NOTE OF THANKS

The Spring 1998 volume of Educational Change marks the fourth year that I have edited the journal for the N.Y.S.F.E.A. As I look back over these years with this project, what I find most striking is the commitment of many individuals—the essential social dimension—which is the *sine qua non* of efficacious action. For this, there are many people to thank, the members of our association, the contributors, a dedicated editorial staff and many colleagues at SUNY Oneonta and elsewhere whose comments, as well as the mere give and take of casual conversations, contributed far more than can be quantified or estimated.

However, the following must be signaled for special acknowledgment. Barbara Paugh, Manager of Publications at SUNY Oneonta, and Su Hartley, of the same department, have meticulously guided the proofs of four consecutive volumes until these were ready for the Print Shop. Wayne Byam, supervisor of the Print Shop, was unusually cooperative. At times he readjusted his own schedule to help us meet our deadlines and still provided us with an outstanding product. Dr. Jane Fowler Morse, President of N.Y.S.F.E.A., has provided editorial help and much constructive criticism. I am immensely grateful to her and welcome her to our editorial staff. I also look forward to working with Dr. Joseph DeVitis, of SUNY Binghamton, who has graciously agreed to join our editorial staff beginning with the Spring 1999 volume. I am especially grateful to Marge Holling, the dedicated secretary of the Philosophy Department, who, beginning with the first issue (Spring 1995) that I have edited, has provided excellent secretarial help.

Further, I am delighted to report that the N.Y.S.F.E.A. has been able to hold its first essay competition for teachers K-12. Three essays were chosen by a panel (Joseph DeVitis, Jane F. Morse, and Anthony Roda) and awards of $100, $75 and $50 were distributed to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd place entries which were submitted by Thomas Gajewski of the Ithaca City Schools, James J. Carpenter of Union Endicott High School and Carol Dean Nassau of Oneonta City School.
District respectively. All three presented their work at the association’s annual meeting held at SUNY Geneseo (April 3-4, 1998), and the first place essay will be published in our journal in the Spring 1999 volume.

N.Y.S.F.E.A. is grateful to Dr. Michael Merilan, Dean of Science and Social Science at SUNY Oneonta whose office provided financial support and enabled the association to hold its first essay contest. In addition, thanks are due to Dr. Anne Federlein, Provost at SUNY Oneonta, who was first approached with the project and whose supportive response created a receptive climate for the proposal.

One result of this initiative has been a gracious offer by Dr. Linda Bernier, Dean of Education at SUNY Binghamton, to help defray the costs of the association’s second essay competition. The entire association is grateful for this financial support which will help establish continuity at this early and critical stage of this project.

Finally, thanks to Dr. Alan Donovan, President of SUNY Oneonta, whose steadfastness in his pursuit of a better SUNY Oneonta has inspired and paved the way for many small initiatives such as the one before you.

The Editor
TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note of Thanks ......................................................... front page

Preface by Anthony Roda, Editor ................................. i

Learner-Centered Education: Thoughts on Urbanski’s Keynote Address at the 1997 NYSFEA Meeting ........................................ 1
  Jane Fowler Morse

Mythologizing Ideas: Schiller and the Role of Aesthetics in Education ................................................................. 7
  Kipton E. Jensen

Idealism and Realism as Schools of Thought in the Philosophy of Education ......................................................... 21
  Jane Fowler Morse

From Coeducation to Coordinate Education at the University of Rochester: A History ................................................ 31
  Christine M. Lundt

The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education ................................................................. 43
  Norman J. Bauer

Motivational Characteristics of College Women: A Comparative Case Study of a U.S. and Mexican Institution .................. 67
  George Iber and Pedro Sanchez

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Response to Michael Green ........................................... 85
  William Griffen
Concerning Consciousness ..................................................... 91
  Douglas W. Shrader

Expanding on Bassey’s “Preparing Teachers for the
21st Century” ........................................................................ 103
  Joyce Woelfle Lehmann

Ad-libbing on Justifications for Intervention ...................... 108
  Achim D. Köddermann

The “Categorical Imperative,” Kant’s Rule of the Road to Morse’s
“Ends of Education” .............................................................. 112
  Anthony Roda
PREFACE

The members of the N.Y.S.F.E.A. were privileged to hear from Dr. Adam Urbanski at their annual meeting held at Nazareth College on April 18, 1997. Dr. Urbanski, president of the Rochester’s Teachers Association, quickly cut through the confusion and disorder as well as the many false dichotomies that are bandied around with respect to the theory and practice of education. Especially critical is Urbanski’s view that the student or learner must be at the center of any educational policy that is worthy of its name. Only by re-focusing our perspective, accordingly, can we establish some clear outline of the ends we expect to accomplish. But we shall always be lead astray unless the subject of our inquiry and concern are truly treated as subjects and we consciously resist the recidivist tendencies of turning them into mere objects.

Picking up this thread Dr. Jane Fowler Morse of SUNY Geneseo provides us with an account of Urbanski’s address relating it to her own experiences as a professor of educational foundations. Surely, it is a sign of hope to have thoughtful educators such as Urbanski and Morse recall us to the center and heart of our educational responsibilities.

Dr. Kipton Jensen of Nazareth College attempts to shed light on the present crisis in “liberal arts education” by calling attention to the foundational relevance of the aesthetic factor in human development. His essay, “Mythologizing Ideas: Schiller and the Role of Aesthetics in Education,” provides an account of Schiller’s aesthetic view and its role in a sound liberal arts education; hence, an education appropriate for the development of the students’ total humanity. Using a Marxian analysis, Dr. Jensen suggests that the present educational system exhibits the same patterns of alienation and estranged labor which Marx found in a capitalist society. By substituting student for laborers he finds the same essential patterns of estrangement and alienation in our students which Marx found in the industrial workers, who are trapped in dehumanizing and repetitive routine activities.
Having painted education and society with these broad Marxian strokes, Professor Jensen appeals to Schiller's use of the aesthetic activity to provide us with a principle of unity and harmony. Such a principle would reconcile the self's (student's) antagonistic drives and free it by overcoming such self-destructive conflicts. It is also a way of harmonizing means and ends. The attempt is to annul the pernicious division of means and ends so that the students may find fulfillment in each activity, done for its own sake and not merely as a means to something else. Viewed as such the scholarship of students may achieve the freedom of play and the human activity that exhibits such freedom par excellence is the aesthetic. But the big problem is how we as educators may actualize it.

As a starter, educators must try to take seriously the experiences and histories which students bring and carry with them to the classroom. It is in such a spirit that Professor Jane Fowler Morse attempts to convey the experiences of her students as she introduces them to educational theories of "idealism" and "realism." By picking up the experience of confusion which her students expressed in her classes, Dr. Morse manages, as her essay shows, to present these positions (idealism and realism) as expressions of essential parts of the problem of knowledge. She, thus, sees Plato and Aristotle as complementing each other rather than locked in mutually exclusive philosophical positions. She presents these (positions) in the spirit of William James' Pragmatism as specific emphasis of either the interior subjective pole or the exterior objective pole of the human cognitive experience (relation). To elucidate this Dr. Morse turns to Immanuel Kant whose uneasiness with both continental rationalism (akin to idealism) and British Empiricism (akin to realism) led him to attempt a synthesis of these positions which is captured by his famous statement that, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." Consequently, Professor Morse suggests that idealism and realism may be contrived or artificial ways of dividing up our experience. In view of these considerations she suggests that it might be profitable to revise and re-organize textbooks in the philosophical foundations contextually or historically.

Anthony Roda
PREFACE

The members of the N.Y.S.F.E.A. were privileged to hear from Dr. Adam Urbanski at their annual meeting held at Nazareth College on April 18, 1997. Dr. Urbanski, president of the Rochester’s Teachers Association, quickly cut through the confusion and disorder as well as the many false dichotomies that are bandied around with respect to the theory and practice of education. Especially critical is Urbanski’s view that the student or learner must be at the center of any educational policy that is worthy of its name. Only by re-focusing our perspective, accordingly, can we establish some clear outline of the ends we expect to accomplish. But we shall always be lead astray unless the subject of our inquiry and concern are truly treated as subjects and we consciously resist the recidivist tendencies of turning them into mere objects.

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books in the philosophical foundations contextually or historically.

Anthony Roda
In so doing our students would be able to appreciate the usefulness (strength) and the uselessness (weakness) of a classification which justly caused them much uneasiness.

The perceptive instructor is one who effectively uses these opportunities of uneasiness, confusion or, in general, occasions which disrupt our customary organizing patterns; and in so doing, may open up the possibility of conveying to students a deeper and richer grasp of a principle, idea, issue, method or whatever is in question. I suggest that Dr. Morse’s essay is an illustration of such a pedagogical technique.

The next three contributions in our journal are variations of the above theme. Of course, these are not always illustrations of human effort exercised fruitfully; but, nonetheless, clearly point to the most problematic cognitive experience — the interaction between inherited or acquired principles and the lived historical occasion.

Professor Christine Lundt of Roberts Wesleyan College gives us an historical analysis of the educational experiences at the University of Rochester from year 1900-1913 which corresponded with the admission of women. In her analysis, “From Coeducation to Coordinate Education at the University of Rochester: A History,” Dr. Lundt traces the development and institutional responses by both the academic and the civic community to this new development. She shows how the University of Rochester, under the presidency of the Reverend Rush Rhees, implemented an educational arrangement that led to a coordinate structure rather than a coeducational one. She argues that, in large part, this was due to Rhees’ educational vision with a preference for coordinate education with the consequent re-interpretation of the previous trustees decisions in such a way as to undermine the development of a coeducational structure. This is an excellent account of how Dr. Rhees with his educational presuppositions responded to the academic context he encountered at the University of Rochester during those years that corresponded with the arrival of women at the university.

Preface
Another illustration of the interaction between idea and historical act is provided by Dr. Norman Bauer, Emeritus of SUNY Geneseo, in his piece, “The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education.” In his analysis, Dr. Bauer attempts to show the relationship of a constitutional foundational principle (the Establishment Clause) and its tortuous turns as it was subjected to new legislation (e.g.: Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981), social pressures, and judicial reviews and re-interpretations — in short, historical contexts and experiences. In tracing out the Felton Saga [challenges to the distribution of tax monies to private schools] from 1985 to 1997, Dr. Bauer enables us to develop an appreciation for the Establishment Clause and the pitfalls inherent in applying it to new emerging social contexts.

The concern for understanding the significance and influence of cultural contexts is put into sharp relief in “Motivational Characteristics of College Women: A Comparative Case Study of a U.S. and a Mexican Institution,” a study by Dr. George Iber of Russell Sage College and Dr. Pedro Sanchez of the Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan in Merida, Yucatan. These scholars collect, compare and contrast many characteristics detailing the historical background, the present conditions and future expectations of an American and a Mexican sample of college women. Their study suggests that future expectations of these women are tied to their economic and social conditions which in turn influence their self-perception and consequent motivation. However, these scholars alert us to powerful globalization forces (economic, social and cultural) which impact the outcomes in ways difficult to discern and in need of closer attention and analysis.

Finally, at this juncture, a word about the newest feature of our journal is in order. With this issue of Educational Change our new feature “Notes and Comments” appears for the second time with five pieces of varying lengths and approaches. These suggest that a dialogue which provokes further analysis and enriches a scholar’s origi-
nal contribution may be sustained within the boundaries of our organization and journal. Hopefully, these efforts will help us distil the better in pedagogical scholarship and in human conversations. Those of us who are engaged in sketching out and sharing the problematic journey of human learning and discovery should find this feature of some benefit.

The first among these is William Griffen’s “Response to Michael Green.” Griffen suggests that Green’s assumed unbiased (objective) stance has beneath it a presupposition (its own bias), or as Griffen says, “a naive faith in the rapidly emerging computer information technology world.” Perhaps, Griffen and Green are not as far apart as their language suggests; and perhaps, both are addressing different aspects of the social issues that this relatively new computer information technology raises. Green seems to emphasize the potential promise (uses) that this new technology holds, even to address some of Griffen’s concerns such as promoting accessibility and potentially promoting democracy. On the other hand, Griffen emphasizes the potential (abuses) which the technology holds; and he suggests that the deck is stacked in favor of those who develop and control this technology which will result in another undemocratic form of distribution determined by this new “commodity” or “cultural capital.” Some logicians, occasionally, introduce different kinds of disagreements such as (i) factual disagreements and (ii) disagreements in the way facts are viewed or interpreted or valued. This distinction presents us with a number of alternative positions with respect to the social issues raised by the computer information technology. Perhaps, Griffen and Green could sort out their differences and similarities along such lines which might lead them to a better appreciation of their respective positions.

In our second piece, “Concerning Consciousness,” Douglas Shrader comments on Greg Nixon’s “A Fool’s Paradise,” in which it is argued that the experience of consciousness cannot be reduced to a scientific functionalism. For that matter, Nixon argues that consciousness is simply irreducible and unexplainable due to the cognitive cir-
cularity of trying to explain the “experience through an object created through that experience.” Although Shrader agrees with much of Nixon’s factual account of recent research in artificial intelligence and neurobiology, he parts company with the pessimistic conclusions that Nixon reaches. Rather, Shrader suggests that the knowledge acquired by studies in artificial intelligence and neurobiology, etc., in no way threatens the humanities, education or the social sciences but informs such disciplines in ways that provides for deeper appreciation of the human self. Ultimately, these are human constructions which no less than language and technology may be used beneficially for human purposes but at the same time run the risk of being abused to undermine and subvert the uniquely human. In short, the fear that reductionism poses is baseless since reductionism is simply an attitude or disposition in “the play of human factors within the social and physical environment.” With respect to artificial intelligence and neurobiology we have a conceptual pattern which provides one among a number of attitudes and dispositions. These must ultimately be evaluated in the fruitfulness they have on human consequences and human expectations.

The third piece in “Notes and Comments” is by Joyce W. Lehmann. In it she attempts to show that Magnus Bassey’s concerns with respect to the cognitive base in knowledge, skills and values needed by pre-service teachers to deal with the present public school demographics in the U.S. must also deal with the present cultural climate (receptive and non-receptive). She takes an initiative that occurred in rural Wayne County, N. Y., and uses it as an illustration which deals with Magnus Bassey’s concerns, but in a setting distinct from pre-service training, and yet one which provides a context that promotes constructive behavior within a diverse population.

In “Ad-libbing on the Justifications for Intervention,” Achim Köddermann uses Anthony Roda’s essay, “The Demos and the Dictator,” as a point of departure to reflect on alternative justifications for intervention. These alternatives have been appealed to by differ-

Anthony Roda
ent regimes at various times. Köddermann suggests that as one moves up this ladder of alternatives one moves up to a morally “higher” ground while at the same time integrating the lower options. Is this a form of Hegel’s dialectic, a romantic view of history or a passionate plea for improving the human condition? Finally, Köddermann invokes an “international moral consensus, based on a rational decision” as a way of justifying the political formality involved in such justification. But, before one arrives at such a stage one must have developed a sense of “civil responsibility driven by empathy with the suffering of fellow human beings.” Does this amount to saying that “if one is a Christian he will behave as a Christian? or If one has faith one will believe? or If one is civil he will intervene civilly?” Is Köddermann re-incarnating the ontological argument?

The last comment is a partial answer by Anthony Roda to Jane Fowler Morse’s defense of “The Ends of Education.” Roda’s comment is an attempt to sort out some of the issues implicit in Morse’s application of Kant’s categorical imperative to educational practices.

ENDNOTES

4. Ibid., p. 25.

Preface
NOTES AND COMMENTS

Editor’s Note: I am happy to announce that this issue of *Educational Change* continues the feature, “Notes and Comments,” initiated with the previous volume. I hope that it will go some way in addressing the difficulties aired at the meeting at Nazareth College (April 19, 1997) and prepare the ground for continuing conversations which our meetings and journal set in motion. And, again quoting from the note that introduced this new feature: “Readers are encouraged to contribute letters, notes and comments on any and all articles and criticisms as well as any and all aspects of this publication.”

It is a pleasure to thank our colleagues who have made it possible to continue this feature for Spring 1998. For this we are grateful to William Griffen of SUNY Cortland, Douglas Shrader of SUNY Oneonta, Joyce Lehmann of SUNY Oswego, Achim Köddermann of SUNY Oneonta and Anthony Roda of SUNY Oneonta.
LEARNER-CENTERED EDUCATION: A REPORT FROM THE FLOOR

Thoughts on Urbanski’s Keynote Address at the 1997 NYSFEA Conference

Jane Fowler Morse

In the keynote address delivered at the 1997 NYSFEA Conference at Nazareth College in Rochester, Adam Urbanski summarized elements that contribute to reform in education. Urbanski holds that reform will continue to flounder until we develop “a clear image of where it all leads” (Urbanski, 1995, p. 282). As long as education is merely custodial, then large class sizes, a top heavy administrative bureaucracy, and behaviorally defined standards dictated from above will accomplish the job efficiently — keeping children off the streets and slotting them into the proper positions of the work force. However, if education aims, as Urbanski thinks it should, at cultivating habits of mind, creating skeptical citizens who think critically, then education must foster the development of people who are responsible for their ideas. Surely this is the goal of education in a democracy. In order to accomplish this, Urbanski believes that we must promote learner-centered education.

Urbanski began his address by debunking the idea that unionism and professionalism in teaching are incompatible. Teachers are professionals who have much in common with doctors and lawyers, including (1) a shared body of knowledge of both content and pedagogy; (2) knowledge of human development (which Urbanski described as “everything a pediatrician knows and then some”); (3) knowledge of epistemology and ethics; (4) high and rigorous standards (which Urbanski wishes were enforced by peer review); (5) professional discretion and accountability; (6) collegiality; and (7) professional terms and conditions for work (which undoubtedly could be improved, but have become better over the years). Although teachers, unlike most doctors and lawyers, are salaried officials working in a public institution, teachers’ unions have paid attention to the professional issues which affect the quality of teach-
ing, not just wages and benefits. In Urbanski’s vision, teachers can create learner-centered schools that “respect, challenge and nurture” students (Urbanski, 1997).

In Urbanski’s view, it will not be difficult to create such schools. First, schools must have high academic standards, but he warned that there must be “standards without standardization.” (Urbanski, 1997) Setting a standard does not itself accomplish anything. What matters is how teachers enable students to reach that standard. Urbanski also thinks that school should enforce higher standards of behavior. In his view, it would be fairly easy and would cost little to produce real changes in education by implementing a learner-centered education. I agree. Our aim in education for democracy must be individuals who are capable of autonomous behavior according to rules consistent with civil society. Urbanski listed a number of ways we can accomplish this. I am sure he is pleased by Clinton’s proposal for smaller class sizes in the primary grades which is in agreement with Deborah Meier and Thomas Sergiovanni’s call for schools to be smaller, so that a personal community can develop. According to the keynoter, “You can’t care about people you don’t know, and you can’t teach people you don’t care about.” (Urbanski, 1997) I have long held that the single most effective reform we could institute in education would be a lower student to teacher ratio, perhaps in the range of one to ten or fifteen. In Urbanski’s opinion, small classes and small schools will enable teachers to make learning “real to life.” Dewey would be pleased at his language and would applaud Urbanski’s view that children learn when what they learn is contextualized in a real, rather than a contrived, situation. Authentic assessment would also contribute to children feeling responsible for their actions. Recently, a teacher I know praised student-led parent/teacher conferences. Students shared a portfolio of their work, explained it, and discussed their goals with their parents. These conferences produced a better understanding of the student’s work than the old model which excluded the student. Obviously, a system that is less behavioristic would please Urbanski, too. Training children to respond to contrived reinforcers accomplishes someone else’s purposes. Education encourages

Jane Fowler Morse
individuals to accomplish their own purposes.

Urbanski also envisions a much larger role for teachers in providing effective leadership for our schools. He called for teacher-administrators to take turns running the school, because they know what is going on in the classrooms. In the meantime, Urbanski challenged teachers to “comply differently” or engage in “creative insubordination” if administrators without classroom experience make it difficult for them to follow their professional judgment. (Urbanski, 1997) Urbanski would also like to see peer evaluation take precedence over administrative evaluation. Urbanski praised school programs that involve parents, encouraging them to spend time with their children on homework and other projects; nevertheless, Urbanski warned that there might be pitfalls in Rochester’s upcoming experiment with parent evaluation, if irrelevant factors influence personnel decisions.

Urbanski noted that educational reforms are doomed if not coupled with improvement in social policy. Housing, employment opportunities, child care, and medical care must be adequate; and he cited research which shows the strongest predictor of success is the amount of time young children spend with nurturing adults. (Urbanski, 1997) He thinks that teachers can provide a great deal of support to parents of young children through programs that draw the home and school together. Recently, my seven year old niece created a book in her second grade classroom. Her assignment included collecting the responses of family members. Her pride and delight in her accomplishment was the real object of the lesson. Teachers like my niece’s can design assignments to link school and family, but it is also our obligation to create a society which supports parents, so they have the time and resources to be nurturing. Urbanski called for health and social services to be coordinated. School is an obvious place to do it. Many times, families are made dysfunctional by conditions that are remediable; employment, subsidized child care, adequate nutrition, and health care are all within the power of an affluent country like the United States to provide, yet statistics continue to show an

*Learner-Centered Education: A Report from the Floor*
increase in child poverty. I used to be able to tell my foundations students that 20% of the children in their classrooms will be living in poverty, a shocking figure in itself. Now it is closer to 25%. This is unacceptable. We talk casually about bombing Iraq to "take out" Saddam Hussein; perhaps we should and can avoid such expenditures and ought to calculate what that money could do if we spent it on education.

Urbanski also raised the issue of conduct. He claimed that our students "act in ways that are unthinkable in other countries." (Urbanski, 1997) High standards of conduct are based on the idea of obligation rather than privilege. Teachers model good conduct and create conditions that encourage moral behavior. Urbanski foresees a school in which students feel "a sense of belonging, are respected, and show respect for others." (Urbanski, 1995) He envisions no more locked doors and no more hall passes. Instead, he would like to see a joyful learning community based on mutual respect and cooperative effort. In foundations classes I emphasize that teachers teach values whether conservatives want them to or not. Children are learning how to act morally. I contend that they learn it two ways — by habit and through reason. Aristotle recommends teaching children moderation in conduct through habit; Kant recommends following the categorical imperative, a rule that commands that we treat other people as ends in themselves, never as a means to our end (Morse, 1997). Either way, teachers play a vital role in children's moral development. Urbanski's recommendation: teachers have a moral responsibility to be good teachers who care for themselves, creating children who hold ideals, value principles, and act accordingly. (Urbanski, 1997) Being professional teachers involves much more than improving working conditions and salaries. Teachers need to be autonomous themselves if they are to encourage autonomy in children.

As Urbanski pointed out in closing, morality doesn't guide the free market. Neither should the market control education. Although the business metaphor has long been used in education, I can think of many ways in which it is inappropriate. In business, profit is the bot-

Jane Fowler Morse
tom line, but in education, potential is what we hope to realize. Goods and services are sold in business, but in education they are rendered. Business uses propaganda, but education cultivates open-mindedness through accurate and accessible information. The goal of education according to business is to train people for the work force, but students are not products. Education aims to produce individuals who are capable flourishing as human beings. If we adopt the business metaphor, how will we promote the democratic ideals that we desire children to hold? Locke claims that the people shall judge when revolution is justified. More than ever, in this age of managed media, we need Urbanski’s critical thinkers. Education should not merely mold children to fit a slot in the economy which we hope will still be there when they are forty. Rather, Urbanski called for children who have “earned the right” to think critically by learning the basics. As he pointed out, creative and critical thinking must be about something. I have seen people teach children what Bloom’s taxonomy is in lieu of teaching them to think critically about appropriate content. Urbanski’s contextualized learning would teach children to think about the problems they face. Until we educate people to think creatively and critically, education will remain custodial. Teachers can make the difference between Brave New World’s vision of conditioned robots who fulfill the functions for which they were created and real people who actualize their potential.

Sometimes foundations professors are accused of being out of touch with what really goes on in public education. It was refreshing to hear Urbanski, representing Rochester area teachers, raise issues that I discuss in my foundations classes. Urbanski does not expect that educational reform will ever be finished. Change is ongoing. But we must envision where we are going. As the unexamined life is not worth living, the unreflective practitioner should not be teaching. Would-be reformers must formulate the purpose of education before tinkering with the materials, methods, or curriculum.

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*Learner-Centered Education: A Report from the Floor*
REFERENCES


Jane Fowler Morse
MYTHOLOGIZING IDEAS: SCHILLER AND THE ROLE OF AESTHETICS IN EDUCATION

Kipton E. Jensen

“Until we make ideas aesthetic, i.e. mythological, they will have no interest for people.”
— Hegel and Schelling, 1796

Introduction

In this essay I propose to examine Schiller’s account of an aesthetic education as a response to what many consider a crisis in the liberal arts. This excursion into the thought of Schiller is the second part of a much larger project.¹ To state the obvious, a liberal arts education was traditionally understood as an education suitable for a liberated or free person, i.e. artes liberalis. Consistent with this etymological definition of liberal learning is a brand of knowledge which is free from servile ends and political agendas. Liberal education is aimed at fostering the development of persons who are sociable, civilized, creative, thoughtful, active, and free — in a word, fully human.² A liberal education suffers a mild crisis whenever these purposes flounder and suffers a severe crisis whenever the opposite sort of person is (unwittingly or not) produced. This “opposite sort of person” is an alienated person — i.e. someone estranged from what Marx calls our “species being.”³ An alienated student is one for whom education, i.e. mental labor, is perceived as self-sacrifice and mortification, who develops her mental energies only under coercion (grades, the fear of not getting a job when and she graduate, etc.), who only feels at home outside the classroom, who avoids critical thinking as much as possible, and who shuns education like the plague as soon as no other compulsion exists. Said differently, alienated students are so absorbed in the restless pursuit of their economic interests that this pursuit shapes every phase of their encounter with reality — i.e. nothing they experience has meaning in itself, nothing means
anything unless it can be turned into a means for attaining these ends.\textsuperscript{4}

The task of the modern intellectual, says Sartre, is decidedly political — it involves lending one’s expertise to the historical mission of the oppressed.\textsuperscript{5} In the present case, the oppressed are our students. How might we best resist this tendency in higher education? First, I suppose, we must make transparent the structures of oppression; this I do in Section I. In his rather celebrated and terse critique of Hegel, Marx claimed that “it is not enough to merely understand the world, we understand it in order that we might change it.” Agreed. Having identified the causes of alienation in the classroom, the factories of the twenty-first century, we are in a much better position to offer intelligent strategies of emancipation. I think that Schiller’s 

\textit{Aesthetic Education of Man}, discussed in Section II, offers one such strategy. I conclude by identifying several obstacles which stand in the way of our successful implementation of this and similar emancipatory strategies.

\textbf{I. Marxism and Liberal Learning.}

Let us assume then that a liberal arts education is aimed at the creative facilitation of a certain type of person—namely, someone who is fully human. Marxism, if properly understood, is directed to a strikingly similar goal. Indeed, I think the two are similar enough in their professed purposes to justify the analogical application of Marx’s analysis of alienation to the crisis in the liberal arts.

For whatever reason, or reasons, those who claim to have read Marx tend to forget the profound humanitarian impulse which gave birth to Marxism. Marx proceeds from what he took to be a contemporary \textit{fact}—namely, that persons, instead of determining the conditions of social production and social organization, become detrimentally determined by them; in short, Marxism is an attempt to resist a profoundly pernicious devaluation of humanity (i.e. the reduction of a person to one commodity among others). More simply: Marxism

\textit{Kipton E. Jensen}
is, at bottom, a reaction against the treatment of persons as things; in Buber’s words, the systematic and tragic substitution of an “it” for a “thou”.

Kant once complained that we too often philosophize with hammers when we should be using an etcher’s needle, but a hammer is often justifiable in the early stages of a project—it seems to me a question of focal adjustment. Let us assume for the sake of argument that Marx’s analysis of political economy is right. The Marxist analysis sketches the intellectual and social alienation which inevitably follows in the wake of, or goes hand in hand with, estranged labor — this account tends toward philosophizing with an etcher’s needle. The hammering liberties I mentioned above refer to the following strategy: I would like to take Marx’s analysis of the stages of estranged labor in political economy as the model for an analysis of intellectual alienation in a theory of education. The crassness of this model lies in viewing knowledge as a product of sorts, and education (collectively or otherwise) as a form of labor. To the extent that one learns only in order to further one’s economic interests, the product of one’s labor is not one’s own. More concretely considered, this would mean that the student construes education as little more than a hoop through which she needs to jump in order to succeed economically — in this way, her educational labor has no meaning in itself (but only to the extent that it furthers those interests). This is hardly labor (production, creation, life activity) for the free person—analogically, education takes the shape of wage-labor. The laborer (student) is thereby estranged from both the product of her labor (knowledge) and, naturally, the productive process itself (thought, study, etc.).

A non-human animal, says Marx, is immediately one with its life activity (i.e. its own active functions)—it does not distinguish itself from its life activity (read: work). By “life activity” Marx means, I think, something very similar to what Aristotle meant when he defined (in his *Nicomachean Ethics*) virtue to “the exercise of one’s

*Mythologizing Ideas*
complete range of faculties.” The human animal, in contrast to the remainder of the animal kingdom, “makes his life activity itself the object of his will and consciousness”\textsuperscript{6}; one of the peculiar bi-products of self-consciousness is the distinct possibility that labor becomes external to the laborer—i.e. for the laborer to become estranged from his or her essential being. On this model, a human is estranged when her essential life activity issubjugated to a mere means of existence. The distinguishing characteristic of humanity, then, is the fact that our own life is an object for us, i.e. our life activity is the product of our will (free activity). As Marx puts it, “[a]nimals produce only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom”\textsuperscript{7}. The point of all this is simply to draw attention to who we are \textit{essentially} (creatures who exist in order to live) and what we have become as a result of estranged labor (creatures who live in order to exist)—estranged labor reverses the relationship and in so doing dehumanizes humanity (subjugating one’s life activity to mere existence or animality). When education is taken abstractly and separated from all other human activities\textsuperscript{8}, \textit{it too is merely an animal function} (or worse!). The immediate consequence of the student’s estrangement from her “species being” is her estrangement from others (or, at least, others who show vital signs other than those of mere animality).

This is not to say that the average student learns nothing at all, but rather that the content of what she learns has no meaning in itself; society at large and educators in its wake create information machines, “mass men,”\textsuperscript{9} not thinkers and individuals—we are becoming, says Saul Bellow, terribly “cerebral but not too intelligent.”\textsuperscript{10} Thoreau puts it nicely when he claims that we are so occupied with the factitious cares and superfluously coarse labors of life that its finer fruits cannot be plucked by him. His fingers, from excessive toil, are too clumsy and tremble too much for that. . . . He has no time to be

\textit{Kipton E. Jensen}
any thing but a machine. How can he remember well his ignorance — which his growth requires — who has so often to use his knowledge?¹¹

When we allow our life activities to become subjugated to mere existence or the lower (read: animal) pleasures, we lose our capacity to enjoy the higher pleasures — as Thoreau put it, “we can no longer sustain the manliest of relations with one another.” Mill has said (in his *Utilitarianism*) that our capacity to enjoy the higher pleasures or noble feelings, what Goethe was to call “life’s higher interests,”¹² is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupation to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise.¹³

Are the higher pleasures — the pleasures of the mind against which the pleasures of the body allegedly pale — slowly approaching extinction, atrophying due to neglect? Or are those pleasures reserved for the elite? For the vast majority, at any rate, it seems that our hands tremble far too much to pluck such delicate fruit.

As is well-known, Marx believes that estranged labor is the inevitable bi-product of capitalist society. It was merely a matter of time before the “icy water of egotistical calculation” worked its way into the chinks and crevices of academia; and it is merely a matter of time, I suppose, before it freezes and the halls of higher learning collapse under the strain. To the extent to which we still believe that the present system works, we have become the unwitting allies of the ruling class—indeed, we have become their watchdogs. The standard Marxian term for a system of thought which serves a class function in ignorance of its true social character is “ideology.” Is not the present system perpetuating a breed of creatures incapable of enjoying the higher pleasures—pleasures which are their birthright?

*Mythologizing Ideas*
The well-meaning effort of many educators to salvage the present system is a vain attempt to roll back the wheel of history and prolong the inevitable. Perhaps by collectively abandoning the present ideology, we make room for one of the more humane alternatives. The present system proves itself unfit to rule because it tears away from each person his or her human status and dignity (i.e. it systematically resists their largely vain attempts at self-actualization, “it is incompatible with society”¹⁴). Indeed, I suspect that Marx would call us “ideologues” for no other reason than our attempt to liberate the human race simply through the apparatus of critical thinking, inspiring lectures, and moralizing. The alienation we see in the glassy, blank stares of our students is real and is caused by real, social obstacles to human self-actualization. Perhaps short-term gains are, returning to the analogy, “nothing but a better payment for the slave.”¹⁵

II. Schiller and the Role of Aesthetics in Education.

My interest in Schiller’s *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* turns on his conviction that an aesthetic education is uniquely adept at fostering “the ordered growth of the mind and furthering our sense of reality.” Schiller’s treatise is a response to several perennial philosophical questions: What is the relation of reason to sense, or insight to action? Will understanding virtue make us virtuous? How are principles transformed into practice? What is the relation of art to politics? What is the ideal form of government? And what does it mean to be fully human? It should be clear, then, that an aesthetic education in Schiller’s sense of the term extends well beyond the sense familiar to us today. Indeed, we are unlikely to understand Schiller’s conception of an ‘aesthetic education,’ let alone his ‘philosophical-poetical visions’ [*meine philosophisch-poetische Visionen*],¹⁶ if we start out with stock preconceptions about either aesthetics or education.

While it is often argued that the *Aesthetic Letters* are “an apolitical retreat into the ivory tower of aestheticism,”¹⁷ “recoiling” as it were from the horrors of the French Revolution, a historical interpre-

*Kipton E. Jensen*
tion of this sort betrays a seriously myopic view of aesthetics and politics alike. Schiller was convinced that any reform which is to endure can only proceed from a change in our whole way of thinking. (The Marxist has, I think, a good deal to learn from Schiller.) A more accurate description of the treatise is found in Wilkinson and Willoughby's excellent Introduction; far from "an aesthetic retreat," we find instead

... an impassioned analysis of the cultural predicament of modern man: the evils of specialization, whether of knowledge or skill, or of one function of the psyche at the expense of the others; the dissociation of what was once united — sensibility and thought, feeling and morality, body and mind; the cleavage between different branches of learning, between the sciences and the arts, between the development of the individual and the welfare of the community, between those who are too exhausted to think for themselves and those who are too indolent to make creative use of their leisure; the reduction of man to a mere cog in the wheel of an over-developed society; the de-humanization of the citizen in a State where he is valued for the function he performs rather than the being that he is, treated as a classifiable abstraction and administered by laws which seem irrelevant to him as person.¹⁸

It is obvious, I suppose, how closely these concerns correspond to the professed purposes of a liberal arts education on the one hand and Marxism on the other. So while it is certainly true that he was disenchanted by the course the French Revolution had taken, Schiller was fundamentally concerned with discerning in the flux of human affairs 'the unchanging needs and attributes of human nature.'¹⁹ An aesthetic education, in Schiller's sense of the term, is directed at 'restoring the totality of our nature.'

The term itself, aesthetic [ästetisch],²⁰ is left undefined by Schiller until the twenty-second letter and then in a footnote:

Mythologizing Ideas
For readers not altogether familiar with the precise meaning of this word, which is so much abused through ignorance, the following may serve as an explanation. Everything which is capable of phenomenal manifestation may be thought of under four different aspects [Beziehungen]. A thing can relate directly to our sensual condition (to our being and well-being): that is its physical character. Or it can relate to our intellect, and afford us knowledge: that is its logical character. Or it can relate to our will, and be considered as an object of choice for a rational being: that is its moral character. Or, finally, it can relate to the totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any single one of them: that is its aesthetic character. . . . Thus there is an education to health, an education to understanding, an education to morality, an education to taste and beauty. This last has as its aim the development of the whole complex of our sensual and spiritual powers in the greatest possible harmony.  

The systematic study of aesthetics began with A.G. Baumgarten in 1750; in his Aesthetica, Baumgarten treats aesthetics as a unique mode of knowledge, a cross between art and science which mediates between the ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ functions of the psyche.  

As a participant in the Enlightenment, Baumgarten was pushing back the frontiers of reasoned inquiry and shedding light on activities of the mind hitherto thought beneath rational concern. . . . For although the inferior powers of the psyche were to be legitimized, this was not to be done by exhausting them above reason: their role was seen rather as that of mediator from the ‘darkness of unknowing’ to the ‘noon-light of distinct thought.’  

Like Kant before him, Schiller extends the ‘mediating role’ of aesthetics; not only does art mediate from sense-perception to intellectual insight, from formal properties to the vital content, and from  

Kipton E. Jensen
principles to practice, but also from self-regarding motives to virtue. Narrowly defined, an aesthetic education is concerned with the ‘cultural task’ of reconciling our two natures (XIII); more broadly construed, one could arguably refer to any practice as ‘aesthetic’ which assimilates the totality of our human nature — i.e. thought, perception, and feeling. But in this drive to replace the then dominant model of the psyche as a collection of discrete and independent faculties with a picture of the psyche as a unity and continuity, Schiller is part of the anti-rationalist Zeitgeist.24

But the amalgam of reason and feeling, the goal of an aesthetic education, is extremely complex; indeed, the task of knitting heterogeneous natures is, for Schiller, a process of ‘reciprocal subordination’ — i.e. achieved only through hostile forces holding each other in check.25 In his *The Stage as a Moral Institution* (1784), Schiller claimed that “[o]ur nature . . . demands a middle-state which unites these two opposed extremes [i.e. pure animality and pure intellectuality], moderates the harsh tension between them, and facilitates the reciprocal transition from one state to another.”26 Unreconciled, these opposing forces cancel one another out (gegenseitige Aufhebung) and render persons less than human (i.e. deficient in, literally, will power).

Schiller thinks that the alienation of the self from the world is the result of a psyche alienated within itself; when left to itself, the psyche is torn between mutually antagonistic drives — e.g. between the sensuous drive (Sinntrieb) and a rational drive (Formtrieb). The harmonious synthesis of these two drives forms a third, an aesthetic, drive — what Schiller calls the play drive (Spieltrieb). Schiller’s neologism (Spieltrieb) owes something to Kant who, in his *Critique of Judgment*, described the aesthetic moment as involving a ‘free-play’ of the imagination and the understanding; but what is most novel about Schiller’s use of the term is his effort to transform ‘life-interests into a kind of play which yet has its own seriousness’ (*ein ernstes Spiel*). An aesthetic education aims at facilitating the transition or Steigerung (progressive intensification and refinement) from feeling

*Mythologizing Ideas*
to thought by combining the virtues of both into a ‘third thing’ (the objective correlative of which is beauty); but it is important to note here that in Schiller’s thought beauty is elevated to the ‘perfect symbol’ of our dual nature, ‘triumphant proof’ that it is our destiny to reconcile sense and spirit in blessed union (XXIV). Freedom is the product of these two opposed forces; though in some sense we are all born free, there is another kind of freedom ‘which we achieve when we learn how to manage our mixed nature’ (XIX). From Rousseau, who claimed that to deprive a man of his freedom is to deprive him of his essential nature, Schiller learned that the aim of education is freedom. And like Rousseau, Schiller viewed freedom as a ‘task to be achieved’ (Aufgabe).

The central thesis of the Aesthetic Letters is that art is uniquely qualified to induce the free play of all our faculties. Above all else, art is able to mediate and educate because of the power it possesses to ‘symbolize through analogical outer movements the inner movements of the psyche.’ Art itself is a conceptualization of feeling and carries with it a distinctive principle of organization. And while Schiller reserves a unique function for an aesthetic education, it is by no means exclusive or even, except in a strictly qualified sense, predominant. In contrast to the rationalist assumption that the unity of the psyche is the result of an order imposed from above, Schiller is interested in an order from below; the key to a lasting reconciliation within the personality, and thus true freedom, lies in the fact that the sensuous drive develops first, that it has a ‘priority in time’ (XX.2). Schiller is interested in the education of feeling, “not just for its own sake, but as a means of ensuring the better operation of reason.”

One is reminded here of Rousseau’s motto, which Schiller drops from the title page when the treatise was revised, that: Si c’est la raison, qui fait l’homme, c’est le sentiment, qui le conduit. In works prior to the Aesthetic Letters, e.g. in the never completed Kallias or in his review of Matthiessen’s poems, Schiller tends to view a work of art as a symbol articulated by the mind of the artist as he works on a medium, whether natural or, as in the case of lan-

Kipton E. Jensen
guage, artificial, kneading and shaping it until . . . it be-
comes a vehicle for expressing the otherwise inarticulate
life of feeling, ours no less than his.30

An aesthetic education is a complex process by which the stu-
dent is led from sense-perception through the picture-thinking of the
imagination to ‘life’s highest interests’; aesthetic educators, it would
seem to follow, must themselves be ‘whole persons.’31 If art is to
educate, it must ‘make connection with the chaos it claims to con-
quers, not remain aloof from it.’ In a word, an aesthetic education
begins in a form of truth that is truly expressive of life as it is felt and
thought; it ends in a similar form of truth. But between the beginning
and the ending, between the crudest acts of sense-perception and the
highest abstraction, the mind is involved in —thinks Schiller—a
imperceptible but continuous growth. In XXV we are told that it is
not in human nature to make a leap from mere life to pure form.
Schiller is here repudiating the view that, as Wilkinson and Willoughby
put it, “the abstractions of reason spring fully fledged from the head
of one who was but yesterday little more than an animal.”

Conclusion:

An aesthetic education of the sort described by Schiller is
beset with pitfalls; at best, it would be an extremely difficult, lengthy,
and collaborative process. To what extent are we, as educators, will-
ing and able to lure our students —sometimes at the cost of short-
term compromises to our educational ideals— away from the lower
and over to the upper functions of the human psyche? Although na-
ture diligently nurtures the former, she seems less adept at providing
for the latter (the provision of which is, according to traditional so-
cial contract theory, the responsibility of and a powerful impulse to-
ward society.) Surely the seedlings of wisdom wither quickly when
the soil on which they fall is not merely unsuitable, but absolutely
hostile to the growth of such strange fruit.32 Are we not often caught
asking the student to sacrifice the drive they know best (and, what is

 Mythologizing Ideas
the same, the forms of happiness they know best) in exchange for something of which they have little or no experience? Like the ancients, Schiller thinks that freedom consists in what Aristotle called the ‘harmonious exercise of the complete range of our human faculties’; education, then, is the means by which we “liberate” the student from the fragmentation of the psyche — in a word, from alienation.

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ENDNOTES

1. The ‘larger project’ was sketched in my paper, delivered at the 1997 meeting of the NYSFEA, “Artes liberalis: Alienation and, uhm, Revolutionary Intellectuals”; in that essay I suggested, with hand-waving generality, four strategies for resisting alienation in the classroom: in addition to Schiller’s notion of an aesthetic education, I also suggested that academics double as public intellectuals, that we readjust our expectations, and that we become more active in administrative decision-making.

2. One may well wonder whether “fostering the development of persons who are sociable, civilized, creative, thoughtful, active, and free” is not itself a deceptive mask for some lurking ideology; but I think that at this stage of the argument these terms are sufficiently abstract to render all demasking enterprises premature.


5. This is the upshot of Sartre’s discussion of the classical and the new intellectual in “Sartre par lui-meme.” It is, I think, a task shared by most French post-modernists. If there appears to be a contradiction between the political task of the educator on the one hand and our definition of a liberal arts education as interested in a brand of knowledge free from political agendas, see Kant’s distinction between the public and the private in What is Enlightenment? (in The Philosophy of Kant, New York: Modern Library, 1949, 135-36).

6. Marx, op. cit., p. 231

7. Marx, ibid.

Kipton E. Jensen
9. See Ortega y Gasset's *The Revolt of the Masses.*
12. In a letter to Eckermann, 2.v.1824.
19. See Letter VI; also, VII, which opens with the claim that “[o]ur age is enlightened . . .” and ends with “Why, then, are we still barbarians?”
20. Derived from the Greek αισθητική, which means perception by the senses, esp. by feeling, but also seeing, hearing, etc., the Latin aesthetica was used by Baumgarten (1750) to coin the name of a new science of what were usually referred to as the inferior faculties of the mind — i.e. imagination and intuition, and of their products, art and poetry. Kant restricted its use — in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) — to the science which treats the conditions of sense perception.
21. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, XX.4, 140 - 142; hereafter, all citations to the *Letters* will be placed in parentheses directly following the cited text.
22. Schiller inherits this distinction from Leibniz and Wolff; the distinction is between ideas that are ‘clear’ (i.e. sufficiently clear for practical purposes) and ‘distinct’ (i.e. broken down into their component parts and thus revealing the whys and the wherefores).
23. Wilkinson and Willoughby, xxv; they are referring here to Section 7 of the *Aesthetica*.
24. As cases in point, recall Hume’s contention that “without their cooperation [i.e. of feeling], reason cannot take a single step forward”; or, according to Diderot, “the true power of the soul springs not from their [i.e. the various faculties which constitute the psyche] destruction but from their harmonious balance.”
25. Perhaps Schiller’s ‘addiction to the figure of antithesis,’ as one author puts it, is simply a matter of style; perhaps his division of the psyche into two hostile camps in his aesthetic writings should be read against

*Mythologizing Ideas*
the backdrop of the clash and conflict of opposed pairs of characters in
his plays.
26. Schiller, SA, xi. 89 f.
27. We must be careful not to underestimate the extension of Schiller’s
sense of “beauty”; in the Kallias, Schiller says that an object strikes us
as beautiful when, though having a law within it, it yet appears free of
every law or when, in other words, it gives the impression of freedom
made manifest to the senses. On this definition of beauty, all human
actions are potentially beautiful; indeed, when Schiller talks about
beauty, he usually refers to moral beauty — i.e. when duty happily
coincides with inclination.
28. In particular, I am thinking of Rousseau’s comment in the Social Con-
tract that in certain circumstances we “must be forced to be free.”
30. Ibid., xxvi; also see Wilkinson and Willoughby, “The Blind Man xx
and the Poet” in German Studies Presented to W.H. Bruford, London,
1962, esp. p. 33.
31. In a letter to Goethe, 7.I.1795, Schiller says that ‘the poet is the only
true human being, and the best of the philosophers is a mere caricature
by comparison.’
32. In particular I am thinking about the manufacturing model of educa-
tion. In the name of efficiency, we have resorted to mass (how many is
a ‘mass’ in this case?) education, but if an effective education depends
on the capacity of educators to carefully monitor the affective register
of the various students (‘emoting’ is not — after all — monolithic), an
effective education is inversely proportionate to the number of students
one is expected to educate. Perhaps this is slightly overstated, but the
general point (i.e. that higher education is suffering from ‘false
economy’) seems to me undeniable. Where does this all lead? To my
mind, it leads us back to Dewey.

Kipton E. Jensen
IDEALISM AND REALISM AS SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Jane Fowler Morse

I. The Supposed Conflict Between Idealism and Realism

I have never understood why philosophy of education textbooks use “Realism” and “Idealism” to identify two schools of thought in philosophy. As far as I am aware, other philosophers don’t use this terminology in the same way. Of course, there is a sensible distinction between Idealists and Realists; the former focus on the reality of the intelligible world whereas the latter think reasoning must, initially at least, be based on sense experience. Nevertheless, my philosophy of education students find the use of the terms confusing for several reasons.

First among these reasons, the other categories of philosophy or schools of thought in philosophy are identified by names belonging to historical periods, resulting in, for instance, chapters on Pragmatism, Marxism, and Existentialism, which follow chapters on Idealism and Realism. However, the terms Realism and Idealism don’t work in a parallel way; we can’t assign dates to them as we can to the others. We can talk about the sense in which a Pragmatist is a realist, but we are using realist in a different way (as I have indicated by the lower case “r”). Alas, we can also explain the sense in which a Pragmatist is an idealist (lower case “i”), as James does in Pragmatism. At this point, my students become annoyed with the textbook’s initial distinction between Idealists and Realists, and rightly so. The terms should be parallel. The way chapters in philosophy of education textbooks are often organized amounts to being topical at the beginning of the book and historical at the end. We need a better system.

Second, and more importantly, my students are confused be-
cause no Idealist can make sense without having some Realism, nor can Realists make sense without some Idealism. James makes the same claim, except he is using the terms “rationalist” and “empiricist.” Although he proposes that people are naturally either “tough-minded” (empiricist) or “tender-minded” (rationalist), he also claims that anyone in her/his right mind really is some of each, as the Pragmatist is. He elaborates,

“...in philosophy we have a...contrast expressed in the pair of terms ‘rationalist’ and ‘empiricist,’ ‘empiricist’ meaning your lover of facts in all their crude variety, ‘rationalist’ meaning your devotee to abstract and eternal principles. No one can live an hour without both facts and principles, so it is a difference rather of emphasis....I select them [the philosophical types represented by rationalists and empiricists] solely for my convenience in helping me to my ulterior purpose in characterizing pragmatism.”

II. Uniting Idealism and Realism

Earlier in the history of philosophy, Kant made it his project to unite rationalism and empiricism to show us that “thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.” According to Kant, concepts and sense perception are two sides of human experience. One is the world of the mind which we use to make sense of our experiences; the other is the physical world of appearances which supplies the content to sort into conceptual categories which we construct with our minds. The Realist asks, “If there were nothing to fit into these categories, what would we do with them?” From this question, the Realist concludes that we must derive them from experience in the first place. But the Idealist poses an equally pressing question. “If we had no concepts by which to sort out our experience, how would we make sense out of the incoming sensory perceptions (Kant’s empirical intuition)?” All we could do would be appreciate the movement of colors and shapes, which would be perpetually new and different.

Jane Fowler Morse
all the time. From this the Idealist concludes that concepts must come first because they are necessary to understand experience. Kant’s work is interesting because he attempts to solve the dispute between Idealists and Realists by acknowledging the contribution of both ideas and sense perception to knowledge.

William Faulkner creates a memorable character in *The Sound and The Fury* who is in a predicament much like the ultimate Realist. Benjy, a mentally retarded adult, has few concepts by which he can make sense of his experience. He has a limited sense of time and space, the two “pure intuitions” that Kant considers essential to understanding experience (more about these later). Consequently, Benjy finds many of his experiences frightening, as we well might, if we had only our immediate sense experience to guide us. But imagine a literary character whose thoughts do not correspond to anything in the “real” world. Like Hamlet, such a person might think too much and have trouble getting anything done.

Even a radical empiricist like Hume admits that the Phryronian skeptic who will only believe what is in front of her face right now could not function in this world. We must suppose “that the course of nature will continue uniformly the same.” Thus enters the *a priori* element: the supposition. Likewise, Descartes, who methodologically doubts all appearances whatsoever in the beginning of the *Meditations*, does so only to affirm that we can trust our senses enough to do science by the end. Thus the *a posteriori* element re-enters. What Kant does is shows us how these work together; we need them both. I think my students, from their twentieth century perspective, instinctively see the problem with maintaining either position absolutely.

Because Kant’s project is to unite Idealism and Realism, I, too, find it confusing that Kant is often classified as an Idealist in textbooks on philosophy of education. He could just as well be put in a chapter on Realism, since he asserts we can know things

*On Idealism and Realism*
only as they appear to us, never as things in themselves. Kant would not undertake Plato’s project of discovering the form of virtue, piety, or justice. But he does think that there are some elements of thinking that precede the possibility of experience. These elements are a priori. Experience depends on these; without them it is not possible. The first elements, which Kant calls “intuitions,” I have already mentioned — a sense of time and a sense of space. To know that we have two identical chairs, instead of one experienced somehow again, we have to know that the same thing cannot be in two places at the same time. We also know that if the same thing is in the same place at the same time, it is the same thing. In my classroom there are thirty or more identical chairs. If I brought each one in one at a time, my students would not know whether there were thirty chairs or one chair. But when they see them all at the same time in different places in the room, they know there are thirty identical chairs. Kant calls the sense of time and space “intuitions” because they must, in his view, precede experience, so they cannot come from it. We know time from the functioning of our own biology, breathing, heart beating sequentially in time. We know space from our encounters with other solid objects that we cannot displace or merge into.

The second elements of thinking Kant calls the categories. These could justify calling Kant an Idealist, except that is confusing because he can also be called a Realist. Kant thinks there are twelve categories of four groups — quantity, quality, modality, and relation — each with three subgroups. The subgroups consist of two opposites and a third category which combines the two. For instance, under quantity we find singularity, plurality, and totality, which is all the singular subgroups taken as a whole. Under quality, we find reality, negation, and limitation, which is a negation of part of reality. Under relation, we find relationships of inherence and subsistence, cause and effect, and reciprocity. The first two are one way relationships, the third combines them in a two way relation. Under modality we find two pairs of opposites:

Jane Fowler Morse
possibility/impossibility, existence/non-existence, and necessity/contingency. Again, the third term combines the first two; necessity is the impossibility of non-existence, and contingency is the possibility of existence. It is a very neat package.\footnote{11}

It is not my purpose to explain the Critique of Pure Reason in this short paper. I'm only showing the sense in which Kant was both an Idealist and a Realist. On his Idealist side, the categories allow us to sort and interpret our experience. On his Realist side, all the \textit{a posteriori} part of our knowledge, which is a huge proportion of what we humans know, however, is the vast manifold of experience, all our sense perceptions of the world. Without this the categories are useless. James agrees with Kant when he says that “our experience...is all shot through with irregularities,” but we can “make advantageous connection” with future experience through ideas. Such useful ideas are, for James, what we call truth.\footnote{12} They work. If we are to understand cause, we must use the category of relation to interpret what we see happening when $Y$ follows $X$. This cannot come from our perceiving \textit{causes}; the category gives us the possible logical relations of things to each other. As Hume claims, we perceive things, not causes. We do not see $X$ causing $Y$; all we see is event $Y$ following event $X$ consistently over time.\footnote{13} Kant is right; we could not reason our way to an idea of cause if all we had to go on was sense experience. In a way, Hume is right, too. Probability is all we can assert if we have no concept of cause, which he claims we cannot have, since he is a dyed-in-the-wool empiricist. All we know is that $Y$ is prior in time, contiguous, and consistently follows $X$. Kant thinks we have an \textit{a priori} concept of cause. Consequently, we can have an idea of what it is for one thing to cause another. So we can interpret our sense experiences as showing us causal relationships, if appropriate.

Beyond the intuitions and the categories, we have no other \textit{a priori} knowledge, however. All the rest of it comes from what Kant calls the manifold of experience, raw sense data, unsorted.

\textit{On Idealism and Realism}
This he calls empirical intuition, supplying us with material content for the categories. If we didn't have the categories, sense data would make less sense to us than Benjy's experience made to him. Sense experience has to be understood through the categories. So we cannot know the object of experience as a thing in itself, only as a thing as it appears to us. This leaves out the possibility of knowledge of the Form of Justice or Virtue or Piety apart from experience, which Plato sought. But it includes logical ideas like that of a causal relationship, which Hume excluded from the realm of possible knowledge. Thus Kant's system combines Idealism and Realism.

III. How To Revise the Textbooks on Philosophy of Education

So, where does this leave us on the use of Idealism and Realism as chapter headings in philosophy of education textbooks? It seems to me that Kant has done quite a nice job of showing us that we need both, since we function as creatures of both sensory and intellectual experience. It is artificial to classify Plato as an Idealist and Aristotle as a Realist as if these were two mutually opposed and conflicting schools of thought. After all, Aristotle, who wrote the earliest books on logic that I know, understood full well the difference between the Prior Analytics and the Posterior Analytics. As he says in the Metaphysics,

But if, on the one hand, there were nothing apart from individual things, and the individuals are infinite in number, how is it possible to get knowledge of the infinite individuals? For all things that we know, we know in so far as they have some unity and identity, and in so far as some attribute belongs to them universally....If there is nothing apart from individuals, there will be no knowledge of anything, unless we say that sensation is knowledge. Further, nothing will be eternal or unmovable; for all perceptible things perish and are in movement. But if there is nothing eternal, neither can there be a process of

Jane Fowler Morse
coming to be, for...nothing can come out of that which is not.\textsuperscript{15}

The idea of an uncaused first cause, the prime mover, is the upshot of this. What could be more “Idealist?” Yet Aristotle is classified as a “Realist!”

Likewise, Plato understood that we begin education with the lower levels of the divided line, those concerned with the visible world, and climb higher and higher to the intellectual realm through such exercises as thinking about mathematics (dianoia), until we could understand the most abstract thing of all, the Form of the Forms. Aristotle understands that it matters whether we are going to or from first principles, as he credits Plato with doing, as well as what we take those first principles to be.\textsuperscript{16} Plato proceeds towards them, feeling uncertain of his footing until he arrives and can retrace his steps. Aristotle knows that this is appropriate in some cases, but in others he understands that we proceed from particulars to universals.

What should we do about the textbooks? How do we reorganize them? Maybe we need to have a chapter on ancient philosophy in which we contrast idealist (or rationalist) and realist (or empiricist) methods. We could start with the Presocratics, where we find both. Parmenides’ “All is One” and Thales’ “All is water” make a nice pair. Then we could proceed to compare and contrast Plato and Aristotle. Their modes of proceeding in doing political science would be instructive in illustrating their idealist and realist (but note the lower case!) preferences. Plato has Socrates dream up a utopia out of his head in the Republic, but Aristotle investigates 158 different constitutions of city-states in his Politics and then draws general conclusions about what is best under what circumstances. Then we could add the atomists for their materialism, making sure students understand materialism in the technical sense, not the popular meaning of being overly concerned with the acquisition of material possessions. As an example of a

\textit{On Idealism and Realism}
materialist, we could include Epicurus, whose theory that people
are motivated by pleasure contributes an important strain to mod-
ern philosophy of education. This idea has certainly been reiter-
ated in philosophy of education. After that we could trace what
happened to these strains of philosophy in the middle ages, then
on to the early modern period. That will get us safely to the usual
historical chapters on Pragmatism, Marxism, and Existentialism.
If we use the terms “idealism” and “realist,” let’s at least use them
with the lower case ‘i’ and ‘r.’ However, in agreement with James’
choice of words, I prefer rationalist and empiricist; they have
fewer confusing connotations.

Until we can revise the textbooks, we can at least tell our
students that their uneasy confusion about Idealism and Realism
as divisions in the philosophy of education is justified.

State University of New York, Geneseo

Appendix A

Kant’s Table of Categories

I

Of Quantity

Unity

Plurality

Totality

II

Of Quality

Reality

Negation

Limitation

III

Of Relation

Of Inherence and Subsistence

(substantia and accident)

Of Causality and Dependence

(cause and effect)

Of Community (reciprocity

between the active

and the passive)

Jane Fowler Morse
IV
Of Modality
Possibility. Impossibility.
Necessity. Contingency.

ENDNOTES

1. William James, *Pragmatism* (Longmans, Green, and Company: New York, London, and Toronto, 1949) 47-48. In describing Peirce’s 1878 article “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” James says, “To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we have only consider what considerable effects of a practical kind the object may involve – what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.”

4. By intuition here Kant means sense perception; see below, pages 24-26, for a fuller explanation.
6. These are “pure intuitions” (as opposed to “empirical intuitions”) because they give us the form of experience: space and time. Empirical intuitions give us the content of experience.
8. Kant, 67-82. [“The Transcendental Aesthetic”, Section One, Space, and Section Two, Time] For my point in particular about space see page 68; for time see page 77. For Kant these are the “pure” intuitions, as opposed to empirical intuitions, namely sense experience.

*On Idealism and Realism*
11. See Kant's Table of Categories, Appendix A.
12. James, 204-205.
14. Kant, 92. Raw sense data is empirical intuition; time and space are pure intuitions, which supply the form of the thought of an object, rather than the material.
16. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, Chapter 4, line 31, 1731. The second point can be established from *The Posteriori Analytics*, Book I, or the *Metaphysics*, Book I, or the *Physics*, Book I.

*Jane Fowler Morse*
FROM COEDUCATION TO COORDINATE EDUCATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER: A HISTORY

Christine M. Lundt

Introduction

The University of Rochester’s Susan B. Anthony University Center recently celebrated its namesake’s birthday and the achievement of women at the school. It is fitting that Miss Anthony’s name be attached to such an enterprise since her efforts were crucial for the admission of women and for the establishment of coeducation at the University of Rochester (UR) almost one hundred years earlier. However, it is also ironic that her name be so prominently promoted by the UR now since there was a time when the success of the effort to have women admitted there seemed to depend on minimizing her personal involvement!

Coeducation was introduced relatively recently in the history of American higher education and was a matter of considerable controversy. This paper examines a case in point, namely the UR, which admitted women fifty years after its founding in 1850. The academic and extracurricular experiences of the school’s undergraduates during these first years of coeducation are described along with the administrative developments which led to another significant change, the creation of a coordinate College for Women in 1913.

Coeducational institutions created various educational mechanisms to regulate and restrict interaction between the sexes, such as the position of the dean of women, and separate extracurricular activities for the women to encourage their proper social development and to provide the leadership experience for them that they said co-education would not supply. In time, several schools decided to separate the sexes even further. Coordinate education was a form of separate education utilized by fewer than twenty schools in the United States. Although there was great structural variety among the schools,
coordinate education is defined here as the instruction of both sexes within the same institution, by primarily the same faculty but not always in the same classrooms. The road to coordinate education at the UR was a long and bumpy one.

In June of 1898, some twenty years after women started auditing a few college courses, the UR’s board of trustees accepted a petition signed by the members of local women’s clubs which asked the trustees to name the price needed for women’s admission to the UR “on equal terms with young men.” The board agreed to admit women “on exactly the same terms and conditions as men” if a sum of “$100,000 was provided.” This was a great deal of money but the men defended the amount on the grounds that although a new classroom building to accommodate the increased enrollment was not needed right then, experience at other schools had shown that the number of women students would most likely increase sharply. They needed to be prepared. Two years later, the women returned to report that, despite their best efforts, they were unable to raise so much money. They asked that the price be halved, and the trustees agreed. Since the Alumni Gym was nearing completion, additional space would soon be available in the existing academic building and hence a new one would not be needed.

The day before the trustees’ meeting in the fall of 1900, when the money was due, Susan B. Anthony learned that the “Co-ed Fund” was still shy $8,000. Miss Anthony personally collected the remaining pledges and delivered subscriptions for the entire amount to the trustees the next day. When the validity of one of the subscriptions was questioned, Miss Anthony confessed herself to be its true guarantor. She told the trustees that she feared her association with the women’s suffrage movement would have caused them to refuse a pledge made in her own name, but the pledge of her $2,000 life insurance policy was accepted. Twenty full-time matriculants arrived on campus for the start of the academic year, along with a new president who was no fan of coeducation.

Christine M. Lundt
Reverend Rush Rhees was an alumnus of Amherst, a school well-known for its anti-coeducation sentiment. He began immediately reinterpreting the trustees’ decision and promoting policies which thwarted the acceptance of coeducation. In the second semester of that first year, for example, the trustees approved Rhees’ motion that, out of “considerations of equity,” women were not eligible for the existing one hundred scholarships since their donors had designated them for the male students. However, there is no trace in the university records that any attempt was made to contact the donors to even question them about the matter. Therefore, only a handful of scholarships were available for the college women. After four years, there were thirteen scholarships available for sixty-four women and 104 for 166 men. In this way, women’s educational access was restricted from the start of this new administration.

Another example of the bent of Rhees’ policies against coeducation is provided in his first Annual Report, where he reinterpreted the terms of women’s admission. He wrote that the trustees’ decision “requires that the ... [women] receive equal attention, equivalent instruction, and the same standards of admission and graduation” as the men. He proceeded to promote the coordinate system, stating it allowed for the “full and frank discussion” of such subjects as literature and hygiene, which “mixed” recitations now prohibited. Another advantage of coordinate education would be “the cultivation of feelings of social unity among women which may develop here some of the social advantages of the separate college of women.” Rhees’ mind was already set on the issue. It would take him over a decade to officially implement his plan for coordinate education but, in the interim, he continually worked towards that end.

In the fall of 1901, after the freshman class had elected a coeducational slate of officers, Rhees prevailed upon the two elected women to resign their offices and, with the rest of the women, to form a separate Women Students’ Association. The following year there were separate bible classes for men and women, with Rhees as the instructor of the men, and separate sections of junior debate classes

*From Coeducation to Coordinate Education*
were also instituted. The selection of these two particular courses for the start of "academic segregation," as it was then known, is telling. In general, a religious presence on campus inhibited student activism which challenged the traditional social roles of the sexes. Secondly, in debate classes women learned how to speak in public, e.g. at political and civic functions, and these are generally used as a barometer of the political activism that existed or was tolerated in women's education. Rhees' religious convictions, combined with his positional power, surely had a significant conservative impact on the education of all students. There is no evidence of additional academic segregation until 1910, when the new post of dean of women was created and filled. The new dean assumed responsibility for teaching women's sections of the required English literature, history and rhetoric courses of the freshman and sophomore years. This description of the administration's decisions provides us with the appropriate context in which to consider the academic and extracurricular experiences of the undergraduates during this period.

Profile of Student Academic Life

As the reader will note in the statistical summary (Appendix A) provided at the end of this article, contrary to the administration's fears about a massive male exodus, the men's enrollment rates remained stable or increased after coeducation. Furthermore, there was little change in their rates of retention. Even though women's enrollment rate had quintupled by 1908, they only constituted 36% of the student population. In terms of the students' academic programs, there was a characteristic shift in their choices. Between 1905 and 1909, the number of men in the classical program was halved while the number in science doubled. During these same years, there were slightly fewer women in the classical program, triple the number in science, but a great majority remained in the philosophical program, which included teacher training. It is interesting that, in 1909, 50% of the faculty taught in the fields of mathematics and physical sciences where only 10% of the women majored. Not only does this illustrate the UR's progress towards becoming a research university,
but it also demonstrates that neither the “same” instruction promised in the trustees’ original decision to admit women nor Rhee’s reinterpreted version of “equivalent instructional resources” were provided to the women during this period of coeducation.

As happened elsewhere in coeducational colleges, the women generally surpassed the men in the area of academic achievement at the UR. At the end of the first year of coeducation, 53% of the female first year students made the honor roll as compared to 18% of the men.\(^{18}\) Although women comprised only 29% of the junior class in 1908, they earned 47% of departmental honors awarded.\(^{19}\) The women of this class also distinguished themselves in another way. All four seniors elected to Phi Beta Kappa Society in 1909 were women. This was a first, not only in the history of the UR but also in that of all other college chapters in the state.\(^{20}\) The following year, twelve women and five men were elected to this honor society.\(^{21}\) This achievement, along with the other academic laurels they won, intensified the animosity between the sexes. Never again would the elections result in such a total “sweep” by the women. As indicated in the statistical summary, in 1911, as the “academic segregation” of the students increased, the pattern was reversed.\(^{22}\)

**Profile of the Extracurricular Life**

It was in the extracurricular part of college life that the men consistently held clear sway. A full complement of activities and organizations were available to them, and all of the graduating men in 1904 had joined some student group or club. However, 25% of the women had had no extracurricular involvement, probably because there were only a handful of options for them. Interestingly, although there were six national fraternities represented on campus, and Rhee was a member of one of them, he forbade the establishment of any national sororities. This is curious given Rhee’s statement quoted earlier about the desirability of “social unity” among the women. One alumna believed this was because he did not want the women students to achieve the type of solidarity that those organizations
enabled.23

The story behind the creation of the women’s annual gives further testimony to the tenor of the extracurriculum during this period. The women had been included in the college annual until the fall of 1908 when the men of the junior class decided summarily to exclude the women from the Interpres. Six months after its publication, the next year’s junior class began to plan their annual. This time the question of whether to include the women was hotly debated by the men. Rhees approached the women and suggested that they end the men’s debate by withdrawing the question, and starting their own yearbook. The women agreed.24 In the first issue, Rhees expressed satisfaction with the “gradual separation and ... natural development of student independence,” and stated that the existence of the Croceus “demonstrates equality... of women in college.”25 The following poem, also published in this annual and entitled “The Steel Eyed Co-ed,” indicates that there were some women who disputed Rhees’ rosy view:

There was a space when I kept pace
With styles throughout the land ...
But now, alack, I’m told ‘Stand back!
Room for the truly great!’
My sails curtailed, my tast assailed,
I share the co-ed’s fate...26

By 1913, there were some interesting changes. Now almost all of the junior women and men had participated in some club or activity. However, while nearly every woman got involved in conventional social activities, such as the religious and greek organizations, fewer men did so. One possible explanation for this is that there were still many more extracurricular options for the men versus for the women.

Campus reports on how coeducation was faring somewhat depended on whether a man or a woman was the informant. The men

Christine M. Lundt
generally described their conduct towards the women as “gentle- 
manly” or, if a bit too rowdy, as merely involving “harmless pranks.” A few chastised their fellow male students for their rude treatment of women or tried to change some male-only traditions, but these were few and far in between. There seems to be a much more mixed version of these years by women who left a record of their reactions. One alumna from the class of 1905 denied that there was much difficulty. But a couple of alumnae from these years still recalled, years later, how poorly they were treated by the men, and that Rhees’ remarks at one coeducational student assembly were “insulting” to them. One freshman, in a speech to the Women Students’ Association, expressed her hope that “the misogynists at the University of Rochester would be buried beneath the ground.”

The regret Rhees expressed about campus hostility towards coeducation was mild in comparison to the enthusiasm with which he endorsed the separation of the sexes. Yet he wanted to prevent any negative publicity about how coeducation was faring at the UR. He contacted the editors of newspapers in Rochester and New York City, seeking their cooperation in maintaining “uniform friendliness” and even suggesting that stories about the UR should be reviewed by him before publication. Rhees’ concern about the image of the school was understandable given his strong desire to transform the institution from a liberal arts college to a modern research university, which would require considerable financial support from alumni and other wealthy patrons. During the first decade of his presidency, Rhees initiated several major endowment campaigns to expand scientific and technical education at the UR. By 1906, he had received large donations from Andrew Carnegie and Rockefeller’s General Education Board to build an applied science building and hire two full-time faculty in this area. He also convinced George Eastman to donate enough money to erect the Eastman Lab.

At the same time as wealthy industrialists and loyal alumni were supporting the university’s drive towards becoming a research university, Rhees received an offer from some local women which was
equally useful for actualizing his vision for the UR. The women, eager to erect a campus building in memory of the recently deceased Susan B. Anthony, launched a fund raising campaign.\textsuperscript{33} This work was made much more difficult by the restrictions placed on the campaign by university officials. The long-awaited settlement of the estate of Lewis Henry Morgan in 1909 also helped Rhee to finally begin fully implementing his plan for the creation of a coordinate college for women.\textsuperscript{34} He hired Annette Munro as the first dean of women. In her first report to the board, Dean Munro joined Rhee in stressing the need for a “special woman’s building.” She dismissed the complaints from some women students about their inequitable treatment as a product of either their ignorance or ill breeding.\textsuperscript{35}

By June of 1910, Rhee began speaking to alumni about the upcoming change to coordinate education.\textsuperscript{36} Yet, there were still not sufficient funds. When he received an offer of the presidency from Amherst in the spring of 1912, he gained a powerful tool for forcing the trustees to launch the largest endowment campaign in the history of the institution. He notified the trustees that he would accept Amherst’s offer unless they approved the creation of a coordinate college for women, and agreed to a one million dollar campaign, though only 25\% of the funds would be earmarked for the Women’s College. The trustees agreed and justified their decision by stating that the experience of coeducation had convinced them that it would be “in the interest of the most satisfactory college life and successful college training for our women” to create a separate college for them.\textsuperscript{37}

Once this decision was announced, sizable donations were quickly obtained from prominent local citizens.\textsuperscript{38} Rhee added the remaining funds from the original “Co-ed Fund” to those raised by the women to pay the Anthony Memorial gym.\textsuperscript{39} How ironic that the monies originally donated for coeducation had been saved until the time they could be used for the separate education of the women! By the spring of 1913, the faculty had devised and approved a necessary revision to the curriculum. The College for Women opened the fol-

\textit{Christine M. Lundt}
Following September. Some thirteen years after his arrival, Rhees had promoted and managed the professionalization of the UR, and its change from coeducation to coordinate education, developments which were distinct though not unrelated.

The arrival of UR women in 1900 coincided with two critical developments in American higher education. There was an increasing emphasis on scientific study and professional preparation as the primary functions of higher education. The involvement of businessmen and the use of their principles of efficiency in college administration were also increasing. Women’s presence in coeducational colleges was often viewed as the cause of overcrowded classrooms. Even worse, women typically surpassed the men in the areas of academic achievement and retention. Since women were not generally permitted to enter the professional schools, and few planned to pursue a graduate degree, overcrowding and the women’s academic successes were viewed as proof of the inefficient management of a scarce and valuable resource, namely higher education. The establishment of admission quotas for women to ensure a continued male majority and the creation of separate departments or colleges for women were mechanisms of efficiency commonly employed at private, coeducational institutions during this time.

The University of Rochester’s structural changes were not simply determined by a powerful leader’s efforts, nor by the combined ones of the president, influential alumni and students. The timing of women’s arrival in the history of this institution and in the history of higher education itself significantly affected the status of coeducation. A combination of many factors made the change to coordinate education at the UR almost inevitable.

Roberts Wesleyan College

From Coeducation to Coordinate Education
APPENDIX A

STATISTICAL PROFILE OF COEDUCATION AT THE UR, 1900-1913*

Total Enrollment
1900-01 164 men and 20 women
1904-05 166 men and 64 women
1908-09 196 men and 109 women
1912-13 269 men and 154 women

Retention
Class of '00 (all male) 47%
Class of '05 50% for m & w
Class of '09 40% m, 70% w

Academic Programs
1905 Women: 39% Classical, 3% Science, 58% Philosophic
   Men: 47% Classical, 27% Science, 26% Philosophic
1909 Women: 29% Classical, 10% Science, 62% Philosophic
   Men: 27% Classical, 54% Science, 19% Philosophic

Departmental Honors
Junior Class of '05 2/31 m & 2/11 w
Junior Class of '09 8/37 m & 7/15 w
Junior Class of '13 5/42 m & 10/38 w

Phi Beta Kappa Elections
Class of '05 6/31 m & 4/11 w
Class of '09 0/37 m & 4/15 w
Class of '10 5/35 m & 12/27 w
Class of '11 14/53 m & 5/22 w

Extracurricular Participation Rates
Class of '05 91% in fraternities & 25% in sororities
Class of '13 2% in YMCA- & 84% in YWCA-sponsored activities
   60% in fraternities & 97% in sororities

*sources: annual catalogues, president's reports, yearbooks and college newspapers.

Christine M. Lundt
ENDNOTES


3. UR Board of Trustees' Executive Committee, “Record of Minutes,” vol. IV, 76, Dept. of Special Collections and Rare Books, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York (hereafter DSCRB.)

4. Ibid., press clipping, undated, newspaper unknown, 278.

5. UR Board of Trustees, “Record of Annual Meetings,” vol. 3, 69, DSCRB.

6. Arthur May, The History of the University of Rochester, 1850-1962, (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1977), 121. Once the funds were collected which exceeded the pledged amount, Miss Anthony’s policy was returned to her.

7. Trustees “Record of Annual Meeting,” vol.3, 85, DSCRB.


10. Helen Cross ’05, “Opens Its Doors to Women. The University of Rochester Henceforth a Coeducational Institution,” Tms, [photocopy], no date, 5, College for Women Memorabilia collection, DSCRB.


14. Retention rates are based on the number of students who enrolled as full-time freshmen and graduated with their class four years later.


16. Ibid., 1904-05, 136; 1908-09, 151-64.

17. Ibid., 8-10.

18. Ibid., 1901-02, 116.

19. Ibid., 1908-09, 140.

20. May, op. cit., 150; Iota Chapter, Phi Beta Kappa Society, “Record of

From Coeducation to Coordinate Education
21. Ibid., 248.
22. Ibid., 256.
23. Interpres, 1905, 58-60; May, op. cit, 153.
25. Ibid., 33.
26. Ibid., 169.
29. H. Cross, ‘05; V. Twitchell, ‘04 and M. Seligman, ‘03, “Correspondence to Helen R. Cross,” undated, Box 3; E. O’Connor, Box 1, 1903 folder; F. Henderson, Box 1, 1909 folder, College of Women Memorabilia and Photographs, DSCRB.
33. May, op. cit., 135.
34. “A Bequest for Founding of Female College,” undated clipping, newspaper unknown, Executive Committee, 287, DSCRB.
36. Untitled clipping, Rochester Post-Express, 16 June 1910, SBA Memorial Fund Collection, file 2, DSCRB.
37. Executive Committee, “Record of Meetings,” vol. VI, 83 and 86.
38. Ibid., 113.
39. Board of Trustees, op. cit., vol 4, 60.
THE HISTORY OF FELTON AND THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION
Norman J. Bauer

"Congress shall make no law respecting an ESTABLISHMENT of religion, or prohibiting a FREE EXERCISE thereof . . . ."¹

PURPOSES

The purposes of this paper are (a) to review one essential attribute of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and to reveal its relationship to the essential attributes of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981; (b) to identify and briefly examine the initial, secondary, and tertiary consequences for urban schooling which emerged from this Act; (c) to enable one to acquire an enhanced understanding and appreciation for the Establishment Clause in the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and (d) to speculate about the significance of the 'Felton Saga' for professors in the cross-disciplinary domain of Social Foundations of Education (SFE), particularly for the content which they include in the courses they teach.

ESEA and ECIA

During July, 1965, the Congress approved and then President Lyndon Johnson signed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, a statute which was designed to be one of the major components of Mr. Johnson’s desire to build a Great Society. One significant segment in this legislation was called ‘Title One’. The thrust of this segment was to provide federally derived tax dollars to finance remedial education classes for disadvantaged students, including students enrolled in religious and other nonpublic schools. The ‘categorical method’ of distributing money was used to control the manner in which monies allocated to fund the Act could be used by the states.
Although the distribution of tax dollars to support religious schools represented a clear and unequivocal contradiction of the Establishment Clause, these religious schools became eligible for Title One monies because of sustained pressure from the Roman Catholic Bishops throughout the country whose allies in Congress blocked the bill until this concession was made.)

While this contradiction continued without resolution, ESEA continued to be annually refunded by the Congress, and monies continued to be distributed to religious schools to handle the needs of the poor, the disadvantaged and those with special needs, for more than fifteen years.

ESEA was abolished during the first year of President Ronald Reagan’s presidency. This occurred on July 31, 1981, the date on which the first budget of the Reagan era was adopted by Congress. This budget had not been scrutinized by any Congressional committee. In fact, it was laced throughout with handwritten notations, and had not been transformed into a printed document before it was debated, adopted by Congress and transmitted to the President for his signature. This budget contained the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA), a statute which included changes which were destined to elicit very significant consequences for schooling, particularly in urban areas, throughout the United States during the years immediately following its passage.

Three subtly integrated changes (1) terminology, (2) method of funding, (3) and regulations for controlling allocations, were woven into the design of ECIA. The first change appeared to be, at least at the outset, cosmetic. The statute included three divisions, each of which was called a Chapter instead of a Title. The titled provisions in the ESEA statute were distributed into one or the other of the first two of these three Chapters. Chapter One received those titles from what was to become the defunct ESEA which pertained to poor and disadvantaged students and students with special needs; Chapter Two included those which where related to general academic and instruc-
tional resource needs. Chapter Three described the rules and regulations for distributing the public tax monies which were to be allocated to fund Chapters One and Two.

Chapter Three stipulated that the distribution to the states of the tax dollars which were to be allocated to fund the statute was to be by the block grant method. This differed sharply from the categorical method of allocation which was the method incorporated in ESEA. In essence, this change meant that the States could decide for themselves how the monies allocated to ECIA could be distributed to handle the educational needs of their states as they were outlined in Chapters One and Two. Because many school people, particularly bureaucrats in State Education Departments and many school administrators, saw this as a positive means to improve schooling throughout their various states, much enthusiasm accompanied this change. Indeed, so much ballyhoo accompanied it that the most significant change went largely, almost entirely, unrecognized.

Changed by the content in the regulations included in Chapter Three was the way in which each state was required to distribute the monies it received from ECIA. All states were obligated to allocate the funding of ECIA in a way which would enable the same amount of money to be available for each and every elementary and secondary student within their boundaries. Private sectarian and private nonsectarian schools were entitled, in other words, public schools. Now, suddenly, tax dollars were to become available for all students enrolled in religious and other nonpublic institutions as well. In other words, for the purposes of ECIA, all students attending nonpublic schools, sectarian and nonsectarian, were suddenly lumped, i.e., consolidated, (hence the term ‘Consolidation’ in the title of the Act) with the students attending public schools. This design feature in ECIA represented a strategy which would enable all nonpublic schools, more than 90% of which were religious schools, to obtain public tax dollars, on a per-student-enrolled basis to pursue their particular purposes.

To ensure the distribution of monies as mandated by Chapter

*The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education*
Three, the legislation required each state accepting ECIA funds to establish a Local Education Agency (LEA). This was to be a state-wide monitoring agency charged with the responsibility for guaranteeing the equal distribution of Federal funds to all elementary and secondary schools throughout each state, public and nonpublic alike, based on the student enrollment in each school.

Immediately after the 1981-82 Federal budget year commenced on October 1, 1981, under the watchful monitoring of each state’s LEA, the distribution of public tax dollars to support nonpublic, largely religious schools, began.

Once the consequences of the interrelated three-Chapter design of ECIA became evident, a number of agencies, including New York PEARL (Public Education and Religious Liberty), became deeply alarmed by what they perceived to be an egregious violation of the ‘Establishment Clause’ in the First Amendment. By early 1982 they had commenced action in the courts to have ECIA declared unconstitutional.

**FELTON I — INITIAL CONSEQUENCE**

By 1985 the effort to declare ECIA unconstitutional had reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In a case entitled ‘Aguilar v. Felton’, the Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 that the State of New York and the City of New York could not use Chapter 1 funds to pay salaries of teachers who would teach remedial programs in religious school buildings. Recognizing that the provision of such instructional services violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Court argued that such practices forged a “symbolic union of government and religion” that threatened to convey a message of state support for the indoctrination of the theological doctrines in both the parents and the students receiving these services and in the general public. The Court also held that the need to insure that classes were free of religious content, even if the rooms were stripped of all religious artifacts, inevitably would result in the ‘excessive entanglement of church and

*Norman J. Bauer*
state’ one of the three standards of the Lemon Test which had been guiding the decision-making of the Court since 1972. To prevent the incorporation of religious content in such teaching would require a “permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid” in order to verify that these teachers were not being influenced by their supervisors or surroundings to participate in religious education or in other religious activities. Clearly this would involve much more ‘entanglement’ between the state and the sectarian school than the ‘Wall’ of separation between the state and the religious school could permit.

Any thought, however, that this decision had eliminated the value of ECIA to any who were opposed to the cultural principle of ‘a wall of separation between church and state’ was quickly demolished by the almost immediate response emanating from the U.S. Department of Education (DE).

William Bennett, then Secretary of the Department, blasted the ruling as “crazy,” “terrible” and “badly reasoned.” He immediately had regulations issued by the DE which permitted nonpublic sectarian schools to purchase vans, essentially mobile classrooms, in which instructional services could be provided immediately adjacent to religious schools. The regulations also provided that, in order to meet the statutory mandate of equal expenditures to students in private (mostly religious) and public schools which was contained within ECIA, all administrative costs, including the purchase of the vans, would have to come “off the top” of the monies allocated to handle the administrative costs associated with implementing ECIA. The LEA in each state would be responsible for ensuring that the cost and outfitting of the vans were entirely paid for before the remainder of the money allocated to a state could be distributed equally to all public and nonpublic (mostly religious) schools on the basis of the number of students enrolled in these schools. One can understand with minimal difficulty that one significant consequence of this was to spend much more money on each nonpublic sectarian school student than on each public school student.

The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education
Administrative leaders in the city of Chicago, fully aware of this inequity, argued unsuccessfully before a federal appeals court that these “administrative costs” actually benefited religious schools only and, therefore, should be treated as a part of the overall distribution of ECIA funds for the students in the religious schools. The court rejected this contention, noting, that “we do not believe that the disparity in costs in the delivery of constitutionally permissible services render the program (ECIA) unconstitutional.” Adding, almost unbelievably, the claim that “The cost of compliance with Felton I is hardly a cost attributable to the children whose parents have exercised their constitutional right to send their children to a sectarian institution.”

As a consequence of Bennett’s efforts, between 1986 and 1991, the New York City Board of Education diverted over 30 million dollars in funds that were supposed to be spent delivering Chapter I remedial education services (a) to eligible poor and disadvantaged children, and (b) to children with special needs to pay for the capital and overhead costs of delivering deluxe remedial services to religious schools.

This diversion of Chapter I funds deprived almost 26,000 poor children in the public schools of New York City, including almost 2,000 attending religious schools, of services to which they were entitled. Indeed, by 1991 an eligible poor child in a Roman Catholic school in New York City was much more likely to be served by taxpayer dollars than an eligible poor child attending a public school. This despite the fact that 90 percent of New York City’s Chapter I students attended public schools.

When one considers the incredible plight of these students as revealed in the seven unbelievably poor New York City neighborhoods analyzed by Jonathan Kozol in his book Amazing Grace one cannot help but feel pangs of anger and disgust. Recall the passage in which he has recorded a dialogue which he had with a woman near the site of what was once the location of Children’s Park. She had just requested him for a match.

Norman J. Bauer
“Lighting the match and holding it for her as she cups her hands,”
... Kozol asks her, ‘What do you call this kind of place?’
She looks perplexed. “What do I call what place? she asks.”
“This place here - what do you call it?”
“This place here?” She shrugs. “This here is the ghetto.”
When she sees Kozol taking out his pen, she says it louder,
“GHETTO,” and then spells it.
I (Kozol) ask, “Why do you live here?”
“She looks around her at the tree and shrugs again. “This is
where poor peoples lives” she says. “Where else you think poor
peoples going to be? You a professor? You wants to meet poor peoples,
you come to the ghetto.”

A bit further on he described the plight of public elementary,
junior and senior high schools, stressing especially the “sense of hu-
man ruin on a vast scale” which he observed. “Many of the schools
with the most devastating academic records,” he points out, “are also
physically offensive places. At Morris High . . . barrels were filling
up with rain in several rooms . . . green fungus molds were growing
in the corners of the room in which the guidance counselor. . . many
of the schools quite literally stink. Girls.” he goes on, “tell me they
won’t use the toilets. They rush home the minute school is over. If
they need to use the bathroom sooner they leave sooner. At Taft High
School in the Bronx, one of the grimmest schools in the United States,
Kozol describes how “the self-esteem of children has been crushed
to the degree that students ridicule themselves . . . Taft, they say,
means ‘Training Animals For Tomorrow.”

When one becomes aware of the fact that, by 1991, contrary to
the Federal mandate to assure equity in delivering Chapter I services,
the diversion of funds to pay for vans and deluxe equipment to outfit
them meant that the city had spent from 66 to 165 percent more on
each sectarian school student than on each public school student, one’s visceral system cannot help but vibrate with rage and anger. And, when one adds to this devastating example of gross inequity
the fact that during this process of diverting millions of dollars to

The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education
these schools many church-owned buildings, buildings designed and built to transmit and reinforce particular religious doctrines and beliefs, but not Taft, or School 65, or numerous other public schools located in the ghetto of the poor, were repaired, upgraded and made compliant with city building codes, all with public tax dollars, at the expense of serving as many of New York city’s poor children as possible, then one cannot help but feel a profound sense of revulsion at the way in which the ‘establishment clause’ of the First Amendment was being violated and how the powerful and, until now, enduring cultural principle of separation of church and state was being savagely attacked.

Were these Chapter I capital expenditures necessary? Absolutely not! Instead of buying expensive, custom-made mobile classrooms, referred to as Mobile Instructional Units (MIUs), for providing curbside Chapter I services to religious schools, and outfitting them with sophisticated interactive technologies, the city of New York could have used Chapter I monies to provide services in its public schools to the eligible students who were enrolled in the religious schools at a cost almost equal to the cost of service to a public school student.

This is the direction which seemed to be most reasonable during the years immediately following the ’85 Felton I decision. Indeed, the Federal guidelines included within ECIA required that equal Chapter I services be provided for all poor and disadvantaged children and children with special needs; The guidelines did not require, however, that they be accepted. On the surface, it appeared, at least in New York City, that neither the administrators of the sectarian schools or the parents of students attending such schools had the right to veto offers to distribute Chapter I services to all students in private and nonpublic schools on an equal basis. Further, at the outset, the New York State Education Department considered public school sites to be the most cost effective means for delivering such services.

Unfortunately, however, the sectarian hierarchy and the parents with whom they worked, categorically rejected the public school sites

*Norman J. Bauer*
because they did not want their children in the public schools. As a result, after they engaged in more than 100 meetings with representatives from the State Education Department which were held for the purpose of persuading the state officials to change their position, an alternative plan was developed; a plan which by 1990, after three years of operation, saw a drop from 3,578 students attending 67 sectarian schools who were receiving Chapter I services at public school sites to 1,578 students from 12 sectarian schools receiving such services at public school sites.

Why did this significant change occur? Unmistakably because (a) of the increased use of vans, which by now had been designated as Mobile Instructional Units (MIU’s), (b) sites to locate these vans adjacent to the sectarian schools had been leased, and (c) because of the purchase of computers. Incredibly, the MIU’s alone, i.e., without the cost of the computers, required the city of New York to use more than $14 million dollars of taxpayer money to own and maintain.

Just a word or two about the nature of these MIU’s. They are in reality buses, equipped as classrooms, usually parked at curbside or as near to a religious school as possible. They provide (a) space for a maximum of 10 students, which represents a student—teacher ratio of 10 to 1, unheard of in the New York City public schools, (b) a counselor, and (c) a driver, each paid out of funds designated in ECIA to pay for the services mandated by Chapter One. All of the students receiving services in an MIU attend the same sectarian school. The MIU’s also provide space for conferences between Chapter One teachers, other school personnel and parents. They are equipped with an intersite communication system that enables communication with the sectarian school. On the down side, they do not have toilets.9

The MIU’s, in other words, do not function, in either a physical or an educational sense, independently of the religious school they serve. They do not, therefore, resolve the Constitutional problem of a violation of the Establishment Clause which was posed in 1985 by Felton I.

The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education
FELTON II – SECONDARY CONSEQUENCE

Slightly more than nine years ago, in 1987, a legal challenge commonly known as Felton II was filed in the courts by agencies concerned that the MIU’s which had emerged following the 1985 decision. Again led by New York PEARL, they claimed that the MIU’s had simply returned to the original issue, namely a violation of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment.

The essence of FELTON II, more formally known as PEARL v. Secretary, U.S. Dept of Education et al), is that the post-Felton I arrangement is just as unconstitutional as the pre-Felton I arrangement. Among the plaintiffs more significant claims about the post-Felton I actions are the following: "It forges a symbolic and actual link between government and religion. It subsidizes religious institutions. It reflects an unjustifiable capitulation by public school officials to the pressures of religious leaders, school administrators, and parents, who categorically refused to send their children to public schools". 10

In April, 1995, eight years after Felton II was filed in 1987, following much foot-dragging and stalling by the New York City Board of Education, and the defendants in Felton I the plaintiffs (i.e., PEARL, et. al.) filed a motion to obtain a summary judgment in the case.

Suddenly the defendants, including the city of New York School Board and the New York State Education Department, somehow noticed that the post-Felton I alternative plan which had been using MIU’s was too onerous, both financially and constitutionally, to continue operating.

Further, as a result of their having become aware of the substance of four recent decisions by the Supreme Court, (1) School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball (1985), (2) Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Schools District (1985), (3) Grumet v. Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District (1994), and (4) Rosenberger v.

Norman J. Bauer
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (1995), they came to recognize that a number of Supreme Court justices had made references to the 1985 Felton I 5-4 split decision in opinions which they have written in these cases.

In the Grand Rapids decision, decided on the same day in 1985 as Felton I, the Court found that two programs in which publicly paid and employed teachers providing instruction in several "secular" courses on the premises of religious schools were unconstitutional, not only because of "excessive entanglement" between religious and government authorities but also for two broader reasons. As then Justice Brennan explained the other two reasons: "The symbolic union of church and state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support for religion to students and the general public. Finally, the programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects."11

Grand Rapids is significant in terms of Felton II because the facts related to the Grand Rapids decision were not a part of the issues addressed in the Felton I hearing. The primary issue being: Isn't government-provided "remedial instruction" in such basic subjects as reading and mathematics in religious schools as much a subsidization of the religious functions of these schools as the instruction in art, music and physical education struck down in Grand Rapids?

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District was a case involving James Zobrest, a profoundly deaf student attending Salpointe Catholic High School in Tucson, Arizona. Zobrest's parents sought a government funded interpreter for their son through the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Officials at the Catalina Foothills School District refused, arguing that providing the interpreter at a 'pervasively sectarian' institution would violate the separation of church and state. In a 5-4 decision, drawing on precedents decided in prior cases which allow some forms of 'indirect'
and 'incidental' government aid to flow to religious education, the Court declared that providing a deaf Catholic school student with a government-funded hearing interpreter does not violate the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment.

In Grumet v. Board of Education the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the New York legislature acted unconstitutionally when it created a special "public" school district for a group of ultra-Orthodox Hasidic Jews. Justice Sandra Day O'Conner suggested that the Kiryas Joel problem in New York was created by the Court's 1985 decision in Felton I. Recall that in that decision, a majority of justices held that allowing public school teachers to offer special education services to parochial school students inside parochial schools violates the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. "It is the Court's insistence on disfavoring religion in Felton I," claimed O'Connor, "that led the State of New York to favor religion in the Kiryas Joel situation. The court should, in a proper case," she argued, "be prepared to reconsider Felton I, in order to bring our Establishment Clause jurisprudence back to what I think is the proper track - government impartiality, not animosity, towards religion." 12

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, while agreeing with the lead opinion in Kiryas Joel which stipulated that New York lawmakers had unconstitutionally engaged in "explicit religious gerrymandering," and thereby had violated the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment by delegating governmental authority to a sectarian group to operate its own public school system, also concurred with O'Connor's reasoning about the Court's decision in Felton I. In addition he added that Felton I was a case similar to Grand Rapids v. Ball, saying that both decisions, Felton I and Grand Rapids may have been erroneous. 13

"In light of the case before us, and in the interest of sound elaboration of constitutional doctrine, it may be necessary," claimed Kennedy, "for us to reconsider them at a later date. A neutral aid scheme, available to religious and nonreligious alike, is the prefer-

Norman J. Bauer
able way to address problems such as the Satmar handicapped children in Kiryas Joel have suffered.”

The apparent dislike of *Felton I* by both O’Connor and Kennedy which is revealed in the foregoing views, when coupled with the consistently antiestablishment views of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, must seem to suggest to the defendants in *Felton II* the very real possibility that now, more than nine years after the case had been pursued in the courts, it is possible to imagine that the 1985 *Felton I* decision may be overturned.

To add support to their feeling that *Felton I* may be reversed, consider the fact that on June 29, 1995, in *Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia*, the Court reversed the rulings of two lower federal courts and ruled 5-4 that the University of Virginia must award university-wide mandatory student activity fees to a student-run religious newspaper. Five justices, including Justice Kennedy who wrote the majority opinion, along with Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas did not perceive the student activity fees as taxes and hence did not see how the support of the religious newspaper ran contrary to the Establishment Clause.

The latter three justices, as has already been noted, are well known for their anti-Establishment perspectives and opinions. With the addition of the former two one can see how those who would like to have *Felton I* overturned feel that their chances are very good.

**RULE 60 (B)(5)**

This brings us to a little know rule which needs to be clearly comprehended to understand the nature of what is currently going on relative to overturning the Court’s decision in *Felton I* (1985). Designated as Rule 60 (b) (5), this rule provides that “a court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment [if] the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” In the case of

*The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education*
Felton I the second consideration, "... or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or vacated..." is the provision that applies. It should be noted, however, that no court has yet found that Rule 60 (b)(5) can be properly invoked in the absence of an actual, indisputable change in the applicable law.

Here is where matters become almost incomprehensible. In late Summer, 1996, Federal District Court Judge John Gleeson issued a decision which went against those attempting to sustain the original decision in Felton I. In his decision Gleeson stipulated that the defendants, i.e., those wishing to overturn the original 1985 Felton I decision, had properly invoked the Rule. That is, the Judge found that the current method of providing Chapter I services to students attending parochial (almost entirely Catholic schools) by using MIU’s located immediately adjacent to the schools was constitutional. He seems to have (a) entirely ignored the fact that the New York City School Board had offered to provide the desired instruction of students enrolled in the parochial schools in public school buildings; (b) refused to recognize that the use of MIU’s constitutes extensions of the religious schools, that the installation of computer labs in religious schools, funded by Chapter I tax funds, is direct instructional aid, that classrooms located in rectories are not in ‘neutral sites’, and that all of these tactics are nothing but a deliberate effort to accommodate religious groups on religious terms; and (c) lacked any sympathy for the argument that the current provision of Chapter I services via the use of MIU’s advances religion by supplanting — not supplementing — services, services that the religious schools have admitted they could not otherwise offer their students.

In a most bizarre sequence of events, immediately following his decision, Judge Gleeson immediately denied the motion of the defendants to overturn Felton I on the grounds that Felton I was still the law.

Working collaboratively with one another, the defendants appealed directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Norman J. Bauer
for support of their position. This court almost immediately granted the defendants an ‘expedited appeal’, meaning an appeal without delay. On the day of arguments presented by the contesting parties, this Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Gleeson’s lower court judgments.

As a consequence of this action and in light of the positions which different justices on the Supreme Court seem to have taken in the four cases briefly described earlier in this paper, the defendants immediately petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to have *Felton I* overturned. Shortly thereafter they were joined by the U.S. Department of Education in support of their action.

**FELTON III — TERTIARY CONSEQUENCE**

The new case, *Agostini v. Felton*, which I shall refer to as *Felton III*, argued before the Court this week on Tuesday, April 15th, presents the justices with another opportunity to address the issue of taxpayer subsidies for religious schools, an issue which appears to be a bona fide example of a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.

It is not unimportant to recognize that *Felton III* comes at a time when efforts to provide voucher subsidies from public tax dollars to support religious schools increasingly are becoming a subject of national debate. While it is true that *Felton III* is not directly connected to vouchers, what the justices eventually decide could very well affect the question of how far government may go in distributing tax dollars to religious schools which are integrally connected with and responsible to institutions which adhere to Established Religious Doctrines, along with the social and political implications these doctrines have for our liberal democratic culture.

It should be clear that *Felton II* (1987) would be dead if the Court’s decision in *Felton III* (1997) is to overturn *Felton I* (1985).

To make matters even more complex, changes have been made in *ECIA*, the statute authorizing Chapter I expenditures, since 1985.
More and more public schools, and religious schools, have been enabled by these changes to use their Chapter I funds on a school-wide basis rather than on a student-need basis. These changes strike at the very heart of the constitutional question raised by the Establishment Clause which constituted the main line of argument in the 1985 *Felton I* decision.

**SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ‘FELTON SAGA’**

It requires no great imaginative power to identify a variety of significant implications which emerge from the as yet unfinished Felton Saga for those professors who teach one or more of the subjects in the cross-disciplinary domain of knowledge ordinarily associated with the SFE, and for the content of the knowledge which they expose to their students.

**SFE Professors**

☐ Ought to enhance their understanding of the issues which had a strong impact on church-state relations as they emerged in the Western World following the Reformation and particularly in our country during the 17th and 18th centuries. In particular professors of SFE ought to recognize what a singularly significant revolution occurred in the social and political history of humankind when our Constitution was ratified and the 1st Congress approved the Bill of Rights. Never in history had a society divorced the secular world from the transcendental world - such was our experiment, first with Article VI in the Constitution which stipulates that no religious test shall be required of anyone wishing to seek a public office; later, on December 15, 1791, with the first sixteen words in the Bill of Rights. We had shaped a fundamental principle, a powerful, transcendent standard upon which the future growth and development of our nation would be grounded.

If the content included in the courses which we include in the SFE ought to stress anything, it ought to stress a search for funda-

*Norman J. Bauer*
mental standards, for principles, upon which we can base our judg-
ments. Professors in our domain of endeavor need to rededicate them-
selves to the task of creating a love in their students for our
emancipatory, liberal Constitution and its accompanying amendments
each of which entails one of the fundamental standards in our cul-
ture.

☐ Ought to renew their knowledge of some of the major docu-
ments which were written about church-state relationships during the
period of 1775 and 1860. 15

☐ Ought to reenergize their understanding about the vital im-
portance of public schooling in the perpetuation of our liberal demo-
cratic society.

☐ Ought to encourage the professional organizations to which
they belong to include major speakers, papers, panels and symposia
which examine the intimate relationship between public schools and
a free and open society, and which reveal the significance of both the
‘establishment’ and the ‘free exercise’ clauses in the first amendment
to church-state relationships on their conference programs.

☐ Ought to make every effort to require all prospective teach-
ers and administrators to take at least one dedicated course in the
history of American schooling. If only one is possible, this course
ought to cover the period from the Reformation to the present.

☐ Ought to be sensitive to the fact that much of the public ap-
ppears to have an astonishing lack of understanding of and apprecia-
tion for the significance of the cultural religious pluralism which the
Establishment Clause guarantees everyone in our society. Many of
their students will reflect this lack of both an understanding and an
appreciation of this concept; and some, sadly, will resist, perhaps
even antagonistically, any efforts to examine this matter. This is par-
ticularly the case when it comes to the importance of retaining as
clear an understanding about the wisdom of keeping the state and
religion as separate as possible. Problems of understanding continu-

_The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education_
ously arise when allusions are made to such phrases as "In God we Trust," "Under God", or "We are a Christian Nation", etc., often found on the cornerstones of many of our buildings, on much of our money, in the pledge to our U.S. flag, in the claim by some that the principle of separation of church and state is not found in our Constitution or any of its amendments, and in spontaneous conversations with one another. Many of these allusions, frequently uttered in a disparaging way, usually support claims that we do not, in reality, have a 'wall' of separation between church and state in our country, that 'wall' is an unjustified metaphor, that the integration of an established doctrine with the state would be just as acceptable, if not more so, than the effort we now make to separate the secular and the religious. One need only think about different places throughout the world to find support for the counter claim that these claims, although often made by well-intentioned people, are, in effect, misguided assertions.

**SFE Content**

- Ought to include within its domain a significant analysis of the cultural religious pluralism which has been an emerging phenomenon in our country since the seventeenth century. The larger public frequently appears to possess an astonishing lack of understanding and appreciation for the significance of such pluralism, for the rights of conscience to believe or not to believe as one wishes, which our liberal democracy provides all its citizens.

- Ought to include an analysis of both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses in the First Amendment. This analysis ought to make every prospective teacher and administrator clearly aware of the significance of the Establishment Clause for each of the thirteen original colonies when the Bill of Rights were adopted by Congress on December 15, 1791 and how, during the course of the following sixty-five years, largely because of the rapid appearance of a wide range of religious sects which began emerging along the east coast, and the resultant significant growth in religious pluralism which emerged, the original meaning of 'Establishment' gradually came to

*Norman J. Bauer*
mean ‘Disestablishment’ as one after another of the original thirteen states abolished its Established Religion because of the necessity to live civilly and harmoniously with the increasing array of religious doctrines which were emerging throughout the land. Prospective school people ought to realize that the Felton Saga has had to do with the post-1860 meaning of the Establishment Clause; just as have been all the recent efforts to acquire Tuition Tax Credits and Vouchers for nonpublic schools (most of which are religious schools.)

☐ Ought to enable students to recognize the beauty of the cultural religious pluralism which the Establishment and Exercise clauses permit in terms of the emancipation of all our citizens from the tyrannical power which clerics and the religious doctrines they have historically espoused and imposed on the minds of people. Further, they ought to come to understand deeply the fact that nothing in our Constitution or its amendments constitutes a permanent condition, and that there are forces in our culture which would be most pleased to destroy the religious pluralism to which all our citizens are now entitled.

☐ Ought to enable prospective teachers and administrators to respond to such questions as “What could possibly be wrong with integrating the church and the state”?; or “Where in the Constitution can you find any mention of “separation of church and state”?; or “Would we not be a much better nation if we all subscribed to a similar religious doctrine”; or “What can possibly be wrong when a sitting judge insists on posting the Ten Commandments in his courtroom”; or “What can possibly be wrong with placing a Creche on the lawn of a public court house at Christmas or with having crosses affixed around the rooftop of a county court house”; or “Why can’t we allow some forms of organized oral prayer in our public schools”; or “Why should I have to pay public school taxes when I choose to send my child to a religious school to which I have to pay tuition? Isn’t this a form of ‘double-taxation’”, or “Why can’t we have religious leaders say a prayer during baccalaureate or commencement ceremonies which are held in public elementary and secondary

The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education
schools”?

Clearly these questions suggest that the larger public has an astonishing lack of understanding about why Thomas Jefferson created the Religious Freedom Statute for Virginia, about why James Madison penned the paper entitled “Memorial and Remonstrance”, about the genesis of the ‘Wall’ metaphor, about the substance and impact of John Locke’s Letter on Toleration on the creation of our political structure during the eighteenth century.

Indeed, when it comes to understanding and appreciating the power and durability of the constitutional document which emerged from the forethought of those who shaped the structure of our nation, many citizens are less literate than they are about practically every other matter.

SUMMARY

Hopefully a cursory perusal of this paper will leave one with something of an understanding about how the Felton Saga has emerged since 1985. A bit more thoughtful reading and interpreting would be likely to raise the question of the background and the intentions of those members of Congress who were responsible for designing ECIA as it was incorporated in the July 31, 1981 Federal budget. A thorough consideration of its contents will enable one to acquire an increased understanding of the importance of enlarging and enhancing our nation’s commitment to and movement toward a rich cultural religious pluralism which is guaranteed by the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment to our Constitution.

If each of these levels of understanding have been acquired, then it is possible, though not certain, that one will have become much more highly interested in and knowledgeable about matters related to our country’s religious history. If this has occurred one will be increasingly able to appreciate and insist on the continued move away from the melting pot notion, and its implicit Judeo-Christian imagery, which has been the tacit guide of much of our social think-

Norman J. Bauer
ing during the past two hundred years, and commence moving toward an inclusive, pluralistic, round table metaphor to guide our thinking about the development of cultural religious pluralism in our culture.

Such a metaphor would enable us (a) to grow in appreciation for the aesthetic richness and moral enhancement which religious pluralism regularly introduces into our culture, and (b) to recognize the vital necessity of preventing public tax dollars from being used to support any established religious doctrine.

Finally, one could become a more responsible agent in the choices one makes, in the respect one shows persons who choose religious or irreligious beliefs which are quite different from one’s own, in one’s recognition of the rights that all people have to make their unique choices of religious or irreligious beliefs. Gaining an appreciation for, and acquiring the habits of mind which accompany each of these three fundamental values in our liberal democracy, responsibility, respect and rights, is vitally important for all prospective school personnel if they are to become effective in their ability to help their students acquire those habits of civility which will enable them to avoid the tribalism which often emerges when conflicts in religious beliefs emerge.

Emeritus State University of New York, Geneseo

ENDNOTES

1. First sixteen words of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Capitalization of the terms ‘Establishment’ and ‘Free Exercise’ by the author of this paper. For additional insights about the meaning of this term when the Bill of Rights were adopted on December 15, 1891, see: Bauer, Norman J. (1995). “Transformation of the meaning of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment.” Unpublished paper.

Note: In the first two consequences to be discussed in this paper Aguilar is the name of the defendant in each case (1985) and (1987); Agostini

*The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education*
is the name in the third (1997); (both names are ‘parent intervenor front’
names.) They represent the parties who are attempting to persuade the
Supreme Court that it is constitutional to distribute tax monies to reli-
gious schools. Felton is the representative of New York PEARL (Pub-
lic Education and Religious Liberty.) New York PEARL is the primary
agency attempting to persuade the Supreme Court to rule that it is un-
constitutional to continue giving Federal Tax Dollars to religious schools
to support their efforts to handle the needs of poor and disadvantaged
children, and children with special needs, as required by Chapter One
of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA), included
in the first Reagan budget which was adopted by Congress on July 31,
1981.
3. Lynn, Barry, Stern, Marc D. and Thomas, Oliver S. (1995). The right to
religious liberty: The basic ACLU guide to religious rights. Second
4. Boston, Rob. (April, 1997). “Religious schools, tax dollars and the Su-
preme Court.” In: Church and State. 10.
5. Lynn, et. al. op. cit., 37.
conscience of a nation. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc. 137-
138.
7. Ibid., 150-152.
8. Newsletter of The Committee for Public Education and Religious Lib-
erty, Inc. (Fall, 1994). “Chapter I in New York City: Inequity, and more
to come.” New York: The National Committee For Public Education &
Religious Liberty. p. 3
paign to overturn Felton. New York: The National Committee For Public
11. Ibid. 3.
12. Boston, Rob. (July/August, 1994). “Forbidden fusion.” In: Church and
State. 5.
13. Ibid.
15. For a magnificent collection of significant documents by a first rate
scholar of American religious history see: Gaustad, Edwin S., Editor.
(1993, 1982). A documentary history of religion in America to the Civil
War, and A documentary history of religion in America since 1865.

Norman J. Bauer
POSTSCRIPT

Since this paper was written the Supreme Court, on June 23, 1997, in a 5-4 decision, overruled its 1985 Aguilar v. Felton decision and ordered the injunction that required the public school system of New York City (and, implicitly, all other public school systems) to provide Title I services off the premises of parochial schools vacated. Writing for the majority (Justices Kennedy, Rhenquist, Scalia, Thomas and herself) Justice O’Connor argued that “New York City’s Title I program does not run afoul of any of the three primary criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: it does not result in government indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement. We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing supplemental remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid under the Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as those present here. . . . Accordingly, we must acknowledge that Aguilar, . . . [is] no longer good law.”

Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate the injunction prohibiting New York City from sending public employees into parochial schools to Administer Title I benefits.

Four Justices dissented. Justice Souter, in an opinion which Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined, and Justice Breyer joined in part, argued that the Court’s decision rested on a “mistaken reading” of the holdings in Zobrest . . . Aguilar [Felton I], he contended, “was a correct and sensible decision. . . . The State is forbidden to subsidize religion directly and is just as surely forbidden to act in any way that

The History of Felton and the Social Foundations of Education
could reasonably be viewed as religious endorsement.” Justice Souter argued that the conclusions reached in *Aguilar* and *Ball* regarding the promotion of religion and excessive entanglement are still valid. . . . Title I, he stated, subsidizes religious schools by teaching core courses for which the religious school would otherwise be responsible and provides its benefits directly to the religious schools. . . . In response to the majority’s assertion that there is no difference between a benefit offered on parochial school grounds or directly outside, the dissent stated that “off-premises teaching is arguably less likely to open the door to relieving religious schools of their responsibilities for secular subjects. . . .”


*Norman J. Bauer*
MOTIVATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLEGE WOMEN: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF A U.S. AND A MEXICAN INSTITUTION.

George Iber and Pedro Sanchez

Global economic trends appear to be increasingly important to the decisions we make which affect us personally. When students think of obtaining an education they must make their decisions against a backdrop of international technological and economic forces of which they may be only indirectly aware. A recent Time magazine article, “Learning to Earn,” (Hornblower, 1997) reported that since 1967 the percentage of entering college students in the United States who consider it important “To develop a meaningful philosophy of life,” has dropped from 82% to 42%, while concerns for financial security have risen in almost the exact inverse rate to become the major concern of today’s American college student.

Trade in goods and services across national borders is changing the perceptions of students’ future economic viability. In this age of NAFTA, where governments are asking schools to prepare a more sophisticated and internationally aware student, where grants for technological development in all schools are proposed by the Presidents of our countries, and where term “global competition” has replaced “getting a good job” as a rational for educational funding, we are interested in how individual students are internalizing these messages and choosing careers. Given this background, what may be the different motivating factors involved in students decisions to engage in university training?

This study compares women students at two very different institutions of higher education, Russell Sage College and the Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan. Data for the study was obtained at Russell Sage College through the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP), and in Mexico through a Spanish lan-
guage instrument including analog and selected items from the English language instrument developed by the Higher Education Research Institute. The purpose of this study is to compare the cultural and academic profiles of the two student groups. Of particular interest to the researchers was the academic training that the students received prior to entering college, their social awareness, their self esteem, motivation for attending college, and likely academic or career expectations. The study is expected to illuminate motivational differences in these two groups and to demonstrate that despite their differences they share many common higher education expectations.

The Institutions

Russell Sage College, located in upstate New York, near the capital of Albany, is a predominantly woman’s college founded in 1927 under the inspiration of Margaret Slocum Sage, and named for her husband. It is an outgrowth of the Emma Willard School, the oldest preparatory school for women in the United States. The college has as its motto “To Know, To Be, To Do.” It reflects the founders desire to provide an institution for women that could provide them with a life of satisfying work. Today the mission statement proclaims that the college’s mission is to “offer women professional preparation through outstanding rigorous academic degree programs in the humanities, social and professional sciences, natural sciences, and health sciences. The College emphasizes teaching and research for women and other under represented groups so that they can become leaders and key players in our society” (Sage Catalog, 1994). The original curriculum offered classes in sewing, accounting, and nursing. Today the college of about 900 students, offers numerous popular B.A./B.S. career programs supplemented with a liberal arts requirements, as well as several M.A. degree options. Reflecting its heritage as a college conceived to provide women career options, the most popular majors at this institution include Physical and Occupational Therapy, Nursing, and Education. The college recently instituted

George Iber and Pedro Sanchez
a two semester foreign language requirement, citing the need to learn about foreign cultures. Many graduates pursue the 5-year graduate degrees options made available to them.

The college is a part of a small federation, known as “The Sage Colleges.” The Sage Colleges are composed of a 2-year coeducational junior college, Sage Junior College of Albany; a 4-year coeducational evening division, Sage Evening College; and a coeducational graduate college, Sage Graduate School. Thus Russell Sage College exists as the central institution which influences curriculum development in the other divisions. The college competes with a number of other institutions in the “New York Capital District” that include two community colleges, three private baccalaureate institutions, and a comprehensive state research university. The students at Russell Sage may either live on campus or commute to school.

The Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan (UADY), located in Merida, the capital of the Mexican state of Yucatan is a comprehensive public University. Its size and scope vary tremendously from Russell Sage College. Within the Mexican context it is a medium sized University, with a student population of about 15,000. Founded in 1922, the University by law is charged to: 1) train professionals responsive to the economic, political, and social needs of the state and region; 2) foster and develop scientific research; and 3) expand the benefits of culture into the community. The statement declares the mission to be “...la educación de nuevas generaciones...a las cuales debemos brindar las herramientas suficientes para el desarrollo de su creatividad, de su capacidad de reflexión, y todas sus potencialidades para enfrentar los retos que plantea nuestra Nación y procurar mejores niveles de bienestar, justicia y libertad para los mexicanos” (Pasos, 1994). Its broad mission is clearly oriented to the “responsive” role education plays in relation to economic and political needs.

As is the case with most large Universities, individual colleges comprise the larger University. In the case of UADY, the colleges include Anthropology, Administration, Architecture, Biol-

Motivational Characteristics of College Women
ogy & Chemistry, Chemical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Dentistry, Economics, Education, Computer science & Mathematics, Medicine, Nursing, Psychology, and Veterinary Medicine. This particular study used students attending the college of Education as the sample group from which comparisons were made. UADY provides no housing for its students. They either live with relatives or other families in the area while pursuing their studies. The Colleges are located in various parts of the city, rather than the more centralized versions of their US counterparts. As can be noted in the school’s mission, as well as its college divisions, economic and culture promotion are central to the functions of the institution.

In spite of the differences in size, country, culture, and student body, at least one similarity should be apparent. These institutions clearly position themselves as vehicles for economic advancement of its students, and by extension industry and country. It should not surprise us then if students in their decisions to choose an institution of higher learning, likewise consider the advantages that such an education may bring to them in economic terms and that the students activities prior to entering college may reflect similar patterns. As noted by Michael Apple (1986 p. 153) “Thus while there has always been a relatively close connection between the two...there is now an even closer relationship between the curriculum in our schools and corporate needs. In a number of countries, educational officials and policy-makers, legislators, curriculum workers, and others have been subject to immense pressure to make the ‘needs’ of business and industry the primary goals of the school system.”

**Comparative data:**

The following data represents a survey of 129 Russell Sage College first year students and a random sample of 100 females students form different grades at the College of Education, Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan. The survey was administered.

*George Iber and Pedro Sanchez*
in August of 1996 and January of 1997 respectively. Also included are the United States results for female students attending 4-year nonsectarian colleges and universities taken from survey data collected by the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) as published in The American Freshman: National Norms For Fall 1996 (Sax, L. J., Astin, A. W., Korn, W. S., Mahoney, K. M., 1996). All figures are percentages. The first three tables, Section 1, provide us with a general overview of the students’ background. Tables four through seven, Section 2, describe common activities in which the students were engaged in the previous year. Tables eight through eleven, Section 3, focus more directly on the issues of motivation and schooling.

Section 1: Student Backgrounds

Table 1. Age of Students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Sage</th>
<th>UADY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 24</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 39</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The age profile of the students ranges from a mean of 18 years for the Sage students to a mean of 21 for the UADY. Age differences are due to sampling differences since the Sage data was obtained only from entering students. In future studies this variable will need to be controlled.

Table 2. Status of Parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
<th>+ or &lt;&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>living with each other</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>&lt;12&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>divorced or separated</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>&lt;11&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one or both deceased</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows an important variable in student home life his-

Motivational Characteristics of College Women
tery. Divorce rates are double in the United States. This may con-
tribute, in part, for some of the women’s need for financial security
as shown in later tables.

Table 3. Met or Exceeded Recommended Years of H.S. Study (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English (4 years)</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mathematics (3 years)</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign language (2 years)</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical science (2 years)</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biological science (2 years)</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history/Am. government (1 year)</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>computer science (1/2 year)</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arts and/or music (1 year)</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mexican secondary curriculum is fixed to a greater degree than
in the United States. Students are seldom allowed to select subjects.
The majority must follow a pre-established program that they must
complete. Both groups of women are well prepared according to
their country’s standards. Note that science and technology are ei-
ther not offered or not chosen by many women in the UADY sample.
Both groups are well prepared according to each country’s standards,
but it does appear that science and technology offerings are signifi-
cantly higher in the Sage sample.

Section 2: Activities Profile

In this section we see responses to questions regarding the stu-
dents’ activities engaged in during the past year. A number surrounded
by a <> indicates that the percentage of students responding to this
measure was higher for the UADY students than for the Sage stu-
dents.

George Iber and Pedro Sanchez
Table 4. Activities Engaged in During the Past Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>&lt;UADY&gt;</th>
<th>+ or &lt;&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attended a religious service</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>felt bored in class</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participated in demonstrations</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tutored another student</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>studied with other students</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was a guest in a teacher’s home</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>&lt;35&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smoked cigarettes</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>&lt;2&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drank beer</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drank wine or liquor</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>felt overwhelmed</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>felt depressed</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>&lt;7&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performed volunteer work</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>played musical instrument</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>&lt;6&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overslept &amp; missed class/appt</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>&lt;11&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discussed politics</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worked in political campaign</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>&lt;29&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voted in student election</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>&lt;33&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialized w/diff ethnic group</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missed school due to employment</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>&lt;12&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lost my temper</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>took prescribed anti-depress</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>&lt;24&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>used nontraditional medicine</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difficult to study at home</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sage women tend to study with other students much more that UADY women, but UADY women interact with their teachers to a significantly higher degree. Mexican women seem to be more politically involved, but do not engage in “demonstrations.” The question regarding “socializing with a different ethnic group” needs consideration. Perspectives on ethnicity vary greatly from one culture to another. Interestingly, while Sage women would be more prone to lose

Motivational Characteristics of College Women
their temper, Mexican women would be more prone to depression. As a matter of fact, 25% of all subjects in Mexico have taken antidepressive medication. There are those who would interpret depression as “anger turned inward.” It is also possible to obtain non-prescription antidepression drugs in Mexico, while that is not possible in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours/Week in the Last Year</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
<th>+ or &lt; &gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>&lt;46&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; one</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>&lt;4&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>&lt;4&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 20</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seventy percent of the UADY women appear not to have jobs with associated income. Is this typical of young women in Mexico? If income producing work is not possible then perhaps it is logical that motivation to attend university must come from a source other than career.

Table 6. Hours/Week in the Last Year Spent on Volunteer Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours/Week in the Last Year</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
<th>+ or &lt; &gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>&lt;29&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than one</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

George Iber and Pedro Sanchez
16 to 20  1.0  1.6  0.0  2
over 20   1.4  1.6  2.0  0

It would appear that Sage women have more time to spend on volunteer work, but here we must use some caution in interpretation. Perhaps the term "volunteer" itself is problematic. For example is household work considered voluntary or obligatory?

Table 7. Hours/week in the last year spent on household/child care

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
<th>+ or &lt;&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>&lt;15&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than one</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>&lt;5&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>&lt;7&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>&lt;1&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 20</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although twenty-nine percent of the UADY women report that they have no household responsibilities, forty-three percent have between five and fifteen hours of home responsibilities. More Sage students appear to have one or two hours of home responsibilities. Thus on the top end UADY students have greater household responsibilities.

Section 3: Motivation and Schooling

Table 8. Probable residence in the next year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
<th>+ or &lt;&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>with parents or relatives</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>&lt;77&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other private home, apt, room</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>&lt;5&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college dormitory</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>&lt;7&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Motivational Characteristics of College Women
Clearly there is a tendency for UADY women to live with relatives. This represents the time that the typical student in the United States is encouraged to become “independent.” There is a different emphasis for the Mexican women. The reasons for this difference are rooted as much in historical and cultural differences between the two countries as it is in economic necessity. For reasons of economy there is a growing trend in the United States for students to go to schools closer to home so that they may also continue to live with parents.

Table 9. Student Rating themselves Above Average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
<th>+ or &lt;&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>academic ability</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>artistic ability</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>&lt;19&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitiveness</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperativeness</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creativity</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drive to achieve</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emotional health</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leadership ability</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mathematical ab.</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public speaking ability</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>&lt;6&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-confidence (intellectual)</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-confidence (social)</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-understanding</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>&lt;8&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spirituality</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>&lt;20&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding of others</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>writing ability</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>&lt;16&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note lower scores for Mexican students for self-efficacy. The lower self-efficacy feelings could derive from either cultural differences or low SES. UADY is a public school. However, why this is
not important for the purpose of this study. These are highly selected students that passed a tough admission exam. Sage students are lower than national norms also for many of these areas. The low “spirituality” figure for Sage students seems to contrast with the previous table that reports 84.5% attended a religious service.

Table 10. Reasons Noted as Very Important in Deciding to Go to College

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
<th>+ or &lt; &gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>parents wanted me to go</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>could not find a job</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wanted to get away from home</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get a better job</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gain general education</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>&lt;2&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improve reading and study skills</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>&lt;6&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nothing better to do</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>&lt;5&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>become a more cultured person</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make more money</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learn more about things</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>&lt;4&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prove to others I could succeed</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>&lt;38&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 shows differences in motivators for attending higher education. Both groups indicate a desire to learn more about things. The benefit of learning more about things includes an economic perspective for both groups, but is significantly higher for Sage students. Sage students are generally higher in this regard than national norms. For Sage women “getting a better job” and “making more money” show the highest percentage and the greatest difference from the UADY women. Although learning more about things is important for both groups, and while the content is not identified in this survey, one can assume that one group values the learning more in terms of making money than the other. Self improvement appears to a strong motivator for many UADY students. While both groups note that
"becoming cultured" is an important goal, further inquiry is needed to determine how each group defines this term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>SAGE</th>
<th>UADY</th>
<th>+ or &lt;&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>achieve in a performing art</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>&lt;19&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>become authority in my own field</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obtain recog from colleagues</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence political structure</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>&lt;3&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence social values</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>&lt;25&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>raise a family</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>&lt;11&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have admin responsibility</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>&lt;9&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be very well off financially</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>help others in difficulty</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>&lt;3&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theoretical contrib to science</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>&lt;13&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>write original works</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>&lt;21&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>create artistic work</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>&lt;20&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be successful in own business</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>&lt;20&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be involved in environ clean-up</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>&lt;39&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>develop philosophy of life</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>&lt;38&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participate in community action</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>&lt;6&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>promote racial understanding</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>&lt;29&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keep up to date with politics</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be a community leader</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

College students can be considered to be successful negotiators of a complex cultural field consisting of educational challenges, gender expectations, social mores, family dynamics, and economic stratification. Having negotiated these factors successfully we see a different person with different motivations for life priorities and schooling in each country (tables 10 and 11). Women in both countries felt

George Iber and Pedro Sanchez
that it was important to “raise a family,” 72% at Sage and 83% at UADY. But the highest concern for Sage women was “being well off financially” at 77%. This is significantly higher than the UADY women of whom only 14% indicated that being well off financially was essential. After raising a family and helping others in difficulty, Mexican women want to be successful in their own business. It would appear that this is a comparable goal to “being well off financially.” In either case it indicates a desire to at least contribute and provide towards the economy of the family. More Sage women want to obtain recognition and become leaders in their communities, but more UADY women desire to become involved in community improvement such as environmental clean-up. It is noteworthy that five times as many UADY students are interested in the arts than Sage students. Neither group considers it very important to keep up to date with politics.

Interpretation

Without question educational institutions are undergoing change as they seek to meet the needs of its students. The change is driven by any number of factors, but certainly demographics and market niches along with technology are playing a major role. The internationalization of business and governments are also a factor. Government and business seeks to have workers fluent in different languages and well as knowledgeable of other cultures. Schools at all major cities service immigrant and transitory populations. These macro forces are often the focus of policy makers and administrators in educational institutions, as they should be. However individual students, be they from New York or the Yucatan also make decisions with respect to their own lives and view educational institutions as vehicles for achieving their aspirations. “Serving” the aspirations of students is the purported raison d’etre of educational institutions, nevertheless the “product” of the institution serves the student in the context of an economic process. The student may “choose” his or her program of studies, but as we have seen one of the strongest motivations for a field of study is eventual job acquisition. However, as Michael

Motivational Characteristics of College Women
Apple reminds us (1986 p. 20) education, like culture, is not an “autonomous nor externally determined field, but a site of social differences and struggles.” The women in this study are making choices which appear to them to benefit their life goals. Culture as defined by Spindler and Spindler (1988) is the means by which people attain perceived needs. If we assume that these women seek whatever measure of success that the culture may afford them, then the US system appears to encourage women to want more financial success than their counterpart in Mexico.

A recent study of Japanese women graduates (Tanaka, 1996) showed that schools did little if anything to either produce sexual divisions of labor or to promote continuous full-time employment for women to the degree expected by large increases in women attending universities. The high interest that women have in Sage programs of nursing and therapy reflect a traditional women’s role of assisted care giving. The UADY women are attending the Facultad de Educación, also traditionally a field dominated by women. This is not to belittle these much needed vocations, but only to underscore the political and gender variable. A study by Mendiola (1989 p. 334) investigating schools in Costa Rica demonstrated that in spite of higher educational reform and availability, social and gender differences continued to exist and may be strengthened. He says this may be due to a certain “incompatibility of egalitarian educational reforms with efficient reproduction of labor for capitalist work.” These trends are further analyzed by Mayes, (1977) Carnoy and Levin, (1978), and Bowles and Gintis, (1976).

The women in both institutions are not overtly politically involved, though as noted, the Mexican students are involved and at the same time more pessimistic that an individual can change society. Perhaps they prefer to “Romance the State” as proposed by Stromquist (1995). As she notes, the state provides women opportunity to enter the workforce, but it clearly limits their power by providing a limited number of options and tying women to families (Stromquist, 1995). We saw this in women’s dual desire to raise a

George Iber and Pedro Sanchez
family and pursue a career.

Education as an extension of the state, and private education as an extension of the marketplace reflect similar norms. That a women's college, from inception, could form its charter around the idea of "Republican Motherhood" and today after decades of feminist scholarship, draw its largest cadre of students into technical health support field is noteworthy. That its students are making such "informed" choices at the age of 18 in a non-political framework, is even more striking. The larger cultural setting of family and secondary education seems not to have provided a wide range of alternatives for these women.

The U.S. and Mexican secondary institutions from which they have recently graduated all offer some type of humanities and foreign language program as well as math and science. Kamens, Meyer, and Benavot (1996) have argued that national educational systems are at their basis a cultural system, "With much of modern's schooling's power deriving from public meanings and purposes" (p. 117). They further argue that secondary education has come under a world model which links education with "notions of social and economic progress" (p. 117). Based upon their proposed model we see that US and Mexican schools both provide a "comprehensive" curricula. The comprehensive curricula does not eliminate stratification (Ogbu, 1987).

Ornelas and Post (1992) found that at a "radical" university in Mexico, Universidad Autonoma de Puebla, few working class students enrolled and fewer graduated. Of those who did enter, they demanded traditional professional tracks rather than modern technical ones. We can see a subordination of political philosophy for economic advantage on the part of the students' choice. Students in Mexico demand access to higher education, so that they may improve their economic situations. In the United States, student access to some type of higher education is virtually guaranteed through a matrix of public, state, and private colleges, but here the 20 year

Motivational Characteristics of College Women
trend shows rising concern over college financial assistance, and if college “pays off” with entry into graduate school or marketable skills (Sax, Astin, Korn, and Mahoney, 1996).

In an age of global economic considerations and tight local economies students make decisions about their futures that incorporate these economic considerations. They want their time spent in school to improve them personally and economically. To the extent that economic considerations become more important to an individual, the decision to optimize current and future economic resources also becomes more important. A study such as this one is not able to detail all aspects of these students’ lives, but we can see that the Mexican students in this study appear to be motivated more like the students in the United States some 30 years ago. They have a greater desire to improve the world and themselves rather than work primarily for economic gain. We can not say what the long term trends will be for certain for either group, but if we assume a continued social and economic push for development by government and industry and that it will be defined by improved GNP, we can safely assume that students will continue to seek parallel goals as these become the options offered to them within their culture. Individuals have always worked within a cultural matrix that includes economic considerations. Colleges and universities are perceived as institutions that can increase one’s economic and cultural capital. Unfortunately trends in the United States indicate that higher education is becoming viewed almost exclusively as a means for economic advancement. One can make the conclusion that within the United States higher education will be forced to conform ever more closely to the market place or lose potential students.

The case of Mexico is less clear in that the institution has as a part of its charter the development of culture and no long term studies of this type are available. UADY students are more interested in contributing to the community and participating in the arts. They also are interested in being successful in business. Future long term trend analysis may provide more definitive answers. Until those are

George Iber and Pedro Sanchez
available one can only point to the remarkably high aspirations both
groups hold for their lives and the future, and that institutions such as
UADY and Sage figure prominently in these students’ plans.

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Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan, Merida, Yucatan

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Motivational Characteristics of College Women
NOTES AND COMMENTS

Editor’s Note: I am happy to announce that this issue of *Educational Change* continues the feature, “Notes and Comments,” initiated with the previous volume. I hope that it will go some way in addressing the difficulties aired at the meeting at Nazareth College (April 19, 1997) and prepare the ground for continuing conversations which our meetings and journal set in motion. And, again quoting from the note that introduced this new feature: “readers are encouraged to contribute letters, notes and comments on any and all articles and criticisms as well as any and all aspects of this publication.”

It is a pleasure to thank our colleagues who have made it possible to continue this feature for Spring 1998. For this we are grateful to William Griffen of SUNY Cortland, Douglas Shrader of SUNY Oneonta, Joyce Lehmann of SUNY Oswego, Achim Köddermann of SUNY Oneonta and Anthony Roda of SUNY Oneonta.
RESPONSE TO MICHAEL GREEN¹
William Griffen

Wow! This is the first time anyone in academe scathed one of my essays. Since I’m an optimist, I rejoice at finally being recognized. Truth be known, though, I was kind of hoping for a collegial recognition of my insightful, analytical power to see through the current uncritical adulation of computers and information technology as a panacea for everything but high cholesterol counts.

Michael Green correctly perceives that “the whole tone of the (Griffen) article is one of extreme emotional distress” (p. 94). Emotional about what? Green explains that my emotion-laden concerns derive from a conception of how our economic system negatively affects the quality of life. Correct. And what, according to Griffen, characterizes that economic system? “. . . a growth economy (actually, a growth-imperative economic system I argued), . . . concentration of wealth in an unjust manner, the few rent the labor of the many. . . a workplace hierarchy that prevents democracy, marginalizes and exploits workers . . .” (p. 97).

Then an unemotional, “empirically-driven” Green forgets his earlier chastising me for neglecting evidence and dismisses my valid summary of present capitalism with his own “evidence” and sophisticated level of reasoning: “(Griffen’s) accusations are pretty much a common part of the warmed-over (some would say moldy) Marxist medley of accusations against competitive capitalism” (p. 97). Call my indictment list microwave Marxism if you must, but that hardly, in the absence of any evidence or argument, invalidates anything I have argued.

How much evidence is required to render credible the linked problems of injustices and environmental degradation I cited? I had
assumed NYSFIA members (including Green) are familiar with the Worldwatch Institute’s annual reports for the past decade. Read with even minimal care, these reports, including 1997, detail with mounting evidence an environment severely battered by the legacy of industrialism, technology and capitalism. However, Green, emotions firmly under control, turns away from this overwhelming evidence of humans armed with technology and a rapacious economic agenda (“grow or die”), fowling their nest. He turns to the comfortable world of a scholarly march through eight centuries of “movements (that) are characterized by millenarianism and messianism” (p. 98). Worse, he indulges in what Tom Athanasiou terms “green washing.” “(When) ecological crisis met public relations, the age of corporate ‘green washing’ (began) . . . .”2 Environmental environmentalists like me are admonished to look at the “good side” of environmental problems such as global warming. Green tells us there is disagreement as to “is it a problem?” The green washers, thanks to Green’s non-green position, are getting their obfuscating environmental messages out. Athanasiou, however, summarizes recent studies in this area: “The accuracy of global climate model is improving with surprising speed and each year the claim that global warming is only doomster speculation is less plausible than the last . . . .”3 Not to worry. Green tells us, “A somewhat warmer planet might be more inhabitable for human beings . . . .” Bless the risk-takers (I’m typed as “risk-averse”) for they shall heat up the earth.

Green comforts us with, “An appraisal of Marx’s thought is certainly beyond this review” (p. 97). But we get one anyway. He was right. His two paragraphs on real Marxism (not that microwave brand) only lead to confusing conclusions. “Neither (capitalism or communism) became nor could become world-dominating systems” (p. 99). Well, it is also beyond this review of Green’s review to appraise this conclusion, but two questions arise: 1. When and where and to what extent was communism (not Soviet state capitalism) tried? 2. Is not capitalism presently, or soon to become a world-dominating system?

William Griffen
Green approvingly notes that “there will always be a plurality of cultures . . . .” (p. 99) Why then isn’t he concerned about how the technology-driven capitalist global order functions to homogenize many of the world’s cultures through computerizing, McDonaldizing, and Disneyizing the planet?

Green closes his review with the question: “What is the problem of being a human being?” (p. 99) It comes as no surprise that his “answers” are anthropocentric (“. . . impose order on a seemingly disorderly world” is cited as the most basic human quest (p. 99). With the environment and nature serving as mere wallpaper for us Homo sapiens, Green divides individuals and cultures into the overly cautious “china shop . . . slightest wrong move can lead to catastrophe” types—that’s me, he claims. Others, obviously the more preferred ones, “. . . live in a world of extreme flexibility which can rebound from nearly anything that is done to it. . . . At the core of the difference between Griffen and his Marxism and the competitive individualism of Anglo-Saxon capitalism is this fundamental difference in the conception of the world. Griffen’s view is risk-averse, while competitive individualism embraces risk.”

Ah, if only it were that simple and clear-cut. Green sounds like the early lessons we all received in elementary school on capitalism/democracy/and our superior economic system. The owner entrepreneur deserves the rich rewards because he (almost never a she in the past and rarely now) took a risk. And what drives these great culture-shaping, risk-taking, non-china shop types? Michael Parenti gets it right.

Through history there has been only one thing that ruling interests [Green’s risk-takers] wanted—and that is every-thing: all the choice lands, forest, game, herds, harvests, mineral deposits, and precious metals of the earth; all the wealth, riches, and profitable returns; all the productive facilities, gainful inventiveness, and technologies; all the control of the state and other major institutions. . . . Every

*Reply to Beneath the Beyond*
ruling class has wanted only this: all the rewards and none of the burdens. The operational code is: we have a lot; we can get more; we want it all.4

But Green is not so simplistic that he presents only a choice between riskophobes and riskophiles. He calls for a non-emotional balance and tells us “the problem for each historical epoch is to strike the proper balance between various problem-solving strategies that are essential for social existence” (p. 100). Green’s choice on balancing suggests a strong tendency toward those Anglo-philic risk-takers. Can you say elite CEOs? A pox on those china shop, emotional, overly cautious Griffen types. In the present reality, what forces are positioned to determine the striking of balances? Don’t ask Green. For all of his scholarly, objective, non-emotive posturing, he leaves us with this non-evidenced hope: “With the increase in information technology, cultures no longer need to be tied to a specific geographic region, and smaller groups will be able to preserve and perpetuate their cultural differences. Social fragmentation and decentralization will probably be the most likely outcome” (p. 100). Green should have ended his review with that sentence. Instead, he forges on. “Individuals who lack the proper skills to enter the information world and to acknowledge and appreciate cultural differences [how about acknowledging the increasing affluent-poverty differences as technology emphasis increases?!] will be left behind as they become unskilled relative to the new requirements of social existence” (p. 100). [emphasis added] So much for the plurality of cultures’ goal.

After all the high theory, well reasoned, scholarly grounded, non-emotional offerings of Green, we arrive at the moment of truth. After rhetorical flourishes that sprinkle his review with “a plurality of ways of solving the problems of being a human being” and “there will always be plurality of cultures” (p. 99) platitudes, we see revealed Green’s brave new world—a naive faith in the rapidly emerging computer information technology world. The monoculture message on the wall: get with the info-techno age or get lost!

William Griffin
Cutting through Green’s academic underbrush we find the reality that Parenti and ten thousand environmental reports describe. There’s your evidence! How many adequately documented, well-reasoned, nonemotional articles in professional journals do we need before leaving pens (my Luddite-preferred tool) or word processors (preference of Green and most of the rest, I gather) to begin attending to the 1.1 billion people in world poverty, (our own one out of every four children in poverty) and the planet’s forest and air and water resources?

In a somewhat patronizing final touch, Green allows that “Griffen’s voice in the wilderness can serve to awaken us to these responsibilities.” This refers to the difficulty educators will have in moving their students to the necessary transition into the age of information. Why not a transition to a future to be claimed by future generations? Now there is a challenge!: defining cultural capital in pluralistic ways instead of the emerging hi-tech, computerized ecocidal-tending culture now claiming the future.

Deron Boyles observes, “The ontology of schooling intends technologization. In other words, the computer, as cultural artifact, is a highly valued and valuable commodity in terms of cultural capital.” Computers and related technologies are the latest top of the line, highly-prized, over-hyped and over-sold cultural capital to define our times. Does it democratize our society? No. Does it accelerate production and consumption for its own sake? Yes. Does it promote a rich variety of open-ended life-choices and life-styles—a choice of low-tech, high-tech, or no tech? No.

Boyles anticipated Green’s threat to those individuals lacking in the info-technology cultural capital category. They “will be left behind” warns Green. Boyles notes that technology’s claim of equity... is like an invitation from the neighborhood bully to play ball. Deny the opportunity and be beaten up. Accept the challenge and still be pum-
meled, as bullies are bigger than those they bully anyway. Poor and disenfranchised students pay the price of technological illiteracy and the non-transfer of their cultural capital, not because of any lack of aptitude, but because capitalistic restraints define for them that they will be perpetually behind.  

Call me a victim of “extreme emotional distress” (Green’s characterization), but I suggest if we are serious about struggling for an open, just and ecologically sane tomorrow we start by breaking the cultural capital monopoly of the techno-bullies.

State University of New York, Cortland

ENDNOTES

1. See Michael K. Green, “Beneath the Beyond,” Educational Change (Spring, 1997), pp. 96-103. This is a criticism of my article “Beyond Technology,” Educational Change (Spring, 1996), pp. 95-103


6. Ibid., p. 90.

William Griffen
CONCERNING CONSCIOUSNESS

Douglas W. Shrader

Philosophers have pondered the mysteries of consciousness for millennia. In many ways, the exploration is nothing less than an unpacking of the Socratic dictum: "Know thyself." While some studies have contemplated the nature of consciousness, others have explored the source and status of its contents, attempted to chart its various types and/or stages, or probed the apparent centrality of consciousness to our sense of self, worth, and identity.

Recent years have seen a veritable explosion of consciousness studies. In "A Fool's Paradise?", published in the Spring 1997 issue of this journal, Greg Nixon raises a series of cogent concerns which revolve around contemporary investigations in artificial intelligence and neuroscience.¹ Nixon's article is interesting, provocative, and well written. It raises important questions and offers answers that merit further consideration. Though there are, perhaps inevitably, points where our opinions and intuitions differ, there is much in Professor Nixon's article with which I agree. This modest paper will explore a few points of agreement and disagreement which I consider most useful for continued discussion. To establish context, I begin with some simple observations.

Central to our inquiry is the reflective nature of consciousness. Not only do we become aware of rocks, trees, and apples, but we also develop an awareness of being aware of these and other objects. We think both about the rock, and about our thoughts about the rock. As we examine the contents of consciousness, we seem driven—as if by an innate, irresistible mechanism—to group those contents in certain ways. (In fact, grouping the contents of consciousness is a fundamental prerequisite for important cognitive processes like association and induction.) In the process, we create something analogous to a mental map of our experience.
Many of the contents of our consciousness (rocks, trees, apples, etc.) fit into a broad category we designate with terms like physical. They are extended throughout a portion of our perceptual space, can be touched, etc. Other contents (e.g. the thought of a rock) resist that classification: they cannot be touched, do not extend throughout a portion of our perceptual space, etc. As a result, it is quite common to regard thoughts, hopes, dreams, etc. as mental objects. Thus the philosophical position known commonly as Dualism is born, not from an esoteric metaphysical inquiry, but as a natural consequence of the experiences and cognitive reflections of ordinary people.

According to Dualism, the contents of consciousness can be divided into two basic groupings: Mind (mental stuff) and Body (physical stuff). Subgroups are both possible and potentially desirable. Plato apparently accepted Empedocles’ division of body into earth, water, air, and fire (Timaeus). To understand the dynamics of the psyche (soul/mind), he wrote of a variable relationship between three component parts: reason, passion, and desire (The Republic and Phaedrus). Though it may seem quaint and old fashioned to some, Plato’s approach continues to strike many people as both plausible and intuitive. Modern counterparts are not difficult to find. Despite other marked differences in theory, for example, the parts of the Platonic psyche correspond remarkably well with Freud’s ego, id, and superego.

While it is possible to move beyond Dualism to other, more complex forms of Pluralism (e.g. a Tripartite system which distinguishes body, mind, and spirit), most philosophical reflection on this topic has focused on the possibility of a reduction to some simpler system. Various scholars have attempted to prove that—despite appearances—all the mental stuff is really physical (Physicalism), that all the physical stuff is really mental (Idealism), or that both the mental and physical stuff are manifestations of a more basic reality which is neither mental nor physical per se (an indefinite suchness or apeiron). If successful, such a reduction would not only achieve a prized metaphysical parsimony, but resolve a series of perplexing

Douglas W. Shrader
questions concerning causation as well.

Experientially, it seems fairly obvious that physical objects cause changes in other physical objects by contact (e.g. hitting the apple with the rock may knock it loose from the tree). It also seems fairly obvious that mental objects affect other mental objects through various cognitive processes (e.g. my thoughts about the apple may give rise to thoughts about a summer day when I sat beneath the tree eating an apple with my sweetheart). What is far less clear is how mental objects could cause changes in physical objects or vice-versa. For most people, telekinesis is simply an intriguing idea. No matter how hard I throw my mental rock at the physical apple, it stays firmly attached to the branch.

In many ways, Mind/Body Dualism is similar to wave/particle duality in contemporary Quantum Mechanics. We can develop a semi-intuitive understanding of light as a substance composed of particles (photons). It is a conceptual model which works reasonably well for most of our experiences/experiments, but not all. Similarly we can develop a semi-intuitive understanding of light as something which propagates as a series of waves (so long as we do not worry excessively about what is waving). Again, it is a conceptual model which works reasonably well for most of our experiences/experiments, but not all. To deal with the full range of experience, we need both models. In practice, most scientists use a chart (devised predominantly via trial and error) that tells them which model to use for which type of experiment. Calling their solution an instance of the Principle of Complementarity salvages some measure of intellectual dignity, but it seems clear that many physicists would prefer a straightforward reduction: wave to particle, particle to wave, or both wave and particle to some third thing (e.g. multidimensional quantum “strings”).

Similarly, many philosophers are uncomfortable with “the Mind/Body Problem” (some are even embarrassed that our discipline has taken so long to resolve such a fundamental issue). Each of the theories listed previously (Dualism, Physicalism, and Idealism) has been

Concerning Consciousness
worked and reworked in a seemingly endless array of variants. Though some variants are clearly better than others, none has proved sufficiently strong to stand alone as a fully acceptable, conceptually and empirically adequate accounting of the contents of consciousness.

The recent surge in consciousness studies is due, in no small measure, to developments in two areas: neurobiology and artificial intelligence (AI). The first provides enticing information in a crucial area about which we have remained ignorant throughout most of human history: the mechanisms of the human brain. The second (AI) developed as we created, for the first time, complex computational machines which could perform tasks commonly associated with cognition. Both areas point in the same direction: consciousness may have a physical basis which is not only identifiable and subject to empirical study, but potentially subject to physical manipulation and replication as well.

Following Roger Penrose, Greg Nixon provides a tight, coherent, reasonably accurate overview of several types of theories designed to account for consciousness in the evolving landscape of the late twentieth century. Of primary concern are Strong AI (functionalism) and Weak AI (generativity). Nixon objects to both theories for two interrelated reasons: (i) they do not (and cannot) provide an adequate account of consciousness, and (ii) the physical reductionism with which they are associated threatens to undermine traditional arts, humanities, social sciences, and even an experiential approach to education. He writes:

If the brain or mind works as either of these approaches demonstrate, then the flaming scientific sword of demonstrated proof is about to be raised before the east gateway of paradise and the fools of cultural intersubjectivity will be required to exit forthwith. (p. 14)

Education driven by a sort of mechanistic determinism toward complexity would merely be a matter of acquiesc-

*Douglas W. Shrader*
ing to the technological imperative. The fool's paradises of the arts, humanities, and social sciences would no longer serve much purpose. It would be time to stop being so humanistic, time to get out the tool kits and build the machines which will supersede us. All the sooner to transfer our memory programs into immortality! (p. 16)

Lest we miss the seriousness of the challenge, Nixon explains:

The study and understanding of the institutions of education, generally seen as a social science, may no longer manage to straddle the chasm between experimental science and experiential humanism. Science and technology's explorations into mind and consciousness are threatening to overrun their territory and throw down assault bridges upon the weak-kneed mediations of social science, overthrowing entirely the fool's paradise of the arts and humanities. (p. 13)

Strong AI assumes a strong connection between thinking and computation. Prominent proponents include Margaret Boden, Patricia Churchland, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Fred Dreske, and Paul Thagard. Ultimately, according to Strong AI, thinking is computation. As Trudy Govier explains in *Socrates' Children*:

There are two fundamental aspects of Strong AI research. One is the over-riding materialist hypothesis that human beings are purely physical and material beings. The other is the belief that computer modelling can give specific guidance as to how brains perform various thinking tasks.³

In "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," first published in 1950 in *Mind*, Alan Turing asked us to imagine a game in which we try to distinguish between a computer and a human on the basis of their responses.⁴ To provide a reasonable test, we cannot see either the human or the computer. Responses are typewritten. Interestingly, Turing did not claim the test would prove that machines can

*Concerning Consciousness*
think; in fact, he argued that that particular question is “too meaningless to deserve discussion” (p. 57). What he did claim was that by the year 2000,

it will be possible to program computers ... to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning (ibid.)

Perhaps more tellingly, he argued,

I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted (ibid.)

Although I do not believe that the desktop with which I am typing these words thinks, Turing was right about this much: the vocabulary of cognition is applied to computers by even thoughtful, reflective people. Even if, as I suspect, that reflects sloppy linguistic usage rather than considered philosophical opinion, the ease with which we extended our usage of these words reflects something about our experience that a truly open-minded researcher cannot afford to ignore. I believe we must be wary of simple mechanical contrivance, and it may even prove useful to distinguish consciousness from simulated consciousness, but Turing seems to have been sensitive to these concerns as well. Ultimately the task may not be all that different from the one we already encounter in education as we attempt to distinguish memorization from true learning, regurgitation from internalization, etc. Consider the following hypothetical exchange, composed by Turing:

INTERROGATOR: In the first line of your sonnet which reads “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day,” would not “a spring day” do as well or better?
WITNESS: It wouldn’t scan.

_Douglas W. Shrader_
INTERROGATOR: How about “a winter’s day”? That would scan all right.
WITNESS: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter’s day.
INTERROGATOR: Would you say Mr Pickwick reminded you of Christmas?
WITNESS: In a way.
INTERROGATOR: Yet Christmas is a winter’s day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick would mind the comparison.
WITNESS: I don’t think you’re serious. By a winter’s day one means a typical winter’s day, rather than a special one like Christmas. (p. 60)

If computers were able to respond, without contrivance, to a wide variety of inquiries such as this, I believe we would have to accept them into the community of conscious entities. But such, it should be noted, is an open question at best. Weak AI does not expect mere computation, no matter how complex, to produce consciousness. For that, proponents insist, one needs appropriate “wet ware” (an organic brain). Consciousness, in short, has a biological basis.

Despite obvious differences, Strong and Weak AI are cut from a similar metaphysical bolt. Both attempt to “reduce” consciousness to purely physical occurrences. As such, Nixon finds them totally unacceptable:

Both Penrose’s interpretation of the Strong AI position ... or the neurologic extreme of B [Weak AI] imply that a great deal of what we have been doing in schools and universities for thousands of years has been an utter waste of time. First of all, the consciousness we experience would have been shown to play no significant role in our behavior, just as predicted by Watson, Skinner, et al. The causal factor in behavior, however, would no longer be primarily the environment but the function or generativity of the brain. Secondly, we could now look to improve ourselves

Concerning Consciousness
by improving such functionalism or generativity. In the case of functionalism, that would mean improving the information processing which causes intelligence—and that may involve the change to a new and improved substrate. In the case of biological generativity, that would mean taking genetic and neurobiological adjustment much more seriously. Ironically, the reductionist realization opens the potential for expansion of whatever to which consciousness is reduced. (pp. 17-18)

If the assumptions of Strong and/or Weak AI are correct, Nixon continues, “Education could now include biological improvements and direct attachments to more efficiently functioning technological substrates” (p. 18). For Nixon, the scenario resembles Frankenstein’s monster. But is the situation as dire as he fears? Let us consider Nixon’s claims:

(1) Both Penrose’s interpretation of the Strong AI position ... or the neurologic extreme of B [Weak AI] imply that a great deal of what we have been doing in schools and universities for thousands of years has been an utter waste of time. (pp. 17-18)

While it may be that much of what we have been doing in schools and universities has been a waste of time, such does not follow as a simple consequence of either Strong or Weak AI. Future developments in AI and neurobiology may provide new tools or mechanisms for manipulating consciousness (even if both Strong and Weak AI are false), but such would not show that what we have done in the past (when such tools were not available) to have been a waste of time. More importantly, decisions concerning the proper use (and restrictions) for such tools and mechanisms will have to be made on a case-by-case basis when and if they become available.

(2) First of all, the consciousness we experience would have been shown to play no significant role in our

Douglas W. Shrader
behaviour, just as predicted by Watson, Skinner, et al. The causal factor in behaviour, however, would no longer be primarily the environment but the function or generativity of the brain. (p. 18)

"Reducing" consciousness to function or generativity of the brain does not eliminate it; neither does it eliminate or displace its causal role. If consciousness plays a significant role in behavior, any satisfactory account of consciousness must reflect that fact. Since, ultimately, it is not behavior per se but consciousness and its contents which concern education (which is what concerns Nixon), the connection is even more obvious. Any account of consciousness which ignores consciousness is bound to be stillborn.

(3) Secondly, we could now look to improve ourselves by improving such functionalism or generativity. (p. 18)

Surely this means we would consciously and deliberately decide to improve ourselves (contra (2)). Naturally, we may make poor choices. What we initially believe to be an improvement may have disastrous consequences. Such is the nature of human choice. As indicated previously, the merits of possible advances will have to be weighed on a case-by-case basis. New findings in AI and neurobiology may create new tools, but with new tools will come new problems. Even if we choose to use those tools to solve existing problems, those solutions will be, in the final analysis, our own. If we are "replaced", it will be by selves of our own creation.

(4) In the case of functionalism, that would mean improving the information processing which causes intelligence—and that may involve the change to a new and improved substrate. (p. 18)

If Strong AI (functionalism) is correct, all cognition is computation. To improve cognition on this model we might (a) transmit data to our brains via methods similar to those currently used with computers, (b) add storage space (memory) and/or processing capa-

Concerning Consciousness
bility to our brains by implanting circuit boards (for example—or by connecting directly to external storage/processing devices), or (c) replace our brains with more efficient data processing hardware. I readily agree that this does, especially in extreme cases, sound like Frankenstein on acid. Certainly there is ample room for mischief. If these possibilities become realities we will have to exercise extreme caution to preserve human dignity, avoid excessive mind control, etc. It will be a tremendous challenge, but could be a tremendous benefit as well. If it becomes possible to implant the entire contents of the Encyclopedia Britannica in your brain, in a single chip subject to annual replacement, we will have to rethink the role of experiential education. But I suspect, contrary to Nixon’s fears, we will still find there to be extremely important differences between implanted “knowledge” and experience. Moreover, with simple data acquisition made easy, I suspect the arts and humanities would come to occupy an even greater portion of the experiential curriculum. As we struggle to maintain our humanity in the midst of a technological explosion, those parts of our curriculum would be truly critical.

(5) In the case of biological generativity, that would mean taking genetic and neurobiological adjustment much more seriously. Ironically, the reductionist realization opens the potential for expansion of whatever to which consciousness is reduced. (p. 18)

Here the potential for application is both immediate and demonstrable. Several studies have established clear connections between adrenalin, learning, and memory. Rats injected with adrenalin learn more rapidly and retain that information longer than counterparts in a control group. Those injected with an adrenalin blocker perform more poorly than their counterparts. The connection, which may have its roots in the fight-or-flight response, helps explain why many people learn better under conditions of moderate stress. It provides a physiological basis for the phenomenon known as “flashbulb memory” (the ability to recall even trivial details of where you were and what you were doing when you first learned some particularly

*Douglas W. Shrader*
traumatic news—e.g. the death of John F. Kennedy). Not surprisingly, the connection even reinforces some of the key elements of good teaching: students learn more when they are alert, cognitively engaged, and excited about the material.

In a society in which easier is better, it does not take too much imagination to envision a future in which students pop pills before class, before studying for a “big exam”, etc. Even if, contrary to our experience in other areas, there prove to be no physical side effects, the development and use of these “cognitive bioenhancers” could create significant social, moral, and personal difficulties. If, as seems likely, the better bioenhancers are fairly expensive, those with wealth would gain even more advantage than at present. At a personal level, imagine what it would do to your concept of self-worth if your ability to learn at a socially acceptable rate depended on chemical stimulants. Imagine what it would do to our collective self-image if that dependency were true for all. Imagine too what it would be like to know five or six times as much as you do now—to learn faster and retain more with less effort. Would it be worth it? Would the benefit outweigh the cost?

As we probe deeper into the physical processes of our own being—especially as we develop the ability to intervene in, manipulate, and even engineer those processes—we acquire new, sometimes frightening opportunities, obligations, and dilemmas. By giving a child injections of biosynthetic human growth hormone (hGH), we can now “cure” shortness, provide a somewhat-better-than-average basketball player a shot at NBA stardom, etc.6 As many athletes have demonstrated, steroids can provide an advantage of size, speed, and/or strength. For the first time in history, human cloning seems technologically feasible. If findings published in the January 1998 issue of Science prove reliable, we may soon be able to arrest aging at the cellular level (thereby increasing a “normal” human life span to 150 years or more).7

The history of human consciousness is not a history of passive

Concerning Consciousness
self-reflection. We have used our consciousness to shape, define, and redefine not only our environment, but ourselves as well. We have created cultures which, in turn, helped create us. We have used the powerful tool we call “education” to transmit values, information, and a carefully crafted sense of self (both individual and collective) to future generations for thousands of years. We are, in a very real sense, products of our own creation.

Greg Nixon is right: contemporary research in artificial intelligence and neuroscience has potentially far-reaching consequences for education. He is also right to warn us about the dangers of scientism. But I see no reason to believe that the research itself undermines the arts, humanities, social sciences, or experiential education. Solving the riddles and predicaments which are sure to result from this new research/technology will require all the tools at our disposal. It is traditional studies like Philosophy which will provide not only anchors to our past, but clues to our future.

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ENDNOTES

5. The question is an empirical one. If it turns out that there is no discernible difference between implanted “knowledge” and experience, the concern evaporates. All of the skills, insights, cognitive dispositions, layers of understanding, etc. which are currently constructed through experience would still be available (presumably in a more convenient, and possibly more democratic, package).

Douglas W. Shrader

EXPANDING ON BASSEY’S “PREPARING TEACHERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY”

Joyce Woelfle Lehmann

In his article “Preparing Teachers for the 21st Century: Connecting Preservice Teachers to Community,” Magnus Bassey states that teachers tend to lack relevant information for instructing diverse populations. He points out that most students believe it is important to see reflections of themselves in the learning environment, and adds Henry Giroux’s concern that an instructional agenda should enable students to draw on their own histories, voices, and cultural resources in developing new skills and knowledge.

Although Bassey focuses on programs for preparing pre-service teachers in cultural diversity, it may be equally important to consider whether there is a receptive climate in the schools where they arrive for student-teaching or employment and how this climate is being developed. For example, in rural Wayne County, New York, two locally-initiated projects attempt to bridge cultural gaps between teachers and students as well as among students themselves. A Multicultural Club for 4th to 6th graders begun in 1987, and a Multicultural Education Resources Notebook for teachers and administrators published in 1988, both focus on expanding the dominant white perspective in the public schools to encompass and value minority cultures—particularly the heritage of migrant farm workers and resettled migrants who support the agricultural economy of the region.

In the past, these migratory workers usually have been African-Americans from southern states, but in the last decade increasing numbers are Puerto Ricans, Haitians, and Mexicans. The 1990 census indicates that about 5 1/2% of Wayne County’s population is minority; or specifically of the 89,000 total population, approximately 84,000 are White; 2,700 African-American; 1,500 Hispanic; and the
remainder undetermined. Also, some 3,000 to 5,000 seasonal workers temporarily reside in the county during the June to November harvesting and food processing season, and add between 100 to 200 students to the schools at the beginning of the semester as well as some in summer school.

The Multicultural Club was formed in the north central part of the county at the Sodus Elementary School where the year-round student population is about 15% minority. The club's original format included field trips, sampling ethnic food as a sharing experience, and outside speakers who were usually scheduled every two or three weeks. Also for a while, the club froze special desserts to present in a multicultural luncheon for family members and staff at the end of the school term.

By the second year, the club developed a different format. The speaker component continued, but two committees had evolved, each meeting weekly on different days after school for a separate activity. The interview committee works both in the school and the community to generate interviews of persons from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds, particularly older people who began life in a foreign country or another region of this country. The students then transcribe and store this information on a computer as an available resource for multicultural events. The other committee collects old family recipes, especially those brought from another country or from another area of the United States, adding to it a short paragraph explaining how the food connects to the family's culture. These recipes and personal information are compiled into an annually-updated cookbook given free to members and sold to others. Also the group prepares some of the recipes for sale during lunch period, often assisted by members of the interview committee. At the end of the school year, both committees meet together to select an ethnic restaurant for a club outing which they pay for with the money generated for that year.

This model was developed by Dr. Jim Wood, a 4th grade teacher

*Joyce Woelfle Lehmann*
and curricular services coordinator, who said:

We try to do things that bring an appreciation for the wide array of cultural backgrounds and try to get kids working together. I know it doesn’t always work out exactly, nothing really is perfect, but it’s been pretty helpful. One of the things I think that’s interesting about it is that when we first started we probably had a high percentage of African-American students and we still have a good percentage of them but it’s really attracted the White students as well; and we find out some surprising things about the background of different kids. I think that for self-identity it’s really important for all of them to understand that when they start to look into their own backgrounds they find out a lot of diversity also.

Dr. Wood thinks that this club along with a number of other things that have been initiated over the same period really make kids aware, especially of the dominant minority culture in that particular town—the African-American culture. He explains:

It’s given kids a chance to appreciate—more than just look at this as a foreign body and say “I don’t understand it, it’s strange, and it’s scary, and it’s intimidating” but to see it in a deeper context; and that’s why the Multicultural Club is tremendously valuable.

The idea for this club emerged from a discussion between an outreach worker, Rosetta Henderson Pappin, and the director of the Wayne-Finger Lakes Tutorial Program, Basil Dobush, who recalled:

I just got the idea that we want to involve the kids more in multicultural, ethnic activities; also one of the main indicators for dropouts is that kids don’t have any after school activities that they go to. So I put all that together and said “Well, why don’t we try an after school activity around that theme?”

Reply to Bassey’s Preparing Teachers for the 21st Century
He added:

Sodus was chosen because Sodus was pursuing the same concepts. They had some racial problems that they were trying to deal with so it was a ripe ground to start it. I knew Jim, I knew that the administration would be very supportive of the concept. We had worked together on bringing in speakers which we had jointly funded. We had done several activities, college visits, jointly so we were working together hand-in-glove in Sodus. It was the most likely spot to try.

Dr. Woods added this comment:

I think when you look at a group of two white kids and two black kids, and they are listening to somebody whose experience was Canadian, and the Canadians are not very different—but they all had pretty much the same reaction to something that was kind of foreign to them; ...I think that’s important for them to see together, and then have things pointed out as to how that’s similar to anybody’s experience that’s different—it’s going to be uncomfortable—they’re not sure about it, it sounds weird and strange.... That’s what we want—those things to come out, so the teacher has teachable moments.

Probably a broader segment of the community was affected by the second project, the Multicultural Education Resources Notebook, that was published by a local community organization, Wayne Action for Racial Equality or WARE. This two-inch thick looseleaf volume includes ideas for curriculum development, names and addresses of local speakers for inservice training plus other staff development resources, models of student projects, lists of local people available for career days, resources for minority students, assistance for minority staff recruitment, and extensive bibliographies of children’s literature. There are additional units for parent involve-

Joyce Woelfle Lehmann
ment and college/financial resources plus a back pocket containing an 80-page booklet, "The Martin Luther King, Jr. Resource Guide." In addition to preparing this resource book for sale to area educators, WARE participates in regular joint meetings with the NAACP and Wayne County superintendents of schools for the purpose of sharing views, ideas and strategies for digging beneath the status quo to undo the harmful effects of racism in the schools and to accomplish the extraordinary efforts that are needed to produce genuine outcomes.

Projects such as these, of course, are not part of the pre-service training recommended by Bassey; however, they too create a positive environment for beginning teachers who want to develop appropriate behaviors for working with diverse populations. Although national focus often is on inner city situations, there are also these persistent ongoing efforts to dislodge institutional racism and promote mutual understanding and racial harmony in rural areas. In the words of the WARE group:

Our schools need to be models in the county for how to undo the dangerous and harmful effects of institutional and individual racism. We can no longer afford to mistreat others who share our community—we all lose in the end.

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ENDNOTES


2. This information is based on personal research and was presented at the New York State Foundations of Education Association meeting held April 22-23, 1994, at Ithaca College, New York.
AD-LIBBING ON THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION

Achim D. Köddermann

"Who should, under which circumstances, intervene in Iraq?" Before settling the question I will give a brief account of my experience and reflections while introducing the moral issue of intervention to my Spring 1998 Ethics class. I hope to expand, briefly, on the essay by the editor of Educational Change which appeared in Spring 1997. While presenting the formal distinction, between de jure ad bellum versus de jure in bello, I find the students indifferent to the issue. Drawing the attention of the class to the current political crisis in Iraq, which brings the U.S. to the verge of an armed conflict, does not help much either. In part, this is due to the inadequate background of the students.

So I attempt to interest my students with something analogous to my experience at the University of Denver during the Gulf War. Members of the faculty from all sections of the University were "pooled" to form a forum which served as an informative and discursive market place of ideas. This provided a ground that led to informed dissent or consent within the framework of the choices and interests of the participating students. However, in my class apathy carried the day.

No interest was sparked until a striking footnote was introduced in the form of the following consideration: "Assume that one-third of you will be drafted." Not surprisingly, only a non-traditional student in this class, a "biker" and Vietnam veteran, could make the class understand what war potentially means, and then concern arose. This concern was different from the view on the Panama affair's taken in Anthony Roda's "Preface" to the Spring 1997 volume of Educational Change. Questions of "right" or "wrong," and for whom, seemed to play no role in the discussion; the good of the polis, be it in Aristotelian or Platonic terms, was of no concern. Not out of civic concern, but inspired by Realpolitik or non-enlightened "angst," the
class, i.e. the "public" responded, collectively yet in pursuit of very
private preoccupations. Nothing was felt of the civic engagement
that I read in John Marciano’s² account of past experiences in higher
education. In reading Book I of Plato’s Republic with current stu-
dents, I find it difficult to start any discussion. Unanimously the class
agrees: “obviously” might is right; who could think otherwise? An
almost blind acceptance of Machiavelli’s most immoral version of a
Prince passes unchallenged. The conclusion, with side remarks ad-
dressing the moral conduct of the president, is that it is bad to get
cought. What counts is the outcome, without differentiation of mo-
tives or justifications.

What, then, is the “mission” of an educator in the debate con-
cerning a “just war” against Iraq? By clarifying positions, we can
show incompatibilities and alternatives. We can distinguish seven
stages of justification for intervention, each on morally “higher”
ground, while integrating the lower options.³ What is at stake is the
justification of intervention, which since the Peloponnesian War, can
and has been justified simply because one can wage war.

The might is right position is still as anti-social as it was in
ancient Greece. Since Aristotle we should know that we are political
beings. Macchiavelli himself was able to see this and warned of ex-
cessive use of power. Why shouldn’t our students see this?

▼ The next justification, self-preservation, has slightly more
moral undertones, since it claims that states, like people, have
a right to self-defense.

▼ With the third justification, consent of the subject state to
such an intervention, which was given in the Bosnian con-
flict, we have reached a higher stage: implied is the concept
of equality that allows free choice. How the consent was
obtained, however, has little to do with independence. And
didn’t South Vietnam call for help from the U.S.?

▼ At the next level intervention is justified because, amidst

Achim D. Köddermann
chaos and genocide, choice would be an illusion and intervention establishes the preconditions for choice.

Wouldn’t it be nice if “our” intervention were approved by the world community? Sure, “we” do not depend on it, but who doesn’t like approval? Shuttle diplomacy is a quest for such approval. “Realpolitik” is slowly replaced by a moral claim to the next higher, global stage.

Implicitly, all nations appear to agree on something which does not have its justification merely in its use (consequences): some actions are just not right, and should be globally banned, like the use of land mines (which the U.S. did not banish because of their usefulness!), or weapons of mass destruction. The “Preface” to the Spring 1997 volume of Educational Change spoke about the right of peoples to self determination, thus suggesting the same justification. However, this would require the principle of group rights; a provision not foreseen in the present framework with the emphasis on individual/sovereign distinction and the individual’s human or legal rights bestowed by international law.

The reasons why nobody seems too happy with the implied morally “highest ranking” seventh option, global world government, stem from the above dichotomy: even a benign dictatorship seems to fall under the circumstances described in step 1, might is right; why then all the moral pretense?

First, we would have to give up the widely used, never observed notion of absolute state sovereignty. This political fiction is especially absurd in the case of Panama since its sovereignty served U.S. interests. However, not only Panama, but states in general were never truly “independent” or autonomous. Today, with global consequences of “sovereign” actions ranging from environmental pollution to potential chemical warfare, the fiction underlying the otherwise attractive stage three on the scale of intervention, legitimized by a cry for help, becomes absurd. Who would have the right to cry for help, the dictator or those legitimately carrying out genocide or aggression

Adlibbing on the Justifications of Intervention
themselves? Victims seem to have no rights to intervention under the current regime of world politics.

Second, in response to Roda I hope not to have to return to the fiction of stage 7, a benign, utopian world dictatorship; nobody would aspire to such a world government or enforced new world order. Such a world order would rely on enforcement by a largely unfair, self-interested Security Council of the U.N. or the U.S. government, both equally driven by self interest. The judges commanding intervention should be impartial. Instead of the last stage as “global fiction” the new, emerging force within the U.N., NGO’s (non-governmental organizations) should carry future initiatives. Such interventions should never be unilateral, but should be carried by an expressed, not implied, international moral consensus, based on a rational decision. The question who carries it out, and how, becomes then a question of political formality. However, before we can discuss the possibility of group rights and justification of intervention by shared civic values, we might have to practice them at home. Without a sense of civil responsibility, driven by empathy with the suffering of fellow human beings, I cannot expect my students to develop civil courage, and I cannot hope to solve the problems of the world with the help of U.S. morality. Am I asking for predetermined harmony, or for ethics in education?

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ENDNOTES


Achim D. Köddermann
THE "CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE," KANT'S RULE OF THE ROAD TO MORSE'S "ENDS OF EDUCATION"

Anthony Roda

In her response to my comments on her "Ends of Education," Dr. Jane Fowler Morse has sorted out my three major concerns with respect to her use of Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative." Since it is impossible for me to address all the three concerns within this issue of Educational Change, I would like to confine myself, briefly, to the first of these and say something with respect to the others in future issues of this publication. I also invite reactions and comments from those of our readers and colleagues who have had the occasion to follow our exchanges or may wish to do so. The issues go to the heart of educational theory and practice.

Without considering the derivational or epistemological status of Kant's categorical imperative or the transcendental ideal, we can ask questions with respect to how such an ideal works in education. According to Dr. Morse "it [transcendental ideal] functions as a rule to guide action, rather than prescribing particular responses." Turning to our own pedagogical interests she states that "a transcendental ideal gives us a rule to check proposed or actual educational practices. Does it foster autonomy? Does it help children to reach their potential? Does it recognize a world community of all rational beings?" We should note that Morse's language clearly demonstrates a penchant for the phenomenal world or what John Dewey refers to as the "empirical details" or "intercourse with experience."

In Dewey's account Kant's categorical imperative is regarded as a principle or ideal which works in much the same way as Morse says the "transcendental ideal" does in education. However, Dewey insists that moral principles and ideals cannot be separated from experience. For Dewey, when principles or ideals are isolated or separated from the give or take of everyday life they are set on a course to
self-destruction. Excluding from principles all connections with empirical details also excludes all reference to consequences. However, Dr. Morse’s questions, “Does it foster autonomy? Does it help children reach their potential?” are questions of consequences and empirical details.

Raising such concerns takes us beyond Kant’s deontological morality to one which clearly intersects with the concerns of the theologian. Not to recognize this gives rise to a fragmented moral universe which drives human intentions into an unknowable secretive world and opens the door for all kinds of hypocracies and abuses. The adage that “the road to hell is paved with good intentions” expresses what common sense has recognized as a ready made gambit for both private and public deception. I suspect that Kant’s idea of a “good will” is a recognition of such deceptions as well as a possible corrective; but, eliminating all connection to empirical and experiential details robs us of any way of determining the answers to Dr. Morse’s questions and concerns.

Morse’s article “Fostering Autonomy” suggests a metaphor which draws heavily on context and history. To place our principles “in that wild, weird clime out of space and out of time” keeps them pure, clear and distinct at the cost of de-contextualizing and de-historicizing them. These considerations should not dismiss Kant’s categorical imperative but should enrich the analysis of lived educational and lived moral experience while insisting on the need for impartiality and sincerity. But impartiality entails taking account of the consequences as well as any other dimension of human action. In “The Nature of Principles” Dewey found that Kant’s reasoning “turns out to be a method of recommending a broad impartial view of consequences,” and to ignore such a crucial dimension of human action is tantamount to taking sides and failing in impartiality.

Morse’s account and example of preparing students for the Regents Competency Test shows that the consequences are critical considerations and determine the way the educator adjusts the context in

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order to bring about the desired end, e.g. "improving their writing skills." But the more difficult and troubling problem is deciding the appropriate end or ends. If we are able to decide on the ends, we might want to explore how these ends are related to Kant’s transcendental ideal or the categorical imperative. Further, we might try to explore the status of these ends and the question of human freedom. I urge all our colleagues to join in this dialogue and help explore these issues through their own reflections and experiences.

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ENDNOTES

4. Briefly stated my concerns are: (1) how does the transcendental ideal (categorical imperative) function in education? (2) what is human freedom and what is the status that Kant and Morse accord to it? and (3) what is the relation between the individual’s rights and the group’s or society’s rights within the conceptual framework that results from the analysis of (1) and (2)?
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 245
11. This is merely to point out that a deontological principle of justice needs to be complemented with a teleological principle. To recognize this is the same as saying that consequences must be an integral part of an

The “Categorical Imperative”