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**Principled Conservatives or Covert Racists:
Disentangling racism and ideology through implicit measures**

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Inna Burdein

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The Graduate School

Inna Burdein

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the
Doctorate of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend
acceptance of this dissertation.

Charles Taber, Ph.D. – Dissertation Advisor
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science

Stanley Feldman, Ph. D. – Chairperson of Defense
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science

Milton Lodge, Ph.D.
Distinguished University Professor
Department of Political Science

Antonio Freitas, Ph. D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Psychology

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School

Lawrence Martin
Dean of the Graduate School

Abstract of Dissertation

Principled Conservatives or Covert Racists:

Disentangling Racism and Ideology Through Implicit Measures

by

Inna Burdein

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This dissertation addresses the current debate in the race literature regarding the connection between racism and conservatism. Specifically, do conservatives support or oppose certain racial policies because of the principles they hold, or because they want to insure a negative outcome for minorities? Due to the obvious social desirability concerns when explicitly studying this topic, I utilize both implicit measures and experimentation to get at thoughts and practices of conservatives, rather than their rhetoric. In turn, I find that despite the fact that conservatives discuss policies in ideological terms, at the implicit level these policies activate racial, and not, ideological considerations. Furthermore, I find that the ideological concepts of work ethic and individualism are quite linked to racial concepts (i.e. negative stereotypes) in the minds of conservatives, particularly sophisticated conservatives. Finally, an experiment that puts conservative principles to the test, uncovers that principles are *not* consistent across people, but are applied differentially based on the race of the beneficiary as well as the sophistication of the respondent. In line with Social Dominance theory, sophisticated conservatives apply their principles to minorities but not whites, while the non-sophisticates apply these same principles to whites – further legitimizing the myth that principles, rather than race, define policy.

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Chapter 1: An Overview

Introduction

Since the 1960s, overt measures of racism have failed to turn up racism in the American populace. In the early days of political research it was common for a large portion of survey respondents to say that they believed in the segregation of the races in school or work. Discrimination against minorities, be it through selective service or assigned seating, was accepted as a norm. Nowadays, one would be pressed to find people who agree with such positions or behaviors (McConahay, 1986). Racial stereotypes and labels that were once accepted as reality are now perceived by most Americans as offensive and inappropriate. This shift in racial relations has accounted for a new supposition that racism is “dead” (D’Souza, 1995; Roth, 1994). While few scholars truly believe that racism is dead, many have argued that race, at least in some cases, is no longer the driving force that it once was in American public opinion (Hagen, 1995; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993).

Despite the new speculation, events, studies, and personal accounts undoubtedly indicate that racism persists (Bobo et al, 1997; Devine & Elliott, 1995). However, this racism has transformed from a blatant antipathy into a more subtle disapproval or distrust. In response, new measurement scales, like the modern and symbolic racism scales, have been developed to account for a more subtle form of racism (Sears & Kinder, 1971; McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995, Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Katz et al., 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Bobo et al, 1997). Unfortunately, these efforts to detect new, more “subtle” forms of racism have prompted empirical and theoretical concerns about what they actually measure. Perhaps these new racism scales actually detect more than racism, or even something *other* than racism – particularly political conservatism (Fazio et al., 1995; Roth, 1994; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Weigel & Howes, 1985). For example, the symbolic racism scale originally achieved its subtlety by focusing on people’s support or opposition to race-related policies, or people. A symbolic racism scale question read, “It is wrong to set up quotas to admit black students to college who don’t meet the usual standards” (Kinder & Sears, 1981). This item has since been omitted, in response to the accusation that their items were too similar to the policy positions they were intended to predict. However, the present symbolic racism scale and other scales like it, still address “racism” through ideology related ideas: hard work, special favors, and undeserved outcomes. (Sears & Henry, 2003). These items differ greatly from the “Black people are not as smart as whites” item from the “Old-Fashioned Racism Scale” (McConahay et al., 1981). Presumably, the new items “work” because they offer some legitimacy to a response opposing blacks. “Racist” people may hide behind the seemingly reasonable imposition of “standards” in opposing racial quotas, or “hard work” in opposing special treatment, though their position is actually driven by their negative feelings towards blacks.

The difficulty of interpreting the scale occurs if a person is not *hiding* behind legitimate concerns about standards or merit but opposes quotas or special treatment

on principle. Accordingly, people may oppose certain policies on ideological principle rather than on prejudice, which is ultimately what these scales attempt to “explain.” To make matters worse from a conceptual standpoint, the opposition to quotas by some respondents may be a product of *both* principle and prejudice or may be principled for some and racist for others (Feldman & Huddy, 2005).

Although there have been endless studies that have tried to prove one side over another, the two sides remain convinced of their position. The debate remains open mainly because the theories involved appear unfalsifiable. When a study finds a significant relationship between conservative positions and subtle racism, one side claims that this confirms that racial considerations are driving conservative positions, while the other side claims that this confirms that the measure of subtle racism is picking up conservatism.

The problem is, while the new racism has become something more *implicit*, the measures have continued to be *explicit*. As a result, implicit racial thoughts remain unknown. Meanwhile, because the new explicit measures have become more vague and subtle, the explicit racial thoughts are not evident either. The goal of my dissertation is to help distinguish between ideology and racism, through the use of implicit measures, as well as experimentation, in order to offer some insight into the current debate.

Hypotheses

There are ten hypotheses that come out of the race literature that I will tackle in this dissertation. The first five hypotheses come out of the work of Sniderman and Carmines, four come out of the work of Sears, Kinder, and Sidanius, and finally the last hypothesis is based on my research on ideology.

Sniderman and Carmines claim that the principle of individualism, and other such conservative principles, underlies the opposition to race-related policies. Furthermore these principles are *orthogonal* to racial considerations, suggesting that the scales that utilize principles to get at racism are invalid. In fact, Sniderman and Carmines have argued that it is the liberals who are racially motivated, and for whom subtle or implicit measures are best suited. In their research they find that Liberals are more likely to overcompensate for their racial prejudice by being overly “pro-black” when the opportunity arises. Meanwhile, conservatives remain principled through out, regardless of the racial implications, making them appear more racist next to the overly generous liberals. Specifically, Sniderman and Carmines find that conservatives actually do not mind helping out minorities as long as their principles are not at stake. The two principles they find are critical to conservatives are less government involvement and color-blind standards. In turn, when private funds are at stake and when the beneficiaries of a policy are not determined by race, conservatives are supportive even if minorities are likely to benefit.

In contrast, those that rely on the symbolic racism scales in their work believe that racial considerations guide racial-policy opposition. The idea here is that racists find shelter in the conservative label, and use seemingly neutral principles of individualism to achieve racial inequality. Under this argument, principles are *intertwined* with racial considerations, and while not everyone may be aware of this manipulative tool, the more sophisticated the conservative the more he or she understands the racial utility of principles.

Finally, I hypothesize that both research camps may be right if we distinguish between two types of conservatives: social and economic. While the social conservatives most closely resemble the sort of conservatives symbolic racism is based on – one motivated by social hierarchy and social issues. The economic conservative may be the sort of conservatives found by Sniderman and Carmines, who are theoretically more principled and consistent in their beliefs.

Summary of the Hypotheses

1. Individualism underlies the opposition to race-related policies.
2. Individualism and Race are orthogonal.
3. Conservatives are more principled, liberals are more race conscious.
4. Conservatives oppose many minority focused policies due to their dislike of government involvement, *rather* than their dislike of blacks.
5. Conservatives appreciate color blind policies: They are willing to support policies that help blacks, as long as they are not designed to *only* help blacks.
6. Racial considerations underlie racial policies, more so than principles.
7. Racists find shelter in the conservative label (i.e. conservatives are more racist).
8. Racism is intertwined with conservatism.
9. Racism and conservatism are linked, or more intertwined, for political sophisticates.
10. Social conservatives are racist, economic conservatives are principled

Layout of the Dissertation

I address the relationship between Racism and Conservatism with the seven following chapters of my dissertation. Beginning with Chapter 2, I review the two main opposing views on this topic and the nine hypotheses that come out of them. I first outline the ideological argument, most notably proposed by Sniderman and Carmines: Principles of individualism influence conservative policy decisions regardless of the racial context. I discuss the logic and history of those conservative principles, suggesting their independence from racial concerns or motivations. I then summarize the empirical research that supports the principled and *not racist* nature of

conservatives and their consistent beliefs. Then I proceed to outline the racial argument which consists of several different theories, all suggesting that covert racism is at the forefront of people's minds and at the base of their political preferences. Here I begin to address the issue of social desirability or the current pressure to suppress racial views, along with empirical support. Additionally, I introduce the more controversial and complicated theory, most notably attributed to Jackman and Sidanius, which states that the conservative elite is actually manipulating the masses by promoting seemingly unbiased ideological principles in order to maintain the social hierarchy where minorities remain on the bottom.

In Chapter 3, I address the loaded concepts of racism and conservatism, the meanings of which differ from one context or researcher to another. I first discuss the way racism has been conceptualized in the literature, the measurements that have come out of that conceptualization, as well as the problems associated with those measurements. I then offer my accepted definition of racism and the measures that this definition warrants, specifically implicit measures. After organizing the racial concept, I move on to the concept of ideology and more specifically conservatism. Here I address the common measure of conservatism (i.e. self-identification) and its limitation. Given the limited research or support on this matter I present my own analyses of the ideological self-identification utilizing NES data, from which I identify three different types of conservatives. Two of those types account for the tenth hypothesis.

The following four chapters represent the studies I conducted to address the hypotheses the prior chapters fleshed out. The first study of Chapter 4 addresses the contentious relationship between racial policies and the motivations behind their support or opposition (*hypotheses 1, 3, and 6*), as well as the possible differences between social and economic dimensions of ideology (*hypothesis 10*). I utilize implicit measures (i.e. Lexical Decision Task) to gauge what people are actually *thinking* about when they are faced with three policies that range in their racial implications. My findings suggest that opposition to policies that have racial consequences is guided by racial rather than ideological considerations, as racial thoughts (i.e. African American stereotypes) are activated in people's minds rather than ideological ones (e.g. concepts of individualism or work ethic). However, economic conservatives are more likely than social conservatives to think about principles when faced with racial policies.

In Chapter 5, I delve further into the way people organize concepts in their mind by directly assessing the connection people have between conservative principles and racial stereotypes (*hypotheses 2, 8, and 9*). Once again by utilizing the implicit method of Lexical Decision Task, I gauge how related racial thoughts are to conservative principles by priming people with one or the other and seeing if the concepts activate each other, outside of conscious awareness. In accordance with the prior study, I find the two concepts are intertwined for most people, especially for political sophisticates. Both these studies exemplify the utility of implicit measures in attaining information about people's implicit thoughts or organization of concepts.

While both of the mentioned studies reject the hypothesis that the racial and conservative concepts are orthogonal, in chapter 6 I utilize the experimental method, similar to the one employed by Sniderman and Carmines, to understand how these

racial motivations (seemingly apparent in my implicit work) play out in the “real world” (*hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9*). Here I offer people a chance to support or oppose a hypothetical educational policy, where I vary the conservative principles this policy espouses, as well as the racial group this policy affects. Not surprisingly, I duplicate Sniderman and Carmines findings at first suggesting the conservatives are staying true to their principles, but with the added control of sophistication a different pattern emerges. While non-sophisticated conservatives apply principles in the case of white recipients, the sophisticated conservatives apply principles only in the case of black recipients. This supports Sidanius’ assertion that it is the sophisticated conservatives that *use* principles for racial ends. Additionally, I test the conclusions I drew from the first study by observing specific groups of people in their support or opposition of the different education policy. This paints a consistent picture of the connections people make at the implicit level and how they play out at the explicit level.

While the first three studies address how “racially” people think, and certainly suggest that there are racial motivations at hand, the last study of Chapter 7 attempts to more accurately get at the “racism” as it is defined in Chapter 3. Even if conservative principles are tied with racial stereotypes, that in itself doesn’t mean conservatives are more “racist” than liberals (*hypothesis 7*). I utilize implicit measures to gauge automatic affect people feel towards “African Americans” and basically replicate numerous other studies by showing that liberals and conservatives alike hold negative stereotypes and negative affect toward African Americans.

In chapter 8, I address the ten hypotheses I set out to test. With each hypothesis I tackle, I paint a fairly consistent picture of racism and its relationship with conservatism. On the methodological front, the studies together make a strong case for the use of implicit measures, especially in combination with explicit experimental methods. Meanwhile, on the theoretical front my research insinuates a fairly controversial reality, one of persuasion and conspiracy, where the sophisticated elite exploit the masses in order to promote a racial hierarchy.

Chapter 2: The Debate

Ideological Argument

Principles of Conservatism

The protestant work ethic, which affirms the importance of hard work, has shaped the U.S. history and its capitalist society. The American dream symbolizes the notion that people can come here with nothing and attain wealth and prosperity. Simply put: “God helps those who help themselves.” Certainly in a society where success is a sign of individual merit, a group that is low in status and wealth cannot be perceived with too much sympathy. Even if sympathy were present, it would not overshadow the individualistic rules of achievement. Accordingly, policies that are intended to help those who are in a sense “not helping themselves” will not be supported by those who live by the protestant ethic. Moreover, the general belief that hard work improves the prospects for prosperity is not necessarily unsound. It is likely that people who believe that life is “fair” are going to be more active in achieving their goals, compared to those with a more external locus of control. This view becomes politically relevant when it is the basis of opposition to public policy.

Sniderman and Carmines (1997) contend that people who hold to these individualistic principles most strongly have been falsely labeled “racist.” In contrast to truly racist people who oppose race-related policies because they do not want to see blacks succeed, this group may both understand that racism exists and believe that racism is unfortunate. Nevertheless, the principled group maintains that hard work and merit are the only considerations for job placement or college placement. Race in their case is not an issue, because other principles overshadow it (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Abramowitz, 1994; Roth, 1994; Carmines & Merriman, 1993; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Miller, 1994). This group is strong in their beliefs about work and fairness. Of course, a different definition of fairness may lead some highly principled people to support affirmative action. However, as long as fairness means individuals are judged based on individual merit, then those rules have to be respected despite any secondary considerations.

In addition to these genuinely principled respondents who have thought through the ramifications of their principled stand, there may also be people who follow principles because of their adherence to conventional norms (e.g., Authoritarians). The conventional group abides by the code of the protestant ethic, but not because of any sophisticated ideological analysis of policy outcomes, but rather because of a personal need for conformity with convention. Regardless of how one attained their ideology, Sniderman and Carmines (1997) refer to the consistent and stable belief of these groups as “principled conservatism.” They claim that individualism, the main value implicated in principled conservatism, is a general construct that affects all policy areas despite racial overtones in some policy areas. *I refer to the contention that individualism underlies the opposition to race-related policies as Hypothesis 1.* Accordingly, they assert that racism and ideology are orthogonal. Despite the conservative position on affirmative action, they are no

more, if not *less*, likely to be “racist” than liberals (Sniderman & Carmines, 1997). *The contention that racism and ideology are orthogonal is my second hypothesis.*
Empirical Support

Sniderman and Carmines (1997) have employed numerous experiments in order to address the distinction between racism and ideology. They used overt survey measures (asking people how angry they were in regard to affirmative action) and more covert experimental measures (the list experiment). They found that while conservatives were more likely to express anger in light of Affirmative Action when asked directly, the indirect measure revealed that liberals were as likely (or slightly more likely) to express anger toward the same policy. They also employed excuse experiments, where they offered people legitimate reasons to dislike a black or a white person (e.g. use of foul language). They found that even when admitting dislike would be justified, subjects did not treat the black and white characters differently. In fact, subjects seemed to give the black characters more credit (i.e. thought they would try harder to find a job). In other words, their experiments suggest that conservatives that claim to have positive views toward blacks, in fact do (as shown by their resistance to take advantage of an ‘excuse’ to express dislike). Liberals on the other hand, seem to repress their prejudiced feelings. This certainly contradicts the logic behind symbolic racism scales that attempt to capture racists by offering conservative-based items. What Sniderman and Carmines’ research suggests is that the “new racism” measures ought to be created to capture the liberals who shy away from old-fashioned measures, because conservatives who are “prejudiced” aren’t hiding.

Moreover, they observed the effects of racial prejudice of both liberals and conservatives on policy support. They found that while conservatives did not differ in their support across prejudice levels, liberals did. As prejudice increased for liberals, they became less supportive of racial policies; for conservatives prejudice had no effect. Sniderman and Carmines argued that this illustrates the principled nature of conservatives. Even when conservatives are highly tolerant toward race, they hold true to their ideological beliefs. *The notion that Conservatives are more principled than Liberals will serve as my third hypothesis.*

Finally, Sniderman and Carmines argued that race-related policies attained more opposition from the conservative side, *not* because of racism, but because of the conservative discomfort with government involvement and racialized politics. They posed different scenarios (i.e. college scholarships) in both a race-neutral frame and a race-specific frame, and found that the race-neutral frame attained more support. They used this piece of evidence to affirm that conservatives appreciate color-blind policies. They do not mind helping people in need, in fact they support help as long as it does not depend on race. Moreover, they found that those conservatives who claimed to like blacks, though not willing to support government-run programs, were

willing to support privately run programs. *My hypothesis four and five will focus on these contentions: (a) conservatives dislike government involvement, rather than dislike helping the black community, and (b) conservatives support policies, even if they help blacks, as long as they do not specifically aim to just help blacks; conservatives appreciate color-blind policies.*

Racial Argument

Covert Racism

Despite arguments that conservatives are not more prejudiced, the new racism scales continually find a high correlation between “racism” and ideology. The argument can be made that modern racism scales do not misperceive these principled people, because they are in fact *hiding* behind ideology, rather than *relying* on it. Due to the new norms of politically correct language and beliefs, a person who does not support the integration of black and white students is compelled to hide that fact. However, through opposition to admission policies that favor black students this person is able to support his preference without being outed as a racist. When asked to justify such a stance, this person may throw out words like ‘merit’ and ‘fairness’ with little difficulty, especially because those elements may be present to a lesser extent. Kinder and Mendelberg (2000) argue that the ideological construct of individualism *only* surfaces when the policy is race-related, and does *not* surface when the policies deal with gender and class. Affirmative action is a prototypical example of a “race-related” policy (Sears et al, 1979; Sidanius et al, 1996), however other policies like welfare spending, law and order, and even tax-reduction policies have been predicted by racial attitudes as well (Gilens, 1995; Sears & Cintrin, 1985). This strongly contradicts the Sniderman and Carmines (1997) argument that ideological principles guide most policies, independent of racial factors. This does not in itself mean that conservative people are all racist; rather, this suggests that racists may find shelter under the conservative label. *The notion that racial considerations, rather than ideological ones, guide policy positions will serve as hypothesis six. The idea that conservatives are actually more racist than liberals will be my seventh hypothesis.*

Racist ideology

The more complicated contention is that racism and ideology are intertwined. Kinder and Sears (1981) argue that symbolic racism is “a blend of anti-black affect and traditional American moral values embodied in the protestant ethic” (p.416). Similarly for Jackman (1994), ideology is not a hide-away but a deliberate tool. She asserts that dominant groups use ideology as a method of social control (also see Jackman & Muha, 1984). The moral framework of ideology is manufactured in order to create a legitimacy that subordinate groups are able to accept. Emphasizing opportunity over outcome is an example of a strategic principle. Accordingly, affirmative action interferes with outcome- more minorities attaining jobs or school

entrance. Instead the dominant focus is ensuring equal opportunity, so laws stating that minorities will not be discriminated against are supported while laws stating minorities will attain certain privileges are not. This conception is reminiscent of other conspiracy theories, where the brilliance is in the perfect blend of a dominant group's discrimination and seeming sensitivity toward the group they are discriminating, which both keep the subordinate groups down and allows them to believe that they are being cared for. *My eighth hypothesis is Jackman's assertion that the concept of ideology has become intertwined with racism.*

Similarly, Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) argue that ideology is a legitimizing "myth" that maintains the general group hierarchy. Again it is important to note that even if ideology was created or merged with the interests of the dominant groups, there are people who may subscribe to an ideology based on the principles it now represents (no matter their basis). In response to that assertion, Sidanius et al. (1996) found that the relationship for conservatism and racism increased for sophisticates. This suggests that conservatism may be a hiding place or a representative ideology for prejudiced people, or at least it is perceived to be so by sophisticates. However, the unwashed majority of non-sophisticates may not perceive ideology to be related to racism or group hierarchy. Perhaps an extension to Jackman's theory may be that in addition to manipulating subordinate groups, the dominant elite are able to convince other members of their in-group that their ideological values are legitimate. *My ninth hypothesis, which is an extension of hypothesis eight, is Sidanius' assertion that the relationship between ideology and racism is strengthened as sophistication increases.*

Chapter 3: Revisiting the Concepts

The Concept of Racism

Defining Racism

Before proceeding it is important to define what is meant by “racism”. In 1954 Allport defined “ethnic prejudice” as an “antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole or toward an individual because he is a member of that group.” The two main elements here are that the antipathy must be “faulty” and “inflexible.” Certainly in the context of this debate, the perceived “faultiness” of the beliefs are part of the question. Is the perception that blacks are not working hard enough a faulty generalization or an accurate one? The two ideological camps surely differ on this question. Furthermore, the “inflexibility” of the generalization may be perceived as a positive trait of a principled person, referred to as “consistency.”

Present Definitions

Sears et al. (1997) identifies five conceptualizations of racism that have been employed in the literature. The first conception is the “old-fashioned” racism. The clean aspect of this theory defines racism as a belief that whites are superior to blacks. The messier aspect of this theory defines racism as support of physical segregation and legalized discrimination. As with the other definition of racism that follow, there is a constant confusion of the antecedents of racism with the subsequent results. Believing blacks to be inferior ought to lead to support for segregation. While the reversed causal arrow is possible, it is dangerous to assume that policy support in itself defines racism. Although Americans have accepted the fact that blacks should not be forbidden to go into “white” restaurants, or pursue an education, support for policies, even those that are presently referred to as “racist,” must remain the dependent variable. For example, in 1996 the Kentucky government removed the ban on racially integrated education; 33% of the electorate opposed this change. Does that mean a third of the voting electorate is “racist?” If the same electorate was asked about its beliefs about those issues directly, more than likely a much lower proportion of the electorate would express support for segregation and discrimination. An argument could be made (and has been made) that people simply wanted to maintain their historical document, as it was (i.e. a conservative desire to maintain the status quo). Similarly, an argument could be made that behind discrimination is “real interests” (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). Not wanting blacks to move into my house next door, because I believe the property value will go down, is not equivalent to not wanting a black family to move in because I believe they will steal from me.

A more systematic conceptualization of racism lies in stereotypes. This is similar to old-fashioned racism if we include “inferior” as a stereotype people hold for blacks. While more often than not negative stereotypes are employed (i.e. lazy and violent), positive stereotypes (i.e. athletic and sexual) have also been observed. Stereotypes have been found to predict both policy and candidate preferences (Bobo

& Kluegel, 1993; Kinder & Mendelberg, 1995; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Tuch & Hughes, 1997). The problem with this conceptualization is twofold. First, stereotypes seem to be held by most Americans. The famed Devine study revealed that most people knew and could come up with racial stereotypes quite easily, and were then also able to automatically apply them to “Donald.” Since stereotypes are often culturally shared, this offers less variance than would be preferred. At the automatic level, people are able to link blacks with hostility quite easily. That link may be a product of mass media more than a person’s belief that blacks are hostile. In fact, Devine’s second part of the study concluded that stereotypes were not critical to racism, but rather people’s controllability of those culturally induced stereotypes was.

The second issue with stereotype use, is the direction of that stereotype. While a positive stereotype is still a stereotype, people may not feel comfortable labeling someone who thinks, for example, Swedish people are beautiful, as prejudiced. On the other hand, most people would find that believing that all Polish people are stupid is prejudiced. One can certainly make arguments that positive stereotypes are just as detrimental as negative ones (i.e. An Asian girl feeling like she must excel in math), but the literature on stereotypes is not consistent in this way. The theory, which includes both positive and negative stereotypes, is often operationalized one-sidedly (i.e. NES asks if people think blacks are lazy, rather than if people think blacks are musically inclined).

The third conceptualization of racism adds an affective component; so regardless of one’s perception of a group (e.g. they are smart or stupid) the question is how one *feels* toward this group. In fact, one may not have any developed stereotypes about a group, but maintain an aversion or an affinity toward it. Despite the fact that a positive feelings toward a “group” may be just as biased as a negative one, the literature has defined racism in terms of *negative* affect (Carmines & Merriman, 1993; Sears & Jessor, 1997; Sears, 1988; Sidanius et al, 1996).

The fourth conceptualization of racism, Sears et al. define as the “new” racism. This includes the symbolic racism (Sears & Kinder, 1971; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Henry 2003), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), subtle racism (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), racial resentments (Kinder & Sanders, 1996), ambivalent racism (Katz, Wackenuit, & Hass, 1986), aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), and Laissez-faire racism (Bobo, Kluegel & Smith). The problems of these scales are the motivations for this dissertation. These scales attempt to combine elements of the racism conceptualization already mentioned with political conservatism and other cognitive content that may or may not relate directly to the stereotypes or negative affect that the items attempt to indirectly capture (Feldman & Huddy, 2005; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1993).

Looking specifically at the latest version of the symbolic racism scale (Sears & Henry, 2003), there are four categories of items all of which are problematic. The first category defines racism as a denial of racial discrimination (i.e. “Discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem...”) Although I appreciate the resurgence of a psychoanalytical concept (denial), unless more research is done on Freudian theory, “denying” racial discrimination may not equal racial resentment. Certainly one’s living environment may affect one’s response to these items (i.e. living in a

segregated or multi-racial community). One's reading habits may also influence what one believes the state of minorities is. If a person has never experienced racism first hand, and has worked pleasantly with ethnic minorities, there is no reason to suspect her to believe discrimination is still rampant, especially since the mass media conveys both that it is and that it isn't.

The last three categories of symbolic racism, like the first category, may also play on ignorance or mixed media messages. Most importantly, these categories are directly linked with the ideological arguments noted: blacks should work harder, demands for special favors, and undeserved outcomes. The problems with these items have been noted throughout this paper. For each item a logical argument could be made to support each response, all without the use of racial concepts. In addition to individualism, subjective reference points may guide the response. For example, the agreement with "blacks are demanding too much from the rest of the society" depends on one's idea of what "too much" is, and what the "demand" is. Is their demand to be treated equal? Is their demand to be given restitution? Those are not equivalent demands. The most important problem with these scales, which I will return to in the measurement section, is that each item has a different "correct" answer for different audiences.

For the fifth and final conception of racism, Sears et al. include four separate theories, all of which focus their attention on the 'racist' person's group: group position theory (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996), realistic group conflict (Bobo, 1988), social dominance theory (Sidaneous et al., 1996), and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). According to the social identity theory people strive for a positive self-concept, which is tied with a positive social-identity. In order to have a positive social-identity one must believe their social group (which may include a racial group) is better in some ways to other groups. According to this conception, it is not that whites dislike Blacks because of who *they* are, but rather blacks are disliked in order for whites to *like themselves* more. For the purpose of this research, this distinction is not important. Whether a white person dislike blacks because of an attempt to increase her self esteem, or whether she dislikes blacks because she finds them repulsive is equivalent, if the dislike itself is comparable.

In the case of the realistic group conflict, the concept of racism is more problematic. Under this theory whites do not have to hold negative stereotypes of blacks, nor do they need to actively dislike them. Whites react to blacks as an economic threat; they are interested in maximizing their gain which may mean that they do not want (a) a black person to have an advantage over them in attaining employment, or (b) having a black family move into their white neighborhood. This again treats the behavioral outcome as an operationalization of racism, which is problematic because other reasons may exist for a given behavior. Social dominance perspective, though theoretically employs some of the self-interested and economic ideas, does require people to hold a view, consistent with old-fashioned racism, that some groups are inferior. A white person that opposes racial quotas, in this sense, is not racist unless he opposes it *because* he believes blacks are inferior to his racial group (i.e. supports group hierarchy).

Proposed Definition

For my research I will employ the first three conceptualizations offered above. Specifically, racism must be defined in terms of cognitive and affective predispositions, and *not* the outcomes of those predispositions. The cognitive aspect, which includes beliefs and stereotypes, may be both negative and positive. However, the term racist will be used to indicate (1) the *negative affect* people feel toward minorities, of which blacks are my focus, and/or (2) the objectively negative stereotypes or beliefs people apply to minorities. Notably, negative affect is a relative term that is specific to the individual: An ill-tempered person may dislike blacks, because he or she dislikes most everybody. In turn, the dislike is indicative of racism only if the black person elicits more negative feelings than a non-black person. Under this definition, people may be racist even if they think “well” of blacks, as long as they dislike them more than other groups to which they do not belong.

In the same vein, people may be racists *despite* the fact that they have positive affect toward blacks, if they believe them to be an inferior (though likeable) group. This is an important distinction given the type of studies that were employed by Sniderman and Carmines. Particularly, they often observed people’s affect toward blacks in negative contexts (i.e. welfare mother or drug search). It is quite possible that racist people have positive affect toward blacks, when they are in inferior positions. So a racist person may be perfectly comfortable with a black gardener, and they may like or feel sympathetic toward the black problem child. However, if that same problem child excels and becomes an honor student, that positive affect may decrease; while for a white child who excels the positive affect would increase.

Under this definition of racism, opposing affirmative action in itself has no bearing on how racist a person is. If a person feels neutral toward blacks and doesn’t perceive them to be inferior or lazy, but dislikes the concept of special treatment affirmative action espouses, she is not ‘racist.’ Most importantly, by moving away from behavior or beliefs about related issues and focusing on one’s beliefs about blacks directly, the term racism is discernable rather than obscure. This is a critical point for this debate, because the contrasting research defines “racism” differently, and as long as the definition of racism is contested, claiming that one group is more “racist” will be detested.

Measuring Racism

Social desirability Concerns

Given that I have defined racism as holding negative feelings toward minorities and/or holding negative beliefs about them, the question that follows is how do we attain this information? An obvious problem is that people are no longer comfortable expressing race-related beliefs (Schuman et al, 1985). Virtually all studies designed to contribute to the race-ideology controversy have used *explicit* measures to test their hypotheses. Due to the shift in racism norms, social desirability concerns that may have been absent before now pose a serious problem to findings based on explicit measures. If a survey is at all suggestive of its racial purpose, people will resist their prejudiced urges (Kuklinski & Cobb, 1979; Wittenbrink et al., 1997), especially if they are high self-monitors (Terkildsen, 1993). Moreover, these desirability effects occur in both survey and experimental research. Explicit measures have been able to bypass some social desirability through innovative experiments (for

example, the “list” survey procedure). Specifically, removing censure, retaliation, and ensuring anonymity increases the chances that respondents will reveal their true preferences (Crosby, 1980). Also, the experiments Sniderman and Carmines (1997) ran were able to gauge prejudice by offering a legitimate excuse to reveal prejudiced feelings. A similar logic has been employed in creating the Symbolic Racism scale and other such scales. However, surveys do not have the capability to ensure that what is being measured is in fact a reaction to the race content, and not the ideological content inherent in the items. Moreover, if racism is in fact inherent in ideology and vice versa, then trying to separate the two will be impossible. Without the separation though, could we say people are hiding behind conservatism? Simply relying on what people say or how people react does not offer enough information about their motivations and thoughts. If a person feels disgust at the thought of a black person attaining a job over a white person or if a person feels that a black person ought to be able to attain the job based on merit, she is likely to say it is “not fair.”

To complicate matters further, Crandall (1994) found that self-monitoring affected people’s responses to the Modern Racism Scale items. This suggests that people were aware of a social desirability component (most probably in regards to the racial content) even in these diluted items. In the Sniderman and Carmines studies, a closer look at the data revealed that despite the “excuse” to express negative feelings toward the black characters, Liberals seemed to express more positive feelings toward blacks. Granted, Sniderman and Carmines use this information to confirm that Liberals are less consistent, the more critical finding is that Liberals are over-compensating their feelings when they perceive the experiment to deal with “blacks.” In a similar vein, Terkildsen found that high self-monitors showed a *decrease* in prejudice as a candidate’s skin darkened. Simply put, as people become more aware of the sensitivity surrounding race, explicit measures of racism, even if they are covert, become noisy and distorted.

The need for Implicit Research

Clever explicit measures that bypass social desirability and demand characteristics are only as clever as the subjects they are attempting to “trick.” The only way to insure that social desirability is not an issue is to employ implicit measures. Implicit measures allow researchers to elicit feelings, opinions, and thoughts of a subject without the subject realizing that they are disclosing personal information. In this way, implicit indicators may tap into “true” prejudiced feelings (Wittenbrink et al, 1997; Kuklinski et al, 1979). Interestingly, Fazio et al. 1995 found that reaction time studies, as used by Wittenbrink et al., were more predictive of behavior than Modern Racism scores. Particularly, it was the implicit prejudice indicator that predicted how “friendly” white students would act toward black students. Other researchers have also found that implicit attitudes were predictive of explicit behavior in other fields (Marsh et al. 2001, Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Greenwald and Schuh, 1995).

In regards to this research agenda, predicting behavior is a secondary concern, what is most important is to describe the thoughts and feelings of different people, who support or oppose different policies. The present debate is not centered on whether we can predict that conservatives will oppose affirmative action; the present

debate is centered around whether opposing race-related policies or supporting principles of individualism, means that one is racist.

The Concept of Conservatism

Defining Conservatism

Although the measurement of racism has been a contentious issue, ideology has continually gone under the radar. In response to conservatism being linked to racism, researchers have attacked the measurement of racism despite the possibility that the ideology measure is itself inadequate. Part of the reason ideology has remained unquestioned, may lie in the fact that as early as 1937, people's placement on an ideology scale has been a consistent predictor of policy preferences, issue positions, candidate choice at the individual level, and racism.

Despite the seeming acceptance of a simple seven-point scale, the concept is far from clear. The terms liberal and conservative have not been stable in America, and have not matched the meanings attributed to these terms in other countries. Liberal once stood for free choice, individualism, private property, and the free market. This definition has since become associated with conservatism. Moreover, one's association with the right or the left was at one point highly class based, as Marx had perceived it. This anchoring in social groups, according to Knutsen, has since declined, (though it remains a safe bet that a rich person is more likely to be conservative than liberal). However, classical liberalism is hardly the sole definition of conservatism. Rossiter defined conservatism as a preference for stability, founded on dispositions or values for peace and security. Although this definition was offered in the 60s, how much does it define what ideology means today? In contrast to Rossiter's image of peaceful-minded conservatives, Jost et al. (2003) found support for his contention that conservatives were aggressive and intolerant beings. For Jost et al., as for Rossiter, this orientation stemmed from fear and uncertainty, but the resulting values and behaviors are what Rossiter would have defined as a reaction or standpattism. Is the conservative label combining both prudent mediators along with the aggressive fanatics?

In addition to the materialist dimension and the 'rigid' dimension, Inglehart found yet another dimension that defined ideology: the postmaterialist value orientation. Postmaterialist values extended beyond materialist concerns, and focused on environment issues, gender rights, and other social issues. Although this dimension was argued to be a result of affluence, higher educated and middle class people were not necessarily post-materialist (Scarborough). While this post-materialist dimension has been argued to be orthogonal to the materialist or economic dimension, Knutsen found support for the pluralisation theory, which states that the values of both factors contribute to the final Left-Right placement. Is that the case? Are people averaging across all of their post-materialist, economic, and rigid considerations as they define themselves as a "2," or are people likely to be a "2" on

all these dimensions as Knutsen's findings suggest? Does it follow that if one strongly believes in the free market, they will also oppose the equality of women? Which of these labels best encompasses what conservatism means to the race literature?

Conservatism relation to Racial Issues

In response to these theoretical works, many researchers have pushed for a more multi-dimensional approach to ideology (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Asher, 1980; Weisberg & Rusk, 1970). Nevertheless, ideology continues to be included as a simple seven-point scale in most of the studies I have discussed. This introduces the possibility that the confusion surrounding the ideology and racism link may lie in part in the merging of different types of conservatives. The studies that uncover a significant relationship between conservatism and racism may be picking up just a subgroup of conservatives. Similarly, a study that finds that conservatives appear to be principled and not prejudiced may be picking up another subgroup within this messy "conservative" label. Specifically, the belief system of economic conservatives ought to be a lot more in line with individualism, than the belief system of social conservatives, which ought to be more focused on social groups (i.e. minorities). Notably, if principles guide racial policies as Sniderman and Carmines suggest, than economic conservatives may be principled while social conservatives are not. *Accordingly, I hypothesize that social conservatives oppose racially targeted policies due to their feelings toward minority groups, while the economic conservatives may oppose racially targeted policies due to principles, such as individualism.* Ignoring this distinction unfairly clusters two different groups of people together, which further accounts for the discrepant findings among the research.

Preliminary study

Despite the numerous works that uphold the multi-dimensionality of ideology, there is limited empirical support for the distinct effects of specific ideological dimensions. In turn, I provide a preliminary study that supports my contention and defends my choice to distinguish social and economic conservatives in my following studies. While I suspect there are more dimensions than I am explaining (see Conover & Feldman, 1981), I have focused on: (1) the economic/materialist dimension, (2) the social dimension, and (3) the propensity towards change dimension. I suspect that these three dimensions are neither highly correlated nor perfectly orthogonal. I believe these dimensions are most pronounced in conservatives, however, liberals too may distinguish among these dimensions. My main hypothesis is that when people place themselves on the L-C scale, they are placing themselves on their most salient dimension and that placement/dimension in turn influences their opinions about related policies. Furthermore, despite the seeming complexity of such political distinctions, I expect that most people who place themselves on the scale are able to apply their ideology in a consistent manner. For the purpose of this dissertation, although I report on the "change" dimension, I am particularly interested in the differences between the social and economic dimensions.

Method

I utilized the 1980 National Election Survey in order to test my hypotheses. My first goal was to distinguish the different dimensions people relied on when they placed themselves on the Liberal-Conservative scale. The most obvious way to find out what the ideological scale means to people is to ask them. The 1980 post-election survey asked respondents what “Liberal” meant to them, as well as what “Conservative” meant to them. Although people were asked to come up with three definitions for each, many people stopped at one. For my purposes it is important that I attain their initial response because that is their most salient response, which I suspect to have the most influence on their placement. The second and third definitions offered may be forced attempts to offer something *different* than their first, and I suspect, more accurate response. Furthermore, I was most interested in respondents’ definition of themselves rather than the other group. Also, because of the animosity that often lies between liberals and conservatives, the definition of another group may elicit exaggerated and personal definitions like, “irresponsible and aggressive,” the dimensions of which are not clear. For moderates I decided to use their first response to the open-ended question about liberals, simply because that was the first question that they were asked and hence I expect their personal ideology definition to have surfaced there.

All of the open-ended responses were recoded to fit the categorizations found earlier by Conover and Feldman (1981). Just as they had found, the majority of the open ended responses fit within their 13 categories. Of those the most commonly used definitions by liberals of liberals involved change, group references, concern with problems, socialism, and equality, in that order. For conservatives the most common responses included change, fiscal policies, new deal issues, capitalism, concern with problems, and reference to groups. Although there were several people that offered other definitions that dealt with items not related to my three dimensions, like foreign policy, they were small in number. My final dimension variable was a recoding of the 13 categories into 3. Specifically, the first dimension was the “rigidity” or Rossiter-type conservative dimension, and it only included the change category (including comments like “rash” or “status quo”). The second dimension was the “social” dimension and it included five categories: equality, concern with problems, group preferences, recent social issues, and minority groups. The third and final dimension was the “economic” dimension and it included three categories: fiscal policies, socialism/capitalism, and new deal issues. As expected given Conover and Feldman’s findings, the liberals offered more responses dealing with the social dimension, while the conservatives offered more responses dealing with the economic dimension, refer to Table 3.1 for the breakdown of the people in each category.

Table 3.1 about here

The second step was to compare the people who differ in their definition of ideology in the way they react to different policies. I analyzed a total of eight policies. All of the policy questions offered a 7-point scale, and were recoded 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the more conservative position. Of the eight policies, four dealt with social issues, while the other four dealt with economic issues, although some social aspects seeped through. The social issues dealt with (1) abortion, (2) women’s role, (3) aid to minorities, and (4) busing. The more economic issues involved (1)

government spending, (2) defense spending, (3) tax cuts, and (4) government guaranteed jobs. In order to determine how distinct the dimensions are for liberals and for conservatives I ran eight regressions for each policy variable separately for liberals and for conservatives. I created dummy variables for the different dimensions in order to compare liberals who defined ideology in terms of change, and those who defined it in social or economic terms.

Results

The partial results are noted in Table 3.2, the N for the liberal subjects was 131 and the N for the conservative subjects was 253. Note that the excluded dimension is the economic one. Although I did not include these variables in the table, I controlled for party identification, strength of ideology (leaning, weak, or strong), and several demographic variables that may affect policy stances: gender, age, education, income, and race.

Table 3.2 about here

Although some policies were not affected by the different groups of people, in some cases there were clear significant differences between the social, economic, and change prone (or not) liberals and conservatives. The liberals that defined themselves in terms of “open,” “flexible,” and “progressive” were consistently less “liberal” on the issues compared to both social liberals and economic liberals. In other words, the people that consider themselves liberal because they appreciate change are seemingly less “liberal” than those who are devoted to specific goals and values. More importantly, there seemed to be no differences in policy preferences between social and economic liberals. This makes sense since the support of a fiscal policy that encourages spending, or a support of a welfare state are tied in with the idea that people need to be helped, and government needs to help them, which defines the social dimension. In contrast, a highly significant difference was found between social and economic conservatives in regard to two of the four social issues. Particularly, social conservatives were much more likely to say that the women’s place was in the home and that abortions should be prohibited, than economic conservatives. Social conservatives were also significantly more likely to want to prohibit abortions than Rossiter-type conservatives who were .22 less likely to support a pro-life stance.

The two ‘social’ issues that did not distinguish between economic and social conservatives were race related issues. Consistent with the problems with new racism scales, racial policies are both social (minorities focused) and economic (government aid). The economic policies also failed to distinguish between social and economic conservatives, again suggesting that social concerns (i.e. who benefits?) seeps into seemingly economic issues. Nonetheless, this analysis suggests that the way one defines ideology may account for distinct political preferences.

Despite the fact that economic and socially defined liberals did not differ among themselves on policy preferences, they may still significantly differ from conservatives. I would suspect that liberals might not significantly differ from conservatives if the policy in question is not within their dimension of ideology. In order to test this hypothesis, I combined all of the liberals, moderates, and conservatives that defined ideology in the same terms. This both increased my N, and allowed me to compare the overall effect of ideology on policy preferences given the

specific dimension, refer to Table 3.3 for the results. Like the previous models, all of the reported regressions controlled for party identification, gender, age, education, income, and race.

Table 3.3 about here

For each policy there are significant differences in the effect of ideology between dimensions. With the exception of defense spending, the smallest effect of ideology occurs among those whose ideology rests on the change/no change dimension. As I had suggested before, these people are choosing to identify as liberal or conservative because of a general disposition or understanding of how issues should be handled. This is starkly different than people who identify with liberals or conservatives because of the values or issue positions they hold. In turn, the pro-change liberals do not seem to differ significantly from conservatives on seven of the eight policy issues. The largest ideological effect for such people lies in the one policy that directly relates to their concern for security – defense spending.

The people who align based on the social dimension react strongly to policies in light of their identification. The largest impact of ideology for these people occurs when they are dealing with social issues. Refer to Table 3.4 for the slope effects of ideology. For two of the social policies, the impact of ideology for the social ideologues is significantly larger than the impact of ideology for the economic ideologues. In the case of minority aid and busing this difference is not significant but is in the expected direction. What is interesting is that social ideologues were not significantly different than the economic ideologues regarding the economic issues. Part of this may-be due to the social elements inherent in these policies. Although taxing is a purely economic issue on the surface, cutting taxes may mean fewer services for the disadvantaged groups.

I found support for this notion by running regressions for a couple clearly economic thermometer variables like “big business,” “working men and women,” and “business men.” These variables are free of any social implications, so I would expect that social liberals and conservatives would not necessarily differ in their affect. In fact, social ideology was significantly less predictive of the ratings than economic ideology ($p < .001$). It seems reasonable to infer from this that social conservatives and liberals may-be hyper-sensitive toward “social” issues, so any social implication or connotation results in a polarized reaction.

Table 3.4 about here

Implications

The goal of these analyses was to uncover the working dimensions within “ideology.” Although the social and the economic dimensions were not always distinguishable, when they differed their difference was significant. Particularly, in relation to social issues, conservatives were *not* united. Based on my results, the average economic conservative is not so distinct from the average economic liberal in his or her perception of the women’s role in society. The social conservative, however, varies from the social liberal three times more than the economic ideologues do. Researchers continuously throw in the standard ideology variable and conclude those conservatives in general are or support “blank.” In actuality, what often is picked up is one concerned subgroup. When this same variable is thrown into

yet another equation, ideology picks up a new subgroup or an additional subgroup, further confirming the false sense of a dichotomy.

The relevance of this study to my dissertation lies in the complexity present in a simple seven-point scale of ideology. Although I am interested in “conservatives” and how they perceive race related policies, I do not want to ignore the possibility that conservatives differ, particularly if they define their ideology through economic or social terms. While social and economic conservatives did *not* seem to differ in the two race related policies (busing and minority aid), the fact that they differed on other policies, and had a different relationship with social and economic liberals, does suggest their *reasons* for support or opposition of race related policies may differ.

Table 3.1: Ideology by Dimension

	<i>Liberals</i>	<i>Moderates</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>
<i>Change Dimension</i>	64	115	85
<i>Social Dimension</i>	67	38	31
<i>Economic Dimension</i>	29	101	206

Table 3.2: Regression of Issue Positions on Liberal and Conservative Dimension

	<i>LIBERAL DIMENSIONS</i>		<i>CONSERVATIVE DIMENSIONS</i>	
	<i>Change</i>	<i>Social</i>	<i>Change</i>	<i>Social</i>
<i>Abortion</i>	.15** (.07)	-.01 (.06)	-.07 (.07)	.14** (.06)
<i>Women's role</i>	.03 (.05)	-.08 (.05)	.04 (.04)	.26*** (.06)
<i>Minority aid</i>	.12** (.06)	-.01 (.06)	-.05 (.03)	-.03 (.05)
<i>Busing</i>	.09 (.07)	.05 (.07)	-.06 (.02)	-.01 (.03)
<i>Government spending</i>	.09 (.07)	-.04 (.06)	-.15*** (.04)	.02 (.06)
<i>Defense spending</i>	-.02 (.06)	.00 (.06)	.03 (.03)	-.04 (.04)
<i>Tax cut</i>	.11 (.09)	.01 (.08)	-.08 (.05)	-.03 (.05)
<i>Jobs</i>	.06 (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-.08** (.03)	-.08 (.05)

* Economic ideologues are the excluded group

Table 3.3: Regression of Issue Positions on Ideology Interacting with Dimensions

	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Dim1: Change</i>	<i>Dim2:Social</i>	<i>Dim1*Ideol</i>	<i>Dim2*Ideo l</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Abortion</i>	.31** (.10)	.01 (.08)	-.17** (.09)	.11 (.14)	.40* (.15)	657
<i>Women Role</i>	.12 (.09)	-.07 (.08)	-.26** (.08)	.12 (.13)	.62** (.14)	650
<i>Minority Aid</i>	.37** (.07)	.16** (.06)	-.11* (.06)	-.26** (.10)	.14 (.11)	641
<i>Busing</i>	.24** (.07)	.13** (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.21** (.09)	.05 (.11)	645
<i>Government Spending</i>	.31** (.09)	.12 (.08)	-.13 (.08)	-.36** (.13)	.13 (.14)	617
<i>Defense Spending</i>	.30** (.07)	.01 (.06)	.02 (.07)	.06 (.10)	-.06 (.12)	633
<i>Tax Cuts</i>	.41** (.11)	.17* (.10)	-.02 (.10)	-.34** (.17)	.03 (.09)	500
<i>Job</i>	.43** (.08)	.19** (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.36** (.11)	-.08 (.13)	611

**Economic dimension is the excluded category*

Table 3.4: The Impact of Ideology for each Dimension

	<i>Change Dimension</i>	<i>Social Dimension</i>	<i>Economic Dimension</i>
<i>Abortion</i>	.42	.71	.31
<i>Women's role</i>	.23	.74	.12
<i>Minority Aid</i>	.11	.51	.37
<i>Busing</i>	.03	.29	.23
<i>Government Spending</i>	-.04	.44	.31
<i>Defense Spending</i>	.30	.30	.30
<i>Tax Cuts</i>	.07	.44	.41
<i>Guaranteed Jobs</i>	.07	.35	.43

Chapter 4: What are they thinking?

Purpose

My first experiment tackles the first, third, and sixth hypotheses presented in my dissertation: What are people thinking about when they are faced with racial policies? Do they think about the principles these policies challenge, or do they think about the minorities these policies affect?

The work of Paul Sniderman and colleagues, suggests that ideological considerations, first and foremost, are behind race-related policies. Although there may be some conservatives that oppose affirmative action on the grounds that it helps blacks, the majority of conservatives oppose Affirmative Action on the grounds that it contradicts valued principles of work ethic and individualism. Moreover, they find that liberals are more in tune with the racial components present, suggesting conservatives are more principled than liberals.

According to Sears and Mendelberg work, however, when people are faced with a racial policy they perceive it to be primarily a race issue, and only secondarily an ideological one. Following the affirmative action example, we would expect that those who oppose it are motivated by their feelings toward the minority group the policy is trying to help. Despite their explicit support of “fairness,” at the core of the issue lie their beliefs about African Americans. This study also begins to address the possible differences between social and economic conservatives (*hypothesis 10*), specifically by asking the question: Are economic conservatives more principled than social conservatives?

Method

Participants

A total of 163 undergraduate students at Stony Brook University participated in the study in fulfillment of department subject pool requirements. There were 97 men; 60 whites, 65 Asians, and 16 African Americans in the sample. Most of the sample was ideologically moderate, with only 25 claiming to be conservative and 43 claiming to be liberal. The lack of conservatives in the sample is not ideal, however it does require my effects to be stronger in order to pick up a distinction.

Measures

From the point of view of empirical measurement, an obvious problem is that people are no longer comfortable expressing race-related beliefs (Schuman et al, 1985). As noted in Chapter 3, if a survey is at all suggestive of its racial purpose, people will resist their prejudiced urges (Kuklinski & Cobb, 1979; Wittenbrink et al.,

1997), especially if they are high self-monitors (Terkildsen, 1993). Simply relying on what people say or how people react does not offer enough information about their motivations and thoughts. If a person says Affirmative Action is “not fair” we have no way of knowing if this is because she believes that everyone should be judged on merit, or if it’s because she believes white people should be preferred to blacks. One way to avoid treating the two *different* scenarios as equivalent is to employ implicit measures that show us what the person is thinking about – race or ideology – without asking her to tell us.

The implicit method that was employed to gauge what people are actually *thinking* about when they are faced with race and ideology related policies is the lexical decision task (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). This task involves subjects reacting to a stimulus on a computer screen. Specifically, subjects are asked to press a given key to indicate if the letter string that they see on the screen makes up a word or not. When the subject sees “diamonds” she indicates “yes” by pressing a green key, if the word is “mdonasdi” she indicates “no” by pressing a red key. The basic logic of this task is that people will be faster in indicating “yes” when the word they see is more accessible, either because it is chronically accessible or (as in our study) because it has been primed. Hence, reaction time is reflective of the present activation of concepts in one’s mind. If a person is primed with the word “jewelry”, then he will be quicker to recognize “diamond” as a word rather than “picture.” Although, the actual task of reading the word is explicit, or conscious, the task is implicit in the sense that the subject is unaware that they are revealing what is activated in their mind. And if the prime is presented subliminally, or below the threshold for conscious awareness, any impact of the prime on the accessibility of the target word must be implicit. This sort of procedure allows us to make inferences about the associations in memory, and in particular about the associations that may exist between the prime and target words

Consider again the example of a woman who opposes affirmative action due to her negative feelings toward blacks, versus a woman who opposes affirmative action due to a strong regard for merit and fairness. A lexical decision task, which primed both women with the phrase “affirmative action” and then asked them to recognize racial and ideological words should distinguish between the two women. The first woman should have race related words activated in her mind, since race is intimately connected to affirmative action (indeed it is the reason she opposes it). Moreover, if the prime is not consciously perceived, she will not be able to “prepare” or activate her normal response, only her actual thoughts. For the second woman, however, words like “fairness” or “merit” should be made accessible by the prime, if affirmative action is perceived by her to be an ideological issue.

The present study utilized three issue primes: (1) affirmative action, (2) progressive taxation (presented as “taxing the rich”), and (3) welfare. Since the goal was to distinguish between ideological and racial considerations, I picked three issues that varied in their association with race, but that all theoretically elicited similar ideological considerations. Particularly, affirmative action and welfare have been associated with both race and ideology, while progressive taxation is more clearly associated with ideology alone.

There were 37 target words used in the study. One third of those words were related to race, while the other words were related to ideology. The race words were comprised of black stereotype words that were meant to capture racial thoughts and not simply an association of black and affirmative action. Hence, words like “black” and “African” were not included, since presumably affirmative action ought to elicit “black,” “women,” “minority” simply because that is part of its definition. If a person opposes affirmative action on the grounds that it is not fair, words that are stereotypic or clearly derogatory toward blacks should not be activated (though the concept “black” may well be). On the other hand, if stereotype words are activated while ideological words are not, this suggests that affirmative action is largely perceived as a race issue. Specifically, the race stereotype target words were rhythm, rap, hip-hop, basketball, Afro, hostile, aggressive, gang, and nigger (many of these words were used in the Devine study). More words were included originally- like lazy, stupid, and ghetto but were removed due to the possible non-black connotations. Particularly, “lazy” could be argued to be an ideological term, meant to encompass those that are attaining “hand-outs.” Also ghetto, while not ideological may elicit the concept of “poor” which is directly related to welfare. Thus, the target words were chosen for their close ties to considerations about racial stereotypes and absence of ties to other possible considerations that one might expect to be linked to the three policies used as primes.

The ideological words were divided into two groups. While the literature on symbolic racism mainly focuses on conservatives, this sample contained liberals as well. Since liberals are not theoretically expected to value individualistic principles, at least not to the extent conservatives do, half of the ideological words related to egalitarianism, while the other half related to individualism. Certainly liberals may perceive affirmative action and welfare as racial issues, just as they may perceive them as ideological issues (i.e. “help” and “equality”).

The individualism words used were self-reliance, individualism, earn, responsibility, freedom, work ethic, merit, hand-outs, hard work, fair, unfair, interfere, undeserved. Several of these words were dropped in the analyses where egalitarianism was observed as well. Particularly, words like responsibility and fair/unfair might be made more accessible for egalitarians as well as individualists. Accordingly, the egalitarian words were eliminated to avoid confounding individualistic and egalitarian values. The final words used in the analyses of the impact of egalitarianism were: equality, opportunity, help, care, sympathy, prejudice, oppression, need, disadvantage, and mistreated.

Moreover, for each of the target categories some of the words were positive, while other words were negative. The purpose of this was to control for a possible affective bias, whereby people may be faster to recognize negative words if they perceive affirmative action to be negative (Lodge & Taber, 2004). Furthermore, I wanted to see if *negative* rather than positive race words might be more accessible for opponents of affirmative action, which would suggest that their thoughts on race were predominately negative and perhaps more “racist”. At the end of the lexical decision task, subjects had to state whether they thought the target words were positive or negative and this rating was used to categorize the words.

Procedure

For each target word subjects were exposed to in the lexical decision task, there was a non-word that contained a reshuffling of the same letters. Each subject was instructed to simply indicate whether the string they saw was a word (which happened 50% of the time) or a non-word. Each subject was given a short practice trial before the mentioned targets were shown. The actual task involved four different stimuli. After a 4ms forward mask (a string of jumbled letters to standardize the contents of sensory memory), the primes came on the screen for 40ms, too fast for conscious awareness. A 4 ms backward mask immediately followed (to insure that the prime word was not still in sensory memory). The first thing the subject consciously saw was one of the target words or its respective non-word. Each target word was paired with each of the three issue primes. Both the target words and the prime words were randomized for each subject to control for response effects. In addition to the three issue primes, there was a baseline prime (a string of letters with no semantic meaning – e.g., BBBB) that preceded each of the targets. The baseline reaction time to each target was later subtracted from all the other reaction times of the same target, to control for the possibility that some words are simply more accessible than others, and also for the differences in general response time across people. Hence, the response times that were analyzed depict facilitation or inhibition of targets in comparison to each individual target's baseline.

In addition to this implicit task, I also included a more explicit task, which gave people the opportunity to come up with considerations for consciously perceived issues. Specifically, the subjects were asked to think about one of the three issues, which they had not yet consciously perceived. They were told that they would be asked about this issue later in the experiment. After they were told to think about one of the three issues, which was selected at random, they completed the same lexical decision task described above for each target but now without the subliminal issue primes. Instead the issue label remained on the screen while they completed the task. At the end of each task they were, as promised, asked to indicate on a seven-point scale whether or not they support or oppose the specific issue. The goal of this task was to see if people may evoke different considerations when they believe that they would have to account for their position later in the study. This task is still implicit in the sense that the subjects do not realize they are revealing what thoughts come to mind; however by making them believe that they will have to offer explicit responses I may activate their secondary or explicit answers. In other words, while I suspect conservatives will not think about ideology in the subliminal priming task, ideology may be activated in the more explicit task.

Finally, in addition to the standard seven point Likert scale for ideology, I included three more Likert scales that emphasized either the social, economic, or change¹ dimension. Specifically, subjects were asked, "Thinking only about the economic dimension (free market v. regulated market) where do you place yourself?" as well as "Thinking only about social issues (abortion, family values) where do you place yourself?" I chose to offer common examples of what "economic" and "social" ideology represent to help subjects with the atypical identification, while avoiding

¹ Change dimension was offered to give, what I believe is a substantial group, an option – however for the purpose of this dissertation "change" group was not analyzed.

any terms that actually help to define one's stance on racial policies. I also included a sophistication scale consisting of 17 political knowledge questions (Delli Carpini & Keeter's, 1996), as an additional check of Sniderman and Carmine's theory, in the case that sophisticated conservatives were more likely to be principled. As always, subjects were also asked to indicate their race, gender, and party identification.

Hypotheses and Predictions

If individualism underlies the opposition to race-related policies, those who oppose the three issues should be quicker to recognize individualism words, rather than racial stereotypes, when primed by those issues. Furthermore, if conservatives are more principled, we would expect there to be a significant difference between the activation of principles for those who hold a conservative position versus those who hold the liberal position (e.g. support Affirmative Action).

If on the other hand racial considerations underlie racial policies, we should observe shorter reaction times for race words, than ideology words, when people are primed by the racial policies. It is also important to note, that not all three policies have to activate principles or racial concepts. Based on the work of Mendelberg I would expect Affirmative Action, which is most obviously race related to activate more racial considerations than Welfare and Progressive Taxation, which are more ideological.

Finally, given the possibility that conservatives appear less principled than Sniderman and Carmines would expect, I will also distinguish economic and social conservatives in the case that economic conservatives are more likely to think in terms of principles, while social conservatives are more likely to think in terms of race.

Results

Despite the liberally biased sample, the participants were fairly divided on the issues, except in the case of progressive taxation, which was more often supported (refer to table 4.1). As expected self-reported ideology was a strong predictor of support for all three policies, however, a third of self identified conservatives still supported Affirmative Action, and about a fourth supported welfare. Given this possible inconsistency it was important to not separate subjects based on their ideology when observing the effects of the racial primes. For the purposes of understanding what underlies *support* and *opposition* to policies, the following graphs and analyses are done by defining "conservatives" loosely as those who hold the conservative position on a given policy.

Table 4.1 about here

So what were people thinking about when they were primed with the different issues in the lexical task? Affirmative action significantly activated black stereotype

words for analyses pooling across all subjects². Interestingly, ideology words were not seemingly activated in response to affirmative action when looking across all subjects. When grouped by position on the issue, however, one group *was* clearly thinking ideologically. That group, however, was not the principled conservatives (refer to Figure 4.1). In fact, for those who opposed affirmative action ideology was not only inaccessible, but was significantly inhibited. In other words, people in this group were slower to recognize words like “merit” and “work ethic” than they normally would be. For them, black words like “afro” and “gang” were the *only* words activated. For neutrals, or people with no clear opinion on the topic, none of the words were activated while ideology words were slightly inhibited (though not significantly so). Those who supported affirmative action however were significantly faster in identifying both the race and the egalitarian targets. Based on these analyses it appears that it is the more liberal position that contains principled reasoning, but it is a reasoning based on egalitarianism rather than individualism. Notably, the fact that this pattern was found confirms that activation may occur for several concepts and simply because one consideration is more dominant does not mean other considerations would not be activated.

Although I am using the term “ideology” and “conservatives” loosely to encompass principles and policy positions, when I look more specifically at self-identified ideology, the patterns remained similar. For self-identified conservatives, individualism words were significantly inhibited as well. However, when I separated the subjects by their economic-related ideology, principled considerations did surface for the economic conservatives (faster by 13ms) while remaining inhibited for the social conservatives (slower by 7ms), this however did not reach statistical significance. So there is some suggestion that economic conservatives may be more principled, although racial concepts remained activated for this group.

In another attempt to find “principled conservatives” I observed *sophisticated* self-identified conservatives. One argument Sniderman and Carmines had made is that while the non-sophisticated conservatives may be racially motivated, the sophisticated conservatives are more principled. Again, I found an activation of principle targets (a mean 23 ms faster than baseline), but the sophisticated conservative sample was too small for this to reach significance. Note however that despite their small number, the activation of black words was marginally significant for this group (mean=-52 ms, $t=1.56$, $p<.1$), suggesting that even if there are conservatives that think more ideologically, racial considerations still seep through.

Figure 4.1 about here

At this point, the lack of activation of conservative principles may have been explained by a less than adequate choice of target words. Perhaps while conservatives may use individualism as a value, they may not use the sort of words chosen to be targets. One of the purposes of looking at progressive taxation as an issue was to test the appropriateness of the ideological words picked. Progressive taxation may be argued to be a racial issue as well, to the extent that the poor are perceived to be black, but it is more clearly an ideological issue. Like affirmative action progressive

² While the tables and figures presented in the chapter showcase cleaned raw data, the analyses were performed on log transformed data.

taxation has been framed as a violation of capitalistic values such as self-reliance and entitlement, but unlike affirmative action it has rarely been couched in racial terms.

While I failed to find any evidence of individualism when people were primed with affirmative action, these considerations surfaced when the prime was “taxing the rich.” As expected, these words were activated for those who opposed progressive taxation (*refer to Figure 4.2*). For those who supported progressive taxation individualism targets were inhibited ($p < .1$), while egalitarian words were significantly activated ($p < .05$). In other words, for a clearly ideological issue, ideological words were activated in exactly the expected pattern. Controlling for self-identified ideology and sophistication yields similar results and sophisticated conservatives again become a bit faster in recognizing words relating to individualism. An unexpected finding is that those opposed to progressive taxation also consider the egalitarian words. More specifically, they consider, as do supporters, the positive egalitarian words such as equality, opportunity, and need. It is possible that these considerations are accessible due to the semantic connection between distribution of resources and equality. It is also possible that the connotation of the words we chose may still be applied to the rich, whereby people feel “sympathy” for the rich. Finally, it is possible that people who oppose taxation of the rich are more cognizant of the egalitarian position, or even ambivalent about their own position.

The other, at first surprising, finding was the significant activation of black words for people who opposed progressive taxation. Meanwhile, for those who supported taxing the rich, black words were not accessible, but inhibited (though not significantly so). The explanation here may be that those who oppose taxation may perceive blacks to be the group who benefit from such a distribution. This finding is also consistent with the social dominance perspective, in that all policies are intended to maintain the lower status of the minority groups. Giving money may then be just as enabling to a minority student as giving them preferential treatment.

Table 4.2 about here

Finally, the last issue people were primed with was welfare. The patterns that emerged for this prime resembled those that emerged for the progressive taxation prime (*refer to Figure 4.3*). The only notable difference is that the egalitarian words that were accessible for the supporters of welfare differed based on their affect. Particularly, it was the positive egalitarian words that elicited activation, while negative words did not. Although this same interaction did not reach significance for the taxation condition, a similar pattern was found there as well. The race-related words that were included as negative egalitarian considerations, such as racism, prejudice, and oppression may explain this. Since supporters of taxation and welfare do not seem to think of these issues in terms of race, perhaps the negative egalitarian terms failed to resonate as well. Instead, words like “equality” and “sympathy” account for their liberal positions. Meanwhile, for those who oppose welfare, all three categories of words were significantly activated (perhaps the egalitarian words were activated for the same reason they were not activated for supporters, but I was not able to support this hypothesis statistically).

Figure 4.3 about here

In summary, the focus of affirmative action supporters seems to lie in their racial and egalitarian considerations. In the case of progressive taxation and welfare,

however, race seems to leave their thoughts – to the point of inhibition – while egalitarian considerations continue to dominate. For people who oppose affirmative action on the other hand, race is the only dominant consideration, and ideological thoughts are actually inhibited. In the case of the other two issues, the opposed are much more thoughtful, as all racial and ideological considerations are activated.

The next question is whether these subjects would activate ideology when they thought that their preferences would be questioned. I tested this by asking subjects explicitly to reflect on the issue while they performed the lexical task (*refer to Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.*) In all three conditions all the target words were activated. This may be in part due to response effects, since by this point everyone has seen each target word several times. However, several interesting findings did emerge. For the subjects who opposed affirmative action policies, while individualism was inhibited in the implicit condition, it became the *most* salient consideration in the explicit condition. Also, while race was the most dominant consideration in the implicit condition, it became the *least* accessible consideration when subjects consciously deliberated on the issue. For supporters of affirmative action, individualism became accessible but remained secondary to egalitarian and racial considerations. Although neutrals were fairly unaffected by primes in the implicit condition, when they were told they would have to give their opinions, all three considerations became highly accessible, with race and individualism most accessible. In the case of welfare and progressive taxation again all considerations seemed highly accessible, especially in the case of neutrals and opponents.

Figure 4.4 about here

Figure 4.5 about here

Figure 4.6 about here

Although I have not hypothesized about the effects of the respondent's race on this task, I did compare the white sample to the Asian and black sample. Basically, I didn't find any significant differences among these groups. Notably, the black sample was quite small and most of this sample held a liberal position. Still I ran analyses with and without this group and the results remained unchanged. Similarly, the Asian sample didn't behave significantly different, in regards to policy support and lexical decision task, from the white sample. This lack of distinction of the Asian respondents is consistent with research (Fu, 2005; Neta, 2005). This research, which was presented at a 2005 MPSA Conference, suggested that Asians are either as race conscious or more "prejudiced" than whites. This has been explained as both a function of the quick Asian assimilation of American culture, or individualistic values, as well as the "color-oriented" predisposition that exists in Asian countries.

Discussion

When we asked people to think about affirmative action and how they felt about it, those who opposed affirmative action activated ideological considerations.

They activated concepts of self-reliance, responsibility, and merit. If all we had done is asked people what they thought about, we would certainly infer that we were dealing with principled conservatives, concerned about fairness and freedom. The fact that these conservatives are significantly more “racist” according to the symbolic racism scale does not make their reliance on individualism any less likely—mainly because the items are confounded with just these principles.

The more interesting fact is that when those same conservatives were not aware that they were reacting to the concept of affirmative action, words like “effort” and “responsibility” were not present in their private thoughts. The words that were activated in their minds were “dirty,” “ghetto,” “nigger,” and “afro”, words that they would undoubtedly deny entered their considerations or worse, influenced their decisions. Even more interesting, those same words were activated for policies that are not normally presented in the context of race, like progressive taxation.

Does this mean conservatives are more “racist”? In order to support this, given the definition of racism outlined in Chapter 3, the conservatives would have to be more likely to activate *negative* stereotypes of blacks, compared to liberals. The fact that one group chooses a policy that is more hurtful than another cannot be the definition of one’s racism. Looking back at the effect of the race terms, there is no significant difference between the activation of positive or negative words for conservatives and liberals. Similarly, there were no significant differences between positive versus negative ideology words. There was, however, a significant interaction between affect and target words: While positive ideological words were more accessible in general, negative black words were slightly more accessible than positive black words. This however was found across *all* subjects, conservatives were no more likely than liberals to think of negative stereotypes of African Americans.

Putting “racism” aside, this study also does not demonstrate the greater use of racial considerations for conservatives, since liberals were just as likely to think in racial terms. What this experiment does illuminate, is that what people say is not equivalent to what people think. There are politically correct (i.e. acceptable) concepts, and people will rarely offer answers to interviewers that they know are “incorrect.” Saying that affirmative action is not a racial issue is appealing to all those who shy away from controversy, including both conservatives and liberals, supporters and opponents. However, this research suggests that affirmative action is undoubtedly a racial issue, as are welfare and progressive taxation. They are racial issues in the sense that racial thoughts more than ideological thoughts are activated when these issues are implicitly primed; even when respondents are asked to think explicitly and openly about the issue, racial thoughts could not be suppressed.

Table 4.1: Distribution of Subjects on Issues

	<i>Affirmative Action</i>	<i>Welfare</i>	<i>Progressive Taxation</i>
<i>Support</i>	62	74	109
<i>Neutral</i>	41	40	27
<i>Oppose</i>	60	49	27

Figure 4.1: Accessibility of Targets by Affirmative Action Stance




Figure 4.2: Accessibility of Targets by Progressive Taxation Stance




Figure 4.3: Accessibility of Targets by Welfare Stance




Figure 4.4: Accessibility of Targets by Affirmative Action Stance




Figure 4.5: Accessibility of Targets by Progressive Taxation Stance





Figure 4.6: Accessibility of Targets by Welfare Stance



Chapter 5: What is the link between ideology and race?

Purpose

The previous experiment suggests that Affirmative Action is not an ideological policy at its core, but a racial one. Nevertheless, when subjects are explicitly asked to think about the policy, ideological concepts become highly activated. This begs my next question: When people offer words like “work ethic” does this actually represent their racial considerations? Has the politically correct culture actually merged the two concepts that were once theoretically separate?

This second experiment addresses this contentious relationship between ideology and race. Given Sniderman and Carmines arguments and findings, the terms are orthogonal. As in the first experiment, at first glance it seems that people think racially at times, ideologically at times, both at times, and thinking of one doesn't *have* to elicit thoughts of the other (*hypothesis 2*). On the other hand, according to Jackman the racial and ideological concepts have become intertwined (*hypothesis 3*). So while racial thoughts are activated at the implicit level, ideological concepts must remain on standby in case these racial considerations require expression. Taking this idea even further, Sidanius argued that this expression of racial consideration through the use of ideology is a deceptive, while clever, tactic most likely to be employed by sophisticates. The non-sophisticates do not have to adopt this complex relationship; they need only to apply the principles, for the “legitimizing myth” to be successful (*hypothesis 9*).

Method

Participants

A total of 336 undergraduate students at Stony Brook University participated in the study in fulfillment of department subject pool requirements. There were 164 females, 104 whites, 143 Asians, and 34 African Americans in the sample. Most of the sample (198) was ideologically liberal, with only 36 claiming to be conservative and 102 claiming to be moderate.

Procedure

As with the previous experiment, asking people to report how they link their racial and ideological concepts in their minds is unrealistic. So once again I turn to implicit measures, specifically the lexical decision task (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), to address the relationship between racial and ideological concepts. *For the logic of this task refer back to Chapter 4*. Unlike the last experiment where my primes were policies and the targets were both racial and ideological concepts, in this

study I will use one of the target groups as the prime to the remaining target groups. So now, I am observing the activation of ideological concepts in response to racial concepts, and vice versa.

As with the other study, each subject was given a short practice trial before the mentioned targets were shown. The first thing the subject consciously saw was one of the target words or its respective non-word. Each target word was paired with each of the prime words. Both the target words and the prime words were randomized for each subject to control for response effects. In addition to the ideology or racism primes, there was a baseline prime (a string of letters with no meaning) that preceded each of the targets.

For the analyses the log transformation of the response times was used to compare baseline primes with non-baseline primes. This allowed me to keep all of the trials but minimize the effects of the outliers. However, for the purpose of discussing activation and facilitation, the baseline reaction time to each target was subtracted from all the other reaction times of the same target, after throwing out all the reaction times that exceeded 2500 ms and were below 250 ms. These reaction time differences from baseline are used when activation or inhibition means are reported.

There were two conditions within the experiment. One set of subjects received the ideology words as primes and the race words as targets at first, while the other group received race words as primes and the race words as targets. This was chosen to the alternative of jumping from racial primes to ideology primes back to racial primes, because of the possibility that once the primes (subconscious) were shown as targets (conscious), then both these terms would be contextualized and connected accordingly. Since the goal was to see what the natural (non-contextual) relationship between the concepts was, it was important to have one of the concepts remain outside of one's conscious awareness.

However, I also had to account for the fact that there may not be a link between the two concepts without some racial context. In turn, after the first round of lexical decision task, subjects had to read a short story about two boys, one of whom benefited from Affirmative Action. The point of this was simply to introduce a racial policy (because up until this point the people were either consciously faced with ideology *or* with race). Following this story, the primes and targets were reversed for the given subject and the above procedure continued. After the lexical task was completed the subjects were asked to answer addition survey questions described below.

Measures

I used 12 ideology words and 11 racial words. The ideology words consisted of eight conservative terms (individualism, earn, work ethic, merit, hand outs, effort, hard work, conservative) and four liberal terms (opportunity, equality, liberal, disadvantage). The race words include some neutral and some negative stereotype words for blacks (rhythm, rap, hip-hop, basketball, hostile, aggressive, gang, nigger, African American, black, racism). While people may realize ideology has some relationship to racism, I am trying to distinguish those who think of conservative concepts in way that activates prejudice, defined by negative associations or stereotypes for blacks.

Additional variables included a standard ideology seven-point Likert scale and a sophistication scale consisting of 17 political knowledge questions (Delli Carpini & Keeter's, 1996). Subjects also indicated their race and gender.

Hypotheses and Predictions

According to Sniderman and Carmines, I would expect that ideology words and racial words are not connected. In other words, priming people with a word like "work ethic" should not activate a racial concept like "ghetto" because these concepts are not linked for people.

Jackman's assertion is stronger than that, here I would expect that ideological concepts activate racial concepts regardless of a policy frame. In other words, if "hard work" is a legitimizing myth that is meant to keep the "black man down," then its appearance ought to elicit racial concepts. A possible variation of a strong connection between the terms, comes out of Mendelberg's work. Her findings suggest that racial concepts ought to activate ideological concepts only when a racial policy is presented. Since people are trained to hide their racial notions, and cite ideological reasons for their opposition to race related policies, a racial stereotype (e.g. "gang") should activate the social acceptable term "merit" that is intended to hold blacks back. So these concepts may not be linked at first, but after presenting an issue like affirmative action, the link between these concepts should become activated.

Finally, according to Sniderman's work I would expect the facilitation of racial concepts when primed by ideological concepts to occur *only for the sophisticates*. So here I would expect that the sophisticates understand the link that exists between racism and ideology, while the less sophisticated have not realized that the "work ethic" is a cover for discrimination.

Results

The first set of analyses address the relationship that exists between ideology and racism at a basic non-contextual level (before the Affirmative Action story is introduced). A Within Subjects ANOVA revealed that race primes (as compared to the baseline primes) significantly facilitated conservative principle targets ($F=9.61$, $p<.01$). In other words, respondents were -4.66 ms quicker to recognize conservative ideology words (e.g. "work ethic") when they were preceded by racial primes (e.g. "ghetto) versus neutral primes. More specifically, there was a significant interaction between the effects of the primes and the respondent's ideology ($F=2.23$, $p<.04$). Figure 5.1 displays this interaction. Conservatives were quicker to recognize ideological words when a racial prime was given, compared to Liberals. For the more liberal respondents the racial primes inhibited ideological concepts by 9.28 ms. For the more conservative respondents the racial primes activated ideological concepts by an average of 8.01 ms. Although there was a main effect for sophistication ($F=2.02$,

$p < .01$) because sophisticates were quicker to recognize ideological concepts, their recognition was not affected by the primes.

Figure 5.1 about here

As expected, when the targets were liberal words, no prime effects were found. Once again the sophisticates were significantly quicker to recognize these terms ($F=2.24$, $p < .001$), but this was not affected by the primes. So while words like “merit” activated “hip-hop” for conservatives, liberal concepts like “equality” (which one may expect to be more theoretically associated with “blacks” or minorities) was *not* facilitated by racial terms. This further suggests that there is a specific link that exists for conservatives between conservative principles, rather than liberal principles, and racial stereotypes.

The results are similar when the primes and targets are reversed, so that the racial words become the targets and the ideological words become the subliminal primes. Although the main effect for conservative primes only reaches marginal significance, the interaction between prime effects and ideology is significant at the .05 level ($F=2.11$). Specifically, for conservatives ideological primes activate racial words by 6.24ms, while for liberals ideology primes inhibit racial stereotypes by 6.53ms. As might be expected, sophisticates were not quicker to recognize racial concepts as they were to recognize the more complicated ideological concepts. Also consistent with the previous analysis, when the liberal terms were the primes there was no significant difference in their effects on the targets compared to the baseline primes.

Although a significant interaction between sophistication and prime effects did not reveal themselves in my ANOVA analyses, a closer look revealed a significant pattern that distinguished conservative sophisticates. Table 5.2 reports the interaction between conservatism and sophistication, by displaying the mean difference in response times (RT) between the racial primes and baseline primes. Table 5.3 reports the same interaction except the RT being reported is the difference between baseline primes with conservative principle primes. As seen in the tables, sophistication increases the effect of ideology. In other words, while conservatives seemingly link conservative and racial concepts together, for sophisticated conservatives this link is stronger ($p < .15$).

Figure 5.2 about here

Figure 5.3 about here

The results thus far reported are based on the concepts people associate outside of any frame or context. The next set of analyses I looked at the same prime and target relationships, except these relationships were observed after the respondents read a story about two young men, one of whom benefited from Affirmative Action. The ANOVAs did not produce the same relationships when the baseline primes and ideological primes, as well as racial primes, were compared. This surprising lack of effects caused me to look closer at the data, which revealed a significant difference between the pre and post frame reaction times for the baseline prime. In other words, when respondents were given the baseline prime without any frame, it took an average of 670ms for them to recognize the target words. After the frame, respondents identified the ideology words at about 600ms. This is a highly significant difference ($F=8.3$, $P < .01$). This suggests that the affirmative action story

worked as a prime that activated concepts to the point that the same meaningless prime (“nnn”) produced significantly different results.

Hence, deeming the “baseline” or control prime senseless, I instead compared the target response time given a conservative prime pre or post frame. Not surprisingly, there was a highly significant effect of frame on recognition of ideological targets ($F=39.09$, $p<.001$). Just as with the baseline, people were much quicker to identify ideological words, when preceded by racial primes after the frame than before the frame. Furthermore, after the frame was presented ideological differences diminished. While conservatives were significantly faster in identifying ideological primes before the frame, after the frame the difference (though still in the same direction) became insignificant. Similarly, after the frame sophisticates were not significantly different from non-sophisticates. In other words, across all the respondents after the context of affirmative action was introduced, ideological terms, as well as racial terms, became accessible regardless of the prime and regardless of the ideology and sophistication of the respondents. One possible explanation for this may lie in practice effects, so people simply became fast at reading these terms. While that’s certainly a possibility, given the practice effects I have seen in other implicit studies – particularly the experiment featured in chapter 4 – even after 30 minutes of identifying a set of 20 words, respondents do not seem to master the task and inhibition still occurs. That suggests to me that the high activation came from *thinking* about Affirmative Action rather than simply learning to quickly distinguish words from non words.

Finally, as in the previous experiment, no significant differences emerged between Asians or African Americans and Whites. This suggests this link is not just a white phenomenon but may resonate with both non black and black minorities.

Discussion

Originally, when I created this design, I had expected minimal effects without any contextual frame. I suspected that while a racial policy would elicit the link between race and ideology, without a context ideological concepts would only marginally activate racial concepts or vice versa. Instead, the link was seemingly present for conservatives without any explicit reference to the ideological-racial connection. What the frame did was create accessibility of racial and ideological terms across most of my respondents, regardless of the prime and regardless of their ideology.

These results strongly support Hypotheses 8: Ideological principles have become intertwined with racial concepts to the point where conservatives cannot think of either one independently of the other. The key here is not that people are *able* to link the two concepts, but that these concepts *are* linked in people’s memory structure and are automatically activated in response to each other. Under the Principled Conservatives Theory there are people who think in terms of race, for

whom principles are barely an afterthought, and there are people who see the world through their principles so much so they are blind to color, or able to dismiss it quite easily. If this was the case, “merit” and “work ethic” wouldn’t activate black stereotypes, and certainly black stereotypes wouldn’t activate the former. The fact that this activation occurred suggests several possibilities. One possibility is that the “principled” people are aware (at the implicit level) that their ideas impact blacks, and the “racist” people are aware of the culturally accepted terminology to express their racism. An alternative explanation is that there are no distinct racists and ideologues, rather everyone is following racial principles (i.e. blacks belong at the bottom of the social hierarchy) and the method for achieving this principle, given the cultural norms, is through the protestant ethic.

Another more complicated possibility involves the relationship of sophistication to the link of principles and racism. While sophisticates were the group Carmines and Sniderman’s found to be most principled, according to Sidanius the sophisticates’ are the ones who are most likely to use principles to maintain the social hierarchy. Meanwhile the non-sophisticates may be less likely to realize the racial effect of those principles. My research certainly suggests that this may be the case, by showing the higher activation levels of sophisticated conservatives compared to non sophisticated ones. However, a possible explanation of this may be that the activation is higher not because sophisticates are abusing principles to keep the minorities down, but rather because the sophisticates are more *aware* of the possible effects of these principles. My third experiment will speak to that fact, but at this point it’s important to emphasize that the original argument laid out by Carmines and Sniderman was that sophisticates are more color-blind, rather than less so. This research undoubtedly suggests that people, especially sophisticated people, regardless of how they perceive conservative principles, are not color-blind.

Figure 5.1: Effects of Racial and conservative Primes on Respective Targets for Liberals and Conservatives




Figure 5.2: Interaction between Sophistication and Ideology for Responses to Conservative Targets and Racial Primes





Figure 5.3: Interaction between Sophistication and Ideology for Responses to Racial Targets and Conservative Primes



Chapter 6: Principles in Theory versus Practice

Purpose

The first two studies suggest that even though people are able to offer principled reasons for their conservative policy positions, behind those principles lie racial considerations. Although these concepts are linked, it is not yet clear what the nature of that link is. Is the link simply showcasing the fact that conservatives, especially sophisticated conservatives, are *aware* of the political relationship of these concepts but do not exploit it accordingly? Or does the link represent how the principles are used?

The previous studies simply illuminated the memory structures of the respondents; the purpose of this study is to see the “real world” implications of those links. In this study, I require subjects to make policy decisions which place principles and race against each other. Specifically, respondents are asked about a specific policy that varies between subjects in the principles it contains and the racial group it affects. In addition to merit, which was included in the conservative principles in the first two studies, this study introduced two other important conservative principles or values: Conservative dislike of government involvement (*hypothesis 4*) and conservative support of color-blind policies (*hypothesis 5*). As noted in the second chapter, accordingly to Sniderman and Carmines conservatives are willing to support policies and programs that are (a) funded by private agencies and (b) are not geared toward one specific race, but rather benefits people outside of their race.

Additionally, this study offers another test of what considerations underlie policy decisions, principled (*hypothesis 3*) or racial (*hypothesis 6*). Finally, the role sophistication plays in the application of principles is addressed (*hypothesis 9*).

Method

Participants

A total of 347 undergraduate students at Stony Brook University participated in the study in fulfillment of department subject pool requirements. There were 174 men; 137 whites, 112 Asians, and 37 African Americans in the sample. Most of the sample was ideologically liberal, with only 58 claiming to be conservative and 114 claiming to be moderate.

Measures

The study involved students filling out a short survey, which consisted of two 2*3 experiments. Respondents were told that the purpose of the study was to understand people’s views on a given education policy. Their first task was to read a

summary of the policy, as well as a case study describing one of the schools that will be affected by the given policy. After they have read the policy, they were asked to fill out a seven point Likert scale to gauge their support for the policy. Each respondent received one of six conditions. There were two versions of the policy: the policy was either funded by the government or by a private agency³. There were three versions of the case study: The school that was said to be affected by the policy was either predominately white (67%), mixed (34% white and 34% black), or predominately black (67%).

After they noted their support of the policy, they were asked to read about a scholarship related part of the policy, along with a description of a potential recipient. The scholarship was either based on merit (i.e. top 3% of class need) or a lack of merit (i.e. falling behind in school). Once again – in accordance with the racial make-up of the school – the recipient’s race varied. Instead of explicitly stating the race of the recipient (which would be too obvious of a manipulation) the students were simply given names: Greg Baker (from the white school), Brandon Smith (from the mixed school), and Darnell Jones (from the black school). The names chosen were based on how common each name was for a particular racial group, and how uncommon it was for another. Brandon was the most common name shared by both groups. A manipulation check was included in the survey to make sure the names were interpreted as intended.

After they read about the scholarship they were asked to indicate their support. Additional questions were asked of them regarding their agreement with the relevant principles (merit, color-blindness, private funding), their ideology, and party identification. Political Sophistication was measured with five general questions about political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Finally, respondents indicated their race, income, and gender.

Hypotheses and Predictions

According to studies that rely on symbolic racism scales, conservatives aren’t guided by their principles of a policy but by the racial implications of the policy. Accordingly, conservatives will oppose policies that benefit minorities regardless of the principles that are at play. The policy that benefits the black school should be least supported, while the policy that benefits the white school should be most supported, regardless of funding. Furthermore, the scholarships should be most supported when a white students benefits rather than a black student, regardless of their merit.

Under the principled conservative theory, the conservatives are not guided by racial consequences of policies, but by the principles inherent in those policies. Given the chance to support a policy that abides by the principles of color-blindness, merit, and private versus government funding, conservatives will support it regardless of the racial implications. In this study, they should support the policies that are funded privately, and support the mixed school more than the predominately white or black school, since the mixed schools are helping all children, regardless of their race. Similarly, they should support the scholarship for the student who earned it by working hard (merit condition), and should support the race-neutral student in getting this scholarship to the race-implied student.

more on schools and preschools” is a topic used by Sniderman and Carmines (1997).

If conservative ideology is meant to serve as a legitimizing myth, as Sidanius would suggest, then we would expect sophisticated conservatives to use principles strategically – applying them disproportionately to cases where minorities are concerned. However, because this is a manipulative tool, the non sophisticated conservatives may adopt these principles and apply them regardless of the racial implications – thereby giving the principles the legitimacy needed to maintain the racial hierarchy. In other words, I would expect sophisticated conservatives to apply the private versus public principle to a black school, but not apply that same principle to a white school. Similarly, the black student would be held to the merit standards, while the white student would not. On the other hand, the non sophisticated conservatives would be more likely to apply the principle to the white school and white student, but let their racial views influence their support where black students are concerned.

Results

In order to test the hypotheses I ran an OLS Regression on policy support, as a function of conservatism, the experimental conditions, party identification, and demographic information. Since the hypotheses address the relationship of conservatism with conservative principles or racial considerations I included several interactions. First interaction was between conservatism and private funding. Once again, if conservatives are particularly principled, this should be significant and positive, suggesting that conservatives are more supportive of policies that are funded by private agencies rather than government agencies. The other interaction of interest was conservatism and the color-blind policy (mixed school as compared to white or black). Again, if the principle holds this should be both significant and positive, suggesting that conservatives prefer color-blind policies to color-specific ones. Given the possibility that one of the principles may be valued more than the other, I also included a three way interaction (along with the additional required two way interactions) of conservatism, private funding, and colorblind policy. If Covert Racism holds true none of these ought to be significant, suggesting the principles had no impact on support.

The results of the regression with and without the three way interaction are noted in Table 6.1. Despite the fact that conservatives were significantly less supportive of the policy across conditions, colorblind policies and privately funded policies had a significant effect on conservatives, but not on liberals, in the expected direction. Conservatives preferred privately funded policies to publicly funded policies when the policy benefited a black or white school⁴, but did not prefer private funding to public funding when the policy was color-blind, or benefited the mixed school. Refer to Figure 6.1 for predicted probabilities. Unlike conservatives, liberals

⁴ There was no significant difference between the white and black school conditions for liberals and conservatives.

prefer government funding to private funding (although this is not significant) and did not significantly prefer one school over another (*refer to Figure 6.2*).

Table 6.1 about here

Figure 6.1 about here

Figure 6.2 about here

According to Covert Racism, principles should not have played a role and the minority status of the school should have. This theory is not supported, while Principled Conservative theory is. Notably, this experiment reveals the same findings as Sniderman and Carmines work revealed. In fact, in their own work this is precisely where they stop, arguing that conservatives are clearly principled and not racist. However, in order to test the third hypothesis, sophistication has to be accounted for. According to Sidanius it is the sophisticates who are most aware of the link that exists between principles and racial consequences. Figure 6.3 and 6.4 present the mean levels of support of sophisticated and non sophisticated conservatives. Looking at the sophisticated conservatives, the preference of private funding to public funding is only statistically significant for the blacks schools and not the white schools. In other words, while the mean support of a privately funded policy for a black school is at .67, this drops to .46 if the policy is government funded. The same principle is much less strong in the white school condition, .64 to .57 respectively. In fact, the government funded predominately black school was more likely to be opposed than all the other schools. This is very consistent with Mendelberg's findings that these allegedly colorblind principles only surface in light of racial policies. The more interesting finding lies in the second figure. Specifically, the effect of the private versus government funding principle is reversed for non-sophisticates. While the principles play no role in black or mixed schools, when the white school is government funded the support falls to .41 compared to .62 if it's privately funded. Meanwhile the black school is supported at .67 regardless of funding. This generally high support for black school is not unlike the findings of Sniderman and Carmines and may be explained by the tendency of respondents to be a bit more exaggerated in their support of blacks – in hopes to avoid being labeled a “racist.”

Figure 6.3 about here

Figure 6.4 about here

The other experiment featured another principle often cited in Affirmative Action cases: Merit. Unlike the first two principles, there was no significant interaction between merit and conservatism. Liberals relied on merit as much as conservatives when stating their support for the scholarship. While conservatives were once again, less likely to support the policy overall, both groups seemed to rely on this principle over the race of the recipient.⁵

The more interesting finding, as with the other experiment, was the difference between sophisticated and non-sophisticated conservatives. Once again, for sophisticated conservatives merit only had a significant effect on policy support when the student was black (.6 to .76), and had no effect when the student was white (.73 to

⁵ The earlier mentioned private versus government funding had no significant effect, suggesting that the respondents forgot about that aspect of the policy when reading the second section, or merit considerations overshadowed the other principle.

.71 respectively). For the non-sophisticated conservatives merit seemed to effect all the different recipients equally⁶. Figures 5 and 6 display the means for both groups.

Figure 6.5 about here

Figure 6.6 about here

As with the previous two experiments no significant difference came out of looking at Asian versus blacks versus whites. Although I had more black respondents in this sample the majority my black sample identified as liberals, on the other hand the Asians who were more mixed in their identification had a similar reaction to the policies as whites.

Discussion

While racism *has* transformed into something subtle, arguing on behalf of principles does not necessarily mean racist motivations are present. Sniderman and Carmines have been arguing all along that there are many conservatives who abide by principles and discount racial information. Their experiments suggest that the seeming opposition to racial policies on the part of conservatives is a function of who was funding the policy and the color-blind nature of that policy, *not* the minority status of the recipients. In line with their findings, in my own research, conservatives *did* prefer private to government funded policies, color-blind policies, and merit based policies, just as their rhetoric would suggest.

However, a closer look revealed that there is strong sophistication effect that may have muddied Sniderman and Carmines results. Taken together the conservatives appear principled, but when sophisticates are separated from non sophisticates a different pattern emerges. It appears that non-sophisticates apply the principles to whites, but follow race where blacks are concerned (by over-supporting their policies). On the other hand the sophisticates apply their principles to blacks, but discount their principles where whites are concerned. This is contrary to what Sniderman and Carmines argue, which is that non-sophisticates lack principles and are race driven, while sophisticates are consistently principled. In reality, the relationship seems a lot more complicated than that.

The theory that best fits these findings is Social Dominance. Under this theory, sophisticated conservatives are well aware of the racial implications of principles: keeping minorities down. Accordingly, sophisticates apply these principles disproportionately in the case of minorities. In fact, when white recipients or groups are concerned, these principles seem to lose their predictability. What explains the non-sophisticates use of principles for white students? Part of the grand theory of the “legitimizing myth” is that the principles intended to keep minorities down must be transferred to the masses in a legitimate package. That is how a myth – “hard work must be a guiding principle of any policy” – becomes legitimate. The fact that this myth was “misapplied” toward blacks is irrelevant, because despite the fact

⁶ Only the recipient whose race was not clear reached significance.

that these non sophisticates may support a policy that benefits blacks, these same non sophisticates may support a policy that does away with affirmative action and progressive taxation in the name of those principles.

Admittedly this is just one experiment done on a less than preferred sample of undergraduates; nevertheless the finding is slightly haunting. In keeping with the literature on opinion leaders and mass communications, it is plausible that the conservative elite spread messages of principles and color-blind values to the less sophisticated public. In turn the sophisticates are able to maintain the racial hierarchy with the blind support of their fellow conservatives.

Table 6.1: Regression of Policy Support by Principles and Conservatism⁷

Colorblind Policy	-.11*	-.16*
	(.06)	(.08)
Private Funding	.01	-.04
	(.06)	(.07)
Conservatism	-.25**	-.33**
	(.12)	(.13)
Colorblind * Conservatism	.28**	.52**
	(.13)	(.19)
Private * Conservatism	.15	.34**
	(.12)	(.16)
Colorblind * Private		.09
		(.12)
Conservatism*Private*Colorblind		-.44*
		(.25)
Constant	-.65**	.69**
	(.07)	(.08)
N	328	328
R ²	.09	.10
F	2.42**	2.48**

p<.1* *p*<.05**

⁷ Variables not displayed but controlled for: gender, income, race of respondent, and their party identification. None of these reached significance

Figure 6.1: Policy Support of Conservatives by Principles




Figure 6.2: Policy Support of Liberals by Principles




Figure 6.3: Policy Support of Sophisticated Conservatives by Race of School




Figure 6.4: Policy Support of Non-Sophisticated Conservatives by Race of School




Figure 6.5: Scholarship Support of Sophisticated Conservatives by the Race of the Recipient





Figure 6.6: Scholarship Support of Non-Sophisticated Conservatives by the Race of the Recipient



Chapter 7: A test of “racism”

Purpose

Up until this point the terms “racism” and “conservatives” have been used loosely. Although the studies suggest that conservative positions on racial policies are influenced by racial rather than principled considerations, it is not obvious that conservatives are more “racist.” In fact, my experiments suggest that liberals think racially as well, they just have an opposite response. They support policies that aid blacks, while conservatives oppose those policies, yet the racial stereotypes that come to mind are the same for both groups.

In turn, this study relies on the definition of racism that I outlined in Chapter 3 (negative affect and stereotypes instead of policy positions) in order to address the seventh hypothesis: Conservatives are more racist. Given the extensive research in Psychology on racism, I am doubtful that conservatives are more likely to hold negative affect toward African Americans than liberals. So as an extension to that hypothesis, this study tests a more complicated assertion that addresses how both groups feel toward “racists” rather than “blacks.” Specifically, while conservatives and liberals both hold negative views/feelings toward blacks, their difference may lie in the way that they perceive “racists.” Conservatives may have more positive affect or thoughts about others who dislike blacks, compared to Liberals who have more negative affects toward racists even if they themselves harbor negative feelings.

Method

Participants

A total of 336 undergraduate students at Stony Brook University participated in the study in fulfillment of department subject pool requirements. There were 164 females, 104 whites, 143 Asians, and 34 African Americans in the sample. Most of the sample (198) was ideologically liberal, with only 36 claiming to be conservative and 102 claiming to be moderate.

Measures

The subjects were asked to read a story about several characters (who work at a restaurant together). They were told that the details of the story will be asked of them later (to insure that they are paying attention). More specifically they were told that their perception of the characters presented in the story will be asked at the end of the study. The story featured several irrelevant characters and three relevant characters. The first two relevant characters were a black man and a white man. The

third character was a white man who was said to dislike the black men that worked at the restaurant.

This story was divided into several parts (during which one relevant character was introduced), and in between these parts of the story the subjects completed a lexical decision task. The names of the characters served as primes. Notably, the names chosen were standard male names (e.g. Jim, Eddy, Kyle, Derek) that were randomly assigned to different characters. The targets for the characters included racial stereotype words (same words as the previous studies), affective words (sunshine and cancer), group pronouns words (us and them), and positive and negative trait words (e.g. smart, honest, stupid, ugly).

Hypotheses and Predictions

The expectation for the first character (the black man) is that at the explicit level people, particularly liberals, may express positive feelings. At the implicit level however, I would expect that people would be quicker to recognize negative words and stereotypes. This hypothesis is not original, and is meant to simply support the existing findings that people have automatic negative feelings toward blacks, although a more specific analysis will be employed in attempt to differentiate between and within conservatives and liberals.

The critical part of the study is how people treat the “racist” character. In trying to figure out who is more racist, my definition of racism may turn up most every American regardless of their ideology. One hypothesis offered by Devine was that ultimately it is up to people to control their prejudice. While, I doubt prejudice is “controlled” there may be a difference not in the way people view blacks, but in the way people view racists. Particularly, I suspect that at the explicit level the “racist” will be perceived to be negative, but at the implicit level more variability may arise among the subjects. In other words, although people may associate black with “bad,” some people may also perceive the racist character to be “honest,” “smart,” and perhaps associated with “us.” This would suggest that while racism persists in most, racism may be condoned by some. If the “some” are conservatives, particularly social conservatives, I may be able to note that though conservatives are no more likely to be racist, they are more likely to support racism.

Results

Not surprisingly, for both conservatives and liberals, when primed with the black character’s name racial stereotypes and negative words (affect, trait, and pronouns) were activated. This held true for blacks (though to a lesser extent) and Asians as much as it held true for whites. The white character’s name, on the other hand, activated positive traits and affect words. A couple interesting findings did surface, particularly conservatives saw the black character more positive than liberals ($F=7.72, p<.01$). While political sophisticated participants (both liberal and conservative) were more likely than non-sophisticated to activate negative targets in response to the black character’s name.

The character of interest however, was the “racist” character. Contrary to my hypothesis both liberals and conservatives activated negative words in response to his name. While liberals perceived the “racist” as slightly more positive than conservatives, both groups were significantly more likely to activate negative terms for the “racist” than for the black character.

Discussion

Although this experiment did not offer a simple answer to my “who is racist?” question, it does emphasize that people, both conservatives and liberals, have internalized the negative connotation of racism. In some ways, it makes sense that both groups would have such a negative reaction to someone who is perceived to be prejudiced, because without that there would be no reason for political rhetoric to be so race-neutral and there would not be a movement toward subtle measures of racism. Part of the ultimate argument here is that the protestant ethic has become code for racism, which is undeniably a convoluted story not unlike a “conspiracy theory”. In fact, Sniderman and Carmines research is based on the fact that conservatives don’t need a code because those who are “racist” can and do express their racism through more overt questions. While there may be some “racist and proud” sentiment out there, the fact that an implicit test picked up an automatic negative dislike for a character who “allegedly” did not like black co-workers, stresses the pervasiveness of the social norm: being racist is unacceptable.

In turn, there ought to be a good amount of cognitive dissonance in the American populace, which maintains negative stereotypes and affects toward blacks and yet also maintains negative stereotypes and affects toward people who dislike blacks. Despite my original question, which group is more racist, the real question is how does each group choose to deal with its dissonance? Under the theory of dissonance a person has to change one of their perceptions in order to attain consistency (i.e. start liking blacks or start liking racists). Perhaps the liberal choice is to fight their dislike of blacks by fighting for minority rights (i.e. liberal guilt). The conservative choice, on the other hand, may be to fight their dislike of racist by legitimizing the racists’ sentiment by cleaning out racial terminology. In other words, neither is more or less racist, however one’s choice may be more detrimental than the others to the minorities. The finding that political sophisticates had a stronger negative reaction to the black prime further suggests that their approach to dissonance may be more likely to lie in the justification of that dislike rather than a fight against it⁸.

⁸ Part of the Dissonance theory is that one will try to change the opinion that is least strong.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Review of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Individualism underlies the opposition to race-related policies.

My first study rejects this hypothesis to some extent. For the policy of Affirmative Action it seems that individualism plays no part in one's opposition. In the case of progressive taxation and welfare, however, individualism does enter the picture but never outside of race.

Hypothesis 2: Individualism and Race are orthogonal

My second study strongly rejects this hypothesis. My findings suggest that the two concepts though theoretically distinct are highly related in people's neural networks. The presentation of one concept significantly activates the other, without any context.

Hypothesis 3: Conservatives are more principled, liberals are more race conscious.

My first study does suggest that liberals may be more race conscious, in that race is highly activated for them at all times; however, liberals appear *more* "principled" than conservatives. For liberals, egalitarian values are activated at the implicit level, and seem consistent with their attempt to protect or help African Americans, despite their negative affect toward them.

Hypothesis 4: Conservatives dislike government involvement, not helping blacks.

My explicit experiment suggested that people do make decisions based on government involvement, however it is not as consistent as Sniderman and Carmines had suggested. Sophisticated conservatives appear to apply this principle consistently when looking at cases where blacks are affected, but when the group changes to whites, government involvement becomes a non issue. On the other hand, while non-sophisticates are able to abide by "less government" when they are dealing with whites, this principle loses power when blacks are involved. In short, this hypothesis is rejected; conservatives aren't being guided by government involvement irrespective of race, but rather contingent on race.

Hypothesis 5: Conservatives support policies that help blacks, as long as they do not specifically help blacks.

My findings suggest that conservatives do support color-blind policies to color-specific policies, and are more willing to sacrifice their government involvement principle if the people that benefit appear "mixed." However, given the other findings it isn't clear that this willingness to help blacks as long as they are mixed in with other races is "color-blind" in itself. This principle was not tested implicitly as other principles were, but it is quite possible that "color-blind" policies activate racial considerations.

Hypothesis 6: Racial considerations underlie racial policies, more so than principles.

This hypothesis is strongly supported. Its strongest support lies in the first experiment that revealed that racial stereotypes are immediately activated in the presence of racial policies. Racial considerations seem consistent across both

conservatives and liberals and across the three policies I observed. Furthermore, in the explicit experiment while policies did play a role, race was an important component to how and when those policies were applied.

Hypothesis 7: Racists find shelter in the conservative label (i.e. conservatives are more racist)

The support for this hypothesis lies in the definition of racism one employs. If racism is defined as negative affect and negative stereotypes, then this hypothesis is not supported. While conservatives seem to be guided by racial considerations, they are not necessarily more “racist” than liberals. Liberals, much like conservatives, have negative affect toward African Americans and hold negative stereotypes about them. The clue to the reason this racism doesn’t surface lies in the fact that the “racist” is hated far more than the “African American” so being a racist is not an option. The two options then are to “help” blacks, to “ignore” them, or to keep them down. If we define racism as the desire to keep the African Americans down, then hypothesis seven may be supported.

Hypothesis 8: Racism is intertwined with conservatism

This hypothesis is strongly supported. The two concepts are seemingly linked for people, especially sophisticated conservatives. Racial concepts activated individualism, and vice versa, supporting Jackman’s assertion that the use of conservative principles has become such a tool in dealing with racial issues, that one represents the other.

Hypothesis 9: Sophistication increases the relationship between racism and conservatism

Several of my studies supported this hypothesis. Despite the argument that sophisticated people are more likely to be principled and less likely to be guided by race, my experiments suggest it is the sophisticated conservatives that are most in tune with the power and negative effects of principles on minorities. For them the two concepts are more linked, and their use of principles appears highly strategic (i.e. applying government involvement principles to cases that affect minorities).

Hypothesis 10: Social conservatives are racist, economic conservatives are principled

According to my research individualism may underlie racial policies but only for economic conservatives. A more representative adult sample would be necessary in order to say this with more certainty, but it seemed that economic conservatives were more likely to activate concepts of individualism when they were faced with policies.

Dissertation Question and Answer

In addition to the ten hypotheses I addressed, the overarching question of the dissertation (i.e. the title) was whether conservatives are “principled” or “racists.” More specifically, what is at play when citizens vote for a proposition that is said to

eliminate Affirmative Action programs? Are they asserting their preferences for a society that is guided by merit and work ethic? Or are they attempting to maintain a social hierarchy that keeps minorities at the bottom.

My research supports both possibilities, while introducing a new and more critical question. On the one hand, concepts of individualism are present in the minds of conservatives as they are faced with policies. Moreover, while for most conservatives racial considerations were also present, for economic conservatives racial stereotypes were not as accessible. This suggests that the sort of principled conservatives Sniderman and Carmines spoke of may be present among economic conservatives, who unfortunately did not account for a large enough sample. Furthermore, principles did guide the conservative support for the educational policy and the scholarship in my third experiment. Conservatives supported policies that were privately funded to government funded even if privately funded policies were geared toward a predominately African American school. Similarly, conservatives supported scholarships that were based on merit rather than on race alone.

On the other hand, racial concepts were activated for most conservatives when presented with a policy. Even the privately funded educational policy, which was preferred by all conservatives, was applied differentially to the white and black schools, given the participants' sophistication. The last study, which defined racism as having negative affect toward an African American character, most obviously suggests that racism is alive and well among conservatives. Participants had a negative reaction to a black character, just as Devine's study from over a decade ago had shown. While this further supports the notion that conservatives are in fact "covert racists," the key here is that liberals are also likely to be "covert racists."

As it turned out the more critical question wasn't whether conservatives are principled rather than racist, but what do those principles represent? As the second study highlighted, racial stereotypes and principles have become intertwined for conservatives. This suggests that it isn't a matter of being principled *or* racist, because being principled is no longer distinct from racism or racial considerations. Honorable words like "work ethic" and "merit" activate concepts like "gang" and "aggressive" suggesting the principles themselves are no longer pure in their meaning. This speaks directly to the argument that "race never entered one's mind"; regardless of one's level of racism, simply put principles do not seem to be color-blind. The principles' racial undertones, however, do appear to be mitigated by one's sophistication. Specifically, while the two concepts were linked for both sophisticates and non sophisticates, the link was much more pronounced for sophisticated conservatives. Furthermore, it was the sophisticates who applied their principles consistently in the case of the predominately African American school, but abandoned their principles when dealing with the predominately white school.

According to Sidanius, it is the sophisticates who want to maintain the social hierarchy, and are clever enough to know that the only way to maintain it is to convince the non-sophisticates that the principles that will ultimately keep African Americans down are both respectable and color-blind. The fact that the non-sophisticated conservatives abided by those principles when dealing with the white schools and the fact that most everyone was able to elicit principled responses when

asked to defend their policy views, are highly suggestive of the fact that this legitimizing myth is thriving.

Limitations and Future Research

Although the story of Social Dominance fits my research quite well, there are alternative explanations for my findings that deserve consideration. One such explanation lies with the limitation of my sample. Particularly, it is possible that principled conservatives exist just as Sniderman described them but simply not in my sample. First my sample was disproportionately liberal. In fact, only about 15% of the samples used were self-identified conservatives. Of those less than half were politically sophisticated, and/or identified themselves as economic conservatives. While I do believe even my sample challenges the prevalence of Principled Conservatives, I cannot conclude that such conservatives do not exist. It is quite possible that a study of older self-identified economic conservatives would have produced different results. Another group, which was overlooked in this research, which might be fruitful in finding people for whom the principles still hold a pure meaning, is Libertarians. As they are essentially economic conservatives and social liberals, on a conservative scale that doesn't specify dimension they may fall on either end. However, this group is the least subject to elite made packages of what liberals or conservatives should support, which may allow it to be a highly principled and consistent group.

Another explanation for my findings lies with a different understanding of what the implicit task ultimately uncovers. My main argument is that the lexical decision task uncovers the "considerations" present in one's mind as they are thinking about a policy. In turn, I make the claim at times that this in fact suggests that the considerations in one's mind serve as the motivations for one policy position. Although I believe this is a possible interpretation of the data, and alternative interpretation exists. Instead of assuming that "considerations" of the policy light up in one's mind, an argument may be made that it is the "associations" that are lit up in one's mind. Although a conservative associates affirmative action with black stereotypes, that in itself doesn't prove that he or she is *guided* by those stereotypes. In other words, due to the constant discourse of affirmative action and its affect on minorities, minorities and all the links associated with them become highly linked to the policy construct, even if the reason for opposition isn't based on race. Especially given the cognitive dissonance that exists for people regarding race, perhaps the conservative position is highly sensitive to the implication of race, since they are constantly accused of being racist. In turn, their cognitive structure is highly racialized, but in light of their perception of the outside world, rather than their rational thoughts.

Several studies may address these possibilities. One approach may be to use framing to mediate the association of race with policy. Two framing possibilities come to mind, one of a specific policy context and another of a specific audience. In

the former, the policy in question may focus on women, Asians in the case of Affirmative Action, or poor white people in the case of Welfare, be it through pictures or descriptions. After the frame a lexical decision task, similar to the one I presented in my first study, would be completed. If in fact the black stereotypes are linked to affirmative action because the concept is highly associated with blacks, then we would expect that frames that focus on women and other minorities should deactivate this link, and perhaps activate gender or poor whites associations instead. If on the other hand, the link exists due to considerations involved in supporting a given policy, black stereotypes should creep in, while gender stereotypes (which would become more accessible at their base) would not necessarily be activated in light of the policy prime.

The other frame option is to vary the perceived audience. In line with the argument that race is highly accessible for conservatives because they are hyper sensitive to the implications or the judgments that their opposition produces, the audience or the researcher conducting the test may be described as either a conservative or a liberal. Under this hypothesis, the activation of racial stereotypes should be enhanced in the case of a liberal researcher, but deactivated in the case of a conservative researcher, where the dissonance is less pronounced.

Instead of trying to prove that the links that exist are not simply semantic between policy and race, other possible research foci may be to find support for the cognitive dissonance theory as I believe it applies to this case. At this point this theory is just my understanding of what may be happening: Liberals overcompensate for their racism, while conservatives try to legitimize racism. It would be interesting to find support for this through experimentation which would offer both alternatives to liberals and conservatives and see which one appeals to them. As an example, participants may be asked to read a hypothetical scenario where a black student was treated poorly and a different course of action was taken. In one case there was some sort of restitution paid to the boy, an apology was given, he was allowed to take some time off of school and in another the reason for treating this boy poorly was legitimized, he cheated on the exam, he started a fight, etc. If we start from an understanding that both liberals and conservatives are equally prejudiced, but equally dislike prejudiced people, we can get at the way they prefer to deal with cognitive dissonance. If liberals prefer to address their own racism, by fighting against it, they should feel (affective reaction is what most closely addresses the theory of dissonance) most relieved or positive when the boy is given something. On the other hand, the conservative, who I hypothesize rather deal with dissonance by fighting against "racism" should feel most relieved if the reason for the boy's poor treatment is justified. In other words, are conservatives and liberals distinct in how they prefer to deal with dissonance, keeping other things (i.e. racism) constant.

Implications

In 2002, voters in Oregon were offered a chance to cast their vote to eliminate racist language from their state's constitution. The Oregon electorate voted against this change. In Alabama, two years prior, 40% of the total electorate voted to maintain the ban on interracial marriage; in twenty-four counties the referendum was voted down by the majority. In 1996, the Kentucky government finally removed the ban on racially integrated education, but not without a significant (33% of the electorate) opposition to this change. In all of these cases, the Supreme Court had already ruled that these provisions were unconstitutional, forty to fifty years earlier. This begs the question: Why did so many voters want to maintain this racist language or these laws in their state constitution? Was it their respect for their state's history or their conservative disposition toward maintaining the status quo? *Or is racism still stirring within Americans, waiting for opportunities to express itself?*

Often political science research is more concerned with predicting future events, than describing present events. I believe that in the context of race, explaining what is really going on, defines the rules of the game, and potentially alters future events. The goal of this research was to shed light on the present thoughts and feelings that motivate Americans to support or oppose racial policies, across different ideologies. Much like Sniderman and Carmines, I believe it is unfair to label people racist, when their positions are guided by principles and logic. Placing a stigma on opposition to affirmative action, by equating it with racism, may suppress that opposition and result in non-actualized preferences of the electorate. On the same account, it is misleading and counterproductive to accept ideological reasons, when racial beliefs guide the policies in question. In this case, the "legitimizing myth" of individualism does not result in thoughtful application of principle, but in the legitimizing of discrimination.

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