that followed on his footsteps. Juan Huanca Cutipa, founder and teacher of the first school in his native Pallalla, actively participated in the creation of many public schools in different communities. He accompanied Stahl in his missionary activities through the district of Pichacani, and travelled to Lima several times as messenger and delegate of indigenous communities. He received attacks and beatings that almost killed him (from a local catholic priest) but survived affirming: “Ustedes pueden matar el cuerpo, pero no el alma.” (“You can kill the body, but not the soul”) (Chambi 1985: 99-100)

According to Ruben Chambi, the Adventist school system gave the indigene “personality and self-sufficiency.” (Teel 1989: 263) Carlos Pacho, cited by Churata, was convinced that literacy meant personal as much as national progress. Churata cited a letter Pacho sent to an indigenous Adventist “brother” studying in Argentina recommending him to daily write in Spanish copying and analyzing texts to correct mistakes and perfect his writing. (Zevallos 2002: 112) Ricardo Chambi affirmed the Adventists schools gave a sense of dignity and courage with their teachings of the Bible. One of the cases he cited was that of Tomasa Mayta. Andrés Mayta was an active leader of his community (Colline) who spent 20 months in prison accused of “subversive activities”, meaning funding over eleven schools. He was soon assassinated. His septuagenarian widow, Tomasa, could not find justice in Pomata or Puno. One night she entered the cemetery, retrieved her husband’s body and cut the head, wrapping it in a table-cloth. She carried it in a basket all the way to Lima to present her case to President Paro in 1915 with a memorial probably written by Camacho who accompanied her. (Chambi 1985: 102; Teel 1989: 263-264)

Adventism brought to Puno the help peasants needed to promote rural education. They offered free educative and health services in exchange for few religious and moral demands. Adventist arrived with a dedication and compromise that allowed them to fend off Church and gamonal verbal and physical attacks. They were helped by a feeling of moral superiority that prevented them to bow to hacendado threats and despotic attitudes. For Zevallos Aguilar, Adventism brought a modern cultural revolution: its schools created “indígenas pleitistas” who could read about their rights and question mandatory contributions and services to the State, the local gamonales and the Church. Protestant Indians would not allow themselves to be exploited; they looked hacendados in the face, knew their rights and greeted without kissing hands. (Zevallos 2002: 112-113; Réquique 2004: 86) Adventist schools produced several generations of indigenous teachers that spread all over Aymara provinces and some Quechua areas allowing for an amazing campaign for peasant education through private schools.

THE OVERTAKING OF RURAL EDUCATION

After two decades of indigenous and protestant campaigns for education, private rural schools had spread all over the department increasing the demand for State support. “Palacios notes that about 150 temporary licenses for private schools were granted in 1922. In 1923, Chucuito Province
was estimated to have seventy private schools, in contrast to only seventeen government
ingstitutions. The District of Ilave alone included twenty Indian private schools, five Adventist
facilities, three Catholic schools, and three run by the government. Schools associated with the
Tahuantinsuyo Society allegedly numbered 170 in Huancáné Province alone.” (Hazen 1974: 123)

On April 1, 1922, Tomás Mamani from the district of Acora, province of Chucuito, sent to the
Prefecture a list of the students he had registered in the parcialidades Amparani and
Condorccachi: twenty two boys between 5 and 16 years of age and twenty men between eighteen
and 30 years of age. Mamani wrote the list himself and enticed the government in the name of
“Christian Civilization” to create schools so that their children could learn to pronounce “with
accuracy” the Castilian language. They had a teacher (Mariano Contreras) and forty two students
registered. They expected, however, structural support from the State. They asked for either a
State-built public school or simply the sending of architectonic plans for they could build the school
room themselvess. Mostly, what they needed from the State was the validation of their initiative with
a public building or with legal papers. (ARP, Legajo 447: Prefectura 1921-1930)

Many communities were in this situation. Around 1908, Juan Huanca and Pedro Pauro had
built a school room with several companions in his native community of Pallalla (district of
Chucuito, Province of Puno). Juan Huanca had spent several years at the Adventist Mission and
was to be the teacher. Confronted with the construction of an indigenous school to be led by an
Adventist trained communal Indian, local mistis and authorities had constructed a public school.
The new public school, however, did not meet the needs or expectations of the ayllus for the
indigenous school continued to function. Huanca and Pauro were jailed accused of rebellion then
sent to military service. In their absence, the door and windows were torn off and the building
deteriorated. Huanca and Pauro had returned even more prepared and eager after military service.
They had decided to put a new roof, windows and door. They were even building a second room.
They had some of the materials already but needed to organize meetings to obtain the rest of the
materials as well as school supplies. They were aware that their meetings, gathering about 180
people, would raise suspicion among authorities and landlords, so in August 1922, they sent the
Prefect a letter soliciting guarantees for their private school and the presence of the district’s
governor in their meetings. A guard was commissioned to visit the place. (ARP, Legajo 450:
Prefectura 1921-1930) Almost fifteen years later, the community of Pallalla continued to defend its
private school, and communal peasant intellectuals (Huanca and Pauro) continued to fight for their
educative project.

A document presented by Ezequiel Urviola as “indigenous representative from the province of
Azángaro” to the National Congress evidenced the ambitious goal of Puno’s peasantry. The
document written on October 12, 1922, denounced abuses, crimes and land usurpations, and then
it added: “Además, muy especial y principalmente, por lo expuesto, pido: amplias facultades y
garantías para mejor establecer Escuelas Rurales en todas las Parcialidades del Departamento de
Puno, según Plan de Instrucción Primaria y R. G. de J. J. a fin de que no sean molestados ni
perturbados en esta sana y patriótica labor.”136 (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8., p. 1) The plan was to
scatter private schools all over the Department, one for each community. Many areas, especially
Aymara areas, were putting the plan into action.

On January 23, 1923, Claudio Ramirez, literate representative of the communal indigenes of
the district of Ilave (province of Chucuito), asked the Ministry of Development to protect the schools

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136 “Also, in a special and principal way, as exposed, I ask: ample faculties and guarantees to better establish Rural
Schools in all the Parcialidades of the Department of Puno, according to the Plan of Primary Instruction and General
Regulation of Justice so as not to be bothered or perturbed in this healthy and patriotic task.” (my translation)
they had been building. Since 1920, they had put in all the *parcialidades* twenty three indigenous rural schools with innumerable sacrifices and efforts to free their children from “the ignorance, superstition, slavery and backwardness in which they were immersed, intentionally by their eternal exploiters” the *gamonales*. (AGN, MI 242, 1923) In spite of the noble, honest and wise character of this effort, landlords considered it a grave crime and were set on impeding indigenous instruction “para que sigamos siendo siempre sus inventariados ganados de explotaciones inicuas.” The document explains how landlords used any means at their disposal to close down their schools: presuming revolts they destroyed and burnt the locations; they mistreated and threatened school children to prevent them from attending to class; they also persecuted, jailed and fined the teachers and those in charge of the schools. Considering that the Constitution fostered the “cultural and social evolution” of the race, Ramirez asked for guarantees for maintaining their private schools and not be bothered in their scholar activities by the *gamonales* so that their children would learn to be “healthy and conscious elements for the family, society, town, province, department” and “citizens and defenders of the Peruvian Fatherland.” The Ministry of Development asked the Prefect of Puno and the President of the *Patronato* of Puno to inform him of these events and ordered the Prefect to grant guarantees. (AGN, MI 242, 1923)

Once and again, the problem faced by communal private schools was not the availability of teachers but the opposition of local *mistas*. Peasant and Adventista efforts had been so effective they were able to respond to local demands for indigenous teachers. The main problem to rural education in Puno was elite opposition. In February 1929, Valentín Ticona and Rafael Huaquisaca, indigenes from the district of Yunguyo (Province of Chucuito), asked the prefect to protect their school against the threats of the local governor. By “unanimity” the people of Aychuyo had decided to build a private school in their *parcialidad*. They counted with the help of Leonardo Tintaya, a teacher from the evangelist mission, and of the parents who maintained the school for the education of their children. The Governor of Yunguyo Alejandro Romero (“persona retrograda”), however, aimed at demolishing all schools and killing the evangelist teachers. They asked thus for a better authority with more patriotism and for the protection of the Civil Guard. Faced with no response the indigenes presented again a letter to the Prefect in April 1929. The Prefecture barely transcribed in the report the answer to the initial petition that had never reached the plaintiffs: they needed to present the legal license of the school for the government to proceed. (ARP, Legajo 446: Prefectura 1921-1930, nº 302)

Peasant initiatives were hindered by local powers and by the instances of government that often failed to protect them. Prefect and sub-prefects were caught in a web of intra-elite factions they could seldom overcome. At the district level, the governor, usually a client of a local landlord, depended on indigenous services. A bilingual literate Indian could read legal documents and demand the enforcement of citizen rights, refusing to perform unpaid services and threatening the governor’s income and benefits. Authorities intervened in various ways. Some persecuted teachers accusing them of subversive activities, like the governor of Yunguyo. Others connived with local notables to co-opt the project and hegemonize local education, as in the case of *Ayllu* Pallalla. At best authorities remained aloof, failing to intervene, hiding behind administrative procedures: requesting the licenses designed to maintain some State control over private educative initiatives.

In September 1922, Tiburcio Medina, delegate of the district of Chucuito, requested the Prefect authorization to open a private school in his community “Chojñacollo.” All expenses of construction and maintenance would be covered by the community, and they bound themselves not to perturb the public order nor usurp a third person’s property. He provided a list of the students that would be attending the school (95 boys and 52 girls) and the name of the teacher (Ramses Medina). Prefect Villanueva gave license to Medina and his community to build a school, ordered the governor of
Chucuito to give guarantees but also recalled Medina of the need for a license from the education authority for the functioning of the school. (ARP, Legajo 453: Prefectura 1921-1930)

Some peasant groups were ready to pay even for state protection. In late August-early September 1922, José Antonio Chambilla & Asencio Zapana, messengers from Santa Rosa (Province of Chucuito) gathered signatures in the district to ask the government for a Rural Commissariat to stop the banditry that prevailed in their area. On September 19, 1922, Manuel Paka Ortiz neighbor of Santa Rosa presented the Ministry of Government a similar appeal as proxy of the indigenous communities of his district. He affirmed that due to the crimes and robberies that desolated the area the Southern Regional Congress had created a Rural Commissariat. It had not been implemented due to the dire situation of the public treasury. Thus, the communities that commissioned Paka offered to pay the salaries of the staff of the Commissariat.137

Peasant appeals to the State showed their need to establish stronger connections with the central State yet they also showed a long time distrust of State decisions and initiatives. Messengers demanded material support and protection for schools that had already been built. They had rolls of registered students and a teacher. The teacher was bilingual and often issued from their own community or a community nearby. They trusted he would teach their children what and how they wanted their children to be taught. On March 30, 1922, Marcos Ochoa and Mariano Copaja, delegates of the parcialidad of Ayriguas (district of Desaguadero, Province of Chucuito) explained the Subprefect in a letter (very difficult to read for its irregular grammar and use of vocabulary) that they were pleased to learn draft exercises and go to school. However, they affirmed they could learn themselves in their communities from the local discharged soldiers. The drafted young men and school children would come more willingly, they assured, if taught by indigenes.138

Teachers of Aymara or Quechua origin played an important ideological role. Although many were imbued with protestant or Western ideas of civilization, progress and morality, they had a better understanding of the indigenous cultural background and were attuned with rural educational needs. In more peripheral and isolated areas, they could hardly reject their Aymara or Quechua origins and surrounding culture and they often participated in local affairs and established family ties with the community.

“Despite the repression, increasing numbers of Indians received some education –whether just the rudiments of Spanish, or full literacy. As the gamonales had anticipated, these semi-educated Indians became ever more resistant to abuses.” (Hazen 1974: 124) The State, however, was not ready for this. Its initial attitude was permissive; it looked away and maintained its pro-indigenous education discourses feeding discontent and even ire within the elite and the Church. However, once a network of Indian schools started to develop fed by protestant activism and confronting gamonal repression, the State itself felt the need to recuperate control of the situation. Education thus, while being a common strategy for progress was envisioned twofold by the State and the peasant communities. While indigenous constituencies hoped to gain more power to counter gamonal demands and enforce their citizen rights, State officials wished for a hegemonic process that would slowly dilute Indianness and create a Hispanicized labor force that could be molded by Western cultural patterns to the benefit of capitalist labor needs.

138 “...con mucho mayor de gusto tenemos para aprender de esta Ejercicio de Movilisables y a las Indígenas, no si mete a ninguna individual, ni Escuela ni Ejercicio Militar, nosotros mismo podemos aprender lo que nos enseña los de Lisencarios Indígenas bendran con mayor gusto. (sic)” (ARP, Legajo 452: Prefectura 1921-1930)
The efficiency of communities to build their own schools and find bilingual teachers only evidenced the inefficiency or unwillingness of the State to provide rural education. Puno’s communal peasants were ready to negotiate with the Central State the price for their education and the protection of their citizen rights. They were ready to pay for the cultural power to counter gamonal society and change the social order. The State, unfortunately, was not ready for such a negotiation. State insecurity and elite fears hindered the power of education both as a personal empowerment and national hegemonic tool.

Tamayo Herrera affirms that since 1900 there was in Puno an educative revolution. He calculates illiteracy covered at the beginning of the twentieth century 96 or 98% of the population; but by 1940 it had gone down to 85.7% of the population and by 1961 to 64.3%. (Tamayo 1982: 35) I would argue that if the State had supported peasant initiatives of private education, illiteracy could have reached much lower levels in Puno. By 1961, illiteracy was still high mostly in rural areas. Still it is worth noting that Puno had a higher literacy level than the wealthier and university-endowed department of Cuzco (72% total illiteracy, 80% in rural areas) as well as the departments of Ancash, Apurimac, Ayacucho and Huancavelica. Though the number of illiterate adults (64%) was higher than the national average (39% illiteracy within population over 15 years old), Puno’s rural illiteracy levels (66%) were far below regional (81%) and even national (78%) levels indicating an important and rather successful development of education in Puno’s rural areas. (Romero & Levano 1969: 135)

CONCLUSION

From its birth, the Republic set as a goal the education of all its citizens. In fact, the State took a practical approach to education viewing it as a means to produce a more modern and efficient labor force, a “useful” element for society participating in the market economy. Yet elites from Lima and the provinces reviled rural education for it could endanger their capacity to control the indigenous labor force. For decades education was hailed as the panacea for all national problems yet these discourses were never backed by a sound financial support of public education. School was omnipresent in official discourses but did not figure in state budgets. Social differences were legitimated through consumption of culture, and a nation of literate indigenous citizens went against the grain of the elite’s imagined nation, haunted by the spectrum of whiteness.

In the nineteenth century thus, the public education system was in a particularly gloomy situation in the Department of Puno. The educative apparatus was inefficient and almost nonexistent in rural areas. The few existing schools were mud huts with dirt floors, straw roofs, no furniture, blackboards or textbooks. Students were often mistreated by their teachers that were seldom paid on time and demanded from their students unpaid services and provisions. Education was in Spanish, discriminatory and unrelated to the peasant world. Even the Church had done little to improve rural education.

Answering the demands of indigenous messengers, the government designed a new educative system approved in 1903. It was based on the centralization of the school system and the division of primary education. The Ministry of Education (not local municipalities) was entrusted to allocate all resources assigned to education and primary education was divided into elementary school (two mandatory years) and the Centro Escolar (three more optional years). Through this reform the State expected a better use of resources and the spread of basic education: two strong indigenous demands. This system however produced controversial results for it maintained social divisions (lower classes and especially indigenous groups could barely aspire to obtain elementary school education) and difficulted the functioning of local schools (the central government could not take
care of local schools as municipalities had). Secondary education was mandatory but not free so hardly at the reach of rural masses.

This scenario went against the grain of social developments. A growing middle sector was demanding education searching for social mobility. The early twentieth century was marked by university students' mobilization and a growing social consciousness about the country's evils. New proposals appeared to develop rural education. These proposals however maintained a tutelary approach that offered no practical solution to indigenous demands. Few educators dared to propose a bilingual education and even fewer acknowledged peasant intellectual capacities and educative demands.

Puno's peasant communities, searching for long term tools to protect themselves, were betting on education to reach citizenship. They proposed the State a renewed tributary pact to promote rural education. In several memorials, communities confirmed their solvency and their willingness to pay legal taxes that would translate into rural education. The State, however, was not ready for this renegotiation. It reproduced year after year its indigenous education discourses but it failed to decisively curtail gamonal and Church opposition and develop a system of public schools with a consistent educative program.

Aware of the need to take education in their own hands, communities and their leaders played a paramount role in expanding rural education in Puno. They build their own facilities, found and paid for their own teachers and even chose the curricula. They were aware of the deficiencies and limitations of their communal schools so they asked for State support. Many communities were willing to turn their private schools into public schools to obtain support from the State but without relinquishing the regency or control of the teachers they had chosen. They wanted to avoid the inconsistencies and abuses their children suffered in public schools. Teachers were to live close to the school and dedicate themselves to teach both boys and girls a wide variety of subjects.

Peasants even proposed the state to take over their own military training to avoid mistreatments and long absences from home. They counted with trained discharged soldiers that could provide a local military preparation producing a more voluntary conscription. Discharged soldiers who had obtained some basic education in the army were seen with respect (since they were registered in military rosters they could vote) and they often served as the first teachers.

Peasants searched integration without acculturation; selectively appropriating the cultural elements that would help them protect their way of life and partial autonomy. They did not worry about cultural miscegenation or loss. They envisioned themselves as Quechua or Aymara bilingual citizens of the nation enforcing their rights as citizens. This project, however, did not coincide with that of the State and many intellectuals that hoped to dilute Indianness through education. The State was intent on linguistic homogenization to create a modern proletariat, while local elites secured or legitimated their power through cultural distinctions. Peasant educative projects seemed irreconcilable with state and local elites' educative projects and this hindered the power of education as a hegemonic tool and state support of peasant initiatives.

A few puneño intellectuals went beyond acculturation sharing some of the more practical views of the peasant sector. Santiago Giraldo proposed to turn San Carlos School into a Normal school and make high school education free for Indians. Telésforo Catacora attended Lima's Normal school responding Puno's need for teachers. José Antonio Encinas devoted his life to education developing through the Centro Escolar nº 881 an educative program centered on the social problems of the highlands. Trilingual pedagogue Julián Palacios was one of the stronger promoters of Adventist schools and state projects to develop rural education through the fusion of the main cultures composing Peruvian society. Teacher and lawyer Francisco Chukiwanq a Ayulo developed a phonetic alphabet to make Quechua and Aymara written languages and facilitate the teaching of
Spanish to indigenous children. These intellectuals hoped to integrate indigenous masses into the nation through education breaking the monopoly on education and cultural capital held by elites and the Church. Their actions, however, were geared to middle-class and elite audiences more than to native audiences. They expected more of an institutionalized change from above while communities were changing the cultural scenario from below.

Much needed help came actually from abroad, with the arrival of Adventist missionaries that installed themselves inside communities. Adventists established schools, health centers and markets. They also created a Normal school to train indigenous teachers in Platería directed by local leader Manuel Allqa Camacho and a North American couple, the Stahls. They faced a strong opposition from local landlords and the Church being personally attacked more than once. However, their persistence and that of other Adventists that arrived later allowed the spread of schools and missions all over Aymara provinces. Adventists had more trouble responding to communal demands in Quechua areas due to strong clerical and gamonal hostility. The success of Adventist schools explains why a state commission sent in 1920 acknowledge the fact that the only ones who had been able to solve in a practical way the problem of indigenous education were the Adventists. The results were remarkable not just because of the several generations of indigenous teachers trained and the more than 200 schools created around Lake Titicaca. They were remarkable due to the sense of dignity and pride they gave to the peasantry.

After two decades of indigenous and protestant campaigns for education, private rural schools had spread all over the department increasing demands for state support. Once and again the main problem faced by communal private schools was not the availability of teachers or materials but the opposition of local mistis for whom the motto seemed to be: “indio leído, indio perdido”. The State was expected to give communities a license and defend these education initiatives but local authorities were often caught within elite factions and clienteles and could not always respond to indigenous demands.

Once a network of Indian schools started to develop supported by protestant activism and confronting gamonal repression, the State itself felt the need to recuperate control of the situation. The creation of a non-governmental indigenous educative structure functioning parallel to weak state efforts threatened State legitimacy and evidenced the lack of a strong commitment with education. This attitude of the state hindered the power of education as a personal empowerment and national hegemonic tool. Still, Puno peasantry’s fight for education did not go to waste. In less than five decades, Puno reached rural literacy levels higher than the national and regional average, showing a rather successful development of private education in rural areas. The fight for rural education also showed how popular mobilization kept changing its character, assuming more complex goals and developing more elaborate strategies.
CHAPTER FIVE
“LA PATRIA NUEVA”: POLITICAL ALLIANCES FOR A NEW BEGINNING

In 1919, Augusto B. Leguía rose to power waiving the banner of social reform, cultural opening and capitalist modernization. He was trying to bring down the political power of his former party, the Civilista party. Claiming independence from Peru’s traditional landowning elite, Leguía searched for middle class and popular support. The redemption of the Indian was twice as necessary for his new project, “La Patria Nueva,” a new and modern nation. On one hand, it was imperative to modernize rural areas and rural production, on the other hand popular support would help balance the excess power the civilista party had given to hacendados in these areas. The influence of positivism and the ideas of progress and modernization reached their high point during this regime, a mixture of paternalism and an intense drive towards modernization. Leguía surrounded himself with a group of intellectuals hoping for social change and reform to break what they viewed as the isolation, poverty and backwardness of the majority of the population. Attracted by the openness of Leguía’s discourses, many indigenistas and Indian leaders adopted the regime promoting dialogues between the state and the representatives of indigenous and pro-indigenous organization. New civil and governmental institutions were created to try to introduce indigenous groups into the State’s project, often in controversial ways. As a result, peasant activism intensified displaying the enormous development reached by peasant intellectuals and organizations and the rationality of their discourses on ethnic citizenship.

“LA PATRIA NUEVA” AND THE INDIAN

In 1919, Leguía was trying to build a modern nation in close relation with the capitalist development that followed the Great War. To modernize the State Leguía rose the taxes on exports, expanded the state bureaucracy and signed technical accords with foreign agencies and experts to modernize the areas of health, education, agricultural technology (irrigation), infrastructure (sanitation, roads, railways, commercial aviation), etc. He took advantage of the support the U.S. government was offering Latin American rulers willing to open new markets and facilitate investment. Leguía contracted huge loans, guaranteed by the cession of national resources, which greatly increased the income of the state: while in 1915 the State counted with $30 million dollars, in 1927, it counted with $270 million dollars. This increase allowed for a strong centralization that benefited local oligarchies while developing populist policies. (Deustua & Rénique 1984: 12; Cotler 1978: 141; Bullick 1999: 76)

Henri Favre affirms the state apparatus developed at a slower pace in the Andean countries than in Chile or México due to the difficulties found by emerging capitalist groups in trying to secure their interests in the face of traditional landowning aristocracies. Capitalism appeared in regions relatively new and sparsely populated, while large concentrations of population were immobilized by the social structures inherited from the colony. Capitalist entrepreneurs thus had to share for years their power with the aristocracy that did not need a developed State. Favre considers Leguía’s second administration the beginning of a modern Peruvian State. (Deler & Geours, tomo II, p. 342-343) Contreras and Cueto seem to agree for they view “La Patria Nueva” as one of the great political projects of Republican history: its ambition and reach gave it a civilizatory character, the promise of a great reform. Leguía represented the new groups and local interests of entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, professionals and students that had increased the middle classes and hoped to modernize the country. (Contreras & Cueto 2004: 15, 187)

Key to Leguía’s project of a centralized modernization was the reinforcement of the repressive apparatus of the State to ensure control over the provinces and maintain the order needed for
progress. He reorganized the General Direction of Police, the Civil Guard and the army building military posts, and acquiring new arms, vehicles and more modern uniforms. The territory was divided in five military regions. The fourth region centered in Puno to ensure the safety of the nation and its borders. As a consequence, affirms Tamayo, revolts diminished and even stopped. (Tamayo 1982: 196; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 132; Basadre 1983: IX 414)

Leguía’s main task was to strengthen the power of the central government, curbing the power of Civilistas and regional elites. His goal was not to break down the economic power of Southern elites; as a businessman himself he was far from wanting to debilitate the wool market. His goal was to weaken their domination of the area. Listening and fomenting peasant claims was an effective way to curb the political hold of the Southern hacendados over their area, strengthening the power of leguísimo in the face of a waning civilismo. Indigenous masses could be made into a large pool of available hands for the building of roads and infrastructure, and a strong support base at the political level.

Indigenismo was one of the most enduring banners of Leguía’s administration. He gave himself the title of “Wiracocha” and pronounced discourses in Quechua, a language he ignored. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 128) He maintained all along his regime a pro-indigenous discourse that echoed the claims peasant commissions were bringing to him. Leguía’s discourses took into account Indian and indigenista arguments such as the demographic and economic roles of the indigenous peasantry, the lack of effective protection and the uselessness of laws, institutions and discourses produced by the State so far. They also reaffirmed the rightfulness of the two main demands voiced by messengers: the right to property and the right to education.139

Leguía, as many others before, wanted to erase the past and start from scratch, with a “new” project to create a modern and prosperous nation. Official indigenista position, however, brought nothing new: education, privatization of land, roads and military service. (Tord 1978: 64-66) These “solutions” to the “Indian problem” dated as far back as the first Civilista government (1872-1876) or as far back as the first congressional debates after Independence. However, as Jacobsen pointed out, the new Constitution passed in 1920 showed the growing political strength of the indigenista campaign. (Jacobsen 1993: 261) More indigenous laws were approved between 1919 and 1924 than in the previous century of Republican life. (Rénique 2004: 88-89) It seemed that now conditions might be ripe for progress: the election of a strong man determined to change the balance of power through new political alliances and large sums of money.

Official indigenismo appealed to provincial regionalists, intellectuals and politicians. Regionalist elite, both pro- and anti- Leguía, used Leguía’s project “to carve their distinctive place as intellectuals on the central political stage of the nation. In an era when intellectual achievements

139 "Las dos terceras partes de nuestra población están constituidas por los indios. Y el indio es apenas una gran víctima a la que abaten las servidumbres acumuladas del pasado y los abusos incalificables del presente. El indio es, sin embargo, agricultor que cultiva las tierras con rara maestría; productor de casi todas nuestras riquezas; trabajador infatigable en mortíferas labores mineras y, por último, es casi el único soldado del ejército nacional. El indio, pues, lo es todo en el Perú y, en cambio, le damos un tratamiento de siervo. (...) Urge, pues, re Integrar al indio a la vida nacional, protegiendo eficazmente su vida, su salud; instruyéndole y amparando sus derechos, entre los cuales es el principal es el de la propiedad. (Basadre 1983: IX 432) ("Two thirds of our population is constituted by Indians. And the Indian is barely a great victim brought down by accumulated servitudes of the past and unutterably abuses of the present. The Indian is, however, the farmer that cultivates the land with rare mastery; producer of almost all of our wealth; indefatigable in fatal mining tasks and, at last, is almost the only soldier of the national army. The Indian, thus, is everything in Peru and, in exchange, we give him a servant treatment. (...) It is urgent, then, to reintegrate him to national life, effectively protecting his life, health; instructing him and protecting his rights, amongst which the principal is that of property.")
allegedly determined racial hierarchies and status (...), indigenismo, as an originally serrano doctrine, had an important effect: it proved that highland politicians were as capable as their limeño peers, and therefore, racially equal rather than subordinate." (De la Cadena 2000: 46) New faces related to middle and lower sectors entered the political arena. In words of Emilio Romero, there were no people from the provinces in Lima until the early 1920s. With the Centenary of the Independence, a new generation of provincial youngsters arrived to see for the fatherland: Erasmo Roca, José Antonio Encinas, Emilio Romero, Humberto Luna, Luis Ernesto Denegri, Carlos Doig y Lora, Hildebrando Castro Pozo (Piura). (Romero 1969: 23) These young and progressist provincial intellectuals supported Leguia’s move towards a centralized State, believing that only a strong centralized State would tilt the balance of power that hindered the advance of the indigenous population and the middle classes. They consciously surrendered provincial autonomy in the expectation of change. In words of Romero: “Los provincianos desde 1920 reforzamos el centralismo limeño como un intento de balancear y contrapesar el caciquismo encallecido en las provincias.”140 (Romero 1969: 25) They believed in change from above.

The strongest indigenismo came from the “germancista” group that infiltrated the Senate, the House of Representatives and the administration itself. It was a group of young professionals from the provinces and Lima’s small bourgeoisie led by Germán Leguía y Martínez, lawyer, teacher, historian and writer, long time representative of Chiclayo. Germancistas produced their own newspaper called “Germinal” dedicated to draw the attention of the public to the social problems affecting the country. They despised the traditional Civilista oligarchy and linked the progress of the provinces to the “indigenous question”. They hoped to open the political scenario for the middle classes and the peasantry that was showing through its constant mobilizations its will to participate in the political scenario. They did not wish to break the alliance between agro-exporters and landlords but to enlarge its social base, forcing it to embrace the urban middle classes as representatives of the peasantry. They were active in local politics, trying to respond to peasant complaints.

Encouraged by Leguía’s discourses, some representatives fought over indigenous rights with prominent members of the oligarchy also aligned with Leguía, such as puneño hacendado Angelino Lizares Quiñones, and they denounced the abuse and violence exerted by local authorities and gamonals on indigenous populations. Representatives from Cuzco Víctor Maurtua and Puno José Antonio Encinas were among the most active in defending indigenous constituencies. They continually communicated the reception of peasant memorials and asked for measures. Germancistas such as representative from Puno José Antonio Encinas were at the origin of the investigative commission sent in 1920 to analyze social conditions in Puno and of the social and tutelary legislation included in the Constitutional Reform of 1920. (Planas 1994: 197-200; García Salvatecci 1972: 115; Basadre 1983: IX 254; Deustua & Rénique 1984: 94; Encinas de Zegarra 1999: 60; Lynch 1979: XIX; Valcarcel 1981: 224-225; Rénique 2004: 82)

The new constitution drafted in 1919 sanctioned in article 41 all property of the State, public institutions and indigenous communities as imprescriptible and only transferable through public title in the cases and form established by the law. Article 58 mandated the State to protect the indigenous race and dictate special laws for its development and culture in harmony with its needs. The Nation recognized, through this constitutional article, the legal existence of the indigenous community and corresponding rights. (Lynch 1979: 52; Basadre 1983: IX 247) Indigenous

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140 “Since 1920, us provincials, we started to reinforce Lima’s centralism in an attempt to balance and counterweight the caciquismo hardened in the provinces.”
memorials will often cite these constitutional articles as well as article 16 stating the right of petition.

In 1922, a group of Southern representatives elaborated a new project aimed at solving the “Indian problem” in Cuzco and Puno. The project declared that all titles over communal goods acquired since the legislative resolution of October 30, 1893, were revisable. Their restitution would be facilitated after the devolution of their just value. The project also decreed the opening of a register of communities and the constitution of an Equity Tribunal composed of two vocals of the Superior Courts of Puno and Cuzco, a senator and representatives chosen from each Chamber and a lawyer appointed by the government to solve the problems of ownership of communal lands and solve conflicts between hacendados and peons or communal Indians (payment of salaries, services, labor hours, liberty of commerce and industry). It was to be a mobile tribunal prone to short tramitations and procedures. Nullity recourse could be made to the Supreme Court. The discussion of this essential law project remained however stalled in Congress and the project was eventually abandoned. (Basadre 1983: IX 430-431)

In 1920, Congress approved the controversial law of vial conscription (Ley de Conscripción Vial): the mandatory service of all males between eighteen and sixty years of age all over the Republic for the construction and repair of roads and annexes. It was based on the Military Register, administered by provincial juntas integrated by the maire, provincial judge and military chief of the circumscription, and only excepted clergymen, telegraphists, preceptors and foreigners. The conscripts were to work in periods of six to twelve days a year or redeem it through the payment of the corresponding labor days according to the area. As expected, the vial conscription only affected indigenous populations. (Basadre 1983: IX 391) Indigenistas denounced the new “Republican mita” contradicting the law that Capelo managed to approve in 1916 to regulate Indian labor, with a minimum salary and no servitude. According to Planas, this law constituted a heavy burden on leguista parliament since it returned the Indian to the condition of slave: the Indian was forced to labor for and by the State. (Planas 1994: 32) For Marisol de la Cadena, the Ley de Conspiración Vial was the means by which Leguía reconciled his liberal indigenismo with his modernizing capitalist agenda. The roads were required for “national progress”. (De la Cadena 2000: 87) I would argue that the Law of Vial Conscription was the closest thing to a renegotiation of the colonial tributary pact. Leguía was open and willing to dialogue with peasant messengers, offer them protection through different state organisms and approve of certain peasant initiatives. In exchange, however, he asked for illimited access to the Andean reserve.

“By the late 1920s Puno’s road network, with about two thousand kilometers of improved roads completed, was the most extensive in the whole republic.” (Jacobsen 1993: 185) This, according to Jacobsen, would be due to the favorable terrain, the influence of Puno’s elite in national politics and the abundance of Indian labor. I would add the willingness of local indigenous groups to work in road building for the State. Indigenous constituencies usually resisted the Vial Conscription law when it led to abuses. Juntas viales could be dominated by the prepotence and the arbitrarity of subprefects who sent gendarmes to take young men in the markets forcing them to work on roads. Hacienda colonos used to avoid the accomplishment of this obligation with a simple intervention of the hacendado while communal Indians were forced to work double shifts with the excuse their cards were invalid. Conscripts covered long distances on foot, fifty kilometers or more with no more than coca. Their efforts were used to construct or repair regional, local or particular roads, work in cemeteries or for the benefit of powerful landowners. Some conscripts were even used as pongos (personal servants) or as contracted workers. In some cases alcaldes (the presidents of juntas) worked as enganchadores of peons for coastal haciendas. Others did businesses with the vial conscription cards. (Basadre 1983: IX 391-392; Briggs et al 1986: 112) Still, many communities
Indigenous constituencies asked the government for roads to link their communities to the main commercial routes: Juliaca-Puno-Desaguadero or Puno-Ilo-Moquegua. On January 18, 1928, neighbors and authorities of Capachica representing the ten *parcialidades* of the district congratulated the government on the "wise" and "benefic" law of vial conscription dictated by "patriotic" President Leguía. They were aware of the satisfactory development of roads in the department (932,900 kilometers) thanks to the "titanic" efforts of Prefect Cesar Cardenas Garcia and other authorities. They had noticed, however, that all districts of the Province of Puno were connected except for Capachica, which remained isolated for lack of roads. The vial law mandated each town to build its own roads with its inhabitants. To ensure the moral and physical progress in the name of civilization and culture, they proposed to construct a road that would link the district of Capachica to the road Puno-Juliaca. They had contributed to the patriotic task of building infrastructure in considerable numbers for six years (1922-1927). They asked now to be allowed to use vial conscripts locally in the construction of the road Capachica-Raya-Puno-Juliaca. The document was signed by ninety-one inhabitants of the district showing an agreement reached by the *ayllus* and the townsmen of Capachica.141

The law was not just a source of abuses. It could improve the communication and commercial ventures of a district at a low cost and impact for the population. One of its main advantages, according to Contreras and Cueto, was that it did not introduce a foreign social element that could lead to a future dual structure. Native population was not marginalized or displaced by outside workers or *colonos*. (Contreras & Cueto 2004: 190) These advantages allowed Congress to ignore the numerous denunciations against the law that was maintained throughout the Oncenio. Puno was one of the Departments that benefited the most with the Vial Conscriptcion.that left a large amount of roads linking previously isolated areas.

The Leguía administration’s modernization efforts went beyond infrastructure. The Dirección de Fomento (Ministry of Development) had up to now focused its activity on the creation of roads, bridges, dams and sanitation systems. In 1921, it developed into the arbiter of peasant-hacendado, peasant-authority relations through a new office called Sección de Asuntos Indígenas (SAI, Indigenous Affairs Section). The main goal of this office was to follow the new constitutional precepts and help Indians in the defense of their lands and labor force. One of its major tasks was to gather information: register communities recording their land, herds and other resources to modernize and rationalize production further increasing the control of the State.142 For this same purpose, the SAI took over the Granja Escuela de Chuquibambilla, initially under the sponsorship of the Peruvian Corporation.

The SAI was in charge of informing the population about special laws and decrees in favor of indigenous communities. In April 1925, the government authorized the SAI to print 500 copies of a pro-indigenous decree passed in 1921. (AGN, MT/DGAI 3.13.2.14) By request of Representative Encinas and after two messengers "reportedly died of exposure and malnutrition on Lima streets",

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141 ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930. Most signatures are hard to read and indicate a limited knowledge of Spanish, reading and writing. Some signatures are undecipherable but a few are from literate neighbors of the town.

142 "This was the starting point for the emergence of a legally uniform category of communities in which geographical boundaries, internal institutions, and the communal property of the land again coincided as they had during the colonial period. All of the lands within the boundaries of the community constituted communal property, and none could be alienated to outsiders, a legal concept strengthened by articles 208 and 209 of the Constitution of 1933 and by the Peruvian Indigenous Community Statute of 1936." (Jacobsen 1993: 261)
the SAI was released government funds to finance messengers’ travel home. (Hazen 1974: 154)
This encouraged the arrival of messengers presenting complaints to the central government. After a strong indigenista activity under rural teacher Hildebrando Castro Pozo, the SAI became mostly a center of statistic information.

The State needed a neutral organism that could act locally responding to peasant claims. On May 29, 1922, Leguía founded the Patronato de la Raza Indígena (PRI), an institution destined to protect and defend “the race” and its cultural and economic development. It was devised as an organization dependent of the Church that would work as an intermediary between the government, local authorities and peasant communities. The Church was envisioned as a possible buffer to peasant pressures. The Patronato was composed of a central council residing in Lima coordinating the work of departmental and provincial councils directed by bishops and district delegates. A position in the Patronato was incompatible with the exercise of political or judicial authority. Upon its foundation, the Central Council included among its members Archbishop Emilio Lisson, former State commissioners José Salvador Cavero and Alejandro Maguina, and official indigenistas such as Francisco Alayza y Paz Soldán. (Tord 1978: 148-149; Deustua & Rénique 1984: 74; Valcárcel 1981: 235; Basadre 1983: 432)

The Patronato councils could session twice a day when demands increased. The councils and delegates were bound to protect the indigenous population by investigating the causes of conflicts within indigenous communities and between communities and landlords; informing and demanding from authorities and public powers the adoption of measures to solve conflicts; studying remunerations and labor conditions of indigene; protecting indigenous property rights and soliciting from the government and hacendados the acquisition or selling of lands for indigenes to live and pasture their herds. Being a religious institution, the Patronato was also bound to develop more ideological and moralist goals that departed from a racialized preconception of Indian immorality, idleness and incapacity. The Patronato felt the need to teach indigenes respect for other’s rights and property as well as respect of legal contracts oral and written. Indians were to be taught also not to live in concubinage, how to care for their children’s health and the effects of drunkenness. The Patronato’s hegemonic task also included promoting the development of trades and crafts (masonry, pottery, weaving, etc.) and creating asylums to care for children while parents worked. (Tord 1978: 149)

The Patronato produced some interesting results. In 1922, Julian Nina, indigenous leader from Puno praised a document produced by the Patronato that included “audacious reforms” based on the propositions of Representative José Antonio Encinas. Nina complained, however, about the incorporation of a new member into the council: Congressman Pedro José de Noriega whom he identified as a gamonal denounced by indigenes of Juliaca and Vilque.143 Local Patronatos were infiltrated by hacendado elements that hindered the pro-indigeno activities of the institution. Messengers founding no answer with the SAI or the Patronato also recurred to Regional Congresses.

In 1919, three Regional Congresses were created parallel to the national congress to represent the North, Center and South. Elected from each province with the national representatives, regional representatives gathered thirty days a year to create legislative projects adequate to each region. Their resolutions were passed directly upon the Executive power in charge of their execution. If the presidency considered a resolution incompatible with the interests

143 Communiqué of Julian Nina (Secretary of the CPDIT Departmental Subcommittee) dated September 11 1922. (Ramos Z. 2003: 79)
of the Nation or the general laws, however, the resolutions were to be sent to Congress to be reviewed. (Basadre 1983: IX 236) The Regional Congresses served as tribunes for the exposure of developmental plans of all kinds as well as denunciations of abuse of power by authorities.

The third Southern Regional Congress gathered in Puno in June 1921. The representatives from Puno included Eduardo Pineda Arce (Puno, friend and lawyer of indigenista Ezequiel Urviola), Juan Luis Mercado (Sandia), Manuel Quiroga (indigenista lawyer from Chucuito), Felipe Sanchez (Huancañé). The presence of figures such as Manuel Quiroga made it appealing to peasant leaders who presented a letter addressed to the President of the Regional Congress of the South, complaining about the State’s lack of action in the face of gamonal repression: “El espectáculo doloroso de nuestra desgracia cuando más da lugar a declamaciones líricas en el Congreso Nacional, en la sociedad y en la prensa sin que benga (sic) algun alivio de ninguna parte. De esta manera no solo se escarcene nuestro dolor se aumenta nuestra angustia; también se aniquila lentamente a nuestra raza.” (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930, f. 2, June 5, 1921) The letter affirmed that messengers had presented their complaints to the Indigenous Investigative Commission sent from Lima in 1920 but had reached no justice and had to face a fierce persecution from landlords and authorities forcing them to move to Puno leaving their families unprotected. They were condemned to hear from the distance the claims of their families on whom vengeances fell. They called upon the regional congressmen’s national sentiments: “Va a cumplir el Centenario de nuestra vida Republicana y es vergonzoso para el patriotismo y para las Instituciones públicas de que estamos destinados a no poder vivir en nuestras umildes chosas a no poder cultivar las miserables parcelas que aún nos quedan y a no poder cultivar siquiera los afectos de familias en el suelo que nos bio nacer (sic).” (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930)

The messengers asserted they had no purpose of revolt or of disturbing the public order. They just wanted to live a “more tranquil and humane life” in their humble huts, working the small plots they had left. They had presented detailed information about abuses in several memorials that had been “fruitlessly” presented to “all the governments” (sic). Thus they urged Southern regional representatives to take action before the Congress’s closure. The document praised President Leguía’s splendid idea of creating an organism where their claims would be appreciated and listened to. Messengers expected guarantees and no persecutions from Prefect Arenas, the destitution of the Department’s sub-prefects (since they openly supported gamonales) and the immediate change of governors and lieutenant governors who were employees of gamonales. The messengers also requested the approval of the legislation project presented by the honorable regional representative from the province of Chucuito Manuel Quiroga. (ARP, Legajo 449: 1921-1930, ff. 3-4)

But Regional Congresses were far from having the power they were granted in paper. In June 1920, a group of regional representatives led by José Luis Mercado (Sandia) accused Minister of Justice Alberto Salomón of hindering the realization of the patriotic goals of regional congresses. Salomón had vetoed a law project to create a Normal School of indigenous teachers (to instruct the race to which “all of us have the honor to belong”) that had been approved by Congress. Regional representatives complained their laws and resolutions had been derisively received by the central power and the work of the Southern Congress had been useless. Though established with great enthusiasm and expectation, Regional Congresses banged from the beginning against the wall of

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144 “Approaching the centennial of our Republican life it is shameful for patriotism and for public institutions we are destined not to be able to live in our humble huts, not being able to cultivate the miserable parcels that we still have and not being able to cultivate even the affection of our families in the soil that saw us being born.”
centralism. Instances of the executive power blocked their initiatives often considering them unnecessary, superfluous or inferior to other instances of government. (MI, Prefecturas 222, Senadores 1921) The functions of regional congressmen were soon reduced to creating rural districts and commissariats, schools and public buildings, annexing villages to districts, consigning telegraphic lines, and passing budgets for minor public works. It could not be otherwise when the main goal of the State was to centralize power.

Leguía’s centralized modernization vowed to protect indigenous communal property and foster rural education in exchange for access to the Andean reserve. The regime took several measures towards a new tributary pact, mainly a constitutional reform recognizing collective property, a Section of Indigenous Affairs and a Patronato de la Raza Indígena. Even Regional Congresses turned into an audience for peasant claims. Soon, young provincial indigenistas, who had opposed departmental juntas attracted by official discourses, found themselves caught in and contained by the contradictions of power. The activities of these new institutions showed however a very active sector of the Southern intelligentsia that was incurring into politics to make social changes.

THRIVING INDIGENISMO

The early 1920s were a period thriving in controversies and debates. News about the Russian Revolution, the post-World War II crisis in Europe, North American industrial development and its individualist and pragmatical philosophy, alternated with news of the complex evolution of the Mexican Revolution, the anti-imperialist fight in the continent, the Cordoba university reform and the intellectual affirmation of a Latin American identity. (Zevallos 2002: 40) All this was unfolding in an environment of exacerbated nationalism. The need to reaffirm national destiny and national identity was only increased by the coming 100th anniversary of the War of Independence (1821-1921) and the plebiscite to decide the sort of Tacna and Arica, the two provinces that Chile had kept after the War (1879-1883). This conjuncture produced innumerable debates about the national destiny that focused most of all on the role of the Indian. Pro-indigenous and anti-indigenous currents of all sorts developed through a complex equilibrium between modernity and tradition.

In 1921, the “Sociedad de Propaganda del Sur del Perú” (Propaganda Society of Southern Peru - a group of merchants from Cuzco and Puno) published a general guide to celebrate the first centenary of the Independence. The issue was dedicated to President Leguía and started with his biography and praises of his program to modernize the country. The publication dealt mostly with economic matters from agricultural production to tourism, promoting certain haciendas but also raising strong criticisms against latifundia. It cited fragments of Luis Valcárcel and Ricardo Bustamante Cisneros’s university thesis (the latter written in Lima in 1919 on the juridical condition of indigenous communities in Peru) as well as Francisco Tudela y Varela’s work “Socialismo Peruano”. The production of latifundia was deemed exiguous in comparison to their extension. Production was extensive and done by the indigenous race which worked for alcohol and coca and to pay for festivals. Latifundia hacendados seemed afraid of progress and preferred a safe rent to continue with their comfortable urban lives.145 They hoped for the arrival of capitalists that would introduce technology to increase production and efficiency. The State only appeared in certain areas to collect taxes while communal lands disappeared daily absorbed by the codiciousness of gamonales and the impunity of laws and justice. (Sociedad de Propaganda del Sur 1921: 65-69)

145 “El trabajo agrícola es, pues, una imposición, una carga, que en la familia, cada uno arroja lejos de sí… en algunas viejas familias hay un Pedro o un Juan que procede de la antigua servidumbre y que por su fidelidad y honradez administrará con bien el fundo que sostiene la satisfacción de las necesidades primarias y secundarias de la familia…” (Sociedad de Propaganda del Sur 1921: 73)
They recognized the interest of the government who had sent a commission to find solutions for the evolution and incorporation to national life of the indigenous race, an essential element for the development of agricultural, cattle and mining wealth in the Sierra. (Sociedad de Propaganda del Sur 1921: 201)

The capitalist modernization project of Leguía produced in Puno strong conflicts between mestizo intellectuals, indigenous peasants and landlords. In this conflictive situation, intellectuals instituted themselves as protectors of the indigenous population and mediators with the government. They became informants of a reality the government and urban public opinion needed to know, and demanded a series of revindications in representation of indigenous populations. (Zevallos 2002: 34) Young middle class intellectuals like José Antonio Encinas, Francisco Chukiwanka Ayulo, José Frisancho Macedo, Manuel A. Quiroga and Ezequiel Urviola appeared in several documents circulating in Puno as advisors, mentors and even leaders of indigenous movements. (Zambrano 2003: 77)

Francisco Chukiwanka Ayulo showed from an early age a strong and rebellious nature. According to Encinas, he had a fight with a professor who questioned the virtues of the indigenous race. He refused to swear oath as a lawyer for he considered the formula an insult to human liberty. He searched in the Escuela Normal de Lima a different option for his restlessness but was again mortified by empiricism and routine. On November 21, 1907, he participated in the strike of second-year students in support of the University Reform. He was President of the Asamblea Universitaria Revolucionaria, and one of the founders of “La Tea”, publication demanding a radical and complete modernization of San Marcos University. Chukiwanka rejected the solution given to the strike; he understood that civilismo was still muzzling the teachers and he retired. He decided then to return to Arequipa to obtain the title of Doctor in Law (1908). (Flores Galindo 1957: 158; Encinas 1932: 85-86)

In 1908, he returned to Lampa, close to the center of peasant fights. His house became a center of convergence of peasant groups. In 1909, he joined the Pro Indigenous Association. In 1913 he took over the defense of the Stahls against the attacks of Bishop Ampuero who would eventually excomulgate him in a ceremony held in Lampa. An anticlerical free thinker, Chukiwanka believed religion served to exploit humanity and priests were the main enemies of Indians. That same year he joined Teodomiro Gutierrez Cuevas’s delegation, sent to investigate the events of Samán in Azángaro. Later, when rebellion started in San Jose, he gave Gutierrez legal advice in spite of the risks involved. After the revolt was repressed, he wrote a report to the Asociation, published in “El Deber Pro-Indígena” and Puno’s “El Siglo”. (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 71; Rénique 2004: 78; Tamayo 1982: 307; Kapsoli 1980: 18) Chukiwanka was identified in Puno as promoter of several peasant revolts due to his closeness to Gutierrez Cuevas and peasant leaders exposing his life to reactionary brutality.

Chukiwanka faced the indigenous problem with realism through journalism and law. In 1908, he participated in the foundation of the periodical "Huajchacuyay", in 1910 "El Indio", in 1922 the magazine "Pututo". He also collaborated in important reviews such as "Sierra" and Mariategui’s "Amauta." Most of Chuqiwanga’s pro-indigenous labor was done while serving in Puno’s judicial system. In 1920, he was appointed provincial judge of Chucuito. Between 1928 and 1930, he acted as Agente Fiscal of the Province of Huancané, between 1930 and 1941 as provincial judge of Lampa, and between 1941 and 1952 as Vocal of the Superior Court of Justice of Puno. He was a founding member of the Colegio de Abogados and participated in the first Junta Directiva. As a magistrate he often used the criteria of conscience permitted by the law. He based his rulings on a deep knowledge of the indigenous social situation. (Flores Galindo 1957: 158; Tamayo 1982: 306-307) His pro-indigenous attitude attracted the attention of Mariátegui who praised his efforts as
Fiscal Agent of the department of Madre de Dios in the mid 1920s. Chukiwanka's main legacy was set by his attitude in defense of the Indian and against *gamonal* oppression as a lawyer and magistrate. (Tamayo 1982: 307; Kapsoli 1980: 18)

José Frisancho Macedo (Pucará 1881) studied in the Seminar of San Ambrosio, the School of San Carlos and law in San Agustín (Arequipa). He returned to Puno to serve as Fiscal Agent of Azángaro and Provincial Judge of Chucuito and Huancané, Vocal of the Superior Courts of Cuzco and Lima and even Vocal of the Supreme Court of Justice which he presided in 1949. He stood out for his impartiality, rectitude and his defense of the Indian. He sanctioned influent people when he thought necessary. According to Valcárcel, he refused to jail Indians until guilt had been proven for it often turned out that the accused were the victims of a *gamonal*. He listened to indigenous claims with interest (he spoke Quechua and Aymara) and gave them the same weight he gave to powerful people's claims always applying the principle of equality before the law. (Valcarcel 1981: 135-136; Tamayo 1982: 314; Torres Luna 1968: 266) "Frisancho's insistence on honesty and justice later provoked charges of incompetence. He responded with an eloquent appeal for official morality and a scathing denunciation of those who prostituted justice in Azángaro.” (Hazen 1974: 47)

Luis E. Valcárcel identified Frisancho Macedo as a great influence for his generation due to his exemplary conduct more than to his writings. (Valcarcel 1981: 135) Frisancho Macedo wrote several books and articles related to the indigenous problem amongst which we find *"La propiedad agraria y el caciquismo*” (a 1916 report sent to the Superior Court of Puno corroborating the need to better understand colonial laws that did not forcefully destroy collective property), *"Algunas visitas fiscales concernientes al problema indígena*” (1916), *"El Procesalismo Serrano*”, *"Del jesuitismo al indianismo*” (1931). (Tord 1978: 62; Tamayo 1982: 314) Frisancho denounced in his works the violent appropriation of peasant land by *haciendas* and the impossibility of the Indian to reach justice in the face of *hacendado* crimes. He believed peasant movements were born of the profound deception of Indians towards justice. He also pointed out how the powerful sectors always found the means to get rid of non-complying magistrates. He personally faced this kind of power and suffered the retaliations of *gamonales* with the complicity of local authorities. His defiance of *gamonal* power left us an important testimony of *gamonal* system. (Tamayo 1982: 315)

Manuel Augusto Quiroga (Pomata, Chucuito 1888- Lima 1970) studied primary school in Pomata and Juli, secondary school in Puno (San Carlos), and law in Arequipa, obtaining his title with a thesis entitled *"La evolución jurídica de la propiedad rural en Puno*” (1915). A lawyer, journalist, poet, social fighter and politician; he embodied Puno’s involved indigenista activism. He spoke Aymara fluently and understood Quechua. He was a tall, stout man who appeared in *Album de Oro* in European clothes but with a local chuyo and a proud though somewhat melancholic glance. Quiroga admired Chukiwanka Ayulo, whom he considered had opened the way for liberal forces to enter the conservative circles of Arequipa’s university. As a lawyer he worked not only in most of the highland provinces but also in Abancay and Tacna, defending passionately indigenous rights. *Gamonales* accused him of profiting from the Indian, surnaming him “Dr. Quirroba.” (Frisancho Pineda 1973-76: III 128; Tamayo 1982: 308)

He was Regional Representative for Chucuito in 1920 and presented a "Project of Indigenous Legislation". The Regional Congress, in spite of the opposition of conservative elements, accorded to publish Quiroga’s work as official document in a volume of 113 pages containing 403 articles dealing with all known aspects of the “Indian problem”. The weakness and ineffectiveness of
regional congresses left the document stranded in commissions that reached no result, but it was used later for the creation of laws and resolutions related to communities, colono labor, domestic service, anti-alcoholic prescriptions, limitation of the use of coca, appointment of authorities, and other issues. Once the Regional Congresses closed down, Quiroga defined himself politically to the left, denouncing the project of the "Patria Nueva." Accused of being an agitator of the indigenous masses, he was taken prisoner one night by men sent by Prefect Arenas. He was sent to the Island of San Lorenzo, where he remained for several months. Upon his release, he returned to Puno to attend his peasant clientele. In 1931, he was a candidate for the Constituent Congress but of 1931 but ended up persecuted this time by Sanchez Cerro’s administration and jailed in Puno’s Prefecture together with teacher Julián Palacios, poet and journalist Emilio Armaza and writer Gamaliel Churata. He spent there two months and was threatened to be sent to exile to the jungle lands of Madre de Dios with other political prisoners. This was not his first time in jail and it was not the last. Though he continued with his pro-indigenous labor he was appointed provincial judge of Chucuito, then of Huancane. (Frisancho Pineda 1973-76: III 128-130; Tamayo 1982: 308).

He was the founder and/or director of three publications: “El Collao”, “Pututo” and “Inti”. “Pututo” had been founded by Chukiwanka Ayulo and served for a long time as the voice of the indigenous movement in Lampa. The first issue was financed by the Indians of Lampa, the second by workers in Arequipa and the third by Chukiwanka. Quiroga took over then, financing the fourth (June 24, 1930) and subsequent numbers with other associates. He was by then the owner of "Tipografía e Imprenta Pututo.” The periodical “Inti” appeared in November 1933, once “Pututo” died, assuming the role of “baluarte de la defensa de los derechos del pueblo”, with a clearly defined program of action since it was one of the voices of the Aprista Party. Only seven numbers appeared due to the persecution of Aprismo by Benavides’s administration. (Tapia, Album de Oro, III: 129-130)

His two main works “La evolución jurídica de la propiedad rural en Puno” (1915) and “Proyecto de Legislación Indígena” (1920) remained mandatory readings for those studying the agrarian struture of the South. In his first work he introduced statistics of haciendas that became one of the main written testimonies to demonstrate latifundia expansion between 1876 and 1915. He denounced gamonalismo as “the natural political superstructure of a feudal economic regime.” He proposed the secularization of Church lands and the distribution of free parcels to the Indians to turn colonos into independent peasants. He believed it convenient to turn indigenes into the absolute and direct owners of the land, having communal lands administered as “aymas” producing rents that would sustain rural schools. (Tamayo 1982: 309) Quiroga’s legislative project was based on empirical experience: he knew first-hand the practices and customs of the peasantry. (Tamayo 1982: 310) Quiroga suffered repression but remained strong in his beliefs and actions. He joined the Aprista Party in 1930 and remained a member until his death in 1970. He died in poverty having the honor of being the most calumniated, persecuted and arrested member of Puno’s illustrated sector. (Tapia, Album de Oro, III: 129-130; Tamayo 1982: 308)

Ezequiel Urviola y Rivero was probably the most astonishing case in Puno’s indigenista movement. He was born in 1895 in the district of Muñani (Province of Azángaro), a pastoral area enclosed by some of the largest haciendas of the Department. Orphan at a young age in a precarious middle sector of impoverished small tenants caught between landlords and indigenes, he was soon deprived of his patrimony. He studied at the Centro Escolar of Azángaro, then at San Carlos as an intern in 1905, with an integral scholarship. (Kapsoli et al 1977: 182; Tamayo 1982: 311; Ramos Zambrano 1994: 10; Deustua & Rénique 1984: 28) Urviola played the indigenous quena with the perfection of a flute, even to the point of interpreting Mozart, but he had a back injury (hump), chest problems and wore glasses. He was nicknamed Copérnico, not so much for
his studiousness as for his physical defect: it seems it was a derivation of “qopo” Quechua word for hunchback. Romero affirms: “era un amigo que queríamos con pena.” (Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 185; Tamayo 1982: 312) Being an orphan deprived of inheritance, crippled and introverted, Urviola was denigrated or protected, integrated or rejected. Though he maintain friends issued from Puno’s landowning elite (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 12), he was constantly exposed to abuse and paternalism, just as Indians. His later identification with the indigenous cause then seems only natural. During those years, Urviola witnessed, heard and read about events that marked him, mainly attacks and massacres on indigenous communities. (Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 186)

According to Julián Palacios, Urviola directed for some time the Centro Escolar in Juli, but was expelled because it was prohibited by the statutes to have a professor with a physical malformation. In 1914, Urviola traveled to Arequipa to study Law. He participated in the creation of a periodical called “La voz de Azángaro” with other students from his province. In 1915 he wrote a manifest to his fellow azangarinos asking them to participate in the electoral campaign. He formed in Puno a “Comité de Adelanto Local” to improve the Department’s situation (1917). (Kapsoli et al 1977: 187-188) Classmate Antero Peralta remembered him as a “quarrelsome street man, without a speck of fear, proclaiming the ABC of anarchism at any place and any time (…); small, dark, hunchback and with a strong voice: he did not argue, he vociferated, imprecated, proffered inciting slogans. From him we learned to cry: “Back off, back off, bourgeois pig!” (Kapsoli et al 1977: 185-186)

In 1916, as a law student, Urviola published a newspaper add in Arequipa manifesting Velasco Choquehuancu was an usurper and could not sell the lands that belonged to Urviola and his family. He was barely waiting for his graduation as a lawyer to start a lawsuit of revindicication to recuperate his family’s patrimony. Velasco responded with a letter published in “La Federación” of Arequipa (I, nº 50, February 21, 1916) in which he cruelly scorned the landowning aspirations of Urviola. This might have increased Urviola’s virulence. (Tamayo 1982: 311) In 1916, he supported with his friend Enrique Encinas (brother of José Antonio and student of medicine in Arequipa) the peasant leaders who denounced the massacre of ten Indians in the peninsula of Chucuito by Emilio, Guillermo and Julio Pinazo. With Manuel Z. Camacho, Florentino Carrión, Juan M. Huanca and Antonio Calamullo, they marched with the coffins through the city of Puno, pronounced themselves against gamonalismo and demanded sanctions to authorities. Urviola also joined them in signing a pamphlet written in protest for the events of Chucuito. (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 13)

Urviola formed “nucleus of liberty” in haciendas and in 1920, after the assassination of a group of peasants in Chucuito, he received the victims in Puno’s main square pronouncing an incendiary discourse against gamonalismo. That year, he spent his vacations with Enrique Encinas in Puno and Azángaro trying to liberate the Indian from judicial procedures. They constituted themselves judges to work out small disputes among peasants, doing justice according to their convictions, ignoring as much as possible the legal establishment. They fixed innumerable affairs causing jaleousy and discontent among lawyers and polical authorities who saw their incomes diminish. This system worked for a couple of vacations, during which the indigenous population became used to Urviola. They trusted and even revered him: he spoke Spanish and Quechua, was knowledged and wrote for newspapers in favor of the Indian, yet had never asked them for anything, owned nothing, depended on nobody and was despised and attacked by his fellow mistis. (Tamayo 1982: 312; Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 190-191)
One event changed forever the life of Urviola. A group of young puneños had founded a cultural institution named Bohemia Andina. It was created to diffuse literature and art mainly through conferences and activities. This institution could not help expressing its generation’s worries about the climate of violence lived in the region. Emilio Romero wrote a play in 1918 (“The night of San Juan”) denouncing the situation. Urviola arrived from Azángaro before the performance and asked to be included in the cast as the Indian who in the first act was whipped by his master. On June 9, 1917, at the Municipal Theater of Puno, Urviola represented his part perfectly. On the next day, Romero found Urviola in the street still wearing the Indian clothes of the representation. He asked him what had happened and he confessed that he had found his path, that he finally knew who he was. Six months later, Romero found Urviola in Arequipa still dressed as an Indian. Worried, he asked him about his career. Without hesitation, Urviola asserted he had no intention of finishing a career which had only served to despoil and annihilate Indians, like they had done with him when he became an orphan. “I know my part”, he affirmed. (Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 191-192)

According to hacendado Lizandro Luna, Urviola’s transformation was so complete that he mastered the bitter mordant irony of Indians as well as the art of simulation and duplicity. He knew when to bend and when to lift himself as amauta. Indians obeyed him blindly, with a revering respect. (Kapsoli et al 1977: 191-193) Urviola participated in the foundation of the newspaper “El Federalista” to promote a federalist political organization for the country and wrote articles for Lima’s and Puno’s newspapers, and memorials addressed to the State. As founding member of the “Council of Indigenous Defense and Instruction of the Department of Puno” and Secretary of the “League of Indigenous Mutual Defense,” he denounced the massacre of Llallahua (October 1920) and many other abuses. Little is known about these institutions that could have been named just for the sake of legitimation. Still, as Réquique argues, they are testimonies of Urviola’s search for a connection between the urban and rural sectors, an alliance that would rescue the peasant fight from its secular isolation. Ramos Zambrano affirms Urviola inspired, assessed and encouraged the revolts of Santiago de Pupuja, Pinaya, Huaypara, Ichocollo, Ayaviri, Huancané and Huayta without intervening personally in the attacks. The leaders of these revolts were the friends and comrades of his many peregrinations to see political, administrative and judicial authorities. He maintained contact with leaders from all over the department, especially the Quechua area (Antonio Zea, Elías Mamani, Eduardo Quispe, Martín Huayta, Juan de la Cruz Chambi, Jorge Ticona, Juan Chura Huanca, Sebastián Huaynacho, Eugenio Mango Turpo, Anaceto Quispe Suyo, Toribio Quispe, Inocencio Condori, Miguel Cruz, Gerónimo Mamani, Carlos Condorena and Vicente Tinta). For all of this, he was restlessly persecuted by Azángaro’s hacendados. He had, by 1921, at least ten trials pending for revolt, mutiny and sedition. (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 37) His lawyer, Eduardo Pineda Arce, saved him several times from jail. Urviola

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147 The association included Emilio Romero, Manuel A. Quiroga, José Antonio Encinas, Arturo Peralta, Eduardo Pineda Arce, José Frisancho Macedo and Adrián Cáceres Olazo and many other intellectuals of the department. (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 15)

148 “En defensa del Indio”, La Prensa, Lima 18 October 1921; see also “El Siglo” nº 1715, Puno 21 September 1921, “La Voz del Obrero”, Puno 15 June 1917; (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 20-21) On October 12, 1922, he wrote a memorial in Lima asking for guarantees for the indigenes of the Department, a law prohibiting judges, notaries and scriveners to formalized forged documents of sale of lands, judicial possessions and measurements as well as the fixing of boundaries. He also asked for good authorities and affirmed gamonales had committed terrible crimes (pulling off eyes, castrating, cutting noses, lips, tongues, breasts, burying alive peasants and massacring entire communities) and conspired against the peaceful peasant movement by forming their own armies and inventing race wars, heresies, treasons and millenarist stories. (Tamayo 1982: 312-313; Réquique 2004: 76)
was also guarded day and night by Indians who revered him and called him “ccopito” (little hunchback). (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 39, 42)

Urviola could hardly escape persecution yet he kept coming back and forth. A supreme resolution (11 August 1922) granted third class fares Mollendo-Callao to Ezequiel Urviola “delegate of the communaries of Puno.” (AGN, MT, DGAi, 3.13.2.8) In 1923, his situation in Puno was untenable, so he traveled to Lima. Those who met Urviola in Lima in 1923 thought he was an Indian for he wore ojotas, chullo, poncho, sombrero and chewed coca. He had no fixed place and he ate lima beans, roasted corn and water. (Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 179) He met with the general disdain of the capital; still, he tried to stir the ambiance, diffusing the indigenous cause, denouncing gamonales, helping messengers demanding justice in Lima. He wrote pamphlets, articles, memorials to the President of the Republic and solicitudes to the president of the House of Representatives. He participated in congresses, pronounced discourses in plazas, unions, official ceremonies and at the Universidad Popular Gonzalez Prada. He strove to imprint the need for an agrarian reform and to strengthen an alliance between the working class and the peasantry. (Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 196-197)

In the prologue to Luis E. Valcárcel’s Tempestad en los Andes, José Carlos Mariátegui wrote: “Recuerdo el imprevisto e impresionante tipo de agitador que encontré hace cuatro años, en el indio puneño Ezequiel Urviola. Este encuentro fue la más fuerte sorpresa que me reservó el Perú a mi regreso de Europa. Urviola representaba la primera chispa de un incendio por venir. Era el indio revolucionario, el indio socialista. Tuberculoso, jorobado, sucumbió al cabo de dos años de trabajo infatigable. Hoy no importa ya que Urviola no exista. Basta que haya existido. Como dice Valcárcel, hoy la sierra está preñada de espartacos.” 149Urviola epitomized socialists’ expectations and hopes. He lived, however, in precarious conditions and took poor care of his health.

A resolution (June 13, 1924) granted Urviola state paid fare Callao-Mollendo-Pucará, “to return to his town” as “delegate of the indigenes of the department”. (AGN, MT, DGAi, 3.13.2.8) According to Palacios, Urviola was exiled and walked from Arica to Moquegua to return to Lima and continue with his fight. But, he was soon hospitalized. The workers of the garbage collecting system, most of them from Puno, took turns to care for him at the hospital; they feared gamonales would profit to attempt against his life. He died at 29 on January 27, 1925 (Zulen died the same day). José Antonio Encinas relates he went to the Chauffeur’s Federation were the body was waked but could not enter for the whole block was filled with all of Lima’s trade unions. The day of the burial the unions and organizations that accompanied the coffin singing “The International” covered at least ten blocks. (Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 198-204)

His total surrender to the cause made him an exceptional Indian who had an ample cultural formation and a simple but convincing rhetoric. (Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 179) Ramos Zambrano describes Urviola’s language as passionate and sometimes contradictory for he demanded justice yet sometimes did not believe in it. (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 24) Some authors have pointed out the ambiguity of trying to reconcile aspirations of progress, a relative openness to the novelties of the industrial era with the assertion of an indigenous identity as a valid and promising way to look at the future. (José Luis Rénique in Zambrano 1994: 6) For Kapsoli, Urviola could not overcome the Andean utopia; Flores Galindo affirmed his originality lied in

149 “I remember the unexpected and impressive kind of agitator I found four years ago in puneño Indian Ezequiel Urviola. This encounter was the strongest surprise that Peru reserved for me upon my return from Europe. Urviola represented the first spark of coming fire. He was the revolutionary Indian, the socialist Indian. Tuberculous, hunchback, he succumbed after two year of tireless labor. Today it is not important that Urviola does not exist. It is enough he existed. As Valcárcel says, today the Sierra is pregnant with spartacuses.”
amalgamating Andean utopia with anarchism and socialism. It is clear that his attitude set him apart and gave him an incomparable perspective of Puno’s situation and position to reach peasant constituencies.

Encinas, Chukiwanka Ayulo, Frisancho Macedo, Quiroga and Urviola were middle class intellectuals compromised with the defense of the local peasantry. They understood peasants had to be brought from isolation and included in the nation mainly through education, justice and political rights. Their labor strengthened the organicity of peasant mobilizations stressing the rationality of their demands. One of their most important legacies was the relationship they established between peasant leaders and the labor movement.

RURAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES INTENSIFY

The labor movement had grown in the last decades spreading to different public spaces, but remained rather enclosed in an orthodox and elitist perspective regarding the rural masses. Labor leaders stressed the idea of a cultivated socialism, a socialism that could not be spread openly to the uncultivated masses to avoid misuse. Nevertheless, a sector of the labor movement remained quite active in trying to spread its organization to peasant sectors and support peasant initiatives. Some union leaders understood the need to introduce themselves into indigenous demands. They often did so through their rank and file or through provincial indigenistas. This intermediation added layers of meaning that could distance the labor movement from actual peasant claims and needs perpetrating stereotypes and paternalist attitudes. Though often bypassed or ignored, messengers drew experience and information from their sporadic or permanent links to the labor movement. Many messengers through their ties to the urban worker movement participated in the universidades populares González Prada, where they acquired knowledge of law and many of the political ideas of the time.

By the 1920s, many peasant intellectuals had made political activism their modus vivendi, depending less on pro-indigenous lawyers and intellectuals and more on a growing number of indigenous migrants who had joined the proletariat and its organizations. (Rénique 2004: 91) They became active members of organizations such as the the Liga de Mutua Defensa Indígena continuing with their political labor even after the disappearance of these organizations. “Their successes also reflected the growing Indian willingness to embrace new alternatives and to accept new non-traditional leaders.” (Hazen 1974: 168) These were men such as Estanislao Aceituno, Mariano Paq’o, Carlos Condorena, Claudio Ramirez and Eduardo Quispe. These men from Aymara or Quechua peasant origin are cited as indigenistas, political activists and social agitators next to Ezequiel Urviola. (Tamayo Herrera 1982, Deustua & Rénique 1984)

Estanislao Aceituno was a discharged soldier from Puno. He acted as delegate in the first two Indigenous Congresses of 1921 and 1922, and was appointed Provincial Secretary of the CPDIT in 1921. He was literate and wrote memorials in Spanish for him and his companions. (AGN, MI Prefecturas 224) Mariano Paq’o was also a discharged soldier who became delegate from

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150 Federico Ortiz Rodríguez, “La organización social” in “Página del Pueblo”, Mundial II: 58, June 3, 1921.

151 Syndical newspaper “La Protesta” (found by Gonzalez Prada) published in February 1920 an article entitled “La cuestión indígena” that read: “No; el Estado está virtualmente muerto para el indio. Han de ser la vuelta al ayllu, a la comunidad libre, al municipio comunista y confederado, en lo administrativo, si se acepta el término, y la “Escuela Indígena Industrial Regionalista”, que preconiza el doctor Chuquiwanca Ayulo y un grupo de amigos, en lo que compete a la preparación eficiente del niño indígena para sus ulteriores funciones como unidad social, la que integrarán la evolución sociológica reservada a esa pobre raza. Entonces: ¡Inti lla! ¡ay manta cauchachiaj! ¡Sol de mi tierra, alumbras!” (Romero & Levano 1969: 76)
Huancané. After serving the cargos of his community, he joined the army and learned to bear arms reaching the grade of Sargent. He went to Tacna, La Paz and Cuzco and was a respected communal representative. He had three interviews with Leguía returning to Puno with state paid fares. In December 1922, with other delegates from Vilquechico, Moho and Rosaspata (Huancané), Paq’o solicited the Prefecture permission to practice military exercises. He was a fanatic of schools and in his community taught unionism, religion (he was close to Adventists) and how to read coca leaves for he was also a yatiri (medicine man, spiritual leader). (Register 172; AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8; Rénéque 2004: 96)

Carlos Condorena was delegate of the Provincial Sub-Committee of Huancane in 1922 and was sent to Lima to the Second Indigenous Congress. He traveled to Lima again in 1924 to denounce gamonal abuses and claim justice, and obtained return fares from the state on November 1924, by solicitude of Hipólito Salazar of the “Federación Indígena Obrera del Sur”. In a letter to the SAI, dated January 7 1925, Condorena identified himself as “Delegate and first implanter of Schools and all the progress initiated by the natives of Huancané.” He obtained from Leguía some form of authorization to construct autonomous schools without misti intervention (several private schools had already been built clandestinely) and was one of the promoters of the construction of the Indian led district town of Wancho-Lima in Huancané in late 1922. While in Lima, he participated in the project of the universidades populares González Prada acquiring knowledge about the constitution and the political ideas of the time. Condorena’s lands in the parcialidad Iscca-Cullcata were attacked by gamonales robbing and destroying all he possessed. His parents, four younger siblings and wife barely saved their lives and took refuge in the city of Puno but lacked resources, home, even food. He asked the government to pay their fares to Lima where he had come to sustain them with his “honest work”. The fares were granted a few days later. From Lima, Condorena tried to help his companions, many of whom had fled from Huancané after the events of 1923. He witnessed the internal problems and divisions of the CPDIT in 1924. With other delegates of Puno and Cuzco, he distanced himself from the CPDIT and joined the Regional Federation of Indigenous Workers, having to defend Martín Huayta and others detained in Arequipa in February 1925, accused of anarchism and subversion. (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8; AGN, MI 262, Vp-Zp 1925; Rénéque 2004: 91-98)

Claudio Ramirez was delegate of all the communal indigenes of the district of Ilave (province of Chucuito). In January 1923, he was in Lima presenting to the SAI a petition of protection and guarantees for the twenty-three rural schools they had built in the district that were being sabotaged by local landlords and authorities. In April 1923, he received state paid fares Callao-Mollendo-Puno to return home. (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8) Eduardo Quispe Quispe was part of the “Liga de Mutua Defensa Indígena” founded under the leadership of Ezequiel Urviola in 1920. That year, after the State sent an Investigative Commission to Puno, the messengers were persecuted and the Liga sent a Special Commission to Lima to denounce the threats of haciendados. Quispe traveled with Elías Mamani, Martín Huayta, Miguel Cruz and others. (ARP, Leg.454, Prefecturas 1021-1930) Quispe then became one of the leaders of the Azángaro Subcommittee. As delegate of Chaca, district of Santiago (province of Azángaro) he asked for guarantees to perform military exercises with drafted natives in the district.152 His activism led him to be appointed candidate to the Presidency of the Republic for the Peruvian Communist Party in 1931. (Tamayo 1982: 300, 313)

152 AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8; Register of denunciations made to the Prefecture of Puno between September 16, 1922 and March 16, 1923. ARP, Legajo 442: Prefecturas 1921-1930, p. 10.
According to Mariano Lario Yujra, peasant leadership in the 1920s was interconnected, literate and well spoken. Delegates and messengers had no fear to deal with representatives and senators. They had a clear idea of the political needs of their communities and were particularly convinced about the role of education. Some however were more radical, like Manuel Wawalque who was accused of wanting to kill all the *mestizos* arm the peasantry and create a war. This radicalism sprung sometimes from their activity as messengers and the situations they were exposed to. Events altered the visions they had of themselves, their people and the country. Activism reached families and sometimes changed the role of women. Messengers María de la Paz Chanini and Rosalía Lario Yujra posed as models in Lima’s School of Arts. Nicasia Yábar was a messenger from Puno that became political activist participating in the presidential campaign of Eduardo Quispe Quispe and the Communist Party. (Rénique 2004: 97)

Puno was a center of irradiation of peasant activism. Official reports arriving from the high provinces of Cuzco mentioned indigenous agents arrived from the Collao, distributing propaganda in the railway stations and organizing meetings in the province of Espinar aiming to organize a revolt. The nucleus of peasant messengers from Huancané were thought to be intimately linked to the movement that developed in Espinar under the leadership of Domingo Huarcca against mestizo attempts to change the seat of the provincial capital. (Rénique 2004: 96)

On August 25, 1921, Estanislao Aceituno, Gaspar Apumaita Lopez and other delegates from Puno and Cuzco were in Lima waiting for an audience with the President. They were being persecuted by *gamonales* and local authorities, who threatened them with death, as well as their families which had been thrown out of their lands. Aceituno affirmed they went daily to ask for an audience with the President without success. Worried for their lives, families and properties and considering themselves deprived “servidores a su Nación” (the president’s) they solicited an audience with the President or the Minister of War as well as their “libretas de licenciamiento”. The memorial was signed by seven messengers all literated.153 (AGN, MI Prefecturas 224)

Peasant appeals were more successful in areas of less hacendado control, mostly Aymara areas, where the government’s pro indigenista initiatives were capturing the attention of mestizos and indigenous intellectuals. They had multiplied and increased their knowledge over the years; they identified themselves as Indians and acted as scriveners and proxies in all sorts of demands and claims. Some had a calling: they were leaders of their communities; others made a business out of finding justice for the indigenous groups. They all had acquired a grasp of regional and national politics that made them more keen and effective. Such is the case of Aurelio Lupo Meza Franco, “Indian of the district of July” or Juan Florentino Carrion, indigene from the city of Puno; both literate, informed, legally and politically experienced.

Lupo Meza, owner of a very elaborate signature, had no academic title but acted as legal advisor and representative in Juli. In a lawsuit, a notary public in Puno Alfredo Aramayo Gonzalez certified the signature of Lupo Meza was authentic since it was the same he used in all his private and public acts. Lupo Meza was a professional Indian tinterillo with a typewriter, a proficient legal vocabulary, and knowledge of legal procedures and political imbricacies. In August 1921, he was asking for the destitution of Juli’s Sub-prefect accused of corruption and of the assassination of three Indians whose lands he coveted. Lupo Meza identified the accused authority as a former Pardista who had benefited from a Sub-prefecture in Caraz and now played the leguista song to obtained more state appointments. To foster his case, Lupo Meza affirmed the province of

153 Aceituno the scrivener, Francisco Chilo Murguía, Julian Condori, J. E. Aguilar, Timoteo Luna, Felix Huilca and Mariano Sullicarana, all signed with good handwriting.
Chucuito had been a bastion of Leguismo since 1918 and he appealed to the ideals conquered by the Revolution of the 4th of July 1919. (AGN, MI/Prefectura 213, “Mp-Up” 1921)

Juan Florentino Carrión had worked for Encinas at the Centro Escolar as second auxiliary. In 1922, Juan Florentino Carrión acted as proxy of “a poor Indian Huahualuque” who accused Darío Lucas Carpio of three homicides in Inchupalla. The case file had disappeared when it was being sent from the Superior Court of Puno to the Supreme Court of Justice in Lima, and the widow Ponce blamed Carrión. Mrs. Ponce’s daughter was married to a brother of Darío Lucas Carpio and the widow took her son in law’s family troubles into hand attacking Carrión. The Indian defender, however, was smart and experienced enough to keep a copy of the disappeared file, which he was presenting again to the Judge and to the Prefect of Puno. Interestingly enough, Carrión sees eye to eye with hacendada and family matron Mrs. Ponce. He accused her of having the original stolen document and threatened to sue her after taking care of the arbitrary order of detention she managed to raise against him: “…me reservo mi derecho para después poder hacer los reclamos que sean de ley, por la indebida forma como ha obtenido mi contendora tal decreto, que sabre castigarlo con arreglo a ley.” (ARP, Legajo 447: Prefectura 1921-1930) Carrión spoke as in a duel and presented his dignity and reputation as assets to promote the procedures and reach justice. (ARP, Legajo 447: Prefectura 1921-1930) He did not appeal to a humble or depressed indigenous condition as Urviola did, though he applied it to the Indian he represented. He preferred playing with the concepts of good and evil from a more powerful position: he was the brave and just man helped by providence who had never wished any ill to the evil woman who kept threatening him.

By 1928, Juan Florentino Carrión had a professional title and served as an employee at the Secretariat of the Patronato Indígena. He had spent over thirty years working in different public offices in Puno and ran a “Judicial Agency.” He became an empowered indigenous defender facing and denouncing with great irony the ineptitude and subjection of local authorities. Carrión stressed that his actions had always led to correct resolutions of cases and that he had always defended the Indian out of humanity, considering his need for an “honest tutor.”

Indigenous proxies and defenders were not just becoming more specialized and prepared; they were also creating links and networks of support as they met. In November 1923, twenty three delegates from Puno and Cuzco came together to publish a small article in Lima’s newspaper “El Tiempo.” Marcelino Haliri, delegate from Acomayo (Cuzco) was falsely accused of subversion and persecuted by the local subprefect. The twenty three delegates testified Haliri had been in Lima all along. At least ten of these delegates present in Lima were from Puno, amongst them were Carlos Condorena and Domingo Condori from Huancané, Remigio Huarancca from Ayaviri, María de la Paz Chanina from the district of Chucuito (province of Puno), Cristobal Alvarez from Puno, Antonio Zea from Azángaro and of course, Ezequiel Urviola.155

In 1919, most messengers had adhered to the campaign of Leguía and his project. Ezequiel Urviola was one of the strongest promoters of young teacher José Antonio Encinas’s campaign to be elected Representative for Puno, organizing political meetings in Puno. For the first time thousands of Indians gathered at the Parque Pino to listen to both men. Encinas election was a triumph for Urviola and the peasantry. (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 23) Once elected Representative Encinas responded to his constituencies promoting the creation of an official commission charged

154 J. Florentino Carrión y Alfaro & Julio G. Aspiazu, “Mensura de Propiedades Indígenas y NUESTROS ENEMIGOS” (sic) in La Provincia (?), 15/11/1928, ARP.

of studying the Indian and agrarian situation of the Department of Puno and dictating adequate legislation.

The Commission that visited Puno in August 1920 included Enrique Rubín (President of the Superior Court of Justice of Ancash), Erasmo Roca (representing the Ministry of Labor), Humberto Luna (teacher and student of the indigenous reality in Cuzco) and Alejandro Franco Hinojosa (puneño intellectual who acted as secretary and interpreter of the commission). They realized a careful visit of the centers most densely populated, listening to peasant complaints and assessing the situation. Many messengers presented themselves to the commission with their claims, especially those who had joined Ezequiel Urviola into the Liga de Mutua Defensa Indígena. The complaints came as an avalanche: 521 from Puno, 562 from Chucuito, 234 from Lampa, 777 from Ayaviri, 4,552 from Azángaro, 275 from Sandia and 13 from Carabaya. In all, the commission received 7,080 claims, 86% of which were about land issues, followed by 7% about gamonal abuses. 68% of the land complaints came from Azángaro (4,180) as well as 41% (231) of the claims about abuses of gamonales and 46% of the denunciations of attacks to schools. This indicates the size of the problem but also the labor done by Urviola and other messengers in Azángaro. The commission reached Azángaro on August 19 and remained there for eight days leaving then for Ayaviri, amongst the cries and laments of between eight and ten thousand clinging to their vehicle, begging them to stay and prevent gamonal revenges. (Rengifo in kapsoli et al 1977: 193-194; Rénique 2004: 85-87)

The commission raised all kinds of fear and suspicions. Upon its arrival to Puno, it had been met by haciendo association “Sociedad Ganadera del Titicaca.” There Julio Cano presented copies of two letters supposedly sent from Azángaro to Urviola that mentioned the recollection of ramas and the need to receive powder and dynamite for the attacks on private properties. As soon as the commission reached Azángaro, the criminal judge of Puno ordered the preventive detention of Urviola and Stahl (the first visit of the commission after leaving Puno was Platería) out of fear they would incite the masses to mobilize. Urviola was taken to the Prefecture. The peasantry demanded the freedom of its leader. The commission chose not to intervene. Humberto Luna affirmed it was a matter to be solved by the Judicial Power. It seems the commission did not feel at ease with Urviola’s power and activism either. (Rengifo in kapsoli et al 1977: 193-194; Ramos Zambrano 1994: 24-25; Rénique 2004: 84) In Ayaviri, though authorities had received terminant order to give all kinds of facilities to the commission they decided to take reprisals before its arrival. A group of local “notables” headed by the Sub-prefect and accompanied by guards initiated a mounted persecution against Indians accusing them of preparing a revolt. They hindered hundreds of Indians from presenting their complaints. Each night, the Sub-prefect organized an urban guard firing constantly to the thousands of Indians he assured were hiding in the hill of Chollaquehorcona waiting for the right moment to attack the population. The commission was sued by the provincial judge of Ayaviri and its members threatened with prison. Ayaviri’s notables assured the commissioners there were no conflicts in their province; complaints were produced by the intervention of ill intentioned people who told the Indians the Commission came to distribute land. (Rénique 2004: 87-88)

Encinas expected the Commission to work as an instance revising property titles in situ and resolving usurpation problems. He believed that negotiations, new channels of expression and exposing gamonales to public scrutiny could stop the avalanche of hacienda growth and promote the democratization of the region. But the Commission depended on the good will of the new national caudillo, lacked executive faculties and could only receive tramitations, pass them onto the Chamber of Representatives and present a report with a law project. (Rénique 2004: 84-85) The Commissioners elaborated a report and a large project of indigenous tutelary legislation that was
The project was never discussed, stalled by latifundista pressure. To no one’s surprise, one of the main conclusions drawn by the commissioners was that the bellicosity of Indians in Azangaro responded to the fact it was the province where more communal lands had been usurped and where they found the largest latifundia in the department. They concluded the Indian of Azángaro “ya no tiene el espíritu apocado que le era característico.” (Rénique 2004: 87) The document elaborated soon disappeared from the archive with its annexed documents (Roca published the report he wrote with Luna in 1935 under the title “Por la clase indígena”) but the Commission had already had immediate local effects. (Tamayo 1980: 283; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 118; Rénique 2004: 83)

The president of the Superior Court of Puno, Severiano Bezada, affirmed in 1921 that the presence of State commissioners had aggravated the situation and revolted the masses. He considered it had been a mistake to give the commission the faculty to appoint new authorities, whom were mostly Indians, compromised with invasions of private lands. Commissioners were thus responding in situ to peasant claims or following upon peasant initiatives, ratifying their appointments. The commission noticed a “curious fact”: some communities had established their own autonomous organization with prefect, subprefects, governors, lieutenants and judges whose decisions were unappealable and strictly carried on under the threat of penalties and fines. This system of native appointed authorities was so effective that they did not need to call upon the constituted authorities. Though aware of the danger this scheme involved for “national unity”, commissioners were positively surprised by the cohesion shown by communities and the effectiveness of their initiatives. In their will to educate their children, Indians built schools with their own hands, painted them in white (as a sign of civilization) and found their own teachers, mostly among discharged soldiers. (Rénique 2004: 86)

By appointing new indigenous and pro-indigenous authorities, the Commission stirred the balance of power in a conflictive area where communities were being eaten up by hacendados at a fast pace. The effect of the commission is however difficult to evaluate considering the events that followed its departure. Soon after the Commission left, “feudal lords” had ignored its “wise” dispositions, laws and authority carrying on ignominous revenges against “peaceful and defenseless” peoples accusing them of false revolts and repressing them with violence with the confabulation of local provincial authorities. Ezequiel Urviola, Elias Mamani, Eduardo Quispe, Martin Huayta, Miguel Cruz and others were persecuted to be victimized or jailed; their houses were attacked. In a memorial addressed to the president of the house or representatives, Urviola denounced a massacre in Llallahua, district of Santiago de Pupuja in October 1920. After the commission left, the gamonales of Santiago de Pupuja massacred twelve indigenes and wounded four in the parcialidad of Llallahua. One of them, Isaac Arapa, left a widow and nine children in poverty. Apparently they had gathered in a building housing an Adventist mission. Justice had not been done and the main authors of such a massacre, Arturo and Rómulo Díaz Díanderas walked freely singing poems about their deeds. Juan Gualberto Díanderas had been appointed governor of the district by subprefect Chávarri, accomplice of the hecatombe. These complaints were never discussed in Congress; the memorial was sent to the Ministry of Development and finally filed in the Patronato. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 184; Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 193-194; Rénique 2004: 87)

Many congressional representatives profited to blame president Leguía for the social unrest that occurred with the commission’s visit, accusing Encinas of organizing the upheavals. The media linked the events in Puno to “antinational” and pro-Bolivian attempts at resurrecting the Inca Empire, as they had done with Gutiérrez Cuevas’s movement in 1915. These conjectures touched a sensitive nationalist nerve considering the plebiscite going on about the fate of the southern
provinces lost to Chile. They also showed the anxiety of southern elites with the unstoppable advance of the peasant movement and the growing attention paid by the State. Since the arrival of Leguía’s second administration instances of claim had multiplied: the Executive, National and Regional Congresses, Judicial power, provincial and departmental authorities, pro-indigenous intellectuals, new pro-indigenous official organizations and investigative commissions. New political characters had come to power interested in responding to the claims of popular classes. This climate led to all kinds of interethnic and interclass alliances that made the period particularly advantageous for the promotion of peasant demands and, in particular, for the formation of peasant political organizations.

THE COMITÉ PRO-DERECHO INDÍGENA TAHUANTINSUYO

Several organizations were formed during this period for the defense of peasant interests: the "Liga de Mutua Defensa Indígena" founded by Urviola in Azángaro, the "Council for Indian Defense and Instruction"156, the “Committee of Thirty-Three Friends”157, “Sociedad Auxiliadora de los Pueblos de Atuncolla y Soraza”158, etc. However by far the most important was the Comité Pro-Derecho Indígena Tawantinsuyo created in 1920 by Indians of rural origin and indigenistas from Lima and the provinces such as Dora Mayer and José Antonio Encinas. The presence of Mayer indicates a possible continuation of the disappeared Asociación Pro-Indígena. The latter certainly set the most important precedent for the new Comité. However, there was a considerable difference between these two organisms: while the Asociation was a pro-Indian institution founded and led by urban intellectuals mostly from Lima, the Comité, though founded in Lima, was composed of and directed by people of provincial rural origins.

“Tawantinsuyu delegates were usually estancieros, relatively wealthy ayllu members who owned large herds of sheep and alpacas. Since many of them were literate and because commerce was an activity associated with mestizos, away from their place of residence, they could identify themselves as mestizos. In their villages, because of their ayllu membership, they could define themselves, and where defined by the authorities, as Indians.” (De la Cadena 2000: 95) The members of the CPDIT identified themselves as mestizos in the same way I will not discard as mestizos (and thus not rightful Indian representatives) the Spanish speaking literate members of the Comité working for the organization of a national Indian organism to protect indigenous rights. In the same way I will not discard as non-Indians, members of the working class. The principles of the association itself indicated this: “El Comité Central Pro Derecho-Indígena Tahuantinsuyo, fue fundado en la Capital de la República el 16 de junio de 1920, por los trabajadores de la raza indígena, de distintas organizaciones laborales residentes en Lima, con el fin de unificar a los de su raza y hacerles conocer sus derechos políticos, económicos y sociales, porque su trabajo representa el progreso y

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156 This group included Manuel Zuñiga Camacho and Ezequiel Urviola and wrote documents stressing the official authorization to build private facilities and the need for vocational schools and a normal school for Indians. (Hazen 1974: 165)

157157 It was formed in Huancané in 1923 and was affiliated with the Comité Provincial de Obreros Indígenas de la Región Sur. (Hazen 1974: 166)

158 “Society to Aid the Towns of Atuncolla and Soraza” founded by Indians who migrated to Arequipa. (Hazen 1974: 166)
Founded during the height of Leguía’s government, after the passing of the new Constitution, this organization with syndical influence presented since the day of its foundation clear and viable objectives. Though it was presented as non-political, it had a formal agenda: the legal protection and recognition of Indian citizen rights and the support of education as a unique weapon for indigenous defense. Two declarations of principles are available in print. Both are signed by Secretary General Demetrio Sandoval, but one is dated June 16 1920, the day of foundation, the other is dated June 19. (Oré 1983: 353-361; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 72-73) Though similar, certain differences in these declarations of principles give some insights over the nature of the association and its goals. (Oré 1983: 353)

The CPDIT faced a difficult and continuous fight that could not be hindered by political complications. Its members had to avoid all political affiliation and show good conduct and morality in all acts within and outside the association. The committee did not want to appear as a political party, a potential threat to Leguía’s government so it avoided political denominations. The several denominations given to the association in the initial document (“Nationalist Association," “Central Committee of Indigenous Defense," "Central Committee of Indigenous Communities of Peru") were replaced in the second document by the more generic “Comité Central Pro Derecho Indígena Tahuantinsuyo”. The second document also erased many references to the Inca Empire that were initially at the core of the association’s symbolism and claims for legitimacy. While the first document announced in chapter VIII the need for “Social Restauration”, the second document called for a “regeneration”. (Oré 1983: 355; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 72) The first document upheld the idea of a return to a previous regime, a change in the social (and even political) order. The second document used a less dangerous term, which successfully resounded among intellectuals, politicians and Lima’s elite for it related to the need to rescue “the race” from above. The tone was also mellowed down in its symbolism. Both documents asked for the commemoration of the August 29, 1533. But while the first one identified the date as the day of the “tragic destruction of the Social Organization of Tahuantinsuyo," the second document identified it as the day the assassination of Inca Emperor Atahualpa was perpetrated by Spanish conquistadors.160 (Oré 1983: 356; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 73)

Even the official seal of the Committee was changed in this gist. (Oré 1983: 357; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 73) The first seal proposed was a circle surrounded by the name and founding date of the institution on top and signs of the labor movement (shovel and pick) at the bottom. At the center of the seal there was a composition of mountains, a rising sun (symbol of the reemergence of Liberty)161, the star of Venus and traditional symbols as the llama and the quinua

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159 “The Pro indigenous Committee Tahuantinsuyo was founded in the Capital of the Republic on June 16, 1920, by the workers of the indigenous race from different labor organizations residing in Lima, to unify those of their race and make them know their political, economic and social rights, because their work represents the progress and wealth of the Republic, having as leitmotiv: Union by principle, cultura and illustration by means.” Declaration of Principles dated June 19, 1920. (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 72)

160 For Tawantinsuyu, equality was political, and did not require racial/cultural homogeneity. However, their project also drew from culturalist definitions of race, which they imagined (as did liberal indigenistas) as a historically inherited tradition in the form of customs, symbols, memories, and remains, some of which the Tawantinsuyu Committee used to launch its campaign for Indian citizenship. (De la Cadena 2000: 92) De la Cadena refers to the name of the committee, symbols in the logo (sun), the commemoration of Inca figures and dates.

161 The sun was in all sub-prefects and juries headers of paper: the sun surrounded the national blazon with his rays and was surrounded by a crown of laurels. (AGN, Prefectura de Puno, MI 209)
tree. This seal carried on each side the dates 1178 and 1544 (apogee and fall of the Inca Empire) and in the center a diminute map of the Inca Empire. The dates and map were erased from a second version of the seal to avoid any hint of a political threat to the established order. They were replaced by European symbols (olive and laurel branches underneath the pick and shovel) and more trees (the reference to the local quinua tree is also erased). The final seal added to the second version the complete name of the organization and its date of foundation. The final seal maintained the sun rising over the mountains over trees and a llama.

Other things that could be read as threats to the social order were also suppressed. The first document denoted syndical influence in the use of a more Marxist and gendered discourse. The first document presented an association founded by "the workers of both sexes, from different towns, residing in the Capital" who gathered to "unify through the organization of the indigene brothers." (Oré 1983: 353) The first document showed a more open and comprehensive association, with 3 delegates by department, province, district or annex (ayllu) (instead of 2 in the second document). It seemed willing to absorb any indigenous intellectual "from both sexes", any important figure willing to help in the "unification and sociability by means of the Social Organization towards production and super-production of the land, thus searching integral economic emancipation of the indigene". (Oré 1983: 355) A dramatic and sometimes confusing materialist discourse was replaced in the second document by a more subtle and politically correct language. Economicist perspectives were replaced by a vague notion of "culture": the committee sought "unification and sociability through culture among the indigenous race..." (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 72) The Directive Board of the Committee might have revalued the need to emphasize race identification over proletarian and gender identifications. It might also have considered the many dangers involved in absorbing too many forces that could later be difficult to channel towards the same objectives and means.

The inclusion of "Protectors" could be particularly dangerous for they could be accused of running the association or manipulating it for particular political or non-political purposes. The association was to be run by indigenes for indigenes to ensure its continuity. Only the testimony of the victim was needed to start procedures against an abusive authority or landlord, but the members of the committee must strive towards the conservation of order avoiding movements of "effervescence" due to abuses. (Oré 1983: 356, Ramos Zambrano 2003: 73) Gender equality clauses were strong in the first document, referring to the founders and to the future members of the association. They might have been brought forth due to the presence of "associated protectors" such as journalist and agitator Dora Mayer and even indigenous women. Women will participate in provincial subcommittees. Though these gender equality indicators are reduced in number and strength (the second document only mentions indigenes from both sexes have the right to elect their representatives) it is nevertheless a visionary move of this association. Peruvian women were not allowed to vote and had little opportunities for public participation in this period.

The organization thus ensured its survival and growth by focusing on the defense and cultural insertion of the indigenous race. (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 73 Chapter XI; Oré 1983: 356 Chapter XIII) As Rénique pointed out: "Ni el anarquismo peruano era un todo procesado y coherentemente los

162 Dora Mayer was delegate from the Province of Jauja in 1922 according to the publication "Tahuantinsuyo" (November 30, 1922). This issue also mentions Carmen Mamani as delegate of Caylloma and Nieves Tello as delegate of Talyacaja. (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 75) María de la Paz Chanina was for several years the delegate from the district of Chucuito (province of Puno). Eulalia Torres was appointed indigenous delegate from the district of Conchucos and received a fare to go on steamboat to Chimbote and train to La Limeña. (AGN, MT, DGAI 1921-30, 3.13.2.8)
personeros indígenas eran actores unidimensionales dados a la teoría más que a la astuta evaluación de las correlaciones de fuerza local y nacional.” (Rénique 2004: 93) Though the CPDIT was founded to give Indians access to citizen status and teach them about their rights, it was identified as a non-political organization to guarantee its survival and state support.

Once the statutes were approved, official recognition was solicited and granted on June 21, 1920, by the Labor Section of the Ministry of Development: “Vistos los estatutos del Comité Pro Derecho-Indígena Tahuantinsuyo y teniendo en consideración que se trata de una institución de carácter puramente nacional que, llevada a cabo en toda su forma, producirá grandes beneficios a la raza indígena: Reconózcase oficialmente y expídase por la Sección de Trabajo la nota respectiva con la transcripción de este decreto. Firmado: Barros.” (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 71-72) For Burga and Flores Galindo, the foundation of the Committee showed the fluid communication between Lima and the Southern provinces through the relations of pro-indigenous leaders and “ramalistas” of the interior. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 117) The CPDIT actually seemed an instrument to surveil and give continuity to the government’s promises. It created a network of support for messengers traveling to Lima and empowered messengers increasing their sense of legitimacy and support. (Rénique 2004: 92)

Each subcommittee was recognized by a resolution of the Ministry of Development by petition of the Secretary General of the Central Committee. Samuel Núñez, first Secretary General of the institution, used these occasions to stress in writing that the CPDIT was a legal and well organized association with an official hierarchy, recognized by the government, created to foster the culture and unification of its race (“propender a la cultura i unificación de su raza”). With each ministerial resolution recognizing a sub-committee, he added the declaration of principles and a typewritten list of members and personnel of the Directive Board (President, Secretary General, Secretario de Actas, Pro-Secretary, Treasurer, Accountant, Archivist Librarian, vocals, Commission of Education, delegate and sub-delegate).

Subcommittees spread all over the country and especially in the Southern Andes. The Provincial Subcommittee of Puno was founded on June 18, 1920, only two days after the Central Committee’s foundation. It was provided with a seal, a general secretary (Estanislao Aceituno) and materials. The foundation of this sub-committee was supported by indigenistas Manuel A. Quiroga and Emilio Romero, but also by indigenous representatives and messengers such as Florentino Carrión. On November 3, 1921, a Departmental Sub-committee was founded in Puno with messenger Julián Nina as General Secretary. An undated document from the SAI shows the extent to which activism spread in Puno. It is a list of the fares paid for indigenous delegates traveling to Ica, Arequipa, Cuzco, Puno and Santa Rosa. The SAI paid eleven fares to Ica, 27 fares to Arequipa, 53 fares to Cuzco and 69 fares to Puno. The names of the delegates from Puno include CPDIT members such as Carlos Condorena, Florentino Jara, Vicente Tinta and José María Tune. (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8)

The Society celebrated August 29, 1922, with a series of activities in Puno City. Only about five hundred attended, partly because the Prefect had responded to predictions of a crowd of 10,000 by asking district governors to prevent Indians from leaving for

163 “Having seen the statutes of the Comité Pro Derecho-Indígena Tahuantinsuyo and taking into consideration that it is an institution of purely national carácter that, taken in all its form, will produce great benefits for the indigenous race: it is recognized officially and the respective note should be issued by the Section of Labor with the transcription of this decree. Signed: Barros.”
the capital. The day was noteworthy nonetheless. The Puno Sub-Committee had requested a requiem mass for Atahualpa, or at least masses for the souls of his murderers, Pizarro and Valverde. It had also noted that the Bishop might demonstrate sympathy for the Indians by petitioning for the abolition of ecclesiastical fees. Catholic Indians attended Church services, which were followed with a program of lectures at the Colegio San Carlos and a parade through town. Perfect order was maintained. (Hazen 1974: 164)

In 1922, there was an explosion of sub-committees in Puno’s provinces. Districts like Arapa (Azángaro), Juliaca, Acora and Chucuito (Puno Province) had subcommittees with delegates all over the district. Even ayllus and parcialidades formed their own subcommittees, like the parcialidad of Caricari (district of Vilque Mañazo, province of Puno). Caricari elected on March 6, 1922, a complete directive council. (ARP, CPDIT Folder) Vilque Mañazo was a particularly active district that presented a large number of memorials to local authorities and to the Patronato de la Raza Indígena. The Caricari subcomité was recognized by the government on May 11, 1922, according to a comuniqué from Prefect Villanueva who ordered Vilque’s authorities to grant it guarantees.164

Records show a large number of officially recognized sub-committees in Puno, although more probably existed with and without official recognition. By 1922, the provinces with more recognized subcommittees were Azángaro (district of Arapa, district of Sillota, parcialidad Callana Pata Japi -district of Asillo, parcialidad Carasupo Tututatira Chucayaca -district of Muñani, parcialidad Iltata-Tiramasa -district of Muñani, parcialidad Jasana -district of Samán, parcialidad Llanllii -district of Potoni, district of Saman, district of San Anton)165 and Puno (district of Acora, parcialidad Lacache -district of Acora, district of Chucuito, district of Juliaca, Annex of Pacxsa -district of Tiiquillaca, parcialidad Varaya -district of Puno, parcialidad Caricari -district of Vilque Mañazo). (AGN, MT, DGA1 3.13.2.9, 1922; AGN, MI 224, 1921)

The Province of Ayaviri (separated from Lampa in 1901) counted with a provincial subcommittee (Secretary Mariano de la Cruz), and a distrital subcommittee in Orurillo and several subcommittees within this district (parcialidad Tecouca, parcialidad Caychimpa-Manasaya, parcialidad Caychimpa-Sullcata, etc.).166 Fewer records were found for the province of Lampa (Palca and Vilavila) and the Aymara provinces of Chucuito (Provincial Subcommittee of Chucuito and Subcommittee of llave) and Huancane (Provincial Subcommittee of Huancane, Subcommittees in parcialidad Pasuata and parcialidad Inchupalla). But even the more distant jungle provinces of Carabaya (Macusani, Coaza and Ayapata) and Sandia (Limbani, Patambuco and Huancasayani) left traces of the existence of subcommittees.167

164 Document sent by Samuel Nuñez, secretary general of the CPDIT to the Section of Indigenous Affairs on 16 April 1922. (ARP, Fólder PRI, f. 57)

165 Register of denunciations made to the Prefecture of Puno between September 16, 1922 and March 16, 1923. ARP, Legajo 442: Prefecturas 1921-1930, p. 47 & 50.

166 Register of denunciations made to the Prefecture of Puno between September 16, 1922 and March 16, 1923. ARP, Legajo 442: Prefecturas 1921-1930, p. 80, 97-98. AGN, MT, DGA1, 3.13.2.9

Subcommittees carried on formal elections to select messengers and delegates for general assemblies and indigenous congresses. On May 30, 1922, eight parcialidades of the district of Acora gathered to elect a delegate for the Assembly of the Department of Puno. In an open (oral) suffrage, Don Isidro L. Arohuanca C. was selected and given the register of the 384 voters involved (from 9 to 80 years old). (ARP, CPDIT folder, Legajo 1930: Expediente 1519) On October 28, 1921, Vicente Tinta Ccoa was appointed head of the Subcommittee of Macusani (Province of Carabaya), founded by the communities of Pacaje, Hanac-Ayllu and Mina-Huisa. Tinta Ccoa remained the leader of this sub-committee after the renewal of the Directive Board on April 23, 1923 and continued in this post for several years. Tinta Ccoa filled all the requisites to be selected “once again” as their delegate according to the first and third articles of the Constitution: he was an independent person, without complaints or lawsuits against him. He acknowledged no pressure and could read and write Spanish, besides speaking Quechua. He was elected by unanimity with 288 votes. Tinta Ccoa represented his community in the Third Indigenous Congress. According to Ramos Zambrano he was not just one of the founders of the Subcommittee, his name appeared in several documents of the period as well as publications such as “Tahuantinsuyo” and “Pututo.” He had for long acted as proxy and messenger of local communities and was in several occasions punished or threatened by gamonales and authorities for his “antisocial” activities. (Ramos Zambrano 1980: 122-123) Jorge Ticona in Lampá (supported by Chukiwanka Ayulo and the periodical Pututo edited by Quiroga) and Eduardo Quispe in Azángaro are also cases of long term leadership and activity of local subcommittees. Quispe appeared as President of the Azángaro Sub-committee in documents from the 1930s. (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 80)

Some delegates reached positions of power. The governor of Atuncolla, Manuel Bruno Paredes, who called himself delegate of the Pro-Indígena, was accused of instigating the Indians against landowners and planning to redistribute hacienda lands. In April 1922, Paredes interrupted the measurement, delimitation and appraisal procedures solicited by of hacienda Umayo (district of Atuncolla, province of Puno). The lands of Istri, considered communal lands by the members of ayllu Anansaya, were being measured by the surveyors as “reintegrated” or “adyacent” estancias of the hacienda Umayo. The governor arrived abacked by over 200 Indians, armed with slingshots and even revolvers. Paredes and the Anansaya communaries were accused of frustrated homicide, sedition and damages. However, the communaries had already taken legal measures: aware of the presence of the surveyors they had sent Victor Paredes to Puno to complain to Prefect, Subprefect and even the Patronato. “Intelligent in Spanish” and literate, Victor Paredes wrote denunciations of land usurpation, tumult and injury against the hacienda’s mayordomo and neighboring landowners identified as “modern landowners” using armed colonos to form their estancias. Victor Paredes affirmed these men wanted to commit a “subversive hecatomb” and he added a report of Governor Bruno Paredes who confirmed the abuses. (ARP, CPDIT Folder, expediente 409, f. 1-8)

The swiftness of peasant actions is surprising. They were well informed and organized. They counted with CPDIT backed, Spanish speaking and literate leaders and authorities such as Manuel Bruno and Victor Paredes (identified as a 32 year old farmer), Herminegildo Mansilla and Seferino C. Arias. Their signatures were clear, firm and elaborated. Alejandro Calsín was on the process of becoming literate and could already sign his name. Herminegildo Mansilla presided in 1924 over the Fourth Indigenous Congress held in Lima. (ARP, Földer CPDIT, expediente 409, ff. 4-7) The

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168 Over 15 signatures of other indigenes accompany the document. (Ramos Zambrano 1980: 122)
communaries of Anansaya also counted with the legal counsel of Manuel A. Quiroga who acted as defender of Victor Paredes.

Some pro-indigenous authorities exceeded their post or were often admonished for their pro-indigenous attitude. On August 1, 1922, Ana María Giraldo widow of Cosio, a literate woman from Puno, accused Governor of Capachica, José F. Carbonel of house breaking, kidnapping and torturing his nephew Rafael Giraldo, resident in the peninsula of Capachica. According to the plaintiff, Governor Carbonel with more than six Indians who called themselves “delegados de un Sub-comité indígena” sequestered Giraldo and two companions from his house. Undressed, Giraldo was thrown water, put in the bar and then in jail. The next day they had to pay a fine of $32 soles and subscribe a document saying they would not complain. The accused Governor, José Carbonel y Vermú, a 50 year-old military from Chiclayo was caught in a local dispute over pasturing cattle. Giraldo had captured 35 heads of wool cattle pasturing in his lands. Carbonel responding to peasant complaints summoned the accused. Giraldo ignored three of the Governor's summons and sent offensive messages so Carbonel then sent a commission of fifteen men. A previous commission had been threatened with fire weapons so no smaller commission wanted to go.

When they reached the office of the governor, Carbonel scolded Giraldo with indignation comparing him to the other neighbors of Capachica, who were abusive and harassed or antagonized the Indians committing exactions. Governor Carbonel used foul language and jailed Giraldo without letting him speak and denying him a cover. Giraldo was apparently drunk, would not listen and spent the night screaming against the Governor saying he would throw him from his post. On the next morning, Giraldo was scolded again by Governor Carbonel who told him that killing other people’s sheep and hurting a woman could damage his reputation and threaten his job at the Fiscal Treasure. He recommended an arrangement with the peasants and asked Giraldo to sign a document saying he would not complain to the Prefect, would pay for the healing expenses of each bruised person and the missing sheep and would give up a cow to compensate the inconveniencies he gave the commissioners. A bull would be held until he paid it all. If he refused he would be punished more severely and kept in jail. Giraldo refused to sign but was soon convinced to do so under the threat of being turn in to his own enemies. The document was also signed by CPDIT delegate Julian Parrillo. Carbonel affirmed there were no fines, kidnappings, bars or tortures though Giraldo’s dependant Juan Toledo was put in cepo for his aggressions.

Judge Romero agreed with the Governor: Giraldo was never sequestered as his aunt affirmed. He believed Carbonel’s testimony though he considered he surpassed his duties: he acted as justice of peace giving two summonses in a day and took for granted the reports of his commissioners, who also committed excesses in their duties. He recommended an oral lawsuit against the governor for the crimes above while cutting the procedure with the rest of the accused for lack of proof. In the end, the dispute was solved locally, to the detriment of the landlord and with only a reprimand for the Governor of Capachica who took a pro-indigenous stance and empowered CPDIT delegates.

CPDIT delegates were receiving support from different instances of the State infiltrated by pro-indigenous authorities. In the mid 1920s, Puno was endowed with a pro-indigenous Prefect, Costa

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169 Signed by the widow Cosio and her lawyer Eduardo Herrera. ARP, Legajo 1930: Expediente 1519.


171 Puno, October 24 1922. ARP, Legajo 1930: Expediente 1519, f. 72.
Laurent. In February 1925, Costa Laurent authorized the payment of fares Puno-Callao for six indigenes of the Federación de Campesinos de Puno, who needed to expose their complaints to the President. A few months later, the Fiscal Treasury of Puno paid $3.3.80 Peruvian pounds for the fares Mollendo-Callao of the indigenes Carmelo and Simón Mamani. (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8) Later, backed by the PRI, he asked for subsidies to help the indigenous populations of Azángaro, Ayaviri and Sandia hit by damaging inundations. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.8) On May 19, 1925, Costa Laurent wrote a letter to the Director of the Ministry of Development regarding an indigenous delegate Marcelino Halire who had been in Lima presenting claims for a group of communal Indians mistreated and abused by hacendados. Halire had been jailed in Cuzco “without a justified cause” then sent to Puno without documents or fares and with a brief telegram ordering his deportation to Bolivia for being a “political leader and revolutionary propagandist”. Prefect Costa Laurent was moved by the testimony and sad condition of Halire (whom he had to feed). He worried about his fate as an indigene in a strange country, but also about Bolivian criticisms and the national desprestige of sending an undocumented indigenous leader across the border. He decided to send Halire to Lima so that, if found guilty, he could be sent to the Island of San Lorenzo. (AGN, MT/DGAI, 3.13.2.8)

A more tangible form of State support came from the central administration itself with two resolutions that helped messengers and delegates reach the Capital. The Supreme resolution of 16 Semptember 1921 authorized the Minister of Development, after a petition of CPDIT’s General Secretary Samuel Núñez, to pay the fares in third class (vapor to Mollendo and train to Puno and even to provincial capitals) for the Indians who had come to the First Indigenous Congress in 1921. The next resolution (21 January 1922) empowered the Ministry to pay the return fares of the communal Indians who went to Lima to present their complaints. (AGN, MT, DGAI 1921-30, 3.13.2.8) On August 9, 1922, the petitions of the CPDIT’s Secretary General were confirmed again: the government paid the fares of the delegations of the departments of the South that came for the second Indigenous Congress, by steamboat and train. (AGN, MT, DGAI 1921-30, 3.13.2.8) This allowed for the arrival of wives or female family members. For the year 1923, I have traced the payment of fares for six women from Puno, including that of indigene Rosa Sepúlveda, from Chucuito, apparently traveling alone. Those with more resources and family connections stayed longer, but most had to find temporary jobs to support themselves while in Lima waiting for the State to pay their return fares.173

The Central State also fostered indigenous mobilization by financing the organization of indigenous congresses. These were meetings of indigenous delegates from all over the Republic organized by the CPDIT. There were at least six congresses between 1921 and 1926, held during the months of August and September to promote indigenous revindications and organization. Each congress, funded by the State, allowed for the arrival of dozens of messengers with particular complaints and proposals they shared with their fellows and state representatives in meetings opened to the public. A representative of the Executive was present in the inauguration and some of the audiences. The meetings held were preceded by a parade of delegates in Lima’s downtown and public offices and followed by articles published in several newspapers.

172 Halire was a messenger granted state paid fares Callao-Cuzco in 1923 and 1925. He had even received a subsidy of 2 Peruvian pounds from the government. RS 9/10/1925, AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8.

173 Guillermo Mamani, originary from the Province of Puno, presented a typewritten and signed letter to obtain the fares of his “indigenous relatives” Simón and Carmelo Mamani, who had come to expose claims and lacked funds to return. The fares were charged to the budget of the Patronato de la Raza Indígena. Mamani was “portapiegos” of the Ministry of Development, Section of Labor and Indigenous Affairs. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.8)
The government paid for the trips, lodging and food of the delegates. The larger number seems to have come from Puno since CPDIT’s Secretary General asked the government to pay for 7 fares to Huancayo, 16 to Cuzco (Callao-Mollendo-Sicuani), 8 to Cerro de Pasco and 20 to Puno (Callao-Mollendo-Puno). The twenty representatives from Puno in the First Indigenous Congress were: Juan Tola, Gaspar Apumayta Lopez, Valentin Llanos, Julian Nina, Mariano C. Mamani, Sebastian Aycachi, Gabriel Juarez, Julian T. Cuno, Juan Cruz Chambi, Nasario Solorzano, Pedro Otazú, Juan de Dios Palomino, Estanislao Aceituno, Ynocencio Cardeña, Mateo Cahuana, Jorge Ticona, Donato Mamani, Damian Quispe, Florentino Jara, Ambrocio Ayque. (AGN, MI, Prefecturas 224, 1921; MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8) In 1922, for the Second Indigenous Congress and by request of the CPDIT, the Ministry of Development paid for sixteen fares: nine to Puno, five to Chucuito and two to Ayaviri. In 1923, the number of fares to Mollendo increased, including this time a couple of women among the delegates. By 1924, subsidies of five soles were given to thirty delegates from different parcialidades of Puno. Mariano Coaquira, representative of the communities of Huancané traveled back to Puno with his wife and daughter on September 1924. (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8)

In 1925, the government authorized a subsidy of two Peruvian pounds for each of the delegates who had come to the Fifth Indigenous Congress. (AGN, MT/DGAI 3.13.2.14) On October 1924, a supreme resolution authorized the Ministry of Development to hire the "Industria Femenil" for the making of 45 khaki cotton uniforms for delegates of the departments Puno, Cuzco, Arequipa and Huancavelica who had come to Lima for the Congress. They were probably made for a parade or celebration of the centenary of the Battle of Ayacucho. The delegates also received a gratification of one Peruvian Pound. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.8)

The CPDIT pursued the same objectives delegates had been searching for decades, mainly the empowerment of the peasantry for the defense of the land and citizen rights. The Second Indigenous Congress (29-31 August 1922) asked for the abolishment of the law of vial conscription, the end of all lawsuits against indigenous leaders for actual or supposed revolts, the revision of hacendado property titles, the abolition of yanaconage and serfdom, the establishment of a minimum salary for workers in the coast and mountain area, the introduction of new and more adequate plans of education in rural schools, and the re-establishment of rights that had been revoked or ignored by local authorities all along the republican period. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.8)

Faced with the labyrinthic contradictions of laws and customs, the Committee put particular emphasis on knowledge and enforcement of the law. Circular n° 3 of the Central Committee (Lima, April 8, 1922) was addressed to the secretaries of each subcommittee to reaffirm the illegality of unpaid services, forced appointments and the use of Indian labor force for free in public works and for the personal benefit of authorities, their families and circle of friends. The Central Committee presumed that inhuman and illegal procedures were due to the ignorance of law n° 479, given by the Regional Congress of the Center and promulgated by the Executive in August 1921. The

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176 José Gabriel Chane and Manuel Cáceres. AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8.

177 The Central Committee’s document transcribes the content of Law n° 479 passed by the Regional Congress of the Center (Huánuco 26/6/1921) and by the executive power (22/8/1921, signed by Leguía and Leguía y Martinez), abolishing in the central region all appointments as Alcaldes de Vara or Varayos.
communiqué was also sent to all authorities in the region to exhort them to end the slavery of the Indian race that damaged the nationality and Christian civilization. Those infringing law n ° 479 would not only be dismissed, they also faced “public shame”. In the last paragraph, the document signed by Secretary Samuel Nuñez threatened detractors with one of the few weapons available for the CPDIT, public denunciations in one or more newspapers of the “orbe civilizado”. (ARP, Fólder CPDIT)

Emphasis was on morality and reputation, as well as on the ability to manipulate information. The local, regional and national press was the most effective way to diffuse and promote the enforcement of pro-indigenous legislation and denounce abusive authorities. There were at least three sub-prefect resignations in 1921 induced by Tawantinsuyo activism. (De la Cadena 2000: 103) Accusations of anti-leguismo were rather successful. However, the results of propaganda campaigns did not always meet the CPDIT’s expectations. Delegates from the provinces who had taken refuge in Puno wrote the representatives of the 1921 commission complaining that in spite of the continuous denunciations in the national independent press, they had not been able to stop the crimes against them and their properties. (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930)

The CPDIT also strove to obtain legal legitimation through the intervention and presence of local, regional and even national authorities in their meetings and activities. After the First National Indigenous Congress held in Lima in June 1921, delegates from Puno Estanislao Acéituno, Florentino Jara, Julián T. Cuno, Inocencio Cardeña, Juan de la Cruz Chambi, Juan de Dios Palomino, Julián Nina, Pedro Otazú and Jorge Ticona prepared a document for the Prefect of Puno asking for the presence of the local authority to obtain legitimacy: “Que en todas nuestras reuniones publicas necesitamos no solo el apoyo, sino la intervención de las autoridades políticas, para que vigilando por el cumplimiento de las leyes, se enteren del hecho de no inspirar, en forma alguna, cuidados ni sospechas nuestra conducta… se trata de desvirtuar las finalidades del Comité Central Pro-Derecho Indígena. I, nos interesa, que las autoridades vean de la manera mas inmediata posible todo lo que hacemos.”178 (ARP, Legajo 452: Prefectura 1921-1930, f.1) They requested a special place to hold meetings in Puno “to accord unanimously and publicly” the contents and form of their claims to be sent to the newly created Sección de Asuntos Indígenas. Personal and direct communication with superior authorities would avoid prejudices and misunderstandings with the government. If they met in Puno, they could be heard by the prefect as they were by the president and minister of government. They affirmed it would be a great victory if at least once a week they had a verbal audience with the Prefect as he offered in the beginning. Thus two great evils would be destroyed: the intervention of tinterillos for so many useless appeals, and the delay in the expedition of decrees. They would also strengthen the legitimacy of the CPDIT as a legal institution with the right to associate. If they continued “a salto de mata” (from here to there) they would only raise suspicion instead of being recognized as “elements of order” working for the growth of the fatherland by raising the cultural level of the indigenous race.

Delegates understood that the only thing that could overcome the subordinate condition sealed on “indianess” was education. In each congress, delegates requested the creation of one school in each ayllu of dense population, or one school for every 80 students, sustained with private funds not to compromise fiscal resources. They offered to follow the law of instruction and the building designs established by the General Direction of Instruction. In exchanged they asked for a

178 “That in all of our public meetings we need not only the support, but also the intervention of political authorities, so that watching over the fulfillment of the laws, they confirm we are not producing, in any way, cares or suspicions about our conduct… they are trying to lessen the value of the goals of the Central Committee Pro Indigenous Right. And, we are interested in authorities seeing as soon as possible all we do.”
compromise of collaboration from local authorities. They would even accept the help of mistis if they took the responsibility: “harto anhelaríamos ver preceptores de entre los mismos mistis, para las escuelas aludidas, ofreciéndonos remuneraciones equitativas y puntuales con tal de que ellos sean elementos de suficiente responsabilidad.” (ARP, Legajo 452: Prefectura 1921-1930, f.1-1v)

The ending resolutions of the First Indigenous Congress (July 28, 1921) asserted:

... before being bold it is necessary to be literate. Even if the government has the best intentions, if we do not impel those intentions, we will never ever be able to do anything that will really favor us. An educated Indian is an inconvenience for gamonalismo; gamonales know that their regime will end the day the Indian knows how to read and write and that is why they prevent the functioning of schools. But now Indians are ready to do by themselves what the Supreme Government would not be able to (...) The organized community should support the school they already have or build another one, at their own expense (...) If ten years from now each community has its own school, the fate of the Indian will change (...) Respected for his knowledge, the Indian will have strong fists to defend his rights.179

In 1896, illiterates had been officially denied the right to vote and Indian majorities had lost their suffrage rights. Education was thus the ultimate means to recuperate political power and respect as indigenous citizens. To foster education, the CPDIT also created libraries. In 1923, the Secretary General of the CPDIT Eliseo H. Mariluz asked the Minister of Government books to increase the indigenous libraries they had created, since the indigenes were the neediest and those who most required to fight illiteracy and ignorance caused by slavery and ruin. The document was presented by delegates Hipólito Salazar, Ezequiel Urviola y Juan Zapata. (AGN, MI 242, Tp-Zp 1923)

In November 1921, Capachica’s delegates mobilized to demand local political power. In a “trascendental indigenous movement”, peasant masses gathered to read an extremely radical proclamation to Governor of Capachica, Isaac Mazuelos. The proclamation asked for the end of the political interference and primacy of the mistis in the election of indigenous authorities. Earlier that year, they had proposed their own candidate for lieutenant governor but he had been rejected by local mistis that had chosen instead Benjamin Flores. Flores had already served as Governor making Indians go through a “VIACRUCIS” (sic). They were forced to present thirty weekly pongos, carriers, alcaide, segundo, two doormen, two hilacatas, three alguaciles and one balsero, plus products for the governor, the priest and the lieutenant governor. These cargos could only be redeemed with the payment of 57 soles, a good caning and some days of jail. They had to appeal to the Ministry of Development and to congressman Encinas, and announce a strike and a boycott of foodstuffs to the city to obtain the suppression of charges and obligations that pressed upon them. They were ready to face jail and even the death penalty to end forced services and elect their own authorities. They knew that “us Indians” were in no condition to become authorities due to “our great lack of culture” (“incultura”) and that their candidate was a modest individual; still, they were supporting his election before the executive power. (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930)

179 Cited and translated by De la Cadena 2000: 90.
Delegates of Capachica José Quispe and Mariano Parillo had already requested through congressman Encinas the appointment of a commissary due to the existence of thieves sheltered by haciendas. According to the last census Capachica had 9000 inhabitants, considering their increased numbers they needed their own authority. Capachica was a “big feudal castle” where even priests demanded servants. They knew Governor Mazuelos had not created this situation; but they had had enough:

Pesen las amenazas que pesaren, ciernanse todas dificultades que hubieren; ábranse todas las cárcceles e empleense los más grandes rigores, no cederemos un palmo en pedir el cumplimiento de las leyes. Según ellas, no hay servicios obligatorios, i no estamos, por consiguiente, llamados á seguir en el mismo sometimiento de antes. Cada cual debe vivir para sí i para la Patria, con su trabajo i por su trabajo; i no nos vengan acá con que nos van a poner con carne de gallina, llevándonos hasta el último rincón del presidio. La defensa de las causas justas es noble i honrada. Lluevan las calumnias, que al fin i al cabo, no son sino porquería y lodo. No nos ensucian. (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930)

Peasant leaders were not identifying themselves as helpless victims; they were taking a position of moral superiority, beyond calumnies and attacks. Where was the crime, they asked, in supplicating a governor to read the resolutions on the prohibition of mandatory services signed by General San Martín Protector of the Independence? Where was the crime in asking an authority to follow the law punishing with one year of prison the authorities who forced Indians to surrender their cattle for public or private businesses? Why did they expect indigenes to ignore the laws that protected them and remain quiet and inert as rocks? Even though three had already been sacrificed in those services\(^{180}\) had there been a revolt or protest? The authors reaffirmed their pacific and orderly intentions underlining they were acting within the boundaries of the law: “El derecho de huelga está amparado por la ley”. The document was signed by representatives of every corner of the Peninsula and the islands.\(^{181}\) (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930)

In August 1922, during the opening session of the Second Indigenous Congress, the assembly stated that since the Independence the people of “the four lineages” they represent had lived in servitude and subject to exactions from the absorbing gamonalismo “sucker of national energies.” All laws and decrees dictated to protect the Indian had never been observed. Nevertheless, since 1921 “the Indian’s personality has been taken seriously”, he acquired credibility and obtained justice not just in his protection but also in “the construction of his collective consciousness.” The government had shown concern, “if not for our education, at least for our small properties”. For this reason, the Congress in full conceded a vote of adhesion and gratefulness to President Leguía for his work for the emancipation and tutelage of the Indian. Thanks to him they were able to loose the

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\(^{180}\) Francisco Condori, Andres Pancca and Benjamin Bustinza died when walls collapsed near the plaza del Centenario. Their families obtained no compensation. (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930)

\(^{181}\) Julian Parrillo (Capachica), Raimundo Lazarino (“del pueblo”), José Quispe and Mariano Parrillo (Llachón), Manuel Parrillo and Marinao Paukar (Yapura), Cayetano Paukar and Fortunato Koila (Capano), Paulo Bustinza and Mariano Panca (Chiali), Mariano Parrillo the 2\(^\text{nd}\) and Pedro Quispe (Kotos), Felix Mamani and Pedro Panca (Jhilata), Mariano Nina and Tomás Quispe (Chillora), Dionisio Quispe and Nazario Yanarico (Escallani), Lorenzo Kolla and Juan Kolla (Silakochi), Domingo Mamani and Lucas Ramos (Amantani), Nazario Huatta and Mariano Mamani (Taquile).
muzzle put by their executioners and stigmatize them with the fire of public opinion. They were convinced of the President’s “paternal” support in the redemption campaign sought by the indigenous race. (Ramos Zambrano, 2003: 74) Leguía responded in writing (September 6, 1922) affirming that this recognition of his labor in favor of “our autochtonous race” compromised his gratitude and stimulated his work in favor of the Indian. He reaffirmed his concern for the wellbeing of “our indigenous compatriots”, and the growth of the country, “as long as it remained within order and did not awaken illusory hopes.” (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 74)

This discursive exchange shows the culmination of a dialogue peasant intellectuals had been preparing for years. The document issued by the Second Indigenous Congress spoke of servitude, exactions, gamonalismo but also Indian lineages, personality and credibility. It spoke of laws, tutelage, paternalism and redemption but also of adhesion, emancipation and collective consciousness. Delegates were developing their image as citizens trying to share it with the State. They were mixing old and new vocabulary to be heard and accepted without creating misgivings. They expressed gratitude for the President’s paternal attitude and the protection of their lands while criticizing the lack of observance of tutelary laws and the lack of concern for their education.

In return for this plea, they obtained from the president a written compromise: he would continue to protect the interests of his “indigenous compatriots” as long as there was no disruption of public order with “illusory hopes”. It was a rather honest exchange: remonstrances and petitions on one side, acknowledgements and admonitions on the other. State and indigenous intellectuals seemed to be reaching a new verbal compromise or contract recreating a new moral economy.

Present at the Third Indigenous Congress, socialist journalist and ideologue José Carlos Mariategui was surprised with the speeches of delegates, their energetic accusations and claims. Mariategui characterized the conclusions reached during the congress as “inquietantes” for gamonalismo, stressing the danger of these conferences in which groups of indigenous communities from different regions entered in contact and coordinated their actions. (Mariátegui 1984: 40) He envisioned the end of the assitentialism of the API and the beginning a real indigenous militancy. The CPDIT raised the hopes of indigenistas and indigenes alike. It was set as a non political organization for the defense of indigenous rights and the promotion of education but turned into a quasi-political machinery developing networks at the local, regional and national level and promoting an unprecedented dialogue with the State.

CONCLUSION

En 1919, Leguía was reelected to bring the country out from a crisis of endemic violence and disorder. He brought forth a project based on an aggressive centralization to create a strong State and modernize the country. With the help of new provincial elements attracted by official discourses, the project developed its own brand of indigenismo to weaken gamonal forces and develop rural sectors. As a matter of fact, Leguía came close to a renegotiation of the tributary pact opening channels of dialogue with indigenous sectors and promoting protective measures in exchange of labor (Ley de conscripción vial). The Andean reserve was expected to build the new road system needed to modernize the nation.

In exchange, Leguía became “Protector of the Indigenous Race”. He fostered pro-indigenous measures such as the constitutional recognition of the community and institutions such as the Sección de Asuntos Indígenas (office of the Ministry of Development in charge of supporting messengers’ trips, peasant initiatives and registration of communities) and the Patronato de la Raza Indígena (institution affiliated to the Church in charge of protecting the peasantry in relations with hacendados and the state). Even the regional congresses turned into audiences for peasant claims.
State initiatives went parallel to a strong indigenista wave that also fed into the effervescence of peasant mobilization in this period. Provincial intellectuals instituted themselves as protectors of the indigenous population and mediators with the government. Lawyer and scholar Francisco Chukiwanqa Ayulo turned his house in Lampa into a center of convergence of peasant groups and strove to grant indigenes justice as judge and fiscal agent in different provinces. José Frisancho Macedo stood out for his impartiality, rectitude and defense of the Indian become in 1949 president of the Supreme Court of Justice in Lima. Manuel Augusto Quiroga, lawyer, journalist, poet, social fighter and politician of Aymara origin embodied Puno’s indigenista activism. He produced a project of Indigenous legislation that was recommended by Puno’s messengers to State. Ezequiel Urviola’s activism led him to abandon his middle class life in Azángaro to become a peasant leader adopting peasant garb and living a messenger’s life. These men contributed to link the peasant leadership to the labor movement.

The labor movement stressed the idea of a cultivated socialism that could not spread openly to the uncultivated masses but many leaders understood the need to introduce themselves into indigenous demands through their rank and file or through provincial indigenistas. This intermediation perpetrated stereotypes and paternalist attitudes. Though often bypassed or ignored, messengers drew experience and information from their links to the labor movement and made political activism their modus Vivendi, depending less and less on tinterillos and indigenistas and more on indigenous migrants involved in unions. Estanislao Aceituno, Mariano Paq’o, Carlos Condorena, Claudio Ramirez and Eduardo Quispe had gone through military service and served the cargos in their communities before becoming communal representatives. They traveled to Lima to meet the President, participate in Indigenous Congresses and obtain permits and resources to build indigenous schools and carry military exercises in their communities. They suffered persecutions and witnessed gamonal repression but continued with their fight.

These messengers had learned to read and write, had become more prepared and specialized in indigenous defense and were creating links and networks of support nation-wide. They gathered constituencies to participate in political meetings, supporting candidates to Congress such as José Antonio Encinas. They were also creating parallel political structures, appointing their own authorities, as noticed by the 1920 commission sent by the State. They were even creating their own associations including a national peasant organization geared to defend peasant rights with the support of the State.

The Comité Pro Derecho Indígena Tahuantinsuyo created by and for Indians aimed at empowering peasant groups, mainly through education, to help them defend their property and rights from gamonal attacks. This association received the support of several instances from the State but mainly from the executive that was trying to channel indigenous and indigenista activities. Hence, it strove to present itself as a non political association downplaying its ties to the labor movement and avoiding millenarian references. The CPDIT pledged to maintain social order while surveilling and giving continuity to the government’s promises through a network of departmental, provincial, district and even communal sub-committees led by messengers empowered by the Committee’s official legitimacy. Subcommittees spread all over the southern Andes and especially in Puno. Delegates received state paid travel fares, subsidies and even room and board when participating in annual indigenous congresses financed by Leguía’s administration. Puno was by far the Department most represented in state travel expenses.

Delegates of the association put great emphasis on knowledge of the law, especially of tutelary laws defending indigenous rights and resources. They also emphasize morality, reputation and manipulation of information, using newspapers and periodicals to denounce abusive authorities and hacendados and stress the legitimacy of the CPDIT and its delegates. They understood that
only education could overcome the subordinate condition assigned to “Indianness” so in each visit and each congress they requested the creation of one school per ayllu (or for every 80 students). They were ready to sustain these schools with private funds (not to compromise fiscal resources) in exchange for licenses from the Ministry of Education and protection from local authorities. For CPDIT delegates, education was the ultimate means to recuperate political power and respect as indigenous citizens. Peasant delegates were not identifying themselves as helpless victims. They were taking a position of moral superiority and knowledge enumerating the many laws defending their rights. They had finally reached a dialogue with the State and were renegotiating their role in the nation.

Leguía seemed a fearless reformer inclined to protect the indigenous population as a cardinal duty of the State. His government raised the hopes of indigenes and indigenistas alike. The long and detailed proposal of the 1920 investigative commission presupposed the existence of strong and intervening State with the capacity to impose its authority in the farthest places. The country did not count with one such bureaucracy and Leguía’s will was starting to shiver. By 1923, the administration faced new elections in the midst of a growingly challenging peasant and syndical mobilization and a climate of insecurity and discontent generated by internal and external events (Centenial of the Independence, southern provinces held by Chile, internal political rivalries).
Leguía, “protector of the indigenous race”, had arrived at a difficult moment for Puno’s 
hacendados. In 1919, when haciendas started to acquire technology, wool demand fell. Haciendas 
diminished their profits entering a cycle of endless indebtedness. Hacendados confronted a dark 
economic future and many challenges to their local authority. A growing peasant mobilization 
seemed to be creating strong alliances with pro-indigenous institutions and the central State. Wool 
producing landlords could not afford to back down in the face of peasant demands and they used 
all necessary means to maintain their position of power and their control over peasant land and 
resources. Faced with an intense propaganda war and fierce repression, peasant leaders and 
organizations had to double their efforts not to lose the élan of reforms they were achieving while 
the State found it more and more difficult to maintain the situation under its control. The 
administration maintained an open attitude towards the peasantry’s new and more complex 
projects, yet when confronted with gamonal antagonism repression seemed inevitable. By 1923, 
discourses were wearing out and victories were uncertain. The situation for hacendados, peasants 
and even the government was becoming unsustainable. The present chapter based on discursive 
analysis, will try to show how images and arguments were pulled back and forth to the point of 
losing their significance and creating counterproductive effects.

**HACENDADOS BESIEGED**

Although world prices continued to climb, exports declined after 1918. Wool had been 
stockpiled for speculative gain and with the crash commercial houses were left with huge reserves 
that caused a complete halt in wool purchases. (Hazen 1974: 137) Wool exports diminished to one 
quarter of their previous volume. In spite of a slight recovery in 1922, international prices of wool 
fell until the crisis of 1930. Hacendados used to collect in advance the value of the wool and other 
products of their hacienda they sold. They received advanced payments of up to 80% of the value 
of contracted wool, paying interest of up to 10% on the money advanced. In 1919, exporting 
houses in Arequipa started restricting the credits they gave in advance to hacendados while raising 
prices to benefit themselves. Puneño hacendados could not do much to cope with the fall of wool 
prices. They were unable to grow or accumulate any further due to difficulties to enter the merchant 
field and to the parasitic nature of their economy. Many fell into debt and had to sell their lands to 
their creditors. Arequipeño and foreign wool merchants became the owners of many haciendas in 
Puno (Gibson, Rey de Castro, Muñoz Nájar, Peruvian Corporation). They had several alternatives 
of reinvestment (hacienda, industry, mining, transportation and vial construction) but often opted for 
the more profitable ventures demanding little investment in fixed expenses. (Tamayo 1982: 96-98; 

The growing economic dependence of hacendados on (and indebtedness with) Arequipa’s 
merchant class went parallel to a growing political dependence on the central State. Centralism 
particularly affected the South. In 1921, the state suppressed departmental juntas considering 
them useless and impairing in many ways. Provincial councils were reduced to councils appointed 
by the Ministry of Government. Municipalities were replaced by Juntas de Notables and many of 
the old municipal attributions were absorbed by the State. In 1927, the sums granted to local 
governments for public works started to be administered by the Ministry of Development in Lima. 
Presidential control over the administrative system grew to the point of monopolizing all final 
decisions in the hands of Leguía’s circle. Material progress centered in Lima, target of international
credits and loans and of most important economic, social and cultural developments. Regional development was limited by the Capital’s decisions controlled by the interests of Northern and Lima’s agro-exporters. (Basadre 1983: IX 249-250; Deustua & Rénique 1984: 98) As a consequence of this overwhelming centralization of power and resources, local powers were forced to renegotiate their relation with and access to the State. Yet, the State, focused on breaking traditional powers to centralize and modernize the country, was not always open to negotiations. “La Patria Nueva” had called upon popular and middle sectors with reformist measures such as the eight hour labor day, minimum salary, mandatory arbitrage, protection for labor accidents and recognition of indigenous communities. Leguía’s administration was harassing former dominant groups to deconstruct their mechanisms of political power. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 127-128)

Negotiation with the central State was also hindered by the fact that Puneño hacendados did not constitute a homogeneous group and were always subject to disputes. Internal feuds were the basis of political life in the Southern Andes. The growth of a family led to divisions of the land and conflicts between brothers, cousins and other relatives that often preferred to sell their rights to outsiders. In a myriad of writings, fliers and articles they accused each other of cacerismo, pierolismo, gamonalismo and of using violence as a way of enrichment. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 66, 131-135) Andean society perceived available resources as limited and wealth only obtainable through others (indigenous labor and resources) or in relation to power (administrative posts). (Demélas 2003: 497-499) The direct or indirect control over prefectures, sub-prefectures and governorships was crucial to solve these disputes and depended on connections with the central power. Families supported one or another caudillo hoping his triumph would give them access to coveted political posts. Powerful hacendados divided their society in bands and used all means to attack each other, from local and regional newspapers to private armies. (Manrique 1988: 146-147)

Rivalries between democrats and constitutionalists had plagued for decades the Altiplano political scene. Angelino Lizares Quiñones joined Cáceres’s Constitutional Party in 1890 and boasted about being a hero of the Breña campaign (though his enemies affirmed he never bore arms and surnamed him the “colonel of the virgin sword”). He was appointed Colonel of the National Guard by Remigio Morales Bermúdez and organized the Azángaro battalion, used to usurped lands and cattle from communities and other hacendados of the department (Aragón, Cano, Paredes, Roselló, Dianderas, Manuela Portillo, Adoraida Gallegos and Felix Borda). (Tamayo 1982: 163-165) Lizares’s ambition led him to join each government, regardless of ideology, and profit from any rebellion he thought could foster his interests. In 1911, being a national representative, Lizaques Quiñones led the armed force that attacked hacienda Cuturi of Luis Felipe Luna (killing ten men) and ordered the murder of two merchants from Huancané (José Soncco and Cricomo Sucusaire) to stop the commercial traffic between Azángaro’s Quechua population and Huancahán’s Aymara population. (Tamayo 1982: 166-167) According to Giraldo & Franch there are no records of Lizares’s cattle raising activity. His main goal acquiring estancias and haciendas was to increase his hold on a larger number of people and resources to maintain political control of the province of Azángaro. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 82-83, 152-155)

The Lizares had several enemies, amongst them were half-brothers Bernardino Arias Echenique and José Urquiaga Echenique, who had fought for the Coalition in 1895 supporting Pierola. (Tamayo 1982: 162) Bernardino Arias Echenique was three times Representative from Azángaro in Congress; his half-brother José Urquiaga was twice elected to Congress but remained most of the time in Azángaro with constant appointments as mayor, sub-prefect and departmental treasurer. For Lizares Quiñones, the Echenique brothers were “parvenus”, new comers issued from Arequipa who had become hacendados through abusive acquisitions from weaker landowners and communities. (Tamayo 1982: 203, 154-155; Giraldo & Franch 1979: 141-148;
Hatreds between caceristas (Constitutional Party) and pierolistas (Democrat Party) produced periodical divorces between authorities and gamonal landowners. The Lizares had often problems with Democrat Prefects and Sub-prefects. (Tamayo 1982: 169) In 1899, Azángaro was divided around the figure of pierolista sub-prefect José Albino Ruiz. One faction supported him; the other accused him of being a puppet of National Representatives Mariano Cornejo and Augustín Tovar. One of the fiercest enemies of sub-prefect Ruiz was Lizares Quiñones. On July 19, 1899, Lizares Quiñones rebelled against sub-prefect Ruiz raising an army of 700 Indians, but the rebellion was crushed. Lizares Quiñones properties were ransacked and burned and he was forced to migrate to Bolivia where he was persecuted and had to ask Bolivian authorities for guarantees. (Basadre 1983: VIII-13) Soon, however, he was back in the political scene as national representative.

The endogamic character of families created numerous feudal lineages. Any aggression against a hacendado meant an aggression against the extended family group producing factional confrontations. Gamonales reached the point of promoting indigenous attacks against each other. (Tamayo 1982: 198) One such feud rose between Alejandro Cano Borda and the Dianderas, Roselló and Choquehuancas families over the finca Calla. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 83) The confrontations could lead to written insults, libels, legal accusations and violence. In 1909, Angelino Lizares Quiñones, Luis F. Luna and Arturo Rondón confronted José S. Urquiaga, Bernardino Arias Echenique and Alejandro Cano Borda over the representation of Azángaro in Congress. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 105) In a pamphlet war, Alejandro Cano Borda, vocal of the Superior Court of Puno, was identified as "animal rapaz, sátiro Viejo, espejo de toda iniquidad", "ladrón desde el vientre de su madre". ("rapacious animal, old satire, mirror of all iniquity", "thief from the womb of his mother") He was termed a monster; a bandit disguised as lawyer, and was accused of raping women, prostituting authorities, falsifying documents, stealing Indigenous estancias, assaulting haciendas and usurping fincas. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 103)

The central power hardly intervened in these local wars producing an impunity that greatly contributed to the sense of empowerment of gamonal groups. However, their power could change with national political events. Though questioned at first, they soon found out that by supporting and applauding any act or gesture of Leguía they could still control or influence the appointment of authorities in the provinces. (Romero 1969: 23) The political life, orphaned of doctrines and programs, was divided in leguiistas and non-leguiistas. (Planas 1994a: 205-206) The latter had no political space. As a consequence, constitutionalists and democrats alike turned in the early 1920s into staunch supporters of Leguía. Though a stalwart federalist and regionalist, Lizares Quiñones supported Leguía's centralizing administration and signed the Constitution of 1920 recognizing the imprescriptibility of the Indian Community. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 81-82, 155-160) Lizares Quiñones's nemesis, Luis Felipe Luna, hacendado of Lampa, was a Civilista that also turned into a fervent leguiista. Luna served as secretary of the municipal council of Azángaro (1899-1900), congressional representative for Sandia (1902-1908), Azángaro (1912-1914 and 1916) and Lampa (1919-1924) and Prefect of Huánuco, Apurímac, Ayacucho, Tacna and Junín (1924-1929). Libelous attacks against each other did not prevent Lizares Quiñones and Luna from sharing congressional seats and pro-leguiista discourses.182

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182 Luna had written in Iquique in 1902 a terrible essay against the Lizares entitled “Biografía criminal de don José María Lizares y su hijo Angelino Lizares Quiñones por desgracia vecinos de Azángaro”. This essay was responded by Angelino Lizares with another essay entitled “La Mancha que Limpia.” According to Ramos, during the massacre of Cuturi, the Lizares Quiñones attempted against Luna’s life (though he was married to a Lizares), but he managed to escape. (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 33-34)
Competition over peasant resources, political factionalism, family feuds and violence were so entrenched in Puno that even economic crisis, leguista homogenization and peasant mobilization could not hinder them. Hacendados were being questioned from many fronts: pro-indigenous authorities and State officials, indigenista groups, Adventists, a growing proletariat and different peasants groups and organizations. Its growing absenteeism and dependence on merchant capitals was opening the way for the firm control of Arequipa’s oligarchy. It was, as a matter of fact, in Arequipa that pro-hacendado mobilization started.

On September 30, 1921, besieged landlords of the Southern Sierra founded the “Liga de Hacendados” to defend their situation and place the weight of the crisis on the peasantry. The League, created to defend the property rights of landowners and protect their lives threatened by the crimes of the “indíadas”, included landlords from Puno and Arequipa (Pedro J. de Noriega, Alberto Rey de Castro, Manuel G. Castresana, Luis Felipe Luna, Bernardino Arias Echenique, Pedro Irigoyen and others). Though centered in Arequipa it had local committees in provincial capitals like Azángaro. This association replicated the structure of the CPDIT and used its representatives in Congress and the press to demand with dramatic and alarmist discourses the abolition of the indigenous association and the use of public force to pacify the area. (Rengifo in Kapsoli et al 1977: 195; Ramos Zambrano 2003: 81; Hazen 1974: 180)

Letters printed in conservative periodicals such as Puno’s “La Unión” affirmed hacendado properties were rightfully owned and were threatened by indigenous masses. The protection of the government was imperative due to the imminent Caste War that would be as vast and bloody as Tupac Amaru’s revolt in 1780 and would endanger private property and all Republican institutions.

¡Hacendados! Es ya llegado el momento de organizarse para defender el honor de vuestras mujeres y de vuestros hijos y también el pan de vosotros y de vuestros hijos. Ya la desesperación os obligó a luchar 10 contra 1,000 y vencer. La táctica de los indios fue atemorizaros con el número, pero, bien pronto se convencieron de la ineficacia de ella y optaron por beber la sangre del Misti y la bebieron en Lagunillas y por un exceso de glotonería se comieron la carne de sus víctimas. En efecto, una sola gota de sangre española es suficiente para infundir valor cuando se tiene la convicción del peligro. Esta ventaja, no la tiene, no la puede tener el indio. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 188-189)

One drop of Spanish blood was enough to turn a savage, cannibalistic Indian into a courageous,

183 Previous organizations were formed: the “Sociedad Ganadera del Titicaca” (meeting with the investigative commission of 1920) and in Lampa, the “Liga de Ganaderos de Arequipa y Puno” (1921), headed by Pedro J. de Noriega but they were not as prominent and effective as the League of Hacendados. (Hazen 1974: 180)

184 Hacendados proposed to form in each district “Pro-defense Committees” with provincial and departmental delegates to be officially recognized by the Supreme Government. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 188-189)

185 “¡Hacendados! The time has come to organize to defend the honor of your women and children and also your bread and that of your children. Desperation already forced you to fight 10 against 1,000 and win. The tactic of Indians was to terrorize you with their number, but, soon enough they convinced themselves of the inefficiency of such a tactic and they opted to drink the blood of the Misti and they drank it in Lagunillas and due to an excess of gluttony they ate the flesh of their victims. Indeed, only one drop of Spanish blood is enough to instil courage when one has the conviction of danger. The Indian does not have, and cannot have, this advantage.”
righteous hacendado. The League’s racial argument reified racial categories with coarse and exaggerated moral characterizations that confirmed the indigenous origins of many haciendados while insisting on their superiority due to a remote Spanish ancestry.

These racial arguments were essential in gamonal discourse for many reasons. For once, the alarmed hacendado minority was trying to broaden its bases to include a layer of mestizo landowners placed between them and the peasantry. They needed to increase their weight to protect themselves and to maintain political legitimacy. "The oligarchy’s intolerance and strong repressive tendency showed the fears of a class that knew it was numerically reduced, with an only apparent economic power, surrounded by an indigenous and peasant mass it despised to hide the fear that besieged them.” (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 96) Hacendados felt more and more isolated in the highlands, surrounded by peasant masses that resisted exploitation and discrimination.

Racial arguments also developed to counter coastal racial arguments that were too comprehending and threatened hacendados themselves. According to Mariátegui and Romero, the Indians that came to Lima to the Indigenous Congresses were ridiculed by limeño journalists, cartoonists and even local comedians and playwrights. They were caricatured and denigrated. The word “Serrano” was an insult due to the scorn of limeños pronouncing it. (Romero 1969: 24) News of Indian “savagery” could foster limeño sympathy for mestizo haciendados allowing their inclusion into the “decent” sector. According to the League, local “Pro-Defense” committees had to seek State protection for hacendados threatened by “savage hordes” of Indians; otherwise, indigenous violence would produce “massive” migrations of Puno’s inhabitants: “Por esto es indispensable, si no se prefiere el éxodo en masa de sus habitantes, la formación de Ligas Distritales de salvación (...) para conseguir garantías contra el bandolerismo salvaje de las indiadas, pues no sólo el indio, sino también el Misti debe tener garantías.” (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 188-189) The League of hacendados identified two separate groups: “Indians” and “inhabitants”. Stretching the binarism civilization/barbarism, they denied Indians the status of “inhabitants” of the land being too close to savagery. As Spalding argued, disdain was produced by social hierarchy: the closer the link to the exploited and the participation in the exploitation, the stronger the disdain of the dominant, exploitative group. To accept the demands of those exploited meant to recognize their humanity and delegitimize the ideology behind social inequality. (Spalding 1974: 171-172)

For De la Cadena, culture domesticated the instincts, and was the reason why gente decente (“decent people”) allegedly “did not abuse” their inferiors, but on the contrary treated them properly. Since to be decent was equivalent to being just, decency defined the boundaries beyond which the realm of justice and illegitimacy began.” (De la Cadena 2000: 50) Hacendados were decent people with legally acquired or inherited estates, incapable of violence or abuses against their inferiors. Haciendas were a haven of civilization and prosperity. “Abuses were the immoral acts of racially defined subalterns, whose undomesticated instincts impelled them to mistreat the defenseless.” (De la Cadena 2000: 52) The Gamonal was morally defined as “a spurious landowner who, being himself a hack lawyer (tinterillo) or with the assistance of one”, acquired Indian lands through force or fraud. He was a male figure without the family values of decency, lacking spiritual refinement. Separating hacendados and gamonales was crucial for many political careers. (De la Cadena 2000: 80)

Hacendados claimed that haciendas were born from the repartition of unoccupied lands

186 “For this reason it is indispensable, to avoid a massive exodus of its inhabitants, the formation of District Leagues of Salvation (...) to obtain guarantees against the savage banditry of Indian mobs, since not only the Indian, but also the Misti must have guarantees.”
assigned to the Inca and the cult of the Sun. (Tamayo 1982: 175) Ancestral property was a defining feature of Cuzqueño hacendados, and an argument heavily used to assert “decency”. (De la Cadena 2000: 82) Hacendados claimed that haciendas were born from the repartition of unoccupied lands assigned to the Inca and the cult of the Sun. (Tamayo 1982: 175) This, however, was hardly an argument that could be sustained by Puno’s hacendados who, at best, combined some ancestry with newly acquired lands. They needed to speak of indigenous ignorance, degradation, savagery and even cannibalism to legitimate their position and confirm their decency.

Arequipeño hacendado Pedro Irigoyen, wrote in 1922 a document entitled “El Conflicto y el Problema Indígena”, a compilation of articles published in “El Comercio” of Lima to foster the image of hacendados. Irigoyen affirmed that hacienda colonos were morally, economically and intellectually superior to ayllu Indians. They were not degenerated by alcohol and forced servitude. The hacienda was a productive and social model confronting the moral decadence of the ayllu. Colonos, more than employees, were partners of their patrons who obliged them to follow up on their moral and religious duties and live like men not animals. They lived in their own houses, with their relatives, without suffering hunger and protected from diseases and exactions such as the rights demanded by priests to baptize, marry or bury them. The hacienda was thus the column of pacification. It could deactivate the insubordination of the ayllu and design its strict future tutelage. The proof was that colonos were calm during revolts, while Indians from parcialidades committed disorders and abuses urged by anarchists and CPDIT agitators who were promoting a movement of racial insurrection with the story of reconstructing the Tahuantinsuyo. Haciendas were the victims of neighboring Indians and considering the lack of public force they only counted with the protection of their own colonos. (Tamayo 1982: 176; Rénique 2004: 134)

The image of morality applied to hacendados was set against an image of perversity and ignorance ascribed to Indians to further the argument of the need for hacendado tutelage.

Son indios rústicos e inciviles casi completamente salvajes, sin ninguna pulcritud ni refinamiento y aún profundamente connaturalizados y enraizados en parajes totalmente desconectados de todo centro urbano en que pudieran hallar esparcimientos honestos y espectáculos decorosos, sitios de recreación, clubs, teatros, de manera que no teniendo nada en que invertir provechosamente frecuentes recepciones de cantidades relativamente sobradas de dinero, lo que se les diera en exceso sobre lo que actualmente les reclama su mezquina sustentación, en localidades donde ni siquiera hay un mercado de abastos, iría fatalmente a parar en manos de traficantes de bebidas, rateros y tinterillos.187 (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 207)

Indians were incapable of disposing of their own resources in a correct way. This moral ineptitude described by Irigoyen allowed him to affirm that equality before the law was a chimera since

187 “They are rustic and uncivilized Indians almost completely savage, without pulchritude or refinement and still profoundly inured and rooted in places totally disconnected from any urban center where they could find honest amusements and decorous spectacles, recreation sites, clubs, theatres. Having nothing in which to profitably invest frequent receptions of relatively large quantities of money, what would be given in excess over their meager sustenance, in localities where there is not even a market of provisions, would fatally end in the hands of liquor dealers, thieves and hack lawyers.”
Indians were not equal to the rest of the Peruvian collectivity but rather in a condition of unequivocal inferiority. Deemed minors, Indians were devoid of any agency. Azángaro hacendado and national representative José Sebastián Urquiaga wrote another apology of hacendados in 1916. Urquiaga explained that no peasant was forced to enter the hacienda as colono. They often chose to do so to escape the oppression of corrupt authorities. This voluntary submission had many advantages: free pastures, exclusion from services to authorities, chaqueos and disinterested and impartial justice. Urquiaga affirmed that hacendados and their mayordomos replaced the State in functions such as the judicial system. They constituted the local law and order while ayllus only produced disorder and exploitation. (Tamayo 1982: 172-173) Hacendados ensured colonos a comfortable existence only being obliged to pasture cattle and grant one family member for general tasks of the hacienda twelve days a month. Colonos were thus distanced from idleness and vices and offered civilization through contact with the hacendado. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 206)

The image of communal Indians was stressed as one of savagery and degradation. Newspaper “La Unión”, voice of the hacendados of Puno, directed by the president of the League of Hacendados Julio C. Cano and his brother Alejandro (a judge) imprinted its editorials with strong racist comments such as this one commenting on the Second Indigenous Congress held in Lima in 1922: “Well and good that a medical congress, a congress of students, or even a congress of academicians be held in a nation’s capital. But never a congress of savages, of uncivilized, anti-hygienic, pestilent Indians… While the Indian disappears from America’s progressive countries (i.e. Argentina and the United States), it seems that here in Peru we would revive a dead race…” (Hazen 1974: 178)

Hacendado arguments focused on three images: gullible Indians manipulated by outsiders using them for their political schemes, ignorant Indians devoid of patriotism and national conscience appealed by subversive schemes and irate Indian masses arming and preparing themselves to attack (and eat) entire haciendas and towns. External influences were stressed to give alarmist cries of sedition and revolt while stressing peasant ignorance and credulity. Hacendados considered Encinas a dangerous agitator with influence in Lima: “No necesitamos otros Encinas porque a este tipo debemos toda la situación creada y al que debemos declarar causante de tantas desgracias, y al vernos cuantos propietarios despojados de nuestra legítima propiedad, y todo instado por Encinas y la turba de zánganos que con él han visto en el indio, la mejor bolsa para tapar el cuero puesto, que otro no fue su patrimonio.”188 (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 187) Pro-indigenous congressmen like Encinas and Maurtua were accused of acting as paid lawyers, defending cases that had been taken to their bureaus. Hacendado memorials and pamphlets also warned about the threat that was for Puno the “Palomilla Encinista”. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 183) Mestizo-born peasant leader Ezequiel Urviola was one of them. “La Unión” accused Urviola of being the intellectual author of many revolts. “La Unión” affirmed it had proof that messengers were sending Urviola money to buy arms and ammunitions in preparation for a coordinated attack on white properties. The newspaper singled out Urviola as “Apóstol Judas, predicador de mentiras para estafar dinero a esos infelices ignorantes de pura raza indígena.”189

The article associated racial purity with unhappy ignorance; Urviola’s lack of ignorance made him an extorter of un-pure Indian race. (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 38, 45)

188 “We do not need other Encinas for to this guy we owe the situation created. We must declare him the cause of so many disgraces; seeing so many landowners despoiled of our legitimate property, and all provoked by Encinas and the mob of idlers that like him have seen in the Indian, the best bag to cover their skin, for they have no other patrimony.”

189 “Judas apostle, predicador of lies to swindle money from those unhappy ignorants of pure indigenous race.”
In November 1921, Senator for Puno Dr. Wenceslao F. Molina adverted about the political and social crisis in Puno: the indigenous element was discontent for not being heard in its claims for justice and if not contained the situation would become catastrophic. Puno, he sentenced, had become a fertile soil for deceivers and agitators. Questioned about the situation, Prefect Eduardo Arenas informed that the peasant movement was spreading alarm and uneasiness among townsmen, mainly because it obeyed instigations of enemies of the public order who from their refuge in Bolivia sent special messengers to incite the thousand of Indians of the Department to a general uprising to facilitate their subversive and antipatriotic plans. Arenas believed Indians did not rise unless deceived or instigated “as instrument of spurious ambitions.” Messengers sent from Bolivia had told the Indians that once the government was brought down haciendas would disappear and land would be redistributed. The messengers also informed Indians that they would have the right to elect and appoint all administrative and judicial authorities, and that the law of mandatory military service would be abolished as well as the laws taxing the consumption of salt, alcohol and coca. “Considering the ignorance of the race,” such words had found easy access within the masses that were rising in simultaneous and bloody revolts that if not repressed, sometimes with sagacity others with energy would end in a seriously grave situation. Measures needed to be taken to avoid not just a racial war of scary consequences but also to avoid the disappearance of patriotic love among Indians. Prefect Arenas affirmed he had everything under control, but he understood that peace was transitory and hatred could explode producing a terrible situation.

_Haciendado_ newspaper “La Unión” described this conspiracy in March 1921: Indians with the “pompous” title of “messengers” were bringing from Lima appointments of pro-indigenous prefects, sub-prefects and even judges. They were plotting something “pushed from Lima”. Bolivian Indians captured after the revolt of Jesús de Machaca had confessed they were in accord with the “indiadas” of Puno for a “general conflagration.” Behind all of this was Teodomiro Gutierrez Cuevas, “Pro-indigenous delegate” who had fled from prison and was offering Bolivian Indians the whole department of Puno in exchange for arms. Gutierrez Cuevas was forming a school for the exploitation of the credulous Indian and had participated in the destruction of Pio León Cabrera’s hacienda in Sandía provoking the “scenes of cannibalism” that took place. Not then not now, complained the author of this article, did the government guarantee hacendados. Bolivia had severely punished the rebels of Jesus de Machaca, while Peru had taken no energetic measure. He congratulated the judges and attorney-general of Ayaviri, only province that produced a lawsuit against Dr. Rubin, President of the Pro-Indigenous Commission.

The unrelenting announcement of a caste war showed the levels of anxiety and fear reached by the _haciendado_ groups, especially in the early 1920s with the dissemination of subcommittees in the provinces. Senator for Puno Geronimo Costa received in October 1921 a radiogram from the _League of Hacendados_ of Puno informing that, coached by profiteers, ignorant Indians pretended to take over haciendas with mass attacks, fires, thefts, victimizing owners or administrators. Puneños lived in a profound restlessness, agricultural labors had been abandoned, and they could not make people work because of fear of assaults. _Hacienda_ Indians were threatened by those of

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190 The unstable situation in Bolivia further increased hacendados’ restlessness. Between 1920 and 1927, Bolivia witnessed a war between liberals (in power for several years) and republicans (which had taken power in 1921 with Saavedra). Bolivian Indians responding to republican propaganda attacked neighbors and hacendados. In 1921, ayllu peasants attacked and burned the town of Jesús de Machaca. Threats spread to several other places up to 1927 when the Indians of the province of Chayanta (North of Potosí) attacked the town of Pocoata. (Albó in Briggs et al 1986: 157) These events had a strong resonance within both Indian and haciendo groups.
the ayllus and parcialidades to ensure their support when the time came. The uprising had spread over the entire department, especially in Azángaro and Huancané, in the districts of Achaya, Caminaca, Taraco, Saman and Pusi. The League considered that even though the Indian race was worth all protection and commiseration, the hacendados also had the right to be protected by Public Powers against those under unhealthy influences. (MI, Prefecturas 222, Senadores 1921)

In the early 1920s, hacendados besieged from many fronts carried on a strong propaganda campaign against communities in favor of haciendas. They bombarded congressional debates and the national, regional and local press with preconceived ideas of Indianness and manipulated moral notions of “decency”. They turned around peasant arguments identifying themselves as the victims of land usurpations and called deceivers or agitators those arguing in favor of land redistribution, self-appointment of authorities, abolishment of military service and taxes on salt, alcohol and coca, demands peasants had been doing for decades. They pleaded for government protection against savage cannibalistic hordes of Indians and warned about anti-national conspiracies threatening the country’s integrity. But it is mainly in the political arena that they fought their battles. Unlike the peasantry, they were well represented at all levels of the State and had the know-how to move political cliques and influence government’s decisions.

**HACENDADOS STRIKE BACK**

Puno’s hacendado interests were well represented in the central State. Congressman (Lampa) Luis Felipe Luna had taken upon the task of fighting all efforts of peasant organization under Leguía’s regime. He opposed Encinas and Maurtua’s congressional initiatives and carried on conferences and propaganda against associations such as the CPDIT, which he termed revolutionary and anti-governmental. Peasant leader Ezequiel Urviola adamantly opposed Luna’s candidacy for senator of the department because he had become the spokesman of gamonales in Congress. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 105-106; Ramos Zambrano 1994: 33-34, 43) Luna headed the commission of Punoño representatives that presented a project for the abolition of the CPDIT in late 1922. The measure did not proceed but Luna wrote several pamphlets that circulated through Puno confirming the congressional approval of the abolition.191 He also personally intervened to obtain the suspension of the Trilingual Assembly Prefect Arenas had agreed to have with peasant representatives of the Department. (Giraldo & Franch 1979: 188-189)

Hacendado representatives focused on obtaining armed support from the Central State to repress peasant initiatives. “Azángaro Deputy Lizares Quiñones petitioned for a rural police barracks in his province in 1920, though he tempered this request by also suggesting a Ministerio Pro-Indígena.” (Hazen 1974: 185) The arrival of troops legitimated their use of violence through their own private armies. “Congressional requests for armed force were rarely denied; in one of very few exceptions, José Antonio Encinas managed to debate down a Luis F. Luna plea for hundred-man garrisons in Huancané, Azángaro, and Juli.” (Hazen 1974: 186)

Hacendados spared no effort to build patron-client relations with local authorities. Only in connivance with local authorities (priests, judges, justices of peace, governors and sub-prefects), could they control or repress peasant initiatives. On September 28, 1922, Julio Cano presented to the Criminal Judge of Puno a case of indigenous sedition in the Peninsula of Chucuito. He accused

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191 According to a pamphlet dated January 31 1923, the suspension of the Committee could not be ignored. It was a “monstrousity” and “an absolute lack of common sense” to pretend the institution still existed and would exist under the protection of the Constitution and the right of association. The CDPIT was not protected by the Constitution since it did not respect its laws: it failed to present a program, opposed the principle of order, trespassed individual and property rights and authorized banditry. (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 79-80)
Carlos Estuco and 47 more indigenes (25 men and 22 women mentioned by pairs, indicating marriages) of tumult and sedition. According to Cano, the peasants had opposed to the legal recognition of a disputed land by Civil Judge Ignacio Frisancho armed with whips and “liuis”. They tried to disarm the guards who accompanied the Judge and violently opposed the judicial action almost producing a bloody conflict. Judge Frisancho’s report presented a different scenario: when he arrived to give possession of a terrain to Cano, he expected to find a number of Indians that would verbally oppose. He ordered the guards to bring him the most vociferous and he made them understand they were following a judicial mandate. They accepted the situation and since they had incurred in mere faults but no violence (he specified they did not try to disarm the guards), they were freed. When asked if Julio Cano was attacked, Frisancho mentioned he received verbal offenses uttered in Aymara which he did not understand (Frisancho was from Pucara, a Quechua speaking area). After Judge Frisancho’s testimony, Criminal Judge Zuñiga Bejar stated there was no need for a trial since the accusations of sedition responded to a meeting of Indians in an act of judicial possession. (ARP, Legajo 1926, expediente 87, ff. 53-54, 65-66)

Incensed by the Court’s decision to drop the case, Julio Cano presented recourse of annulment. He assured that the Judges’ verdict was “completely” wrong. Cano cited the articles of the Penal Code related to sedition (art. 307 and 309) adding article 321 punishing those hindering the functions of an authority and concluded that to declare the case as not proceeding was illegal. (ARP, Legajo 1926, expediente 87, ff. 76-77) Julio Cano seems to incur in sedition more than Estuco and his fellows.

A few authorities openly supported peasant claims and initiatives. Prefect Manuel Villanueva was accused by traditional native authorities of Capachica of establishing the regime of “delegates”, that is of supporting the creation of Subcommittees throughout the Department. (ARP, Legajo 444: Prefectura 1921-1930) Other authorities replicated the contradictory attitude of openness and conservatism growingly evidenced by Leguía’s administration. Prefect Eduardo Arenas’s main objective was to maintain public order. “He reportedly sent a commission to Azángaro in December, 1921, to confiscate hacendado arms.” (Hazen 1974: 169) He was also open to alternative solutions to the “indigenous problem”. In 1921, Arenas asked the Regional Congress of the South to pass a law granting official salaries to governors and justices of peace to guarantee their honest conduct and their respect for pro-indigenous legislation. These authorities were the closest to the indigenous population and the State could not continue ignoring the exploitative relations produced by the lack of a salary. Arenas also responded to Indian unrest and demands by organizing a public tri-lingual assembly (“asamblea plebiscitaria”) to be held on November 3, 1921, to hear and discuss the complaints of Quechua and Aymara indigenes and their spokesmen, and restore tranquility. (Hazen 1974: 169) The meeting was not carried out due to the intervention of hacendado politicians such as Representative Luis Felipe Luna and Senator Wenceslao Molina. (MI 222, Senadores 1921) But Arenas was not compromised with the indigenous cause. He could back hacendado alarmist calls summoning State repressive forces. He also believed that Indians were instructed by exploiting petitfoggers with ideas of revindication, racial crossing, communism, etc. Upon his entreaty, the Senate Secretaries assumed the urgency of prohibiting the “odious contribution” of the rama hurting Puno’s public order. (MI, Prefecturas 222, Senado 1921)

Prefect and Sub-prefects knew about peasant meetings and were aware of the need to protect them. However, often enough, they lingered trying to avoid confrontations with indigenous groups and hacendados alike. Landlords and gamonal authorities profited from these power vacuums to take matters into hand. Prefectural archives contain innumerable peasant denunciations about
pacific meetings attacked or interrupted by authorities and neighbors.\textsuperscript{192} Efforts to obtain legitimacy and State protection were constantly sapped by neighbors and local authorities who seemed to fear most of all the idea of a literate indigenous mass. In May 1924, Honorio Calla solicited through the CPDIT help for the ten \textit{parcialidades} composing the district of Juliaca. Each one wanted its own school and they could build them on their own. They did not expect money from the national treasury but recognition and protection. They had been confronted by authorities and neighbors who affirmed the government had dictated special orders to persecute and hinder their pacific meetings and the working of their indigenous schools considering them a revolutionary plan attempting against the interests of the State. (AGN, MI 242, Tp-Zp 1923)

In May 1922, the indigenes of \textit{ayllu} Arboleda (district of Tiquillaca, province of Puno) held a “private” meeting to discuss the defense of communal lands. Around one o’clock in the afternoon they were surprised by Alférez Enrique Guevara and four soldiers guided by Vicente Benavente and a relative, members of the \textit{ayllu} accused of usurping communal land. Alférez Guevara threatened participants one by one, advising them not to complain. He ordered his men to fire and though they did not fire, they allowed Benavente and his relative to threaten the community and hit Pedro Charaja sending him to the ground. Guevara discussed with the \textit{ayllu} members the reasons and rights the community had over the mentioned lands. Even the Benavente family acknowledged those lands had belonged to the community but no resolution was reached. Once the commission left, over a hundred people from the community of Arboleda went to Governor Romualdo Valera’s office to ask whether the commission had been sent by the provincial or departmental authority for inspection or was responding to the orders of the local \textit{hacendado}. Communal representatives pointed out in their testimonies that the military commission came from \textit{Hacienda} Chingarani and took the direction of the \textit{hacienda} once it left. (ARP, Legajo 444: Prefectura 1921-1930)

Lack of agency was the basic premise of \textit{gamonal} discourses about the peasantry. In 1921, Saturnino Cevallos was arrested in Zepita accused of being a “delegate” of the “Pro-Indigena” and of fostering disobedience to authorities, appointment of indigenous authorities and authorizing the repartition of \textit{misti} lands. According to Puno’s newspaper “\textit{El Siglo},” his actions aimed at restoring the Tahuantinsuyo and defeating the Republic. The newspaper also mentions that on its way to jail the Indian was drooling green saliva due to the coca he was chewing and when questioned he said he was a protestant predicador and other times he was a propagandist of the ideas of Encinas and Quiroga. He seemed to hide or ignore the identity of the movement he led. (Rénique 2004: 93) This image of a degraded moronic peasant mixes almost all the negative stereotypes applied to indigenous delegates to discredit their efforts and labor, including insurgency, caste war, heresy and indoctrination.

\textit{Hacendados} looked forward to delegitimize peasant discourses and representation turning a few individuals into the enemies of Indians and \textit{hacendados} alike. Messengers and delegates, the main target of \textit{gamonal} attacks, were thus subject to all kinds of forged crimes and accusations that looked forward to deactivate sub-committees and reduce the power of delegates. Repression was particularly harsh with literate and hispanicized men. Luciano Wissa was a literate man of communal origins with a house in Puno where he lodged incoming delegates from the provinces. He was violently despoiled of his communal lands in Pacsa (Puno Province) by public notary Mariano Flores Garnica. Flores Garnica in connivance with other \textit{gamonales} of the department exerted all kinds of revenges against Wissa and even tried to kill him and his family. (ARP, Legajo 454, Prefecturas 1921-1930)

\textsuperscript{192} On August 10, 1920, the Subprefect of Lampa, accompanied by guards and some neighbors, interrupted an Indian meeting outside the hamlet of Huaynapata. Their irruption led to a confrontation during which an Indian was shot and the subprefect and some guards were wounded. (ARP, Legajo 454, Prefecturas 1921-1930)
Emilio Zeballos urged by Ezequiel Urviola, “porque yo solo como defensor no me bastaba” (because I as only defender was not enough), had written memorials for indigenes who wanted to present complaints to the Investigative Commission of 1920. Zeballos and his family (including two children under 12) were tortured (the bodies were deformed; the wife’s tongue and scalp had been pulled out) and assassinated in their own house in Estancia Condorini, six leagues from the town of Lampa.\footnote{The Zeballos were shot by two men (Añasco) who coveted some plots belonging to Zeballos’s wife, instigated by Subprefect of Lampa José Antonio Torres. Provincial Judge Bejarano affirmed the homicides were due to “public vendetta” but he acquitted local authorities. The case was closed as a case of burglary and witchcraft. Emilio Zeballos was accused of being a sorcerer (not a messenger or tinterillo), and the case was used to question Urviola’s morality, his only goal being to obtain money. (ARP, Legajo 454, Prefecturas 1921-1930)} (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.8, p. 8; ARP, Legajo 454, Prefecturas 1921-1930) Mariano Gonzales, delegate of the district of Tiquillaca (Puno Province), was also persecuted for his labor as scrivener and defender. By order of Eduardo Garnica, Victor, Carlos and Juan Isaac Pineda, a man named Cayetano Choque had entered Gonzales’s house insulted and beat his family and even cut his wife’s hair. Choque had taken some of Gonzales communal plots and invaded the rest with cattle. Gonzales was stuck in Puno, threatened to be shot if he left the city. (ARP, Legajo 454, Prefectura 1921-1930)

In 1921, delegates gathered in Puno denounced to the regional congressmen the killings of indigenes carried in different localities of the department and the ferocious persecutions suffered by indigenous delegates. (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930) Urviola representing “all the indigenous delegates from the provinces of Azángaro, Ayaviri, Lampa, Puno, Chucuito, Huancané, Sandia and Carabaya” pleaded for the Government’s imminent intervention. In spite of a supreme decree and a criminal suit against them for the massacre of Santiago de Pupuja, Arturo and Rómulo Díaz and Juan G. and Maximiliano Dianderas (under an order of capture) had resumed their attacks. On January 5, with a group of armed men, they attacked all the houses of the peasants of Llallahua, Mataro, Tulavi and two more communities, shooting their carbines against those who were working their plots and killing the wife of Mariano Mango. The terror and persecution were sowing desperation, sadness and pessimism among the Indians who were only guilty of claiming their legitimate rights to the Investigative Commission sent by the government in 1920. Urviola identified the situation as a war fought through violence and economic deprivation. Urviola accused pointedly the following: the Pinazo family, the Lizares Quiñones family, Eufracio Salas, Carlos Sarmiento, Bernardino Arias Echenique, Andrea P. widow of Cabrera, Melitón Arroyo, José Antonio Torres, Justo Romero, Mariano Garnica, José Anchieta, Antolín Zirena, Natalia Herrera, Julio Cano, Lopez Echenique and another hundred “feudal lords”. (AGN, Legajo 443: Prefectura 1921-1930)

According to a document presented to Congress in November 1922, the investigative commission of 1920 had provoked the ire of gamonales. In confabulation with local authorities and announcing imminent revolts, gamonales calumniated, sued, persecuted, jailed, raped, tortured and even killed indigenes. Besides being forced to serve as authorities and prison guards, pay arbitrary fines and illegally increased contributions, surrender their cattle for official errands and even pay for military conscription identifications, they were subject now to cold blooded murder. Some had been made to dig their own tombs and at rifle point forced to sign false declarations. Urviola had counted one hundred and twenty two assassinations of indigenes and aggressions of
all sorts\textsuperscript{194} (especially on women) in only two years.\textsuperscript{195}

According to the document presented to Congress, \textit{gamonales} were preparing for the extermination of the indigenes of the whole department with calumnies and false alarms. Under the pretext of a race war, invading abjuring religions, the reconstruction of the Inca Empire and national division, \textit{gamonales} were arming their \textit{haciendas} with revolvers, maussers, carabines, boxes of ammunitions and explosives. Some had even put alcohol, coca and food with strychnine in the boundaries of their \textit{haciendas} to poison surrounding communities. (AGN, MT, DGA1, 3.13.2.8, p. 4) \textit{Gamonal} arguments about sedition and race war were also complemented by arguments about revolutions and political threats to the State. Anarchist and Communist discourses had gained weight since the Russian revolution offering \textit{gamonal} alarmist discourses a new vocabulary and imagery. CPDIT delegates were accused of communist subversion especially when linked to unionism. Committee members had a hard time confronting such political accusations, especially after the creation of the Indigenous Regional Workers Federation (\textit{Federación Obrera Regional Indígena}) in 1923.\textsuperscript{196} This institution aimed at spreading to rural areas the principles and methods of anarchist unionism. (Basadre 1983: IX 433)

On 15 April 1921, \textit{hacendado} Juan Gualberto Dianderas, neighbor and Governor of Santiago, ordered the arrest of Toribio Quispe Pachari and ten more messengers at the station of Laro (Azángaro).\textsuperscript{197} The messengers were escorted to Juliaca and then delivered to the local Governor to be remitted to Puno. They were accused of heading revolts and promoting two attacks on \textit{hacendado} properties (Frisancho and Landaeta). The Commanding Captain, Lieutenant José Cardena (9 May 1921), reported that being at the station of Laro (on commission to Juliaca), he was approached by Juan Dianderas, who told him that many of the Indians traveling on the train were leaders of the revolts that had occurred in different periods and were to blame for the “abnormal” situation in the Department. With the help of two gendarmes also on commission, he had arrested ten men and taken many documents detailing the subversive plans of the indigenes. Lieutenant Cardena reported that the documents found bore seals and indicated the appointment of authorities in Lima by a “said Urviola” and “said Encinas” and of messengers in different ayllus and towns. Most telling was a letter addressed to an Antonio Zea (Puno’s departmental delegate) telling him that they were ready to be summoned and that several commissions were being sent to receive personal instructions. Cardena pointed out he was protecting public order for he had been stationed in Puno due to the continuous revolts undertaken by the indigenous population. (ARP, Legajo 453: Prefectura 1921-1930)

The CPDIT responded with a printed band entitled “\textit{Implorando la caridad de los Indígenas de Puno}” (“Imploring the charity of the indigenes of Puno”) and signed “the indigenes of Azángaro.” It was probably written by lawyer Manuel Quiroga defender of the jailed messengers. According to

\textsuperscript{194} The document mentions gory details: the plucking of María Velasquez’s eyes; the castration of eight among which Carlos Harpita; the mutilation of noses, lips, tongues, breasts; the burial of living persons such as María Maquera and the massacre of entire families and communities. (AGN, MT, DGA1, 3.13.2.8, p. 2)

\textsuperscript{195} The document bore the signatures of several delegates from Puno: José María Tumi, M. Huertas, Bernardino Espetía, Máximo Quispe, Ruperto Amaro Anatías, Manuel Vergaya Pilco, Francisco Ccama, Florentino Alanocca and Justo Gallegos. (ARP, Legajo 443: Prefectura 1921-1930; AGN, MT, DGA1, 3.13.2.8)

\textsuperscript{196} “At least two manifestoes raise the possibility that it was organized from the provinces, particularly in Puno, to the centre, or from the bottom up, though both its growth and activities are obscure.” (Hazen 1974: 161)

\textsuperscript{197} José Lima, Mariano Cabrera, Florentino Arapa, Gregorio Ticona, Victoriano Huacasi, Victoria Carreño, Damian Chuquiwanca, Emilio Román, Toribio Quispe Pachari, Manuel Huaman Quisaris and Vicente Medina. “\textit{Implorando la caridad de los Indígenas de Puno},” Personal archive of Mauro Paredes, Arequipa.
this band, Governor Dianderas was involved in the massacre of twelve indigenes in Santiago and the jailing of another four in Pucara. The messengers found in the Station of Laro were on their way to complain to the Prefect when they were abusively detained, robbed of money and documents and even forced to pay jail “entrance rights”. Another three messengers were jailed in Pucara (Juan de la Cruz Chambi, Ruperto Arratía and Maximiliano Lanza) together with Victoria Carreño, the widow of one of the indigenes murdered in Santiago. They were accused of Bolchevism for having lists of twenty-cents contributions (for the sending of memorials to Lima), the gospel of Saint Matthew, reading primers (cartillas) in Quechua, drafts of letters, military conscription documents, bills, receipts “y otros papelitos insignificantes”. The documents were hardly related to Bolchevism. The confiscated seals belonged to Toribio Quispe, one of the messengers and to the Subcommittee of Azángaro. The band confirmed their right to bear seals as decreed by the Ministry of Development. (ARP, Legajo 453: Prefectura 1921-1930) A pro-indigenous judge, J. E. Romero was given the case. The messengers obtained their freedom after a couple of weeks, but they were left in a “miserable state” and asked for the economic support of the state and other indigenes. (ARP, Legajo 453: Prefectura 1921-1930)

On November 28, 1924, Hermenegildo Mansilla, once delegate from Atuncolla (province of Puno) now President of the Fourth Indigenous Congress, assured the Minister of Government that neither the CPDIT nor any of its sub-committees were connected with the recently formed “Federación Indígena Obrero Regional Parhana” created by groups of students and workers that were foreign to their cause. Mansilla isolated the CPDIT from the anarchist and unionist campaign this federation was fostering along the republic. The CPDIT, he assured, only interested in the defense of indigenous interests and not in rebellion. (AGN, MI, Prefectura 250, Ap-Cp 1924)

Still, the CPDIT could not prevent its delegates from joining or participating in unions and other grassroot institutions. Delegates shared different degrees of intensity, some being more ambitious or involved in the national political context. The CPDIT could only distance itself from such political postures. On November 25 1922, the Committee issued a communiqué voicing its “tenacious fight for culture and for the solid unification of the race”. It stressed its nationalist approach set in its principles and assured that the society was not involved in its members’ doctrinarism, political or religious beliefs and did not pretend to initiate a race or class struggle, as exploiting landlords affirmed.198

Weakened by centralism and economic crisis, Puno’s hacendados launched an ideological and political attack on the peasantry to slow down its advance. They used their political presence in Congress and strengthened their local political clienteles to repress any attempt to increase peasant-state relations. But most of all they used violence. The repression that followed the Investigative Commission of 1920 reached unprecedented levels and was directly targeted towards indigenous messengers and leaders who were tortured, jailed, dispossessed and even murdered. Accusations of communist subversion added to the already known accusations of immorality, treason to the country and millenarism, to create a climate of suspicion and repression that greatly difficulted the task of messengers both with the State and with their own constituencies. Indeed, some of the greatest challenges came from within.

INTERNAL OBSTACLES

Gamonal repression and arguments of peasant revolt haunted delegates and hindered the task
of organizing constituencies, but peasant efforts were not just sapped from the outside. Messengers faced internal obstacles of considerable caliber, mainly the fear or discouragement of certain sectors. Mariano Mamani was an indigenous intellectual eager to promote peasant mobilization. He had become literate and had helped create the Subcommittee of his community, Sollocota, in June 1921. Mamani had also travelled to Lima bringing printed receipts to collect money. He complained however to departmental delegate Antonio Zea that he had not been able to use them since his community did not understand the need for them and feared the gamonales. He was expecting orders from Dr. Quiroga to make mandatory and effective those receipts in his power. Mamani saw the need to use some leverage since many of his fellows were not ready to cooperate: “Los demás compañeros se hacen los desentendidos sin querer cuadryvar en algo con pretexto de que dicen que los gamonales han triunfado y que los indígenas han perdido (sic).”

He criticized the discouragement or lack of involvement of many fearful peasants, yet he acknowledged the critical situation of gamonal repression. Mamani enticed Zea to send him news of the development of events in Lima “que aquí no savemos nada; porque los gamonales nos están vigilando día y noche, sin darnos lugar a movernos a ninguna parte.” Zea was to keep him minutely informed to counter gamonal vigilance. (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930)

Messengers faced a gigantic task not just because of fear of gamonal repression but also due to internal conflicts produced by growing economic inequalities within peasant society. Prefectural documents unveil cases of land usurpation done by actual or former members of the ayllu, the accused sharing the last names of the accusers or evidencing indigenous origins. Usurpations were not just done by hacendados and authorities; they were also carried on by prosperous families who had personally benefited from communal resources. One such conflict was seen early on between the Benavente family and its community Arboleda in the district of Tiquillaca (Puno Province).

Resisting the rise of delegates and subcommittees were also men and families that held or had held traditional positions of authority benefiting from it and felt threatened or worsted by the incoming forces of change. On June 21, 1926, communal indigenes from the nine parcialidades of the district of Capachica (including the islands of Amantani and Taquile, province of Puno) appealed to the Prefect to denounce the situation in their district. Believers in the Catholic religion professed by the state and respectful of authorities, they had followed their ancestors who since remote times professed subordination as customs established. The subscribers of the document had served as mandones or envarados in their communities carrying the governors’ orders. For the last eight years, however, the regime of the district of Capachica had completely changed: demoralized individuals had lost the respect due to authorities and it had become easy to commit any kind of abuse.

Demoralization had worsened in the last two years (1922-1924) since the formation of the “Tahuantinsuyo institution”. Envarados affirmed that it had led most indigenes to believe themselves their “companions” affirming that under the flag of the Tahuantinsuyo they were all equal and old customs were prohibited. Former Prefect Manuel Villanueva had encouraged these arguments by establishing the regime of “delegates”. The consequences were alarming: their fellow indigenes refused to obey the governor affirming they had other more important occupations.

199 “The other companions pretend not to understand to avoid helping in something with the pretext that gamonales have won and indigenes have lost.”

200 “that here we know nothing, since gamonales are watching us day and night, without allowing us to move anywhere.”
This was related to the appearance in the parcialidades of Siale, Cotos, Capano, Yapura and Ylata of individuals who maliciously marauded with the name of “evangelists” teaching ideas of revolt. They visited each house and often stayed at the houses of the so called “delegates” who had promoted disorder in 1923.

The envarados, as solicitors of their communities sent by their fellow indigenes, protested against the establishment of an Adventist Mission in the circumscription. It was deemed inconvenient and unnecessary since they already counted with two schools, one in the capital (Capachica) and one in the parcialidad of Llachon. The parcialidades of Escallani, Chilora, Cotos, Amantani and Taquile had asked the Prefect to arrange with the Direction of Education the creation of two or three more schools. They did not reject a better education. They wanted to recuperate political stability they had with governor Yana (a sagacious man who had tried to restore custom and stop demoralization). They were willing to cooperate to improve the main square, cables and roads and believed the governor should be given the power to severely punish those not complying to work in these tasks. (ARP, Legajo 444: Prefectura 1921-1930)

The document signed by the envarados was accompanied by another document written by Capachica’s authorities and neighbors of the district including seven literate women. The content was similar: they had been bothered in their tranquility by the arrival, in an “almost” clandestine and suspicious way, of two individuals called evangelists. Neighbors and authorities had expelled the two evangelists provoking the complaints of the local delegates who were creating disorder. They asked the state to intervene to calm the situation. Their complaints were echoed by a group of mandonenes, probably older and more traditional peasants had a harder time envisioning structural changes in their society and complying with the new proposals coming from the outside. (ARP, Legajo 444: Prefectura 1921-1930)

Internal rivalries sprung over the issues of leadership, organization and ways of action. In mid 1920, a group of sixteen messengers traveled to Lima with Ezequiel Urviola as the “Liga de Mutua Defensa Indígena”. They soon felt that Urviola neglected their affairs making them loose over twenty days in a critical economic situation. They resorted to the CPDIT and obtained through it room and board as well as free passes to return to their homes. Urviola took the passes preventing them from leaving, mistreated Toribio Quispe and Eugenio Mango Turpo, and threatened them all saying that upon their return they would be punished. The messengers seemed convinced they were receiving justice from the executive power and could not conceive of gamonales disrupting the new pact they had established with the president, their protector. They were confronted however by Urviola, keenly aware of the power struggles in Lima and especially of gamonal fear and ire in Puno. Urviola was probably surprised by the delegates’ decision to return to Puno when measures had not yet been taken by the government to change the situation of subordination in which the messengers would return. These two perspectives clashed into a heated dispute between Urviola and the delegates who decided to accuse him. They told the Minister of Government they felt neglected, threatened and even abused by Urviola. (AGN, MI 216, Prefecturas 1920)

On December 2, 1920, the situation worsened. Messengers stationed in Lima were anxious about their situation; government procedures were slow and inconclusive. The messengers complained they had not received the five soles subsidy the President offered each one of them

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201 Antonio Zea (departmental delegate and leader of the group), Eugenio Mango Turpo, Jorge Ticona, Gerónimo Mamani, Miguel Cruz, Martin Huayta, Eduardo Quispe, Luis Chavez Sairiltupac, Juan de la Cruz Chambi, Toripio Quispe Pachari, Sebastian Huaynacho, Inocencio Condori, Pedro Duran, Donato Mamani, Valentín Llanos and Anacleto Suyo.
the day of their first audience to alleviate their situation. In this context, they were visited by the 
police who searched their belongings finding the seals they had ordered at their own expense for 
their association. The police did not arrive alone. It was accompanied by Demetrio Sandoval, 
Secretary of the CPDIT, who told the messengers that Urviola had accused them of having 
acquired the seals for subversive ends. Peasants thus denounced Urviola assuming they were 
being misled. (AGN, MI 216, Prefecturas 1920) In their frustration, they withdrew Urviola’s right of 
representation, identifying him as a “mestizo disfrazado de ser indígena” (mestizo disguised as 
indigene) and accused him of bragging about the authority bestowed on him by the President to 
threaten messengers.

The ill-disposed intervention of the CPDIT created an internal crisis. Urviola, who had grown in 
Azángaro, rightfully feared the persecution and attack of delegates. He also understood the 
strength of the peasant movement was in its numbers and that it could be weakened by private 
initiatives. His own power as indigenous proxy and leader was in the number of his followers: if he 
wanted to reach some resolution of the indigenous problem in Puno he needed that power. 
Demetrio Sandoval and the leadership of the CPDIT had similar concerns. Messengers’ private 
initiatives could downplay the role of the institution and discourage the support of the executive 
power. The institution needed to show that it was backed by the indigenous messengers and that it 
spoke for them. Urviola’s independence and influence over the peasantry was threatening even for 
the CPDIT, but both parties lost if their followers dispersed. Messengers were caught, not only in a 
circle of gamonal violence, but also in a struggle over representation and leadership. This struggle 
weakened the coherence of the movement feeding, right in the face of the State, gamonal 
discourses about the manipulation of external elements.

The problem was also one of mutual distrust. Sandoval, Secretary General of the CPDIT did 
not trust Urviola. Urviola did not trust the CPDIT leadership. Neither Urviola nor the Sandoval 
seemed to trust the messenger’s initiatives and decisions. And the messengers, tired of waiting, 
doubted the power of Urviola. They rejected his leadership and even complained about the 
unskempt promises of the State. They called upon the personal and direct pact they had with the 
President; they seem to trust no one else to protect them and their constituencies. Delegates were 
reenacting a pact and they used the CPDIT to sustain the right of association and their legitimate 
representation of peasant claims. Delegates like Pedro Choque Cruz and Manuel Ticona Salcedo 
considered themselves functionaries appointed by the government. They identified themselves to 
the Prefect as first and second secretary of their subcommittee “según nombramiento del Supremo 
Gobierno, el mismo que conservamos en nuestro poder”. This idea of institutional legitimacy 
was issued from a protective verbal pact with the executive power and confirmed by countless 
Supreme Resolutions. Through the CPDIT, delegates obtained official recognition for their local 
associations and appointments and even benefits similar to those provided for functionaries, from 
desk supplies to travel fares and lodging expenses. (AGN, MT, DGAi 1921-30, 3.13.2.8)

The pact with the executive did not guarantee peasant expectations however, mainly because 
it was not always supported by local authorities. Messengers received attention and support from 
private individuals and State officials but their interventions had not changed the balance of power. 
Prefect Villanueva’s power and willingness to do justice had been hindered by local confabulations 
of authorities and gamonales who silenced peasant claims with false reports. (AGN, MT, DGAi, 
3.13.2.8, p. 8) Messengers repetitively denounced the uselessness of asking for reports from local

202 “according to an appointment of the Supreme Government, which we keep in our power.” The document written in 
Puno on August 14, 1922 was signed and rubricated by Choque Cruz and Ticona Salcedo who seemed to be literate. 
(ARP, CPDIT folder)
authorities involved in the accusations. Governors and justices of peace, chosen amongst hacendado employees, only served as carriers of their plans of "persecution and annihilation". (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930)

This faltering situation was evidenced during the Third Indigenous Congress held in Lima in 1923. Urviola proposed the following topics of discussion: 1. indigenous education in most important rural centers; 2. the agrarian problem and the role of the state (the study of the commissions’ reports, review of hacienda titles); 3. minimum salary for rural labor; 4. adequate colonization of the jungle; 5. how to rule the actions of the priesthood, especially in the costs of church services; 6. review of the regulations of the vial law (should fall mostly on hacendados); 7. conflicts of communal Indians to be solved only in civil tribunals or by a tribunal especially chosen; 8. law prohibiting communal peasants from selling their lands; 9. Revision of the principles of action of the CPDIT at all instances; 10. acquisition of a press to edit publications. (Ramos Zambrano 1994: 28-31; Hazen)

These proposals are both repetitive and troubling. Most of these proposals followed up from previous congresses and recalled long time peasant remonstrances (education, land titles, minimum salary), evidencing a lack of efficient action from the State. Some proposals showed new approaches to the situation, as well as a more informed and practical attitude: the study of commissions’ reports, the review of the regulations of the vial law (not just its abolition), civil tribunals for peasant disputes, a printing press to edit publications. So far proposals carry the usual mix of frustration at the situation and renewed hope for change. Two propositions however showed a situation of internal strife: the need for a law prohibiting communal peasants from selling their lands and the request for the revision of the principles of action of the Committee at all instances. The peasant movement in defense of communal lands was lacking coherence and the CPDIT was not performing as it ought to. These propositions evidenced the internal limits of all that was being achieved.

By 1923, the peasant movement was reaching a stalemate. Part of it was due to gamonal counterattack. Part of it was due to indigenista intervention. As Marisol de la Cadena pointed out, liberal indigenistas defended delegates and messengers in courts, but this defense did not consider self-identified Indian politicians as conscious subjects of their own struggle. (De la Cadena 2000: 88-89) Messengers were also to blame for that. The 1920s disturbances were not just a fight between radical and liberal indigenistas; they were also a crucial step of self-identification and empowerment that indigenous intellectuals faced with difficulty falling back into recycled discourses. Peasant discourses called upon a moral conscience by turning around the argument of a race war. They stressed however gamonal and local authorities’ violence and plans of Indian “extermination” for the sake of “despoliation”. (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930, f. 2, June 5, 1921) They pointed out consistently that while unfortunate Indians like them were deprived of the most insignificant means of defense, their persecutors had the “rare privilege” of possessing abundant fire arms without a single authority trying to recuperate and return them to
the State. They only hoped to live peacefully their “humble” lives in their “humble” properties: “A la faz de la República, ante la conciencia de vuestros [sic] declaramos solemnemente que no abrigamos propósitos de sublevación ni perturbación del orden público [sic]. Lo que perseguimos es que se nos deje vivir con vida mas tranquila y humana en nuestros umildes hogares, que se respete las propiedades que aun nos quedan que se se se el gamonalismo en su afán de exterminio y acaparamiento de nuestra umilde propiedad territorial.”

In eloquent appeals, memorials identified the plaintiffs as pacific and defenseless persons. From a subaltern position, they denounced the defiance, revenges and lies of “feudal lords” and called upon the State’s paternalism, begging for justice from a “pious” and “humanitarian” State.

Messengers and delegates produced their own pamphlets denouncing the many stratagems used by gamonales to fool public opinion. An anonymous pamphlet published by Tip. “EL INCA” de Puno, entitled “La sublevación indígena. Boletín nº1” condemned the “Liga de Gamonales” as a group of “gamonales desalmados y capaces de todos los delitos, con el fin de extraviar el criterio público.” The League’s “so-called hacendados” carried on violent usurpations of indigenous lands and crimes while turning indigenous claims for justice into “revolts”. Messengers were “challenging the symbolic structures of social life” to change their material circumstances. (Steinberg 1999: 17)

These constituted the “fighting words of conflict”, through which collective actions could be framed with legitimacy and efficacy. By constructing their own meanings of such “words of conflict”, native challengers were elaborating their place within social order, their relationship to other groups, their identity and the limits of legitimate agency. (Steinberg 1999: 2)

Memorials called upon moral (God, conscience) and political (law, public order) arguments, producing a polarized vision of society to appeal to public opinion the same way hacendado documents did. Reified definitions of race were turned around, now it was good defenseless Indians versus evil abusive gamonales: “Es, pues, necesario que el pueblo peruano se forme cabal concepto de las cosas, a fin de que esté en aptitud de juzgar quienes tiene la razón: o los desalmados explotadores sin Dios, sin Ley y sin Conciencia, o los humildes, resignados o indefensos indios.”

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(Steinberg 1999: 37) According to this anonymous pamphlet, society was composed of three elements. One could only belong to one of them: 1. enslaved, poor, ragged, hungry, defenseless, humble and martyr Indians robbed of their land and even of the most sacred and inalienable right to life (compared to the primitive heroes of Christianity). 2. Soul-less, 

203 In early 1921, delegates Mariano Gonzales, Luciano Wissa, José Gabriel Chaña and Mariano Gamarra complained they had been in Lima over a month without reaching justice. They had no resources to subsist and after such a sterile sacrifice, out of charity they asked fares to return to Puno and Ayaviri. Almost a month later (March 8), the Ministry authorized the fares and filed the petition. (AGN, MI, Prefecturas 213, “Mp-Up” 1921) On July 5, Gamarra and Chaña still had not reached any justice or solution to their problem. Persecuted to be killed by their gamonal enemies, they had come to the capital requesting protection for themselves, their families and fellow communaries... “pero como vemos que el Supremo Gobierno no tiene tiempo por las múltiples ocupaciones que tiene por el momento.” They asked for guarantees and fares to return to Ayaviri “a fin de que podamos llegar a nuestros hogares abandonados y expuestos a la cólera y venganza de los gamonales que citamos ya.” (AGN, MI, Prefecturas 213, “Mp-Up” 1921)

204 “In the face of the Republic, before your consciences we solemnly declare that we bear no purpose of revolt or of perturbing public order. What we pursue is to be left to live a more tranquil and humane life in our humble homes, that properties that remain be respected, that gamonalismo ceased in its will to exterminate and monopolize our humble territorial property.”

205 “It is thus necessary that the Peruvian people form a clear concept of the issue, so that it will be capable of judging who is right, the soul-less God-less exploiters devoid of law and conscience, or humble, resigned and defenseless Indians.”
liar, calumniating, insatiable, voracious, exploitative, lawless, rapist, merciless, treacherous and vile gamonales capable of all crimes and infamies to usurp Indian land, who invented revolts, cornered Indians and hunted them like beasts. 3. Honest, conscious, scared, bitter and misinformed citizens, who believed in equality before the law, individual rights, freedoms and guarantees, and rebuffed inequality and injustice in a twentieth century-modern democracy.

The first two categories were hard to miss. The third one however was more fluid and uncertain. Who were these conscious modern citizens? Could they or were they willing to change the situation? Pro-indigenous whites and mestizos under the influence of indigenista sectors produced all sorts of moral discourses supporting the indigenous cause that did not always translate in actions. With notable exceptions as I have argued in the case of Puno, this sector did not share the conviction of Indian consciousness and agency. Most indigenistas envisioned themselves as representatives of large uneducated masses needing their tutelage, while indigenous intellectuals and messengers hoped to construct an alternative definition of Indianness based on the power of literacy (as the road to citizenship).

De la Cadena studying the case of Cusco has pointed out how modern liberal indigenistas were not historically equipped –intellectually or emotionally- to understand a political program that included articulate indigenous leaders. On the contrary, their conceptual baggage blinded them to the fact that insurgent indigenous leaders might be what Guha would call, “subjects of their won struggle”. (De la Cadena 2000: 115) Indigenistas demanded the State more tutelary legislation not the broadening of voting rights, and viewed the political project of the CPDIT as too radical. In it, “Indians did not become mestizos when they learned to read”. This was quite threatening for mestizo intellectuals whose power and identity was based on their knowledge of Spanish and their hold on formal education. “They often delegitimized Tawantinsuyo indigenous leaders on the grounds that they were literate and some relatively well-off, framing them as ex-Indians, opportunistic mestizo exploiters, who were misleading real Indians with the false idea that they would be allowed to even possess hacendados' properties.” (De la Cadena 2000: 88)

Official, Indian and hacendado discourses alike coincided in the characterization of a new stereotype: the gamonal. It was a marauding landowner living out of his subordinated Indians’ toil. In racial terms he was mestizo; in moral terms he was unmarried, dissolute, unrestrained, possessed by savage instincts; in cultural terms he was a man who had rejected civilization and descended to barbarian forms of life and recurrent to exploitation to find wealth. The scope of the term depended on its user. For messengers and delegates, there was practically no difference between the words hacendado and gamonal. All hacendados profited from peasant labor more or less abusively. For hacendados and for many indigenistas, only a few renegades, usually mestizos or hispanized Indians, had turned into gamonales staining the image of educated and honest landowners. The League of Hacendados del Sur used indigenista language to avoid accusations of being anti-Indian. It claimed the legitimacy of hacendados while identifying gamonalismo as source of the regional social tension. For the State, gamonales were the exact reason why its bureaucracy needed to grow, extending its reach to the farthest corners of the country. For Leguía’s centralizing and paternalist regime, the gamonal was a convenient puppet to promote official indigenismo: the State could thus become the rescuer of souls trapped in feudal haciendas. (Larson 2002: 120-121)

These discursive coincidences were, however, of little help for the peasant movement. Reciprocal accusations of racial annihilation attempts and racial assignations of civilization and barbarism at best annulled conflicting discourses, confusing public opinion and fostering inconclusive measures from the State. I would even argue that in their despair to counter gamonal accusations, peasant intellectuals generated contradictory discourses that produced the opposite of the desired effect. Documents such as those Urviola sent to Congress stressed, as we have
noted, the image of indigenous peasants as “desvalidas y pacíficas e inofensivas personas” (“helpless and pacific and harmless persons”) (AGN, MT, DGA, 3.13.2.8, p. 2). Peasants were described by their own representatives as helpless, destitute and conciliatory. This only confirmed an image of tameness and meekness only a step away from the gullible manipulated Indian described by hacendados. Messengers hoped to obtain the moral support of honorable citizens and state officials but sacrificing respect and pride. In these documents, Urviola appealed for justice calling to the humanity, energy and charity of the Minister of Government and other officials, not by asserting the worthiness and merit of indigenous citizens, by stressing their importance as producers and future voters.

Furthermore, peasant spokesmen could fall prey of reifications and polarizations that could be self-defeating, depicting the peasantry as a bomb about to explode or adverting the government about exalted spirits: “No vamos contra el progreso porque somos amigos y afines a él; solamente protestamos contra la injusticia e iniquida (sic) humana, porque no es factible que ahora después de 100 años de vida Republicana, recién pretendan los señores gamonales abrir camino y emprender obras públicas tan solo por desesperar al Aborigen, que falta muy poco para que se llene la medida de la última paciencia – y urgen poner remedio y por esto acudimos ante todos los Poderes Legales de la Nación.” 206 (my highlight, AGN, Legajo 443: Prefectura 1921-1930)

Secretary of the Departmental Sub-Committee of Puno, Julian Nina criticized the House of Representatives’ banning of the CPDIT as a “monstrous attempt against the liberty of association, perfectly guaranteed by the Constitution”. He rejected the silly excuse of the collection of a special tax and the feigned compassion for the exploitation they suffered and warned that the Indians' emergence was like a running locomotive that could not be contained by fifteen Houses together and only needed fair direction and the human support it had been receiving from the Government not to run off the track. (Ramos Zambrano 2003: 79) These speeches contained two powerful elements that could become explosive if combined: helplessness and despair. If tame, the peasantry could be readily influenced by the subversive ideologies of the period rising against the status quo.

Culture is the place where social relations are produced and reproduced daily, where ethnic, gender, generational and class levels fight over meaning. Meaning is expressed in specific context; it is a social production and potential site of conflict within a conjuncture. Yet, symbolic definitions fluctuate fundamentally around power. Power expresses itself first in the development of social definitions and in the imposition of a dominant sense. Dominated groups try to produce counter senses, alternative or oppositional definitions, breaching their encounter with power. Their success will depend on their capacity to fundament their definitions on a credible symbolism capable of acting upon the representations other groups give of themselves and others. (Briggs 1986: 206) Both peasants and hacendados used the dichotomy civilization/barbarism to obtain State support and protection. These rhetorical strategies, however, fostered the inability of Peruvian intellectuals and politicians to cope with indigenous cultural resistance and grasp the totality of their reality.

For Zevallos Aguilar, peasants displayed different behaviors with different interlocutors to prevent gamonal sectors from totally understanding their psychology. This was a “survival strategy” to resist domination and marginalization. (Zevallos 2002: 126-128) Though it might have help resist domination, this strategy fostered marginalization since it hindered communication and the building

206 “We do not go against progress because we are its friends and we are aligned with it. We only protest against human injustice and iniquity because it is not possible that after 100 years of Republican life, gamonal lords pretend to open roads and start public works only to despair the aborigine. Little time remains until the last measure of patience disappears, and it is urgent to put a remedy and that is why we call upon the legal powers of the Nation.”
of strong relations with the State. In a similar way, messengers could call upon the state with loaded images of victimization and helplessness. This nevertheless was counterproductive when leaders tried to impress images of tax-paying dutiful indigenous citizens endowed with rights. This may be why, in spite of its many pro-indigenous discourses and measures, Leguía’s administration maintained on many occasions a hesitant posture and showed little effectiveness when called to intervene in hacendado-peasant conflicts.

Besides having a hard time being recognized as subjects of their own struggles, messengers faced important internal obstacles. Their leadership and representation could be challenged by generational differences, fear of repression and the natural exhaustion of the movement. All of this diminished the possibility of resisting gamonal assaults and pressuring the State for change, and led many messengers to fall back into old paternalist forms of discourse. The image of a weak and defenseless Indian was a discourse used by all sides to foster their interests. Peasants used it to elaborate a self-righteous victimism, hacendados to develop a discourse of external manipulation and the State to maintain a paternalist posture that hindered real structural change. This recycled discourse turned into a self-defeating argument for indigenous voices: it went counter the empowering discourse of literate indigenous citizens, fostered hacendado arguments and fed into the paternalist attitude of indigenista sectors and of a State already unsure about giving agency to the peasantry.

INITIATIVES AND RESPONSES RADICALIZE

By 1923, Leguía had set the bases of an autocratic system. The Constitution of 1920 perpetrated the vices of the previous system: it maintained the provincial base of representatives and still banned illiterates from voting. (Planas 1994a: 20-22) Parties were outlawed and Congressional autonomy reduced. Political personalities were persecuted, jailed or deported. Leguía’s administration produced the emergence of new power groups whose fortunes centered in the expansion of the State and its links to foreign capitals. Security forces were among the most benefited by the raise in public salaries, developing parallel to the civil bureaucracy.207 Internal security started to overpower the voices of reform in the face of the communist “danger”. Strikes were repressed by the army. Progressively, the administration will try to erase all sphere of citizen autonomy in the discussion of public matters through a cult of the presidential image. In 1923, Leguía broke with his progressive relative and eventual successor, Germán Leguía y Martínez, and depurated the administration of “germancista” elements, including Encinas. Civilian professionals, militaries and students opposing Leguía’s reelection were deported or confined in the island of Taquile in Lake Titicaca. In 1924, Leguía was reelected in an electoral process in which he was the only candidate. (Bullick 1999: 76-77; García Salvatecci 1972: 115; Planas 1994: 47-48, 75, 112; Basadre 1983: IX 276; Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 129; Rénique 2004: 102) Leguía’s administration fell back into authoritarianism and into an old civilista paradigm: the idea of an evolving economic integration, with a firm belief in infrastructure that helped avoid the problem of the land. (Romero y Levano 1969: 59)

After its initial pro-indigenous stance to confront old local oligarchies, the administration started to worry about the grave situation in the Southern Andes. The celebrations of the Independence centennial had exacerbated the wounds left by the war with Chile, mainly the difficulty to recuperate the occupied provinces. The country felt torn apart. “In this juncture, the presence in

207 According to a French military attaché, between 1920 and 1932, the number of civilian and military bureaucrats increase in 500%, number confirmed by the State budget. (Bullick 1999: 77-81)
Lima of hundreds of delegates to the First Indigenous Congress, asserting their Indianness by parading through main streets dressed in ceremonial garments, led to the interpretations of a racially inspired war. The Indians were accused of trying to destabilize the entire country.” (De la Cadena 2000: 93) One of Lima chroniclers affirmed: “They attempt to divide Peru into races; they want to re-establish the Tawantinsuyu, the commune, and bring chaos to Peru. The very stability of the government is in danger, because we have to be aware that there are more than three million Indians, and if they are going to assume a bellicose attitude, it is going to be very hard to stop them.” All this happened while Leguía’s administration strove for reelection, through new political alliances and measures.

The provincial elite “expected increasing support from the central government to consolidate their gains vis-a-vis the peasantry, both through distribution of funds and offices derived from Lima among their clients and through strengthened police and military contingents in the countryside. Yet the gamonales never saw themselves as junior partners of Lima’s oligarchy. They insisted on maintaining independent power in the provinces against what they perceived as the threat of subversive modernization pushed by the central government.” (Jacobsen 1993: 212) Their perception was not equivocal: the power of the old regional gamonalismo lost autonomy and independence. Starting in 1924, Leguí a leaned on a fraction of medium landowners with more modern or progressive orientations such as Lampa Representative Enrique Torres Belón (appointed President of the I Northern Irrigation and Colonization Congress in 1929). Luis Felipe Luna, an unquestionable leguist who had launched in the Southern Andes a campaign to convince hacendados that the ideology of the “Patria Nueva” was not looking for the destruction of hacendados but a better treatment for the Indian under the same conditions of the Aristocratic Republic, failed to reach the Senate and became between 1925 and 1929 prefect of different departments, a position dependent entirely on the Executive Power. “De esta manera en una prefectura, el gobierno podía domesticar y controlar mejor la conducta de este terrateniente.” (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 129-137)

Meanwhile, in the naughty department of Puno, official measures and discourses had led Indians to think the long expected time for justice had come. “New-found Indian self-confidence, spurred by politically-aware leaders in both Lima and Puno” was producing a wide range of peasant self-improvement initiatives. Endowed with literate representatives they were recreating a pact with the central State. Many took landlords to court trusting justice would be done. Others disobeyed local authorities appointing their own. They built and maintained their own schools with teachers sprung from their own communities. Gamonal usurpation of communal lands had diminished due to market crisis and peasant resistance. Peasants now envisioned more intricate forms of increasing their partial autonomy to resist gamonal power. They aimed at creating their own markets as in Wancho Lima.

Though the district of Huancané counted with numerous communities and few haciendas (only a reduced 1% of white and mestizo population), Huancané was a town of hacendados, “misti”

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209 On November 19, 1921, after colonos of Tocroyoc took command of the district lead by Domingo Huarca for several weeks, Sicuani’s newspaper La Verdad wrote: “El levantamiento de indios en esta provincial no ha tenido hasta la fecha una manifestación ostensible y palmaria, sino que han circulado rumores que no han dejado de alarma por los sucesos que han tenido lugar en otras provincias de nuestro departamento y el de Puno. En esta provincia no ha encontrado eco el levantamiento o sublevación indígena, tanto por lo que acabamos de decir, cuanto porque nuestros indios son más respetuosos que los de Puno, cuya tradición histórica es haber sido impulsivos desde el Tahuantinsuyo.” (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 119)
patrons who had created entrenched rules to ensure peasant subordination. Aymara peasants were forbidden to use hats or Western clothes, wear long hair and ride horses (only mules and donkeys). They were constantly thrown out of the plaza de armas of Huancané and were not allowed to use public services because they “stank”. Indigenous lieutenant governors and other peasant authorities were treated as “servants” of the mistis. Political authorities and police were also under the command of mistis. Peasants of the district were obliged to lend services for free to the governor, lieutenant governor, justices of peace, priest and councilmen. Cargos started at a very young age and lasted all their lives. They were also subject to religious cargos during the patron saint feast and other religious festivities and chaqueos of horses and mules by gendarmes and cows by the governor who could authorize any neighbor to behead or take cattle paying a minimum compensation to the owner. Mistis also controlled the market, selling at high prices alcohol, coca and foodstuff while peasant products were subject to a sisa (tax) and sold at reduced prices set by the authorities of Huancané. (Tamayo 1982: 231-232)

“As far as we know, the famous revolts of Huancané in 1923 did not confront indigenes with abusive hacendados (in the región of Huancané there are no large haciendas); it seems that they originated in the active resistance of the Indians to the exhorbitant pretensions of townspeople, invested with administrative authority, that demanded unpaid services and labor.” (my translation, Bourricaud 1967: 151) The status of small notables or neighbors depended on their control of a subaltern Indian population as well as of administrative positions. Fed up with this subaltern position that left them prey to all kinds of abuses and incited by the government’s pro-indigenista discourse, the Aymara communal peasants of the district decided to take matters into hand.

Aymaras of Huancané were known to be merry, akin to singing and feasts, as well as rebellious. Huancané counted with very militant, experienced and informed messengers such as Mariano Paq’o, Antonio F. Luque, Hipólito Salazar and Carlos Condorena, as well as with many communities able and willing to finance their trips and procedures. They had created a structured organization: a sub-committee in Wancho led by Antonio Luque, a provincial Federation of Pro-Indigenous peasants led by Salazar and the League of Indigenous Mutual Defense headed by Mariano Paq’o. (Rénique 2004: 95-97) Huancané neighbors affirmed their troubles began after in late 1921 after the “asamblea plebiscitaria” called upon by Prefect Arenas was cancelled. Indians had elected delegates and prepared proclamations and flags so they went ahead and held a conclave on their own in Huancané. (Hazen 1974: 169-170)

The delegates of the parcialidades and ayllus of the area surrounding Huancané accorded not to attend Huancané’s Sunday k’ato (fair or market). They would install a new k’ato in a major town located in the ayllu of Wancho, a community of the Hurinsaya sector of the district. It was crossed by a brook that carried water all year long and bore an intense agricultural activity. Its members maintained a strong social coherence and in the first decade of the twentieth century they had established a school in the house of Mariano Luque. (Tamayo 1982: 232-233) Leaders Mariano Paq’o, Carlosín Condori (who later on adopted the name of Carlos Condorena) and Antonio Luque had learned to read and write in this school. They were the founders of the Sub-committee that in 1922 decided to cut all commercial and personal service relation with Huancané creating their own town free of mistis. (Tamayo 1982: 233)

To protect themselves and make their project they decided to send a commission to Lima to obtain the authorization of the President of the Republic. In the summer of 1922, Antonio Luque and Carlos Condorena had an interview with Leguía who verbally supported their initiative and gave them a map of the city of Lima to serve as model for the town. The commissioners returned affirming the President had authorized their pacific plan for liberation. In estancia Mukuraya, they put the first stone for the school and the church, giving the new urban center the name of Wancho-
Lima. They traced the streets and avenues copying the model of Lima, formed sanitation committees and assigned plots and streets for artisans (carpenters, tailors, milliners, etc.) who started to build their stores. Then they informed the ayllus of the districts of Moho, Vilquechico, Rosaspata, Inchupalla and others that the new weekly market would be on Wednesdays, in Wancho-Lima. They stopped assisting the market of Huancané and cut almost immediately the labor services they were forced to give to local notables and authorities. (Tamayo 1982: 233-234)

This initiative was a turning point in peasant organization and State support. Aymara communities of the district of Huancané had appointed local authorities and created their own district capital with a market and school, boycotting the local mestizo town and authorities. On the medium run, affirms Marcela Calisto, peasant resistance derived in a political proposal: an attempt of self-government, a fight against the political and commercial mediation of local elites carrying a desire for citizenship, for integration—in their own terms—to national society. Indigenes proposed a parallel state apparatus directed by their own communal authorities to oppose gamonalismo.

Mistis discovered with surprise that a contesting and pacific power was cutting the traditional dependence of Indians and depriving them of the free services that allowed them to maintain their status and way of life. Infuriated they came to Wanchu-Lima to threaten them, steal horses and cattle and rape young girls, pretending to impose once again the prohibitions of the town of Huancané. In secret meetings, they decided to provoke an indigenous revolt and attract the army to bloodily repress the Indians. Then they would be able to destroy the new town and take the cattle and lands of the subordinate Indians. According to Tamayo, they chose a local notable who spoke Aymara, Humberto Riveros, to infiltrate the town and create havoc profiting of the absence of Luque and Condorena who were in Lima informing Leguía of the town’s foundation.

Riveros went to Wancho affirming he rejected his misti condition. He offered to adopt the defense of the indigenes and fight with them against the authorities of Huancané. Riveros reported that impelled by the violent climate, a group of Indians was planning a general insurrection against the town of Huancané and other district capitals. Commissions had been sent to communities of the province to incite them to rebel. On December 5, gendarmes had to be sent to Vilquechico to protect the place threatened or besieged by indigenous contingents. (Tamayo 1982: 236-239) The Governor of Moho, Eleuterio Angles, sent a telegram to the Prefect of Puno on December 10, 1923 that read: “Bajo pretexto Tahuantinsuyo indíada amenaza asaltar este pueblo. Comisario Alemán apersonarse su cargo sin ningún gendarme; ruego ordenar tropa haga guardar orden.” (Tamayo 1982: 237)

Carlos Condorena “charged that Huancané Subprefect Arturo del Carpio provoked a feud with Indian teacher Alberto Riveros, and that this led the Indians to defend their mentor. His account was substantiated by reports that Indian teacher Natalio Monroy had been attacked in Vilquechico. The Indians next hired Riveros, a personal enemy of Carpio, and ensuing tensions led to violence.” (Hazen 1974: 174)

According to Felipe Sanchez Huanca, the indigenes of Wancho, Wilacunca and Acollo gathered in the hills of Poco Paca around the town of Huancané to lay siege and isolate the town from the rest of the provinces. Telegraph lines were cut; fires were lit and the town was terrorized with the sound of pututos and screams conveying death threats to the neighbors. Indians pretended to enter and ransack the population armed with slingshots, sticks and firearms. Huancané was terrorized; neighbors took refuge in the church and in their basements. They were saved by large amounts of rain. The rivers Huancané and Ramis overflowed and left their beds hindering the arrival of other groups of insurgents from the North of the province. Sub-prefect Arturo Carpio, Governor Manuel Torres, Provincial Judge Vicente Cuentas Zavala and the Fiscal Agent Benjamín Corrales urged for the arrival of troops.
Prefect Eduardo Arenas sent the Infantry Batallion nº 15 under Major Luis Vinatea by the Lake to Vilquechico and some troops by land. Unequal combats took place in Qoqauta. The Indians were organized almost militarily but could do little against army troops and were massacred and persecuted over the districts. (Tamayo 1982: 238-239) Mariano Lariqo affirms that Major Vinatea asked the peasants of Qala Cruz to stand in line to have their picture taken with President Leguía. They were shot with machine guns not cameras. (Rénique 2004: 99) Later, Major Vinatea justified his actions affirming that though it was a local event it evidenced the eruption of a race that was spreading through the entire nation to produce a general conflagration. It was part of a socialist movement that would then be joined by workers. (Rénique 2004: 101)

Once the army crushed the rebels or force them to take refuge in other areas, the private armies of notables (including the infamous chacuris of Frisancho) followed the designs of hacendados destroying and burning the new town of Wancho-Lima including church and school. They threw salt in the Plaza de Armas to hinder anything from growing anymore. Then, under the leadership of Dario Lucas Carpio, brother of the Sub-prefect, they attacked and burned the houses of the Indians of Wancho, robbed their cattle and took it to Huancané. A similar thing happened in Vilquechico with a private army led by Governor Francisco Morán that attacked the parcialidades of Chaviña, Cahua and Armichiri. On December 22, 1923, the armed bands of the mistis burned the schools of Huancanihuyo, Tiquitiqui, Kejoni, Ojeachaya and Quishuarani. On Christmas day they roamed around the communities taking what was left of the cattle. (Tamayo 1982: 239; Rénique 2004: 99)

The stolen cattle were gathered in the plaza of Huancané and on December 28 and 29, the neighbors proceeded to distribute it amongst them. Francisco Morán, Próspero Peñaloza, Angel Espinoza and Governor Torres took large fractions to their haciendas in formation. No neighbor was left out in the distribution. Meanwhile the army kept persecuting the indigenous masses producing another massacre in Rosaspata. Peasant leaders suffered private revenges: Mariano Luque and Mariano Paq'o were taken from jail one night in January and shot in the banks of the Huancané River (Paq'o managed to survive the attack). (Tamayo 1982: 240)

The violence lasted until January 1924. Mistis conceived the idea of turning Wancho into a hacienda by using not just the wave of repression but also internal communal conflicts. Despoliation had followed repression. Many rebels who had lost everything and spent long periods in jail blamed Condorena for the events. Mistis provoked and bribed the communal indigenes of upper Wancho (Hanan Wancho) to attack the insurrected of lower Wancho (Hurin Wancho). The discharged soldier Justo Condori was used as instigator by the mistis to start an inter-communal fight. Condori, armed by the neighbors of Huancané took prisoner some of the revolted and shot them in the community itself (Melchor Cutipa, Leonardo Carcasi, Ignacio Hanq'o and Manuel Condori). Many peasants fled to Juliaca, Arequipa, Lima and Tacna. Haciendas appeared where the town of Wancho-Lima had been set that did not exist prior to 1923. Surviving communal peasants were turned into colonos and the notary Juan Francisco Bustinza created false documents of land purchase to give a legal appearance to the despoliation. Huancané produced a new group of large landowners: Dario Lucas Carpio, Victor Manuel Torres, Manuel E. Cordero, Próspero Peñaloza, Angel Espinoza, Arturo Carpio, José and Ramón Alemán Cornejo. (Tamayo 1982: 241-242)

Survivors asked for help to the Ministry of Development (April 25, 1925), the President of the Republic (June 7, 1925), and the President of the Chamber of Representatives (October 1, 1927). (Tamayo 1982: 240-241) Condorena, who had remained in Lima, tried to reach the President through a memorial dictated to Urviola. Messenger Mariano Lariqo was present in the interview. He narrated how Condorena strove to convince the President of peasant efforts to build schools and
obtain rights and of *gamonal* repression. Leguía rejecting vandalism would not accept Condorena’s version. Dissappointed, the Aymara messenger audaciously replied that Huancané’s peasants needed him to follow up on his promises: while the President affirmed one thing, authorities and *gamonales* did another. Leguía’s reaction was abrupt: “a mí ningún indio me va a levantar la voz” (“No Indian is going to raise his voice with me”), he uttered, refusing to receive the memorial and storming out of the room. (Rénique 2004: 100)

The Section of Indigenous Affairs (SAI) and in particular the PRI were more receptive to the complaints of repressed and persecuted Indians. In 1925, the Junta Central of the PRI sent a commission to investigate the events. The commission that included Puno’s Bishop was unable to sort out “the morass of charges and counter-charges” but called for an amnesty of all peasants imprisoned.210 (Hazen 1974: 176) Reports and commissions however took time and dilated the arrival of justice.

On January 7, 1925, Carlos Condorena sent a letter to the Section of Indigenous Affairs (SAI) asking for fares to Lima for his entire family: his parents José María Condorena and Mercedes Yujira de Condorena, his younger siblings Modesta, Silveria, Francisca and Gregorio, and his wife Petrona Ccari de Condorena. The “bloody and mournful events of the Province of Huancané” had caused all the communal indigenes of the province great disgrace. His case was particularly dramatic, since as “Delegate and first implanter of Schools and all the progress initiated by the natives of Huancané”, he was accused by the neighbors of Huancané of being one of the leaders of launching a “racial war”. *Gamonales* had ransacked and burnt to the ground his property in the *parcialidad* of Iscca-Cullcata. His cattle were stolen; his harvest dismantled. Nothing was left. His family was able to escape taking refuge in the city Puno but lacked a home, work and even food. He had thus decided to bring his relatives to Lima, to sustain them with his “honest work.” He asked the government to pay for the fares from Puno to Callao of the whole family as a “positive and paternal benefit.” (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.8) Though he had not yet received reports from Puno, Victor Falconí from the SAI told the PRI he believed the situation of the family was unbearable and justified Condorena’s request. Three days later a supreme resolution granted the fares.

Striving to survive in the outmost scarcity, many refugees had to return to Huancané to defend their lands.211 A document addressed to the Chief of the SAI on April 25, 1925, shows how difficult it was for Aymaras from Huancané to stop repression and appeal for justice. Eight men (Manuel and Remigio Mamani, Mariano Gil, Gregorio Sancho, Sebastián Carcasi, Camilo Larico, Mariano Apaza and Manuel Larico) arrived in Lima to present several petitions to the ministries and the Supreme Court of Justice, as they had done to the Prefecture of Puno, the Superior Court of Puno and the court of Huancané. They denounced the crimes committed against “los hombres de nuestra raza” in the province of Huancané after “the indigenous revolt of early December 1923”.212 Their appeals were met with jail and they were dumbfounded by such an outrage considering that

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210 The SAI paid one hundred Peruvian pounds to pay the expenses of engineer José J. BRAVO, appointed to go to Huancané as part of the commission. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.8)

211 The Ministry of Development granted the second class fares to Paulino Manuel Quispe, Eugenio Condori, Juan de Dios Condori, Mariano Condori, Juan Condorena, Josefa Luque, Casimira Carcase, Manuel Mamani, Hilario Condorena, Gerardo Tipula, Mariano Cutipa and Simón Cutipa of the province of Huancané. A month later, the Prefect of Arequipa was reimbursed the $28.30 soles that he had paid for the fares Arequipa-Puno of two Indian women Eulalia Machaca and Marcelina Mamani by request of the Patronato de la Raza Indígena. Both women had taken refuge in Arequipa to escape the abuses committed against their property and interests. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.8)

they had come to denounce the destruction of their homes and their school and the assassination of their peers who dared try to defend themselves of gamonal greed.

All of these crimes were left unpunished because authorities were paralyzed by fear and made no efforts to impose justice. They cited as proof of the reigning impunity the appointment of José Aleman Cornejo as Representative of Huancané at the Regional Congress. The eight jailed messengers accused Alemán Cornejo of killing seven of their peers who were defending their lands from usurpation. They also accused him of trying to shoot Carlos Condorena after falsely accusing him of participating in “political movements of Revolution”. Their accusations had remained unheeded in the Correctional Tribunal because Alemán was in connivance with Judge Cuentas Zavala, who had been, for this reason, separated from his post. They could not but feel revolted by the grotesque sarcasm of having an assassin, with pending suits of such a degree, officially representing the province at the Regional Congress. They asked once again for an investigative commission to confirm these accusations and respond to their situation.213

Finding no logic in the unfairness of their situation they recurred to an emotional appeal, full of self-pity and bitterness at what they felt as the abandonment of the government and their exile from the political system: “Cuando nos preguntamos el por qué de esta indolencia para atender estos reclamos, no sabemos darnos respuesta de ninguna clase y solo creemos que por indios y analfabetos no debemos de tener justicia y que ésta solo debe existir para los blancos (...) Cuando contemplamos nuestras cabañas incendiadas, los locales de nuestra Escuela desde cimientos, creemos que somos hombres de otra raza y otra nacionalidad, que hemos cometido un gran delito y por eso esa es la explotación que debemos tener.”214 These men were beyond disappointment. They were repeating gamonal arguments and starting to feel they were stronger than theirs. They felt rejected by the national state almost accepting a position of outcasts. State indolence paralyzed them and locked them in a position of martyrs. Obtaining the authorities favor implied amongst other things abandoning themselves to gamonal abuses and violence without trying any resistance, defense or protest.

Superior Court of Puno President Julio Campos confirming the perspective of the PRI’s investigative commission affirmed in 1926 that both sides had committed crimes. Yet, the State found it more convenient to adopt gamonal discourses about Indian savagery and disorder. In July 1927, Minister of War Malaga informed the Minister of Government that in late 1923, an indigenous revolt of importance had exploited in Azángaro, Huancané and Chucuito with the participation of Bolivian indigenes. By petition of the Ministry of Government army troops had been sent with guards and “elements loyal to the government” that supported political authorities. There were several encounters with the insurrected but it all ended in February 1924 with no complaints since those who suffered the consequences of the measures of force adopted by the troops were those responsible for altering public order. The culprits had waited a long time, hoping events would be forgotten to react and complain. They were instigating Indians to present civil and criminal complaints against the chiefs, officers, soldiers and authorities that intervened in the subduing of the subversive movement pretending indemnifications for damages. As State servants they had acted in accordance with the constitutional mandate imposing on them the obligation of maintaining


214 “When we wonder why such indolence to attend this claims, we have no answer to give ourselves and we only believe that for being Indian and illiterate we must not have justice: Justice exists only for whites (...) When we contemplate our burnt cabins, the site of our School in ruins, we believe we are men of another race and another nationality, that we have committed a great crime and that is why we are subject to exploitation.” Revista Kollao, año 2, nº3, Puno: abril-marzo 1984, p.25.
public order in the interior of the Republic. Thus, the Minister asked for a law project that would exempt of responsibility the chiefs, officers, soldiers and political and civilian authorities that supported these actions and acted during the re-establishment of order in the provinces of Azángaro, Huancañé and Chucuito during the months of November and December 1923, January and February 1924. (AGN, MI Prefecturas 270) The law nº 6194 of April 28, 1928, cut all lawsuits caused by the repression of peasant revolts produced in Ayacucho, La Mar, Tayacaja, Huancañé, Azángaro and Quispicanchis in 1922, 1923, 1925, 1926 and 1927. (Basadre 1983: IX 431)

For Tamayo, Wancho-Lima was a fruitless attempt of a sector of Puno’s peasantry to free itself of the oppression of the system of exploitation of landlords. The indirect result of this revolt was the strengthening of latifundia in Huancañé. (Tamayo 1982: 229-230) Landlords managed to turn this Aymara peasant initiative into a revolt against public order and civilization to legitimize repression. The revolt may have been the entire creation of Huancañé’s hacendados or a blown up reaction to peasant discontent. The point is gamonal discourses were extremely successful: oral and written history has focused on a supposed attack on the town of Huancañé not on the amazing project of Wancho-Lima. Huancañé’s towns men managed to repress a viable attempt at indigenous autonomy and national integration imposing the image of peasant irrationality and violence. The image that has remained is one of a mob of thousands of infuriated Indians besieging the province’s capital miraculously saved by a river growth or by the action of twenty townspeople and eleven guards who valiantly fought against armies of uniformed Indians led by a self-proclaimed Inca.

Still, news of Wancho-Lima produced strong responses all over the department mainly responses of peasant discontent and restlessness. Denunciations of Vinata’s fierce repression went even beyond the border being criticized by an Argentine anarchist journal that circulated among local Indians. Socialist and protestant propaganda were deemed partly responsible for the revolt and news spread that Indians had received arms from Augusto Durand refugee in Bolivia or that prisoners were forced “to applaud Encinas, Augusto Durand, and Leguía y Martínez—a all by then enemies of Leguía’s regime.” All of this added an element of national politics to the events.215 (Hazen 1974: 175-176)

These versions were repeated by peasant leaders themselves, constituting a source of pride in spite of the defeat. According to a local historian Peña Jumpa, the story of Wancho Lima has been told from parents to children for several generations. The rebellion of Aymara peasants in Huancañé in 1923 against the “mistis” or whites of the city is a historical landmark that communal peasants have kept in their memories. Peña Jumpa has tried to present the events from the perspective of communal peasants, stressing the participation of the community of Calahuyo in the revolt.216 His version carries an empowering millenarian discourse: delegates started to construct a new State aiming at the re-emergence of the Tahuantinsuyo. Communal peasants were well prepared for they had received “knowledge from Lima”: they had spoken to President Leguía asking for “another capital for the country” and taken measures of Lima’s Plaza de Armas. “Quisieron fundar otra capital limeña: la de los indígenas.” (“They wanted to found another limeño capital, that of the indigenes”) (Peña Jumpa 1998: 103-106) The new capital would have street

215 Though Adventist peasants tended to be conservative and avoid getting mixed in revolts, the events were used as an excuse to persecute protestant groups. Pablo Kuturi, an Indian teacher who was secretary of Goldsmith was sent to Huancañé were the repression had created a dire situation. His discrete and astute presence was necessary to save the Adventist work. (Valcárcel 1927: 98)

names such as Manco Capac, Tupac Amaru, Rumi Maki and Juan Bustamante. (Rénique 2004: 99)

Paulo Vilca Arpasi and Aldo Santos Arias, researchers of the association SER Puno, have interpreted Wancho Lima as the first attempt of Aymara separation from the central power:

...el proceso impulsado por Carlos Condorena Yujra fue el primer intento por afirmar lo aimara como posibilidad nacional. (...) Condorena propuso la creación de la República Aimara Tawantinsuyana del Perú, cuya capital sería el poblado de Wancho Lima, ubicado al norte del lago Titicaca, el que incluso llegó a tener señaladas áreas específicas para la construcción de un Poder Judicial y un Palacio de Gobierno, entre otras dependencias que emulaban la organización estatal vigente. Más allá del hecho de que esta propuesta reproducía categoría propiamente occidentales de organización política, era evidente la presencia de un componente de afirmación propia.” (Vilca Arpasi & Santos Arias 2007: 2)

Indigenista and *hacendado* discourses, oral tradition and Carlos Condorena’s subsequent political career imprinted on Wancho Lima the millenarian image of a parallel State inspired in the disappeared Inca Empire. A parallel state may have been the wish of many communal peasants oppressed by mestizo society; however it was not the objective of the original project presented to the State in 1919. President Leguía would not have authorized the creation of a parallel Aymara capital embarked as he was in a centralist project of State building. The fact that the CPDIT supported this project also shows the practical purposes of Huancané’s peasants. The original project was not trying to build a new state but a parallel local public sphere, ruled by indigenous authorities connected to the central state and to the market. Moreover, the absence of one of the main leaders and founders of the Wancho-Lima project, Carlos Condorena (who was in Lima) would indicate that the threat posed by Indians to the town of Huancané was either fictitious or a spontaneous local reaction to a mounting situation of abuse and cruelty.

Peña Jumpa affirms that in spite of the movement’s failure, from that period on Aymara peasants started to be respected. *Mistis* and whites stopped humiliating and committing hostilities against them. Aymaras obtained liberation and acknowledgment of their identity. The k’atao of Wanchu further integrated them and fixed the memory of that movement. Each Saturday, peasants from different communities (included Calahuyo) continued to gather in the plaza of Wancho to exchange their products. The elder gathered there never to forget the old times in which they tried to recreate an Aymara Tahuantinsuyo. As a result of the consolidation of their identity, the Aymaras of Huancané managed to overcome their differences to obtain a school of secondary education for the area. All the authorities of the communities and *parcialidades* intervened in the procedure and in the construction of the school (with limited support from the State). They also managed to improve their relations with the administration of justice. Peña Jumpa’s positive vision of the outcome shows how a situation of *gamonal* repression was turned by oral tradition into a myth to develop and consolidate Aymara identity and pride.

Wancho-Lima marked the beginning of the end of a period characterized by peasant initiatives and mobilization to be integrated into the Nation as “indigenous citizens”. Less than a year after the events of Huancané, in December 1924, Puneño messenger and President of the Fourth Indigenous Congress Hermenegildo Mansilla informed the Minister of Government that, though the nation recognized the existence of the indigenous communities, no law had been created to make
effective the rights of these communities. Communities all over the national territory were at the mercy of gamonal landlords. It was thus imperative to elaborate a law making imprescriptible and inalienable the rights of indigenous communities. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.8) Initiatives were falling back into an indigenista tutelary approach that prevented the peasantry from using its political weight and fully develop its political force. Tutelary thought had two unfortunate consequences: it prevented Indian constituencies from demanding a place of power within the State apparatus (demanding Indian representatives at the national, departmental and provincial not just at the local level) and it fostered in the eyes of the State the gamonal perspective of an inferior Indian in need of control and protection and thus unable to govern itself. By 1924, indigenous messengers were losing track of their initial project of indigenous citizenship.

THE END OF THE CPDIT

The CPDIT from birth had faced internal leadership conflicts that deepened each year, the main issue of contention being its relation to the central State. Radical leaders more influenced by syndicalism envisioned a more independent institution raising the opposition of peasant leaders that thought it impossible to advance without the support of Leguía. In 1923, a heated debate rose during the Third Indigenous Congress over the Law of Vial Conscription. As De la Cadena has pointed out, this law was Leguía’s weak spot on his campaign as champion of Indians. The debate over this law sharpened already existing divisions causing radical leaders to give up their positions as directors of the committee. The positions "were taken over by conservative leguíistas. The new leadership named Augusto B. Leguía as the committee’s honorary president, and the minister of government, Manchego Muñoz (...) as its vice president." (De la Cadena 2000: 96)

The government and especially gamonal sectors worried about the growing contacts between highland and coastal Indians (more influenced by syndicalism). The CPDIT had become more politicized through the influence of Lima’s unions and confederations, and the government was more and more suspicious of its moves. This led to a second break up in 1924, after which the CPDIT was claimed by two separate groups that denied each other undermining the effectiveness and legitimacy of the institution and of indigenous delegates.

The Fourth Indigenous Congress was held in late August 1924, presided by Abraham Cervantes who produced several communiqués for the State. (AGN, MI 250, Ap-Cp 1924) However, in late September-early November there was a split between two sectors that led to the creation of a parallel institution. On November 15, a new congress was organized with the name of “Fourth National Indigenous Congress “Tahuantinsuyo” of 1924” presided by puneño delegate Hermenegildo Mansilla and with Arequipeño delegate Francisco A. Quispe as Secretary General. This new indigenous congress sent communiqués to the government explaining that a strong discussion had led to the “expulsion” of Abraham Cervantes and Andres Vicaña. Upon leaving, Cervantes and Vicaña had taken with them all the memorials and seals of the CPDIT as well as the funds they had received to acquire a printing press for the periodical “El Tahuantinsuyo”. Thus the Congress had created a new letterhead and seal and appointed a new directive board.217 The

217 The new letter head read: “CUARTO CONGRESO NACIONAL INDÍGENA “TAHUANTINSUYO” DE 1924, Fundado en el año de 1921, Secretaría Hoyos 599, Lima-Perú” and the seal changed the overhead title of CPDIT by that of Fourth National Indigenous Congress, keeping all the other elements. AGN, MI 261, Cp 1924.
members of this CPDIT were less experienced\footnote{Upon sending a copy of the discussion of the sessions of the 4th Congress held since November 15, 1924, Mansilla affirmed they sent a rough document “a fin de que su sabio criterio pueda ampliar las incorrecciones y deficiencias (sic) que por razón de la escasísima instrucción y experiencia que poseen los delegados, se haya omitido las reglas y condiciones de la forma parlamentaria de los Congressos.” They had no model to copy from, for they had kept no archive. AGN, MI 261, Cp 1924.}, came mostly from the Southern departments and seemed less connected with weather-beaten unionism. The documents they produced though well informed and structured resumed claims of tutelary protection from the government. They had not lost the expectations of a moral contract with Leguía's administration.

On January 15, 1925, Andrés L. Vicaña, identifying himself as Secretary General of the CPDIT, asked the government for the release of Abraham Cervantes, confined in San Lorenzo Island for a few months. Cervantes had not meddled in political affairs for otherwise the CPDIT would not intervene on his behalf. (AGN, MI 261, Cp 1924) Less than a month later, on February 9, 1925, there was yet another Secretary of the CPDIT’s Central Committee sending telegrams to authorities, Anacleto Carrasco. (AGN, MI 262, Vp-Zp 1925) On April 18, 1925, the CPDIT elected a new Directive Board in a general assembly. The new directive board identified President Leguía as Honorary President and Delegate Protector. (AGN, MI 261, Cp 1924) Lucas Caparó was recognized by the government as head of the CPDIT and in July 1925 was consented a subsidy of fifty Peruvian pounds for the organization expenses of the Fifth Indigenous Congress. (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.11) While delegates from Puno and the southern departments prevailed in the early congresses, the delegates of this Fifth Congress were mostly from the coast and the central highlands. Only a handful of puneños participated in this congress that elicited little interest from the State. (AGN, MI 261, Cp 1925) Internal splits and quarrels had weaned the support of the state. The administration continued paying subsidies but by 1926 it paid only fares to Mollendo for the messengers going to the Southern Sierra. The number of messengers traveling to Lima from the South further decreased. (AGN, MT, DGAI, 3.13.2.11)

In 1926, the Central Committee was under a new directive board that included President Luis R. Ríos Castell, Vice-president Nataniel Estebes and Secretary General Juan G. Zapata. The new board aware of the institution’s weakness decided to take bolder actions. The CPDIT announced in a printed communiqué that it would send Secretary General Juan Zapata (from the coastal department of Piura), and delegates Justo Latorre, Leoncio Solórzano and Juan Felipe Cervantes to the departments of the Center and South. They were entrusted with the tasks of organizing and reorganizing subcommittees, informing about the laws that protected indigenous lives, property and communities and promoting the appointment of delegations for the Sixth National Indigenous Congress to be held on August 29, 1926. After the peak years of 1922 and 1923, subcommittees had fallen prey of repression and factionalism. Many had become independent, dispersed or disappeared altogether. The Central Committee needed to reaffirm its role as an institution articulating peasant demands and protection. Its reach and summoning power had practically vanished.

Zapata and his companions received 25 pounds for travel expenses and started their task in the department of Apurímac. On June 20, Zapata was in Chalhuancá presenting credentials to Subprefect Teodoro Bromley and soliciting permission to visit indigenous communities. The subprefect sent a telegram to the Prefect asking for instructions, and was ordered to give facilities to Zapata for his mission. Zapata proceeded to the foundation of the Provincial Sub-committee of Chalhuancá (capital of the province of Aymaraes), with more than three hundred indigenes. The document bore the seal and signature of the Sub-prefect himself. Zapata then proceeded to do the
same in different towns around the area gathering hundreds of Indians in each meeting.

Subprefect Bromley was growing anxious. In each conference, Zapata and his fellows affirmed to their eager audience unpaid services were illegal and had been prohibited by the Regional Congress of the South. They distributed free leaflets printed by the Indigenous Committee of the Workers’ Federation of Lima that reproduced in Spanish and Quechua the law passed by the Regional Congress and signed by Leguía on July 1st 1922. The law was followed by the International (communist hymn) printed both in Spanish and Quechua. (AGN, MI 264 A, 1926) The surviving CPDIT seemed to be alive due to the support of unionism, mainly of Lima’s Workers’ Federation.

Sub-prefect Bromley soon started receiving commissions of “distinguished” locals worried about Zapata’s activities and about an attack on authorities and “decent” people. The Prefect of Apurimac had already received complaints and warnings from neighboring provinces were the other delegates had gone. Local communities were refusing now to work on the highway construction unless paid fifty cents per journey of labor. Urged to take matters into hand by the Prefect, Sub-prefect Bromley formed an urban guard to capture the four “cabecillas” and send them to Lima. (AGN, MI 264 A, 1926) They were despoiled of everything (wallets, notebooks, military and vial draft cards, seals, eight silver medals, four large pictures, one of them of President Leguía), jailed for fourteen days then taken to Lima. (AGN, MI 263 A, Qp-Wp 1926) The Prefect of Apurimac affirmed he had conjured the danger caused by anti-white agitators and Indian exploiters. The neighbors of Chalhuanca stated that a great conflict had been averted against “civilized whites.” (AGN, MI 261 A, Fomento 1926; MI 264 A, Ap-Cp 1926)

The case of Zapata and his companions was not isolated. In September 1926, Valdivieso, the new CPDIT’s Secretary General, thanked the government for the liberation of two delegates wrongfully jailed and sent to Lima by the authority of Tarma. He also asked for the liberation of nine more jailed by the Sub-prefect of La Mar. Sub-prefect Castilla declared the delegates were in jail because the judicial authority had ordered their definite detention. They were “wolves in sheep suits” who had participated and even headed assassinations, burnings, sackings and other crimes committed during the indigenous revolt of 1923. The Prefect of the Department could not but agree with him, his name was Luis Felipe Luna. (AGN, MI 264 A, Ap-Cp 1926)

The crisis peaked in August 1926, at the dawn of the Sixth Indigenous Congress. Roberto Patiño, identifying himself as President of the CPDIT, affirmed that by resolution of the Prefect of Lima, they had inaugurated the Sixth Congress after expelling former delegates and “dissociators” Víctor Tapia, Juan Zapata, Pedro Turín Durivan and N. Olivera. Once these delegates were expelled, they proceeded with the Congress in the most complete harmony. (AGN, MI 264 A, Ap-Cp 1926) The CPDIT had been dying of a slow death, prey of internal rivalries over leadership, political tendencies, outside enemies and the distant and uncommitted support of the State. New protagonists were trying to save it but its legitimacy was almost non-existent. A supreme resolution (19 August 1927) considered that associations such as the Comité Pro-Derecho Indígena Tawantinsuyo only exploited the Indians with the pretext of carrying on their complaints and created conflicts with subaltern authorities, hindering or lessening the merit of the government’s labor. The PRI and the SAI had been created to study the problems related to the native race and defend their rights. Thus considering the different requests of the parliament, the Comité Tahuantinsuyo and its subcommittees all over the Republic were forbidden.219 Any claims should be made from now on directly to the government or to the juntas of the PRI. No agencies of

219 RESOLUCIÓN SUPREMA 19/8/1927. AGN, MI 270, Fomento 1927; MT, DGAI, SAI nº 57.
reclamations could be created without previous authorization of the Ministry of Development. They were in fact prohibited because they speculated with workers under the pretext of managing their claims and worsened their economic situation. All communist-like movement was to be persecuted. (AGN, MI 270, Fomento 1927)

The news spread fast. The prohibition of the CPDIT was several times published and celebrated. The Sub-prefecture of the province of Puno ordered 400 copies of the administration’s prohibition at the Tipografía Fournier. (AGN, MI 269, Puno 1927) Titles, seals and emblems of the Committee, made to show its official character, were confiscated. According to Marisol de la Cadena, Leguía did not need the CPDIT anymore. “The president shifted his alliances and concurred with the liberal indigenista distinction between hacendado and gamonal.” (De la Cadena 2000: 97) From then on, the government, according to Mariátegui associated any pro-indigenous declaration or promise of land repartition to the agitation or influence of revolutionary groups. (Mariátegui 1984: 41) Though Leguía’s administration became growingly conservative and repressive, it was never able to completely shake off its pro-indigenous policies. The redemption of the Indian was the last banner raised by Leguía to remain in power. I would argue that the CPDIT disappeared because it became useless for both the administration and the peasant movement. Even peasant constituencies did not need it anymore. Ethnic politics had failed as a source for collective action.

CONCLUSION

In the early 1920s, hacendados faced a critical situation produced by falling wool demands, indebtedness, Arequipeño hegemony, personal and family feuds projected to the political scene, centralization of fiscal resources and, last but not least, peasant mobilization. Besieged from many fronts (State, indigenista groups, Adventists, proletariat and peasant leaders and associations) they organized their own association, the League of Hacendados, and carried on a strong propaganda campaign against communities in favor of haciendas. Their ideological battle focused on championing haciendas as havens of civilization and order, depicting peasant messengers and leaders as immoral, violent and irrational elements promoting millenarian and anti-national communist revolts.

The League used reified racial categories with coarse and exaggerated moral characterizations to appeal to a middle sector placed between them and the peasantry and counter Lima’s racial arguments about gamonalismo, Indianess and miscegenation. Puno’s “inhabitants” were threatened by hordes of savage and cannibalistic Indians. As a minority with only apparent economic power they needed to deny Indians humanity and delegitimize the ideology behind social inequality. Hacendados described themselves as decent people with legally acquired or inherited estates, incapable of violence or abuses against their subordinates. They were the contrary of the gamonal identified as a man without family values or decency that as a hack lawyer had acquired Indian lands through force or fraud. Moral arguments were particularly important for Puno’s hacendados who could rarely claimed ancestry or inherited lands.

Images of Indian degradation and perversity focused on ignorant and gullible Indians prone to external influences, lacking a sense of justice and a national conscience and capable of falling into the most complete state of irascibility. Through these characterizations hacendados were trying to prove their moral superiority to claim a tutelary role over the rural masses, deny Indians equality before the law and deprive them of any agency. Puno was described by hacendados as in a catastrophic situation due to agitators and enemies of the public order such as Encinas, Urviola and Gutierrez Cuevas that promised hacienda land repartitions, rights to appoint their own authorities, abolishment of the law of mandatory military service and of taxes on salt, alcohol and
coca. The result could be general a caste war that would end with Puno’s civilization or an Indian conflagration against the State with the connivance of Bolivia.

_Hacendados_ were well represented in the political arena and they carried this propaganda campaign to all levels of government. Cuzco-born congressman from Lampa, Luis Felipe Luna, fiercely opposed the creation of the CPDIT arguing continuously for its abolition in Congress. He sabotaged several attempts to establish state-peasant dialogues such as the Trilingual Assembly called forth by Prefect Arenas in 1921. Luna and hacendado congressman from Azángaro José Angelino Lizares Quiñones tirelessly demanded the sending of armed forces to Puno to legitimate the use of violence against peasant mobilizations. _Hacendados_ also spared no effort to build patron-client relations with local authorities to ensure their support. Pro-indigenous authorities like Prefect Manuel Villanueva and governor Bruno Paredes dangerously tilted the weak balance of power and hacendados needed to control the spread of delegates and subcommittees, the realization of meetings, the local appointment of authorities, the arrival of Adventist elements and the creation of schools. At the local level, _hacendados_ were reacting with plain and simple violent repression in connivance with political clienteles.

The basic premise of _gamonal_ discourse about the peasantry was lack of agency. With images of degraded moronic peasants they delegitimized messengers and delegates and denounced external influences. Repression was particularly harsh with literate and hispanicized peasant representatives. These men and their families were calumniated and sued but also attacked in their properties, tortured, persecuted, killed and subject to economic deprivations. Urviola denounced in 1922 one hundred and twenty two assassinations and aggressions of all sort (especially on women) in only two years. Arguments of immorality, millenarian sedition and lack of national consciousness were complemented by arguments about communist and anarchist subversion. The CPDIT and its messengers struggled to survive claiming no political affiliation, no interest in revolt and stressing its nationalist goals. Their struggle however was done in a climate of rising suspicion even from within.

Delegates and messengers had a hard time keeping up the fight due raising fear of repression. Many peasant groups were falling into discouragement and lack of involvement. Families who held traditional positions of authority and benefited from it felt threatened by the incoming forces of change opposing them. Discouragement was also produced by the fact that the pact with the executive did not guarantee peasant expectations mainly because it was not always supported by a cohesive and modern bureaucracy endowed with a hegemonic project. The growing connivance between local authorities and _hacendados_ neutralized state initiatives.

Peasant leaders also faced growing internal divisions over leadership and representation. Delegates did not always agree on what ways of action to choose and their disputes weakened their power of representation. Moreover, delegates and messengers were caught in the struggle over representation between the CPDIT, more independent elements and indigenistas. Relations between these elements were more and more ruled by mutual distrust and this weakened the coherence of the movement feeding, right in the face of the State, _gamonal_ discourses about peasant manipulation by external elements.

By 1923, peasant mobilization was reaching a stalemate and was returning to discourses that focused on Indian helplessness and appealed to State paternalism. This was due as we have seen to _gamonal_ repression, but also to indigenista intervention and messenger impotence. Most indigenistas did not consider self-identified Indian politicians as conscious subjects of their own struggle, while disconcerted delegates and messengers found themselves more and more disconnected from the State. Leguía faced reelection and was shifting alliances. Desperate and persecuted messengers called upon moral and political arguments and a polarized vision of society.
to appeal to public opinion as hacendados did. They spoke of humble, good, deprived and defenseless Indians abused by evil gamonales, the martyrs of voracious and merciless tyrants that needed the help of conscious and misinformed citizens and authorities. All the blame was put on the malleable character of the gamonal, a stereotyped used by peasants to claim justice, by hacendados and indigenistas to shift abuse to a few individuals and by the State to recover control of the situation as the fatherly rescuer of souls trapped in feudal haciendas.

These reciprocal accusations and racial assignations were of little help, however, to the peasant cause for they confused public opinion fostering inconclusive measures from the State. Peasants were described by their own representatives as helpless and destitute confirming the image of weakness and gullibility promoted by hacendados. They were now appealing for charity more than justice disempowering the image of worthy indigenous citizens becoming literate to vote. They also fell prey of reifications and polarizations that could be self-defeating, depicting the peasantry as a bomb about to explode or adverting the government about exalted spirits. Peasant intellectuals developed their own meanings but could not reach enough power to impose them as the dominant sense. Faced with gamonal repression and indigenista cooptation, they stepped back into old discourses, abandoning the symbolism they had developed to represent themselves. Falling back into victimism hindered messengers’ attempts to present themselves as agents of modernization and culture, as a nation-building force.

By 1923 Leguía’s regime had changed. Though modernization and centralization remained the main goals of his administration, internal security started to overpower the voices of reform and autocratism took over the regime. Parties were outlawed, congressional autonomy reduced, strikes were repressed and political opponents and many former allies (including José Antonio Encinas) were persecuted, jailed or deported. The regime faced new elections in a climate of social effervescence exacerbated by the Independence’s centennial and the difficulty to recuperate the provinces occupied by Chile in the war of 1879. Neither the state nor Lima’s population were then willing to hear about ethnic differences and ethnic citizenship. The state started to withdraw support from its peasant allies choosing instead to quell popular mobilization.

Peasant leaders however, intent on a dialogue with the State, were initiating new and more complex ventures to improve their situation. Their resistance, helped by a market crisis, had practically stopped hacienda expansion but they still needed to secure their partial autonomy. To achieve this they emphasized private education and the creation of their own indigenous markets as in the community of Wancho, in Huancané province. Tired of the mistreatment and exploitation of the local townsmen, communities around the provincial capital of Huancané decided to create their own district capital endowed with a church, school, market and native authorities. The well planned and organized venture was presented to the President who gave his approval providing the messengers with a map of Lima that would serve as a model for the new town of Wancho-Lima. It was an attempt of self-government, of liberation from the political and commercial mediation of local elites, of national integration in their own terms. This boycott to the local mestizo town and authorities, led to local confrontations and alarmist cries of revolt that produced a harsh wave of repression throughout the area. Army detachments crushed the area’s communities followed by private armies of notables that profited to take lands and cattle and form their haciendas.

Wancho-Lima banged against the wall of incomprehension and repression. Gamonal discourses were extremely successful turning the amazing project of indigenous autonomy and national integration into the irrational attack of a millenarian mob on a civilization. State pro-indigenous policies became weak and uncommitted. The fear of peasant mobilization was stronger than the will to change. Messengers full of self-pity and bitterness lamented the abandonment of
the state and their exile from the political system placing themselves in the paralyzing position of martyrs. Leguía’s authoritarianism and his need to control and maneuver the situation ended in a renegotiated alliance with medium landowners with modern and progressive orientations; an alliance sealed with the abolition of the CPDIT in 1927. The association, swamped by internal strife, had by then lost most of its power and legitimacy even within the peasant sector and had become useless both for the regime and messengers.

Centralization of power and political conservatism shattered indigenous hopes and expectations. Wancho-Lima was remembered with pride but not repeated and initiatives fell back into an indigenista tutelary approach that prevented the peasantry from using its political weight and demanding a place of their own in the political apparatus. Unable to overcome the label of “rebellious and irrational Indians”, Puno’s peasant intellectuals abandoned their discourses on ethnic citizenship though they did not abandon their fight.
CHAPTER SEVEN
INDIGENE AND INDIGENISTA LEGACIES

The disruption of the Wancho Lima project in 1924 shacked peasant expectations and hopes all over the department. Huancané hacendados had reaffirmed their control over legitimate violence and were backed by state institutions. The banishment of the CPDIT in 1927 only confirmed the State’s shifting alliances. Leguía’s administration wanted a submissive and condescending peasant movement and a compliant hacendado sector. It was not ready to support peasant initiatives that could alienate the consent of local power groups. Historians have pointed out how revolts died down after 1924 affirming that Puno’s peasantry lingered immersed in a silent submission for over three decades. It seems that repression was too strong and peasants chose to remain secluded in their small world enduring daily exploitation with a resilient resignation. And yet indigenes, indigenistas, and even the State pro-indigenous discourses and organizations remained. The persistence of these voices will only prove the poor self-assurance of a ruling elite unable to co-opt peasant ethnic discourses, the shortcomings of a prejudiced intelligentsia and the rationality and pragmatism of a peasant leadership that had to open itself to new, more practical and local alliances and strategies.

THE EROSION OF STATE PRO-INDIGENOUS DISCOURSES

By 1927, opposition to the government had increase even in small localities in Puno.220 Leguía, however, held tight with an authoritarian centralism that never surrendered its modernizing discourse of Indian revindication.221 For some scholars, Leguía’s plan was an attempt to confront in a pragmatic way the Indigenous problem. It showed more initiative than civilistas had shown since 1899. (Deustua & Réniqüe 1984: 73) Nevertheless, the government’s indigenista posture was difficult to reconcile with its modernizing drive and its growing need to control social movements. The legislation issued was of little use for it was irregularly applied. Tutelary thought had already accomplished the important task of introducing large sectors of public opinion to the fate of indigenous majorities. Its maintenance only showed the lack of willingness of the government to change paths under a reformist mask. (Lynch 1979: XXI) The State reformist posture worked as a half-hearted effort to improve the condition of the Indian while maintaining the priority on centralization and modernization.

In 1928, as the CPDIT disbanded, the administration tried to revamp the Patronato de la Raza Indígena. Departmental juntas could form provincial juntas in all of the provincial capitals they deemed necessary, appointing three members for each provincial junta and even district delegates. In January 1928, its monthly budget was established at $28 Peruvian pounds for the Junta Central, $16 for Cusco, $8 for Puno, $7 for Ayacucho and $7 for Huánuco, plus $12 pounds to prepare Indigenous statistics and $100 pounds for commissions, travel fares and materials. In

220 In April 1927, Germán Salcedo attacked the police quarters of Ayaviri with ten Indians. Then he gathered three hundred Indians to attack the Sub-prefect in the local railway station. (AGN, MI Prefecturas 270)

221 In July 1927, anti-government judges in Azángaro promoted abstention during the elections asking people not to vote since the government had to change. But opinions were divided and manifestations supporting Leguía were soon organized in Azángaro and Ayaviri. (AGN, MI Prefecturas 270) After these events, Leguía pronounced some words in Quechua. In January 18, 1930, he was given in the name of the indigenous race a framed document with the signatures of the representatives of communities. He pronounced a discourse that was considered of such importance that newspaper “El Indio” translated it into Quechua. (Basadre 1983: X 39)
March 1928, Congress authorized the executive to give a supplementary credit of $1,000 pounds to the PRI, and in February 1930, the PRI was granted another $3,000 pounds of supplementary credit. (AGN, MT, DGAi 3.13.2.8)

The institution became a space of power struggles between pro-indigenous forces and gamonales. The resources and official character of the institution made it quite appealing, especially for hacendados and authorities trying to escape the gamonal image. In January 1930, the archbishop (President of the Junta Central of the PRI) reformed article 17 making the position of member of a departmental or provincial junta or district delegate free and incompatible with the exercise of political authority. (AGN, MT, DGAi 3.13.2.8) According to Valcárcel, the meetings of the PRI were helpless, after sterile discussions no measure was taken but to notify Lima, usually with no answer:

El mecanismo a que obedecían estos organismos era muy sencillo. Se les hacía llegar algún reclamo ante el cual el Obispo reaccionaba admirado manifestando “¡pero qué barbaridad que esto suceda!” A continuación se notificaba al Prefecto, quien se dirigía al gamonal implicado para que corrigiese su comportamiento. De esta manera, su única función era propiciar arreglos que evitaran los escándalos y amenguasen las quejas de la población indígena que, harta ya de promesas y falsas soluciones, había recurrido a la violencia propiciando alzamientos y motines. A través de los Patronatos era casi imposible que pudiera hacerse algo positivo para satisfacer el reclamo de los indígenas.\textsuperscript{222} (Valcárcel 1981: 235)

The PRI had created a social dynamic that surpassed its possibilities of action, giving peasants legal justifications to counter abuses. It blamed the situation on “apostles” and tinterillos accusing them of hindering the possibility to solve the problems it was faced with. (Deustua & Rénique 1984: 89)

In July and August 1925, two supreme resolutions ordered the production of a census and cadastral maps of indigenous communities for the opening of an official register of communities in the Section of Indigenous Affairs (SAI). (Lynch 1979: XX) The communities had to produce a detailed map of the area through the help of an engineer commissioned by the state to carry on with the measurements. All expenses were to be covered by the community, sometimes helped by the PRI. (AGN, MA, DGCC (1925-1968), 3.4.6.1)

Among the first communities to vie for recognition were the community of “Huilahuayo” and “Bajos Jilata”, both located in the district of Vilquechico (Huancané), which had suffered from the Wancho Lima repression. The community of Huilahuayo, district of Vilquechico (Huancané) was recognized and registered on the official roster of the SAI on February 14, 1928, with the help of the PRI of Puno. (ARP, Legajo 449: Prefectura 1921-1930) “Bajos Jilata” was recognized on February 24, 1928. In May 1929, the Direction of Development informed the Central Board of the

\textsuperscript{222} "The mechanism to which these organisms responded was very simple. Upon receiving a claim, the Bishop reacted manifesting with surprise: ‘¡My goodness! ¿How can this be happening?’ Next, the Prefect was notified and he addressed the accused gamonal asking him to correct his behavior. Thus, its only function was to propitiate arrangements to avoid scandals and diminish the complaints of the indigenous population that, fed up of promises and false solutions, had recourse to violence promoting revolts and mutinies. Through the Patronatos it was almost impossible to make something positive to satisfy the claims of indigenes."
PRI it had received a request from the community of Checa (Azángaro) for its official measurement. The procedure was also followed by the community of Callasa (Chucuito). (AGN, MA, DGCC (1925-1968), 3.4.6.1) The community of Collini, district of Pomata (Chucuito) hired engineer Julio G. Aspiazu to write a report and draw a map of the community’s land. This information was to be confirmed by a second report of engineer Ernesto Katz, ascribed to the SAI. The map was approved as well as the community’s measurements (4,472 hectares) and delimitations with haciendas and other communities. The official document dated July 11, 1930, was sealed with a rubric of the President and the signature of the Minister. A copy of its contents was sent to the Prefecture of the Department. (ARP, Legajo 443: Prefectura 1921-1930, Oficio nº 274)

Engineer and science professor Julio G. Aspiazu who served as “Perito official de Minas” (official mining appraiser) carried on many measurements entering in strong debates with provincial authorities. In mid 1928, Aspiazu was sent by the PRI to measure the communities of Challapampa and Sihuairo (Chucuito). His report was challenged by Subprefect Celso Chavarri who told the Direction of Development that there were no communities in the area. Aspiazu, questioned by PRI, reasserted the existence of the communities of Challapampa and Sihuairo and of others along the lake from Juli to Pomata (which had collaborated of common accord and in perfect harmony in the measurements). According to the engineer, the communities existed from “immemorial times”, had colonial titles, a numerous population and representatives who had hired him. They had a school in an ayma or public land in the middle of both communities and the community of Challapampa had a license from the Inspector of Elementary Education of the Province of Juli to build another elementary school in the community. Apiazu was appalled by the Sub-prefect’s affirmations since he had furnished him a guard to carry on with the measurements. He accused Chavarri of going against the Executive’s decision to protect and register all communities and of showing weakness of character being influenced by individuals from Juli who lived from the exploitation of the indigenes. To confirm his assertions, Aspiazu asked the PRI to summon the representatives of the two communities with their documents and titles. (ARP, Legajo Documentos Patronato Indígena, 1928)

Measurements were often interrupted or hindered by neighbors and even by fellow communal members who claimed the lands. A community of the district of Paucarcolla solicited in 1929 the measurement and registration of communal lands “Yurac-chupu-pampa” and adjacent terrains bordering Lake Titicaca and crossed by the road from Puno-Lampa. They furnished a rudimentary map with roads and neighbors. Though Engineer Victor Villagra was commissioned by the province’s Subprefect (E. Taboada) to undertake the measurements and delimitations, he was soon interrupted by guards who hindered his work. The communaries reacted and some were taken to Puno and jailed. Upon hearing their complaints, Subprefect Taboada demanded an explanation from the Civil Guard’s commander, who affirmed he sent the guards by request of a Judge. The Guard’s Commander accused Collana’s communaries of disobeying several judicial notifications. They were instructed to leave those lands alone until ownership was established in a pending lawsuit with owner of abutting lands Tomás Ortiz. (ARP, Legajo 446: Prefectura 1921-1930)

To achieve juridical recognition, lands needed to be free of claims or disputes with a neighboring landowner. Also the community to be registered needed to accept the ruling of authorities in boundary matters. The proceedings were bureaucratic, slow and could last for years if confronted with the opposition of neighboring landowners. Communities needed the support of local politicians to put pressure on Lima’s functionaries. This may be why few communities opted for official recognition. “As late as 1958 only 24.6 percent of the 5,986 known communities in Peru
had been registered. In the vast majority of communities without recognition the transfer of land remained unrestricted. By 1958 a considerably lower proportion of known communities –only thirty of 1,396, or 2.1 percent- had chosen and achieved recognition in Puno than had done so in any other department of Peru. (Jacobsen 1993: 261) For Jacobsen, this “reluctance to seek official recognition suggests how far property regimes and institutional aspects of communities had drifted apart in the minds of the altiplano peasantry.” I would suggest communities made a rational choice skipping state recognition: it was a difficult, costly and sometimes counterproductive procedure that could rekindle conflicts with neighbors and did not ensure governmental protection of communal lands. The letter of recognition of the community of Huilahuyo (Vilquenchico, Huancané) warned that recognition did not establish property rights over the lands nor affected the rights of third parties. Furthermore, after obtaining official recognition, lands became unalienable and unsizable, and could not serve as guarantee for credits. (Bourricaud 1967: 93) Puno’s cooperatives began registering only when the State began offering incentives to officially registered communities (assisted self-help, parcel integration, cooperativism, supervised credit, directed and controlled emigration) in the 1960s. (Rénique 2004: 154-155)

New initiatives were undertaken to support the official pro-indigenous discourse, increase control over and modernize the countryside. The SAI and the Ministry of Development promoted eugenic studies and measures inspired in North American positivism. In 1925, the Ministry of Development created in certain Police Intendancies Anthropometric Sections that kept photographs and physical descriptions of the detained persons. (MI 260, “Senadores”, 9 January 1925) On January 30, 1926, it financed Rafael Pareja’s travel to Mexico to study indigenous groups. (MI 261A, “Fomento 1926”) In 1928, the SAI promoted a commission studying “Ethnic Psychology” sent to Puno by the University of San Marcos. The commission formed by Doctor Enrique Encinas and his sisters Victoria and Asunción Encinas, as well as Professors Gustavo Adolfo Rubina and Julián Palacios established itself in the house of Adventist teacher Juan Huanca to study Indian mentality. Following a questionnaire elaborated by Doctor Hermilio Valdizán, they elaborated anthropometric measurements and carried on psychological tests and measurement of senses, memory, imagination, feelings, judgments, wills and dreams of over two hundred Aymaras of both sexes and different ages. (Chambi 1985: 100) Starting in 1928, until 1939, the government paid travel fares to the Sierra for “Visitadores de Indígenas” Engineer Victor Villagra and indigenista lawyer Luis Felipe Aguilar who visited communities and solved land disputes in situ. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.10) Cuzqueño indigenista José Ángel Escalante believed Leguía had initiated a new era for indigenes guaranteeing respectful authorities and judges that supported their juridical belligerence, protected and favored them. Leguía had ensured the adequate use of tax revenues in the construction of roads, aqueducts and schools in the remotest corners of the country improving the indigenous situation. Nevertheless, he considered the PRI “una carabina de Ambrosio más de
nuestra complicación administrativa” and the SAI “una fábrica de decretos, expedientes y papeleos.” (Mariátegui & Sánchez 1975: 50-51) Valcárcel also criticized the Patronato and other pro-indigenous offices and associations. He considered them expressions of the colonialist will to see the Indian as inferior, as bouts of charity not of justice or legitimate retribution. He identified this as a mistake of limeños and of supposed experts who counseled the national governments, unilateral measures that remained inoperative since they were unable to end the secular problem of indigenous exploitation. (Valcárcel 1981: 351; Mariátegui & Sánchez 1975: 143)

The strengthening of the repressive power of the State was probably more important to quell gamonal abuse. Some Adventist missionaries were assigned military guard and soldiers were also dispatched to protect Indians. Anti-gamonal sentiment damaged the more progressive hacendados that were trying to slow down abuses, but most of all, it was “mounting Indian militancy and government responsiveness” that diminished intimidation. (Hazen 1974: 187)

Not all pro-indigenous measures of the State worked in favor of the peasantry. Peasant leaders were deprived of strong allies that could not be controlled or channeled through the State. On 7 November 1929, the conservative newspaper “El Heraldo” published an article written by a priest in Puno (C.Cárdenas García) who accused the Adventists of propagating dissociative feelings and usurping the ecclesiastic jurisdiction that only Catholic priests could have in Peru. Protestants illegally administered baptism and marriage in some ayllus as if they were public officials of the country. Usurpation of a public function was punished with no more than two years in prison. With this denunciation, Puno’s priests were defending “the dearest interests of the motherland” against attempts of absorption by foreign powers. This article was written to praise a resolution signed by President Leguía (June 1929) banning protestant activity in the country. Protestants were accused of exerting antinational and anti-Catholic labor among the “weakest” (the Indians) who were to be protected by the State. Leguía who had once praised the evangelists for their labor was in the midst of his decline. He needed the support of the Church and turned against former, easily targeted allies. Adventista activities in Puno, however, were not interrupted.

Leguía’s regime was sustained artificially by massive external financing and internal repression. With the crisis of 1929, the government’s funds were cut, public works interrupted, unemployment soared. The crisis of 1929 only exacerbated the rising discontent showed by the aggressive centralism of the State, the lack of civil and political liberties, the subsequent presidential reelections and the little attention paid to problems in the South. Subaltern officers less involved in the State’s corruption practices and aghast by the budget reductions reacted supporting a young colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro who was organizing a revolt from Arequipa. Minister of Justice and improvised Minister of War, Cuzqueño indigenista Escalante tried to control the movement in Arequipa by maintaining the loyalty of the Fourth Military Division, located in Puno. It seems that the Fourth Region remained loyal but Leguía misinformed failed to appeal to it. The revolt took place on August 23, 1930, responding to the signature of a pact with Chile over the territories of Tacna and Arica. The military establishment once again intervened to “defend” the nation’s interests threatened by the eruption of urban masses in the political scene. (Bullick 1999: 81-82; Basadre 1983: X 49; Leguía 1930: 44-45)

The “August Revolution” impacted on popular sectors which saw in Sanchez Cerro their protector. The Manifest of Arequipa showed, however, that the rebel military were not voicing the claims of the lower classes. For the 1931 elections, literacy remained a requisite of franchise, so rural masses were left out. Sanchez Cerro and his followers were not radicals they only demanded a renovation of traditional structures, while maintaining public order and the safety of institutions. The pronouncement voiced the claims of provincial middle sectors, intellectual liberals and merchants of the region of Arequipa, thirsty for decentralization and a growing democratization.
They denounced the abuses, inefficiency and corruption of Leguía’s administration and promised to clean the State and free the nation of its foreign creditors. There was no political program and no project of social transformation. They only demanded free elections and a constituent assembly. (Bullick 1999: 83-86)

Although official indigenista discourses were not abandoned, the State broke its alliance with the peasant leadership trying to co-opt or appease rural mobilization through the PRI and the SAI to no avail. Leguía’s regime and subsequent administrations focused on the moral discipline and subordination of the rural masses and failed to articulate fragments of peasant collective consciousness within a totalizing project building an imaginary national community. After one of the last efforts to strengthen puneño autonomy, the federalist revolution of 1931, failed226, Puno entered a period of relative peace. After 1932, hacienda expansion stopped almost completely. Stockraising had ceased to be “a guaranteed route to wealth” due to unstable or stagnating wool prices and new investment possibilities elsewhere in Peru. (Hazen 1974: 183) Some Puno absentist landowners maintained traditional backward latifundia while others combined capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of exploitation improving technology and capitalizing the cattle raising system (enclosing pastures, introducing breeders and sanitary practices, etc.).227 (Tamayo 1982: 103) Indians ceased to be the focus of official discourses and the pro-indigenous banner passed onto Lima’s and provincial intellectuals trying to imagine the nation while carving a place in the national political sphere for themselves.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF INDIGENISMO

In Puno, peasant mobilization had promoted a very militant indigenismo in the first decades of the twentieth century. The period produced a generation of men that came close to a definition of organic intellectuals. But after 1924, their leadership decayed especially after the untimely deaths of Catacora and Urviola and the exile of Encinas. The contacts made with Indians were lost and solidarity diffused. Politically involved indigenistas were forced to join the new parties dominating political life (Communist and Aprista parties). Chuquiwanqa Ayulo after surviving attempts against his life joined the communist party. He led Puno’s branch of the communist party for several years, parallel to his judicial career which ended in an appointment as president of the Superior Court of Puno between 1947 and 1952. Other indigenistas chose to remain aloof from political parties receiving little or no attention except in the intellectual field. Encinas and Romero fell back into their own activities focusing on institutional pedagogy and research. (Rénique 2004: 121-122)

Only a few intellectuals continued with Puno’s militant tradition, amongst them was Manuel Núñez Butrón (Samán 1900-Arequipa 1952) founder of “Rijch’arismo” (awakening), the practice of

226 On March 20, 1931, an autonomist movement took place in Puno’s Municipal building led by Captain Aristides Pachas. Pachas revolted against Sanchez Cerro at the head of Regiment nº15. He was accompanied by Maire Pastor Ordoñez, former representative Eduardo Beroldo, fiscal of Superior Court Adrián Cáceres Olazo, and other notables (José María Barreda, Wenceslao Delgado, Enrique Robles Riquelme, Adrián Solorzano, Guillermo Zaá, Julio C. Gamarra, Ernesto Carpio, José María Miranda and others). They constituted a Federal Party in Puno. They were accused of conspiring to separate Puno from Peru and annex it to Bolivia and were disbanded and persecuted. (Tamayo 1982: 99-101)

227 “The League of Hacendados was successful in fighting for the landowner’s status quo. In return for property guarantees, it helped maintain order and limit hacendado abuses. It also sought the kind of development which would raise wool profits and reduce social tension; thus its calls for better stockraising techniques and for special Indian schools. Though radicals raged over its formation and activities, the League may have initially helped check the gamonal onslaught in Puno and substitute enlightened self-interest for simple greed. Its subsequent existence was a brake on significant alternations in power or property relations.” (Hazen 1974: 183-183)
social medicine. Núñez was born in an estancia of the parcialidad of Jasana, district of Samán (province of Azángaro) in a family of Arequipeño origin. He studied at the National School of San Carlos then traveled to Arequipa to start his studies of medicine. In 1920 he was studying in Lima and then in Barcelona (Spain) where he graduated as surgeon in March 1925. He immediately returned to Puno and became the doctor of Indians in Azángaro, Huancané and San Román. Unable to instill in the local population a respect for occidental medicine, he created a mix of popular and occidental medicine that respected traditional curandero medicine while emphasizing prevention and hygiene.

He taught indigenous curanderos the rudiments of scientific medicine in weekly assemblies and through the publication of a magazine “Runa Sonqo” (1935-1948). The purpose of this publication was to diffuse hygienic practices and treatments of common diseases in the peasantry. The magazine also registered peasant social life informing of baptisms, weddings, funerals, etc. It was a periodical destined to peasants that reached great diffusion in parcialidades, ayllus and haciendas. The impact of this movement was strong and its means revolutionary since curanderos were disdained and even dismissed as ignorant and superstitious. (Tamayo 1982: 2336-337) Núñez organized “Sanitary Brigades” in 1933, integrated by indigenes trained by him. He believed patients should not look for the doctor; the doctor had to go to the peasant’s hut to grant him medical help. (Tamayo 1982: 338-339)

Cases such as Nuñez Butrón did not, however, dominate Puno’s indigenismo. In the mid 1920s, the debate over the nation returned to the literary space. Puno’s indigenismo thrived in a less organic way crystallizing around the Orkopata Group, one of the many associations of intellectuals that tried to articulate, from the provinces, a new concept of nationality adequate to the social changes that were redefining the sector in charge of elaborating the national discourse. (Vich 2000: 44-45) Literature appeared as the ideal form to reassert the centrality of the Sierra as scenario for the nationality: a pristine and millenarian, virile and telluric Sierra opposed to a vicious and decadent, feminine and colonial Coast. (Rénique 2004: 111)

The Orkopata group was the product of Puno’s own social changes: the appearance of a new middle class influenced by Adventist and public education projects. Manuel Z. Camacho and José Antonio Encinas were the teachers of many Orkopatas. The Group was founded in 1926 by Alejandro Peralta (Director), his brother Arturo (Gamaliel Churata), Dante Nava, Inocencio Mamani, Mateo Jaicka (nickname of Víctor Enrique Saavedra), José Bedregal, Emilio Vásquez, Emilio Armaza, Benjamín Camacho and Francisco Chukiwaña. Lawyer Manuel Quiroga, Indian writer Isidro Mamani and teacher Julian Palacios also participated in it. (Valcárcel 1981: 248; Tord 1978: 202; Vich 2000: 23-29) The Orkopatas organized study groups and opened seminaries each afternoon with the participation of teachers, artisans, painters, public employees, etc. The only requisite to participate was to possess intellectual queries and to produce reports and discussions. (Vich 2000: 28) Their publication, the Boletín Titikaka, was an attempt to articulate with the indigenista and vanguardista discourses of the period, connecting the concepts of revolution, aesthetic vanguard and national problematic around the re vindication of the Andean as an essential component of the identity. (Vich 2000: 31) Wide depicted the publication as the most “exotic” or “ex-centric” of the Latin American vanguard, mixing experimental literature, mundonovismo, criollismo, regionalism and indigenismo. (Wide 1984: 258)

According to Zevallos Aguilar the Group was intimately linked to its sociopolitical context mainly as a response to indigenous cultural, social and political mobilization and to Leguía’s 228 Apparently there was a similar group in Juliaca, related to Luis de Rodrigo and the magazine Chasqui.
administration capitalist modernization project. The Group granted agency to the indigene but searched to channel, interpret and often neutralize its force. The Orkopatas tried to represent the indigenous population by speaking about it (mimetic representation) and speaking for it (political representation) claiming a position of epistemic privilege as provincial intellectuals and mediators between Creole and indigenous cultures. (Zevallos 2002: 16) The Group tried to counter the stereotype of the “Indian rebel” imprinted by the de-humanizing discourses of hacendados to propose the image of a human being with a complex and different culture exerting his rights and duties as any common citizen. They tried to change the sense of the term Indian with their self-inclusion in the semantic field of the concept. They developed a reivindicative narrative in which they became the heroes of the peasant struggle, emphasizing their constant and fruitless attempts to find justice through the legal system.229 (Zevallos 2002: 67, 95-97)

Miscegenation was part of official nationalist ideology and indigenistas such as the Orkopatas promoted it not as acculturation towards Western culture but as a universal miscegenation produced by all imports but having a higher proportion of indigenous blood. While limeño and Cuzqueño intellectuals rejected mestizaje230, the Orkopatas adopted it as the solution to Oswald Spengler’s theory of Western decadence (Zevallos 2002: 67) They translated peasant mobilization into an esoteric and nativist idea of social and cultural renovation. They respected and tried to revalue indigenous culture (language, beliefs, customs and social organization) which they viewed as cultural capital needed to create the nation. Only one collaborator of the Boletín proposed total acculturation of the Indian, Cuzqueño indigenista José Uriel García whose neoindianismo saw the Indian as mere biologic value, as the clay to be molded through culture. (Zevallos 2002: 89-90) Orkopatas idealized mestizaje, as a positive fusion without conflict, the much needed “recuperation of a lost cultural coherence”.231 Yet, this was a national essentialism that was just a fictitious construction. (Vich 2000: 60-66)

Orkopata vanguardims was unable, however, to break the binarism “civilization-barbarism" to redefine Indianiess. It failed to propose an alternative political project and most of all it failed to produce and promote a less prejudiced image of the Indian. Its racial scientificism only created more distress within a fragmented and weak oligarchy that was unable to face its indigenous inheritance. Indigenismo was defeated by its uneasy acceptance of the power and strength of indigenous cultures. Even educator and long time indigenous defender, Jose Antonio Encinas found the Indian unable to hold the significance of the nation or fatherland. He affirmed Republican legislation had produced inequality and thus egotism, lack of solidarity and of racial spirit within the Indian turning him into his worst enemy. “Su espíritu de raza es insignificante y débil. Basta la menor influencia para que ella se pierda. Cuando el indio levanta su nivel social, es el peor verdugo de los suyos.” (Lynch 1979: 30) The Indian was unable to bear a collective identity as the proletariat and thus was unable to carry on improvements in his life remaining subject to

229 In his work “Tierra y Aire” (Lima 1971) Alejandro Peralta wrote: “Te vi siempre de pie Manuel Quiroga/ El pecho al frente como un estandarte./ Y te he visto pelear contra inicuo./ Contra follones y contra truhanes…/ Oh, defensor del comunero/ Hermano/ Oh, defensor del pongo/ Doble hermano. (Kapsoli 1980: 19)

230 "In neither María Maturé’s or Valcárcel’s view were mestizos necessarily defined as biological hybrids as in European depictions of U.S. or African mulattoes. Rather, mestizos were Indians (monolingual Quechua-speaking agriculturalists) who had “abandoned” their proper natural/cultural environment and migrated to the cities, where they degenerated morally, as reflected by their deviant sexuality.” (De la Cadena 2000: 24)

231 An example is Francisco Chukiwanqa Ayulo’s “Ortografía indoamericana” appeared in the Bulletin in December 1928. The jurist and intellectual wrote this article in an arbitrary Spanish using Quechua phonetics in a personal search for and original Andean expression. (Tamayo 1982: 262)
landowners’ will. Deprived of a collective consciousness, the Indian remained a negative element for the formation of the nation and the nationality.232

The Indian thus needed to be redeemed through insertion in the occidental culture. The nation was culturally reified and recognition of an oppressed nationality was ruled out. As a consequence the debates and proposals to solve the indigenous question remained within the same frame: the danger of acknowledging a heterogeneous identity in the heart of the Nation. Indigenous cultures were deemed inferior if not a national threat. The homestead should replace the community. Legislation should follow the nature of things not the reason of difference. Difference was ruled out. (Lynch 1979: 45-46)

After the repression of the peasant quest for ethnic citizenship, indigenista allies gave themselves the task of writing the story. According to several scholars, they silenced peasant voices announcing the new indigenous consciousness. By constituting themselves into interprets of indigenous culture they paralyzed their object of study denying it dynamism and they silenced the human groups they described. Indigenismo became the memory of the “indigenous question” while the Andean rebels and militants were relegated to a pre-political past of millenarian uprisings. (Rénique 2004: 26, 117; Zevallos 2002: 119, 122) Many indigenistas placed as intermediaries and holders of knowledge felt threatened and rejected Indian agency through prejudices and stereotypes such as the revengeful and violent character of indigenes, their lack of intellectual capacity or their addiction to alcohol and coca. When indigenes turned into citizens, indigenistas became mere observers or weak intermediaries. (Zevallos 2002: 124-125) Thus the emphasis was put on revolt.

Marisol de la Cadena has argued that Cuzqueño liberal indigenistas “defeated a radical grassroots project which sought to obtain indigenous citizenship by implementing literacy campaigns” because the project implicated “a different definition of Indianness”. Peasant definition of Indianness did not emphasize cultural purity and “advocated for political self-representation”. (De la Cadena 2000: 40) The Incas had been a “race of agriculturalists”, thus Indian identity should be dignified through agriculture. “Rather than civilizing Indians through urbanizing education (that is, rather than transforming them into mestizos as limeños proposed), indigenistas believed that Indians had to be remade in their racial proper places.” (De la Cadena 2000: 66)

“The victory of liberal indigenismo confirmed for modernity that Indians were an inferior racial/cultural type undeserving of Peruvian citizenship, whose relationship with the state had to be mediated either by experts or by laws that acknowledged their “inferior” condition.” (De la Cadena 2000: 41) Indigenistas trying to represent the interests of the peasantry ended up competing with indigenous leaders for the representation of the rural masses. Yet they were unable to articulate themselves with the lower classes and fell into an ambiguous discourse. (Deustua & Rénique 1984: xiv) Indigenistas failed to create a strong political movement because they chose to become intermediary intellectuals instead of creating a more horizontal and solidary relation with subaltern social groups. They positioned themselves as the “vanguard” situated above peasant political and cultural agency and thus maintaining the subaltern condition. (Zevallos 2002: 135) This was for Ossio the end of the creative potential of indigenismo. By adopting a literary-artistic or scientific tone, indigenismo remained trapped in rigid conceptual models. With few exceptions, it created stereotyped and contaminated images that served ideologies or political careers. (Ossio 1995: 238)

232 “El indio viviendo así, en el desamparo, fuera de toda acción social definida, constituye un elemento negativo para la formación de la verdadera nacionalidad. (…) Hasta hoy el indio no tiene un concepto claro de su nacionalidad. La idea de patria y sus vinculaciones con ella le son tan ajenas, que solo, explicando los factores psíquicos esenciales de su vida, puede encontrarse la causa verdadera de tal desconocimiento.” (Lynch 1979: 36)
The strength and limitations of indigenismo were evidence by a debate that took place in early 1927 in the form of responding articles in the magazine Mundial. Though (or maybe because) its main figures José Carlos Mariátegui (socialist in the mist of founding a Peruvian socialist Party) and Luis Alberto Sánchez (future Aprista leader) were not indigenistas, this polemic may be the strongest resonance reached by indigenismo in Lima. It included intellectuals from all over the country: Enrique López Albújar, Luis E. Valcárcel, Roberto Mac Lean Estenós, Darío Eguren Larrea, José Ángel Escalante, Ventura García Calderón, Manuel A. Seoane, Antenor Orrego and Cusco’s Grupo Resurgimiento.

The polemic started as a literary debate that turned personal at times. At its core, was the issue of defining Indianess as well as the nature and role of indigenistas. (Mariátegui & Sánchez 1975: 9) Peruvian indigenismo was “the project that made intellectuals from the sierra comparable to those from the coast. Through culturalist concepts of race, serranos negotiated their geographically defined racial inferiority with formulations and practices that reinforced the superiority of their honourable manliness and lofty intellectual qualities.”233 (De la Cadena 2000: 321) Participants unearthed an incredible number of dumbfounding discriminatory preconceptions234; their ideas were quite far from the discourses peasants had addressed to the nation through the government and newspapers.

Only José Angel Escalante pointed out writers and intellectuals had become enthralled with the mission to redeem or regenerate the Indian, depriving him of his own initiative. The fact that Indians had survived four hundred years of conquest and remained invulnerable showed their strength and he believed the Indian was ready to take responsibility over his own destiny. Escalante was however caught within Leguía’s official discourse and confirmed indigenous agency to reject Mariategui’s socialist militancy. He denounced the new interest of coastal intellectuals and journalists for the Indian as a revolutionary tendency profiting from the indigenous mass to promote bolchevic ideas. (Mariátegui & Sánchez 1975: 48) He concluded: “nosotros, los indios, nos bastamos y nos sobramos, dentro de la actual ideología gubernamental, para buscar remedio a nuestros males.” (“us Indians are enough and more than enough to find within governmental ideology the remedy to our ills”) (Mariátegui & Sánchez 1975: 52)

Mariátegui was aware that the polemic was generating a debate not creating a program, yet he viewed in literary indigenismo a state of the mind, the seeds of a growing consciousness that still needed to produce its masterpiece. (Mariátegui and Sánchez 1975: 32-33) He also saw the seed of a growing consciousness within the peasantry. José Carlos Mariátegui, founder of the Peruvian Communist Party and of the General Confederation of Workers, was a visionary thinker. He had returned from Europe in 1923 to witness the Third Indigenous Congress and the feverish peasant activism in the South. Mariategui met Ezequiel Urviola and maintained personal contacts with indigenous messengers from Puno such as Mariano Lariqo and María de la Paz Chanini who

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233 “Para todo grupo intelectual de alguna ciudad Serrano no intervenir en la polémica, no escribir en quechua o no participar del ambiente indigenista, era una opción que no debía seguirse. Justamente había que afirmar su identidad aprovechando de esta brecha creada dentro de la ideología dominante, aunque a veces esto no representase un movimiento de larga duración, ni una sincera actitud frente a la cuestión indígena.” (Deustua in Deustua & Rénique 1984: 52)

234 Enrique López Albújar: “La muerte de un hijo la festeja una semana, riendo y bebiendo, chacchando y bailando; la de su vaca lo exaspera, lo entenebrece y lo hace llorar un mes y lamentarse un año”, “Una vez que ha aprendido a leer y escribir menosprecia y explota a su raza. Indio letrado, indio renegado.” (Mariátegui and Sánchez 1975: 17) Roberto Mac Lean: “Hoy el indio -¡avergüenza decirlo!- es un ente reconcentrado y taciturno, extraño y hosco, rebelde a todo contacto social, raquítico de cuerpo y alma, mitad hombre y mitad bestia, de cerebro fósil y corazón hipertrofiado.” (Mariátegui & Sánchez 1975: 103-104)
prepared traditional meals for him. His magazine Amauta published several articles denouncing the events of Wancho Lima: the repression, the manipulation of information, the mistakes in the investigations and silences of congressmen and official press. (Réquene 2004: 109) Mariátegui’s ability to listen to indigenous messengers, provincial intellectuals and indigenistas allowed him to have one of the clearest perspectives on the reality of the Peruvian sierra. He resumed some of the claims peasants had been voicing for years: the importance of the communal regime, the need to revise property titles, the abuse of Indian labor and the relations between Indians and mistis. Though he affiliated the Socialist Party to the Communist International, he never surrendered his local perspective. He made the national problem of the Indian a universal movement of oppressed classes but sustained his analysis and revindications under Peruvian criteria. (Valcárcel 1981: 252-253; Mariátegui 1984: 30-32)

Nevertheless he was not completely free from the prejudices that plagued hacendado and indigenista discourses. Mariátegui’s discourse went back and forth empowering and disempowering Indians on issues like miscegenation, cultural exchange, urbanization and leadership. Mariátegui refused the argument of a reviled Indian incapable of fighting and of resistance but stressed the role of outside agitators. Peasants needed to ally themselves with mestizos and white proletarians who would systematize, organize and define the fight for the land. (Mariátegui 1984: 45) Mariátegui was no stranger to the racial thought of the early twentieth century and he confirmed more than confronted it. While he stressed the need for peasants to stress and maintain their oppressed racial identity, he rejected the value of peasant culture. Indians were in the outmost backwardness and ignorance and needed cultural and moral redemption. Their natural evolution had been interrupted by the oppression and exploitation of the upper classes since the Conquest.

Mariátegui criticized racial approximations to the Indian problem, yet he approached the topic in a similar way, expressing the weakness of racial miscegenation, integration and identity. Trying to reivindicate the Indian, Mariátegui affirmed the Indian was equal or superior to the mestizo as could be seen in the Indian’s assimilation of modern techniques of production. (Mariátegui 1984: 22) However, when the Indian was expelled from the land or forced to do military service, he established contact with white civilization becoming disconnected from his race. He tried then to erase his links to it while connecting with white and mestizo habits including the exploitation of his own race. (Mariátegui 1984: 45) For Mariátegui it seemed the Indian ought to remain in “his place”: the countryside, at least until able to cope with Western influence without losing his racial identity. While criticizing mestizos and the effect of contacts between Indian and white society, he believed promoted cultural miscegenation: it was language and mentality which separated the Indian peasant masses from revolutionary workers.236

235 He despised Teodomiro Gutierrez Cuevas as a "serrano mestizo, de fuerte porcentaje de sangre indígena, que se hacia llamar Rumimaqui y se presentaba como el redentor de su raza". (Mariátegui 1984: 39)

236 Mariátegui affirmed Indians could only be taught and led by Indians. He suggested the idea of indigenous militant elements that in urban and mining centers had entered into contact with unionism. The working class would be the vanguard and guide of the indigenous militants who would be capacitad to play a role in the emancipation of their race. A white or mestizo would hardly be trusted and thus able to spread the class propaganda amongst indigenous populations. The main task was to produce a group of “diffusors” ("propagandistas") systematically prepared to spread the socialist doctrine. For their educative mission, militant Indians should be taught through self-education methods, regular readings of unionist publications and correspondence with other militants. They should then coordinate communities by regions, help those persecuted, defend communal property, organize small libraries and study centers. The double goal was to give class education and orientation and prevent the influence of disorienting elements such as the anarchists. (Mariátegui 1984: 49)
Mariátegui identified the indigenous problem as an economic problem, and mainly a land problem. The Indian would only rise materially or intellectually if socio-economic conditions changed.\textsuperscript{237} (Mariátegui 1984: 25) He rejected Haya de la Torre’s moderate solution of diffusing cooperatives and dividing unproductive latifundia among landless Indians. He aimed demonstrating the existence of an Inca communism focusing on Inca structures, forms of integration, absence of private property and management of agricultural surplus paid as tribute to the State. (Demélas 2003: 391) According to Démélas, Mariátegui circumscribed the indigenous problem to an agrarian reform and failed to aboard problems such as internal differences within communities or regional diversity. He failed because he adopted indigenista vocabulary, erasing multiplicity to stress unity in oppression. (Demélas 2003: 393)

Mariátegui’s revindications have been criticized for offering no practical way or map to follow. This may be because though stressing the need for racial identification he acknowledged no cultural revindications, only economic and political revindications. Mariátegui did have a formula, yet once again it disempowered Indians making them unable to reach their own liberation. Mariátegui recognized the resilient habit of cooperation among indigenous populations and affirmed communities had shown resistance and persistence and were a natural factor for the socialization of the land (cooperatives with redistribution of latifundia land). Yet, he believed Indians were not prepared to rule their own space. “Del mismo modo, la constitución de la raza india en un estado autónomo, no conduciría en el momento actual a la dictadura del proletariado indio ni mucho menos a la formación de un estado indio sin clase, como alguien ha pretendido afirmar, sino a la constitución de un Estado indio burgués, con todas las contradicciones internas y externas de los Estado burgueses.” (Mariátegui 1984: 46)

Indians could participate in the movement of mass liberation that would lead to a socialist society but they could not direct the movement themselves. While praising the Indigenous leadership he gave them little agency. After assisting to the Third Indigenous Congress, Mariátegui concluded that the debates and votes were not important, not even the lack of a program mattered. The crucial issue was that it was an affirmation of the race’s will to formulate its revindications in a collective and organized way. Indigenes would stop being an inorganic mass, a dispersed mob incapable of deciding its historical destiny. (Rénique 2004: 106) He believed the CPDIT constituted not real threat for the State since it had no ideological or personal value. “Este comité no había tenido nunca más importancia que la anexa a su participación en los congresos indígenas y estaba compuesto por elementos que carecían de valor ideológico y personal, y que en no pocas ocasiones habían hecho protestas de adhesión a la política gubernamental, considerándola pro-indigenista…” (Mariátegui 1984: 41) Mariátegui’s hopes for the peasantry were in the future, not in the present. His medular thesis was the socialist potential of indigenes. (Rénique 2004: 108)

Mariátegui did not expect indigenous groups to have their own goals and strategies, their own ideological discourse, only revindications. Thus they would naturally accept socialism for it helped their revindications. “La levadura de las nuevas reivindicaciones indigenistas es la idea socialista, no como la hemos heredado instintivamente del extinto inkario, sino como la hemos aprendido de la civilización occidental.” (Lynch 1979: 115) He argued against millenarism which weakened peasant rationality, yet he emphasized its mobilizing strength. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 124)

\textsuperscript{237} Al racismo de los que desprecian al indio, porque creen en la superioridad absoluta y permanente de la raza blanca, sería insensato y peligroso oponer el racismo de los que superestiman el indio, con fe mesiánica en su misión como raza en el renacimiento americano. Las posibilidades de que el indio se eleve material o intelectualmente dependen del cambio de las condiciones económico-sociales. (Revista Amauta, n° 25, Lima junio 1929, Romero & Levano 1969: 79)
His appeal for Inca communism responded to the need to show socialism was not foreign to Peruvian history; it was not foreign or anti-national. By linking it to the past, socialism implied the true independence of the country. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 181)

These contradictions cannot diminish Mariátegui’s contribution to indigenismo. The socialist imprint he left marked irreversibly the indigenista movement. He imprinted the idea that any debate over the structure of the State was subordinated to the debate of the “problem of the Indian” and the “agrarian question”. The State decentralization without taking these issues into account would only lead to the increased power of gamonalíos. (Romero and Levano 1969: 48) With Mariátegui and Amauta, indigenismo entered politics and found its strongest moment passing from a regional indigenismo (in Cusco and Puno) to a national indigenismo (1925-1930). Mariátegui’s proposals were at the origin of most pro-indigenous and pro-community proposals in the Constituent Assembly of 1931.

In 1931, the Communist party overcoming its rejection of electoral processes and its internationalism, tried to participate in the elections in spite of its proscription. The party proposed the symbolic candidacy of Puno’s indigenous intellectual and former messenger Eduardo Quispe Quispe. He ran against Haya de la Torre and Sánchez Cerro. The Communist Party’s program asked for the expulsion of imperialist monopolies, the end of feudalism, gamonalismo, exploitation, the repossession of lands by ayllus and the economic and political autonomy of Quechua and Aymara nationalities. Many survivors of the Wancho Lima movement and the CPDIT supported this campaign while others identified with the ideas of Haya de la Torre (Carlos Condorena). Repression and the dispute between Apristas and sanchezcerristas gave this candidacy little resonance. (Burga & Flores Galindo 1987: 195)

After Mariátegui died, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre was the one called upon to continue with indigenismo but he strayed from this current too identified with communist tendencies. He spoke of indoamericanismo, putting emphasis on Peru’s particularity, but relegated to a second place the defense of Indian rights. (Valcárcel 1981: 255) Both Haya and Mariátegui started political movements that maintained autonomy of though and a national perspective careful in the use of foreign criteria but lacked the organization or ideology to develop a strong mass movement. Mariátegui was a teacher; he educated but could not organize. Haya created a solid organization of which he was the undisputed leader and mobilized large sectors of society but lacked a clear political program. (Valcárcel 1981: 252-253)

Later on, indigenismo became institutional through sporadic moments of official worry such as Manuel Prado’s administration. (Valcárcel 1981: 255-256) This last indigenismo, mostly discursive and imposed from above, had only a limited impact on the indigenous masses. The generation of thinkers that had considered the indigenous problem as the only true problem of the nation stopped being heard. They had failed to produce a coherent conception of the indigenous problem and effective solutions because they placed themselves above the peasant movement denying peasant intellectuals any agency. Velazco Alvarado represents for Ossio, the corollary to the anti-latifundia tradition stimulated by the indigenista movement: he inherited the homogenizing attitude that resulted in a similar protectionist attitude that denied autonomy and creative capacity to the Indian while increasing Lima’s centralism and ethnocentrism. (Ossio 1995: 215) But Velazco did change one thing: hacendados ceased to be the enemy; the enemy became the State itself. By doing this he only followed or made tangible the ideological evolution of the peasant movement.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT

The peasant movement did not immediately relinquish its quest for ethnic citizenship. Right after the prohibition of the CPDIT, a new institution was created, the “Comité Central Nacional
Indígena Del Perú. It was expected to be a mild institution that was not to give problems to the administration, but it was soon infiltrated by old radicals. In November 1930, several delegates complained to the Minister of War that Víctor Tapia and Juan Zapata had once again infiltrated their institution and were assigning quotas from five to ten soles per person to cover the committee’s expenses. Zapata and Tapia had even prohibited them from presenting claims without their signature.238 Among the members signing this petition was Mariano Larico, former delegate of the Huancané Sub-committee. The Ministry of War sent the complaint to the Prefecture. Zapata and Tapia were notified by the “Brigada de Asuntos Sociales” to steer clear of the new institution in December 1930. (AGN, MI 299, Ministerio de Guerra 1930) Nevertheless, both continued with their social activities and remained close to the institution. They were professional indigenous representatives and experienced social organizers; their skills were still needed. In 1932, Víctor Tapia was recognized by the government as president of the “Comité Nacional Indígena Del Perú”, from which he made denunciations of abuses and requested return fares for indigenous delegates. (AGN, MT, DGAI 3.13.2.10) In 1933, this new committee petitioned for a national Indian Congress to formally solicit indigenous representation in the Constituent Congress. (Hazen 1974: 160)

Even before the CPDIT disappeared authorities had to deal with a myriad of small institutions created to protect rights and resources. Many organizations sprung in late 1923 or early 1924, after Congress voted to ban the CPDIT and especially after the events of Wancho Lima. On November 11, 1923, several delegates formed in Lima the “Regional Pro-Derecho Indígena”, apparently a dismemberment or annex of the CPDIT. In January 1924, the unionist approach of this association was made clear with its rechristening as the “Federación Obrera Indígena del Sur” and a few months later as the “Federación Indígena Obrera Regional Peruana” (FIORP). Hipólito Salazar remained its Secretary General and wrote letters asking for return fares to Puno and Cuzco for delegates who had come to claim justice and remained in Lima for lack of resources to return.239 This institution, according to Mariátegui, expected to apply to indigenous organization the principles and methods of anarcho-syndicalism. It was the “vanguardia indígena” but was condemned to be no more than a rehearsal. Two of its leaders were deported, others were intimidated. The Federation was soon reduced to a simple name. (Mariátegui 1984: 40-41)

On November 23, 1923, P. Lanfranco, Minister of Development received from Puno a communiqué participating him of the creation of a “Federación de Campesinos de Puno”. This new institution was created after the visit to Puno of the Secretary General of the Central Committee, who warned the departmental sub-committee of an imminent attack on the CPDIT that could resound on Leguía’s administration. The new institution would, according to its President Pedro P. Salcedo, allow Puno’s indigenes to continue their path to social and educative redemption.240

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238 The letter is signed by Antonio Arbire, Pablo Esteban, Clemente Osorio, Luis Mamani, Víctor Rosales, Juan de la Cruz Chavez, Pío Padilla, Alejandro P. ZavalE, Mariano Larico, Mariano Condori, Daniel Apaza, Paulino Laura, Juan G. Ruiz and two others whose signatures are not legible. The seal accompanying the letter has all the elements of the CPDIT’s seal but is headed by the title of the new committee. Where the foundation date used to be, now appears “Comité Nacional Indígena” and underneath the mountains the word Secretariado. AGN, MI 299, Ministerio de Guerra 1930.

239 Secretary General, Hipólito Salazar, asked the Ministry of Government for return fares for several delegates who had come from Puno to ask for justice (Carlos, Esteban and José Condorena, Valentín Vilca, Mariano Larico, Mariano Quispe, Gabriel Torres, Gregorio Hurqui and Lorenzo Ccoaquira). AGN, MI 250, Particulares 1924.

240 AGN, MI, Prefectura 241, Fomento 1923. Soon thereafter, many other departments formed their own federations. On 1924, the “Federación de Campesinos de Ica Pro-Derecho Indígena” was created with similar goals. AGN, MI 250, Particulares 1924.
Peasant Federation of Puno resumed the a-political argument of the CPDIT’s founding document to maintain the support of the State. It called upon agricultural and industrial ends, yet it vowed most of all to defend peasant lands and rights.

On December 2, 1923, Juan Borda wrote the Subprefect of the province of Puno (Peñaloza) to advert him of the formation of the “Sociedad Auxiliadora Anexo del distrito de Atuncolla”. This society vowed to protect its members’ persons, interests and lands from gamonales and others prone to commit exactions, usurpations and other crimes. (ARP, Prefecturas 1920-1930) To protect their access to salt mines, the twenty six communities of the district of San Juan de Salinas (Azángaro) gathered to form the “Comité de Defensa de la Comunidad Salinera del Distrito de San Juan de Salinas”. They zealously fought to maintain their rights over the salt mines identifying themselves as the communal owners of the lands surrounding the Lagoon of Salinas. They created a legal organization with a seat in Puno (Calle Cajamarca 527) and a directive board. Several of its members could read and write Spanish and owned a voting credential.

A few weeks after the events of Wancho Lima, on February 17, 1924, peasant leaders of the province of Ayaviri created the Federation of Indigenous Peasants of Ayaviri. Delegates from all districts assisted to its first meeting with the license of the local authority. The Federation thanked the government for the decree abolishing unpaid forced services and then proceeded to take decisions on its organization and goals, emphasizing four aspects: the formation of local committees (they included workers and peasants to form a more powerful and organized nucleus to defend their rights and especially their property), the diffusion of education through the construction of several schools, the incorporation of cattle-raising improvements with the support of the state and the granting of jungle (“montaña”) lands. They complained montaña lands were a benefit given to foreigners that was much needed by them considering the usurpations of gamonales. They planned to organize an expedition to the “mountains” of Madre de Dios, Sandia and Carabaya, in search for a better future. The federation was taking a practical stance for the defense of peasant resources and continued with old goals of education and economic growth. It both searched for local strength while applying for the support of the State accepting its tutelary policies. (AGN, MI 271, Ap-Cp 1927)

This institution became the “Federación de Indígenas Campesinos de Melgar” (former province of Ayaviri). It was linked to a union from the Capital and was represented in Lima by former CPDIT delegate Agustín Arela. On October 10, 1927, Arela received a letter from Nicanor Torres and Benito Tume Garsilaso from Ayaviri. They accused Sub-prefect Felipe Aguirre Macedo of trying to prohibit their Federation of Peasants together with the CPDIT and taking the Peruvian flag they had acquired with their own money. The sub-prefect had also taken telegrams they wanted to send the Prefecture of Puno and the Ministry of Development. Sub-prefect Aguirre claimed that the Ministry supported his decision of taking the flag. Torres and Tumi asked Arela to visit Minister Enrique Zegarra who had probably been misguided by the sub-prefect. Arela was to solicit a copy of the Ministry’s guarantees and bring it personally, or send it to lawyer Fernando Tapia. They wanted the

241 They had always extracted the salt which they sold to the “Empresa Nacional de la Sal”. The extraction areas were clearly delimited. When “the violence” started, the enterprise left the installations and all the extraction area to the Community which kept working in it for six years in common. One of its members, Lucas Cari Puma, however, had decided to claim a parcel of the salt mines (“formular denuncia”) and started to collect money for a license and extraction rights. The community reacted denying Cari’s ownership rights and claiming the salt mines as communal lands, which made them inalienable, non transferable and not subject to embargo (cited articles 261, 262 and 263 of the Constitution). (ARP, Legajo 453: Prefectura 1921-1930) The document is half burned and no date appears in the readable parts.
flag back or otherwise the reimbursement of the 120 soles they had paid for it. Arela demanded the return of the flag in a letter that resumed old arguments of peaceful peasants respecting authorities and ethnic citizenship.242 (AGN, MI 271, Ap-Cp 1927)

Sub-prefect Aguirre Macedo refused to give the flag back and explained that considering the supreme resolution of August 19, he proceeded to collect all the seals and emblems used to symbolize the CPDIT’s official character. Though the flag bore the inscription “Federación de Indígenas Campesinos – Ayaviri”, the Sub-prefect had given the flag to the local “Club Obrero Huascao” which had the official recognition of the state as an athletic institution. To further prove his case, Sub-prefect Aguirre Macedo added to his report a leaflet published on February 17, 1924, with the principles of creation of the Federation as proof that it had the same goals as the CPDIT. He also rejected Arela’s intervention considering him an outsider (Arela was from Puno). (AGN, MI 271, Ap-Cp 1927)

Associations were already replacing the term “indígenas” (indigenes) by that of “campesinos” (peasants). “Ex-Tahuantinsuyo Society secretary-general Samuel Nuñez circulated documents for an “Asociación Nacional de Comunidades Indígenas i Campesinos del Perú,” purportedly enjoying official recognition, in Puno in 1933. (...) In 1935, ex-chief of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Magdaleno Chira C. organized an Indian congress and published two numbers of Los Andes. A “Comité Central de Comunidades Indígenas del Perú, Tahuantinsuyo” apparently nearly got off the ground during Bustamante’s presidency in the mid-1940s.” (Hazen 1974: 160)

A social identity (peasant or rural worker) was replacing ethnic identity (indigene or indigenous citizen) in grassroots discourses and institutions. This was done for two reasons: to overcome the image of Indian backwardness and to obtain the support of national, regional and local unions. Peasants were surrendering two key political strategies that had characterized their political mobilizations since colonial times: ethnic citizenship and state support.

Ethnic mobilization had not failed; it had hindered the total annexation of communal lands to haciendas. By 1926-1927, peasant insurrection had ceased almost completely due to peasant resistance, economic crisis and state expansion. “Desde fines de los años veinte se estableció una relativa paz social en la región, que no fue producto de la derrota de la organización indígena, sino de una recesión económica y de un empate político entre los hacendados y las comunidades indígenas. Como resultado, la tensión social disminuyó y métodos legales y no violentos fueron los canales preferidos para lidiar con los conflictos.” (Contreras & Cueto 1990: 196) According to Tamayo, indigenous revolts ended after Leguía’s administration introduced in 1925 the Civil Guard to replace the former inefficient gendarmes (loros). Traditional landlords and their private armies lost terrain in the face of a more energetic Central Government with a strengthened bureaucracy and repressive apparatus. (Tamayo 1982: 99, 104) Hacendados had only superficial control of the political situation. Many had been domesticated by Leguía’s regime either in a compliant congress (Angelino Lizares Quiñones) or in outside administrative positions (Luis Felipe Luna).

The attitude of the peasant population had changed. It resisted abusive situations more effectively, helped by the strengthened presence of the state (also the product of peasant mobilization). In late 1929, fiscal agent José Antonio Solguer informed the Correctional Tribunal about a case of physical mistreatment by an authority in Tiquillaca (Province of Puno). A woman had been beaten by the alcalde de campo of the Governor. Following old local customs, governors made use of small fields belonging to the State or community lands as a prerogative of the

242 “...no perseguimos nada en contra del Gobierno, pues enarbolamos la bandera tan solamente porque tenemos el orgullo de ser peruanos y tener al frente de las riendas del Estado a un patriota y peruano como nosotros: nos referimos al insigne Mandatario que le consideramos como nuestro Libertador.”
authority. The envarados and those neighbors more solicitous with the authority performed the sawing and harvest. Esteban Quispe was the envarado in charge of the governor's fields. He needed more people to finish the task and went to the neighboring land to solicit the help of Felix Mendoza. Mendoza refused to perform a labor he was not obliged to do. Quispe, the envarado, was furious and screamed at him brandishing his whip and beating him. Manuela Ayala de Mendoza tried to take the whip from Quispe but was harshly pushed away. Others intervene stopping the feud. The fiscal agent verified the facts. He reported that the injuries of Mrs. Mendoza were extremely mild and produced mostly by a struggle as evidenced by the reaped shirt of the woman. He concluded that the event did not constitute a crime and should have been solved by the justice of peace. Quispe deserved a light reprimand. Nevertheless, the fiscal agent also concluded that Quispe tried to oblige Felix Mendoza to perform an unpaid service without having the right to do so. He rebutted Quispe's complaints of disobedience to authority asserting that the practice of appointing envarados and other such offices was prohibited and Quispe was not exerting a public function but a particular one. Judge J. Eladio Romero agreed with the fiscal agent's verdict confirming that the there was no crime for Quispe did not have the right of an authority legally instituted. (ARP, Expediente 1455, Instruction 27 J. 1929, p. 54v-55v) Cargos and unpaid services were growingly recognized in practice as illegal. They were not to be enforced even for the service of the State's local representative.

Ethnic mobilization had hindered land usurpation and increased the presence of the State, but it had proved ineffective in the quest for citizenship. "These individuals were trapped in a historical conceptual impasse as dominant racial theories blocked their political project: Indians were racially defined as irrational, politicians were not. Each group, therefore, belonged to a different stock. Indians did not have room to be politicians in the liberal racial/cultural definition of race in spite of its optimism about Indian redemption." 243 (De la Cadena 2000: 89) Gamonal discourses supported by many indigenistas had gained the discursive battle, blocking the possibility of including indigenous citizens into the nation. The nation was not ready to be multiethnic.

Indigenous leaders rejected ethnic political activism and “adopted class vocabulary and activities in their political work: they self-identified as campesinos (peasants) and compañeros (companions) and organized sindicatos rurales (rural unions) as part of their struggle” (De la Cadena 2000: 129) They were on the search for new political allies to connect their local struggles to the regional and national spheres of power. Hipólito Salazar (former messenger from Huancané who participated in the foundation of the “Federación Regional de Trabajadores Indígenas” in 1923, and was exiled in 1924) chose to follow communism. In 1926, he published an article in the organ of the Communist International in Latin America, “La Correspondencia Sudamericana”, in which he presented a favorable scenario for the expansion of communism in the Peruvian sierra. The old Huancané messenger affirmed that by tradition, the Peruvian Indian was inclined toward communism, as a proof he cited the more than two hundred pro-communist indigenous federations

243 In the mid 1920s, led by Francisco Chillihuani and Mariano Turpo, the colonos of hacienda Lauramarca had petitioned eight-hour workdays wages (instead of free labor), and the revision of hacienda property titles. In an innovative form of strike, they stopped selling their wool to the hacendado to sell it directly to an agent of a commercial house. (De la Cadena 2000: 122; Kapsoli, 1977:70) Mariano Turpo, former CPDIT member, was imprisoned in 1933 accused of communism, after organizing one of the first peasant unions. After almost a decade in the peasant movement, he had changed his perspective. Though he still recommended the imperative need for literacy, he affirmed in a letter to his fellow unioners: "not knowing how to read makes us more Indian, easy victims of the gamonales and their lackeys." He was now identifying illiteracy with Indianness and Indianness as "an adverse social condition". He was far now from the Tawantinsuyu’s project of using literacy “to assert an empowered Indianness.” (De la Cadena 2000: 129)
formed in Cusco and Puno. (Réné 2004: 120) Mariano Lariqo became a worker of Lima’s central market and registered in the Communist Party participating in the General Confederation of Workers of Peru. He was jailed and persecuted. Eduardo Quispe, former messenger and leader of the subcommittee of Azángaro accused of having participated in the revolts of Lampa and Azángaro between 1920 and 1922, became in 1930 the presidential candidate for the Communist Party.

Some messengers preferred to remain aloof from the growing politization of the period. Mariano Paq’o remained a wandering yatiri (curandero) in Huancané. Luque, Condori and others returned to their peasant activities. Their activism, however, was not forgotten. Ramón Pajuelo found in the Institute of Aymara Studies memorial peasants copied by a descendant of one of the three messengers of Santa Rosa of 1901. Ruben Saga found printings (entitled “La Raza Indígena en el Perú” from 1902 and 1903) with memorials and pictures of his ancestors and copied them. Social and political formations still carry the names of the messengers of 1901-1902. Collective memory maintained alive the messenger tradition. (Pajuelo 1998)

Peasants did not just surrender state support; in some areas they took over the local state to guarantee the protection of their resources. On May 9, 1929, the Council of the District of Atuncolla gathered to find a solution for the disappearance of communal lands. Alberto Monteagudo, Secretary of the Council, Valentin Colca, head of the Municipal Council, Fortunato Paredes, Governor, Manuel Paredes and Aparicio Mansilla, justices of peace and other council members and principal neighbors of Atuncolla (Lucas Nuñez, Victor Pelotier, Marcelino Flores, Juan Cervantes, Remigio Paredes, Martín Calca, Tomás Enriquez, Mariano E. Borda, Mariano C. Enriquez, Saturnino Paredes) unanimously decided to request the delimitation of communal lands for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the district. Abutting landowners had appropriated or were trying to appropriate communal lands without just titles forging municipal documents without value. Communal lands such as Palcca-Mayo-Chimp and Muyogache-Chimppampa had become mere strips due to neighbors’ stretching of their own cultivated areas without authorization. According to a long held tradition, communal lands were distributed amongst the inhabitants of the district by the council and authorities. Thus the council had decided to publish bands and put signs with the list of communal lands in each ayllu. Those who pretended to be the owners should present, before the end of the month, proof of ownership to the District’s Council on Thursdays or Sundays from 1 to 3 o’clock in the afternoon, when the authorities would gather. Those failing to present titles would have no room for complaint. Atuncolla District’s Secretary Monteagudo was to inform superior authorities in Puno for approval and to begin delimitation procedures.

This letter signed by Maire Colca and Secretary Monteagudo was accompanied by a second letter to the Prefecture. Colca spoke in the name of all authorities and neighbors of Atuncolla bothered by the appropriation of communal lands by neighboring landowners. He asked for the measurement of communal lands and the presence of civil guards to ensure the accomplishment of the task. Upon receiving these letters the Prefecture sent the case to the Subprefect, who ordered a report from the Governor. On April 22, Governor of Atuncolla, Fortunato Paredes informed Puno’s Subprefect that the communal lands were indeed held by the abutting landowners who had stretched their domains so much they had left just a strip of communal land as the denouncing memorial indicated. Paredes underlined that those lands were recognized by the constitution and were thus an inviolable right. The district’s council had gathered to protect those rights and protest the invasions that were threatening the district’s future. He stressed that the lands had been usurped violently and the crime should be contained to avoid conflicts. The measure adopted by the Council was the most adequate, he wrote, reasserting the usurpation of communal lands.
In 1923, Hermenegildo Mansilla, Manuel Paredes and Víctor Paredes, all three Spanish speaking and literate, had led a political and legal fight against owners and overseers of Hacienda Umayo to protect communal lands. Manuel Paredes (justice of peace in 1929) was governor in 1923. He identified himself as delegate of the Pro-Indígena and was accused of instigating the Indians against landowners. The report he wrote in 1923 to the Subprefect had the same handwriting as the letter Maire Colca addressed the Prefect in 1929. Hermenegildo Mansilla was a delegate, from ayllu Anansaya, who became in 1924 President of the Fourth Indigenous Congress held in Lima. (AGN, MI 250, Ap-Cp 1924) In Atuncolla, a Spanish speaking and literate Quechua group compromized with the protection of communal lands had taken over the local bureaucracy to counter gamonal power.

The disappearance of the CPDIT meant in no way the end of peasant mobilization. Even before it disappeared, subcommittees were reinventing themselves with new denominations. These denominations, especially after the repression of the Wancho Lima project in 1924, were increasingly connected to the labor movement. Though maintaining similar goals, mainly education and protection of peasant rights and resources, these new societies made a radical change in strategies. Ethnic discourse was replaced by a social discourse: indigenes could not become citizens so they became peasants. And this new discourse was not geared towards renegotiation a new tributary contract with the State but towards creating new alliances with unionism and the emerging parties that were taking over the political scene. Distrust marked now the character of peasant-state relations. These shifts in the peasant movement marked an abrupt change in the regional dynamic that has been often misunderstood by scholars looking back on the events.

PUNO AFTER 1930

Several authors seem to agree on the fact that in the 1930s the peasant movement practically disappeared or was effectively silenced. For Tamayo, Puno was characterized until 1956 by a “fallacious peace” due peasant apathy:

Pero los campesinos puneños no se rebelan contra el sistema de reciprocidad-servidumbre. Con tal de pastar sus guachos, siguen prestando servicios casi gratuitos a las haciendas como pastores de majadas mejoradas de éstas. Ellos no inician la ruptura de la estructura, y antes bien suceden fenómenos desconcertantes. El cercano, tan próximo, ejemplo boliviano de la expeditiva Reforma Agraria de 1953 no parece afectarlos. No hay un contagio de la experiencia boliviana; los campesinos parecen estar tranquilos por lo menos hasta 1959, y más bien la rebeldía campesina salta al Cuzco, al lejano Valle de La Convención y los campesinos de Puno paradójicamente colocados entre dos experiencias de cambio radical, Bolivía y La Convención, no muestran según aparece de las fuentes ningún fenómeno de organización, rebeldía, o lucha contra la estructura. Están contentos (o por lo menos lo parecen), con el sistema, por eso este periodo lo calificamos como una etapa de falsa paz, porque las contradicciones existen pero han sido limadas, suavizadas, por

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244 The handwriting is excellent and only a few grammatical and spelling errors evidence Quechua origins.

245 In Bolivia, the late eighteenth century indigenous mobilizations had not led to the elimination of leadership and provided a revolutionary tradition and inspiration. Moreover, the geography, that fact that the capital was in the heart of the territory, “forced to a politics of accommodation radically different from the Peruvian situation, where the rebel forces could be isolated and decimated.” (Thorp, Caumartin & Gray-Molina 2006: 471)
una política hábil de los nuevos terratenientes, sobre todo los arequipeños, que mantienen el statu quo con concesiones menores. (Tamayo 1982: 109)

The only insurrection mentioned during this period was the revolt of Huayrapata (Azángaro) against General Sologuren in 1945. According to Mauro Paredes, exalted indigenous masses marched through the streets of Azángaro asking for lands. (Tamayo 1982: 104) Peasants were demonstrating, trying to obtain what they needed through their sheer number not through violence, but this was once more read as revolt. The term revolt was applied because the actors were “irrational” indigenous peasants not workers or more “rational” sectors of society. Tamayo’s perspective of a peasant movement fallen into indolence and unable to connect to the cases of Bolivia and Cusco, responds to a perspective inherited from indigenista and gamonal discourses of the period. The lack of revolts was read as peasant inaction and passive submission.

Where Tamayo saw peasant inertia, Bourricaud saw a period of social changes: the cholification process. There was no nativist movement trying to restore autochthonous customs because being an Indian could only be an insult. Between 1930 and the 1960s, Indians turned into peasants, cholos, aspiring citizens. They just expected to increase their capacity to fight for new spaces in the political system. (Rénique 2004: 179)

Hazen saw this period as a moment of educative change marked by the impressive growth of rural education through private schools, “núcleos escolares campesinos” and literacy campaigns. (Tamayo 1982: 109) The number of literate Indians was on the rise. There was a strong component of Indian voters in the 1931 elections. According to Basadre in 1931, 59.78% of the electorate was mestizo. Mestizos composed the majority that defined the results. The second most important voter population was the indigenous population 24.96% of the electorate. Both groups made up 85% of the electoral universe. (Planas 1994: 245)

In the 1950s, Francois Bourricaud found in Puno the contrast or duality of a shocking stagnation coexisting with an overflowing dynamism. Communities decayed but individual mobilization grew with education, internal migration, seasonal labor, commerce, transportation. Migration activated the process of peasant identity and communal life rearticulation. Unpaid services had disappeared. State lands were administered by local peasant school nuclei. The mobility of land had grown. (Rénique 2004: 147-149) Puno’s peasants kept a practical attitude. In 1965, Edward Dew argued that Puno’s peasants had not followed the taking of haciendas registered in the departments of Cusco, Junin and Pasco because they were headed by their own people on the premises of common economic interests not ideological visions (Hugo Blanco). Puno’s leaders followed a course of less confrontation. (Rénique 2004: 177)

Local leadership remained strong and from 1930 to 1968, Puno’s peasants resumed their search through other political and social alternatives that included international cooperation.

246 “But Punoño peasants did not rebel against the system of reciprocity and serfdom. To keep pasturing their huacchos, they continued to lend almost free services to haciendas as shepherds of improved livestock. They do not initiate the rupture of the structure. Instead surprising phenomena occur. The close, so close, Bolivian example of the expedite Agrarian Reform of 1953 seems not to affect them. There is no contagion of the Bolivian experience; peasants seem calm at least until 1959. Instead, peasant rebelliousness jumps to Cuzco, to the distant Valley of La Convención and Puno’s peasants paradoxically placed between two experiences of radical change, Bolivia and La Convención, show no phenomenon of organization, rebelliousness or fight against the structure according to the sources. They are happy (or at least seem so) with the system. That is why we named this period a period of false peace, because the contradictions exist but they have been polished, softened by a cunning policy of the new landowners, especially Arequipeños, who maintain the status quo with minor concessions.”
(Maryknoll)\textsuperscript{247} and local messianic caudillismo (Cáceres brothers).\textsuperscript{248} (Rénique 2004: 131, 177) As a matter of fact, it was the State who gave the strongest blow to communities. The agrarian reform of the early 1970s, carried out with scarce participation of peasant organizations, left 89\% of the lands and natural pastures in the hands of the associative sector and only 2.5\% in the hands of overpopulated communities. Haciendas were affected but there was no transference of land.\textsuperscript{249} (Rénique 2004: 168-169)

Puno's intense peasant militancy and its ensuing own political developments and experiments will explain the agrarian and even counter-insurgency policies of later governments from the Belaunde's communal support to Alan Garcia's choice of Puno to initiate his counter-subversive offensive. (Rénique 231) From 1982 to 1993, dozens of peasants were victimized for being local leaders or exert some authority. The Shining Path in Puno was more active in the Quechua provinces of the Department (Azángaro, Melgar, Lampa) while Aymaras rejected its advances. (Ramos Zambrano 2003:86)

In the mid 1980s, old peasant discourses resounded to solve the problem of land scarcity among communities. Peasant claimed from Garcia's government the recognition of their ancestors' property titles. They asked to appoint their own judges and municipal authorities, the exoneration of taxes, no administrators nor patrons to communally work the lands and administer them as communal peasants. They wished for protection and recognition while obtaining participation and autonomy. They were appealing once more to a long tradition of partial autonomy, strong local leadership and pragmatism. They claimed the lands of the velasquista cooperatives as they had claimed that of haciendas in the early century. Once again the lack of attention of the government to these claims increased violence (Sendero Luminoso) and forceful land seizures mainly in the Northern pastoral provinces (Azángaro, Melgar, San Román). (Rénique 2004: 282-283) One cannot but wonder at elites' stubborn resistance to listen to the pragmatic voices of Puno's peasantry.

\textsuperscript{247} In the 1960s Puno became the paradise of international philanthropy, concentrating many of the resources of the 'Alianza para el Progreso'. The American congregation of Maryknoll priests arrived in 1950s fostering through their missionaries and their radio Onda Azul a politic of transformation in the consumption patterns.

\textsuperscript{248} The Frenatraca (Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos) was created by lawyer Roger Cáceres, his brothers and other allies of the Department of Puno, mainly in Juliaca. It was a regional political movement with national ambitions. A sector of the regional bourgeoisie took as their own the major symbols of the Tahuantinsuyo, revindicating the Inca empire as model society, using the chullo as electoral distinction, diffusing through private radio Aymara and Quechua music and discussion programs. They won the municipal elections since 1980 controlling up to four of the provinces of Puno and Roger Cáceres was elected Senator. The brothers Cáceres were no real agents of transformation but they incorporated ethnic demands and symbols successfully. (Montoya in Briggs et al 1986: 259)

\textsuperscript{249} Agrarian reform took longer in the Andes and led to some misunderstandings according to Claude Auroi, peasants believed agrarian reform would allow them to recuperate their ancestral lands. They soon noticed however that cooperatives were absorbing parcels of land that had been litigated by haciendas and communities. Many opposed the formation of unions and SAIS (cooperatives); they refused to appoint delegates and sometimes the State functionaries had to force them by closing down schools, blocking state funds and even threatening them to annul their communal property titles. Former colonos showed less resistance, but did reject the idea of letting go their own huaccho cattle in benefit of the cooperative enterprise and they demanded the traditional presents they received from their patron. (Briggs et al 1986: 113-118) In general, Puno's peasants rejected the state capitalism imposed by Velasco Alvarado's military dictatorship. Auroi explains that the attachment of the peasant to old forms of servitude relations did not meant wanting to return to the old system. It was rather an attitude of accumulating advantages offered by each system because they could not identify with either of them. When the expropriation of hacienda lands ended (1975-1976) the fight over land was directed to cooperatives. Cooperatives were constantly maimed of resources by their own members who took cattle, fertilizers, pesticides, tools and food for their personal use. (Briggs et al 1986: 119)
CONCLUSION

Leguía never surrendered his discourse of Indian revindication raising it as a banner to remain in power. It may have been a pragmatic approach to solve the indigenous question but it remained a half-hearted effort subordinated to centralization, modernization and, last but not least, social order. The PRI was revamped and given more funds remaining a paternalist and little efficient organism. The SAI worked mostly as a center of statistics and eugenic studies receiving few petitions for registration of legal communities. Registration was a long, difficult and costly procedure that could rekindle conflicts with neighbors, did not ensure official protection of communal lands and by making lands inalienable and unzisable it made them useless to ask for credits. As Cuzqueño indigenistas Escalante and Valcárcel put it, these institutions were useless paternalist bureaucracies that did nothing to solve the problem of indigenous exploitation. The strengthening of the repressive power of the State did much more than these institutions. It helped quell gamonal abuse. The State banned Adventists but their activities continued almost uninterrupted.

Leguía’s regime had been artificially sustained by massive external financing that was abruptly interrupted after the crisis of 1929. Rising discontent was used by a group of militaries to overthrow Leguía, instauiring a regime that demanded democracy and decentralization but lacked a political program and had no intention of changing traditional structures or disrupting existing institutions. Revolting General Sanchez Cerro demanded free elections and a constituent assembly but maintained literacy as a requisite for voting.

Official indigenista discourses were not abandoned but the alliance with the peasantry was broken. Hacienda expansion had stopped and ethnic citizenship discourses abandoned so the state could pass the pro-indigenous banner to indigenista intellectuals trying to carve their own space in the political sphere. Moral discipline and subordination was expected from rural masses from subsequent regimes that failed to articulate fragments of peasant collective consciousness within a totalizing project of national community.

Indigenista intellectuals did take over the task of producing a national discourse but failed to include peasant discourse and peasants as discursive agents. Puno did produce a generation of organic intellectuals linked to the peasant movement but their leadership decayed after 1924 and only a few individuals continued at the local level with Puno’s indigenista militant tradition. Lawyers like Chukiwampa Ayulo and Quiroga continued to help peasants through their legal practice and joining the new mass political parties formed during this period (Communist Party and APRA). Doctor Manuel Nuñez Butrón developed a practice of social medicine mixing western and curandero medicine in a current called “Rijch’anismo”.

Most indigenistas however took refuge in intellectual ventures developing their pro-indigenous perspectives mostly through literature. In 1926, the Orkopata Group crystallized the end of Puno’s indigenista pragmatism. This group approached the national problematic through an aesthetic vanguardism aimed at producing a national identity that would include indigenous elements and culture. These elements would recuperate the lost cultural coherence and renovate Western culture bringing it out of its decadence. Identifying themselves as indigenes (mimetic representation) they started to speak for the peasantry (political representation), channeling and interpreting peasant discourses and neutralizing their force.

Most of all, Puno’s indigenismo failed to impose a less prejudiced view of the Indian. They failed to embrace the power and strength of indigenous culture and leadership, being thus unable to propose an alternative political project. Peasant mobilization was relegated to a pre-political past of millenarian uprisings. Even long time messengers’ supporter José Antonio Encinas found the
Indian unable to hold the significance of the nation or fatherland. Deprived of a collective consciousness, the Indian remained for most indigenistas a negative element for the formation of the nationality. Indigenous cultures were deemed inferior if not a national threat and western homogenization became the official goal.

By positioning themselves as the “vanguard” situated above peasant political and cultural agency, with literary and scientific tone, indigenistas locked itself into rigid conceptual models and stereotypes that served ideologies, political and intellectual careers. This was evidenced by the literary debate between José Carlos Mariátegui, Luis Alberto Sanchez and many other scholars in Amauta magazine in 1926. This debate over the definition of Indianness and the nature and role of indigenistas could not have been farther from peasant discourses.

Even José Carlos Mariátegui, visionary thinker, founder of the Communist Party and of the General Confederation of Workers was unable to embrace peasant agency in spite of his many contacts with Puno’s indigenistas and peasant leaders such as Ezequiel Urviola and Mariano Lariqo. Mariátegui believed indigenes were in desperate need of cultural and moral redemption and the peasant movement needed the tutoring of union leaders. Indians easily assimilated modern techniques of production yet they had to be protected from contacts with white civilization for they could then become disconnected from their race turning into mestizos exploiting their own race. Indians were to remain in “their place” until able to cope with Western influence and the best way was to form indigenous teachers taught and trained by union leaders. Mariátegui adopted indigenista vocabulary, erasing multiplicity and stressing only unity in oppression. Though focusing on racial identification he acknowledged no cultural revindications, no political goals or strategies, no ideological discourse. Indians were deemed unable to achieve their own liberation. Mariátegui argued against millenarism because it weakened peasant rationality yet appealed to Inca communism to show socialism was not foreign to Peruvian history.

Mariátegui showed any debate over the nation and the State needed to solve first the agrarian question and through his magazine, Amauta, he gave indigenismo a national audience. Still, his contradictory approach to peasant culture and the peasant movement hindered him from developing an ideology that could integrate rural masses. After his death, the Communist Party overcoming its internationalism and its proscription proposed for the presidential election of 1931 the candidacy of Puno’s indigenous intellectual and former messenger Eduardo Quispe Quispe. Its program included the end of feudalism, gamonalismo and exploitation, the repossession of lands by ayllus and the economic and political autonomy of Quechua and Aymara nationalities. Many survivors of Wancho-Lima and the CPDIT supported this symbolic campaign that had little resonance due to the appeal of the other two candidates Sanchez Cerro and Haya de la Torre. These two figures remained disconnected from the peasant adopting the tutelary approach of indigenismo that denied indigenous autonomy and creative capacity. This was the pattern followed by the State all along the century and it explains why the state, not hacendados, became the target of peasant complaints, especially after Velazco Alvarado’s unfortunate agrarian reform.

The peasant movement did not immediately relinquish its quest for ethnic citizenship. After the abolition of the CPDIT, similar institutions sprung both in Lima and in the provinces. By 1923 and especially after the repression of Wancho-Lima, many subcommittees dismembered from the CPDIT forming independent legal associations for the defense of indigenous rights. They maintained old goals of education, local self-government and protection of economic resources but influenced by the syndical movement, they were adopting names such as “federation” and class oriented identification such as “indigenous peasants” or simply “peasants” (campesinos).

By the end of the 1920s, a social identity (peasant or rural worker) had replaced almost completely ethnic identity in grassroots discourses and institutions. The reason was twofold: the
pervasiveness of ethnic stereotypes of Indian backwardness and ignorance and the appeal of the syndical movement. The peasantry surrendered two key political strategies that had characterized their mobilizations since colonial time, ethnic citizenship and state support. These strategies had hindered hacienda expansion over communal lands and increased the presence of the State. They had bought the peasantry time and help in dire situations and had strengthened resistance to abuse. The quest for ethnic citizenship had proved ineffective for political empowerment. Indians could not become politicians and the nation seemed unable to include indigenous citizens.

Peasant intellectuals needed a new social identity and new allies to continue with their work. Messengers’ activism and initiative was not forgotten and fed the local political imaginary. Former messengers however had to join unions, the Communist Party and even the aprista party to maintain their activism and political careers. In some areas they took over the local government to guarantee the protection of communal resources. State-peasant relations were from then on characterized by mutual distrust, a distrust that tuned into opposition after the agrarian reform left most of the lands and natural pastures in the hands of cooperatives depriving overpopulated communities.

Several scholars have depicted the period 1930-1956 as a period peasant passivity and subordination, stressing the indolence of the peasant movement. More positive scholars have seen in this period the progress of social change through cultural miscenagation (Bourricaud’s “cholificacion”) and education (Hazen). I would argue that the apparent peace of the region was produced by the changing strategies. Mobilizations were not led by “irrational Indians” but by “organized peasants” thus they were not seen as revolts but as protests and strikes. Moreover, the leadership of peasant intellectuals remained strong, controlling local governments and following pragmatic interests, not ideological visions. Partial autonomy was ensured not through confrontations but through alliances with international cooperation (Maryknoll) and local messianic caudillos (Cáceres brothers in Juliaca). This strong leadership and pragmatism, mainly in Aymara areas, would explain the only relative success of the Shining Path in Puno and why Alan García’s first government chose this department to initiate its counter-subversive offensive.
CONCLUSIONS

In the early 1900, Puno's peasants faced a dire situation. The growth of the wool market placed a strong pressure first on their labor and marketable resources then on their communal lands. Due to the productive system reigning in Puno, the _hacendado_ sector could only increase its profits by encroaching onto peasant labor and resources. And so it did through forced sales of wool at half the market price, growing demands for unpaid labor, aggressive or illegal usurpations of land, and the extraction of peasant incomes through arbitrary contributions. This added to the serious imbalance between population and resources that was exacerbating the long process of deterioration of peasant livelihood and weakening communal solidarity, a long time shield against _hacendados'_ covetousness. Puno's indigenous peasantry, deprived of voting rights since 1896, had no political power and was devoid of the protection the colonial tributary pact had granted it. Local elites were closing down their circle of power and abuse.

Old strategies (court litigation, local negotiations and open disobedience) were not enough anymore to resist growing encroachment. New strategies were needed and communities mobilized led by the more educated, wealthy and hurt sectors. Aware of the roles and needs of the State, these peasant intellectuals established personal links with the Executive power trying to renegotiate a tributary pact. _Hacendados_ used racialized arguments of civilization and nationhood to reject indigenous integration in order to maintain their socio-economic and political status. Peasants used racialized arguments of civilization and nationhood to obtain State protection and the granting of rights. They presented themselves as tax-paying, hard working ethnic citizens unfairly deprived of their rights and in need for a special treatment from the State. They were betting on education as a long term goal since education would give them voting rights and equality before the law. The multiplicity of indigenous initiatives and fastness of their responses to favorable conditions showed their ability to build interclass alliances and participate in the national political arena and in the project of nation-building beyond their need for autonomy and security.

Indian political mobilizations gained coherence and organization with the activities of locally elected messengers helped by pro-indigenous organizations and intellectuals (teachers, lawyers and journalists). Indigenous initiatives created a huge pressure on middle classes and progressive sectors creating in Puno a militant indigenista movement that tried to support peasant initiatives. This peasant-indigenista dialogue produced strong claims in favor of rural education and discourses trying to equilibrate the cultural endowment of a country bridged by cultural differences too easily exploited for the benefit of particular minorities. Calls for an unprejudiced society and social justice as a first step towards education promoted State support for rural education but did not consistently help peasant efforts creating for example a bilingual education project to be applied in communal private schools. More practical help arrived with strong proactive organizations like the Adventist Church. These allies helped the peasantry form the teachers needed for the schools they had built with their own resources, without the support of the State.

The Civilista government showed its concern with the educative reform of 1903, the creation of a Normal School and constant decrees prohibiting unpaid labor and arbitrary contributions. But it was not until 1919 that messengers managed to negotiate a new pact with the State that supported Indian claims. Eager to modernize the country and find a definite solution to the “indigenous problem”, Augusto Leguía recognized communal lands, created official pro-indigenous organism (Bureau of Indigenous Affairs, Patronato de la Raza Indígena), sent investigative commissions, authorized and even supported the creation of a peasant led national organization for the defense of indigenous rights, the _Comité Pro Derecho Indígena Tahuantsuyu_. This institution created by and for Indians aimed at empowering Indian constituencies through education, diffusing pro-
indigenous legislation and even creating indigenous towns and markets (free of mistis) such as Wancho Lima in Huancané. 1922, the year of foundation of a large number of subcommittees marked the culmination of a peasant-state pact.

Gamonal sectors reacted to all of this accusing peasant messengers and their communities of a wide range of charges that included violence, racial discrimination, cannibalism, treason to the nation, millenarism, gullibility to outsiders' manipulation, heresy, anarchism and communism. Through these accusations, they turned peaceful peasant political mobilizations into anti-white revolts justifying waves of private and official repression that produced several violent incidents. Millenarism was a hegemonic tool used by ruling elites and intellectuals to create a national consciousness or identity but also to deny Indians access to that identity. The fear of a privileged minority and the pervasiveness of racial categories reifying the Indian as savage and uncivilized when acting collectively and ignorant, submissive and immoral when alone, hindered the task of messengers demanding citizenship and individual rights.

And yet peasant fights were never more ideologically coherent than before the 1930s. In the late nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century, peasant political discourse grew in coherence and strength based on set demands that included the protection of peasant labor, resources (land, cattle, wool production) and private schools. The ultimate goal of Indian citizens was not to become urban mestizos but to maintain their livelihood and customs while having free access to the market and the State as literate and thus voting individuals. Their dependence on cultural mediators further undermined recognition of their agency. Puno’s messengers continued however with their initiatives and mobilization supported by a pragmatic and organic local indigenismo concerned with mounting abuse and social tension. Puno’s indigenista movement, though eclectic (deprived of a university or party to direct it), produced many intellectuals and professionals that became practically involved in the daily toil of indigenous leaders.

These peasant-middle class alliances allowed for some improvement of the situation. The peasant movement, however, was unable to imprint upon the State and national society its own definition of Indian citizenship. The term mestizo was used to negate Indians an intellectual condition. Their place on society was set by a racial definition linking Indianness to illiteracy and irrationality. (De la Cadena 2000: 124-125) Peasant leaders failed to impose their own definition of Indianness mainly for three reasons. First of all, granting full citizen rights to indigenous majorities was not convenient for the State. Ruling elites tried to create modernity through an “ambiguous internalization of the indigenous other”. They did not aim at miscegenation but at a bi-cultural (Indian/White) neocolonial nation. Indians were to be pushed to the margins of modern economy as labor force but maintained outside the nation as political subjects. (Larson 2002: 35) The State was unable to firmly answer the claims of the peasant movement because it was stuck in an economic growth based on pre-capitalist forms of exploitation and administration. It fostered peasant claims to quell the power of local elites and to monopolize the peasant labor force. Leguía’s pro-indigenous policy opened only ephemeral channels between the peasantry and the bureaucracy. The initial enthusiasm of his indigenista administration spread to a few provincial capitals but was unable to develop but in bureaucratic organisms that followed the path to decadence of the regime. (Lynch 1979: XX)

In a second instance, few indigenista allies were able to propel changes connecting the movement to the necessary instances of power. The ignorance of state officials and political caciquismo made more difficult the initiative of indigenista professionals and many were force to revert or change their activities to counter these elements and accusations of populist manipulation. Many of them were unable to espouse peasant views and expectations and were
incapable of representing the movement. Indigenistas were unable to help Puno’s messengers reach the necessary levels of power to support or negotiate their proposals, mainly because they refused to fully acknowledge peasant agency.

Finally, deprived of even the most basic political power (vote) and in need of connecting to the State, peasants developed political and rhetoric strategies recalling a colonial tributary pact that guaranteed them protection over land and resources. As indigenous citizens they had maintained the State and defended the Nation. As indigenous citizens they were willing to build and maintain their own schools and roads hoping they would in exchange obtain justice and guarantees over their resources and schools and free access to the market. Their rhetoric was however not successful, mainly because it remained stuck in an ambivalent discourse that went back and forth from empowerment to victimism and fell once and again in a paternalist, patron-client model. The use of a victimist-paternalist discourse prevented peasant leaders from establishing lasting political representation beyond the local level. It was the form of the discourse not the arguments that failed. Though traditional authorities were losing power and old forms of communal political organization were breaking down, traditional forms of discourse remained in the repertory hindering the recognition of peasant agency. The new generation of leaders formed in the early 1920s, during the height of the CPDIT brought about new kinds of initiatives but also fell also prey of radical discourses that produced internal differences breaking the movement’s cohesion.

To be sure, the peasant movement managed to detain land usurpations helped by a crisis of the wool market and a larger presence of the State. The State maintained its indigenista discourse while trying to have a better hold of the area both militarily (controlling peasant movements and gamonal armies) and administratively (taking over school and tax collection). This demonstrates the importance Puno gained in this period not only for economic reason but also for its social mobilization. However, the peasant movement was unable to impress upon the government and national society the image of an indigenous citizen. Peasant intellectuals had to make some discursive and practical changes showing once more their rational pragmatism and their ability to cope with change. They started to identify themselves as “campesinos” (peasants) looking for new alliances with unionism and emerging political parties. They avoided self-reference as Indians to develop an empowered identity. (De la Cadena 2000: 311)

Their fight as indigenous messengers was not forgotten. Local organizations of defense inherited the experiences of messengers and organizations such as the CPDIT and continued to fight for the defense of peasant rights. The State and later intellectuals and politicians recuperated their arguments. The ideas of José Carlos Mariátegui owe much to Puneño messengers and intellectuals as well as the CPDIT. In Puno, oral history kept messengers alive. And the results of their battles built on as private and public schools spread all over the countryside and leadership passed from generation to generation. Puno inherited from them a tradition of strong and pragmatic peasant leadership and ethnic identity.
GLOSSARY

**Alcalde**  Indigenous officeholder in charge of local jails.
**Alguacil**  Indigenous officeholder in charge of maintaining local order.
**Arrieraje**  Service transporting goods with mules and human porters.
**Arroba**  Spanish weight of 25 pounds or 11.5 kilograms.*
**Ayllu**  Pre-Hispanic Andean social unit based on kinship; Indian peasant community.*
**Caudillismo**  Authoritarian leadership based on social, economic and military clienteles.
**Chancaca**  Raw brown sugar.
**Chalona**  Dried and salted carcass of a sheep.*
**Chaqueo**  Requisition of indigenous transport animals for official (or personal) use.
**Chuño**  Freeze-dried potatoes.*
**Civilista**  Member of or relating to the Civil Party.
**Colono**  Hacienda worker
**Compadrazgo**  Symbolic kinship parent-godparent.
**Faena**  Task or toil.
**Finca**  Medium size property owned by a peasant or mestizo.
**Hacendado**  Owner of one or more large estates.
**Hilacata**  Main authority of a parcialidad.
**Huaccho**  Livestock belonging to hacienda colonos usually of a lower quality than hacienda livestock.
**Mandón**  Local indigenous authority.
**Mestizo**  Métis, half-breed.
**Misti**  Aymara derivation of the word mestizo.
**Mita**  Pre-Hispanic and colonial system of draft labor.*
**Mitani**  Indian peasant woman doing domestic service in the household of a local authority or estate owner on a rotational basis.*
**Montonera**  Group of revolutionary horsemen.
**Parcialidad**  Moiety; Indian peasant community.*
**Pongo**  Male Indian peasant doing domestic service in the household of a local authority or estate owner on a rotational basis.*
**Propio**  Unpaid service as mail deliverer demanded from communal Indians.
**Pututo**  Trumpet made from a sea conch used to announce events.
**Quintal**  A hundredweight; 4 arrobas or 46 kilograms.*
**Quipo**  Colono in charge of watching over hacienda borders and livestock.
**Real**  Small coin of five cents.
**Reparto**  Forced sale of wool at prices under market value.
**Rescatista**  Local wool trader.
**Segunda**  Main Indian authority of a parcialidad or ayllu.
**Sisa**  Amount paid by head of cattle pasturing in communal lands.
**Tasa**  Head tax.
**Totora**  Natural reeds growing in the Lake Titicaca.
**Vara**  Staff or wand emblem of authority.
**Yanasis**  Lands set aside for the payment of fees to religious and civil authorities.

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