Educational Change

A Journal of Role Analysis and Institutional Change

In this issue:

The Implications of One Significant Component of Education ‘2000’: Parental Choice of Schooling
Dewey’s Pedagogic Creed
Foundations of Education in New York State: A Critical Analysis
Moral Realism and the Search for Objectivity
The Fourth Great Awakening: An Examination of the Christian School Movement of the Last Two Decades
Why the Medieval Idea of a Community-Oriented University is Still Modern

Spring 1995
IN MEMORY OF DOMINICK RODA
1968-1993

The Sounds of an Eternal Springtime

Girl Before a Mirror

The basic themes of Picasso’s Girl Before a Mirror are dark and serious, but the visual style is colorful and attractive. This seeming contradiction complements the subject of the work which, as a whole, deals with the paradoxical relationship between outward appearances and inward intentions.

The painting is vibrant. Colors, at or near full intensity, are placed beside their complements, thereby creating a visual “push and pull” of shape and form. Forms are used to draw the viewer’s eye across the canvas. Circular arcs, repeated throughout the work, are counterbalanced by the cross-hatched, diagonal lines of the wallpaper. Picasso goes to great lengths to create a visual style full of vitality and grace.

However, the implications of the work are not as vibrant as its visual presentation. Picasso depicts a girl on the verge of discovering her own sexuality. The figure on the left is the actual girl. The head is a combination of a profile and a frontal view, which unite to produce a 3/4 view. Picasso uses this combination to capture the transition between girl and woman. The profile is painted in cool shades of pink, representing the innocence and naivety of the young girl. The frontal view is an impasto of yellow and red, symbolic of the girl’s budding sexuality.

On the right of the canvas, Picasso paints the girl’s mirror image. It is a device which allows us to peer into her soul as she contemplates the change in her sexuality. Here we see a figure much less assured than the one on the left. The head is shrouded in dark color, the chin is sunken, and the face is painted in bright shades of scarlet, as if the girl is shrinking in shame over the discovery of the sexual being within herself.

Picasso uses a vibrant visual style, in a work containing such serious subject matter, to mirror the content of the work. The painting’s bright, graceful style masks the underlying meaning of the work, much like the girl’s outward appearance of youth and innocence masks the inward feelings associated with a newfound sexuality.

Dominick Roda
6-23-92
A Note of Thanks

Of the many who have helped with this project, Professor Norman Bauer (SUNY Geneseo), Professor Douglas Shrader (SUNY Oneonta) and Professor Michael Green (SUNY Oneonta) have played a prominent role. Professor Harry White (SUNY New Paltz), the previous editor of Educational Change, and Professor Parviz Morewedge (SUNY Binghamton, SUNY Oneonta and Cornell University) provided much encouragement and sound advice. I also thank the N.Y.S.F.E.A. for making this undertaking possible and, of course, all the members of the Philosophy Department at SUNY Oneonta for the varied ways in which they have provided encouragement and moral support through a most difficult period. Special thanks are due to Marge Holling, the department’s dedicated secretary, without whose energy and enthusiasm this project would never had been completed.
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Preface

First of all, I apologize to all the members of the N.Y.S.F.E.A. for the unusual delay in preparing this edition of *Educational Change*. Unfortunately, a series of events created a state of affairs which brought the project to a virtual standstill. A protracted illness, initially diagnosed as pneumonia (this turned out to be merely a symptom of a much more serious pulmonary disorder), but which eventually resulted in a tracheostomy (January 1993) debilitated me for part of 1991 and most of 1992, 1993 and 1994. Much more devastating, however, was the tragic death of my oldest son, Dominick, in August 1993. This loss completely undermined my bearing and left me spiritually floundering. As I try to bring this project to completion, my hope is that it may help provide an orientation that will mitigate the negativity of such an event and somehow reaffirm the positive contributions which flow from the singularity of his character and existence.

The papers assembled in this volume have a continuous thread that ties them together. Although, each is the result of the analysis of social phenomena arising from unique historical events, all, nonetheless, urgently point towards a moral rejuvenation of our social institutions especially education. The authors recognize a fundamental confusion and disorder which has infected the latter third of the 20th century and which has reached proportions threatening the entire social order.

In part, this confusion arises out of the facile behavioristic and positivistic pretensions to objectivity. The aim to objectivity is one among the many human aims, which, however significant, runs the risk of dictating to every other concern of our human existence. Furthermore, the construction of the objective order, partly if not wholly fictitious, poses special problems for humans as acting subjects. As such there is a continuous attempt to close the gap between one’s personal (lived) subjective immediacy and the impersonal (sterile) objective constructions. This gap widens or narrows depending upon the acceptance or the rejection of those social forms which express the constructed objective order, i.e. the major institutions of society (politics, religion, education, military,
industry and business, entertainment including sports and, of course, the media in all of its forms, and most importantly family life, and where do we put health care and medicine?). All of these institutions face a crisis not unlike that of 14th century Europe. This crisis has called into question the legitimacy (with good reasons) of these institutions. In part this crisis finds its manifestations in dysfunctional behavior, i.e., human actions contrary to authentic individual or collective ends or in a more Deweyian vein actions which frustrate organic satisfactions and in which neither the self nor the group finds genuine fulfillment. Varied forms of drug abuse, crime ranging from violence to white collar crime such as inside trading, stock manipulations, abuse of political offices, such as the recent congressional post office scandal (even the powerful Mr. Rostenkowski has been touched and tarnished as well as a number of others of our trusted representatives), industrial abuses of the environment and the public and other forms of unscrupulous and self-serving business and medical delivery practices are some of the symptoms of the present social crisis. On the other hand, even what passes as accepted legal behavior is questionable from a moral perspective, e.g.’s the amassing of outrageous individual pension funds (ranging in the millions) by individual members of Congress representing the people at the people’s expense. Without belaboring the abuses and excesses of individuals and groups entrusted with the public weal at the public’s expense we may add that this form of dysfunctional behavior (for lack of a better term or avoiding a more inflammatory one) not only aggravates the general malaise but may be the cataclysm of the present social crisis. In short, these social ruptures by the entrusted representatives of our major institutions betray our trust and undermine the legitimacy of their role and authority. The result is a social, legal as well as a moral vacuum which leaves the youth floundering for guidance or direction. The evolutionary theorists can dismiss this behavior as a form of survival of the fittest (not a rosy picture of humanity) and those who adhere to emotivism (some positivists and empiricists) can take refuge in their standard claim that “violence is unhealthy” has the same knowledge claim as “I don’t like prickly pears.”

The above comments are intended as a way of providing a per-
spective for the work of our contributors in this issue of *Educational Change*. These observers of the contemporary educational and social climate are dealing with crucial issues which escape the simple objective scientific models put forth by positivists and other naive realists.

In his study, “The Implication of One Significant Component of ‘Education 2000’: Parental Choice of Schooling,” Norman Bauer of SUNY Geneseo, examines the consequences of parental choice incorporated by the Bush Administration’s *Education 2000* strategy. Bauer’s analysis exhibits the contradictions in the decision making process inherent in the model outlined in the document. He argues that the inadequacy of the model rests largely on the absence of a moral sensitivity which characterizes the social milieu of the decision makers (business leaders, the representatives of the people, religious leaders and other leaders of the major social institutions). He, further, argues that in large measure these individuals are guided by self-serving factional interests rather than inter-factional considerations.

In his “Dewey’s Pedagogic Creed: Reflections on Education, Process and the Cultivation of Social Consciousness,” Douglas Shrader of SUNY Oneonta, attempts to show how one may apply Dewey’s “My Pedagogic Creed” to introduce the moral and religious dimension in education without turning the classroom into an instrument for a church or some other special interest group.

Edwin Cook of Russell Sage College, pursues the ethical dimension by providing some concrete and disturbing headlines which cry out for societal responses. He provokes us to think of ways by which the foundational studies may play a guiding role in shaping the concerns of the classroom. In addition, Professor Cook underscores the distance between goals established by an anti-historical “management system” alien, divorced and independent of the educational process and those faced by the teachers in the actual classroom with all of the historical diversity and contingency of everyday life.

The ethical problem which results from the contemporary perception of the moral landscape as one of hopeless contradictory systems is
treated by a recent doctorate from Cornell University, Lance Ternasky in “Moral Realism and the Search for Objectivity.” His analysis which is grounded in the work of Richard Boyd and Peter Railton attempts to develop a moral realism which avoids absolutist tendencies and steers clear of a hopeless moral skepticism.

The Christian school movement of the last two decades is examined by Claudia Guthrie of Wayland High School in “The Fourth Great Awakening.” In her analysis, she argues that to a large extent the Christian school movement, understood as Fundamentalists or Evangelical Protestants in contrast to the other Christian churches, is a response to the intrusion of relativism and secularism in the public schools. The outlawing of public prayer and compulsory Bible reading, the increasing influence of Darwinism in the early sixties, the widespread phenomena of drug abuse and the behavioral and social disorder are seen as threatening the groups’ “identity” as well as the stable traditional values and standards. These considerations bring one back to the fundamental foundational moral underpinnings of the social and educational institutions. Claudia Guthrie, thus, provides an analysis that, again, underscores the pervasive role values play in the social order, and points to that sensitive domain in which religious and secular values intersect.

The final paper of this collection, “Why the Medieval Idea of a Community-Oriented University is Still Modern,” is an attempt by Achim Köddermann of SUNY Oneonta, to trace the reasons for the confusion and disorder within the modern university. Köddermann finds that disagreements in the objectives, the basic texts and the fundamental assumptions of the educational process are some of the reasons for the present confusion. In part this results from the phenomena of diversity and the rapid accumulation of knowledge which lack any clear consensus with respect to moral and cognitive organizing principles. He suggests that an examination of the origins of the medieval universities will bring one back to the democratic spirit essential for free inquiry and help one avoid the reactionary aristocratic elitism in which the modern university has at times sought refuge.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ONE SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT OF ‘EDUCATION 2000’*: PARENTAL CHOICE OF SCHOOLING

Norman J. Bauer

“Seek to preserve everything so far as possible, that time has consecrated; adapt the operation of traditional forces to suit present conditions; abhor confusion, and shun any policy which may produce it; be satisfied with less than the ideal; be generous rather than exacting; remember there is a higher justice than that framed in the law, and that all laws derive their efficacy from the spirit of obedience in the people.”

Burke

“One way to achieve a major improvement, to bring learning back into the classroom, especially for the currently most disadvantaged, is to give all parents greater control over their children’s schooling, similar to that which those of us in the upper-income classes now have.”

Friedman

“The fountain heads of the attack (on schools) everywhere are large taxpayers and the institutions which represent the wealthier and privileged elements in the community. Those who make the least use of the public schools, who are the least dependent upon them because of superior economic status, who give their children at home by means of private teachers the same things which they denounce as extravagances when supplied in less measure to the children of the masses in schools, these are the ones most active in the attack upon the schools.”

Dewey

Introduction: Parental opportunity to choose schools within their home districts has been rapidly growing in recent years. The idea of ‘parental choice’, based upon a voucher system, was originally developed by Milton Friedman in 1955 in his now classic work *Capitalism and Freedom*. Subsequently, during the ‘70’s, a number of communities around the nation attempted without a large measure of success to install voucher plans in their schools. Later, early in the 80’s, a constitutionally successful effort to install a parental choice model for both public and nonpublic schools was achieved by the state of Minnesota.
Parental choice was strongly emphasized and supported by the Reagan Administration during the congressional debate leading to the adoption of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA)\(^8\) on July 31, 1981. It was reemphasized repeatedly by Secretary of Education William Bennett during his tenure as the leader of the U.S. Department of Education during the immediate post-RISK years. More recently parental choice has been advanced as the policy which would have the most positive impact on school improvement by John Chubb and Terry Moe in their widely acclaimed 1990 book, *Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools*.\(^9\) A bit earlier, Myron Lieberman, in his 1989 book entitled *Privatization and Educational Choice*,\(^10\) had supported the policy of parental choice as the means to improve school results. Hence, it was not unexpected to find that parental choice as a means for improving educational outcomes had been accepted by the conservative Bush Administration as a key organizational attribute of its educational strategy, publicly revealed on April 18, 1991, under the rubric of *Education 2000*.

Today, some thirty-seven years after its original conceptualization, again during a most conservative period in our nation’s history, the concept of parental choice which the Bush Administration has incorporated in its *Education 2000* strategy is being heralded as a panacea for achieving better school results on the grounds that it will encourage the sort of market-based competition between schools, public and private, which its advocates argue will bring about the improvement of all schools.

**Purpose.** The purpose of this paper is to examine this panacea by:

a. Briefly identifying selected attributes of both the conservative and the liberal political philosophies.

b. Identifying the significant attributes of *Education 2000: An Education Strategy*.

c. Constructing and employing a graphic model which will empower one with the ability, clearly and accurately, to perceive the political philosophy with which *Education 2000* is closely allied, and to examine the likely civic, economic, and religious
consequences for our democratic society of the parental choice component of this proposal for improving schooling in our nation.

Assumptions. Three basic assumptions have guided my thinking as this paper has been prepared:

a. The institution of schooling always is intimately related to the political, social and economic philosophy of the society which has created the need for it; it is not, nor could it ever be, a neutral institution.

b. A corollary to ‘a’, different political philosophies always will generate quite different theories of schooling; hence, dissensus and not consensus, almost always will be reflected by the views of the persons comprising a society relative to the structural design, curricular content, outcome expectations and financial support with which they support schooling.

c. Public schools have been, and continue to be, since their inception during that great humanitarian period which emerged during the Jacksonian administration, the most significant public institution our country has ever established.

Conservative and Liberal Political Philosophies

The purpose of this section of the paper is not to develop an exhaustive treatment of the characteristics of either liberal or conservative political philosophy; merely to identify a handful of salient characteristics which tend to represent some of the more prominent views of each of these ways of shaping democratic political order. To achieve my first purpose I am going to construct and employ five categories of societal activity, capitalism, democracy, nationalism, religion and science, and very briefly identify the normative vision of a good society which emanates from both the conservative and liberal political positions.

Capitalism. From the standpoint of the conservative, capitalism, based upon free enterprise, represents one of the most important of
our societal values. While there is, on occasion, a measure of concern about *laissez faire* unrestraint, most often there is a deep belief in the idea that the free play of market forces will eventually generate the most positive outcomes for the society as a whole. Hence there is much opposition to government regulation, to ‘statism’, to any sorts of social blueprints, to any significant egalitarian thrust; rather, economic stress is placed upon a ‘survival of the fittest’ notion not dissimilar to the thinking which Andrew Carnegie expressed a bit over a hundred years ago:

> “While the law may be sometimes hard for the individual, it is best for the race, because it insures the survival of the fittest in every department. We accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment, the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few, and the law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential to the future progress of the race.”

While the liberal vision of capitalism tends to accept it as a basic economic pattern of order, it does so with serious reservations. For it has witnessed the struggle for economic reform which has taken place in our society ever since the 1820’s and it is sensitive to the problems people confront in a society if the principle of *laissez faire* economic theory is permitted to run rampant. Rippa stresses this matter very cogently when he points out that:

> “During the Enlightenment and the great reform era, acquisitive gain was viewed not so much as an exclusive goal reserved for only a few but rather as a means toward improving society in general. Now the monopolistic power of a few great titans of American industry and capital was based increasingly on materialistic values as ends in themselves. Such a rationale differed sharply from older patterns of thought and symbolized in a dramatic fashion the great transformation occurring in American society.”
Democracy. When the conservative speaks about democracy he most often thinks about it as a moral term in which the intrinsic worth and equality of persons will be realized when they meet their ‘maker.’ Here on earth the conservative believes there is a natural order of things, a natural aristocracy of human beings, a hierarchy of natural talents, and that what we must do is avoid any sort of social levelling. All persons, in other words, are not perceived to be equal, and we ought to avoid any doctrinaire proposals which would attempt to build a society which would be directed toward a vision of such a utopian notion.

Democracy from the liberal position is a far more humanitarian concept, recognizing the dignity and rights of all persons, stressing the civil liberties of all citizens, among which are included their rights to excellent public schooling at public expense, open in every respect to public inquiry and accountability, their suffrage rights, their rights to live and work in a variety of integrated, humanitarian environments, their rights to healthy living and their right to earn a substantial measure of economic well being.

Nationalism. Because of the clear societal recognition of the significant interdependency of nations throughout the world there must be, of necessity, a measure of divisiveness and uncertainty among conservatives about the position they should adopt relative to nationalism. The Gulf War in 1991, conducted to guarantee the preservation of our supply of oil, and the current unwillingness of the Bush Administration to commit itself to attending an international conference pertaining to the likely serious consequences for our earth which are connected with the depletion of the ozone layer represent two glaring examples of the problem the conservatives confront when it comes to this significant category of political structure. Nonetheless, in so far as it is feasible, the conservative tends to make every effort to retain a xenophobic position regarding the importance of the United States in relation to countries around the world.

Liberal thought related to nationalism places significant stress on the plurality of interdependent nation-states which make up the world,
on the need to be a strong advocate of the United Nations, on the need to avoid xenophobic thinking, including the need to defend public schools when they are attacked by excessively nationalistic groups and on the importance of building improved and lasting international relationships, relationships which stress the good for people wherever they live, particularly those who are seeking to escape from the domination of political oppression.

**Religion.** An anthropomorphic conception of God, a universe designed for humans and governed by natural law, a strong belief in God, a conviction that school ought to support and teach religious values, a persistent opposition to a strict constructionist interpretation of the “wall” of separation between church and state along with a strong belief in the importance of providing financial support to help offset the costs of parental choice of schools with a religious persuasion for their children, and a deep antipathy for the principles associated with secular humanism, are among some of the more salient principles which constitute the thinking of conservatives regarding religion and religious practices.

On the other hand, the religious views of liberals are profoundly concerned about the condition of humans in this world, are deeply committed to the power of human intelligence to create and solve problems which will have a direct impact on the improvement of human welfare, are strong advocates of first amendment rights, particularly those related to the separation of church and state, are much more tolerant of the range of beliefs about religion with which the consciences of different human beings and human groups often are comfortable, and possess a deep faith in the power of public schools to solidify and perpetuate democratic principles, thereby improving the lot of humans everywhere in our society.

**Science.** Based on empiricism, carefully designed experiments and controlled observations, science offers the most severe challenge to the conservative. Comfortable with the natural law theory which emanated from the early development of science during the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, conservatives have been increasingly disconcerted by the post-Darwinian, post-structuralist, implications
of man’s new dialogue with nature which projects science into today’s revolutionary world of instability, disequilibrium and turbulence with a creative, mind-energizing force which has brought forth a profound reconceptualization of the physical sciences, synthesizing being and becoming into a unitary rather than the traditional dualist, vision of the universe.

From the very outset of scientific thought, the liberal has been most hospitable to the scientific enterprise. Particularly since the advent of post-structuralism, liberals have recognized the power of science and scientific knowledge to improve the condition of humankind throughout the world. Liberals are most often committed to the power of public schools to enable every student to acquire the requisite conceptual understanding and the performative competency to know and to apply the method of science to the indeterminate situations which humans regularly encounter. Liberals possess a profound belief in the power of the method of science to acquire and use empirical evidence to evaluate social policies and social institutions rather than to depend on the often oppressive, hegemonizing force of tradition to guide the practices of human beings.

In summary, conservatives, possess a deep antipathy to social change, have an abiding respect for tradition, believe in a divine creator, perceive a close and integral connection between ethics, morality and religion, have a significant measure of fear about the implications of post-structural science for human institutions, tend to be pessimistic about human nature and desire to foster preservation and transmission as the significant general aims of schools.

Liberals, on the other hand, have a proud respect for openness and empirical data, a much more optimistic view of human beings, a deeper interest in the common good and the general welfare of the common people, on the need to improve any institution which is not serving that welfare, and the capacity of humans to shape and to solve problems which will have an effect on the control of their future, with a continued emphasis on the rights, including the right to happiness, and a confi-
dence in the capacity of humans to intervene in their world for the purpose of making it more inhabitable for themselves and others.

**Significant Attributes of Education 2000**

**Six National Education Goals**

1. Children to start school ready to learn.
2. High school graduation to be at least 90 percent.
3. Students to demonstrate competency in English, math, science, history, geography.
4. Students to be first in world in science and math achievement.
5. Adults to be literate, to possess knowledge, skills necessary for economy and citizenship.
6. Schools to be free of drugs, violence; to provide an environment conducive to learning.

**FOUR TRACKS TO BE THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS**

**Track I:** For Today’s Students
Radical improvement of today’s schools
and accountability for results

**Track II:** For Tomorrow’s Students
A new generation of American schools

**PARENTAL CHOICE OF SCHOOLS**

**A VITAL COMPONENT OF TRACKS I AND II**

**Track III:** For Those of Us Already out of School and in the Work Force
A Nation of Students

**Track IV:** For Schools to Succeed
Communities Where Learning Can Happen

**A PACKAGE OF STRATEGIES TO ACCOMPANY EACH OF THE FOUR TRACKS**

Let us commence our analysis of **Parental Choice** by identifying
precisely what Education 2000 says about the matter of such choice. To begin, the proposal stipulates that “...choice gives them [parents, voters] the leverage to act. Such choices should include all schools that serve the public and are accountable to public authority, regardless of who runs them. New incentives will be provided to states and localities to adopt comprehensive choice policies, and the largest federal school aid program (Chapter 1) will be revised to ensure that federal dollars follow the child, to whatever extent state and local policies permit.”

Later in the document we find that “...[choice] will apply to all schools except where the courts find a constitutional bar. The power of choice is in the parents’ leverage both to change schools and to make change in the schools. The definition of “public school” should be broadened to include any school that serves the public and is held accountable by a public authority.... Rich parents, white and non-white, already have school choice. They can move or pay for private schooling. The biggest beneficiaries of new choice policies will be those who now have no alternatives. With choice they can find a better school for their children or use that leverage to improve the school their children now attend.”

In response to a question regarding the single most important part of the America 2000 strategy, the claim is made that “the most controversial may be school choice - at least until it’s well understood....”

A few pages later stress is placed on the need to reorient schools so as to focus on results, not on procedures, and one aspect of this reorientation would be “...giving parents more responsibility for their children’s education through magnet schools, public school choice, and other strategies.” It should not go unnoticed here that this is the sole occasion in the entire proposal in which parental choice is suggested for public schools.

Approaching the end of the document we find the suggestion, which, in various guises, has been integrated throughout the proposal, that “we can encourage educational excellence by encouraging parental choice. The concept of choice draws its fundamental strength from the principle at the very heart of the democratic idea. Every adult American has the
right to vote, the right to decide where to work, where to live. It’s time parents were free to choose the schools that their children attend. This approach will create the competitive climate that stimulates excellence in our private and parochial schools as well.”

It is clear from the foregoing specific citations relative to parental choice that the Bush Administration has a deep commitment to the belief that parental choice of schooling will produce the sorts of results which will bring about the achievement of the six National Education Goals which have been established as the aims of the Education 2000 proposal.

**LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF PARENTAL CHOICE FOR OUR DEMOCRATIC NATION**

**COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF SCHOOLING IN OUR NATION**

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<th>Industrial/ Business Sch</th>
<th>Milieu Sch</th>
<th>Proprietary Sch</th>
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<th>Home Sch</th>
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**ANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES OF PARENTAL CHOICE**

**RIGHT OF PARENTS TO CHOOSE SCHOOLING**

**OUR CONSTITUTIONALLY GOVERNED NATION**

For the purposes of the following analysis of the likely consequences of parental choice for our society, I am going to direct my remarks primarily toward the public and the non-public dimensions of this paradigm, referring to the other forms of schooling only if the discussion requires.

Three categories will be used to guide the analysis, civic, economic and religion. While my analysis will be guided by these categories it should be understood that they function interactively and that remarks made in relation to one of these conceptual notions can and often will be closely linked with one or both of the others. Because of the prominent
attention it has generated regarding choice, let us commence with the religious category.

**Religion.** As many of us know, the first sixteen words of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution stipulate that “*Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...*” Adopted December 15th, 1791, just a bit more than two-hundred years ago, these words, the first in our Bill of Rights, provided the citizens of our country with rights never before recognized by any government in the world; thereby initiating an experiment in the separation of the transempirical dogma of religious persuasions from our new, publicly accountable governmental structure which has continued since without interruption. Indeed, during much of the intervening period they have served to provide a solid wedge between those who would have us fund their particular dogmatic creeds and the right of people to believe and to worship in accord with their private consciences.

Increasingly, however, particularly since World War II, powerful and aggressive religious pressure groups, fundamentalist and mainstream Christian organizations, have made a deliberate and sustained effort to thwart the two principles inherent in these words, the ‘nonestablishment principle’ and the ‘free exercise’ principle, in an effort to compel others, frequently not of their persuasion, to pay public taxes to support their particular religious persuasions. During the past forty years legislators have been increasingly inclined to pander to these groups, often fully aware of the fact that the legislation which they were sponsoring or supporting contradicted these principles; unwilling to resist these organizations for fear of the impact on their political fortunes, safe with the knowledge that contested legislation would be analyzed by the courts and overturned if it proved to be unconstitutional. Using this strategy, they have been able during this period to ‘have their cake and eat it too.’ That is, they have been willing to rationalize their positions when voting on proposed legislation on the grounds that, should it prove to contradict these all-important sixteen words, some court, very likely our country’s Supreme Court, would render a judgement which would reveal its un-
constitutionality, thereby preserving the ‘wall’ of separation between nonempirical dogma and empirical, publicly responsible government. Of course, during the years between the passage of such legislation and the rendering of such judgments the use of public tax dollars to achieve the intention of the ill-conceived and hypocritically supported legislation would have been going on unabated, thereby circumventing these First Amendment principles without the possibility of recourse from anyone.

Presidents of the United States as well as governors of our states also have frequently pandered to these groups in an effort to solicit their support at the ballot box. The Nixon, Reagan and Bush Administrations, respectively, purposely and with clear knowledge of the potential for violating these religious principles, regularly catered to the whims and desires of these groups. Indeed, the Reagan Administration went so far as to establish an official Embassy to the Vatican, an action which was challenged by a large group of concerned Americans all the way to the Supreme Court, only to be told they were ‘without standing.’ So the Embassy continues to exist and function, gradually, very subtly, conditioning many in our society to accept the belief that formal recognition of one transempiric, dogmatic institution among the hundreds of such institutions that exist, is of no significant consequence for the development of human mind in our society. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, we have been witnessing an increasing tendency of many in the larger U.S. culture to lose sight of the profound importance of the ‘wall’ of separation if we are to sustain the broadly based moral and civil vitality of our democratic social order.

Here in New York State we have also been witnessing an effort to plunder the State Treasury in an effort to obtain tax monies which violate Article XI, Section 3, of the New York State Constitution, which reads: “Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination and inspection, of any school or institution of learning, in whole or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught, but the legislature may provide for the transportation of children to and from any school or institution of learning.”

Clearly the citizens of New York State have a desire to sustain a clear and distinct separation between the unprovable, dogmatic claims which guide the decisions and actions of religious groups and the open, publicly accountable claims which guide the decisions and actions of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of our democratic government.

Indeed, the recent persistent efforts in New York State to emphasize the importance of the rapidly emerging cultural pluralism in New York as well as throughout the Nation, has been generated by the cultural need to integrate ethnic, racial, gender, socioeconomic class, sexuality preferences, physically and mentally different persons, into our public schools without bias toward any. We are a state and a nation, in other words, of many cultures, of many beliefs and dispositions, of many religions; necessitating the obligation, as perhaps never before during the past two hundred years, to retain the wall of separation between church and state, to be neutral in our views about religion, whether it be Judaism, Islam, Christianity, or any one of the many other religious beliefs which attract the citizens in our country.

Clearly, Education 2000, with its stress on Parental Choice, is an educational strategy which flagrantly advocates the violation of these principles. And, what is most serious about this matter is that, as recently as July 1991, six of fourteen members of our own Board of Regents voted to initiate a pilot program which would have supported legislation which would have paid tax money to the religious schools of children whose parents had freely chosen to have them indoctrinated by a sectarian school of their choice; thereby diminishing the sense of responsibility we want to see as a part of the character traits in all our citizens by relieving these parents of having to face up to all of the fully known, financial obligations which they would incur as a consequence of exercising their free choice.

So much for the category of religion. Let us move on to that of economics.
Economic. Throughout Education 2000 much stress is placed on ‘packages of accountability,’ demands which will be imposed on each of the four tracks which the proposal employs to achieve the six National Education Goals toward which schooling in our Nation is to be focused. These demands represent an emerging conventional sense of meaning associated with the notion of educational accountability, namely, the public reporting and dissemination of the results of achievement tests taken by students. The Comprehensive Achievement Reports which our state recently has begun requiring all school districts to publish annually represents this sense of meaning. But there is another sense of meaning which accountability conveys and which never seems to be heard. I refer here to the need for any institution receiving public funds, particularly an institution such as a school which can and often does have a lifelong impact on the civic and economic fortunes of its students, to have its finances, as well as its budget-making and approving processes, open to public scrutiny and approval. Public schools, of course, because of their publicly verifiable, empirical nature, encounter this democratic requirement at every turn. Non-public schools never reveal to the public in an empirical, publicly verifiable way, their monetary wealth, their sources of funds, or their ways of making decisions about how to use these monies. Such matters are never revealed to the public community. These institutions clearly operate outside the realm of public accountability in this realm of their institutional management. Clearly this form of operation is defensible for any privately operated institution; but it should be clear that such an institution cannot demand or expect to obtain public funds while operating under such a nonempirical, nonpublic, nonopen standard. Either nonpublic institutions, whether sectarian or nonsectarian, clearly recognize their need to subscribe to the same openness regarding their finances as do their counterparts, the public schools, or they are not entitled to any public tax dollars.

Much stress is placed in the Education 2000 proposal on the need for everyone in our country to acquire those knowledges, skills and dispositions which will enable the country to compete successfully with other industrialized countries throughout the world. Clearly reiterating the arguments found in A Nation at Risk and in the Carnegie Report, this
The Implication of One Significant Component

The proposal says nothing about the possibility of restructuring the income distribution in our society if we were to ‘win’ this presumed competition; nor does it suggest that anyone in the public domain would be involved in determining such matters as pricing policy, as plant closings, as the relocation of production jobs in countries where salaries are the very lowest anywhere. Apparently, were we to win this competition we would merely sustain the continuation of the current structure of decision making, the current maldistribution of wealth, the current class structure. Given the clandestine, nonpublic nature of such corporate decision making, the quality of schooling which we develop in our schools can have little if any impact on the means which are employed to engage in competition with our foreign counterparts.

Even if such decision making were made public, every question needs to be raised about the consequences which would be likely to emerge, assuming, for instance, that we were to win this competitive battle, for countries elsewhere in the world. We have been making every effort to persuade our students and the larger public that we are living in a global, interdependent world, a world in which our fortunes are closely tied to the fortunes of others elsewhere on this earth, that what we must do is learn how to function effectively in a cooperative way, not only within our schools and classrooms, but also in the workplace, in the political arena, whether it be local, state, national or global. Clearly, competitive forms of thinking are alien to this sort of intellectual frame of mind. Nowhere in the proposal is there even a hint of recognition of this glaring contradiction.

One cannot help but recognize in the document the dominant influence expected to be imposed on educational endeavors throughout our country by business and industry. Because most of the larger public has no knowledge whatever of the historic effort, dating back to the Reconstruction Period, to shape and control educational design, curricular content and learning outcomes of such business organizations as the National Association of Manufacturers, and because the intellectual structures of many classroom teachers and administrators have been denied this same knowledge, largely because the study of the history of educa-
tion frequently has been perceived as a nonpractical, a nondefensible component of a professional preparation program, we have many practicing teachers and administrators who have not the foggiest notion of the narrow, job specific, orientation of business organizations, of business men, about what schools ought to be teaching. The Education 2000 proposal, with its stress on ‘skill standards,’ on ‘skill certificates,’ on ‘skill clinics,’ on ‘skill upgrading,’\textsuperscript{19} is clearly in line with the sort of thinking about what our schools are to teach and achieve that has prevailed in our country in the minds of powerful business leaders since the Civil War. One needs only to peruse such powerful, empirical studies as that of Raymond Callahan\textsuperscript{20} to become most wary of the involvement of business and industry in the design, in the determination of content, in the stress on desirable learning outcomes in our public schools, which are likely to emanate from business people.

\textbf{Civic.} Much stress is placed in Education 2000, particularly in National Goal No. 3, on the need to ensure that “...all students learn to use their minds well, so they may be prepared for responsible citizenship...”\textsuperscript{21} also in National Goal No. 5 where one finds the desire to have every adult acquire that measure of literacy, that degree of knowledge and skill which will enable one to “...exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.”\textsuperscript{22}

Clearly, students who read our federal and state constitutions, who consider the senses of meaning associated with such notions as \textit{accountability}, will become increasingly perplexed, very likely disenchanted, even offended by the indefensible, hypocritical ways in which they come to perceive the efforts of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of our government to circumvent principles in the fundamental document, the fundamental moral system, intended to sustain an integrated, civil society in the face of the incredible complexities created by the pluralities of beliefs which are extant in our country.

Despite all its efforts to support an educational strategy to achieve the National Education Goals toward which it is committed, the proposal falls far short of pursuing the sort of powerful moral character which we so desperately need in our time. Indeed, none of the account-
ability packages associated with any of the four tracks proposed to achieve the National Goals really provides the sort of emphasis on moral character which our society so desperately requires.

Nor for that matter do any of the National Education Goals place a strong emphasis on the development of moral character in our schools. Goal No. 3 comes closest, perhaps, with its stress on ‘responsible citizenship,’23 but this is so deeply embedded in the goal statement, to say nothing about the vagueness of the term ‘citizenship,’ that little if any significant stress is likely to be placed on the development of moral capacities.

Summary.

In this paper an attempt has been made briefly to outline a few of the characteristics of two political philosophies with which we need to be familiar if we are correctly to perceive the political connections and ramifications of Education 2000. An effort has been made to identify the precise way in which the idea of Parental Choice has entered into the thinking of those who constructed this proposal. Accompanying this effort has been the development of a model which may be used to assess the likely consequences of Parental Choice for our society. Finally an effort has been made to consider a selected number of likely consequences for our society if the Education 2000 proposal should emerge as a full-blown effort to transform our nation’s schools. Clearly one can conclude from this analysis that the proposal represents a powerful effort which has been guided entirely by a conservative political philosophy, one designed to return us to the days of natural law theory, to the era of church-state integration, to the era of the haves and the have-nots, to the survival of the fittest mentality of such thinkers as William Graham Sumner and Herbert Spencer.24

While I am sympathetic to the need continuously to work toward the continued renewal and improvement of our public schools, I am not persuaded, indeed, I am far, far from convinced by the Education 2000 proposal that its emphasis on Parental Choice will do anything whatever to improve the quality of schooling which our nation provides its
young people. Indeed, if anything, it is likely to create religious, eco-
nomic and civic tensions which will be inimical to the democratic struc-
ture of our delicately integrated, pluralistic society. Indeed, I find this
proposal by the Bush Administration to be an intemperate and irrespon-
sible effort to bring about the domination of educational thought and
practice, particularly of our public schools, one of our most important
social institutions, by powerful religious and economic groups in our
society, often accountable to no one for their decisions and actions.

ENDNOTES

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Rutgers University Press.
6. Friedman, Milton, with the assistance of Rose D. Friedman. (1962). Capital-
Education by choice: The case for family control. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
8. The act which superseded and replaced the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965. It had not been carefully examined by any con-
gressional committee, and much of it was in handwriting on the day of its
passage.
York: St. Martin’s Press.
148:653-64.

13. **Stated in truncated form, the package for each track consists of:**

**Track I:** World Class Standards, American Achievement Tests, Test results used by colleges, universities and employers, Presidential citations for educational excellence, Presidential Achievement Scholarships, Report Cards, Changes in National Assessment of Education Progress, New choice incentives and choice applied to Chapter I, Educational flexibility legislation to support the school as the site of reform, Merit Schools Program to reward schools that move toward the goals, Governors’ Academies for School Leaders, Governors’ Academies for Teachers, Differential pay for teachers, Alternative certification for teachers and principals and Honoring outstanding teachers in the five core subjects.

**Track II:** Establishing a New Generation of American Schools, a New American Schools Development Corporation, Design Teams, America 2000 Communities and 535+ New American Schools to initiate the program.

**Track III:** Skill certificates, Skill Clinics and Skill upgrading.

**Track IV:** Renaissance of sound American values such as strength of family, parental responsibility, neighborly commitment, community-wide caring of churches, civic organizations, business, labor and the media, Creating and sustaining health communities, communities where education really happens, America 2000 Communities who have (a) Adopted the six National Education Goals, (b) Developed a community-wide strategy to achieve them, (c) Designed a report card to measure results, and (d) planned for and supported a New American School.


DEWEY’S PEDAGOGIC CREED: REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATION, PROCESS AND THE CULTIVATION OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Douglas W. Shrader

Abstract. The paper offers a series of reflections on some of the major themes of John Dewey’s “My Pedagogic Creed” (School Journal, LIV (January 1897), pp. 77-80). Short, even bordering on terse for John Dewey, “My Pedagogic Creed” contains the seeds of his later work. Special attention will be given to (1) the socio-ethical dimension of education, and (2) the image of education as a dynamic process (embodied in quotations such as the following: “education...is a process of living and not a preparation for living,” “the process and the goal of education are one and the same,” and “ideas...result from action”).

I. Basic Overview and Sketch of “My Pedagogic Creed”

In January 1897, John Dewey published a paper titled “My Pedagogic Creed.” Dewey was 37, a professor of Philosophy and chair of the Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Education at the University of Chicago, but in many respects his extraordinary career had just begun. The years to come were to see publication of a host of monumental and immensely influential texts such as The School and Society (1900), The Child and the Curriculum (1902), The Influence of Darwin (1910), Democracy and Education (1916), Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature (1925), The Quest for Certainty (1929), Philosophy and Civilization (1931), Art as Experience (1934), Experience and Education (1938), and of course many, many more.

In contradistinction to these subsequent, fully developed and carefully argued works, “My Pedagogic Creed” is short and sharply focused. Even so it covers a tremendous range. The piece is indeed written as a creed, divided into five articles of faith. Article I is titled, “What Educa-

_I believe that_

- all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race . . .

- the only true education comes through the stimulation of the child’s powers by the demands of the social situations in which he finds himself . . .

- this educational process has two sides — one psychological and one sociological — and that neither can be subordinated to the other, or neglected, without evil results following.\(^3\)

In addition to the social and psychological dimensions of education, as illustrated in the above passage, Dewey discusses what we might call “the existential dimension of education” — the idea that education and life are inseparable: that schools should not be insular training grounds or ivory towers, but rather critical portions of the playing field of life itself. “Education,” Dewey writes, “is a process of living and not a preparation for future living.”\(^4\) Several pages later he returns to the theme with the remark: “the process and the goal of education are one and the same.”\(^5\)

He addresses methodological and curricular concerns, including the place and importance of science, art, history, literature and geography. As was to become characteristic of Dewey’s pragmatic approach to education, both method and curriculum were subordinated to the abilities and interest of the student on the one hand, and the needs and commitments of the society on the other.

There is throughout an emphasis on action and activity. Ideas,
Dewey argues, “result from action and devolve for the sake of the better control of action. What we term reason is primarily the law of orderly or effective action.”

The existential, social, and psychological dimensions of education provide evidence of an irreducible moral component. Education for Dewey is a process of civilization: one of developing, transmitting and refining a social consciousness. Here, as in later years, Dewey was concerned to underscore the social importance of education. “I believe,” he wrote, “that education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform. [A]ll reforms which rest simply upon the enactment of law, or the threatening of certain penalties, or upon changes in mechanical or outward arrangements, are transitory and futile.” Only in the refining of social consciousness does one engender lasting social reform.

It follows, for Dewey, that “the teacher is engaged, not simply in the training of individuals, but in the formation of the proper social life.” He concludes, “the teacher always is the prophet of the true God and the usherer in of the true kingdom of God.”

II. Evaluation and Reflections: Applying Dewey’s Creed to the Existing System

Was John Dewey right? Are education and life as inextricably intertwined as he would have us believe? Must we subjugate methodology and curriculum to social need and psychological disposition? Is the moral component as irreducible and imperative as he claims?

Certainly, Dewey was neither the first nor the last to make such claims. One can easily read much of Plato’s Republic in just this way. But there is also a tradition of education for the sake of knowledge, pure and untainted by either individual or collective needs, wants or potential use. In the United States, especially, there is a deliberate, conscious and intentional effort to sanitize and universalize the educational process, expunging and expurgating religious, moral, and even social or political concerns of a partisan nature.
Our scholars and universities have pursued the grail of absolute universal truth. Failing to find the chalice, they have become disillusioned with the system, with one another, and with themselves. In their disillusionment they have recreated Sophism and deconstructed even their own works.

Society in turn has become disillusioned with education. The system seems, to far too many, like an expensive baby-sitting service which fails to keep pace with the economic needs and developments of the marketplace: an industry whose product (construed as the student - i.e. the future work force) seems inferior to that produced in other countries (Japan, Germany, etc.).

The structure of our educational system is as mysterious as its goals: tiers appear strangely opposite one another. We provide elementary and secondary teachers with heavy doses of methodology and pedagogic technique, but fail to insist on significant post-secondary training in a substantive field such as history, philosophy, literature or science. For those who would teach at a college or university we mandate significant graduate study and perhaps even original scholarship in the relevant discipline, but neither require nor encourage pedagogically oriented training. In either case we scrupulously avoid differences save difference of opinion or technique.

In our fear of social mandate and prejudicial difference we have disinfect ed the educational process, rendering it clean, sterile, and lifeless. No matter how noble the goals, such a standardized and sanitized product could never qualify as education in Dewey’s sense of the term. For Dewey requires a dynamic interplay between the individual and the larger social whole, in which both the individual and the society define and redefine one another. Here one would find a genuine dialectic of difference, replete with the need for sensitivity, understanding and exploration of alternative solutions.

If, like Dewey, we move beyond the idea that individuals are isolated, independently defined and self-contained entities — if we regard ourselves instead as participatory, creative aspects of a larger
social whole — if, in short, we accept Dewey’s education-as-social-process framework — then we must also squarely face the consequence that education includes a prominent irreducible moral component. For education devoid of moral education or the cultivation of social consciousness simply could not be education as John Dewey understands it, but at best a pale and ghostly image of what could and should be — of what must be, of what is needed for perpetuation and betterment of the culture, for the growth and fulfillment of human beings, and for the justification of the educational system itself.

This is not to say that the school system should become the forum for a politically privileged group to force its particular view of morality or social arrangement on the community as a whole. In a pluralistic culture, tolerance and diversity of viewpoint must be sanctioned and encouraged. This does not mean there are no areas of broad agreement or possibility of reaching greater consensus than exists at present. Nor does it imply anything goes. Social consciousness and ethical conduct require more effort, attention, and understanding — and come with less certitude or assurance — in a pluralistic culture than they do in one in which a single code will suffice for all. As such, the structure of our society calls, not for exclusion of ethics from education, but for redoubled efforts to assure that each generation will provide proper moral guidance for the next in an increasingly complex, variegated and interrelated world community.

Similar observations apply to religion and the schools. Because religion often has significant cultural value, any attempt to excise it from the educational process inevitably compromises that process, weakens the culture and deprives the individual of potentially valuable self-definitional experience. A society with pluralistic religious commitments should have a parallel educational process, not one in which religious discussion and influence are banned. Exclusion produces neither strength nor tolerance, but a generation of cripples with limited vision and virtually no understanding of themselves, ancestral generations, or the many peoples of the world for whom religion continues to be a powerful force.
What I propose is not easy. Nor will it be popular with all segments of our society. It is however, I believe, necessary if we are to integrate education and life, or self and society. This is true not only for elementary and secondary education, but at the university level as well.

III. Test Case

In my Introduction to Philosophy class, I often give what I call a “Pop Ethics Quiz” (the double entendre is intentional). Students are asked to respond to several situations in which they might be reasonably expected to find themselves in the coming years, indicating first what they think they would do, and second what they believe they should do. I vary the situations from semester to semester, but frequently use ones such as the following:

1. You are at a party. Your best friend has had too much to drink and passed out. His/her boy/girlfriend has also had a bit too much and begins making unmistakable sexual advances toward you. What response do you believe you would make? What do you think you should do? Why?

2. Having partied a bit too much, you are not prepared for next week’s exam. A fellow student offers to sell you an advance copy, assuring you that it is the genuine article, obtained through illegal access to the university computer system. What response do you believe you would make? What do you think you should do? Why?

3. You discover that a friend is dealing drugs to elementary school children. Apparently, it is quite profitable. What do you do? What do you think you should do? Why?

4. Remember that exam in number 2? You failed it. You pleaded with your teacher that you would do absolutely anything to raise your grade, and received an unexpected response. There is something you can do — your teacher is willing to exchange grades for sexual favors. How would you respond? What response do you think you should make? Why?
5. Would your response differ if the teacher wanted drugs in exchange for a better grade? Should it? Why?

6. You find yourself (or your girlfriend) unexpectedly pregnant. What do you do? What do you think you should do? Why?

To provide a better background against which to interpret their responses, students are asked to indicate gender and class standing. But to promote truthfulness and candor, they are not required to identify themselves by name.

I collect the papers, shuffle them, then immediately redistribute them at random. Students read the responses of an anonymous classmate, then exchange papers with one or two others sitting nearby to sample the responses of another classmate or so. We then open the floor for general discussion and sharing of those responses. A simple hand-raising process regarding the anonymous responses provides a quick, unembarrassing and reasonably reliable measure of the number of students who thought they would — but should not — sleep with the girl/boyfriend of a close friend, etc.

I deliberately choose questions where there will be a diversity of opinion regarding expected response, morally preferred response, and justification thereof. Sample responses for the first question include the following:

Since it’s my friend, I think it would be better not to do anything to ruin our friendship. My friends and I have discussed this because we saw it happen to someone else.

If it was my best friend, I shouldn’t and wouldn’t do anything. All three of us would regret it. Too much guilt.

I would and should most definitely tell him that my best friend is my best friend and that I would never ever jeopardize our relationship over a guy. I mean, would I want that done to me? No!

I would take advantage of the situation. If he was truly my
best friend then he would understand that best friends share. Besides, what’s a girlfriend of my best friend hitting on me for? She would deserve it.

Do what’s right. It depends on the mood. And if she’s hot, she’s hot - case closed. Act now, ask questions later. (Also depends on if you can get away with it.)

Dude, why not? What an opportunity! GO for it! Take him/her back where no one can see, and play cards!! This is an opportunity of a lifetime! Besides, your friend is out cold; there’s no one to keep his “main squeeze” warm.

Tell him/her to just forget about it. Pull themselves together. What could they possibly be thinking about? Do they think with their brains or their hormones? I have respect for my friend. There is trust and honesty in our relationship. We could pretend the whole incident never occurred if she/he apologizes and realizes how they were selfish and arrogant.

Would do - take her up on the offer. Should do - take her up on the offer. My answer would be different if they were married.

I should tell her to stop, that her boyfriend would not like it, but I would just go with it, and see what happens. If she didn’t want to cheat, she shouldn’t be on top of me, and if he doesn’t understand, he isn’t worth having as a friend (if he finds out). Yes, I would do it.

One thing that I have learned is never, no matter what, fool around with your best friend’s girlfriend. No girl is worth losing a best friend, or a good friend for that matter.

I would politely turn her down without making her angry because I’ve had a steady girlfriend for over a year. If I had no girlfriend, I’d probably do the same but it just might take
longer. Yet, depending on her looks, I might do her.

Depends on the value my friend holds in such a relationship. If he doesn’t feel it’s a big deal, I would go for it. My friends aren’t very big on monogamy at this point! It wouldn’t cause a problem between us.

This is why I don’t drink — the alcohol would have dulled my judgement to the point where I would have had sex with the person. If sober, I like to think that I’d say NO, loudly and repeatedly.

In this particular situation, which oddly enough has happened before and which I have acted in an opposite manner, I would refuse the come-on elegantly because I now have a serious girlfriend.

Don’t do it!! Guys are jerks anyway! No one’s cute enough to lose a friend.

Take her home (especially if she’s hot) and hope she doesn’t remember anything.

This situation has happened to me. I took care of my friend, while keeping his girlfriend out of trouble. I held onto my friendship, but was not liked by his girlfriend. She even tried to get me in trouble in several different ways because I hurt her pride.

I would not take advantage of her or the situation because I would know that it was the alcohol in her making her do those things. Not to mention I wouldn’t want to lose a good friend over one night.

I would try to get my friend’s girlfriend to stop thinking of me and get her to think about her boyfriend on the floor. It is more important to save a friendship than to hook up for one night. The girl would also hate you if you took advantage of her.
In the past I would have had a hard time telling the person to back off and may have ended up doing something that I normally shouldn’t do. Today (I guess from maturing) I would have no problem telling the person to back off, which is what I should and would do.

WOULD - Tell him to go away and grow up. If he really cared about my best friend then he would never think of coming on to me. But never tell my best friend about the incident. SHOULD - Tell my best friend about what happened.

I should turn her away. I would do so. Friendships are of most importance to me; girls come and go. My only dilemma would be should I tell my friend or just stay quiet.

This person is my friend, I would not get involved with her boyfriend because I know it may jeopardize our friendship. I would stay away from him. — If this guy is good-looking, I should go along with him. But I would need a good excuse — so only if we’d both been drinking.¹⁰

No matter what I would like to believe, I would object to the come-ons. I may not want to object, but I would so as not to hurt my friend’s feelings not because I thought it was wrong. It would also matter what others thought.

I have provided far more responses than I had originally intended, but such is the nature of the exercise. Once I start allowing students to read aloud and discuss the responses of their peers there is no shortage of participation, novel answers, or unexpected perspectives or twists within otherwise standard answers. A seemingly simple situation such as the one I have presented here can lead to a full scale examination of human relations, obligations, and — as in the final response presented above — societal expectation.

Discussions such as these do not substitute for formal instruction
in Metaethics, the history of Ethical Theory, etc. Nor should they be expected to provide an adequate substitute for basic normative instruction. But they do provide the professor with a better feel for the ethical values, sensitivity and maturity of the class. They encourage students to talk, within a structured educational setting, about their relationships and obligations toward one another. As such, it is an occasion for moral growth and the raising of social consciousness.

Clearly, the exercise does not transform the professor into a preacher. In fact, while it is possible for the professor to express his/her moral perspective on these issues, it is also possible (and sometimes desirable) to confine the discussion to those perspectives introduced by the students. The success of the exercise depends in large measure on the viewpoint. It is, in fact, for many a consciousness raising experience just to discover that some of their peers value friendship more than sex (or a good grade more than personal integrity, etc.).

IV. Conclusion

Can we then introduce a stronger moral or religious dimension to education without thereby turning the school into the instrument of the church, or similar group? I firmly believe we can. Indeed, as argued previously, I believe we must. I do not believe it will be easy. Simplistic as my little “Pop Ethics Quiz” may seem, I believe it provides a model for how we may take some of those tentative first steps. If our students are to take full possession of the rich cultural heritage which is rightfully theirs — if they are to become responsible participants in the creation of the society in which they live — and if they are to be charged, when we are gone, with becoming the educators of tomorrow then we must provide a multiplex, participatory framework in which they are taught to explore their relationships with one another. They must learn to choose between conflicting and competing alternatives with logical rigor as well as moral and social sensitivity. Only then can they be expected to safely navigate the narrow channel between the Charybdis of unforgiving condemnation of all those who differ and the Scylla of naive belief that an open mind requires a blind eye to every difference and an absolute absence of all grounds for preference.
ENDNOTES


3. Article I, pp. 443-444.


5. Article III, p. 450.


8. Article V, p. 454.

9. Article V, p. 454 (final sentence of the creed).

10. Note carefully the subject’s use of the terms “would” and “should” (which she underlines). Her response is particularly interesting as a contrast to the far more common, “I probably would, but should not.” Compare the following, final response as well.
(Last night Evander Holeyfield successfully defended his heavyweight championship by defeating the challenger, George Forman. For their few moments of physical effort Holeyfield received twenty million dollars; Forman received 12.5 million. Virginia Ravitch has joined Lamar Alexander’s forces in Washington. The New York Stock Exchange closed yesterday with the Dow Jones Average at 2965.42. The Amir of Kuwait’s army continues to reign terror on Palestinians. The valedictorian of Tamaric Hills graduating class commits suicide over the weekend.)

I begin with these headline stories of the last few days to remind us of the context in which we work. Allow me to continue by making a few declarative statements each followed by a simple interrogative sentence.

(1) The most urgent calls today in American Education appear to be related to economics. Do the foundations have a response to that?

(2) A major portion of the rhetoric in our field (not limited to the foundations) seems to be related to how we will address the growing inadequacy of our educational system to enfranchise the “have nots” in our society. Do the foundations have a response to that?

(3) The current demands of national and state efforts to improve education call for collaboration among those that prepare teachers and those that produce knowledge in academe. Do the foundations have a response to that?

(4) The efforts now underway to restructure the educational programs which prepare teachers call for university presence in the schools. Do the foundations have a response to that?
(Four students arrested and charged with vandalism of central offices totaling a quarter of a million dollars.)

This set of statements and questions represents not only the current state of education in New York State but the position of the foundational studies relative to it as well. We can not, and surely must not dismiss these needs. Our response to the concerns and the issues which emerge from them must transcend philosophical biases, retreats to psychological constructs, sociological paradigms and historical deconstruction. We must squarely face what is now happening in our schools. Bluntly, we must enter the muddy waters and get our feet wet and dirty.

(A driver education teacher narrowly escaped serious injury as a fire bomb exploded as he entered his car yesterday.)

The last time I spoke to you formally I entitled my short presentation “Standing On The Corner . . . Watching.” Today, as I take over the helm of this organization I’m nagged by the feeling we may have been left at the corner. As I read and reread the reports emanating from Albany I sense that we who have been marginalized for over a decade in teacher preparation are about to be lifted altogether from the pages unless we can effectively demonstrate in a most pragmatic way how we can make a difference. The analysis of these reports which follows may give you a glimpse of why I draw this conclusion.

Within the last year we have had to begin a three year plan for reregistration of our teacher certification programs in elementary and secondary education. New Commissioner’s Regulations have been activated defining the use of calculators during Regents Examinations and requiring of a two hour workshop in child abuse and maltreatment identification and reporting. School district are required to have a crisis team in place to respond in emergencies such as a measles outbreak or teenage suicide. A New Compact for Learning has all but ignored the handicapped. And where are the foundations? Is there any mention of the a historical nature of American education? Is there any mention of the moral and ethical dimensions of the teaching act? Is there any mention of the deskilling of the classroom teacher through increasing the roles of
technology and the bureaucratization of the schooling process? The answers are clearly no. Succinctly, the foundations are out. Even the most optimistic look at the documents would force me to conclude that our role in New York State is to be somewhat akin to art and music in the secondary schools; we’re there, but we’re of very low priority.

I don’t believe it necessary to elaborate on the position which the foundational studies occupies in our colleges and universities. We have been set apart from both the liberal studies and the pedagogical. Most importantly, we have been all but eliminated from practice itself. I say most importantly, because my analysis suggests that we as foundational scholars have removed ourselves so completely from the public school classroom that the problems which our state and nation face are not perceived as ones which we can solve. When, for example, were any of you asked to conduct a workshop for teachers in the elementary or secondary schools? When, for example, have any of you invited practicing teachers to your department meetings? When, for example, was the last time you examined the state requirements for elementary school mathematics? What, for example, are the qualifying scores for Professional Knowledge on the National Teachers Examination? Have any of you been consulted regarding the items on that examination? Many of you can respond positively to a few of these questions; however, far too many of us have been locked into institutions and reward structures which do not acknowledge that activity as being important. Hence we realistically, avoid it.

Two weeks ago I came before a meeting of teachers in an urban high school with a challenge, a challenge which required a reflective look at practice, a challenge to belief systems which underlie the common sense notions about how we educate our youth, a challenge to collaborate with the development of new ways of preparing teachers for the twenty first century. When my presentation was finished and the building principal asked for question, there were none. Instead, ten minutes were used in debating the merits of a newly implemented procedure for mailing report cards. It wasn’t that my message was misunderstood; they were disinterested. Teachers don’t seem much interested in the moral implications embedded in a reporting system which reduced the
classroom experience to fragmented pieces of oftentimes irrelevant cultural content to be later reproduced on norm-referenced examinations. They are far more concerned about a management system which establishes policy without prior teacher advise and consent. This is not to say that teacher authority to make decisions which affect their work in unimportant. The problem for us in the foundations is that most solutions to the current malaise in education are sought elsewhere.

But there is the possibility for our work to be of some importance, albeit somewhat inferential, since most reports remain general and vague when it comes to matters such as equity and moral imperatives. Allow me to summarize briefly what I am sure is familiar to you all. Norm (past-president Norman Bauer) has laid out the national scene quite well, but I want to begin there in a small way simply to set the stage for what I believe should be our agenda for the 90’s. During a national conference on the restructuring of teacher education programs last December, a panel of state education department spokesperson were describing their most recent efforts to improve the quality of teaching within their domains. The New York State representatives, Donald Nolan, referenced the Regents Action Plan which attempts to bring elementary and secondary school outcomes, teacher certification and college preparatory programs together. I have extracted some language from that Document and others related to it to suggest entry points for foundational study.

“Statement of Regents Goals For Elementary — and Secondary — School Students 1984 . . . We want each child to develop self-confidence and belief in success in learning. We want each to develop a capacity for continued self-learning. We want each to develop self-discipline and a sense of decency and responsibility.”

“Each student will respect and practice basic civic values and acquire the skills, knowledge, understanding, and attitudes necessary to participate in democratic self government.”

Under this last rubric the following are stated:
“5.1 Understanding and acceptance of the values of justice, honesty, self-discipline, due process, equality, and majority rule with respect for minority rights.”

“5.2 Respect for self, others and property as integral to a self-governing, democratic society.” “Each student will develop the ability to understand and respect people of different race; sex; ability; cultural heritage; national origin; religion; and political, economic, and social background, and their values, beliefs and attitudes.”

These are some of the goals.

If one looks at the recommended course requirements sections for K-6, particularly under the “Content/Objectives” section, one sees that:

“Instruction must be provided in: Patriotism and citizenship; history, significance, meaning and effect of the Constitution of the United States and amendments thereto; Declaration of Independence; Constitution of New York State and amendments; the flag, pledge of allegiance, certain holidays.”

These lofty declarations are linked with several other mandates, including:

“Physical education and kindred subjects . . . Highway safety and traffic regulations; bicycle safety; school safety patrol . . . Arson and fire prevention . . . and Conservation Day.”

Intriguingly, the first set of requirements is not applicable to nonpublic schools. Even more provocative, these same requirements apply to the 7-12 program of studies as well. I can’t recall ever having dealt with the school safety patrol in these upper grades, say nothing about those “kindred subjects.”

There are no additional sections under requirements that offer any insight into how we are to attain the goals outlined above. There is, however, one statement under the “Generic Change in Instruction” section of the Action Plan which does.
“8. **Implement Education for Civic Values.** Values are a key element in everyone’s life. Certain kinds of values — civic values — are a critical element in the maintenance of a democratic society, and public and non public schools in a pluralistic society have a responsibility for helping to ensure that young people acquire the knowledge and skills they need to act according to civic values.”

This section makes reference to the Regents position Paper “Education for Civic Values” in which school programs purporting to do this are described. It is expected that these civic values will be integrated within both the instructional and non-instructional aspects of students’ school experiences.

Few would disagree as to the reasonableness of the goals for our state’s youth. It remains problematic as to how these goals are to be met through the Actions Plans’ specification of requirements and the prescribed instruction. Even more problematic is the teacher preparation necessary to achieve the goals. As I read and reread the **Regents Action Plan** I remain convinced that the Regents have inferred that the goals will be met through the curriculum provided by the schools, guided by the various State Education Department syllabi for all subjects K-12. Those of us who work directly in the teacher education programs of our colleges know perfectly well that these syllabi are equally vague as to how these “values . . . understandings . . . sensitivities . . . beliefs . . . and attitudes” are to be encouraged, taught, fostered, etc. Again, it appears that the various department bureaus involved in curriculum development infer that these things will somehow emerge within the instructional programs. Perhaps they also infer that teachers will have gained the appropriate attitudes and skills for transmission to their students from their teacher preparation programs.

Before we turn our attention to that preparation, there are two additional documents from which I want to draw statements germane to our work. One is from a memo written by Commissioner Sobol addressed to “interested persons” in response to the public’s reaction to the “A Curriculum for Inclusion” report. In that memo, Commissioner Sobol
wrote, “we cannot understand our complex society without understand-
ing the history and culture of its major ethnic and cultural components. We face a paradox: only through understanding our diverse roots and branches can we fully comprehend the whole. Only by accommodating our differences can we become one society. Only by exploring our hu-
man variation can we apprehend our common humanity.” This appears in the same section in which we wrote, “the Regents took this action in response to the educational, social, political and economic imperatives of our time.” I repeat, “. . . educational, social, political and economic imperatives of our time.” These appear relevant.

On October 2, 1990, another rather controversial document went forth from the Commissioner’s office entitled “A New Compact for Learn-
ing: A Partnership to Improve Educational Results.” Early on, the docu-
ment summarized the goals outlined in the Regents Action Plan and fur-
ther indicated that they continued to “define our purpose as we approach the next century.” Two statements within the “Compact” should cause us in the foundations to become proactive.

Within the “Set Statewide Goals” section, the following is stated: “In specifying the skills, knowledge and values which students should acquire, the Regents should consult broadly with members of the el-
ementary, secondary, and post-secondary community; . . . ” Later, in the “Provide Resources Incentive and Assistance” section we find this: “More specifically, the Regents should work collaboratively with school dis-
tricts, teacher centers, teacher training institutions, parent groups, and education organizations to provide teachers, other members of the school staff, and parents with the training needed for effective pursuit of state-
wide goals and desired learning outcomes and for effective participation in planning and decision making.”

I urge you all to read this document, particularly section H, The Role of Higher Education. This section is small by comparison to those describing the roles of other participants, perhaps unintentionally com-
municating that we may very well be a minor partner in this new com-
pact. Nevertheless, I want to conclude by expanding on one statement
within section H. It reads, “Develop preservice and inservice education and professional preparatory programs for a new generation of elementary and secondary teachers and administrators committed to achieving better results.”

For the past eighteen months I have been working very closely with the administration and key faculty in an area school district and a select group of faculty from our college liberal arts departments. The working has been driven by a single mission: how we can, together, restructure our teacher preparation program. From this effort two new sociology courses have emerged, one at our Junior College at the 200 level and the other at the Women’s College at the 300 level; both courses address educational issues effected by sociological variables. This is significant given that our Education Department recently dropped our foundations course and replaced it with an introduction of education course. I draw attention to this event for a very specific reason.

There is a source of vigor in working cooperatively with liberal arts faculty who see the preparation of teachers as a significant part of their role. More importantly for us in the foundations at this critical time is the blending of dialogue and blurring of curricular and disciplinary boundaries. To this point we have established two working committees, one at the college and one at a collaborating public school, which are addressing the statements which I have extracted from the Regents Action Plan and other documents. The college-based committee is comprised of a faculty member from each liberal arts department, a representative from a middle school and a senior high school, a school administrator and an Education Department chairman, and a faculty member from the liberal arts and education. The school committee is focusing on the instructional and goal statements from the same documents, relating them to the current public school programs. Its primary function is to find ways of targeting pre-service and in-service teacher education of the content and experiences which are achieving the goals, followed by a translating of the teacher behavior which accompany those achievements into college level experiences. What is happening here is the addressing of our types or questions within the context of actual class-
room experiences. For the first time at our college, the liberal arts faculty in sociology, psychology, history and political science are reframing their disciplinary questions in foundational terms, and methods instructors are asking their students to critically examine their lesson plans in terms of consequences other than academic achievement. One example is our discussions of classroom evaluations which include such things as sex stereotyping in language usage in math word problems and ways in which standardized tests can reproduce social hegemony.

The major reason for describing what has been happening at our college is to stress the need for proactive participation in the restructuring of schooling. I’m relating this to inform you that there are indeed school administrators and teachers ready and willing to challenge the status quo. There are liberal arts and methods faculty who are in tune with us, but they need a vehicle to express it which will not jeopardize their status in the schools and academe. I want to stress strongly that we are the ones who can provide the link between the schools and the university. But, and it’s an important but, we must begin at the school level, not the college level. We must enter the schools often with regularity. We must bring the classroom teachers into our midst, listening to what they have to say. We need to establish a stronger network among ourselves so that our individual efforts and those of our schools of education don’t continue to separate courses and become diffused. We need to provide a more concrete voice for the school teachers, a vehicle that will allow us to understand what it means to be a teacher in our nation’s schools today.

I agree that we must become more politically active as an association, however, I am not convinced that our words will be heard if we are unable to demonstrate, concretely and overtly, ways that the things which concern us are internalized and expressed by those who teach our children and youth. I feel we have to do more than simply join with other foundational associations.

What I need from you, now, are suggestions as to how, collectively, we can “bring off” such things as those happening at Washington University (St. Louis).
MORAL REALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY

Lance Ternasky

We live in a post-modern world, or so we are told. Within it, every group dictates its own standard of meaning and truth, and communication failures between such groups commonly result from the incommensurability of the languages they rely upon. Given such a world, innumerable, contradictory systems seem likely; each characterized by its ethnocentrism and its difficulty handling cross-group, hard cases.

If this is the world we experience, can we expect the study of ethics to offer anything other than idiosyncrasy? And if this is the most we can expect, then the interminable debates between divergent theoretical camps may be principally viewed as academic exercises. While some may hope that debate will periodically promote clarification, anyone foolish enough to claim that such exchanges could provide access to more universal moral truth would understandably expect derision.

Must we repudiate every vestige of universal moral truth? Must we accept either a variant of the many worlds conception of morality or some rigid standard borne of the fear of skepticism? Must those who claim that certain moral questions can be definitively answered be said to suffer from latent absolutist tendencies and the unresolved desire for a “tidy world”?

One candidate for this task is a revived moral realism, and the variety envisioned in this paper represents the union of the current and independent work of Richard Boyd and Peter Railton. I intend to sketch a workable synthesis of their efforts and to suggest how such a model may resolve certain seemingly intractable moral disagreements.

Both theorists contend that thinkers assent to moral scepticism not from a well-reasoned position but by default. The fear of succumbing to
absolutism or of reverting to an untenable form of logical positivism has pushed many to an unwilling acceptance of relativism in the form of constructed realities. Here they find no palpable moral facts. What they do find is agreement about language only within small and distinct subgroups, even though the moral languages of these groups often display an unusual similarity. This, at times, profound resemblance may be thought a felicitous by-product or an indication that the languages are erected on the same foundation.

The suggestion that diverse moral formulations may share a common ancestry is more than the assertion that they often agree about acceptable outcomes. Rather, it is the claim that moral judgments have ultimate truth values which are discernible within the confines of a real world. As such, these “moral facts” are objective in that they are independent of the opinions of those holding them.

Such statements may be perceived as absolutist. The skeptic may reasonably ask where the realist has been during the discussion of theory-dependence. For it would seem that any attempt to articulate moral facts would be forced to contend with the constraints of the thinker’s theoretical, temporal, and linguistic framework; and this would surely force the argument for moral realism to claim that what we (in this time and place) know to be real, is real, while all previously held notions of real were simply not real. The skeptic could justifiably attack this stance as both indefensible and pretentious.

Fortunately for moral realism, Boyd and Railton reject absolutism and endorse both theory-dependence and indeterminacy. Superficially, this may appear contradictory. Would not this position force realists to claim that there is a real world, but that we cannot know it? The realist must explain how this paradox can be overcome.

Boyd accomplishes this by considering the role of theory dependence in science. He concurs that there is no presupposition-free, scientific method, but rather than weakening science, this realization strengthens it. All science is dependent upon a vast array of theoretical assumptions about everything from unobservables to the nature and operation
of detection and measurement equipment. The combination of these theoretical assumptions function not only to aid in predictive success, but also to suggest ways in which a potentially defective theory must be corrected or why and when it must be discarded. Unlike the logical positivist, the realist willingly ventures into the realm of the theoretical, and in so doing, speculates on the properties and behavior of unobservables which she holds to be theory-independent. This tact permits a scientific flexibility the positivist could not know, and offers the realist a legitimate frame of reference from which to access her practice.²

Despite the admission of theory dependence, the critic may ask why a theory dependent methodology should reveal anything about a theory independent reality. The realist may reply that only her conception is capable of explaining the pronounced reliability of modern science. Science’s success cannot be explained by convention where its ability to predict is merely the product of a circularity of thought and where we find only what our theory predicts. Were this actually the case, notions of progress and revisability would be nonsensical, and the incorrigible difficulties that prompt Kuhn’s widely accepted paradigm shifts would never occur. Conversely, the realist will argue that revisability and progress are anticipated consequences of an orientation that views science as a cumulative process that seeks “successive approximations to the truth.” This movement toward the truth and the concomitant plausibility of the theory are measured not by reference to the theory itself but by the strength of the evidence. Moreover, working theories are capable of producing additional plausible evidence to the extent that they are “relevantly, approximately true”. Although never presupposition-free, relevantly, approximately, true theories are objective to the degree that they point to the discovery of an independent reality. In lay terms, science works not because we have designed it to do so, but because it corresponds to the way things really are.³

If the objectivity of science derives not from adherence to a fixed, known standard but from successive approximation to the truth, then we might consider a comparable objectivity for morality. Were the methods of morality to parallel those of the hard sciences, what types of claims
would have to be made? Alone, the theory-dependence of scientific methodology and the presence of theories that provide epistemic access to an independent reality cannot explain the success of science. Science responds to the promptings of the researcher that come in the form of scientific intuitions. These intuitions are inherently theory-dependent, and correspond to trained judgments. While intuitions may not substitute for observation, they may, given the resultant evidence, be said to be sufficiently near the truth.

If one transfers, as Boyd does, the behavior of science to that of morality, then moral intuitions must be seen as trained judgments derived from interaction with evolving moral theories that are relevantly, approximately true. As observation allows the scientist to check the reliability of her theories, moral observation permits the moral theorist to evaluate the reliability of her intuitions and judgments. If her background theories stand relevantly, approximately, near the truth, then it is reasonable to believe that they may by successive approximation move nearer the truth when bolstered by additional social, scientific, and historical evidence.4

Note that the realist model does not require that science or morality necessarily begin near the truth. Nor does it require that the methods or definitions of either remain permanently fixed, for scientific and moral fruitfulness demand a less determinant stance. What is required is that successive approximation to the truth accompany genuine moral and scientific deliberation.

If asked how realism could imagine that the patterns of science were transferrable to morality, the realist might well answer, “why not?” She would note that the idea that science and morality are incommensurable systems is of quite recent origin. Further, she could reasonably argue that the hard distinction between the two is likely grounded in a suspect fact/value split.5 If non-realists are now questioning the validity of the marked separation of fact from value, then a coherent realism may spell its demise.

Even if we accept the justification of moral realism derived from
Boyd’s philosophy of science, difficulties remain. What would it mean to say that morality was to be judged on the basis of the empirical evidence? Would the realist’s proposal suggest that goodness was a natural property on par with gravity, and if so, would it be the same across cultures and periods? And as a natural fact (in the form of a relevantly, approximately, true proposition), would goodness have commendatory force?

Both theorists address these concerns, but quite differently. For Railton, the argument for a normative goodness must be grounded in an objective nonmoral good. His argument begins by distinguishing between desire and one’s interest. While our subjective interest may be captured by our desire for some thing, there is no reason to believe that the desired entity is ultimately desirable. The actualization of certain desires may well produce catastrophic consequences. Hence, it would be improper to designate something a nonmoral good simply because it was a subjective interest.

Through his lengthy discourse on a hypothetical and marginally dehydrated, foreign traveler, Railton posits the operation of an “objective interest.” A’s unwise desire for a glass of indigestible milk satisfies her subjective interest, but perpetuates her malaise. With the introduction of A-Plus, Railton reveals an “objectified subjective interest” as that vantage point from which we can know what is really in A’s best interest. A’s knowledge of what she would want to want were she in A’s shoes (in this case plentiful, clear liquids) reflects a true desirableness, and it may be said to be an objective interest of A’s. Note that A’s objectified subjective interest becomes A’s objective interest and is, therefore, a nonmoral good for A. The key insight here, however, is that A’s objective interest results not from A’s superior knowledge or enhanced reasoning capabilities, but from what Railton calls the “reduction basis” which contains the facts and interests pertinent to a particular situation. This may appear to be semantic jockeying, but the distinction between a nonmoral good derived from a transcendent, neutral observer and one borne of readily accessible facts is critical to a realist account. It firmly ties the nonmoral good to naturalistic roots in physical and psychological well-being while it allows us to speak of the objective quality of subjective value.
Two complementary views of objectivity in moral realism have been presented. Boyd’s version derives from the perceived similarity between the moral and the scientific. Those intuitions and observations are objective that are obtained by applying theory-dependent assumptions which are sufficiently, relevantly, approximately near the truth. Railton’s reduction basis grounds objectivity in the contextual and dispositional facts surrounding an event. While the origins of objectivity in their arguments differ, their applications of it converge.

In demonstrating how morality might behave as one of the “special sciences”, Boyd utilizes a nonutilitarian consequentialism to develop what he calls “homeostatic consequentialism.” In so doing, he accedes to a model not unlike Railton’s description of the nonmoral good. He asserts that there are a number of unspecified human goods which satisfy human needs. These goods are “clustered” and mutually supporting which mitigates against any single good establishing hegemony. The indeterminacy associated with any evolving science prevents the model from exalting reason or utility or beauty or happiness to the detriment of the others. It strives, instead, for higher levels of homeostatic unity where an individual good is maximized just short of the diminishment of other goods.7

Railton extends the notion of non-moral goodness to consideration of moral norms. In the process, he argues for ought being a special case of the way things are.8 Given the popularity of the fact/value split, this is a rather bold claim. To make it work, Railton postulates “criterial explanations.” In such explanations, the selection of phenomena that most closely approximate the intended criterion are said to possess an ought. The use of aspirin rather than talcum powder to combat a headache is understood as what one ought to do given knowledge of the properties of the two substances.

Patterns that produce an ought are said to be instrumentally rational. They may be derived from formal reasoning, but they are as likely to result from trial and error or chance. Regardless of their source, instrumentally rational behaviors are self-perpetuating and organism-enhancing, while those that lack these properties tend to be
self-defeating. Railton writes, “[i]n such cases we may be said to acquire these habits or strategies because they are more rational, without the intermediation of any belief on our part that they are.” Curiously, these non-deliberative patterns often serve us better than do those derived of explicit reasoning.

These behaviors may display incongruity if they are restricted to immediate wants/needs. It is unlikely that one desires the appointment with the accountant or the surgeon, and yet we may say that she ought to keep such appointments. An understanding of this ought requires an extension of the criterial explanation so as to include what is in a person’s objective interest. We may even say “that facts exist about what individuals have reason to do, facts that may be substantially independent of, and more normatively compelling than, an agent’s occurrent conception of [her] reason.”

Railton makes a strong case for instrumental rationality, but to speak of the rightness implicit in moral norms, the argument must be extended. This final extension converts the instrumental rationality of the individual to that of social rationality. Social rationality reflects the objective interests of all affected persons under conditions of “full and vivid information.” The objective interests revealed are none other than those contained within the conception of nonmoral goodness. Given a societal application of nonmoral goodness, the argument identifies moral rightness as the degree to which nonmoral goodness is approximated.

The convergence of the work of Boyd and Railton must be counted both optimistic and controversial. Neither proposes that the question of moral realism is definitively settled by their respective contribution. Both do, however, admonish colleagues to consider this plausible alternative. Setting aside questions of moral realism’s ultimate verity, what might it resolve?

Consider moral realism’s response to the absence of a worldwide moral consensus. The skeptic may ponder why a plethora of contradictory moral systems operate if there exist moral facts in an independent reality. The realist will suggest that we need not expect consensus.
expectation of such agreement actually has its roots in the acceptance of a monolithic ethical theory. If one believes (or undermines the beliefs of those that do) that the ethical standard is fixed and known, then she will justifiably question why it is not universally held, and she will encounter real disagreements between those immersed in conflicting systems. If, however, she takes a realist stance, she will predict that differing social and environmental conditions will produce disparate moral theories in much the same way that the scientific explanations of divergent cultures differ.

Regardless of whether these conflicting moral systems operate between cultures or within them in the form of intractable disagreement, the realist may address the apparent irreconcilability similarly. She may first try to determine whether the presumed source of the conflict is correctly identified. Do the differences persist because of the imposition of notions foreign in a particular setting? Does the irresolvable quality actually come from an adversarial attitude that precludes systematic discussion of the issues? Are the perceived concerns in question really the source of the disagreement, or do they simply conceal underlying issues that are resolvable? At the very least, the realist’s rejection of presupposition-free theory makes all moral assumptions, judgments, and theories subject to deliberation, and by not compelling morality to adhere to one, preeminent component of a single ethical theory, say, the rule of reason, the realist may find agreement among previously hostile parties.

The possible, eventual agreement may result from the clarification of the real issue or it may be seen as the likely outcome of moral progress. Considering the real issue, it is not surprising that dominant ethical theories often disagree dramatically in principle but converge when making applications to actual cases. Could it be that the explanation lies in a second-order disagreement regarding principles and a first-order agreement regarding purpose. In other words the primary ethical theories actually concur that morality’s ultimate, but unarticulated, purpose is the enhancement of human good through the satisfaction of complex human needs; but separated from this knowledge, they generate principles that are, by nature, coherent but antagonistic.
Although Railton argues that moral realism need not embrace moral progress, the notion of progress fits comfortably with it. This results, in part, from the quite tenable role of progress in scientific realism. In science we find disagreement, but we do not expect it to be permanent, and the realist’s position provides a plausible explanation for why not. In time, the competition between differing scientific conceptions ends, and the victorious formulation is that which most closely approximates the truth. With few exceptions, and contrary to the notion of multiple realities, the more plausible and reliable alternative becomes part of the evolutionary scientific standard.

The skeptic may ask whether moral progress does not suffer from the illusion of a systematic unfolding of truth by shielding its eyes from multiple counter-examples. Referring again to scientific progress, the realist will agree that a systematic unfolding is an illusion, but it is one that has been attached to science by those outside it. Rather than progressing predictably and incrementally, science moves by spurts and some of these represent mistakes that occasion sideways movement or retreat. The process may even appear chaotic to those unable to discern its general direction of motion. Science is better served by the image of the periodically halting and somewhat changeable movement forward of a “thin line of flame advancing across the dry autumnal field” than by any reference to a “cutting edge.”

The case for moral realism is not damaged by apparent counter-examples to moral progress. Examples of moral immobility or regression are unfortunate (and may well be immoral), but they present no real challenge. If we understand moral objectivity to result from successive approximation to the truth via theoretically dependent and relevantly, approximately true judgments while we simultaneously hold a realistic image of how progress functions, then we need only ask the direction the fire is burning.

When we examine general moral history it is difficult to refute that the movement has been in the direction of greater moral sophistication and clarity. This assertion rests not in an imagined theoretical homoge-
neity, but rests instead in the dramatic evidence of change. The physical manifestations (e.g., the emergence of rights, egalitarian sentiments, social and distributive justice) associated with the last three centuries can clearly rival the growth of science in the same period. Placed within the proper temporal framework, the fact that the discord over, say, the issues of abortion and euthanasia appear irreconcilable after only two decades of active debate leads to one question whether these are truly examples of issues that cannot be settled.

That moral progress has not been uniform or that countless examples of inhumanity persist does not weaken the claim for moral realism. Were circumstances capable of discrediting moral realism, we could expect the popular admonition to avoid dark vegetables during pregnancy to prevent birthmarks to invalidate the study of genetics. Further, that certain political regimes have governed such that moral salubrity is conspicuously absent is to provide the correlate to science by edict, and hence, leaves the theory intact.

Note that the representation of moral progress proffered here is not one that claims “every day, in every way, we’re getting better and better.” Although it predicts a trend toward progress, it is silent on the relative rate of movement for different groups. The variety of moral realism described does, however, predict that mistakes will be made, but further expects that when the errors are discovered they will play a role in selecting their successors rather than in defending their standing as permanently ensconced in some supernal theory.

This paper offered one theoretical configuration of moral realism. It sought less to fault the thesis in its formative stages than to reveal the potential richness of this line of research. The, at times, unseemly union of the efforts of Boyd and Railton was necessary to portray a reasonable realist account of moral objectivity. Minimally, this effort has suggested that a morality borne of the belief in the superordinance of human flourishing holds promise for the resolution of certain debates. And of one who remains a skeptic, I would ask what Railton does, namely, to show how a skeptical account of our epistemic or moral practices could be as
plausible, useful, or interesting as the account the naturalist offers, and how a skeptical reconstruction of such practices . . . could succeed in preserving their distinctive place and function in human affairs.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{ENDNOTES}

2. Richard Boyd, \textit{How to be a Moral Realist} Forthcoming, pp. 11-17.
4. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
8. Railton, p. 185.
While enrollment in public and other non-public schools has been decreasing by as much as 40% in the last 25 years, Christian school enrollment has quadrupled and now accounts for as much as 20% of all private school enrollment in the United States, a number which is exceeded only by Catholic parochial schools. Not since the Third Plenary Council of Catholic churches in Baltimore decreed that every church parish establish a school, has there been such a mass exodus from public schools. As part of a religious revival that has come to be known as the “Fourth Great Awakening,” the Fundamentalist school movement has become “the fastest growing branch of private education in America.”1 Religious schools, such as Franciscan missionary schools in the Southwest and Florida and frontier Sunday schools, are nothing new in the history of our country.2 According to a publication put out by the Office of Education, church schools have always played an important part in our national life since our country’s earliest beginnings.3 Catholic, Jewish, and certain Protestant groups such as the Lutherans have a long standing history of private school involvement. What seems so peculiar about the Fundamentalist school movement is that for years Protestants have been content with the public school system. Obviously something has changed in the last 25 years to cause such a widespread and growing sense of dissatisfaction. In order to understand what lies behind the Christian school movement, we need to look at what is important to the Fundamentalists, how extensive the movement is, and some of the reasons for the Fundamentalists’ dissatisfaction with the public schools, paying particular attention to one specific reason. We will also look at whether or not public schools are sectarian as Fundamentalist claim, and whether Christian schools are failing to meet the goals of education as many public school advo-
cates claim. Under goals of education, we will examine the quality of teaching, methods of teaching, and curriculum content. Finally, criticisms of and alternatives to Christian schools will be analyzed.

For the purposes of this paper, Christian schools refer not to Catholic parochial schools or traditional Protestant schools, but to those schools which have been founded by evangelical Protestants, also known as Fundamentalists, who broke away from mainstream Protestant groups earlier in the century. This is important because the reason they broke away also has something to do with the reason they are now leaving public schools en masse. R. Scott Appleby, the Associate Director of the Fundamentalist Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences tells us that Christian Fundamentalism was and is a “reaction against modernizing and liberalizing tendencies in the churches” which questioned the inerrancy of the Bible. Feeling “their distinctive Christian identity to be radically threatened by an enemy from within the ranks,” Fundamentalists responded by leaving mainstream Protestant groups “to form their own churches.” The word, “identity,” is important here for it will come up repeatedly as a motivating factor in the establishment of religious schools, Fundamentalist or otherwise.

Because the Christian School movement tends to be a local phenomena and not part of any “coordinated socio-political movement,” it is difficult to get any reliable figures on the number of schools or students in the country. Many schools, because of their hostile feelings towards bureaucratic control of any kind, refuse to take part in surveys or are just not counted because they belong to no central organization. Different sources give varying estimates ranging anywhere from 4,000 schools and 250,000 students to 18,000 schools and 1,500,000 students. Average enrollment for these schools is between 100 and 200 students. Bruce Cooper, who has studied enrollment trends in private schools, projects that as much as 15% of the school-age population may be in Christian schools by 1990. Below is a distribution of private schools by religious affiliation as of 1978/1979.
### TABLE 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>204,144</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvinist</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>47,269</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>9,849</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>3,269,761</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Orthodox</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2,682</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>76,452</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>14,611</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>101,758</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>217,406</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>11,187</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>12,823</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh-Day Adv</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>148,157</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>231,317</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-affiliated</td>
<td>3,944</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>746,730</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE OF DATA: National Center for Education Statistics Surveys.

Schools listed under “other” and “non-affiliated” account for 26.8% of religious schools. If we add Baptist schools, the percentage comes up to 31.2%. True, all of these are not Fundamentalist schools, but it is safe to say a goodly portion are. These three groups also account for 23.2% of all students enrolled in religious schools.

Up until 1833, when a public school system was established which was theoretically non-sectarian in nature, most schools in this country were established and run by churches. In the case of Protestant schools, the purpose of education at the lower level was to enable individuals to read in order to examine the Scriptures for themselves, and at the higher level, to prepare individuals for leadership roles in government or in the church. With the establishment of public schools, only a “common Christianity” was to be taught. In spite of this noble intention, schools still ended up having a definite Protestant bent and grew to be sectarian in nature. Catholics objected to the use of the King James version of the Bible, a translation commonly used by Protestants, and they also objected to the idea that individuals could search out the truth for them-
selves. While Catholics left the public schools to establish their own, Protestants saw the public schools as a form of “parallel education” in which a “common Christianity” could be imparted to all individuals while the specifics were left up to the different churches to address. For over a hundred years, with the exception of groups such as the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Seventh Day Adventists, Protestants saw no necessity for starting their own schools. Then came the sixties and the seventies. In 1962 and 1963, public prayers and compulsory Bible reading were outlawed from public schools. While it is true that many Christians had been unhappy for a long time over such things as the increasing influence of Darwinism in the schools, these court cases were perceived as the straw which finally broke the camel’s back, leaving the door wide open for secular humanism. The sixties and seventies were the beginning of a time of turmoil which continues until the present day. Everything became relative as morals and values were called into question. Drug use became rampant. God was treated as a myth in schools, and evolution was coming to be taught more and more as an absolute. For Fundamentalists, the relativism which had caused them to leave mainstream churches had invaded all of society, including the public schools. In fact, they saw public schools as the chief disseminators of the ideas that were contributing to the collapse of age-old values and standards. Historian, William G. McLaughlin stated the crisis of the sixties and seventies well when he said,

The ferment of the sixties has begun to produce a new shift in our belief-value system, a transformation of our world-view that may be the most drastic in our history as a nation.

James C. Carper, author of Religious Schooling in America, carries that thought further by commenting,

Although it is too early to assess the total impact of these years of disenchantment and uncertainty, it appears that there has been a collapse of consensus concerning the basic nature and function of our institutions and the values, and traditions undergirding them. Indeed this erosion of consensus may mark a “watershed” in American history. In the words of
Henry Steele Commagli: “Perhaps the sixties and the seventies are a great divide — the divide of disillusionment.”

Along with a feeling that their values and beliefs are under attack, Fundamentalists feel their very “identity” is being threatened. It is a fear which has been shared by all religious groups at one time or another and which has ultimately been the primary reason for the establishment of religious schools as alternatives to public schools. C. Albert Koob of the National Catholic Education Association tells us that the establishment of Catholic parochial schools after 1833 was a natural defensive measure. In like manner, the broad purpose of the Jewish school, according to Norma Hernandez and Jorge A. Descamps, “is to contribute to the continued existence of the Jews as an identifiable group.” Settling in the Midwest in 1839, German Lutherans also began to establish parochial schools in an effort, not only to maintain their identity, but to resist assimilation. The main difference between these groups and the Fundamentalists is simply that for these groups, the struggle for an identity is an old and familiar one. For Fundamentalist Christians, the struggle to preserve an identity is still new and frightening. Until recently, this group has not been in the position of having its beliefs attacked or its identity seriously threatened. Just as a sense of crisis has served to unite other groups in an effort to preserve their sense of identity, so the present crisis is producing the same reaction in Fundamentalist Christians. Hernandez and Descamps wrote that “Jewish identification increases when Jews are attacked.” The same is true of any group. According to one social forecaster, John Naisbitt, the Christian school movement is also a response to “a revival in religious belief and church attendance.” I disagree. I feel, like Hernandez and Descamps, that it is the threat or the crisis which produces an increased urgency to preserve identification and not the other way around. The same is true of countries. Sad to say, it often takes the threat of a war to unite a people.

Exactly how does secular humanism threaten the identity of religious groups? That it does is attested to by commentators such as Descamps who writes of the “powerful new forces of secularism, materialism, and scientism” which are threatening to destroy “Jewish iden-
tity.” Like the Jews, Fundamentalists are also feeling this threat. For those threatened by secularism, the evils of secular humanism are manifested in the writings of John Dewey, leader of the American Humanist Association, publisher of the *Humanist Manifesto* in 1933. According to Dewey,

Faith in a prayer-hearing God is an unproved and outmoded faith. There is no God and no soul. Hence, there are no needs for the props of traditional religion. With dogma and creed excluded, then immutable truth is also dead and buried. There is no room for fixed natural law or moral absolutes.

The fact is that if you deny God as the source of authority, then you are left with man as the authority, and if man is the authority, then any one’s set of values is as good as any one else’s, which is what Dewey is saying when he says that there are no absolutes. Ultimately, you are left with relativism where there are no standards or values. It is this idea which Catholics, Jews, Fundamentalists, and non-Fundamentalist Christians find so objectionable — an idea which actively denies God and promotes man as the center of the universe. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment says, however, that no particular creed is to be advanced over another. There is a vast difference between not teaching about God and teaching that God does not exist. One leaves the belief up to the individual. The other dictates a belief. Charles E. Rice, law professor at Notre Dame, stated the concerns about secular humanism as follows:

If the objecting parents are correct in their claim that the public schools are promoting the tenets of a secular religion, it must be on the basis that the nonjudgmental treatment of moral issues without any affirmation of the supernatural is itself an implicit assertion that contradictory moral positions are equally tenable, that there is no objective and binding moral order, that the supernatural is not a necessary factor in the making of moral decisions. It is not unreasonable to describe such teaching as an implicit affirmation of a position that, in
its relativism and secularism, is authentically religious. The Christian parents’ concern is therefore understandable.\textsuperscript{30}

In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Supreme Court ruled that secular humanism was, indeed, a religion.\textsuperscript{31} Not only is secular humanism a religion, but the Supreme Court further ruled in Abington Township v. Schempp in 1963 that the government could not promote secularism. In the 1986 publication of \textit{Classrooms in Crisis}, the authors go on to state that this would be the case if the teaching of religion were completely forbidden in the schools. Furthermore, it would be impossible to have any meaningful discussion of the social sciences and the humanities if all mention of God and the Bible were eliminated.\textsuperscript{32}

In 1833, public schools tried to achieve non-sectarianism, but in actuality they encouraged Protestantism, and so remained sectarian. In 1990, public schools are again trying to achieve non-sectarianism. They have corrected their earlier mistake, though all Fundamentalists would not agree with me, by eliminating those things which were clearly Protestant in nature. However, they have gone and replaced it with something else which is equally sectarian in nature and that is secular humanism. In so doing, public schools have embraced a set of values and goals which all people cannot embrace. Herein lies the problem. C. Albert Koob pointed out, “The public school . . . is not really neutral, for it gives an equivalent denial to the questions by actually taking another starting point and aiming at another goal.”\textsuperscript{33} As long as public schools stick to secular matters and treat all religious matters objectively, a person should be able to attend in all good conscience. This is not the case however. Teachers feel constantly compelled to state what is truth and what is not truth, when they should be sticking to presenting alternate theories to evolution; there is no reason why evidence for and against evolution cannot be presented. Allow the student to do the thinking and the analyzing. Allow the student to weigh the evidence and make the choices. Isn’t this what liberal education is all about?

According to Joseph H. Fichter, Professor of Sociology and author of a sociological study on the parochial school, the purpose of education
in all schools, whether they be parochial, public, or private is “(a) to transmit to the younger generation the culture with its patterns, institutions and values,” and “(b) to supervise the socialization process whereby the child actively ‘receives’ the culture, that is, adapts himself to, and is adapted to the socio-cultural system in which he lives.” If this is so, then Christian schools along with all parochial schools are accomplishing the purpose of education. They have a set of values to transmit, and they are transmitting those values. Who is to say, in a democratic society, which values are those which are to be imparted? In a pluralistic society, there will be many different sets of values, and in a democratic society, we will have a right to pursue those values as long as they don’t infringe on the rights of others. According to Carper and Hunt, “effective” schools have a “shared sense of mission and values,” something which religious schools certainly do have. A different view of education is presented by Alan Peshkin. In an eighteen month study of a Fundamentalist school in Illinois, he states that, “if ‘education’ is understood by its secularist proponents to involve development of critical skills and inherent human capacities and ‘learning’ seen as an open-ended, fluid, and ongoing process, then Christian schools are engaged less in education, more in indoctrination.” I agree that this may often be the case, but not necessarily so. My own religious training has taught me to be a very critical thinker, not only of secular matters and of the beliefs of others, but of those professed by those of my own faith. I was taught to accept nothing as true, simply because someone says it is so, but to search things out for myself. I would contend that the public schools are often guilty of indoctrination except in unusual schools such as St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland, where students are allowed to discuss information without having a teacher interpret it for them. Public schools, as much as private schools, are concerned with instilling certain values. In the case of secular humanism, definite indoctrination is taking place. If quality is equated as academic excellence on standardized tests such as the Iowa Basic or the SAT, rather than the ingestion of a set of values, students from Fundamentalist schools often do well. This finding is consistent for students from most parochial or religious schools. One explanation that turned up frequently in my readings was that parents of children in private schools are more committed to and involved with
their children’s schools because they have gone to the trouble of choosing these schools. This commitment was seen as an important factor in a child’s success.\textsuperscript{38}

As far as teaching methods, no consistent pattern could be found. Methodology ranged from traditional to individualized. Some schools stressed memorization and recitation, a style of learning consistent with indoctrination while others were into the Montessori style of teaching and encouraging creativity. Some used secular texts, and some used standardized Christian curricula.\textsuperscript{39} At Covenant School in upstate New York 80\% of the teachers have MAs from secular colleges. Yet, many Christian schools do not have certified teachers. One case involving the certification of teachers and other state controls on private schools raged in the courts and legislative assemblies of Nebraska for two years, between 1982 and 1984. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights refused to become involved, saying that it was a case for the state to decide. Fundamentalists from many states lent their moral support to Faith Baptist Church in Louisville, Nebraska. Automatic dialing machines were installed in the church basement, and intensive lobbying efforts were launched. Fathers went to jail. At one point, the President of the United States stepped in and called for a speedy resolution to the problem. Ultimately, it was decided that teachers of private schools in Nebraska did not have to be certified, but merely pass a competency test. As of 1980, 13 states required certification, 13 did not, and for 24, certification was optional.\textsuperscript{40}

Curriculum content for Christian schools is just as widely divergent, but some things are common to all. All are centered upon Jesus Christ and the Bible. All teach science from the creationist point of view, and all teach moral values based on Biblical teachings.\textsuperscript{41} In Peshkin’s and Susan Rose’s studies of two Fundamentalist schools, they found such things taught as the infallibility of the Bible, a universe of order, obedience to authority, a rigorous moral code, a total world, and one truth for all humanity once delivered. They also saw a desire for a moral and spiritual control over the family. Rose stated that many were premillennialists which led to a passive withdrawal from the world.\textsuperscript{42} In
writing of Peshkin’s and Rose’s studies, R. Scott Appleby of the University of Chicago stated that Fundamentalists selectively used scriptures to support Biblical inerrancy and that they were opposed to scientific examination of the Scriptures. From my own experience, I would have to disagree with both statements. It may be true of the school which Peshkin examined, but I know it is not true of all Fundamentalist schools.

When it comes to criticisms, many have been launched against Christian schools. They have been accused of producing subservient people incapable of critical thinking. In Peshkin’s words, “the organizational tyranny” he found in Bethany school served to create a “closed universe.” Some fear that Christian schools are divisive, producing people who are not tolerant of the views of other people in a pluralistic society. Peshkin felt this was because Christian schools were “predicated on a sense of crisis” and therefore needed an enemy. He stated that the teaching he witnessed at Bethany was very hostile towards non-Fundamentalists and non-Christians. Susan Rose feels that the appeal of Christian schools is based on little more than the fact that they attempt to provide absolute answers in a time when there are no absolute answers. The most recurring criticism though and the one which I thought was most deserving of being examined more closely was the accusations made by Appleby of separatism and passive withdrawal from the world. It is a criticism which was echoed by other individuals and with which I concur. William H. Willimon of Duke University Divinity School states the problem succinctly when he says,

In too many communities, parents who are talented, educated, committed Christians have withdrawn their children (along with their time, talent, and prayers) from the public schools without a thought for their responsibilities as their brothers’ keeper. Without children in the public schools, they have little interest in the needs of public education....Certainly there is much wrong in today’s public schools — mostly the same things that are wrong with our society as a whole. Christian parents have good reason to feel alarmed over many recent developments in public education. But who will improve it?
What kind of society will we have if all Christians abandon the public school?\textsuperscript{44}

Donald Erickson voiced the same concern but in slightly different words. He saw private schools as jeopardizing the ability of public schools to provide all individuals an equal opportunity to receive an education, for he says,

If children of most concerned parents leave public schools for private ones, the social climate in the public schools will hardly be conducive to effective learning, especially in disadvantaged areas.\textsuperscript{45}

Parents may have a lot more control than they realize in shaping public schools. The Oregon case or the Pierce case of 1926 did more than establish the right of parents to send their children to private schools. It established the right of parents to have some control over the education of their children. As parents, we need to fight for all children and not just our own. One way to do this is to know the law and the rights that each of us have. The Fourteenth Amendment which states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law,” has been judged by the courts to include the right of privacy which includes “the rights of parents to direct and control the upbringing of their children, subject to minimal control by the state.”\textsuperscript{46} Along the same line, the Hatch Amendment, a federal statute, also allows parents voice when they believe that their religious or moral beliefs have been violated. Another statute which is included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits individuals to sue in federal court if their civil rights have been violated by the state. Civil rights would include the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of religion listed in the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{47} The loss or denial of certain freedoms which we have been guaranteed by the Constitution occurs far more frequently in public schools than does the violation of religious beliefs. Merely being exposed to beliefs contrary to our own does not place one in the position of committing a sin. The same freedoms that allow others to express beliefs with which we disagree also allow us the right to express our beliefs. In a
pluralistic and democratic society, these are rights which we must fight to preserve. What generally happens is that these rights are threatened and our voice denied — not that we are made to violate our religious beliefs. One example is the case of Williamsport v. Bender in which students sued the school because they were not allowed to use the facilities after hours for religious purposes. The court ruled that the Free Exercise clause was not violated because the students were still free to meet elsewhere. However, their right of free speech had been denied. The landmark case of Vincent v. Widmer which involved a similar situation, was also decided on the grounds of free speech, not free exercise. Burron points out that it is conceivable that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could also have been used to argue these cases.48 In Classrooms in Crisis, a book dealing with parents’ rights and the public schools, the authors list two tests to determine whether the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause have been violated by a law. The Establishment Clause test was established by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. The questions are as follows:

(1) Does the law have a secular purpose?
(2) As its primary effect, does the law advance or inhibit religion?
(3) Does the law excessively entangle the government with religion?

The second, the Free Exercise test established by Wisconsin v. Yoder, an Amish case is similar:

(1) Does the individual or group have a sincere religious belief?
(2) Does the law impose a substantial burden upon the exercise of that belief?
(3) Does the government have a compelling interest (such as health, safety, or national security) that cannot be achieved by any less restrictive means?49

Just as Fundamentalist parents have rights they may not be aware of, states are also endowed with rights, and those rights include the right to protect the interests of all their citizens. Fundamentalist parents must
remember that while “no citizen should be compelled to support any religious worship” (part of Jefferson’s preamble to the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, 1785-86), others are also entitled to express their beliefs. In the court case involving the Faith Baptist Church in Nebraska, the belief was stated by some of its members that they were not bound by men’s laws, but only by the laws of God. They also asked what right the state had to tax and oversee a ministry of the church. In his letter to the Romans, the apostle Paul plainly teaches, however, that the government has the right to rule, enact laws, punish evildoers, and levy taxes (Rom. 13:1-7). The tax-exempt status that most churches enjoy is a privilege — not a right. The Scriptures also teach that Christians are to obey these laws, and as much as it lies within their ability to do so, to live at peace with all men (Titus 3:1, Rom. 12:18). Furthermore, the Bible differentiates between the realm of the government and the realm of the church (I Tim. 3:15, I Thess. 1:8, Mk. 16:15). When churches begin to get into the business of such things as secular education, the result is split churches, and those energies which were intended to be directed towards spiritual matters are diverted into the things of the world. George Sverdrup (1848-1907), a spokesman for the Danish Lutherans, who split with the German Lutherans over the matter of schools, charged that “God...had vested, not the church, but the state with the responsibility of training children in secular matters.” Obviously, this is a matter which will not be reconciled since church schools have been with us since the inception of this country, but whether an individual believes it is scriptural to establish a church which provides secular education or not, the fact remains that there are alternatives. We live in a country where it is possible to work within the system to bring about changes, and yes, we are our brothers’ keeper. We can not fulfill our responsibility to our brother by withdrawing from the world. At the same time, we also deny ourselves a chance to exercise our First Amendment rights of free speech. Where the laws of God and man do conflict, then, of course, a person must obey the higher authority and accept the consequences. But even this action can bring about changes. State governments are often very susceptible to the demands and needs of their citizens. Some may guarantee a moment of silence (though why this should need to be legislated eludes me), some may guarantee religious groups equal access to public
facilities (this became mandatory in September with the passing of a federal law), some allow “release time” to take students out of school a few hours a week for religious instruction, and some even go as far as avoiding scheduling homework for Wednesday nights when many churches have their mid-week Bible studies.53

In summary, the Fundamentalist movement is a reaction to the replacement of Protestant values in public schools with the values of secular humanism. While the schools need to stand firm on the issue of keeping certain things out of the schools such as mandatory prayers, the Fundamentalist has a right to object to the teaching of such things as secular humanism to the exclusion of all other beliefs, and they have a right to protest the denial of their rights to free speech and equal treatment under the law. Establishing private schools is one way of dealing with the problem, but it is not the only way.

ENDNOTES

1. R. Scott Appleby, “Keeping Them Out of the Hands of the State: Two Critiques of Christian Schools,” American Journal of Education, Nov. 1989, p. 63. The first three “Great Awakenings” were 1730-1760, 1790-1840, and 1890-1920 and were, respectively, reactions to a national church, a missionary spirit, and the Industrial Revolution and Darwinism, (p. 79).
5. Appleby 63.
6. Appleby 63-64.
12. Erickson 1451.
15. Hernandez 1608.
17. Hernandez 1608.
22. Appleby 63, 80.
23. Applyby 925.
27. Carper 118.
29. Appleby 64.
30. Carper 117.
32. Burron 69.
33. Burron 926.
35. Fichter 114.
36. Applyby 66, 70.
37. Appleby 66.
38. Erickson 1452.
39. Appleby 73, 77-78.
40. Robert C. O'Reilly and Beverly B. Fellman, Freedom for Religious Education and Regulation of Schools by the State, Paper presented at the An-
Clausia Guthrie

Annual Meeting of the Nationwide Conference of Professors of Educational Administration, (Orono, ME, Aug. 1984), pp. 3-6 (ERIC ED 251 930).

41. Carper 113-114.
42. Appleby 63, 68, 70, 76, 81.
43. Appleby 70, 72-73, 81.
44. Carper 119.
45. Erickson 1452.
47. Burron 23.
48. Burron 34.
52. Carper 36.
53. Burron 24-25.
WHY THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF A COMMUNITY-ORIENTED UNIVERSITY IS STILL MODERN

Achim Köddermann

Seek simplicity and distrust it.
- A. N. Whitehead

This essay examines the medieval concept of the university, explores applications and lessons for contemporary institutions, and attempts to show how the maxim “publish or perish” is both a legitimate goal and a dangerous limitation of an enlightenment-oriented university. The modern university runs the risk of falling into “confusion and a cultural chaos which invites new dogmatic creeds of a lower level to bring discipline into life and education.”¹ The university is in a conceptual and financial crisis. This crisis can be overcome by a return to some of its origins. In particular modern institutions of higher education — if they are to survive — must rediscover some very old principles regarding the “public” role of the university. It would be vain to attempt to surpass such historical studies as Hasting Rashdall’s The Universities of Europe and the Middle Ages.² However, to hold on to the values of the original university might allow to cope with the current crisis.

The crisis of the university is one of the perennial problems of this century. Views which assert that history has come to an end and that the West is in decline have fueled this crisis. Such “post-post-isms” make a common assertion — all claims have lost their value. The search for originality seems to have stopped; decadence seems to be cherished; history of philosophy has replaced active philosophy; the search for truth has been widely succeeded by the search for funding and money, and the distance between scientific research and life seems to be growing. The more specialized research becomes, the less its results become accessible to the public. Cultural pessimism has become one of the few common attitudes of Western society and its universities. Not even the agreement that we disagree seems possible. The crisis is not in the university, but in Western society itself. The foundation of the university, which
tries in vain to identify the core of its teachings, and the foundation of society, which equally lacks orientation or commonly accepted values, seem to both slip away. The expression of the crisis of the university as an institution no longer takes the form of a student revolt as in the sixties of this century — or the twenties of the thirteenth century. Those who set fire on the tires in 1968 (in Germany or France) very shortly after set fire to their ideas. Assimilation transformed some of the European university revolt leaders into party leaders, show stars, or even conservative professors. In the U.S., Mario Savio e.g. turned into a mail clerk. Yesterday’s revolutionary idealism seems to have achieved little for the challenges of tomorrow. Today’s financial crisis, linked with a deep crisis of confidence and credibility, urges all universities to reflect on their role in and for communities which are increasingly unable or unwilling to pay for their development or maintenance.³

This situation has been compared by Umberto Eco and others to the “dark” medieval times. The lack of orientation, the belief that we are at the (possible) end of all times, the fear of unmastered plagues, growing violence, the wish for a new world order, and the hope for and belief in new saviors are subjects our time shares with the “times of transition” we like to call the “Middle Ages.”⁴ If we try to trace the roots of modern times, we will have to look for their spiritual roots. For the Western world, these are to be found in the emerging institutions and communities which we still cherish today — the universities. Today, as in medieval times, due to rapid social changes and intense social conflicts, communities look for common public solutions. Then, as now, generally accepted answers could not come from an imposed form of authority, as defined by those in power, but only from authority arising from free exchange and discourse. The crisis of the university today could be seen as a result of its loss of independence, flexibility, and availability for the community. It can be seen as one aspect of a loss of rationality and critical distance which is more problematic today than in the Middle Ages. Today, the concept of participatory democracy is — at least nominally — universally accepted. However, the very capacity required for participation in the democratic process, the capacity for significant choice, seems to be in danger. The paradox to be addressed is the following:
how can we assume equal responsibility in a society which bases its decisions on the findings of an elite of experts? This paper tries to point out how to overcome the following contradiction, which arises from the combination of the concept of the autonomy of every citizen on one hand with the elitist concept of a paternalistic elite of experts on the other hand. It can only be overcome by a reconsideration of the roots of the university.

From the Public Origins of the University to Academies for Elites

It is possible to trace the origins of the idea of the university to two ancient schools of thought. In the Socratic-Platonic form of higher education, the academies had the ideal of knowledge or truth as an aim; this aim remains unchanged in most modern academies. In the Sophist variant of higher education, the focus is on the “know how.” For most sophists, the utility of knowledge was perceived as the high road to success; today this approach can still be perceived in debating societies or in business and law schools. Despite their differences, all these schools with different aims shared a common interest in providing and teaching generally acceptable answers. In the dialogue Meno e.g., Plato calls for more research and teaching in both lines.

However, in order to understand the modern form and purpose of the university, one should examine primarily its origins in medieval society. The founding of the first Western universities around the year 1200 parallels the coexistence of both the “dark” side of medieval times, and the resurgence of autonomous communities. The foundation of the first “free” university at Bologna and its French and English counterparts at Paris and Oxford helped to reinstall public discourse in the form of public discussion. This discussion, possible in the framework of the early universities, was dedicated not to biased opinions but to the discovery of supposedly “valid,” generally acceptable answers. The university with its quasi-democratic structures was “free” in the sense of guaranteed privileges which sheltered the community of scholars both in and from the larger community in which the university was embed-
ded. In this sense, the German saying “town air makes free” applied to the early universities. Ideally, “might” had to give place to “right.” As self-governed organizations, universities were granted freedom of research and teaching. In exchange, they spread knowledge which enhanced the reputation — and eventually the wealth and political importance — of the community that sheltered them.

From its beginning, the university had as highest goals the quest for truth and its teaching. The *alma mater* developed, however, in two distinct ways. The institution of Bologna could achieve its position from a loose association of independent legal scholars. Slowly, an autonomous, self-governing law school developed as response to the crisis of authority arising out of a void in orientation. This lack of clear direction was caused by the conflict between the church and the emperor over the ultimate power and command over the Roman Empire. The French “Sorbonne” grew from different theological schools and developed its teachings in harmony with, or under the direct influence of, the governing authorities. Notwithstanding the differences in standards of academic freedom, a vivid intellectual exchange guaranteed that the standards of knowledge and teaching were equally high at Paris and at Bologna. The extension of the horizon by the inclusion of other faculties in the *studium generale* allowed to broaden what started as isolated research and teaching.

A common feature in the founding of all early universities is their link with the burgeoning communities, through which they could preserve or gain intellectual and material independence as the cities developed. At the end of the twelfth century, universities appeared at different places in Europe simultaneously with the emergence of communities and cities. It is not mere coincidence that the city counsel of Bologna from 1166 to 1177 was called *universitas populi Boloniae*. The name indicates the origin of universitas from a corporation or craftsmen’s guild, not from an aristocratic society. The use of robes and insignia such as the rector’s or chancellor’s official chain are surviving elements of the communal origins of the university structures. The deliberate unification of different groups in a common structure led to the oldest surviving
forms of corporate organization in the West. Many “guilds” of research- and teaching-oriented scholars joined forces; the principle was universality in diversity. This diversity was mirrored by the different “nations” or *nationes* of which the university was composed. Their purpose was to organize both professors and students according to their origin. The diversity of guilds, different in aims but equal in rank, was preserved in the quasi-international and quasi-democratic structures of the universities.\(^\text{10}\)

It is no accident that universities appeared at a time when the conflict between the “Hohenstaufen” Emperors (Frederick Barbarossa and Frederick II) and the papacy left the entire population without orientation. In this struggle for power among the supreme authorities, a third independent institution was needed in order to fill the gap. The legendary “Four Doctors” (Bulgarus, Martinus, Jacobus, Hugo) helped to establish a reliable authority in the arising university culture. Its force was not built on any form of political power or ecclesiastical dogma, but on the recovery of the principle of “true knowledge” as the yardstick for the acceptance of their research and teachings. Part of this knowledge, however, was not new, but founded in the Roman legal heritage. Their research and teaching linked the partially lost tradition of Roman Law with ‘modern’ medieval legal needs. Their authority was not founded solely on knowledge, but on the capacity of the university to build a bridge between knowledge and the needs of society. The early university gained its value for the community by its independence. The withdrawal from immediate practical responsibilities enabled the universities to fulfill their role for the community — the critical reappraisal, renewal and reorientation of the cultural heritage and its reorientation for both the student and society.

*Universitas*, in its original meaning, is the name for any corporation with the capacity to have legal standing in court. *Universitas studii* names the association of legally free, independent scholars and masters. In the disintegrating medieval society, the twofold purpose of the university is to provide protection (externally) and order (internally) for its members. As *universitas magistrorum et scholarium*, it was not born out of a desire for democracy, but out of the need to give an unstructured
body enough constancy to be able to fulfill these two functions. It can be considered successful in both endeavors. First, most societies, be it in Bologna or Paris, started as private associations — and could uphold the standard of education by the adaptation of the individual needs to a common standard (trivium/quadrivium, rules for the defense of a master’s thesis). Second, they achieved a relative independence from both the communities they stemmed from and the authorities under which they lived. The emancipation from authority in Paris had to be fought through against the chancellor of the Bishop, but was widely achieved and documented after less than a hundred years of struggle. In Bologna, the fear of excessive internal stabilization of order and non-scholarly individual interest led to a structure which made the doctores employees of the foreign scholars. The structure of the original universities was perpetuated even in the form of later foundations of papal or ducal universities by the governing authorities themselves in order to counter the influence of the free and independent universities. All universities, whether free from or dependent on approval by those in power, had and have to meet the high standards established by the first, community-oriented, free institutions. Together, through competition, they led and lead to a higher degree of scholarship and security without the necessity to sacrifice the freedom of academic research.11

It is interesting to note that the “anniversary” of most early institutions gives the wrong impression of a willed act of foundation. Only those foundations which came later than 1200, as reaction to already existing institutions, were planned.12 The oldest institutions, however, grew out of a process. They were formed organically and not “founded” in a literal sense. The original idea of the university did not include buildings and fixed structures. As subtenants of churches, convents or hospices, the buildings in which the early universities functioned were spread all over the community. As free associations of interest, universities depended not on aristocratic rule or rigid centralization. Instead, scholars gathered informally, following the simple principles of common interest embodied in a loose convivial structure. In this context, the constant battle of contemporary universities to regain or defend their academic freedom against all forms of centralized administration takes
on new significance. Disputations among scholars served not to annoy the defendant of a thesis, but to assemble all present possible knowledge. The aim was to find through common efforts a better solution for problems of common interest. Under conditions of conviviality, the lonely scholars could find the necessary resources and contacts and uphold themselves against all kinds of external pressures.

The early universities could thus be seen as an appropriate response to the Investiture Contest after 1076. However unplanned, but not unorganized, this form of association of scholars was born out of the crisis resulting from the collapse of public order. In this context, it is important to underline the spontaneous character of such a creation out of local initiative — with the declared purpose not to have an institution for its own sake, but as a counterweight (in the case of Paris) to the most powerful man of the city. The very birth date of the University of Paris can be traced back to the victory of its universitas studii over the chancellor. It was codified and documented by King Philip August in 1200. It was slowly widened in 1208 by the official recognition of the independence of all scholars. Here, the word universitas was used for the first time in its present sense. The recognition of full autonomy of the whole body of the university of Paris, as revised charter (reformatio studii), followed shortly in the years 1213 and 1215.

This relative autonomy could only be achieved through the democratization of the structure of the university. It led first to the election of boni homines who served as representatives, legitimized by the authority from those below who had voted them in office. However, since this body formed only a minority in a larger body, the decisions or solutions proposed by this minority were then taken to the whole community — supported by all in the concivor parlamentum. This form of collaboration between university and community might not have been — or be — perfect; however, it involved both in a common decision-finding process.

Scholars attempted to systematize legal (and theological) thinking, to elaborate basic ideas with clarity, to integrate new knowledge
into an old framework, and to eliminate irrelevancies. From their beginnings in Bologna and in Paris, the universities fulfilled their role as a marketplace of ideas. These ideas were presented to the general public through public discussions. The results of such discussions were later summarized in a written Summa. These written summaries were widely spread and thus publicized by the exchange of teachers and students all over Europe. Thus, the influx of so-called “new” knowledge, coming from Africa or the Latin West, could be incorporated by means of the university into society. Through this exchange of ideas, even remote communities got in touch with the relevant concepts, doctrines and discussions. On the one hand, knowledge had, through the university as medium and agent, a direct impact on the life of the community which was, on the other hand, the condition for its existence. Both sides gained from this symbiotic relationship. The major task of translating the works of Aristotle and others meant not only literally translating from the Greek or Arab into Latin (as Lingua Franca), but also the translation of the meaning of these texts into the contemporary context. Furthermore, the university was a place of exchange. Knowledge about everyday life, politics, theology, and science was translated from theory to practice. The results of this academic work benefitted the host community in many ways: it brought fame and income to the city, enlarged the population, increased its political weight and, last but not least, provided guidance.

Urbanization and academic freedom went hand in hand. It was only when this stage of academic freedom in and from an urban environment was achieved that the schools had emancipated themselves (from their origins as law-schools or cathedral-schools) and could be called “universities.” Only a universal, quasi-unrestricted exchange of points of view could produce “objective” answers. The goal of objectivity, based on public discourse, was and is deeply linked with the elaboration of academic rules that guarantee free access to those who accept these rules. The world of the medieval university was far from perfect, but it provided an internationally-oriented frame in which the opposition between local interests on the one hand, and the interest of more globally oriented traveling educators and students on the other led to a compromise acceptable to both.
What were and are the practical gains that the community can derive from an institution focused on scholarly aims? The question “What do WE gain from a university?” was (and is) difficult to answer because in medieval times the university’s goals did not relate the quest for truth to the immediate interests of the community. The mentioned translation never fulfilled the direct wishes or needs of the immediate community. Such a correlation would threaten the “academic freedom” of the university. However, ideally, the university could spread its academic climate, including parts of different racial or national origin into one common structure. In the crisis of a multicultural and diverse society in which the rules were and are quickly changing, the university, as a forum of ideas, could help establish new rules. In fact, the medieval university achieved a core of common teachings that allowed the student and the professor to change universities, places, and even countries without significant problems. The core of teachings, as a result of a steady discussion of its content, was common all over Europe. Conventionally, we would have to assume that such an unanimously accepted core of teachings was not founded in the university as institution, but in the tradition of the Catholic Church. We must not forget, however, that the process of finding the necessary compromise was only possible through long philosophical disputations — which included thinkers of all origins or nationalities. That the possibility of academic exchange outlived the religious wars shows that the universality of the university as institution was not entirely founded on the assumption of a homogeneous Christian culture. From this we could assume that already the original idea of the university was not linked to its immediate host community alone, but also to the community and society at large. The idea of the early university was already linked with a concept of tolerance. Nevertheless, the slow decline of universality emerges with a decline of religious tolerance in communities and universities alike.

The role of the university as a forum for the international exchange of ideas slowly got lost. Starting with the 16th century Protestant Reformation and the later attempts of Counter-reformation, the emphasis changed from the “universal” to the “particular.” The more it became a goal of the university to educate the youth in a particular loyalty to a
nation, an idea or a religious denomination, the less the ideal of independ-
ience or “universality” could be upheld. Doctrinal commitments were
creasingly a condition for research and teaching, and the free exchange
between the universities could not prevent partiality any longer. Loyalty
to truth was replaced by loyalty to the goals, aims and denominations of
the community of those who governed it. A high tide of intolerance
might initially have strengthened the community. However, ‘in the long
run’ the elimination of all opposition blocked research and the value of
its teachings for the community as well. The more higher education got
involved in direct commitments to the immediate goals of the commu-
nity, which were taught in all forms of narrow-minded nationalism, the
more it lost its independence and its impact beyond the limits of its re-
stricted community.18

A further reason which made the university abandon the open struc-
ture, prevalent at the time of its medieval origins, and to adopt its “mod-
ern” forms, was an increased emphasis on research. It remains tempting
for academics to claim that the quest for knowledge must never be dis-
graced by contact with the realities of or struggles within society. Fur-
thermore, there was always the temptation to limit and regulate access to
knowledge supposing that only those with very special abilities and the
required (social or educational) background can and should profit from
higher education. As a consequence, it was logical to attempt to limit the
highest level of research to the few representing excellence in their field.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, new elitist patterns
adapted the hereditary structure of the old feudal system to the univer-
sity. Birth as guarantee for status in society is replaced by achievement.
This leads to the paradoxical ideal of the career open to “talent,” which
holds that “everyone should have an equal chance to become unequal.”19
Aristocracy in research replaced community oriented teaching. During
the middle ages, all scholars, from the B.A. to the professor, had to de-
defend and dispute their thesis in public. The new elite of academic re-
search limited research and the disputatio of its results to their circle. It
was logical as well to push the denial of the importance of teaching one
step further. For the benefit of academic research alone the renaissance
of “Academies” granted the research elite freedom from the “lower”
duties of teaching. In their modern, not Platonic meaning, “Academies” were — and are — conceived as erudite societies. Their aim was not so much the instruction of the public, but the advancement of culture, literature, arts and sciences through its most brilliant or most powerful representatives. Academies of research, focusing on the progress of sciences rather than teaching, can trace their tradition for more than seven centuries. Following Brunetto Latini’s example in the late 13th century, especially the foundation of the Academia Platonica by Cosimo de’ Medici in 1442 in Florence, all other European academies elevated research over teaching. Most prominent still are the English Royal Society and the Academie Francaise, dating back to the 17th century. Both exist today, under a different organizational structure, but operate under the same concept. Their aim is to gather outstanding personalities merely to promote knowledge, without any contact with the community. Consequently, these academies address the public not through public discourse, but solely through their scholarly publications.

Research in academies, in which research implied no teaching responsibilities, offered a model of centralized planning. The concentration of knowledge in the academies allowed both a centralized planning and the organization of society on the one hand and the tighter control on research on the other hand. Due to the aristocratic structure, this form of research seems to safeguard a high standard of knowledge. These academies, when understood in an elitist manner, suppose that progress of society is fostered primarily by scientific or scholarly publications. But can this fulfill the quest for knowledge by the citizenry in a democracy? If, as Aristotle puts it in the opening words of the Metaphysics, “All men by nature desire to know,” can knowledge be restricted to the small elite of those few ‘capable’ of research? The devaluation of teaching and the elevation of scholarly research is still alive and has led to the principle “publish or perish.” Frequently, this principle, as based on quantitative data, governs American universities more than the appreciation of quality in publication or teaching. The number of publications is often mistaken for their significance as — to a lesser degree — the number of students and their subjective responses are sometimes mistaken for objective quality-standards. The medieval standards focused less on the
quantity, but more on the quality of the results. Fame and recognition depended more on the impact of both publications and teaching than on figures.

Notwithstanding, one sign of — medieval — hope is still to be observed. Even the most extensive number of publications does not lead to recognition by the larger academic community which transcends the specifics of the particular campuses. Utopians could imagine that this international dimension will eventually (re)form the ideal university. In this superior sense, the original idea of the university goes beyond the reality of any past or subsisting institution. With Nietzsche’s *Ecce Homo*, the “idea” of the university could claim: “I have not yet come to my time; some are born posthumously.” However, optimism has to be limited. Once the flood of publications leads to “tenure” at the desired institution — an unknown security at Bologna — the incentives to search for national or international recognition diminish. If the institution in question is highly regarded, this corrective does not apply at all. Who could dare to compare the judgement of “immortals” from the Académie Française or similar institutions with anybody else?

The elitist conception of the role of the university as a “research institution” derives from the conception of elite academies. For the U.S. scholarly tradition, it is mainly rooted in the founding of the University of Berlin in 1810 in accordance with the plans of Wilhelm von Humboldt whose name it bears today. Following Berlin and the example of the University of Göttingen, U.S. and English institutions adopted the German research-orientated standards. This “heroic ideal” was always “in conflict with the modern world.” It tried to overcome the medieval influences which “atrophied in a trade-guild mentality.” The “Humboldtian” university mastered the tension between the conflicting ideals of aristocracy through elitism on the one side and extension of knowledge through teaching on the other by an appeal to authority. The dominance of research over (undergraduate) teaching guaranteed the university that its place would not be endangered by the rise of other academic institutions. The adoption of the academic ideal gives the leading U.S. universities a research atmosphere still close to the German academic ideal.
This German academic ideal is built on the concept of the public use of reason derived from Immanuel Kant’s teachings about what “Enlightenment” should mean in a society which tries to escape from the bindings of “self-inflicted tutelage.” Deeply rooted in this concept of enlightenment is the distinction between the private and the public use of reason. For Kant, the private use of reason by the individual must be limited in ordinary life. From a Kantian perspective, both the soldier and the priest, in their lives as “private” people, should obey first. Everyday life does not leave space for ample reflection. One can alter the circumstances of private life only through criticism after the act. The use of public reason, which is meant to reflect on misuse or misconceptions through “scholarly publications,” is supposed to better society and guarantee progress. Thus, it is not the freedom of press or the wide distribution of knowledge, which is hoped to lead to the alteration and improvement of society. The goal is that the written dialogue in the erudite society — as in academies or other scholarly institutions — would be sufficient to constitute a new public opinion. It is supposed that the community of scholars with mutual critique by their peers is enough to guarantee public progress. The discussion is limited to scholarly publications as sole representatives of the public to be “enlightened.” The paradox of this position is to be found in the hidden claim that one has to be already enlightened in order to achieve further enlightenment. Furthermore, such a position is designed for an authoritarian society with only a small elite of influential scholars. It is a concept unfit for a democracy built on general participation of a broad public in the decision-making process.

This conception of community includes the elitist belief that it is enough for a society’s experts to work things out in theory in order for them to work out in practice. Further, it supposes that the aim of research is reached once its results are published. This concept seems to govern the American University-Press system. The Kantian elitist notion of progress in science, through scientific discussion, could be tailored for a society where everybody is already enlightened. However, even for Kant it was impossible to speak about an enlightened age; it would be naive to wish for our present times to aim higher. This is a
problem if we consider that in a democratic society the public should decide on changes and improvements of the future of society. This goal finds itself in an inherent contradiction with the concept of a dialogue of scientists as cherished by the academic community. Furthermore, this common use of the concept of “public discourse” omits the fact that the flood of publications has led to an information glut. Consequently, this information cannot be processed, not even by the most “enlightened” mind. To make the choice of literature more important than its content was certainly not Kant’s aim. Nor is the inflation of articles, arising from the “publish or perish” principle necessary for profound thinking. Rather, it leads to a proliferation of old ideas in new shapes which try to attract attention by non-scientific criteria. The criteria may range from shocking titles to informal arrangements like “I quote you, so you quote me.” Neither of these extremes allows a meaningful discourse. Ultimately, “show” cannot replace content. The results of such research are widely incomprehensible even for an informed public.

It is ironic that the same Americans who founded their country on the rejection of European traditions, intolerance, prejudices and aristocratic distinctions finally accepted an educational system based on modern European, rather than medieval values. Key institutions like Amherst considered themselves as “nurseries of piety.” The Christian ministry, not general education, was the sole perspective. Similarly, the pre-university education in Europe had seen the artes liberale as mere preparation for theology. Most of these colleges tried to shape young minds only according to the goals of their own community. Whereas the medieval university lived in the steady conflict of ideas, of different “nationes” and origins, the early American colleges and universities excluded such conflicts by separation. Even Jefferson, in his attempt to open up education and to reform the university, did not realize the contradiction that was built into the system. On the one hand, we find the rejection of European aristocratic attitudes, or the ideal of an education open to all. On the other hand, the aristocratic aims of higher education (which was copied from European examples, but rejected in theory) were imitated in practice. Jefferson’s Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge in 1778 is not to be reconciled with the attempt to “remodel
the alma mater” he attended into a research institution following the “enlightenment”-inspired European model. Education in U.S. universities would be improved, according to Jefferson, if Americans attempted “to draw from Europe the first characters of science.”

**Medieval Hopes and Fears for a Modern University**

If one is ready to accept that it is possible to criticize the modern idea of the university from the point of view of its medieval archetype, the question remains: what qualitative norm does the university as an institution provide today? American universities, as most of their Western counterparts, still cherish a quasi-aristocratic model of education on the one hand and the objective of open access on the other. Quantitative criteria determine the degree of excellence of an institution in both domains. Today, universities often perceive student enrollment figures as well as student data response as the most relevant indicator of quality. Similarly, the number of publications or the percentage of Ph.D.’s on its staff are meant to provide the criteria for its academic qualification. These quantitative requirements are neither compatible with each other nor with the original idea of the university. There is a split in the university between its attempt to popularize culture and the elitist part of its structure. The crisis stems from the inherent contradiction between these two ideals. The contradiction is not that obvious in the modern American university, because, unlike the academy of Athens, which was in a garden close to the city, most U.S. universities today are gardens of quietness outside the city. The parallel of the contemporary university is not to the medieval university, integrated into community life, but to the medieval *monastery* in its total seclusion. The best framework for the “nurseries of piety” mentioned above could be furnished far from a heterogeneous community, in ‘splendid isolation’ As Umberto Eco puts it:

Nothing more closely resembles a monastery (lost in the countryside, walled, flanked by alien, barbarian hordes, inhabited by monks who have nothing to do with the world and devote themselves to their private researches) than American universities.
The monastic analogy can be pushed further. As a lay brother or monk in a medieval monastery is kept apart from the life of the community at large, most contemporary universities place their undergraduate teaching apart from separately cloistered research. Initiation into true knowledge is reserved to those happy few at very isolated ivy-league schools which will become the next generation of researchers, for themselves, not for the community or the world. Today, however, science and the university as a place of research should contribute more to the community which nourishes them than the mere preservation of knowledge per monastic tradition. There were few exceptions to the monastic rule not to take part in community life. Extraordinary thinkers like scholar and medicus Hildegard of Bingen could write books for the community (partially in the generally understood common German language) only because she overcame the borders of cloistered life. The rule, as codified by ascetic orders such as the cistersians, allowed no such interference with worldly affairs. Scholarly and medical books were conserved and stored in monasteries, not studied and spread. According to St. Bernard, medical practice would disturb the spiritual order. Monks are monks, and not physicians. Analogous the contemporary split between undergraduate and graduate studies, the monastic orders practice a separation between lay monks and those initiated not only in the mysteries of faith, but also those of science. This appears problematic only if modern societies are not willing to accept the medieval consequences of such seclusion of knowledge from the community: even the most skilled writers were mere recorders, including only transcriptions and illuminations as productive activities. Outstanding scholars of the monastic orders like Thomas Aquinas, who were not devoid of any spark of original or new thought as many of their predecessors, could only acquire and distribute their knowledge through the universities. Monastic orders could and can preserve their seclusion because their aim was and is independence and distance from the community. This is not true for the modern or medieval universities. They live from and for the community which finances them, from which the students come and, more important, to which they return. For the original idea of the university, the only substantial change in this interdependent relationship derives from the enlarged definition of community. Instead of the limited sense of town or
Before the rise of the university, it was left mainly to the monastic order of the Dominicans to **preach**, not to teach, to the emerging communities what was right and wrong. The medieval alternative to — and predecessor of — free discourse as practiced in universities was the indoctrination of the community by an informed minority. All curiosity, interpreted as doubt in the divine authority, was withheld and had to be replaced by a blind belief in the authorities. Even if one could trust such authorities, this form of education allows only for the dissemination and the conservation of obtained knowledge. The spirit of conservation, however, does neither allow the development from nor the adaptation of ancient knowledge according to the needs of modern times. As with any form of dogmatism, this form of indoctrination lacks freedom of discussion.

Similar to the “middle” ages, a modern society, especially one in transition, has a constant need for readjustment. The modern challenges, from technology to social change, can only be met by a university that knows how to reintegrate itself in the community from which it grew. Publications of the monastic type, addressed only to the few readers of other elitist institutions, will rarely be able to have the needed impact on everyday life. The same countries which nurtured the most outstanding universities and scholars have a growing gap between academic knowledge and everyday culture. Reading skills are lost, and an increasingly dyslexic population is unable to appreciate or understand the highly theorized arguments of its scholars. Unwillingly, we are today approaching one undesirable aspect of medieval education. By different reasons, we are lowering the degree of literacy to medieval levels of instruction where only few could read and write. The manipulation of illiterate populations by images, be it through stained glass church windows or TV-commercials, is comparable. In addition, we are losing the institutional ability of the medieval university to communicate knowledge beyond the limits of academia.

The role of the university as systematizer and clarifier could and can be upheld in the following ways: it can overcome the attitude of
splendid isolation and regain its role as architect and builder of bridges between the past and the present, the strange and the familiar. As the ancient universities could translate Greek thought or Arab mathematics or optics into everyday life, the university of today can fulfill its ancient role of translator for the community. However, it can do this only through selected publications. A look at the ancient form of the *Summa* of the work of the *quator doctores* in Bologna could be helpful. They tried to incorporate new knowledge in old forms and made knowledge thus “applicable again in an environment with changed customs and practical needs.” The condition for the success of this enterprise is a redefinition of the meaning and form of publication.

The real function of the modern university as derived from its medieval origins is to promote its original egalitarian approach, admitting everyone, notwithstanding his/her social or inherited background. The realm of influence for institutions of secondary education has grown. More students than ever go through a form of higher education, and in the U.S. the percentage is around 60% of the younger population (depending on the definition of what justifies the qualification as “higher”). Since this aspect of influence on society cannot be neglected, the university has to focus more on application of knowledge to “real” life. Thus, the undergraduate-teaching has to find a more important place in the “publishing” practice of the university. Universality of thought implies the universal acceptance of generally discussed ideas — not only of the happy few, but by a broad public. Due to the altered concept of the university today and due to its accessibility to more and more college students, this aim seems achievable by the university itself. Informed consent of the entire voting public is a condition for the existence of a participatory democracy. As the university proceeds with the adventure of increasing human knowledge, it is bound to meet the new challenge of communicating the results to the public. Since the public is not composed of scholars and since the results of relevant research must be distributed nationally, the publishing practices have to be changed.

More attention has to be given to the question: how do we have to publish, lest we perish? The University as a whole must develop a re-
ponsibility to further the understandability of all research. The new aims of a reformed publishing practice should include: publications must be accessible and understandable (if necessary, in summarized “translations” from specialized jargon) to the general public. This could only be achieved if the Cartesian ideal of clearness and distinctness is revitalized — and if rhetoric and logic are revitalized as essential parts of the curriculum. Virtually no faculty of the university would disagree with the view that a basic education in both fields would improve the results of further studies in all fields.

**Teaching and Research on Common Grounds**

To bring research to the public, the results of inquiry will have to become part of teaching — thus not only revitalizing the teaching on the undergraduate level, but also making it public. If these assumptions are accepted, then it will be necessary to revitalize an academic technique lost since the medieval universities — the ability to summarize arguments in simple words and to dispute them in public. Today as then, the necessary criterion for control of research could be met by these disputations. By exposing new ideas to criticism, they can at the same time become public and be integrated in the core of knowledge common to all. On these common grounds, more specialized research can be founded.

This leads to the question: Do we need a “core program”? Should public and private university education preserve a common ground of knowledge? The multicultural society of today’s universities seems to abandon this idea more and more, claiming that diversity itself is a value to be cherished. But couldn’t we learn from the medieval concept of the university that it was just the common foundation of knowledge, be it in classical texts or in logical skills, which allowed on this common ground the most vivid debates? This attempt to find a new canon does not aspire to regulate the subject matter of research, or to impose new dogmas. Such an attempt was made in the case of Galileo — and had to fail. But it seeks to reinstall a common ground of knowledge on which free research can be built and understood by a broader public. The tendency to open up the universities and colleges to wider portions of the population offers the unique chance of spreading knowledge wider and to make
the debate about the fundamental issues of our future accessible to the public. Thus, through teaching and accessible, understandable publications, the impact of the university on the community can grow without endangering either academic freedom or the quality of research. It is only necessary to reemphasize the importance of the forms of diffusion of knowledge. Therefore, greater emphasis has to be laid on the teaching and practice of written and oral discursive skills. “Thought and speech are inseparable from each other. Matter and expression are parts of one: style is a thinking out into language.” The new imperative will have to include rhetoric, understood as the requirement: write and read in terms that everybody can understand. This leads to the question, “What should be taught?” All possible answers go far beyond the framework of this article, but one core guideline we could learn from the medieval interpreters of Aristotle — both the “liberal arts” and the more “useful or mechanical arts” will have to be combined, without placing one upon the other.

The emphasis on a more accessible style was part of the medieval university in which the disputations, the defense of one’s thesis and the study of rhetoric for this sake, played an important role. For this endeavor, the standards of academic work will have to be changed. The form of the presentation has to regain its simplicity and the preparation of scholarship has to refocus on this aspect. Alas, I fear articles like this one will have to vanish. The practice of extensive quotation would have to be replaced by concentration on few, commonly accessible messages. A Summa of knowledge would help to concentrate on the central problems. Publications, as teaching, should regain simplicity. The principle “publish or perish” has led to a flood of written publications which must be stopped, because it destroys the role of the university as systematizer and clarifier. This vital function for the community can only be preserved if publication is reserved to the few “new” ideas, essential to each subject and time. This would require a longer period of discussion and reflection prior to publication, which would only summarize the essence of the results. A concentration of the publication of research would increase the dialogue between both experts and public because it would help to re-create a common foundation for discussion. One danger is,
however, hidden in the need to summarize. The lack and cost of paper served as filter in medieval times. Recent experiences with the allocation of paper, under the control of censoring academies in former east European states, do not encourage to renew this medieval method.\footnote{43}

It should be recognized that it is possible to incorporate the students at all levels in the process of research and that this combination of research and teaching need not, for a relatively long time, lead to written publications. By this method, the quality of papers or books can be increased and their volume decreased. Problems can be discussed in the community only if the standpoints are clear. This requires a limitation of the material. In the Middle Ages, this limitation was natural: the cost of material and work involved in the reproduction, multiplication and, later, print of books often formed the unjust but effective hurdle. It was difficult to obtain access to literature — and even more difficult to get one’s own thoughts published. If the focus will be laid more on the quality of publication than on quantity, the public discussion will be able to grasp the key issues again. A focus on traditional logic and rhetoric should prepare scholars sufficiently. If scholars get prepared not only for research, but also for effective publication, then the university will be able to regain its function as a marketplace of new and old ideas in which the public discussion leads to public teaching and publicly understood and accepted solutions.

The university will also have to focus more on its function as mediator than its role as preserver of knowledge. The knowledge that is presently cloistered has to be spread in order to become socially effective. The university should be able to form and inform for the sake of the community. Its task has to include more and more the help in an orientation of the community. The new challenges, in a scientific and over-informed age, demand similar adaptations from modern universities as the uncertain and under-informed medieval times demanded from their universities. The question of how and where to find knowledge becomes more and more important. These skills have to be taught in order to allow the necessary orientation. The teaching faculty and the librarians have the same duties today as in the middle ages: to provide
the student with an overview, to display the possible directions of research and provide the foundations for later independent research. Furthermore, one classical problem is reemerging: who, if not the universities, could fight again for access to special information? The supporting material might be different, the problem is not. The so called “electronic super highway” and rare, expensive books must not lead to a seclusion of knowledge in the hands of the few able to pay — if the universities can provide the necessary material, and if they are able to teach students how to use available resources to answer their questions. For this task, contemporary universities have to take over another, slightly expanded, responsibility from their medieval predecessors. They will have to train students not only in writing and reading skills, but also in “information literacy.”

The medieval student had more choices than college students have today. He could change the subject, freely commute to other universities and compare the teachings. Ideally — and the idea of the medieval university, not its reality, is the topic of this article — the student could freely make up his own mind. The mobility to travel from one place to another helped to orient oneself and to gain the independence that both the institutions and the students of today are losing. Independence is here to be understood in the medieval sense of autonomy, both politically and socially. This independence however, built on a solid foundation, is today more necessary than ever. Life in the so-called “multicultural” society is possible only if the confrontation of the student with new ideas is the rule, not the exception — and when he/she learns that everybody is a stranger other than at home.

One point closely linked to the contradiction between the necessity of high-ranking, specialized research on the one hand and “popular” publication and discussion on the other hand can now be solved. The right to know, which no democracy can restrict to an elite, is equal for all citizens. It imposes the serious responsibility to develop pragmatic ways of conveying valuable information to non-experts by experts in science and technology on the one side. This implies, on the other side, that all those participating in the decision making process need to acquire enough
scientific literacy to enable them to contribute to and take part in the public discussion. Regardless of the field of research it can be said today that there is no excuse for passively accepting any form of paternalistic or elitist treatment of any subject. Informed consent in a modern society has to be founded on the revitalized university as an institution in which research and teaching are focused on community needs. This demand for clear and relevant information for the non-experts force responsibilities upon both the specialized experts of the research elite and the general public of non-experts.

Last but not least, one other crucial and lost aspect of the medieval university should be regained — its autonomy. The university’s independence made the impact on the community possible which it never could have achieved otherwise. Only the independent counsellor is taken seriously.\textsuperscript{47} We do not have to aim at a structure built on the students alone like in Bologna; but a reasonable change of the institution without endangering its independence seems possible only if those concerned make the necessary steps together, without administrative constraints. “Adapt (to new circumstances) or perish” could be the new motto — which is not so new: it has been a leading principle of the United States and of some early (Italian) universities. The medieval recipe for such challenges was self-administration. We should not forget that medieval universities could teach us another lesson: that universities are not immortal, that they can be advisors or victims of their time. To nourish the authority of the university, it has to regain independence from a) the temporal standards of the marketplace, from b) the city it is situated in and from c) the state or the community by which it is funded. Only distance from the community will enable the university to fulfill its role for the community. Too close a fit between a community’s demands and the academical response to these needs would be shortsighted. Only a truly independent, self-administered university can fulfill the double role as critic of society as well as its servant. In order to flourish in autonomy, it will have to preserve its medieval ideal and adapt its modern shape. A “great idea changes in order to remain the same. In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be is to have changed often.”\textsuperscript{48} In this sense, the surviving idea of the medieval
university can be described in terms of its reformation.

I hope to have shown that the best remedy against some threats of the modern crisis is to regain the simplicity present at the origins of the university in and for the community, understood as an association of those who have something in common. In its wider context, “community” has to be interpreted today beyond the limits of cities or nation-states. Not the town or the place where the university is located form today’s community, but the global interests of society. The medieval university addressed these problems long before the nation-states were born. The part of the medieval origins we have to overcome today is that which originated in a guild system that limits access to members of the research-guild alone. For this, the university does not have to jeopardize its standards — it has just to reconcile teaching and research. The open university, which tries to redefine its role in the community, has to overcome the aristocratic character and become a forum for public discourse relevant to all. The information-age is comparable to the middle ages in its capacity to overcome borderlines. Technically, the “agora,” “forum” or marketplace of ideas can be revitalized by modern technology, involving all members of the growing communities. International exchange, not local research, has to become the rule, not the exception. To fulfill this endeavor, it is not sufficient to allow foreign students on the university campus. Common research goals and projects, transcending national borders, would follow the medieval example. The idea of the university is far older than the birth of border-building nation states. The capacity of medieval universities to transcend questions of national origin — or even race — could serve as an example for an internationalized modern university or society. Modern electronic technology, used responsibly, could provide the necessary infrastructure for such an international exchange. Still free of charge, the “Internet” provides a forum on which all participants are equal. For the medieval forefathers of our current university system, the question of St. Augustine’s African origin was never an issue in his being accepted as a (Western) church-father. In the modern world of global information and global exchange, the temptation to escape from tensions in the declining communities or inner cities by a retreat to a community-alien “ivory tower” of teaching and
research has to be resisted. Instead, the words “community needs” should furnish the goals for teaching and research. Otherwise, the medieval dangers of chaos and the consequent captivity of the public by simplistic answers from dogmatic leaders could become modern again. To prevent this, we should not mourn the glory of those grand old days of the medieval university, but try to save its idea. For the future, we could use some of the old passion and simplicity to push on to the new frontiers.49

ENDNOTES


3. For the U.S., the crisis of the nineties is funding. The number of non-traditional students unable to pay their tuition is growing, and outside sources for funding through industry or governmental plans, like “star-wars,” are dying out. When legislators are asked to step in, they have to weight priorities in view of a difficult budget situation. The university, if conceived as engaged in the ‘luxury’ of research, will have to rank after hot issues like: public health care, public safety, funding for prisons or secondary education. For a discussion of the need for applicable skills see Richard Eisenbeis, “Contingency Theory, Technology, and the Future of Higher Education” in The Image of Technology, Selected Papers, ed. W. Wright and St. Kaplan, Pueblo, Univ. of Southern Colorado Press, 1994, pp. 288-294.

4. The collapse of the “Great Pax” in which it was easy to determine and distinguish good from evil, civilization from barbarian, and democratic from totalitarian, leads Eco to his comparison. See “The Return to the Middle Ages,” in Travels in Hyper Reality: Essays, trans. by W. Weaver, San Diego/New York/London, HarBrace, 1986, p. 75.

5. Interesting to note that the rise of university-like structures in Greece develops parallely with the opening of societies and the shifting and alteration of borders. Saving the Sophist from their bad reputation, de Rommilly makes a point in showing the universality of their practice-oriented teachings. The fifth century Sophist’s teachings inaugurated “modern” education and included besides rhetoric also grammar, the nature of morality, understood as “ethos” in the Aristotelian sense of common understanding and in the sense of history of society. In the diversity of its curriculum and the openness for all contents, the Sophists could claim to have inspired the humanistic ap-
proach of the renaissance more than the classical philosophers could. See Jacqueline de Rommilly, *Les Grands Sophistes dans l’Athènes de Pericles*, Paris, Falleis, 1988, pp. 50-76. Furthermore, the temple-schools in Babylon, Egypt, India and China and the library school of Alexandria could be considered germs of higher educational institutions.

6. The time span between the fall of the Roman Empire, the destruction of the library of Alexandria, and the twelfth century saw a decline of knowledge in the West. The knowledge acquired by the ancient Greeks was cherished more at the caliphs’ courts or in Islamic schools than in their Christian counterparts in the West. The research and teachings of Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Al-Gazali, and, especially, Averroes preserved texts and thoughts which later allowed Western universities to regain Aristotelian ideas through Islamic sources. At the same time, the Western world was living through a phase of intellectual stagnation, largely caused by the hierarchical, aristocratic structure of the “Holy Roman Empire.” Before the era of the universities, the surviving classical knowledge was merely preserved in palaces or in cloisters and embedded in an atmosphere hostile to independent research or intellectual exchange. Before the emergence of universities, even scholarly life was largely dominated — partially under the disguise of neo-Platonism — by half-knowledge. It consisted of a mixture of scientifically absorbed religious doctrines and popular superstition. Before the rise of the universities in the Western hemisphere, critical thinking all but ceased to exist.


8. Giorgio di Vergottini, *Lo studio di Bologna, l’impero, il papato. “Studi e memorie per la storia dell’Università di Bologna,”* Bologna, 1956. It is difficult to determine which universities came first, because in Bologna, the transition from a law school to a university was smooth. Interesting to note that the appearance of universities occurs around the beginning of the 13th century all over Europe (from Bologna ca. 1100, Paris ca. 1150, Naples 1224 to Cambridge 1229 as far west as Salamanca in 1215/1243). However, not the date of the foundation, but the freedom from institutions foreign to the university should furnish the distinguishing criterion. On the freedom of Naples as obtained from Frederick II., see Heinrich Denifle, *Die Entstehung der Universitäten im Mittelalter*, Berlin, 1885, vol. 1, p. 586.

9. Here to be translated as “guild of the people of Bologna,” later renamed as
“populus” (people of Bologna). It has its correspondence in the German “Rat” or council. See J. K. Hyde, “Universities and Cities in Medieval Italy” in The University and the City. From Medieval Origins to the Present, ed. Thomas Bender, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1988, p. 16.

10. The number reached from two (at Oxford, founded upon the Parisian model) to more than twenty, depending on the origin of the student body.


12. Bologna was counterbalanced by Frederick II of Hohenstaufen with the foundation of the University of Naples. Cambridge became the competing institution of Oxford after the exodus of all Oxford scholars from Oxford due to a violation of the freedom of the “universitas” by the authorities. For the sake of completeness, it has to be mentioned that I present here a condensed version of the three major theories about the origin of the university: I dismiss the “traditionalist” theory, which claims a direct link of the West-European copies with Byzantine, Oriental or Arabic models, but acknowledge the large influx of structural elements and content from such institutions, especially through the reign of Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. The second theory, founded on the thesis that intellectual interest alone led to foundations, and the third theory, claiming as “social theory,” that new elites needed a new standard converge in my claim. See Rainer A. Müller, Geschichte der Universität, München, Callway Verlag, 1990.


14. Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, op.cit. # 14, pp. 73-5 and # 20, pp. 78-80.


17. It has to be added that this free access was questioned from the very begin-
nings of the university in order to foster the community in which it grew. Throughout the history of higher education, attempts were made to limit learning to a very small proportion of the population. These limitations were often deliberate in order to reserve specific benefits for a particular community, like Bologna or Paris. See Arnold Toynbee, in *Education in the Perspective of History*, ed. Edward D. Meyers, New York, Harper Publishers, 1960.


20. It is interesting to note that the “Royal Society” had as its aim not knowl-

21. As example, just the most famous French *Academie des Sciences* should be mentioned, which after its suppression under the French Revolution in 1793 by the Convention was reshaped under the dome of the *Institut de France*. The most prestigious branch of the *Academie Française*, which came under the patronage of the Cardinal de Richelieu in 1635, is consid-
ered the highest achievement possible in French society. Thus, its “im-
mortal” 40 members are distinguished as the most famous men of their time without any obligation to teach. What started as a private gathering of men such as Descartes, Gassendi, Pascal and Mersenne was organized under governmental protection under Colbert in the royal library (today’s Bibliothèque Nationale of the “rue de Richelieu” which is only now losing its elitist shape) and formally named Academie des Sciences in 1699. The first American parallel structures were founded by Benjamin Franklin un-
der the direct influence of the French philosophical societies. For the Germanic context, the philosopher-diplomat Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz has to be recognized as the key promoter of this concept of an enlightened academy, which can be found in the Prussian *Akademie der Wissenschaften* in Berlin, its counterparts in Vienna, St. Petersburg, or the latest
re-foundation in 1949 in Mainz.

22. Centralized Academies took control over publishing practices — thus over the content of research and public discourse in virtually all states formerly under Soviet influence. In East Berlin, e.g., the academies controlled not only publications, but even the paper distribution.


24. Wilhelm von Humboldt worked since his nomination as Prussian minister of education in 1809 on common standards of teaching and on the secularization of the educational system. His reform of teacher education and reformed university served as a model for the introduction of the Ph.D. in the U.S. in 1860. Fichte, as Berlin’s first rector in the difficult times of the Napoleonic wars, set the standards in general; Schleiermacher installed theology as a new science. See Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Henrik Steffens and Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Die Idee der deutschen Universität: die fünf Grundschriften aus der Zeit ihrer Neugründung durch klassischen Idealismus und romantischen Idealismus*, ed. H. Gentner, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956. Already in 1853-54, the University of Michigan followed the German example: “The system of public education ... is copied from the Prussian, acknowledged to be the most perfect in the world ...” By the foundation of The Johns Hopkins University in 1876, with the full implementation of the German model of the graduate school, Humboldt’s system was generally implemented. See Daniel Fallon, *The German University*, Boulder, Colorado Associated University Press, 1980, p. 2. Leading the protest against the German influence, see William James, “The PhD Octopus,” in *Harvard Monthly* 36, 1903, pp. 1-3. See also Lynne V. Cheney, *Tyrannical Machines: A Report on Educational Practices Gone Wrong and Our Best Hopes for Setting Them Right*, National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington, D.C., 1990.


26. Hans Schelsky, *Einsamkeit und Freiheit: Idee und Gestalt der deutschen Universität und ihrer Reformen*, 2nd ed., Düsseldorf, Bertelsmann 1971, p. 21. Compare Fallon, *op. cit.*, p. 6. This authoritarian and elitist concept of the university was formed more by the Baron vom und zum Stein (who worked against Napoleon) than by Humboldt. Its implementation, in the framework of the reform of elementary schools and normal school-like colleges by Humboldt allowed to bring all forms of education under close state supervision.


29. Noah Webster’s introduction to his now classical spelling book gives a typical justification for rejecting European values: “Europe is grown old in folly, corruption and tyranny. For America in her infancy to adopt the maxims of the Old World would be to stamp the wrinkles of decrepit old age upon the youth, and to plant the seed of decay in a vigorous constitution.” See Henry Steel Commager, Noah Webster’s American Spelling Book, New York, Columbia Univ., Teachers College Press, 1962.

30. Western Christian Advocate, Vol. I, May 2, p. 2, quoted in Jef J. Mapp, Jr. The City in the Middle Ages, Lanham, Madison Books, 1987, p. 384. The indoctrination for a certain denomination was the origin of most early university foundations: Brown (Baptist), Columbia (Episcopalian), Georgetown (Catholic), Harvard (Puritan & Unitarian), Princeton (Presbyterian), and Yale and Dartmouth (Congregational).


33. Universities like U.C.L.A. or Yale are geographically close to the city, but keep a life so separate that the campus is perceived as a shelter from the wild world outside.

34. Eco, op. cit., p. 83. However, these modern “monastic” institutions can no more fulfill their ancient task, because the feudal society for which they were constructed is gone.

35. See her Physics and the extensive letters to scholars and leading figures of her time, such as Bernard of Clairvaux. On her practical medical achievements see Benjamin Lee Gordon, Medieval and Renaissance Medicine, New York, Philosophical Library, 1959, pp. 38 ff.


37. St. Augustine’s interdiction of post-mortem dissections which was upheld
by the Catholic church until the end of Renaissance. See Augustine De Civitate Dei, XII 14,4 PL 41, 791, whereas the medical school of Salerno could preserve the unbroken Greek tradition and, through Arab knowledge, apply and develop traditional medicine, which included dissection. See Gordon, op. cit., pp. 5 ff.

38. Seebohm, op. cit., 84.

39. The standards for the B. A. were fixed, in content and time, as early as 1255. See H. Rüthing, Die Mittelalterliche Universität, Göttingen, 1973; see Charter Université de Paris I, p. 276, quoted in Kurt Flasch Das Philosophische Denken im Mittelalter, Stuttgart, Reclam Universalbibliothek, 1987, p. 295. The core was composed mainly of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Logica Nova, physics, metaphysics and ethics in an “Aristotelian manner” as well as grammar.

40. See especially John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, Defined and Illustrated, 1852/1858, ed. with intro. and notes, I. T. Ker, Oxford, Clarendon, 1976. For the application of his thoughts today, see, J. Pelikan, op. cit., offering equally an extensive list of the relevant literature on “The Idea of the University” and its discussion from Newman until today (pp. 190-197, especially 89: the definition of the university as “a place of teaching” with “the diffusion and extension of knowledge” as object is still relevant).


42. See the essay on revitalizing the spirit of the University by John Henry Newman, op. cit., chapter v, #6. On the dangers of sacrificing the one for the other part of the university, see also Pelikan, op. cit., pp. 19-21. Yet, a return to the split in “trivium” and “quadrivium” can not provide a valid guideline because here rhetoric dominated a very ambiguous choice of sciences. Compare J. J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages. A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance, Berkeley, Berkeley University Press, 1974.

43. In the German Democratic Republic, dogmatic members of Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur (such as M. Buhr) censored effectively by means of paper-distribution. Humboldt’s authoritarian model of the university was frequently praised and used for propaganda purposes (see Fallon, op. cit., p. 11 f).

44. The medieval threats as described by Eco were to be found in restrictions by the church, the monasteries, and the authorities. Today’s threats are to be seen in the appropriation of information and technology as property (exclusive property-rights in the intellectual domain, hindering research
or teaching) and the price to pay for the access to it. Compare Achim Köddermann, “TV as a Moral Medium and as a Moral Factor of Responsibility” in The Image of Technology, op. cit., 365-371.

45. Retaining and understanding skills are in decline. In order to judge or challenge information, students have how to access information first. See Mary F. Lennox, Michael L. Walker, Information Literacy in the Educational Process, The Educational Forum 57, 1993, pp. 313 ff.

46. Here, the concept of the “International University,” as developed by Rabindranath Tagore, is still tempting. Grounded in a solid knowledge of their own culture and tradition, students and teachers of different backgrounds meet and learn from each other. See K. G. Saiyidain, The Humanist Tradition in Modern Indian Educational Thought, Madison, Wisconsin, Dembar Educational Research Services, 1967, pp. 37-57, cited in Gutek, op. cit., pp. 23-36.

47. The influx of state sponsored and industry money through projects from space research to environmental or “third” world development projects led to a relative independence of research institutions after the 50’s. However, the factors that led to this relative prosperity (cold war, student revolts, rising student numbers, and growing demand for graduates) have changed and led to a yet deeper dependency. In times of social or economical crisis, this can be fatal.


49. For their helpful discussion of earlier drafts of this paper, I wish to thank Michael Green, Michael Koch and Douglas Shrader.