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**Meditations in the Mirror:  
A Return to the Undetermined Animal**

A Thesis Presented

by

**Annie Lynn Smalley**

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Abstract of the Thesis

**Meditations in the Mirror:  
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My aim is to try and discover what it would mean to see from an animal perspective, which is the animal perspective that I once had before my training and the animal perspective buried deep within me waiting to return. Since this animal perspective is weakened by the process of domestication (it is starved), I am very much interested in discovering what it is, what it would be to perceive as an animal, what possibilities does this potentiality have to offer and whether this is the animal that always should have evolved. The animal within can only respond to these questions through a three step translation process that gives it voice: unlearning, relearning and learning. And this process will reveal the details to what it means to be animal—a mode of being honest, involved in non-apophantic logos, and constituted within a cyclical time.

The first part of my investigation will be concerned with unlearning, which reveals that I am a corpse rotting under the values of ghosts. These values no longer give me comfortable answers to the question “Who am I?”<sup>1</sup>; and as a result, I am prompted to

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<sup>1</sup> The question that haunts the mind of the human, and a question that could be said to constitute the essence of the human being. This question is the question that constitutes the human being as an undetermined

look for that which I have been taught to put aside—the animal. I need to go back through the history of philosophy to understand the fetters that have been shackled onto the animal within me. Understanding this past helps uncover the lies that must be unlearned so that truth can be revealed. I hear the faint cries of the animal within me as I strain to perceive both this animal and as this animal. The training that has caused this beast within to be restrained needs to be understood for unlearning to take place and the animal to be revealed. Unlearning is the process of stripping one bare; of peeling away the layers of certainty to reveal an undetermined animal...a naked animal. To unlearn what one has been taught to be certain, essential, determinant, the answer. To unlearn this reveals the human animal in its origins...its nakedness. Only by becoming naked will I begin to become animal.

And from this point (if one wishes to be true to one's self, if one wants to become animal) the undetermined animal needs to reconstitute itself with several elements, one of which is honesty. Honesty is one of three fundamentals discussed in this paper that helps ground the mode of animal being. It is a virtue that will be developed more fully in the part "to follow,"<sup>2</sup> as I look to Jacques Derrida to help open a space where the weakened, undetermined animal can develop itself through the powers of honesty and the non-apophantic.

The second part of this investigation (the one that *follows*) will conjure the ghost of Derrida to elucidate this process of unlearning, of stripping one's self down to nakedness, as well as emphasize the importance of the afore mentioned fundamentals that will help one to become and remain animal. Analyzing the honesty and non-apophantic emphasize the second part of the translation process, which is that of relearning. Derrida will represent a movement from unlearning to relearning.

The camel-lion (chameleon) Derrida goes from the beast of burden (carrying Descartes, Heidegger and others) to the beast of prey, which has the courage to be undetermined.<sup>3</sup> The beast of prey has the courage to strip off its clothing and be naked. To break free from the shackles and announce its presence...a presence that needs to be nursed back to health. Derrida is this lion that has the courage to destroy his past and assumes the above two characteristics of the animal that need to be relearned; characteristics that the human animal once possessed but must relearn in order to understand itself as animal. These characteristics are necessary if one is to be a lion or an eagle that follows itself, which is to say an animal that follows its undetermined self...instead of being the animal that follows after.<sup>4</sup>

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animal. Though this question has existed since the origins of philosophy, Descartes is probably the one philosopher to give notoriety to this question. See his *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993. See p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to a theme running throughout Jacques Derrida's work *The Animal That Therefore I am*. Translated by David Willis. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Derrida is the perfect example to allude to Nietzsche's metamorphosis of spirit from camel to lion. This can be found in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Clancy Martin (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2005), 25.

<sup>4</sup> For more of this notion of following the self, look to Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*. One can find this specifically on p. 18, though it is a theme referred to throughout this work. I contrast this notion with Derrida's theme of the human following after the animal in *The Animal*.

Derrida's invocation of the above two fundamentals in the space his "might"<sup>5</sup> creates has pointed me to look for that which would allow these constitutive elements to be internalized and practiced. A time, as Derrida suggests, that has been put aside.<sup>6</sup> A time that he does not have time to investigate in *The Animal That Therefore I am*. I began to wonder what time would constitute an animal way of being, a time necessary to remain honest and practice non-apophantic logos. After reading Derrida, I turned to Friedrich Nietzsche's notion of cyclical time to consummate my investigation into the relearning process necessary to become animal. I turned to Nietzsche to expand my narrow perspective on the animal mode of being.

Indeed, Derrida's whole text *The Animal That Therefore I am* reminded me of Nietzsche. An echoing throughout the abyss. Throughout Nietzsche, there appears to be a call to adopt both the non-apophantic and honesty in order to become animal. Why do I say a call to the non-apophantic and honesty? Because it appears the apophantic and other tools of the "reason-spider"<sup>7</sup> can cause us to kill ourselves and our life-world with certainty. With lies that prevent us from being honest.

I realized that I was hearing this call through his account of the cyclical. In this third part of my investigation, I plan to reveal the connection between honesty, non-apophantic logos and cyclical time—three fundamentals that constitute animality "as such."<sup>8</sup> A constitution that Zarathustra has whispered in my ear as he lures me from the herd in order to become the animal that follows itself.

I will argue that in order to understand the nature of honesty and the non-apophantic in animal being, a notion of cyclical time needs to be relearned and internalized. Cyclical time allows one to remain in this mode of honesty because it allows one to be in this state of return to uncertainty, to the undetermined. It leaves no room for lying. The non-apophantic, insofar as it is not linguistic, would reinforce these two elements by offering a logos that does not require deceit. Only with this structure can we begin to "give birth"<sup>9</sup> to the animal and begin the child's phase of Nietzsche's metamorphosis. A phase that allows one to live as the animal one should have been all along. A phase that allows one to realize we are dead without being the animal we are. A phase that enables us to constantly learn anew to maintain a mode of being the "undetermined animal"<sup>10</sup> that we are. A learning to follow the undetermined.

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<sup>5</sup> The might of the lion...see Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, 26.

<sup>6</sup> This is the question that he states Heidegger set aside. See *The Animal*, 22 and 44.

<sup>7</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Clancy Martin (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2005), 143.

<sup>8</sup> A reference to Heidegger's way of referring to the essence of animality. See his *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 186.

<sup>9</sup> A reference to Donna Wilshire's work *Virgin Mother Crone: Myths and Mysteries of the Triple Goddess* (Vermont: Inner Traditions International, Ltd., 1994), 97. 'Give birth' refers to "She gave birth to ANIMALS!", which is a phrase I think Nietzsche would have enjoyed.

<sup>10</sup> Being undetermined is what I would like to argue as the fundamental essence of human animality "as such." I am using and expanding upon Nietzsche's idea that man is the "as yet undetermined animal" he mentions in "Beyond Good and Evil," in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufman, (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), 264.

So I will begin my process of unlearning and attempt to invoke the courage needed for honesty, for animal eyes (the courage to look in my mirror at a corpse) and read what my mirror tells me...

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## **Meditations in the Mirror: Investigation into Self Conjunction**

I look into my mirror—that symbol of vanity, magic, and deceit—and I try to extinguish my urge to command my dearest to conjure up the fairest one of all. I am dumbfounded by the struggle to put this tool to a new use. I wish I had Nietzsche's hundred-faced mirror to focus all the fragmented parts into a smooth image.<sup>1</sup> As of now I am one of Picasso's paintings.

I want it to *honestly* reflect that which is looking into it. However, this can only happen if I learn to *honestly* look into it. What is looking back? How do I go about this? How do I interpret this image? How do I see it “as such,”<sup>2</sup> and keep from putting it into a predetermined definition? How can I learn to do this? Or do I need to unlearn and relearn?<sup>3</sup>

I try not to turn this mirror into my pocket mirror, the one I usually carry with me in order to occasionally look into and reaffirm my old skin of values.<sup>4</sup> The one I look into to reaffirm the portrait already painted. I try to keep my familiar at bay (that damn demon), my past at bay, my past experience with this tool at bay in order to perceive myself in the present...in presence. I try to perceive that which I put aside. Society's doppelganger looks back at me with a wrathful glare trying to do its evil. I must persevere and keep commonality at bay so that the truth can emerge.

Philosophy has always talked about the animal as opposed to the human animal. I have been trained that humans are part of the animal kingdom, but not. They have risen above it. Humans are and are not animal; they are something more. I have been trained to look into the mirror at a human, to see as a human. If only I could have the eagle's vision. Only then could I stop this human seeing of assimilation, this surface seeing.

But how can I be something and not something at the same time? What would it mean to look at an animal in the mirror, which would mean I would have to look as an animal? And of course here I play with the double meaning of look...to look as in seeing and to look as in assimilate. How do I look with my animal soul? I guess to do this I will have to quit the dressage and learn to dance.<sup>5</sup>

What really interests me in this possibility? The idea that I am nothing without my animal, our animals. Could this be true? Looking at the nihilistic and skeptical trends throughout philosophy (which aim to be serious<sup>6</sup>), I begin to believe this is so. The weight of constantly carried old values causes one to feel lost, dead. Zarathustra carrying the dead rope-walker<sup>7</sup>...minus the wisdom of Zarathustra. This weight has been too much on me and has caused me to return to why philosophy interests me so much, i.e. what in it speaks to me so much without ever having said a word.

Philosophy first interested me by giving me answers. The feeling of arrogance was exhilarating as I learned to see myself as a thinking thing, a thing working to perfect reason so that I could more ably understand truth. Coming from a background of *manual*

*craftsmen*, the idea of becoming a *master craftsman* with a God's eye was quite seducing.<sup>8</sup> It gave purpose. It took away what I took myself to be and gave me that which allowed me to question what I am...who I am. Philosophy gave the false hope that I could become this master craftsman—but only through perfecting my ability to reason...to determine. This perfecting only caused me to keep running after philosophers past dead...Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Heidegger to name a few. I was not taught how to follow myself.<sup>9</sup> I kept running after the rabbit in all seriousness, grew exhausted and gave up. The nihilism set in the more I was walking the rope the Fate's weaved for me...and I realized I was already dead. I need to laugh to revive myself.<sup>10</sup>

I now want the silence of the animal, the animal that follows itself. That laughing wild dog that is trapped within the cellars of my soul.<sup>11</sup> The animal I have domesticated with my discourse...my dis-course from myself towards my death. The dis-course that causes all to rot as one is trapped within an environment of old created values. Rotting fruit past its expiration date. Language is a game that has become all too serious. A trap that makes me feel like the decaying mouse that has been caught in its springs. I would rather learn how to laugh like my hyena sisters and ruminate like the cow.<sup>12</sup> Such a perspective would keep me chasing life and not death, the end, the determinant. Such a perspective would keep me chasing myself, the child that I am (or could be) and not after dead corpses. I would rather be the eagle, flying above the abyss, always returning to search and spy what it might spit out. And with the eagle's hunger and its talons,<sup>13</sup> I would feast on these new stars. Indeed, I would rather have this eagle's "captivation"<sup>14</sup> to devour prey, never reaching satiety. I would rather get lost in the exhilaration of the chase and live life as a game of chance. I would rather be the animal that lives by creating, pro-activity, building and destroying, building and destroying, moving to and fro, to and fro...rather than walking a straight line, down a path that has already been walked before.

I now wish to see this animal in the mirror, but must still unlearn. The roses that decorate my mirror remind me of Apuleius's Lucius and his search to transform himself back into himself. Two types of transformation are placed in front of me as I encounter Isis: a return to my old form- either the human or the animal. Hopefully I have not given myself completely over to asinanity.<sup>15</sup> I am feeling this way right now and am wondering if I will find my roses. Can this mirror give these to me? Can it be my Isis, my savior? Can I release myself from the prison of this corpse and return myself to my true form? Is this perhaps an animal form, an animal body? And even if I were to find and repossess this body, what would this mean? How does a domesticated animal unlearn, relearn, and learn how to live like a wild animal? I shall continue to scry through the fragments as the images emerge from this mirror.

I wonder if that philosopher sitting in front of his fire felt as I do now. What would he have discovered if he had looked into a mirror instead of that fire? Of course looking into the flame is another way to divine; and its conjurations a little more different and difficult to read.

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My aim, therefore, is to try and discover what it would mean to see from an animal perspective, which is the animal perspective that I once had before my training and the animal perspective buried deep within me waiting to return. Since this animal

perspective is weakened by the process of domestication (it is starved), I am very much interested in discovering what it is, what it would be to perceive as an animal, what possibilities does this potentiality have to offer and whether this is the animal that always should have evolved. The animal within can only respond to these questions through a three step translation process that gives it voice: unlearning, relearning and learning. And this process will reveal the details to what it means to be animal—a mode of being honest, involved in non-apophantic logos, and constituted within a cyclical time.

The first part of my investigation will be concerned with unlearning, which reveals that I am a corpse rotting under the values of ghosts. These values no longer give me comfortable answers to the question “Who am I?”<sup>16</sup>; and as a result I am prompted to look for that which I have been taught to put aside—the animal. I need to go back through the history of philosophy to understand the fetters that have been shackled onto the animal within me. Understanding this past helps uncover the lies that must be unlearned so that truth can be revealed. I hear the faint cries of the animal within me as I strain to perceive both this animal and as this animal. The training that has caused this beast within to be restrained needs to be understood for unlearning to take place and the animal to be revealed. Unlearning is the process of stripping one bare; of peeling away the layers of certainty to reveal an undetermined animal...a naked animal. To unlearn what one has been taught to be certain, essential, determinant, the answer. To unlearn this reveals the human animal in its origins...its nakedness. Only by becoming naked will I begin to become animal.

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Indeed, Derrida's whole text *The Animal That Therefore I am* reminded me of Nietzsche. An echoing throughout the abyss. Throughout Nietzsche, there appears to be a call to adopt both the non-apophantic and honesty in order to become animal. Why do I say a call to the non-apophantic and honesty? Because it appears the apophantic and other tools of the "reason-spider"<sup>22</sup> can cause us to kill ourselves and our life-world with certainty. With lies that prevent us from being honest.

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I will argue that in order to understand the nature of honesty and the non-apophantic in animal being, a notion of cyclical time needs to be relearned and internalized. Cyclical time allows one to remain in this mode of honesty because it allows one to be in this state of return to uncertainty, to the undetermined. It leaves no room for lying. The non-apophantic, insofar as it is not linguistic, would reinforce these two elements by offering a logos that does not require deceit. Only with this structure can we begin to "give birth" to the animal<sup>24</sup> and begin the child's phase of Nietzsche's metamorphosis. A phase that allows one to live as the animal one should have been all along.

One learns that one needs to develop the virtue honesty, internalize cyclical time and develop non-apophantic logos. These three elements are the grounds that allow the animal to reemerge and enter into a final stage of metamorphosis...that of the child that creates the new from these fundamental elements that constitutes its being. The act of creation, of procreation, of beginnings is the mode of being that is enabled through relearning the above three elements. This mode of being is an animal mode of being that allows one to remain and maintain this state of being. A mode of being that allows one to be a living organism instead of a corpse of values long past dead. We are dead, i.e., we are nothing without being the animal we are. A phase that allows one to realize we are dead without being the animal we are. A phase that enables us to constantly learn anew to maintain a mode of being the "undetermined animal"<sup>25</sup> that we are. A learning to follow the undetermined.

So I will begin my process of unlearning and attempt to invoke the courage needed for honesty, for animal eyes (the courage to look in my mirror at a corpse) and read what my mirror tells me...

## Fenrir

I fear me much...that if ye once bind me so fast that I shall be unable to free myself by my own efforts, ye will be in no haste to unloose me. Loath am I, therefore, to have this cord wound round me.<sup>1</sup>

—The Prose Edda

According to Norse myth, Fenrir is the great wolf that has been tricked into bondage.<sup>2</sup> At the end of the world (the Norse Ragnarok), he will break free and aid his father Loki in its destruction. Fenrir is the perfect metaphor for the domestication of man. Fenrir was raised by Tyr, the Norse God of war and at birth enrolled in the process of domestication. This process of domestication was the gods' attempt to prevent his destined destructive nature, a nature that would destroy their order. Domestication to train and thus chain him. Despite the hope of such domestication, the gods knew Fenrir's wild nature would eventually cause them harm. For the wild within every living thing's heart can never be tamed. The current chain of domestication was not heavy enough to inhibit his growth. So they devised a new plan; one that would shackle Fenrir to the heaviest chain ever devised. They lured him into a game of strength against three fetters (in order from weakest to strongest): Leyding, Dromi, and Gleipnir.

*Leyding.* The first fetter that was made to break. But as we shall see, it did not break. The Greeks produced this fetter by cultivating and creating the virtue reason, which could be said to define this period. Looking at the origins of this virtue will allow us to see those elements of it that have caused the human being to live after death—as a rotting corpse. Noble and innocent as the intentions of these philosophers were, child-like in their originality, something else grew to prevent the destruction of Leyding. Something else that caused reason to exist past its date of expiration—the idea of perfection.

Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were children of this time, which was a time that equated reason with the soul and the body with poison...a poison that prevents the perfection of the soul on its way to truth. It is a time that divides body and soul and favors reason over instinct. These were the games of this period...

The Socratic dialogues of Plato are filled with such thoughts on the separation of soul and body. Much is dedicated to this topic in the *Phaedo*, but can be seen elsewhere throughout the dialogues. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates' discussion with Simmias shows the philosopher's opinion that the soul is the discoverer of knowledge, as opposed to the body. Socrates states that the senses are not "clear and accurate," and that "when it tries to investigate anything with the help of the body, it is obviously led astray."<sup>3</sup> From this

Socrates concludes that “in despising the body and avoiding it, and endeavoring to become independent—the philosopher’s soul is ahead of all the rest.”<sup>4</sup> With this belief, it is no wonder Plato thought philosophers should be kings. But do not mistake this line of thinking to be doctrine, for it is still children’s play. A question-and-answer guessing game. A playing with possibilities.

Another example that relates the body’s corruption of the soul can be found in *The Republic*, which will be pertinent in our later analysis of Nietzsche’s subversion of it. Though Plato should not be accused of malice, those who carried his idea past fruition should. The following is the origin of such ideas on human superiority; an origin that Nietzsche will want to attack in order to destroy this foundation. In this text, Plato gives a description of how the pleasures of the body keep the individual from transcending.

Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to feasting and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle, grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights, and in their greed kicking and butting one another with horns and hoofs of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part of their souls.<sup>5</sup>

The body is seen as a shackle preventing humans from experiencing true knowledge. The being “swept downward and back again” of life or the “roaming to and fro” in life is seen as that which prevents transcending. Those who choose to live this way, obeying their bodily inclinations, are animals. The “roaming to and fro” is not seen as a positive way of being, i.e. being lead by whatever arises by chance. Reason is constantly at work in these dialogues to restrain, if not sever itself, from bodily inclinations. In trying to establish and cultivate this line of thought, that reason is definitive of the human being, the body is set aside...for it inhibits the growth of reason. Ironically, the coming periods of philosophy can be seen as feasting cattle as these periods rot under the old value of reason. Philosophers of these periods are then seen to be the lowest of animals, especially when Nietzsche subverts this old value by turning it on its head...showing its nakedness; but more of this to follow.

This hierarchical placement of man is developed further more in Aristotle. Aristotle continues this tradition of human superiority via reason; but he sees the soul’s connection to the body as necessary in order to cultivate one’s reason. He thinks rationality is that element of the soul that is unique to the human being.<sup>6</sup> The superiority of certain individuals is based on the fact that they are able to recognize the reason something is something, rather than something just being so; just as the master craftsman

has the natural tendency to recognize the cause of something, the manual craftsman does not recognize but produces from habit. Manual craftsman are “inanimate things that produce without knowing what they produce.”<sup>7</sup> In short, machines (which is very relevant when looking at Descartes later). These inanimate things look very much like the corpses we will encounter.

The *De Anima* and *Politics* show Aristotle’s views on the human’s superiority over all living things. This helps him to give the human meaning...something of certainty. In *De Anima*, Aristotle states that “finally and more rarely, some have reasoning and understanding. For perishable things that have reasoning also have all the other parts of the soul; but not all of those that have each of the other parts also have reasoning—on the contrary, some animals lack appearance, while some live by appearance alone.”<sup>8</sup> This statement shows his typical classificatory style and the establishment of the human as that animal with something extra...reason. This is an important characteristic in the human that allows it the power to control its appetites. The human is the only animal, so it appears, able to do this. Aristotle thinks that the “soul rules the body with the authority of a master: reason rules the appetite with the authority of a statesman or a monarch.”<sup>9</sup> It is beneficial for the body to be ruled by the soul and the affective part of the soul to be ruled by reason. Reason is the one thing that helps the human to survive, so it is beneficial in promoting its well-being. Reason helps to preserve the human, which is why it is necessary for reason to rule its appetites. Aristotle stresses this in the *Politics*: “tame animals have a better nature than wild, and it is better for all such animals that they should be ruled by man because they then get the benefit of preservation.”<sup>10</sup> To give one’s self over to a master, for Aristotle, is therefore more beneficial. Much better to give one’s body over to reason than to follow one’s own inclinations...the body’s will. The more power reason has over one’s self, the more one can maintain order by restraining disruption. Since human reason is still viewed as the indicator of superiority, Plato is still seen haunting Aristotle. But like Plato, Aristotle should not be blamed for his blind eye toward that which has been set aside. He did bring the soul back to the body, even if the former is thought superior. He is still inventing with a child’s heart. He, as well as Plato before him, is still playing with the “Who am I?”.

*Dromi*. The next fetter placed on the human animal to ensure its imprisonment was Christianity. This was the fetter that produced the illusion that the human was freed from ancient uncertainty. No more playing with ideas and investigating. No more not knowing thyself. So the human grabbed hold of this reason that the ancients developed and dressed it in doctrine, in the guise of God. Reason was made *indubitably* certain by the image of God. The human was only freed from uncertainty when it allowed itself to be chained by reason. God was this fetter that freed the human from uncertainty, but dammed it to be a corpse. The game being played with reason was becoming serious.

Dromi freed the human being from Leyding, only to tighten itself onto the leg of the animal. Dromi deluded the human into thinking that God was this reason the ancients were searching for...that it was God that the ancients lacked in order to solve the meaning that was the human being. God the father that told man who he was, what he was...a being created in his image. A copy.

There was no return to that which had been set aside—the body. This lack of return prevented any new development or cultivation of new values. The human only wished to move forward, linearly, to become what it was certain of...God through death. But the more one moved beyond one's self toward this certainty, the more that which was set aside applied pressure to contradict it. The pleasures of the body had to be damned to deceive the human into believing in pleasures after death...pleasures defined by the ability to achieve a state of pure intelligibility. The use of reason in the quest of truth allowed the human to achieve a state of pure intelligibility in death—a divine state definitive of God. Reason allowed one to return to God. Therefore, the view of the body as corruption also grew into this doctrine to help maintain the certainty necessary in knowing thyself.

Thus, the human became the mediocre.<sup>11</sup> A being of enduring and waiting, a being of inaction, a being of no will. The promise of becoming one's predestined self caused the human to die before it could ever live. The gap between the animal and the human became greater as the human being became a corpse. The cyclical time of being that will be discussed later was further buried as linear time was internalized as part of one's constitution.

Such thinkers that felt the weight of the corruptible body and uncertainty were Augustine and John Scotus Eriugena. These thinkers took the teachings of the Greeks and translated the human being into Christian doctrine to ensure the certainty of the human's nature. They looked into the abyss, demonized Fenrir, and covered the shame felt in the face of uncertainty by looking up toward the one thing made certain by them—God. The fear caused by uncertainty resulted in a fear being induced about the dangers of not evolving one's self to a state of divinity. Augustine helps to establish this tradition by creating fear of the abyss by writing, "By the one term, rational, humans are distinguished from brute animals; by the other term, mortal, they are distinguished from God. Therefore, unless it holds fast to the rational element, it will be a beast; unless it turns aside from the mortal element, it will not be divine."<sup>12</sup> Platonic ideas of the immortal soul hindered by a brute body that prevents the exercising of reason influence Christian doctrine, as well as Aristotle's categorizing the human above animal as a result of its reasoning capabilities. Reason and the immortality of the soul complement each other in defining the human, making its nature certain. A nature that must be chosen if one is not to become a beast. One must chose to develop his or her divine nature or be damned to the passions of the body and live a short, brute life. Fear is induced in order to determine human nature as that which has the potentiality to be divine if one can avoid the tempting passions of the body.

Eriugena continues this line of thinking by stating:

For we observe in man not a few things which neither reason understands nor authority transmits to subsist in angel. For instance there is this animal body which, according to Holy Scripture, was attached to the human soul even before the Transgression; there is the fivefold bodily exterior sense; there are the phantasies of sensible objects, which through the sense enter into the soul; there are the perplexity and difficulty which

delay the reason's enquiries in the nature of the Universe; the painful industry which it requires to discriminate between vice and virtue; and very many other things of that sort.<sup>13</sup>

The animal body “delays” the evolution of the human into a rational and divine being. These thinkers are creating a spell to translate the human out of nature and into doctrine. To translate the human out of uncertainty into determinant beings. To translate the human out of the body and into “the Word.” The tone of these thinkers is less inquisitive than the ancients as they work to help the human know itself. The inquisitive play with reason in ancient philosophy becomes serious as reason is made to be that value that determines human being. The body is shoved ever more aside as its threat to uproot this order increases. The perfection of the soul enforced to displace this threat. Eriugena helps to keep the body suppressed by translating Aristotelian philosophy into Christian doctrine. He affirms:

Consequently, the body of this universe, the figures, qualities, ordered motion, and elements disposed from heaven down to earth, and whatever bodies are in them, nor any life—whether that which nourishes and conserves, as in the case of trees, or that which has this but also perceives, as in the case of animals, or that which has all this but also understands, as in the case of man, or that which has no need of the support of nourishment but conserves, perceives and understands, as in the case of angels—can have being but from Him who has only simple being.

Thus “every rational nature is rightly preferred to the irrational and sensible nature because it is closer to God.”<sup>14</sup>

Breaking down the orders of being, we see the hierarchal categories of plant, animal, human, angel and God. Each order has something more than the former. However, we see a great break between the animal and the human...the orders of the human and above are reserved for the divine and the order of plants and animals reserved for the earthly. Rationality is that which marks this point and marks the divine. And to return itself to God, the human must perfect this reason in order to enter into the simple being of God. Any perfection of reason saves the human from the uncertainty that plagues the animal. God saves the human from its animal self by offering him certainty.

Dromi has strongly restrained the wolf via the power of Christianity by giving the human certainty in itself; to help it fight for a certain self against the body of uncertainty by promising it release through the perfection of reason...of the possibility that human can become angel and God. Christianity provides an answer to the “Who am I?”; but this answer is not truth but a lie. The spirit of gravity weighs upon the human and the “despisers of life” train it to look toward the otherworldly.<sup>15</sup> Mediocrity takes over as the human rots in this life with promises of riches in the next. Better to remain blind and secure in certainty than to look and risk the devil of uncertainty grabbing hold of you.

Dromi remained the main shackle on the animal until modern philosophy and its Enlightenment. The human was fooled into thinking it broke free from God, when in actuality was still enslaved to the ever-growing power of reason. And while the human had its back turned, that last shackle made by dwarves<sup>16</sup> was slipped on to replace Dromi. This fetter, Gleipnir, is what causes the wolf to remain ill to this day within the human body. It caught the curiosity of the animal and deceived it.

*Gleipnir.* The Enlightenment. We are still in its shadow. The human being's divinity remained during this period, even though God was slowly erased from the picture. One could state that everything was put into motion by Descartes and the human itself as reason slowly replaced God. The human achieved its goal of rising from semi-divinity to divinity. This was a time of self-perfection...of perfecting the meaning of reason in order to perfect the meaning of the human. The animal remained shackled deep within the shadows. Examples of men responsible for this period are: Descartes, Rousseau and Kant.

René Descartes, that philosopher of doubt and mind, put the strongest fetter on the animal. This fetter caused us to cut ourselves from our body, the body the theologians tried to escape. In so doing, Descartes cut the human away from the animal and left it a corpse. The fire in his meditations burnt his body and left him (as well as the rest of philosophy) living in a mode of utter mind. So much has been set aside.

One cannot blame Descartes entirely for his egoism. He was probably confronted with the same doubt of self that I suffered from, that many philosophers suffer from, that philosophy suffers from. It is either nihilism or an ignorance that results from striving after certainty, ground, answers, truth. And when one has gone under, swimming too long in the abyss and cannot find the answer, one either drowns or runs home. Descartes ran home to reason...the thinking "I." This animal decided not to remain curious.

Descartes decided to overcome himself and have the strength to query into the abyss; but this can be tiring, exhausting, as most thinkers know. He weakened Dromi but was one of the great movers to strengthen the weight upon the animal even more by adding Gleipnir. The strongest fetter made by the dwarves (and let us recall Zarathustra's warning about the dwarf of ignorance). Descartes did not go under to go over...he went under to anesthetize the pain of the great uncertainty he felt as God died. And as he searched, he grew tired. Tired of the uncertainty that has plagued the human mind, tired of his struggle to find truth itself in the abyss that is both in man and all around man; he was eventually seduced by the same spell cast by the theologians. That spell that denies the importance of the animal and affirms that which man is not, will never be, will never obtain—Godliness. The certainty of God (pure intelligibility) was replaced by man himself, and reason still continued to cause the walking about of corpses.

In his hopelessness, as he stared in front of the fire, scrying for answers in the flames, he was hypnotized and charmed by their dance. He went under. But almost as soon as he was about to go over, he stayed under the theologians' spell. His great doubt weakened him and he "grew tired of repeating this to no purpose."<sup>17</sup> Swimming in the abyss and growing tired, what could he grab onto to keep him from drowning (perhaps the greatest fear in the human)? "But now what am I?"<sup>18</sup> He grabs onto this buoy... "thought exists; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am; I exist—this is certain."<sup>19</sup> And thus, he stays afloat as a thinking thing that exists as long as it thinks.<sup>20</sup> And this

thinking thing is a “thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses.”<sup>21</sup> The thinking “I” is what allows me to grasp a thing in itself more wise than a mere sensual encounter ever could. The thinking “I” allows me to take the place of God as creator. And this is what distinguishes us from animals:

Let us then go forward and inquire when it was that I perceived more perfectly and evidently what the piece of wax was. Was it when I first saw and believed I knew it by the external sense, or at last by the so-called common sense, that is, the power of imagination? Or do I have more perfect knowledge now, when I have diligently examined both what the wax is and how it is known? Surely it is absurd to be in doubt about this matter. For what was there in my initial perception that was distinct? What was there that any animal seemed incapable of possessing? But indeed when I distinguish the wax from its external forms, as if stripping it of its clothing, and look at the wax in its nakedness, then, even though there can be still an error in my judgment, nevertheless I cannot perceive it thus without a human mind.<sup>22</sup>

The Aristotle the theologians indoctrinated still haunts. Aristotle’s example of the master craftsman’s ability to see something as something based on the powers of his reason still rules over the manual craftsman that produces by habit and only sees something as so. Though the body nature equipped the human with was made to sense beings as “just so,” it takes the unique power of reason to judge the reason something is so. Reason, the “common sense”<sup>23</sup> in the human. Pity that Descartes was not able to see how common is this sense. The need felt to “raze everything to the ground”<sup>24</sup> did not enable him to get to the bottom of the abyss, to find the earth...but caused him to put on a ruse. To cover the shame of the body and the uncertainty of its powers with the so-called certainty of reason. For as long as he clothes this with thought, he can deny his nakedness, the mud that he is, his animality. The more he is able to use the faculties of reason to judge experiences, whether or not they are truly illusion or reality, the more he can affirm that he exists, because he thinks.

This ability to affirm one’s existence through thinking and not the body further widens the gap between the human and the animal because it is still assumed that animals have no reason because they are slaves to their bodies. They are machines pre-equipped with what nature intended for them. They produce everything by habit. Descartes gives as evidence the following: animals do not exhibit language. Language is considered a manifestation of the “I,” the thinking thing. My use of language exhibits to me and others that I am a thing that “understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses.”<sup>25</sup> Language is the manifestation of thought...of *common* sense. He states in the *Discourse on the Method* that because animals do not reveal this fact about themselves, beasts “have no reason at all.”<sup>26</sup> This further proves that animals are machines and that this state of being (animal being) is not based on rationality. The nature of natures is ascertained through the affirmation of the thinking thing.

Thus, the human has moved from the pure intelligibility of God to the pure intelligibility of itself, the *res cogitans*. From God as creator to the human as creator of its thoughts. A ruse that covers the commonality of thought, of language, and the tyranny of a value that continues to rule long after its death. The human's mediocrity remained stable as it crossed from the theologians to Descartes. The human being was still viewed as the sailor of a ship<sup>27</sup>, the ghost in a machine, the voice in a box, and its dominion over the animal world still remains intact based on this "indubitable" fact. Since humans can think, as evident from their manipulation of language, they exist; since animals cannot think, as evident from their lack of language, they do not exist...they are machines.

Carrying the torch and helping to secure Gleipnir, Jean-Jacques Rousseau also takes on the view that animals are machines (automatons). The difference between the human and the animal is that "nature alone does everything in the operations of an animal, whereas man contributes, as a free agent, to his own operations. The former chooses or rejects by instinct and the later by an act of freedom."<sup>28</sup> Following Descartes, Rousseau thinks animals are machines created by nature. Animals are preprogrammed machines, whereas humans have the freedom to create programs for their own operations. It is interesting to note that, unlike Descartes, Rousseau thinks animals can think to a point, i.e. they have ideas (even though they are machine). He states that "every animal has ideas, since it has senses; up to a certain point it even combines its ideas, and in this regard man differs from animal only in degree. Some philosophers have even suggested that there is a greater difference between two given men than between a given man and an animal."<sup>29</sup> Therefore, it is not so much understanding which causes the specific distinction of man from all other animals as it is his being a free agent."<sup>30</sup> Animals have ideas of what they sense because nature constituted these ideas in the animal. The senses enable these embedded ideas to be brought forth as the animal encounters the world. However, one distinguishing characteristic between the human and the animal is not so much understanding, since humans can be inferior to each other in this respect, but free will. Will appears to be the greatest faculty of reason to Rousseau. The ability to choose, to wish, to create. Rousseau calls it purely "spiritual,"<sup>31</sup> that of which is above the body.

If this will is disputable, Rousseau states that there is another quality that is unique only to humans. This quality is: "the faculty of self-perfection."<sup>32</sup> This faculty cannot be denied to any member of the species, but can sure be denied to other beings under the genus of living things. Self-perfection of one's ability to combine one's ideas is of great advantage to the human, who always seeks to overcome its natural circumstances. The more imaginative the human is, i.e. the more skillful it is at combining its ideas and understanding its circumstances, the more it is able to overcome its circumstances and live in a state of enjoyment unburdened by crude nature. The more the human was pressured by nature to use reason, the more it was forced to perfect this faculty in order to keep itself above her.

Language, thus, was a natural result of the human's faculty of self-perfection. The human was able to develop a system of language that would help it overcome the state of nature. The advantages of society helped illuminate the need for the communication of ideas so that the human could retain its leisure time. The more its needs were met and security felt in numbers, the more it was able to elevate itself further from the state of nature. And the more it perfected language as a system of manifesting

its ideas, the more it was able to live in abstraction and forget about the state of nature. As evident from their apparent lack of language and a believed lack of need to form groups, animals were determined to be machines with everything provided for them by nature. Non-linguistic ways of being were set aside and forgotten.

Another aspect unique to humans, based on human reason's ability to imagine and drive to self-perfect, is the human ability to know death. Rousseau states, "an animal will never know what it is to die; and knowledge of death and its terrors is one of the first acquisitions that man has made in withdrawing from the animal condition."<sup>33</sup> This is a view that has been carried from Cartesian philosophy and a view that we will encounter in later philosophers. Whether animals do not think (Descartes) or do not reason (Rousseau), they do not have the mental capacity to anticipate their own deaths. Because they are machines, they do not have purpose to perfect themselves...they are pre-equipped with all that they need. The lack of this purpose does not incorporate them in the time established by perfection (linear time), which requires recognition of the past, present and future.

Memory enables the human to symbolize death; this allows it to travel forward in time with the purpose of claiming its death and ascertaining it through the making certain, concretizing one's life up to that point. This solidification of one's life by predetermined projects that will be definitive of one's life at death closes one off from life's spontaneity. In making death one's own, one dies before one's time. Dying is denied the animal as a result of its inability to make death its own. Perhaps this is just as well; animals have escaped the condition of the human being—a being that defines itself by death and therefore becomes death. It becomes a death that walks on ropes towards its becoming. Many things are set aside to make way for this death. Indeed, the certainty of one's death causes the human to kill all aspects of life by constricting everything in its everyday living to certainty. The human is truly able to rise above its animality through death. But in this death, there is no promise of return or of life after death...one remains a corpse.

Like Rousseau before him, Immanuel Kant thinks of the human as a sensible and rational being as well as a being ever perfecting itself to rise above its animality. Kant was concerned with the role reason had to play in the human being's constitution. He wished to carry this value as that which gives the human meaning. He concluded that the development of reason is a duty that all have in order to promote well being—perhaps one could say to promote well-being to avoid the insanity in uncertainty. Carrying along the old prejudice of the mind over the body, Kant's interests in well-being pertained to how well reason was perfected to maintain and control the body in order for the human to perceive and adopt those moral maxims that would allow it to live in happiness, above a harsh and crude nature. In *Practical Philosophy*, Kant writes

The human being is a being of needs, insofar as he belongs to the sensible world, and to this extent his reason certainly has a commission from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with the view to happiness in this life and, where possible, in a future life as well. But he is nevertheless not so completely

an animal as to be indifferent to all that reason says on its own and to use reason merely as a tool for the satisfaction of his needs as a sensible being. For, that he has reason does not at all raise him in worth above mere animality if reason is to serve him only for the sake of what instinct accomplishes for animals; reason would in that case be only a particular mode nature had used to equip the human being for the same end to which it has destined animals, without destining him to a higher end....besides this he has it for a higher purpose: namely, not only to reflect upon what is good or evil in itself as well—about which only pure reason, not sensibly interested at all, can judge—but also to distinguish the latter appraisal altogether from the former and to make it the supreme condition of the former.<sup>34</sup>

Rousseau had a similar view of nature destining the human to a higher purpose, as is evident from its current station above her. Reason is that which makes the human and has allowed the human to be superior to animals. The human is animal inasmuch as it is a sensible being, and its reason is used to help guide its sensible body toward the best way to obtain happiness—satisfaction of basic needs. But the human also has reason for a higher end, an end not animal. This is its ability to use pure reason as a faculty of judgment to reflect on good and evil. And it is pure reason that is separable from the sensible body. For reflections on such moral values does not require the body and its sensations. Pure reason is the unique element that places the human above animal. Without pure reason, it would only be a “mere animal.” Pure reason allows the human to make its own ends and to ultimately make its own death.

But it is not just pure reason that separates human from animal, but also the ability to perfect one’s faculties. In bringing the body back into play, the body Descartes denied, Kant has to give an account of why there is a duty to the body as well as reason; and in addition, why one is more important than the other. In *Practical Philosophy*, Kant speaks of qualitative perfections belonging to a human being “as such,” which involves the duty of “cultivating one’s faculties, the highest of which is understanding, the faculty of concepts and so too of those concepts that have to do with duty. At the same time this duty involves the cultivation of one’s will, so as to satisfy all the requirements of duty. 1.) A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality, more and more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends.”<sup>35</sup> So the human must cultivate its faculty of understanding and will in order to satisfy the requirements of its duty to raise itself from the state of nature toward humanity. The more it rises above this crude state of nature, the more it is able to go beyond itself and set ends. Its cultivated understanding and will allow it to have this aim. However, even though the human works to raise itself above nature, she still works through its body by causing impulses so that the human may maintain its sensible being. These impulses can be equated to the following instincts “a.) self-preservation, b) the preservation of the species, and c) the preservation of his capacity to enjoy life, though still on the animal level only.”<sup>36</sup>

The human has a duty to itself as an animal being to hold true to these three principles, which means a duty to not deny or suppress these impulses. Denial of these impulses would most certainly lead to death. Kant warns in the *Critique of Judgment* not to neglect our animal body for risk of injury. He states that we must “allow ourselves to be fettered by the impulses that nature gave us only as guides so that we would not neglect or even injure our animal characteristics, whereas in fact we are free enough to tighten or to slacken, to lengthen or to shorten them, as the purposes of reason require.”<sup>37</sup> We are the masters that keep the body at leash length to keep it from running away with us. It is merely a machine for us to manipulate in order to carry our soul forward. If we want to rise above animality, we must be able to preserve it so that we may do so.

Opposed to being on the animal level, the human rises above to become a moral being. This involves the cultivation of the will in order to take “what is formal in the consistency of the maxims of his will with the dignity of humanity in his person. It consists, therefore, in a prohibition against depriving himself of the prerogative of a moral being, that of acting in accordance with his principles, that is inner freedom, and so making himself a plaything of the mere inclinations and hence a thing.”<sup>38</sup> One can assume here that the practice of restraint in regard to inclinations requires the cultivation of the will to control them and steer the human toward the path of “dignity,” which means being able to distinguish between the bad and the good. Reason in the human, therefore, gears it toward this higher end; reason gives it the ability to see it and set it as an end. This moral being enables the human to set a measure to order its projects on its way to its ultimate end—death. Reason enables the human to construct its life in all certainty, rather than be open to uncertainty. So again, we have a suppression of the appetites of the body to avoid becoming an animal, a thing that is open to its inclinations; and therefore the possibility of leading a life of “roaming to and fro.” Suppression of the body to become human helps one to see what is needed to obtain self-perfection, which reflects the need to have certainty.

So up to Kant, we have a historical account of an animal that does not reason, even though it may think, and an animal that is apart of ourselves whom we must necessarily drag along if we are to live. Truly a brain in a vat.<sup>39</sup> The more the body haunts the minds of these thinkers, the more strongly they stick to the ruling order of reason. For fear of losing themselves in their bodies, they cling to the one thing that they are certain of—the created value in reason. This same story is suffocating as I travel on through the history of philosophy. The same story told, abet in different forms, by many other philosophers. So much worry in maintaining its certainty in order to ground the human being’s certainty. I suffocate as that which has been set aside, the animal and all its potential ways of defining human being, are covered...and I am suffocated by the stench of this expired value given to rotting reason.

Three fetters, each one stronger than the other. One representing reason, one representing divine reason, and one representing perfected reason. Each fetter separating the human from animal. As the wolf grows weaker, the human animal grows sicker. Like Fenrir, the human animal has been tricked into tighter and tighter chains, into domestication. The human being drags the chain of reason around to ground itself and feels the increasing need to rely on it as its wild nature is beat out of it. The human was once wolf and has now become a dog. It is too afraid of what it is without reason and

what it would do without reason. Why does it not see that it is the cause of its end. The human denies the fruit that will enable it to revive itself...to return to itself.

The dwarf of ignorance weighs heavier and heavier upon the human being's shoulders. Reason is looked to, I can only presume, as an escape from the body, which is felt in all its weakness when one encounters chance. The body is open too much to the world, open to the sensations of the pressure brought about by the chance and change in any moment. The body causes the human being to be in a constant process of uprooting...too much "to and fro" for some individuals. For those weak animals, it is too much to stand up to this abyss and witness the birth of new stars. Cyclical time, the returning to the abyss to be reborn a star, causes uneasiness in most who are accustomed to security, i.e. domesticity. Reason grounds one in closed systems of security that keep one from sensing this upheaval (one such system is language). One dies in order to eliminate these sensations. Thus the current problem with zombies.

Reason turns the body into a corpse; whereas animal openness and inquisitiveness turns the body into a living being. Too much of the animal has been set aside...so much that we have not let the animal speak to us, teach us...and this has kept us running in place. The human has become mediocre with reason, language and society. There is no more space made for creativity, creation, procreation, life; there is no more space made for the midwifery of the new. There is only a carrying of the dog-matic doctrine of reason from one member to another. Breath stops, life ceases. The ends of man are near.<sup>40</sup>

What would it be to stop striving for the certainty reason provides us and work on cultivating our nature according to the animal that we are? How does one go about this? How does one learn to go along with the animal as an animal? This will need to be taken up later, but first, an analysis of why Gleipnir still continues to hold us. One more philosopher to analyze before we unlearn all that we had learned and are able to begin the process of unleashing the wolf...the wolf that would allow us to feel how to live again, rather than living according to a disinterested eye...a corpse's dead stare. It is time to begin the process of learning how to allow the animals to speak their secrets, secrets that we once knew and have by now forgotten. The process of relearning to be animal can begin once we have broken the weight of Heidegger's thought, which continues to keep us restrained.

## Gleipnir

The animal is still in chains due to the narrowed perspective in philosophy. The perspective that is narrowed by the dominion of reason. Why has the wolf not been unleashed? One more thinker has carried forward this tradition of reason as definitive of human nature: Martin Heidegger. Though he wishes to establish in his *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* lecture the animal's position above machine, this is merely a ruse. A cover. Concealment. This concealment works to hide its origins in those that went before. And perhaps it works to conceal a shame felt when one encounters Nietzsche's philosophy...a man certainly not afraid of peering into the abyss, laughing into the abyss, dancing in the abyss, standing naked in the abyss. A shame felt when one realizes the rotten fruit that philosophy continues to eat. The fundamental constituents of Dasein's constitution (understanding, language and death to name a few) are too precious for Heidegger to give up.

Heidegger's purpose in this lecture was to uncover the essence of world, which is also to uncover the essence of time. In order to do this, Heidegger analyzes what world means to the very things that make up the world. Heidegger puts forth three theses for the purpose of coming to a realization about world. The theses are: [1] the stone is without world; [2] the animal is poor in world; and [3] man is world-forming/rich in world.<sup>1</sup> One can detect the classical Aristotelian hierarchical classification of species. Indeed we re-encounter the parts that comprise living things. We are brought under these teachings again: that some things only have some parts, while others have all parts, and man has all plus an additional part- the ability to exercise reason.

Heidegger goes straight to proving the second thesis in order to support his third thesis. By first defining the animal, Heidegger can discover what the human is not, and therefore, affirm what the human is. He can affirm why the human is more than animal. I think that with his preconceived notion of Dasein from *Being and Time*, Heidegger's definition of the animal is bias. He defines the animal as that which is indeed opposite the human to support what he believes the human is not in order to support what the human is—Dasein.

Heidegger states that “the behavior of the animal is not a doing and acting, as in human comportment, but a driven performing. An instinctual drivenness, as it were, characterizes all such animal performance.”<sup>2</sup> Animal behavior is seen more as a drive different from human comportment, which is seen more as action (and more specifically decisive action). It appears we still encounter the argument carried from philosophers past regarding the absence of will in the animal. The animal ruled by instincts, trapped by the appetites of the body. The instincts that decide for animals; instincts different from the free will that decides for the human. To reaffirm this, Heidegger goes on to state, “behavior and its forms are not something which radiate outward and allow the

animal to run ahead along certain paths.”<sup>3</sup> If the animal were allowed to run ahead, or in other words, “leap ahead,”<sup>4</sup> this would mean the animal would be able to comport itself and ‘take action’ as it were. The animal would be able to freely make its own decisions. But precisely because the animal is a slave to its body, there is no way there could be room for any type of reasoning in the animal’s constitution. Captivation keeps the animal captive; it prevents the animal from being free for itself. The animal’s mode of being captivated also keeps it constituted in a different form of time that prevents it from running head. This is a different form of time that Heidegger neglected to investigate in its entirety. Perhaps if he had, a very different definition for both the animal and Dasein would exist. But of course this would set most of everything the reasonable Dasein is aside.

Captivation is the term Heidegger calls “the essential moment of animality as such.”<sup>5</sup> It is the self-absorbed state of the animal in which it is “simply taken”<sup>6</sup> by a being or an object, such as food. The animal, in being taken, is driven toward this being or object. The instinctual “towards” initiated by a being that takes the animal prevents the animal from ever recognizing the presence of such a being.<sup>7</sup> In referring to his example of the bee, Heidegger states that “it is precisely being taken by its food that prevents the animal from taking up a position over and against this food.”<sup>8</sup> Therefore, “instinctual activity is not a recognitive self-directing toward objectively present things, but a behaving.”<sup>9</sup> The animal is poor in world because the beings “as such” are taken away from it. This poverty is a result of the mode of time the animal exists. The animal in so far as it has to maintain itself in its present drive is constantly putting things into perspective. It is in a constant mode of presence, which means it is in a constant mode of forgetting (otherwise it would have memory, the ability to conceptualize, and thus the ability to stand back and access). Its instincts keep it in this driven mode. It does not exist in the mode of time that will provide it a clearing of understanding things “as such.” It does not live in the mode of time that will allow it to perceive beings as present-at-hand. There is no room for manipulability of the object, just the drive to eliminate it.

This mode of captivation can be thought of as a disinhibitory ring that the animal draws around itself. A prison. This is a ring that it cannot escape; a ring that dictates “what can affect or occasion its behavior.”<sup>10</sup> The disinhibition of one drive so that another drive can be facilitated. Each animal has a specific number of capacities, based on its bodily makeup, which allow it to cope with a certain range of stimuli. Heidegger explains this restriction in the experience of the animal by stating “the life of the animal is precisely the struggle to maintain this encircling ring or sphere within which a quite specifically articulated manifold of disinhibitions can arise.”<sup>11</sup> The animal lives as long as it can deal with the stimuli it was constituted to deal with. Indeed, the machine of the past is represented...the machine that nature has pre-equipped with pre-determined ideas and behavioral responses.

As a result of this constitution, the animal is poor in world. It is poor in world precisely because it is deprived of world. It has no reason to judge the world and thus take a position over or against it. There is only hardwiring that prompts the animal to be in or to switch over into another drive. If reason were granted to the animal, it would be able to understand its circumstances, its past, present and future. Once reason has been exercised and potentialities foreseen, it would then have the ability to comport itself into

the future, toward an end. The animal would have to have Dasein to have this freedom to construct meaning for itself. But its constitution does not allow this as is evident from the missing trait Descartes illuminates—discursive language. Because human Dasein lives in a certain mode of time, it has the ability to have language. Language allows Dasein to learn, symbolize (meaning to conceptualize) and apply these symbols to the world. The symbols that imprison things in created certainty. And precisely because animals lack language, they lack all the characteristics of Dasein. Their circle of absorption does not allow them to exercise reason and develop language. Perhaps this is best...animals do not have to kill the world with symbols in order to know it.

Heidegger has carried the presumption that animals are constructed in such a way that they lack reason. Based on this presumption, he has offered the above analysis and line of reasoning regarding the nature of the animal. It appears that he presumed that animals were poor in world only to conclude it. Animal being as it is constituted by its particular time is seen as deprived when compared to the human being and time. Many old assumptions from past philosophies are carried through the argument and confirmed. Why does reason make one rich in world? Given that we have perfected our reason through the adoption and use of language, how is it that we can any better perceive a thing “as such”? Especially since language is a system of created values that we impose on the world? Would it not be the case that animals are a little richer in world since they can encounter beings in a space of spontaneity, of life; while the human encounters beings in a space of certainty, of death, of moments long past due, a world re-presented? It is too bad that the animal was not used to open up what the human being could become.

And thus, the great wolf in the human has been chained and weakened by the seriousness of the game played by human. The seriousness that makes everyone play by a strict set of rules. A fear of what honesty will reveal—that one is dead under the rule of reason—makes the human ever more fearful of uncertainty. The fear to own up to uncertainty and remember how to live in its presence. A fear of drowning, of becoming lost, of possessing the courage to challenge the spirit of gravity. The animal grows sicker as the human remains a corpse under its cowardice. The human avoids following itself and remains a sheep.

But the time will come when the wolf is unleashed from Gleipnir, and the world of the human is consumed by the animal. The animal returns and devours the gods that had kept it chained for so long. And from the ash that remains, the phoenix will arise and establish the time for new beginnings. The question is how to overcome this past and begin the process of relearning to be animal. How do I develop the honesty to follow animals like Zarathustra? What do I need to develop and maintain this virtue honesty?

I return to my mirror, after contemplating what it has shown me and the challenges I must face in order to see Fenrir in the mirror looking back at me—instead of the cold eyes of a corpse. In order to see the animal in the mirror...in order to see with my animal eyes. I return to myself. And as I meditate on this, I am reminded of John Wilmot’s poem “A Satyre Against Mankind”:

Were I - who to my cost already am

One of those strange, prodigious creatures, man -  
 A spirit free, to choose for my own share  
 What sort of flesh and blood I pleased to wear,  
 I'd be a dog, a monkey, or a bear,  
 Or anything but that vain animal,  
 Who is so proud of being rational.  
 The senses are too gross; and he'll contrive  
 A sixth, to contradict the other five;  
 And before certain instinct will prefer  
 Reason, which Fifty times for one does err.  
 Reason, an ignis fatuus of the mind,  
 Which leaving the light of nature, sense, behind,  
 Pathless and dangerous wand'ring ways it takes,  
 Through Error's fenny bogs and thorny brakes;  
 Whilst the misguided follower climbs with pain  
 Mountains of whimsey's, heaped in his own brain;  
 Stumbling from thought to thought, falls headlong down,  
 Into Doubt's boundless sea where, like to drown,  
 Books bear him up awhile, and make him try  
 To swim with bladders of Philosophy;  
 In hopes still to o'ertake the escaping light;  
 The vapour dances, in his dancing sight,  
 Till spent, it leaves him to eternal night.  
 Then old age and experience, hand in hand,  
 Lead him to death, make him understand,  
 After a search so painful, and so long,  
 That all his life he has been in the wrong<sup>12</sup>

After reading this I begin to wonder if Nietzsche ever came across this poem. This poem always refreshes my memory that reason is that which actually prevents the spirit from choosing freely from what has been set aside. And that only when one begins to experience death, the process of death in its actuality, does one understand that one has been wrong in not appreciating the spontaneity that nature brought so many times before our eyes, which were blinded by reason. The painful search for certainty, truth, an answer prevented us from experiencing life itself, from living life itself. And only when one is in the face of death can one affirm one certainty—that there have been too many opportunities offered by uncertainty that would have allowed man to enjoy life. Perhaps this realization and regret allows one to surrender to the great uncertainty in death itself. Perhaps this realization and regret actually allows one to become animal in death.

## The Lion

Looking in the mirror, I am reminded of Jacques Derrida, who first sent me on the path to Nietzsche. The potentiality hidden within Nietzsche to reinstate human animality. Derrida is the one who sent me on my path of unlearning in order to look for those things that need to be relearned. He resurrects the question of the animal in his text *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, having prepared it in such a way, I think, to be filled with intuited metaphors. Perhaps he did so purposively in the knowledge of his approaching death in order to keep his ghost among us, antagonizing us, with the questions and creative allusions that encompass this essay. I believe that in this way, Derrida was a true overman himself, ensuring that his creative energies will continue to cultivate this question of the animal, ourselves, and philosophy. By creatively writing this essay the way he did, he left an openness that allowed him, dead, in the past, to return, perhaps eternally, to us in order to cultivate mankind; perhaps save it from what he refers to as “the ends of man.”<sup>1</sup> And it is not just a return to us, but something about this work may have us constantly returning to him. Something that may allow us to cultivate a certain openness about ourselves, an openness indicative of the animal. Perhaps he was our Zarathustra.

There are many important themes and metaphors, some loud some discrete, that help to open the problematic of the animality in human being. These metaphors are ones that help open a space to see and relearn that which has been set aside. The ones I would like to touch on are those related to what I feel are Nietzschean themes, resurrecting that firebird back into the space of philosophical creativity. Reading Derrida in this light will help ground the framework necessary to nurture our animality. Derrida is an important transitory point to conclude the unlearning process and to begin relearning what it means to be animal. He leads us back and leaves us in this state of uncertainty, leaving us with the task of taking up and developing those qualities that will allow us to become animal. These qualities are those characteristics we set aside and must remember...honesty, non-apophantic logos, and cyclical time. The first characteristic to investigate, open and develop is honesty.

Honesty is a Nietzschean theme encountered in Derrida as nakedness. Derrida begins with this theme, the original state of the human in nature...when it was as honest as an animal...when it was naked. A mode of being that the human must remember if it is to return to the animal. A mode of being before the fall. And what exactly is this fall? In Derrida, it is the human's fall from nature (notice not rise above nature). He discusses this in a very interesting way to highlight the honesty in animality that has been set aside and concealed with clothing.

His discussion of human nakedness implies the human having devolved from the animal's state of innocence, which is very similar to Nietzsche's opinion of the human. This “Je suis” Derrida brings up again and again seems to refer to the human being

following after the animal (in the sense of behind the animal). The human has fallen away from animality because it was not able to remain naked. It was not able to remain uncertain. The human must return to this state of uncertainty if it is to regain its animality. Everything, Derrida will argue,

will lead back to what “to follow” or “to pursue” means, as well as “to be after,” back to the question of what I do when “I am” or “I follow,” when I say, “Je suis,” if I am (following) this suite then, I move from “the ends of man,” that is the confines of man, to “the crossing of borders” between man and animal, to the animal in itself, to the animal in me and the animal at unease with itself, to the man about whom Nietzsche said (I no longer remember where) something to the effect that it was an as yet undetermined animal, an animal lacking in itself.<sup>2</sup>

We have followed the animal and ourselves so far throughout the history of philosophy to see that the human animal lacks itself. After we see what the human has pursued, tried to capture and ascertain, we return back to the uncertainty in the question asked by Descartes: “Who am I?” The original question. This question is the catalyst that can cause the human to fall or cause the human to realize itself as a deprived animal, an undetermined animal—an animal deprived of the answer to this question “Who am I?”. This is the pivotal question that can cause the human to remain a ruse or cause the human to cross the border over to the animal. This is the question that allows us to imprison ourselves or free ourselves.

A very important question, this “Who am I?”. A question that always causes curiosity and anxiety. Reflecting upon a confrontation with his cat, Derrida reveals our unease with our undetermined natures in the presence of such a question and our wish to cover them up. Hence his emphasis on nakedness and clothing. Covering up this undetermined nature has caused us to be sick...preventing us from becoming the animal we are; keeping us from a mode of naked honesty we possessed before the fall. Derrida returns to this question of “Who am I?” and the shame felt, the embarrassment felt being naked in front of this question in order to open up what it means to be naked...the type of nakedness before the fall. A nakedness that is animal and what is needed to become the human animal. He opens by investigating the horror felt in finding oneself in uncertainty; by finding himself in uncertainty.

Feeling uncanny, Derrida tries to maintain an honest perspective when confronting the question “Who am I?”. Through this honesty, he tries to describe the predicament that is man. “I often ask myself, just to see, *who I am*—and who I am (following) at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of the animal, for example, the eyes of a cat, I have trouble, yes, a bad time overcoming my embarrassment. Whence this malaise? I have trouble repressing a reflex of shame.”<sup>3</sup> He further states “it is as if I were ashamed, therefore, naked in front of this cat, but also ashamed for being ashamed.”<sup>4</sup> Ashamed by the fact that I am cognizant of the shame, that I can see my shame as present-at-hand, which shows me the origin of this created value connected

with bodily nakedness. Indeed, if I see this origin, I feel as if I am a sham...mediocre. Robbed of who I took myself to be, who I am, and who I had the potentiality to become if only I had known to be honest from the start. If only I had known that I have not been honest. I am embarrassed by this charade, of having been duped.

How am I to overcome my embarrassment? How does Derrida overcome his embarrassment? Does he again cloth himself and become mediocre, or does he accept it in all honesty and try to regain himself before the fall? Before he was certain? It is difficult to overcome this embarrassment and give one's self over to uncertainty, to the fact that one cannot conceptualize one's own being. Derrida states "nothing can ever rob me of the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized."<sup>5</sup> An inability to answer the question "Who am I?" An inability to conceptualize the human animal's existence and that of the animal itself. A realization and embarrassment that *reason* fails to provide answers to our questions. This is the origin of skepticism and nihilism. It is also the point where we begin to ask the animal for answers—a consideration that seems like madness to the rational. This is the point, the crossing of borders. The relearning to cross over to the animal, the animal one was before the fall.

An inability to conceptualize something "as such" it is...How does one begin to accept this realization and move toward the animal and not toward a path of deception? Confronted by the same choice that was before Descartes in the face of the "Who am I?", Derrida feels he is at the point where he can run and hide or he can continue to swim in the uncertainty of himself. A very fragile point that one always encounters in front of uncertainty. A fragile point Derrida wishes to highlight in order to raise caution. If one is not careful, one may fall.

In such moments, on the edge of the thing, in the imminence of the best or the worst, when anything can happen, where I can die of shame or pleasure. I no longer know in whose or in what direction to throw myself. Rather than chasing it away, chasing the cat away, I am in a hurry, yes, in a hurry to have it appear otherwise. I hasten to cover the obscenity of the event, in short, to cover myself. One thought alone keeps me spellbound: dress myself, even a little, or, which amounts to the same thing, run away—as if I were chasing myself out of the room—bite myself, therefore, bite my tongue, for example, at the very moment when I ask myself "Who?" But "Who therefore?" For I no longer know who, therefore, I am (following) or who it is I am chasing, who is following me or hunting me. Who comes before and who is after whom? I no longer know which end my head is. Madness: "We're all mad here. I'm mad. You're mad." I no longer know how to respond, or even to respond to the question that compels me or asks me who I am (following) or after who I am (following), but am so as I am running.<sup>6</sup>

Is my head above or below the dwarf of ignorance? In such moments of vulnerability, he could choose to run to reason or remain as mad as a cat (perhaps curious as a cat). Does he run or does he remain in uncertainty? Derrida considers the first option, the path Descartes chose.

Rather than investigating the nature of this madness, this uncertainty and the freedom felt in its openness, where anything can happen, he feels the full weight of this encounter on his shoulders as he grabs for a buoy to keep himself afloat certainty. He decides to run away to security, into his clothing. To have everything appear familiar. He stops himself from asking “Who?” so he does not feel the madness in feeling uncertainty. The “Who?” which reveals itself in all honesty in such moments. The “Who?” that robs one of speech. The abyss that one cannot get one’s head around. The “Who?” is a question that does not remain open and uncertain, for he answers it as soon as he runs...and the answer is a mediocre one. Why is one’s first reaction to run and cloth one’s self?

The abyss is that which one’s mind fights to stay above...the mind established by old values fears going under. One does not want to encounter uncertainty, a “seeing oneself seen naked under a gaze behind which there remains a bottomless, at the same time innocent and cruel perhaps, perhaps sensitive and impassive, good and bad, uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal and secret.”<sup>7</sup> The inability to conceptualize, to own the situation, to put into perspective causes fear. A realization that we are that animal philosophy has described for so long. The philosophical animal defined by the inability to interpret and decide. One does not know what to do. In these moments, the tyranny of reason is thrown off its throne and speech is prohibited since the cat has his tongue. He feels the hair-raising feeling of the possibilities opened by chance...that anything can happen. If I do not run to certainty, to lies, how do I handle this uncertainty in an honest way? What if he were to wait for anything to happen with the curiosity of a cat? What if he decided to risk drowning in uncertainty rather than run to the certainty, the ruse provided by a thinking thing? I risk drowning in order to wait for what? Derrida considers this possibility, the path Descartes did not choose, which is the path that keeps one swimming in the abyss. If one remembers correctly, Descartes’ arms grew tired. Derrida states

As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called “animal” offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: The inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say, the bordercrossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself, thereby calling himself by the name that he believes he gives himself. And in these moments of nakedness, as regards the animal, everything can happen to me, I am like a child ready for the apocalypse, I am (following) the apocalypse itself, that is to say, the ultimate and first event of the end, the unveiling, the verdict.<sup>8</sup>

In this abyss, one awaits the apocalypse, a verdict that will prevent one from running away. An apocalypse caused by being able to perceive the limits of the human. Seeing this limit, this inability to conceptualize, to ascertain, enables one to cross the border to the animal, to become the undetermined animal, and burn the bridge behind one's self. This is where one confronts what one had been, a liar, and regains honesty by regarding one's self as the undetermined animal. An animal open to everything that can happen, to everything that it may become. Open to the spontaneity in becoming. To live as an undetermined animal that is willing to play with that which the abyss spits forth.

To choose the animal, one chooses to live without deceiving one's self. Free from deception, frank about one's being undetermined and knowledge of the world as arbitrary, the human as animal relates to the world with respect. This is the state of honesty, and this is the virtue that must be developed if one is to become and remain animal.

Cautioning us as he does by revealing the two paths that present themselves in the face of "Who am I?", Derrida becomes the Sphinx. His purpose in revealing these paths is grounded on the hope that the limit to the human can be accepted and a mode of honesty be resurrected and adopted by the human so that it may cross the border to the animal. Accepting the challenge of the Sphinx and responding truthfully, one becomes animal. By refusing this animality, the honest response, the human is devoured by its own deceit.

And as has been argued above with the human's inability to conceptualize the "who I am" and the animal, it indeed appears that the differences between the human and animal "are not those between "as such" and "not as such."<sup>9</sup> Heidegger assumes that the animal cannot "let beings be in their being," i.e. let the thing be as such it is; whereas the human can. He does not consider that his animal's constant mode of putting-into-perspective, of putting its environment into a constant context of drives may be a similar fault in the human—perhaps even a projection of the human itself onto the animal. For it appears that the human itself cannot let things be...that it is driven or tempted to put things into its narrow perspective, to put things into perspective by the only way it knows—language. An answer, a concrete symbol that fills in the void created by the question "Who am I?".

And through this answer, the human kills the thing by contextualizing it...just as the animal eliminates the thing it is driven after. Derrida illuminates this absurdity of the cloak contextualization provides by contrasting Nietzsche with Heidegger:

It is evident that the difference between Nietzsche and Heidegger is that Nietzsche would have said no: everything is in a perspective; the relation to a being, even the "truest," the most "objective," that which respects most the essence of what is such as it is, is caught in a movement that we'll call here that of the living, of life, and from this point of view, whatever the difference between animals, it remains an "animal" relation. Hence the strategy in question would consist in pluralizing and varying the "as such" and, instead of simply giving speech back to the animal, or giving to the animal what the human deprives it of, as it were, in marking

that the human is, in a way, similarly “deprived,” by means of a privation that is not a privation, and that there is no pure and simple “as such.”<sup>10</sup>

By accepting our animality, which means accepting that we are similarly deprived of the “as such”, would allow a new ground. By accepting that we are deprived of certainty. Seeing that we are not gods but mere animal may enable us to open the floor to be animal. By seeing ourselves not as being determined by the thinking “I”, we are able to be open to possible ways of being that were put aside...ways of being animal. And the animal is not this captivated drone that Heidegger makes it out to be...a drone that perhaps reflects the human’s domesticity. What does it mean to be animal? Surely not as a being that cannot let beings be.

In a state of uncertainty, of deprivation, one now sees how to begin to follow the animal. To keep running after the animal, following the animal that I am supposed to be...following; and this can happen only when we unlearn the grand moments of the “I think therefore I am”<sup>11</sup> and relearn honesty; to honor things as they are and to honor myself as I am...undetermined. And to live in this honesty, this consciousness of myself as an undetermined animal, I can develop the power to move spontaneously, which is the movement of living, of life. “Let me repeat it, every living creature, and thus every animal to the extent it is living, has recognized in it this power to move spontaneously, to feel itself and to relate to itself.”<sup>12</sup> Opposed to this spontaneous movement is the restriction of movement caused by deception. Deception closes off, kills, confines the human by restricting movement. The human cannot breathe, so it dies underneath the layers of its clothing. The human closes itself off from the world, from living, from a dialogue with the world. To avoid this death caused by deception, one needs to practice honesty and relearn to relate to one’s self. What way of living would allow us to become the honest animal? Here we encounter the second characteristic of animality that goes hand in hand with honesty. This characteristic of the animal is that which it practices and that which constitutes it within honesty, of relating to itself as the undetermined animal. This characteristic is non-apophantic logos.

But what is the exact nature of this non-apophantic logos and how can it be a practiced logos that does not deceive through certainty? Derrida shows that Heidegger admits Aristotle accounted for non-apophantic logos.

Heidegger, analyzing the question of the lie and the apophantic logos, alludes to the fact that Aristotle himself takes into account a nonapophantic moment in the logos, a moment that isn’t declarative, enunciative, and the example he gives is that of requesting: “Requesting, *euché*, for example, is a non-apophantic logos” (quoted at 309). He is here distinguishing between a logos apophantikos, “exhibiting discourse”—and when I say “I” it is an exhibiting discourse, “I”, that is to say, “Me, I am speaking to you,” I show myself—and a nonapophantic marking (I wouldn’t say logos here), for example, prayer, which doesn’t show anything, which in a certain way “Doesn’t say anything.” And the

possibility of a nonapophantic logos here would, in my opinion, open a breach in the whole apparatus, but I don't have time to show that.<sup>13</sup>

Derrida did not have time to finish; but the possibility of a non-apophantic logos should be thought about and developed. This logos would open a breach in the whole deceptive apparatus of the human being, of man, of philosophy. A breach that would create a space for honesty and allow bordercrossings to take place. This language of silence, no speech, the speaking of animal eyes is similar to that of requesting.

By requesting, I can only assume Derrida means "to ask for," an asking for. And such asking for puts one in a state of spontaneity, a not knowing what to expect. A not knowing what the answer will be. A not knowing what to expect from the other...a not knowing what will be granted. To lie in wait for that which is granted in order to move. Spontaneous becoming begets the spontaneous becoming of the human animal. And this mode of being would support one's efforts to be honest, to not kill with words. Requesting prevents an answering/decision/determination on the part of the requester. Requesting makes one wait for a response from the other as such it is and not as that which is determined through apophantic logos. The cat does not first pounce on the mouse to kill it; the cat waits for the mouse to signal the beginning of the chase. The cat requests a response so that it knows how to move next. This is a state of constant indeterminacy, of chance, of spontaneous becoming.

Perhaps avoiding violence caused by a language that kills would be the advantage of a language characterized by requesting...learning to not put into context based on one's preconceptions, but learning to be patient and wait for what is given, what is granted. A respect in a request to be shown; as opposed to a disrespect in killing that which is presented. A learning to lie in wait like the animal and accept things as they are given to us. An accepting of the silent speech of others so that one knows how to follow one's self, to create one's self, to innovate.

But before one can begin thinking about the exact nature of the non-apophantic and honesty, an account of animal time needs to be established. An important question that Heidegger left aside. An important question that is key to understanding what must be developed to become animal. The key to understanding the honesty and non-apophantic logos of the animal. I will look back at Nietzsche for this key, the third characteristic that completes this framework of what could be called the being of the animal. This third characteristic is cyclical time. Understanding how this supports honesty and non-apophantic logos by allowing the practice of both will enable us to know how to be animal. Internalizing this framework of three (and perhaps much more I am setting aside), we can learn to cultivate the animal within and develop the eagle's eyes, talons and stomach. We can resurrect the animal from the grave and cause it to live again. Gleipnir can be broken and the apocalypse ensue.

## The Phoenix

Let us start from shame, the shame that embarrasses, which is the point from which Derrida began and also the point we must return to relearn...to always return to see what has been set aside. The shame and embarrassment that begins when one realizes that "God is dead!"<sup>1</sup> The uncertainty, the loss that reveals the ruse...the shame of being duped. The shame in knowing that the human is "the animal that has red cheeks."<sup>2</sup> Nietzsche quotes Feuerbach to announce the process of unlearning. Without God, without the arrogance and without the divine intelligibility, the human is naked and will have to realize the power and will deep within itself to recreate itself. In other words, to reconstitute itself. And upon what is it to reconstitute itself? As has been argued, the animal. That state we have fallen from by setting aside. That state that allows us to know the truth about ourselves; there can be no deceit. That state that allows us to stand in front of the "Who am I?" and not hide, but laugh. How is the human to draw up another constitution? We have seen two qualities that must be part of this constitution: honesty and non-apophantic logos. It has been shown how honesty is the essential mode of the animal, and non-apophantic logos necessarily follows from this mode as that which affirms it. But these qualities characteristic of the animal cannot be understood in a linear time, least of all be practiced in one. These qualities require a cyclical time for understanding and practice. A cyclical time which can be seen as the third characteristic that constitutes the animal. A trinity that demonstrates the animality of the human being.

So let us return to Nietzsche to understand this cyclical time and this trinity. Let us begin from embarrassment in the presence of the "Who am I?" in order to see how honesty, the non-apophantic, and the cyclical (if all developed) promise to give the human over to the animal. And in this animal, in this trinity, the human will be able to affirm "who I am" without ever speaking a word.

"Who am I?": without God to cloth one, one sees that he or she is just an ape...and this embarrasses. Embarrassment not just in seeing that the animality one has worked so hard to rise above remains, but that there is no ground to this so-called essence "pure intelligibility." It is the ability to see and overcome this determined essence that Nietzsche wants to teach. To overcome the nihilism involved with the loss of God. Nietzsche states "*I teach you the Ubermensch*. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All beings so far have created something beyond themselves: and you want to be the ebb of the great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than overcome him? What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment. And just the same shall man to the Ubermensch: a laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment."<sup>3</sup> The human has one of two choices according to Nietzsche. A choice between two apes. Run from the undetermined animal back to that deceived ape, a puppet of the determinant or laugh at the past, at one's predicament and embrace the path of becoming the ape man should have become. The past should not be a weight on

the present that hinders spontaneity...that hinders the exciting uncertainty in becoming. The human should not go back to the beast that society has made it. It should go back to its origins to live on.

The deceived ape is the ape that did not evolve with the other animals. Because of this, Nietzsche thinks man is lower than ape. He states "once you were apes, and even yet man is more of an ape than any ape."<sup>4</sup> This is because: 1.) of his inability to conceptualize his circumstances "as such", his inability to see his domestication...the lies and 2.) man's mediocrity has prevented him from becoming and cultivating the animal. Too many things have been set aside to rot, which have prevented the human from crossing over to the animal. Indeed...once we were apes, but through domestication, we have become lower than that which we consider the lowest.

To prevent the human from rotting further, one must return to origins. Becoming can only occur if one is honest with one's circumstances and learns to constantly return to one's self, to relate to one's self, and to those things one sets aside, those things that will enable one to dance. A cyclical way of living. A time of returning and creating. He states "I beseech you, my brothers, *remain true to the earth*, and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes! They are poison-mixers, whether they know it or not. They are the despisers of life, themselves the decaying and poisoned, of whom the earth is weary: so away with them!"<sup>5</sup> Constantly return to the earth to remind one's self to cultivate. Do not forget the earth, i.e. the possibilities the earth has to offer. Be honest to one's self with this return and do not let the earth rot underneath one's feet. Those individuals that speak of other-worldly hopes, of an after life, work to suppress the cyclical nature of creation. They work to suppress the return to the earth by causing the animal within to grow sick. They keep the human moving in a straight line forward toward death. The individuals domesticated by these preachers are prevented from replenishing themselves.

One should live by a motion of "over-going and a going under."<sup>6</sup> Rising above one's self and a return to one's self. An animal that lives by going forward, but also returns to water what was set aside...to cultivate the crop that was put aside for the following year. This going under allows one to rise again with that year's crop. And when it grows to maturity, it is one's job to return and prepare the next crop. Never to go under, to awake that which is sleeping, is causing the human to become polluted with rotting seed and diseased crops. Nothing is available for nourishment.

Maintaining this cyclical motion allows one to avoid deception. This cyclical motion is what instates an honesty that provides one the knowledge that one is undetermined, a knowledge that causes one to move spontaneously if one is to avoid deceiving one's self. A spontaneous movement that allows one to remain in this truthful consciousness of one's self, that allows one to relate to the true self, the undetermined self by the very act of uprooting the self and becoming new. One can take comfort in uprooting themselves because this is seen as the essential mode of being true to one's self. Uprooting causes one to live by causing a thousand births...one forever remains a child.

Living within this cycle of overcoming and going under may seem chaotic to someone intent on living linearly. But this chaos leads to the birth of the new. Like the chaotic forces of gravity that give birth to new stars. Nietzsche states "I tell you: one

must still have chaos in oneself to give birth to a dancing star. I tell you: you still have chaos in yourselves.”<sup>7</sup> The chaos of going under and over-going within the self causes one to be reborn. Such forces within the abyss grant one the possibility to live a thousand times over by being born and reborn a star.

The key to keep the star we are dancing is to follow one’s self, i.e. to “follow after” in both senses--ahead and behind one’s self. “But I need living companions, who will follow me because they want to follow themselves—wherever I please.”<sup>8</sup> Companions that will help one to live instead of helping one to die. Companions that help prevent one from becoming a rotting corpse. Is this why Zarathustra has so many animal companions? Because his wild animal friends know how to follow themselves? Here, we are reminded of Derrida’s question “Who am I following?” In following himself, Zarathustra has come to “lure many from the herd.”<sup>9</sup> Zarathustra seeks “companions, the creator seeks, not corpses—and not herds or believers either. Fellow creators the creator seeks—those who write new values on new tablets.”<sup>10</sup> Not corpses who are dead as they live, who rot as they outgrow their peak of maturity. He seeks those who would recreate their own values. Those who will one’s self to go over when one has gone under, and those same that will one’s self to go under once one has gone over. To uproot one’s self to follow one’s undetermined self. To know that the future is a return to origins; a future that should not be lived by a corpse, but by a child.

This is a conception of cyclical time, of the human living instead of dying. Of the human constituting itself back into the cyclical time it put aside. Maybe this can be relearned from the silent speech of animals. Maybe this time enables the constitution of non-apophantic speech. Nietzsche expresses this idea of cyclical time throughout his works by using the metaphors of animals. It is through these metaphors that one can glimpse the non-apophantic. Two important animals are the eagle and the snake.

The serpent represents wisdom. Besides their connection to the Genesis story, serpents in many cultures are thought to be wise because of a myth- they never die. The serpent accumulates knowledge of itself (creates its past) but does not let this prevent its ability to move forward. The serpent is able to shed this past via forgetting, which allows it to be reborn into a new phase of its life. It allows itself to be undetermined in order to facilitate growth, otherwise it could not shed its skins, the past, the old. The past becomes too itchy and irritating for the snake to hold onto long. It reaches maturity in the skin it is in but then sheds so it can begin the process of shedding the next...a fore-seeing of its going under and overcoming—of its growth. Through the undetermined, the serpent is in a state of honesty in order to know that the future contains promises of becoming (not death). The serpent has the gift of knowing when the fruit is ripe for the taking and when to throw it away to rot. There is no fear in casting away the past in order to take on the future. What it has learned in its past as a result of not being able to shut its eyes is that the cyclical is the process of the return to one’s self, but one’s new self. A new self that once reborn needs to be cultivated.

Understanding this mode of honesty that allows this process of shedding the past and becoming in the future is strengthened by the figure of the eagle. Not only does one need to realize that this process is part of the human’s natural constitution, one that it has forgotten about, but that it need’s the eagles pride in order to be proactive. The ability to take this process, grab hold of it, and make it one’s own. To hunger for the return of the

self. The eagle flies above with superior vision to help in its search for prey. In a mode of having overcome, as evident from its flight, the eagle searches for weakness to devour. It “goes under” in order to snatch these areas of weakness and potentiality within the self and tries to satiate its hunger. The eagle is always on the “look” out for areas where the earth has responded to its request and granted it fruit. The eagle has the ability to remain open and be patient as it waits for the right time to go under. Devouring points of weakness, i.e. immaturity, allow the eagle to resume its flight.

These are the animals that follow themselves, that know themselves and that Zarathustra is “following after” in order to reach a state of following himself. These animals are also more than mere metaphor; they also reveal that it takes an animal to listen to its drives in order to know when the right time is near to induce the process of change. It takes those instincts reason has dulled in order to know when is the time of maturity, when is the time to forget, and at what time occurs the chance to take on the new and begin the process of devouring. To follow the undetermined self, to relate to it, to nourish one’s self with the new in order to remain in this state of following. To follow the undetermined self is the being at home in uprooting.

And this cyclical nature of time demonstrates the constant metamorphoses of the human spirit. The metamorphoses from camel to lion to child. Nietzsche states

All value has long been created, and I am all created value. Truly, there shall be no more ‘I will.’” Thus speaks the dragon. My brothers, why is there a need of the lion in the spirit? Why is not the beast of burden, which renounces and is reverent, enough? To create new values—that, even the lion cannot accomplish: but to create freedom for oneself for new creating—that the might of the lion can do. But say, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion could not do? Why must the preying lion still become the child? The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yes-saying.<sup>11</sup>

The lion is needed to overcome the dragon of stagnation, of no more ‘I will.’” To be a camel is not enough...of renouncing what one was, how one was created, what past one carries with it. One also needs the courage of the lion in order to open the space for creation...a relearning who one is, which is a return to the self after one has announced all falsity. A return to the ground underneath. Courage allows one to remain on the ground, naked in honesty, and the ability to search for those seeds capable of creating new values. Derrida represents this lion. But also it takes the child to take these values and cultivate them, playing with them; and it also takes the child to forget, i.e., to grow bored with this game and move onto the next game granted it. The spirit of gravity cannot harm the child because the child can never remain serious.

We encountered the spirit of gravity in Derrida. This spirit of gravity is the one that sits on the minds of men, causing them to decay as they live under old values. There is no life force, no creativity. This is why laughter is so important. Laughter opposes

gravity and opens a space for creativity...for dancing. A confirmation that one is living by playing a game. "I would believe only in a god who could dance. And when I saw my devil I found him serious, thorough, profound, and solemn: he was the spirit of gravity—through him all things fall. Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill the spirit of gravity! I learned to walk: ever since, I let myself run. I learned to fly: ever since, I do not want a push before moving along."<sup>12</sup> Laughing subverts the rule of the spirit of gravity. Laughing opens up the space for change. It is representative of the child and its inability to carry its past with it. Laughing helps one to forget the importance of the past... it affirms that one is living. For when one affirms the wrath of the spirit of gravity, one has as much affirmation as a corpse.

It is interesting to think of the connection between language, wrath and death...as they are all characteristics of the spirit of gravity. Language affirms death by affirming what has been. It is the weight of the past in all its wrath taking charge of any situation. Taking the potentiality for the new and shoving it under the yoke of old values. So it would be interesting to think what it would be like to move past language...and live by requesting. Nietzsche seems to put forth the notion that language is a handicap, a trap that prevents life. And perhaps this is the advantage animals have over us. The advantage that children have over us with the games they sometimes play with make-believe languages. He says, "and if it wanted to speak it would have none who could understand it: so high has it grown."<sup>13</sup> And perhaps this is why Derrida's cat is silent. The animal has developed past the need for language. The cycles of time have moved it past this crux.

Looking at Nietzsche's critique of language, the question to be analyzed is whether the animal within us is able to overcome man, to overcome language...whether the "wild dogs"<sup>14</sup> within one's self can overcome the cage that contains them. This cage that keeps these dogs is a system of old values, of maintaining old values that one needs to confront. "Our senses learn only late, and never learn entirely, to be subtle, faithful, and cautious organs of cognition. Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimulus by reproducing once more an image that it has produced many times before, instead of registering what is different and new in an impression. The latter would require more strength, more "morality."<sup>15</sup> Domestication, training has caused us to maintain a mode of imposition, of domination over the world, of making the world ours instead of letting the world be "as such" it is. Our rule over our bodies (damn reason) has caused them to dull and unable to respect. This lack of respect causes an inability to be open to the new. We prevent the new from returning us to the undetermined animal. We prevent the new from altering the system of old values. "What is new finds our sense, too, hostile and reluctant."<sup>16</sup> To be able to register the different and new would take more "morality." A morality that is possible by the honesty in animal. But we must relearn to be honest; and until that time, when the animal has been unleashed, we will be dishonest by lying to ourselves. We will continue to push aside the body, push aside the world in order to live in a world of reason. A world formed of old values. A world that language has helped construct and fortify to deceive us. Language deceives us by making us think we are the creators of experience, when in actuality the old values that are able to be manipulated gives the appearance that we create experience.

Just as little as the reader today reads all of the individual words (let alone syllables) on a page—rather he picks about five words at random out of twenty and “guesses” at the meaning that probably belongs to these five words—just as little do we see a tree exactly and completely with reference to leaves, twigs, color, and form; it is so very much easier for us simply to improvise some approximation of a tree. Even in the midst of the strangest experience we still do the same; we make up the major part of the experience and can scarcely be forced not to contemplate some event as its “inventors.” All this means: basically and from time immemorial we are –accustomed to lying. Or to put it more virtuously and hypocritically, in short, more pleasantly: one is much more of an artist than one knows.<sup>17</sup>

Lying is a result of our education and the war of reason against the senses. A war awakened by Rousseau in his analysis of the useless particularities of perception, and the usefulness in generalizing experience via language. Generalization helps to maintain old values and prevent the creation of new ones by ignoring the different and the new. Language is the perfect tool for caging the animal. It is the perfect example of a reapplication of the past upon the present, a closure of uncertainty, nonclarity and chance. We set aside a new object of experience by reproducing an old image. There is a denial to register the new. To structure one’s life according to old values is to die before one begins living. To walk backwards from a pre-destined end to the present. A mediocrity of following what is predestined instead of following one’s self. Nietzsche warns not to be duped into the belief that there are such things as the fates. “Truly I do not want to resemble the rope makers: They spin our their yarn and always walk backwards.”<sup>18</sup> No spontaneity can be had. No freedom in life can be had. One needs to let go of the security this thread offers and give over to the fact that it is a lie...a lie which comforts. One most lives in a mode where one is always ready and able to burn this rope: “You must be ready to burn yourself in your own flame: How could you become new, if you had not first become ashes!”<sup>19</sup> And this mode needs to be characterized by honesty, non-apophantic logos, and the cyclical...a mode of being animal that still needs to be relearned.

The “fetters of false values and delusive words”<sup>20</sup> need to be broken to unleash Fenrir. This can happen if one concentrates on releasing one’s self from these values that fragment the self...from language. “With a hundred-faced mirror I caught its glance when its mouth was shut, so that its eye might speak to me. And its eye spoke to me.”<sup>21</sup> The non-apophantic. The speaking without speech. A cat’s eyes. The ability to catch the glance of the abyss, its potentiality and the patience to wait for it to speak. A speaking with the eyes, a speaking without speech. A speaking that grants that which one has requested, which one has remained open for, which one has remained open to be moved by in order to dance.

On the “feet of chance”<sup>22</sup> and not rationality can one dance. One learns to dance upon the discovery that there is no “eternal reason-spider”<sup>23</sup> spinning its web for us. No pure intelligibility or final purpose. There is just “a god’s table for divine dice and dice players” and that space of chance is what defines ourselves.<sup>24</sup> Becoming is not the unfolding of a path one has already traveled down in one’s head. It is not a path constructed to conform to one end in mind. Becoming is an always waiting for oneself, of following one’s self. Of relating to the undetermined animal that one is in order to take hold of chance and allow it to make one dance as so. This being open for chance gives one the lightness of heart and prevents the weight of the spirit of gravity. Chance allows us to follow the undetermined animal...to remain true to ourselves. To move spontaneously. This is what Nietzsche calls “bird-nature.”<sup>25</sup> And this occurs through learning. “Truly, I too learned to wait and profoundly so, --but only to wait for myself. And above all I learned to stand and to walk and to run and to leap and to climb and to dance. But this is my first teaching: he who wishes one day to fly, must first learn to stand and to walk and to run and to climb and to dance—one does not fly into flying”<sup>26</sup> This is the animal way of being, of time. A time indicative of the cyclical, a being indicative of honesty and silence. A being and time that must be relearned and develop if one “is to fly.” And this is not something one can just fly into...one needs to relearn in order to become animal again; one cannot just drop the dog to be wolf. One needs to realize and relearn the being and time Zarathustra’s animals tell him: “all things themselves dance for those who think as we do: they come and offer their hand and laugh and flee—and return. Everything goes, everything returns; the wheel of being rolls eternally. Everything dies, everything blossoms forth again; the year of being runs eternally.”<sup>27</sup> To think and live in this way takes great honesty and strength. One must allow one’s self to wait for the abyss to answer, which is to wait with courage in front of uncertainty. To remain undetermined. To wait for that which will allow one’s self to remain one’s self, to wait for the new that will allow one’s self to uproot one’s self. This waiting allows us to follow ourselves. The undetermined animals that we are. To follow ourselves in order to become ourselves. To create an opening for things to dance for us, to move us spontaneously.

Learning not to fear the process of uprooting through our natural spontaneous movement allows us to become and remain animal. “He has heart who knows fear but conquers it; who sees the abyss, but with pride. He who sees the abyss, but with eagle’s eyes—he who grasps the abyss with eagle’s talons: he has courage.----”<sup>28</sup> The abyss is seen as a vast pool of potentiality...one that offers up an endless amount of fish. So one must constantly return to the abyss, to the womb in order to nourish one’s self. This allows one to be reborn a star. Avoid setting them aside. Individuals able to do this are “in view of the fact that man is the as yet undetermined animal.”<sup>29</sup> They are honest, having perfected the only virtue left to them after their unlearning.<sup>30</sup> They have prevented themselves from becoming “a sublime miscarriage.”<sup>31</sup> These individuals, the Zarathustras, are the one’s one should follow from the herd in order to become the animal that follows one’s own indeterminacy.

These individuals of honesty have learned the importance of chance. Chance, every chance, is the thrill in possibility of letting loose the devil, the beast, the animal within in order to look differently at the world, i.e. leaving room in one’s narrowed

perspective for expansion. Forgetting. And this being open to chance is only possible for the rest of mankind if the human regains his or her animal self. If the human is able to “translate man back into nature.”<sup>32</sup> Back into the animal one is by developing one’s animal instincts again. One’s animal movement—spontaneous movement. The movement that allows the animal to relate to itself. A cultivation of reason is not needed...for this is what has sickened us. Reason is what has made us common. So opposed to Rousseau’s account of the perfection of man above the crude state of nature, Nietzsche urges for a cultivation of the uncommon human, the cultivation of an uncommon human that has an advantage of living in happiness over those who feel lost in the common. Those who have the advantage of registering the new, instead of flattening all life with commonality, simile. Those who live and let live instead of those that kill with words. This uncommon human is the animal that has been set aside. This human has been translated back into nature by moving with her, living with her, by relearning honesty, non-apophantic logos, and cyclical time in order to continuously learn from her. Learning from that which she lets dance in front of this human’s face. Letting these things move it to dance itself, to move spontaneously. Following these individuals will show one the road to living instead of the road to nihilism.

## The Apocalypse: Burning the Rope of Fate

I still struggle to peer in the mirror. Do I see an animal? Do I now know how to dance and not walk a tight-rope? Can I laugh in the face of gravity? Or am I still that dead mouse that remains trapped? Have I found my roses? My animal perspective?

I have observed the process of my education, that education that has domesticated me into a definite form...a common form. Courage to maintain honesty enabled me to view the lowly animal, the herd animal, I had become...the corpse—a being already dead before its time. Looking at the history of philosophy, I was able to see the fetters that restrained my potential animality...and these fetters were the tools of reason. One fetter innocently placed by the Greeks, who were open and inquisitive, offering up a value that was to be helpful and matured during their period. Another fetter was that of the theologians, domesticated by the God they created, carrying on this value of reason past its maturation. A value taken up and carried on as the one thing thought certain...and the idea of God reaffirmed this certainty. The after-world blinded the human so it could not see the earth, the cyclical, the wolf. The last fetter is the fetter that still holds us. The fetter consisted of those thinkers of modern philosophy that helped to stabilize and protect reason's power. They did this by replacing God with themselves. The human, instead of God, taking charge of its destiny by predetermining it. Setting ends and developing principles to achieve these ends. This period (which we are still under) of rope-walkers. It has taken one man to open the space of the undetermined animal...one man that reacts to the last (perhaps) of the rope-walkers.

Through Derrida, I have learned to unlearn and have the courage to remain honest by following myself. Honesty in following a naked self. His critique of his ghosts helped me to critique my own. His brief recommendation to develop the non-apophantic logos helped me to open a space to relearn what this means (something I must investigate more), a space which helps me also to relearn honesty.

Looking at the non-apophantic and honesty offered by Derrida, I snatch it up with my talons...talons I am not sure I have developed quite yet. I hear a faint echo as I read Derrida's brief discussion of these possibilities. This faint echo is Nietzsche, who whispers that to which I must return in order to understand these two elements: cyclical time. The cyclical time developed by Nietzsche seems to require a mode of honesty and a non-apophantic logos from those who constitute themselves upon this foundation—animals. One needs to follow the snake and the eagle to learn from their cyclical modes of being. This enables one to relearn how to be a cyclical being...an animal. Following these animals allows one to follow one's self. To return to one's self. To return to the undetermined animal. This process of returning to the abyss to shed skin and grab hold of that which will allow one to be reborn a new. To grab a hold of that which will allow one to remain undetermined and thus truthful to one's self. To grab hold of the new by

maintaining spontaneous movement in order to remain one's undetermined self...one that is not restricted to the non-movement of a corpse that causes one to be dead in certainty.

I look in the mirror and try to return to myself, to the animal, the undetermined animal. And the possibilities not yet known excite me...

I wait, open, heightening my senses as I peer into the abyss awaiting a response. I think I have found my roses that will lead me to enlightenment, to an honesty of perceiving myself as the undetermined animal. I now know to return to this state of nakedness. I am now proud of my nakedness. No more red cheeks. In the mirror I stare in the presence of the "who am I?" and can now begin to know "who I am." A who I am that must remain undetermined. A "who I am" that will become more and more as I follow my undetermined self via a new mode of being—one constituted on honesty, non-apophantic logos, and cyclical time. A "who I am" that will not fall under the certainty of the "who am I?" A "who I am" that moves spontaneously in order to resurrect one from death, uproot one from certainty in order to forever remain a child. A displacement of language appears to be necessary, a shift of power from the apophantic to the non-apophantic, a shift connected with the relearning of honesty and the cyclical. And once this time has been developed and constituted...once man has been translated back into nature, man can say: "I—have no reason for covering my nakedness."<sup>1</sup>

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## Notes and References

### Introduction: Meditations in the Mirror

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Clancy Martin (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2005), 100.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to Heidegger's notion of essence. The ability to perceive the "as such" is the ability to perceive the being of a Being. This is an ability that he believes only human Dasein possesses. See *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. For a summary of the animal's inability to apprehend the "as such," look to pages 259-261.

<sup>3</sup> In most of his works, Nietzsche describes a process of unlearning, relearning and learning. These three stages correspond to the camel, lion and child stages of the spirit's metamorphoses in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. See p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> An allusion to Nietzsche's metaphor of the snake used throughout *Zarathustra* in conjunction with the eagle. In this case I would be a snake unable to shed its skin. I am stuck in a skin of society's created values...old values.

<sup>5</sup> This is a reference to Derrida's comment that man must be cautious not to repeat oneself for fear of presenting oneself as having been trained, *dressage*. See *The Animal That Therefore I am*, trans. David Willis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 1. Dressage has the connotation in French of training. I know that in America, dressage is a method of training a horse to perform certain commands via the rider's weight and hands; a kind of trained dancing and a sign of domestication. Interesting in contrast is Nietzsche's notion of dancing, which is an act that welcomes the coming of pure spontaneity. Nietzsche loved the metaphor of dancing in this respect and uses it repeatedly throughout his works.

<sup>6</sup> This is another allusion of Nietzsche. Seriousness is opposed to play. It is a mode of perception that causes one to forget they are playing a game. We have all played games and hated that person that "takes it too seriously." They focus too much on the end of the game, winning, instead of enjoying the process of playing the game. Spontaneity is

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killed the moment one stops playing the game by projecting one's self toward the goal...and by projecting I not only mean projecting as in projectile, going forward, but also projecting as in projects (planning).

<sup>7</sup> See "Zarathustra's Prologue" for this account in Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 7.

<sup>8</sup> A reference to Aristotle that will be encountered later. One can find this in his "Metaphysics," in *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle*, ed. S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 691.

<sup>9</sup> Another Zarathustrian idea of the ability to follow one's self, which is related to his conception of cyclical time. For an example, see Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 18.

<sup>10</sup> Laughing, rope walking and the fates are all allusions to Nietzsche's metaphors.

<sup>11</sup> Another allusion to Nietzsche. See Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 40.

<sup>12</sup> Another allusion to Nietzsche. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra meets a man trying to speak with cattle because his speech was not understood among men. His speech was not understood among men that belong to the herd of old values. See Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 229-36.

<sup>13</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 247.

<sup>14</sup> This is a reference to Heidegger's analysis of the animal in his *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. The concept of captivation will be reencountered below.

<sup>15</sup> A term coined by Derrida referring to depriving the animal "every power of manifestation" (*The Animal*, 18). Derrida implies that one would be an "ass" for doing this...I use it here in the same way, but my purpose is to play with the metaphor of the ass in Apuleius's *The Golden Ass*.

<sup>16</sup> The question that haunts the mind of the human, and a question that could be said to constitute the essence of the human being. This question is the question that constitutes the human being as an undetermined animal. Though this question has existed since the origins of philosophy, Descartes is probably the one philosopher to give notoriety to this question. See his *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993. See p. 19.

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<sup>17</sup> A reference to a theme running throughout Jacques Derrida's work *The Animal That Therefore I am*. Translated by David Willis. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.

<sup>18</sup> Derrida is the perfect example to allude to Nietzsche's metamorphosis of spirit from camel to lion. This can be found in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Clancy Martin (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2005), 25.

<sup>19</sup> For more of this notion of following the self, look to Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*. One can find this specifically on p. 18, though it is a theme referred to throughout this work. I contrast this notion with Derrida's theme of the human following after the animal in *The Animal*.

<sup>20</sup> The might of the lion...see Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, 26.

<sup>21</sup> This is the question that he states Heidegger set aside. See Derrida, *The Animal*, 22 and 44.

<sup>22</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 143.

<sup>23</sup> A reference to Heidegger's way of referring to the essence of animality. See his *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 186.

<sup>24</sup> A reference to Donna Wilshire's work *Virgin Mother Crone: Myths and Mysteries of the Triple Goddess* (Vermont: Inner Traditions International, Ltd., 1994), 97. 'Give birth' refers to "She gave birth to ANIMALS!" which is a phrase I think Nietzsche would have enjoyed.

<sup>25</sup> Being undetermined is what I would like to argue as the fundamental essence of human animality "as such." I am using and expanding upon Nietzsche's idea that man is the "as yet undetermined animal" he mentions in "Beyond Good and Evil," in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufman, (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), 264.

## **I. Fenrir**

<sup>1</sup> Saemund Sigfusson, *The Elder Eddas of Saemund Sigfusson*, trans. Benjamin Thorpe (New York: Norræna Society, 1907), 287.

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<sup>2</sup> Fenrir was the offspring of Loki, Norse god of mischief, deceit and trickery. Loki is most often known for his unruly nature. The figure of Loki appears to hold many of the qualities Zarathustra held.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, "Phaedo," in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 47-8.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, "Phaedo," *Collected Dialogues*, 48.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, "The Republic," in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 813-4.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 282.

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle, "Metaphysics," in *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle*, ed. S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 691.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle, "De Anima," in *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle*, ed. S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 750.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, 16.

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, 16.

<sup>11</sup> Another reference to Nietzsche. Mediocrity is equated to passivity, and passivity is a sign of domesticity. Nietzsche uses this term many times throughout *Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil*.

<sup>12</sup> Augustine, "Concerning Order," in *Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Richard N. Bosley and Martin Tweedale (Ontario, CA: Broadview Press, 1997), 520.

<sup>13</sup> John Scotus Eriugena, "Periphyseon," in *Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Richard N. Bosley and Martin Tweedale (Ontario, CA: Broadview Press, 1997), 625.

<sup>14</sup> John Scotus Eriugena, "Periphyseon," *Basic Issues*, 625.

<sup>15</sup> Nietzsche warns against the spirit of gravity and despisers of the body throughout *Zarathustra*. For examples of this use, see Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 31 or 164.

<sup>16</sup> Dwarves are used as a symbol of ignorance in Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 135-6.

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<sup>17</sup> Rene Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), 19.

<sup>18</sup> Descartes, *Meditations*, 19.

<sup>19</sup> Descartes, *Meditations*, 19.

<sup>20</sup> Descartes, *Meditations*, 19.

<sup>21</sup> Descartes, *Meditations*, 20.

<sup>22</sup> Descartes, *Meditations*, 23.

<sup>23</sup> A reference to Nietzsche's use of "common," which can be found in "Beyond Good and Evil," in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), 406.

<sup>24</sup> Descartes, *Meditations*, 13.

<sup>25</sup> Descartes, *Meditations*, 20.

<sup>26</sup> Rene Descartes, "Discourse on the Method," in *Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 45.

<sup>27</sup> Reference to Aristotle's idea of the soul as a sailor commanding the body as a ship. See his Aristotle, "De Anima," in *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle*, ed. S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 746.

<sup>28</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Basic Political Writings*, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1987), 44.

<sup>29</sup> I can only assume he is referring, in particular, to Aristotle.

<sup>30</sup> Rousseau, *Basic Political*, 45.

<sup>31</sup> Rousseau, *Basic Political*, 45.

<sup>32</sup> Rousseau, *Basic Political*, 45.

<sup>33</sup> Rousseau, *Basic Political*, 46.

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<sup>34</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 189-90.

<sup>35</sup> Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 518.

<sup>36</sup> Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 545.

<sup>37</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1987), 319.

<sup>38</sup> Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 545.

<sup>39</sup> An allusion to Descartes in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*.

<sup>40</sup> Allusion to Derrida's theme throughout his work *The Animal that Therefore I Am*.

## II. Gleipnir

<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, trans. By William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (In: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 184.

<sup>2</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 237.

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 238.

<sup>4</sup> A reference to Heidegger's concept of leaping ahead that is developed in *Being and Time*.

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 239.

<sup>6</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 242.

<sup>7</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 243.

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 243.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 243.

<sup>10</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 255.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts*, 255.

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<sup>12</sup> John Wilmot, *The Complete Poems of the Earl of Rochester* (Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2006), 23.

### **III. The Lion**

<sup>1</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, trans. David Willis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 3.

<sup>2</sup>Derrida, *The Animal*, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 9.

<sup>6</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 10.

<sup>7</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 12.

<sup>8</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 12.

<sup>9</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 159.

<sup>10</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 159.

<sup>11</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 78-9.

<sup>12</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 94.

<sup>13</sup> Derrida, *The Animal*, 157.

### **IV. The Phoenix**

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Clancy Martin (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2005), 9.

<sup>2</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 77.

<sup>3</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 9.

<sup>4</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 9.

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<sup>5</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 9.

<sup>6</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 11.

<sup>7</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 13.

<sup>8</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 18.

<sup>9</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 18.

<sup>10</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 18.

<sup>11</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 26.

<sup>12</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 38.

<sup>13</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 39.

<sup>14</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 40.

<sup>15</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil," in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. by Walter Kaufman (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), p. 295.

<sup>16</sup> Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil," *Basic Writings*, 295.

<sup>17</sup> Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil," *Basic Writings*, 295. On 406 of Kaufman's translation, Nietzsche further develops this idea of language as a trap that domesticates man to the common order, i.e. the order of the herd. This commonality dulls the originality in sensing the new. He states, "Words are acoustical signs for concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite image signs for often recurring and associated sensations, for groups of sensations. To understand one another, it is not enough that one use the same words; one also has to use the same words for the same species of inner experiences; in the end one has to have one's experiences in common." He continues

...it would follow on the whole that easy communicability of need—which in the last analysis means the experience of merely average and common experiences—must have been the most powerful of all powers at whose disposal man has been so far. The human beings who are more similar, more ordinary, have had, and always have, an advantage; those more select, subtle, strange, and difficult to understand, easily remain alone, succumb to accidents, being isolated, and rarely propagate. One must invoke tremendous counter-forces in order to cross this natural, all

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too natural progressus in simile, the continual development of man toward the similar, ordinary, average, herdlike—common!

<sup>18</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 64.

<sup>19</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 57.

<sup>20</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 80.

<sup>21</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 100.

<sup>22</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 143.

<sup>23</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 143.

<sup>24</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 143.

<sup>25</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 164.

<sup>26</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 167.

<sup>27</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 187.

<sup>28</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 247.

<sup>29</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. by Walter Kaufman (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), p. 264.

<sup>30</sup> Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” *Basic Writings*, 345.

<sup>31</sup> Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” *Basic Writings*, 265.

<sup>32</sup> Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” *Basic Writings*, 351.

## **V. The Apocalypse**

<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” *Basic Writings*, 426.

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